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In diesem Heft:

Schwerpunktthema: Dual-career couples

- Dual-career couples in Switzerland,
Italy and
Germany
- The end of the career mystique?
Work-family interface in the United States and Germany
- Sozialpolitische Steuerung des Careverhaltens von
Männern
- Forschungsnotizen

ifb-Mitteilungen

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Editorial

Liebe Leserinnen und Leser,

das vorliegende Heft ist dem Schwerpunktthema *Dual-career couples* gewidmet.

Durch den Übergang vom Alleinverdiener-Modell zum Zuverdiener- und Doppelverdiener-Modell wird die wechselseitige Abstimmung der Karrieren von Partnern und Eheleuten zunehmend wichtig. Ausmaß und Rahmenbedingungen dieses Wandels werden in diesem Heft für verschiedene Länder beschrieben und analysiert.

Gastherausgeberin ist Prof. Dr. Chiara Saraceno, die als Familiensoziologin an der Università di Torino wirkt und gegenwärtig eine Forschungsprofessur am Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) inne hat. Als ausgewiesene Expertin für diesen Forschungsbereich hat sie eine Reihe von englischsprachigen Beiträgen zusammengetragen und führt im ersten Beitrag in das Thema (*Introduction to the special issue: Dual-career couples*) ein.

Die Reihe der Länderstudien wird angeführt von René Levy, Felix Bühlmann und Eric Widmer, die in ihren Beitrag *Dual and single career couples in Switzerland: Exploring partners' trajectories* betonen, dass Mobilitätsverläufe nach wie vor stark geschlechtsspezifisch sind: die Verläufe der Männer folgen einer Beschäftigungslogik, die der Frauen Kombinationen aus Beschäftigungs- und Familienlogik.

In *Dual-career and dual-earner couples in contemporary Italy* führen Mario Lucchini, Chiara Saraceno und Antonio Schizzerotto aus, dass doppelte Karrieren in Italien eher Heiratshomogamie mit einem hohen Bildungsabschluss der Frau zur Bedingung haben und dass Paare mit doppelter Karriere die relative Mehrheit der recht niedrigen Zahl von Zweiverdienerpaare stellen.

Für deutsche Akademikerpaare zeigen Alessandra Rusconi und Heike Solga in ihrer Untersuchung *Determinants of and obstacles to dual careers in Germany* auf, dass Kinder und geschlechtsblinde Einstellungspraktiken das Risiko erhöhen, dass nur die Karriere eines der Partner verfolgt wird.

Das Schwerpunktthema findet mit *The end of the career mystique? Policy and cultural frameworks that structure the work-family interface in the United States and Germany* seinen Abschluss. Elisabeth Reichart, Noelle Chesley und Phyliss Moen untersuchen in einem Vergleich zwischen Deutschland (West- und Ostdeutschland) und den USA, wie wohlfahrtsstaatliche Praktiken und kulturelle Schemata und die damit verbundenen Gelegenheitsstrukturen zusammenwirken und bei Paaren nach der Geburt von Kindern zur Favorisierung geschlechtstypisierender Vereinbarkeitsmodelle führen.

Hans-Peter Blossfeld
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Chiara Saraceno

Introduction to the special issue: Dual-career couples

Dual career couples are experiencing a renewed attention by researchers for at least three different reasons. Firstly, the increasing women's labour force participation throughout the family formation years, particularly among well educated women, opens the question whether something has changed both in gender arrangements within couples and in career patterns in the labour market and particularly in the impermeability of the "glass ceiling" that used to block women's upward mobility. Secondly, when both partners in a household invest in paid work the question arises concerning who is going to do all the unpaid work otherwise performed by women, for the household but also for kin and sometimes community. What is the quality of life of households, communities, societies in a world where all adults invest most of their energies in paid work? Thirdly, the divergent patterns of women's labour force participation, together with the prevalence of homogamous marriages, raise concerns on the risks of a possible strengthening of social inequalities.

As the interest for dual career couples remains fairly sustained and trespasses the boundaries of the sociology of the family within which has long remained confined, the "dual career couple" concept becomes however more elusive. *Strictu sensu*, dual career couples should refer only to couples in which both partners are involved in an upward mobile professional trajectory (Hiller and Dyehouse 1987, Levy et al. in this issue). Neither all dual earner couples nor all the well-educated ones are necessarily also dual career ones in this sense. Clement and Clement (2001) add an additional requirement for being defined a dual career couple *strictu sensu*: that of having children, that is of having caring responsibilities. According to their concept, therefore, dual career couples are defined by the fact that both partners are highly qualified, and follow their career path while not renouncing having children and a satisfying family life. On the basis of this narrow definition, the number of dual career couples might be quite small, and insufficient for a quantitative research approach. Furthermore, while research on dual career couples focuses mainly on the couple's dynamics and more or less asymmetrical interdependencies, the possibility that one or both the partner have a career does not depend only on negotiations and power relations within the couple, that is on its gender culture and arrangements. It depends also on the labour market and on the institutional framework within which couples develop their negotiations and take their decisions. The labour market and

institutional arrangements (i.e. the welfare state) embody both gender arrangements and gender cultures in the way they are organised (Pfau-Effinger 1998, Blossfeld and Hofmeister 2006). Therefore, they may or may not favour women's labour market participation and women's access to a professional upward career not only at the level of values or cultural models, but also in practical arrangements. Labour markets differ across countries also with regard to the kind of upward mobility they offer to men. For instance, the Italian and Swiss cases presented here clearly illustrate a situation of relative professional immobility.

For these reasons, research on dual career couples remains on shifting and uneasy grounds. As a matter of fact, most recent research on this issue – as the articles presented here testify – use a very broad definition of professional upward career, which in the case of women sometimes is even reduced to the ability to remain steadily in the labour market throughout the couple and family life course. Stability and continuity in labour market attachment, in fact, although prevalent among men, is only one of the possible employment trajectories for women (e.g. Maruani 2003). And dual careering/dual earning is only one of the ways in which couples combine work and family roles even in societies where an increasing number of women participate in paid work while having family responsibilities. At the same time, the focus has progressively shifted from women's careers at the cross road of labour market and family demands to the “careers of couples” themselves (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001), that is to the couple as a – more or less asymmetrical – inter-dependent unit, or as “linked lives”. In this perspective, research on dual career couples is greatly indebted to life course research both at the theoretical and methodological level.

Against this background of shifting definitions, research for a long time has focused on the one hand on mechanisms that favour, or hinder, the forming of dual career/dual stable earner couples, on the other hand on the different arrangements couples develop in dealing with each partner's career and the impact these have on the other partner.

The mechanisms that favour, or hinder, the forming of dual career couples have been probably the more continuous object of research in this field, spurring also a substantial development at the theory level (for a systematic presentation of the various theoretical approaches see Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001). Most of research and theories, however, do not actually address the issue of dual career couples, but rather the most basic one of the chances couples have of becoming dual earner ones through women's labour market participation. This is clearly the case for the group of explanations that focuses on the individual level and on mechanisms at play in the labour market. According to this kind of explanations – be it demand-side (e.g. Phelps 1972) or supply-side (e.g. Mincer and Ofek 1982) oriented – the forming of dual earner couples is mainly hindered by constraints on women's labour market participation and by gender specific labour market mechanisms. Cross-country and cross-social group differences, therefore, may be accounted for mainly by the operation of, and in, the labour market with regard to women's participation as well as by differences in women's human capital. This kind of explanation has been criticized for its limitations on two grounds. First, it considers the operating of the labour market as if it were independent from assumptions and practices concerning the family

as organized around specific gender arrangements. These, instead, are at work on both the supply and the demand side. Both men and women in couples, in fact, take their decisions concerning labour market participation on the basis of – gendered – assumptions and practices concerning their respective and reciprocal duties and opportunities with regard to the dual needs of income and care. Marriage/couples roles are gendered and, more or less asymmetrically, interdependent, not only during partnership, but to some degree even before a partnership develops. The missing attention for the interdependence of patterns of women's and men's labour supply within couples is the second kind of criticism addressed to an exclusively labour market based explanation of the mechanisms constraining or favouring dual earner couples. This interdependency, in fact, is implicitly expected by labour market demand: in its different expectations concerning women and men as potential workers and more generally in expectations concerning "proper" patterns of labour market and professional attachment. Consequently, it is also re-enforced by this very demand.

Theories and explanations addressing the issue of interdependency consider the couple and the household as the locus of decision making with regard to both family matters and individual labour market participation. They too are mostly concerned with the issue of women's labour market participation rather than with dual careering as such. Further, they seem more focused on explaining why women do not participate steadily in the labour market than why they make or not a career. Beyond these commonalities, however, they offer quite different, sometimes complementary and sometimes competing explanations. The human capital/new home economic approach (Becker 1981) underlines both the benefits and the reproductive power of role specialisation in so far as men and women have different "market value". According to this approach, specialisation reaches equilibrium when both spouses' resources are maximally utilised and husbands and wives make rational decisions to utilise their human capital to achieve what is best for the household unit. Altruism and the existence of a single utility function for the couple are two fundamental assumptions of this theory. The resource bargaining model (Blood and Wolfe 1960, Brines 1993, 1994, Coltrane 2000) and its variant, the marital dependency model (England and Farkas 1986, McRae 1986, Sørensen and McLanahan 1987), on the contrary stress the conflicts and power implicit in negotiations over who can or must do what, between partners who command resources of different financial and market value. According to this approach, wives with a high earning power should more likely be able to strike a better balance in the division of labour with their partner; therefore they should also be more able to invest in their profession. Contrary to this assumption, however, time use data indicate that husbands of working wives do perform more family work and childcare than husbands of full time homemakers; yet, they do not appear to do so to a degree that really substitutes for their wives' family work (see Eurostat 2004, Saraceno 2005). It appears more likely that women buy themselves out of part of family work, rather than rebalancing paid and unpaid work within the household between husbands and wives. In addition to the focus on negotiation, rather than altruism and single utility function, the marital dependency model suggests that in a contest of increased marital instability it is more worthwhile for women to invest in their professional career. This, in turn, increases their negotiating power if and when they do partner. From a different perspective, the

same suggestion is made by Bielby and Bielby (1989). They, in fact, argue, that as the number of dual earner couples increases, more balanced gender identities will develop both for women and men. Once again, there is no real evidence that men substantially change their investment in family and work due to their wives' labour force participation. Certainly they do not seem to change their investment in work and in the breadwinning role. Recent European employment data, for instance, show that throughout Europe having a child under six years increases men's labour force participation, while it decreases that of women (see Plantega and Siegel 2004). With specific regard to dual career couples, Bielby and Bielby argue that in these couples both partners have a higher work orientation than "simple" dual earner ones, since within the former each partner has a well paid partner who might support him/her. Working for pay, therefore, is not the outcome of financial constriction; on the contrary, it is driven mainly by internal, identity-based, motivations (see also Clement and Clement 2001). This is particularly true for women, in so far as working for pay is less established in women's than in men's gender role identity. Somewhat paradoxically, this argument sounds very similar to the perception of women's work found in upper middle class couples in a number of qualitative research performed in the 1980s. Men, but also many women, tended to say that in their case women's work was a luxury, something done for self-realisation, which had nothing to do with, and might even intrude on, family needs (e.g. Weiss 1987, Ferree 1987).

Introducing a social class perspective on the gender division of labour further complicates the analysis, since class specific gender identities – or scripts – interact, sometimes in a cumulative, sometimes in a conflicting way with actual options in the labour market, with the quality of jobs available, as well as with the specific career patterns and requirements available to men and women located differently in the social structure (see e.g. Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001, Crompton 2006).

The theories and research presented so far address the issue of dual earner/dual career couples mainly from the point of view of women's participation to the labour market and investment in professional life. The issue of family work, particularly care work, appears in these theories in the form of a cost, or constrain, for women – which, of course it is, given the prevalent division of labour (see also Halleröd 2005). The focus, therefore, is on who in the couple has more negotiating power to shift this work to the other, or what kind of women, in which social position, are more able to shift part of this work to somebody else. Another group of studies on dual earner/dual career couples, however, focuses on family/care work as a dimension of individual and family life that is not sufficiently taken account of in discourses on dual earning as the standard pattern of household organisation, particularly, although not exclusively, when there are children (e.g. Moen (ed.) 2003, Pfau-Effinger 2004, Crompton 2006). They argue that the asymmetry between the emphasis on gender equality in public discourse and the practice of gender inequality in labour market participation owes certainly to gender arrangements and cultural models within the couple. But it is also the consequence of an approach that considers participation to paid work and investment in a professional career as the main, if not only, basis of social participation and self realisation and even the main citizenship duty. According to its critics, this approach fails to acknowledge that experiencing both demands and needs of care is a normal part of each individual's life

course and that the standard model of participation to the labour market was, and still is, based on a male breadwinner/female carer household model. When this household pattern is no longer viable or accepted, and it is even discouraged, the total social organisation of labour (to use Glucksmann’s, 1995, terminology) needs to be restructured. Workers and their families, in fact, can no longer rely on full time homemakers. Time to care should be accommodated for and acknowledged also for workers and breadwinners, male and females. In absence of this, since caring needs must be addressed, couples and families fall back on – more or less modernised – traditional gender scripts, unless they renounce altogether assuming caring responsibilities. In any case they are likely to suffer because of time pressures. In this perspective, both Moen (2003) and Crompton (2006) develop a typology of couples based on how paid work and unpaid care are allocated between partners but also between households and the welfare state. The two typologies, which develop from more to less traditional in gender arrangements, are quite similar, as it can be seen in the table below. The role of state vs. market provision of care is crucial for the “democratisation” of participation in paid work as well as for granting quality services to all children. Yet, in these two typologies it is clear that exclusive involvement in paid work and career with a full contracting out of care, if possible at all, is not perceived as the best possible and even most innovative pattern.

Gender relations

| | | | |
|--|--|---|---|
| Traditional | | less traditional | |
| C.: male breadwinner/female carer M: traditionalist | C.: male breadwinner/female part time earner and carer M.: neo-traditionalist | C.: dual earners/state carer M.: high commitment | C.: dual earner/dual carer M: dual moderates |
| | M.: alternate commitments | C.: dual earner/marketised care | |

Source: Moen 2003, Crompton 2006, author’s own pairing off of categories

Interestingly, according to a study by Crompton (2006) based on ISSP data, these types of couples are quite differently distributed across countries. Nowhere do “high commitment” couples – where dual career couples might in principle be found – touch 20% of all couples. They are more present in Portugal, the UK and the US. The “dual moderates”, another group where dual career couples might be found, are more evenly widespread and constitute the relative majority in most of the countries analysed by Crompton, but not in the US and the UK. These differences are the outcome of the complex interplay between national gender cultures and arrangements, and particularly welfare state arrangements, and national labour markets.

A quite different concern informs recent research on “work-rich and work-poor” couples and the possible impact on social stratification of education-based differences in women’s labour force participation. Better educated women, in fact, are

more likely to enter and remain in the labour market throughout the family formation phase. They are also more likely to marry equally well educated men with good positions in the labour market. Marriage homogamy, therefore, redoubling human capital and labour market resources, may strengthen social polarisation in a labour market where the less skilled have fewer chances than before, and where jobs are becoming more insecure. According, for instance, to Hyslop (2001), marital homogamy accounts for about 23% of the rise in U.S. household income inequality. On the basis of various data, Esping Andersen (2006, p. 6) argues that “with two notable exceptions (France and the Netherlands) the Gini of household market incomes has surged (a 20+ percent rise in the past two decades) in Germany, Sweden, the UK and the US; in others, less so (a 6-7% rise in Denmark and Italy). The U-turn is very much driven by the top pulling ahead of the rest”. This is a very interesting field of study, but it addresses only marginally, if at all, the issue of how dual career/dual earner couples deal with the dual demands of investing in paid work and care.

Another line of research, starting from the pioneering work of Rapoport and Rapoport (1971, 1973) has focused on the specific dynamics and tensions within dual career couples as they have to deal with decisions concerning work, career and family demands. These decisions involve issue of time allocation and time scarcity (e. g. Moen 2003), role conflicts (e.g. Skinner 1980), but also where to live and how to manage the mobility demands of a partner’s career without affecting that of the other partner. Particularly in the United States, the issue of how to deal with geographical, sometimes international, mobility has become a growing issue not only for the couples themselves, but also for the organizations they work with (e.g. Harvey 1996)

The articles presented here address in various ways all the issues described above. Levy, Bühlmann and Widmer address explicitly the question of the conditions that favour the formation and management of dual career couples *strictu senso*, carefully reconstructing the professional histories of both men and women in the couple. They conclude that dual career couples are an elitist phenomenon, due not only to the scarcity of career options in the labour market, but to the operating of what they call gendered master statuses. Lucchini, Saraceno and Schizzerotto’s study on Italian couples uses a broader definition of dual career, based on Erikson’s and Goldthorpe’s (1992) class stratification. In Italy not only careers are very flat even for men. The formation and persistence of dual earner couples is also difficult, in so far family obligations keep a large proportion of women out of the labour market. In this perspective, women’s education, rather than the couple’s characteristics, seems to make the main difference. The somewhat paradoxical result is that, due to marriage homogamy, dual career couples in Italy are the relative majority of dual earner couples. Rusconi and Solga analyse the difficulties German women with high skills find in forming dual career couples (in a broad sense) because they face constraints in entering a career path. They also address the issue of the role of enterprise policies and not only of the welfare state, and of the contrasting norms of anti-nepotism on the one hand, of supporting dual career couples on the other hand. Reichart, Chesley and Moen, within a comparative approach, enlarge the perspective from the mechanisms of dual career formation to the viability of dual careering, and even only dual earning, while having caring responsibilities.

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René Levy, Felix Bühlmann & Eric Widmer

Dual and single career couples in Switzerland: Exploring partners' trajectories

Doppel- und Einzelkarrierepaare in der Schweiz: eine Studie der Berufsverläufe zusammenlebender Partner

Abstract:

Based on retrospective data from a sample of 602 women and 621 men living in couples surveyed in Switzerland in early 1999, professional trajectories of partners are compared using the optimal matching technique in order to distinguish typical sequence models. We identify dual-career couples and distinguish them from other couples with dual- or single-employment, showing that dual-career couples proper are a rather rare phenomenon, and that mobility trajectories continue to be strongly gendered: male trajectories respond to a predominantly occupational logic, whereas female trajectories are structured by both an occupational and a familial logic. A multinomial regression analysis allows to identify some of the factors conditioning couples' trajectory constellations.

Key words: occupational mobility, family, gender, work-family balance, life course

Zusammenfassung:

Anhand retrospektiver Daten einer Stichprobe von Anfang 1999 befragten Paaren (602 Frauen und 621 Männern) vergleichen wir die Berufsverläufe zusammenlebender Partner und ermitteln typische Verlaufsmodelle. Mittels der *Optimal-Matching*-Technik identifizieren wir Doppelkarrierepaare und unterscheiden sie von anderen doppel- oder einfachverdienenden Paaren. Doppelkarrierepaare erweisen sich dabei als relativ selten. Außerdem sind Mobilitätsverläufe nach wie vor stark geschlechtsspezifisch: männliche Verläufe folgen einer reinen Beschäftigungslogik, weibliche Verläufe unterliegen zugleich einer Beschäftigungs- und einer Familienlogik. Eine multinomiale Regressionsanalyse erlaubt, einige der Bedingungsfaktoren für das Vorliegen der verschiedenen Paarkonstellationen zu identifizieren.

Schlagworte: berufliche Mobilität, Familie, Geschlechterverhältnisse (Gender), work-family balance, Lebenslauf, linked lives

The level of scientific interest in dual career couples seems relatively high and stable, even if it may have passed its peak. This attention reflects the growing importance of the phenomenon itself on both the private and the public level, as the long-term rising female employment rates in most Western countries indicate (for European countries see Rubery et al. 1999, Maruani 2003). More specifically, the proportion of couples with a male breadwinner decreases whereas double-earner couples increase their share (according to Jacobs & Gerson, 2004, 51% of all American

couples had a unique, male breadwinner in 1970, but only 26% in 2000; in Switzerland, the corresponding figures are 75% and 37%). The equally growing literature on issues of work-life balance shows that this development engenders problems of many sorts, and that dual-career couples might be less than the hoped-for positive model of modernised, egalitarian family organisation that brings high and equal satisfaction to all its members. The topic takes us right into the heart of gender relations, not only with respect to "horizontal" differentiation, but also with respect to inequality. It focuses our attention on the intersection of the two institutional realms of occupation and the family since it concerns both of them at a time, i.e., occupational mobility, its antecedents and mechanisms as well as family engagement with its opportunities and constraints.

In this perspective, looking at the conditions that facilitate the emergence or stabilisation of dual-career families may be at least as interesting as looking at their consequences (for the partners' marital satisfaction, for children's socialisation, etc.). Our contribution tries exactly this: after stating our definition of the concept, we identify it empirically by using a novel methodology allowing to take directly into account individuals' biographical trajectories, to classify them into empirically determined trajectory types, and to treat them as a dependent variable.

Definitions and theory

Before engaging in any theoretical reasoning, some definitional clarification is necessary. Despite the presence of the notion of "dual career" in the research literature since more than 35 years, the terms used are still varied, the definitions not always well explicated and even less consensual. Let us take up some basic aspects.

On the basis of what criteria should we define double-career couples, by partners' mutual career *ambition*, by their effective upward *mobility*, or by other criteria of "*success*"? We follow the proposition of Hiller & Dyehouse (1987) and other authors to reserve the phrase "dual-career" to couples in which both partners are engaged in upwardly mobile occupational paths. To what extent upward mobility is accompanied or even explained by career ambitions is an empirical question, not a definitional one. We therefore consider ambitions as a phenomenon different from careers – i.e., movements in the social structure's hierarchical dimension – which makes them an inadequate indicator for our purpose. The same holds true for other possible criteria sometimes used in the literature, such as education. Moreover, men's and women's career (or, for that matter, also non-career) ambitions, i.e., their attitudes and biographical projections, may ask for mobilising a rather different theoretical context than factual trajectories; this is another reason to separate their conceptual definitions. A further particularity should be mentioned in this context: with respect to European countries, the operational identification of career with occupational status is not warranted. High educational degrees may neither be the only nor sufficient conditions to lead to upward occupational mobility, even though they are particularly favourable for it to happen.

It is equally important to distinguish between *dual-earner* and *dual-career* couples, dual-career being one subvariant of dual-earner couples. Other typical dual-earner situations exist: couples with non-mobile, downwardly-mobile, irregularly-mobile (sometimes up, sometimes down) or differently-mobile partners (the most frequent being probably the combination of “she stable, he upwardly mobile”). It may be possible that we find no empirical difference between dual-career couples and dual-earner couples without upward mobility as to certain features or consequences of their common life, but this is one of the interesting empirical questions and should not be presupposed by way of definition. It is especially interesting to see if there are associations between the male and female partners’ occupational trajectories, since we know that in many countries, these trajectories are different in terms of shape, frequency, continuity vs. interruption, etc. Indeed, in her study of inter-country variations, Maruani (1993, 2003) has identified three global types of employment trajectories for women in European countries: steady employment, resembling the male model, rapid and definitive exit from the labour market, most likely at marriage, and temporary exit, most likely at birth of the first child, followed by later re-entry. Beyond the studies exclusively focused on dual-career couples, the question of the relative frequency and social location of these couples is also important; it may turn out that they are rather exceptional, and this simple fact merits to be studied as well as more intricate features.

Should we rather talk about dual-career *couples* or dual-career *families*, or are these de facto synonyms? This distinction is highly important; dual-career families are composed not only by adult partners, but include one or more children.¹ The literature shows that in many occidental countries, couple equality with respect to occupational engagement is much more wide-spread in the pre-child phase of family life than in the subsequent phases. However, there are important international variations, partly correlated with the countries’ welfare-state regimes and their impact on family- and other biographical choices (Korpi 2000, Blossfeld & Drobnič 2001, Levy et al. 2006, Nollert 2006). This gives particular importance to the couple-vs.-family distinction; we therefore include all couples in our analyses and use the presence of children as a potentially explanatory variable.

Explaining dual-career couples usually comes down to explain women’s occupational participation, especially with respect to the factors responsible for its being steady, reduced, or interrupted; in comparison, explaining men’s employment is rarely at stake. One argument in favour of this practice might be that in practically all studies of occupational trajectories, variation is wide among women whereas male trajectories appear as constants instead of variables. In Switzerland, empirical studies show that a large majority of male occupational trajectories are steady between first job entry and retirement, except for rather rare “biographical accidents” such as unemployment or health impairments, and contain only few episodes with

1 We exclude monoparental families since by definition they leave no room for a dual-career situation in the usual sense of the term. This is not to pretend that it would not be interesting to study the dynamics of both partners of former couples, or of informal and may be not cohabiting couples in a similar perspective. Unfortunately, these situations can not be identified with our data.

part-time employment. This differs strongly from women's trajectories, many of which are characterised by interruptions or reduction to less than full-time employment, especially during phases of active mothering (Widmer, Levy et al. 2003; Levy, Gauthier & Widmer 2006). Nevertheless, male trajectories should not by principle be excluded from analysis as their very steadiness merits explanation, too (Eichler 1988).

Two theoretical perspectives on female labour force participation have been widely debated: the more classical economic theory of partners' rational choice (Becker 1981) and Hakim's (2000) preference theory, offering an individualistic and culturalist explanation for the differential participation in the labour market of women and men living in couples. Neither of these theories has provided satisfying results in recent studies (see especially the thorough account of Blossfeld & Drobnič, 2001; Drobnič & Blossfeld 2001; Schulz & Blossfeld, 2006).² One plausible reason for this unsatisfactory situation may be that these theories, explicitly or implicitly, consider women's lesser labour-force participation as "their problem", i.e., as explainable by factors concerning individual women, a lopsided perspective on two accounts. First, why should it be more relevant to explain women's lesser labour-force participation rather than men's constant and stronger one? Second, why should we exclude by design the possibility of interdependences between the partners living together? Women's lesser or men's stronger occupational integration may as well be conditioned on their partner's configuration as on their own factors; the logic that influences how the two partners adapt to changing situations, especially to the birth of a child, may also be proper to the couple and not to one of its members.

For this reason we rather refer to perspectives that allow to include the couple as a collective actor with an internal structure characterised by varying degrees of inequality and forms of labour division. One such perspective is that of gendered life courses organised by sex-specific master statuses as proposed by Krüger & Levy (2001) that we shall expose when interpreting our results. Since our analysis has an exploratory outlook, we prefer to include a range of potentially relevant aspects to strict hypothesis testing on the basis of a highly elaborated theoretical frame of reference. We therefore limit ourselves at this point to mentioning a series of interesting dimensions without a lengthy discussion of their underlying mechanisms, conditions, and effects.

Beyond purely economic factors such as differential utility functions, human capital optimization, partners' earning capacities, and their relation to familial labour division, we consider power and its legitimacy to be an interesting dimension, be it in the perspective of the resource-theoretical model as handed down since Blood & Wolfe (1960) or in that of patriarchy or male privilege and its acceptance,

2 Let us cite just one typical phrase in Drobnič & Blossfeld 2001 (p. 372) who were long-time defenders of economist approaches: "From the point of view of the economic theory of the family, the resource-bargaining model, and the marital dependency model, the division of labour in couples therefore remains a puzzle". One of the main components of that puzzle is that these models suppose gender neutrality of actors' behaviours which is squarely contrary to empirical results.

defence, or challenge, as formulated, e.g., by Connell (1987) or Walby (1990). A supplementary element in a more complete vision of the dynamics implied in the relation between extra- and intra-couple factors is the prestige differential between housework and employed work. Its importance derives not only from the fact that housework is unpaid, but also from other aspects, intrinsic as well as extrinsic. Compared with most paid work, the quality and results of housework cannot easily be appreciated “objectively”. Moreover, its “appropriation” takes place in a private space and relationship, not in public or on a market. It has a repetitive, routine character and little satisfaction potential, and is therefore less attractive than other activities (see for early treatments Eichler 1976, Held 1978). This configuration characterises family work more generally; many elements of care work can be described by similar features. An important and difficult problem, rarely attacked systematically in empirical research, is the question of the sources of marital power (see already Safilios-Rothschild 1970) and their measurement and weighting, especially sources other than earning (like network strength, relational and other social competencies, etc.). A companion aspect is the accessibility of alternatives to the existing couple relationship, which may also be an important base of power differentials. The power-and-privilege dimension may be seen as close to the doing-gender aspect since traditional male identity includes domination and breadwinning whereas traditional female identity includes acceptance of being status-dependent and dominated (Bielby & Bielby 1989, 1992). Another group of interesting factors is not individual or couple-bound, but contextual and institutional: the availability of childcare and of family-compatible workplaces. They depend mainly on the institutional outfit of society on the local, regional or national level.

Against this backdrop, our contribution is first of all exploratory. With a view to the widespread discourse about recent change in women’s situation within and without the family, and also in couple organisation, we wish to clarify the question conceptually and empirically. Can we content ourselves by distinguishing between dual-career couples and others or should we use a more differentiated classification? How can we locate dual-career couples in the global landscape of couples’ occupational participation in Switzerland? What are the conditions presiding over couples’ strategies? Our central criterion for distinguishing non-earners, non-career earners, and career earners will be the individuals’ occupational trajectories or careers (Spilerman, 1977) as defined in an intragenerational perspective. This restrictive operational definition allows us to include social origin in the analysis of trajectories rather than “burying” it in the definition of the trajectories themselves.

Data and methods

Sample: The data stem from a postal retrospective follow-up to a representative telephone survey of 1534 couples living together (married or not) in Switzerland conducted in winter 1997/98 (main study: Widmer, Kellerhals et al. 2003), addressed to the couples who agreed to be contacted again (96% of the initial sample). About half of the initial couple members returned their questionnaires in due time

(717 women, 703 men). The questionnaire was deliberately limited in scope and concerned only a few factual aspects of training, employment, and cohabitation (Widmer, Levy et al. 2003). On the basis of the information concerning the whole sample, the respondents of the retrospective questionnaire are a representative subsample, showing no significant deviation from the initial sample. The analysis of male and female trajectories is based on the responses of the 602 women and 621 men aged 30 or more (for reasons of trajectory identifiability) and presenting a sufficient proportion of non-missing information. The N at hand for couple analyses is lower (N = 505) because in some couples, only one of the partners answered.

The information about the *independent variables* has been mainly collected in the initial survey and concerns aspects of social status and family composition.

For social origin we rely on *father's occupational position* as the main status variable. It has the double advantage to designate the social origin of the respondents' trajectories and to be analytically independent of the trajectories themselves.³ We also consider national origin as a secondary status marker that may influence mobility trajectories which we call *civic status* because it is legally defined and constitutes a social hierarchisation on the basis of the extent of civic rights granted (here dichotomised into Swiss vs. alien).⁴ Furthermore, we use two indicators of family composition, the *number of children*⁵ and the father's *age at the birth of the first child*, considering that the temporal placement of childbirth may be a component of career planning. Finally, we include male respondents' *age at the beginning of the (actual) partnership relation* (with or without marriage, and irrespective of cohabitation).⁶

Our main *dependent variables* are sequence types of *male and female occupational trajectories* defined by help of the eight kinds of biographical situation or "states" the available year-by-year information allows us to distinguish: worker/employee, middle manager, higher manager, self-employed, non-employed homemaker, full-time education or training, retired, other (unpaid leave, travel, benevolent worker, unemployment, military service, accident, sickness, etc.).⁷ In the case of information overlap, especially between employment and family work, (full-time)

3 It is not possible to add the respondents' education because by its duration it is part of the dependent variables.

4 Several empirical indications attest, e.g., the diminished value of foreigners' education with respect to the attainable job positions in Switzerland (Levy et al., 1997).

5 Unfortunately, the low number of couples without children (12% of 505, i.e., 62) does not allow to distinguish no children and one child. Analyses with less restrictions – and hence more cases – indicate that the strongest difference exists between these very two categories that have to be collapsed here.

6 Taking the male rather than the female partner's information for the two age variables is a purely arbitrary decision. Both age variables, especially if recoded into three classes as we use them, are so highly correlated between the partners (gamma = .84 for age at first childbirth and .75 for age at partnership inception) that they cannot be used together in a regression analysis.

7 The hierarchical differentiation tapped by the occupational subset of these categories is rather crude, especially for lower ranks; moreover, we cannot distinguish between full-time and part-time employment.

employment is given priority. Taking into account various employment situations along with non-employment situations is important to compare male and female trajectories; it would make little sense to artificially restrict our analysis to employed respondents, especially as employment interruptions are a typical ingredient of female trajectories and may have an important incidence on their occupational mobility.

On the basis of this grid, individual trajectories are described as sequences of such states (one state for each year of life between 20 and maximally 64). The sample contains all ages, which implies that the number of individuals diminishes with increasing age; this explains the limitation of the analysis to the age bracket just mentioned. The individual trajectories are compared to each other by optimal matching analysis which establishes their resemblance or dissemblance in terms of a distance measure, thus creating a matrix of distances between individual trajectories (see Appendix 1 for a brief explanation of optimal matching analysis). In order to discover to what extent there exist consistent patterns of trajectories in terms of typical sequences of these states, we apply hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward) to these distance measures. The final dependent variable describes the combination of the couples' male and female trajectory types and will be analysed by multinomial regression.

Auxiliary variables: In order to better grasp the meaning of the trajectory types, we use a series of additional variables as descriptors that neither enter into the definition of the trajectories nor will be used in the subsequent analyses. These are respondent's social origin as represented by *father's occupational position* (8 categories) and *mother's employment* (employed vs. not employed) at respondent's age 15, their *intergenerational educational mobility* (trichotomised into upward, stable, and downward, based on a five-fold information of hierarchical educational levels), *hierarchical level of occupation trained for* (8 categories), *hierarchical level actually occupied* (8 categories), *actual personal income* (7 classes), and *rate of employment* (not employed, low part-time, i.e. under 50%, high part-time, and full time). The three measures of occupational position (father's, respondent's vocational training, actual) are the official Swiss "socio-professional categories" (Joye & Schuler 1995). These categories – except one – constitute a hierarchical order; the exception is that of smaller self-employed which are very heterogeneous with respect to social position.⁸ Finally, we include actual *age*, dichotomised into younger or older than 50. These auxiliary variables are displayed in appendix table A1 for men and A2 for women; their features will enter into the description of the trajectory types (next section). In order to simplify the reading of these tables, the variables are dichotomised, showing the percentages of specific categories for each trajectory type (in the case of the occupational hierarchy, "high" positions are those higher than qualified, but non-managerial jobs).

8 Obviously, occupational training and even more so actual occupation are a part of individuals' trajectories as grouped into our types. But they highlight specific biographical time points rather than development. Their inclusion in the enriched description of the types is therefore not redundant.

Double-career couples and others: identifying trajectory types

Hence, we describe the respondents' trajectories in terms of the above-mentioned eight states on a yearly basis by optimal matching analysis, done separately for men and women and followed by cluster analysis. The decision about the number of clusters was taken on the basis of the stopping rules evaluated by Milligan and Cooper (1985). These rules help decide how many "real" clusters are present in the data. The stopping rule for a statistically optimal cluster solution can be defined as a local peak of the *pseudo-F* (high ratio between inter- and intra cluster variance), associated with a low value of *pseudo t*² that increases at the next fusion, and a marked drop of the *overall R-squared*⁹. The selected solutions of four clusters or trajectory types for men and five for women correspond to these conditions.

Male trajectories

Let us start with the description of the *male trajectories*, using graphs that show for each cluster the year-by-year histograms of the distribution of the eight states we can distinguish.¹⁰ In order to enrich the description of the resulting trajectory types, we include results from appendix tables A1 and A2.

An important proportion of male trajectories (about a fourth) are grouped in a cluster we call *Slow Career* (fig. 1) because they are slowly and modestly ascending. The graph shows that the training period rapidly diminishes its proportion until age 26, then phases out around mid-life, with very few exceptions. More importantly, job entry happens for half of these men on the lowest hierarchical level we can identify, for another half on mostly middle levels, and gives rapidly way to middle (very rarely higher) management positions or to self-employment. So the upward mobility of this trajectory type is largely restricted to the passage from rank and file to middle management positions or to self-employment. Non-employment states are insignificant, except retirement among the elders.

Looking at table A1 for a "thicker" description, we can see that the profile of social origin of this trajectory type is relatively modest, fathers were rarely self-employed, the rate of upward educational mobility is close to the mean; occupational training took place mostly in not very high-ranking sectors. With respect to most indicators in this table, this type does not stand out as particularly low or high. It may be compared to the social image of modest upward mobility gained by "working one's way up", based on acquired experience rather than on formalised qualification.

9 Ratio between interclass variance and total variance.

10 It is important to note that these age profiles are not based on the theoretical assumption that age is an important determinant of the trajectories, but only on their practical utility for synthesising longitudinal information. Their main limitation is that they cannot directly show the individual trajectories that define the trajectory types.

Fig. 1, Slow Career (n=161, 27%)





Fig. 2, High Career (n=124, 21%)




In comparison, the second type, *High Career* (fig. 2) assembles a somewhat smaller proportion of male trajectories (one fifth). They are characterised by a longer phase of education, a more rapid transition to positions in middle and higher management, and a hint to a more direct relevance for job positioning of the higher levels of edu-

education attained. Upward mobility is clearly faster than in the previous type and sets in almost immediately after job entry; self-employment becomes relatively important in this trajectory type and remains so all along.

According to table A1, this trajectory type is most strongly linked to self-employed fathers, it shows also the highest rate of self-employed respondents and of high incomes and the “highest” age distribution (although nonsignificant). It seems to combine two different mechanisms of attaining privileged positions, the “meritocratic” one based on formal qualification and the “patrimonial” one of inheriting material or cultural means of production.

Fig. 3, Nonmobile Workers (n=189, 32%)



The third type, *Nonmobile Workers* (fig. 3), is numerically the most important. It conveys practically no sign of upward mobility, job entry occurs rather quickly after initial education which is not followed by further education later on in life (but can be supposed to include vocational training). Thus, a third of adult Swiss men seems to be “scotched” onto the bottom level of the job hierarchy once and forever.

Table A1 confirms that their trajectories remain close to the bottom of social stratification according to our status criteria: their social origin is very modest, their educational mobility is close to the mean, they have the lowest proportion of training for high-ranking occupations and actually occupy such positions rarely, including self-employment which is a hierarchically heterogeneous category; their income is particularly low. Their age distribution is more concentrated in lower-than-the-mean categories than the other trajectory types, but age differences are not significant. This type of trajectory seems to describe the life course of the working classes, i.e., manual and nonmanual employees with no or little formal qualification and hence little prospects of promotion. Seen in a macrosociological perspective, it rep-

resents the other face of the reproduction of social inequalities: whereas high qualification is the most central asset to upward mobility, low qualification is the most important impediment to it (for the centrality of education in the Swiss mobility regime, see Levy et al., 1997).

Fig. 4, Middle Management (n=119, 20%)



We call the fourth and last trajectory type *Middle Management* (fig. 4) because its members attain this level either directly after initial education or more or less quickly later on (probably on the basis of prolonged training, as indicated by the continuing, although diminishing presence of education), but still early in their careers. They remain there until retirement without climbing higher up.

We learn from table A1 that their trajectories start out from higher social origins than the preceding types, but rarely from conditions of parental self-employment, and they occur rarely after upward educational mobility (which is probably due to an already high educational level of their fathers). Their mothers were more often employed than for the other types. Their age distribution fairly corresponds to the overall means. This kind of trajectory occurs most often in relation with training for relatively high-ranking occupations, which are also most often effectively attained.¹¹ They concern principally men who gain high incomes as salaried managers rather than being self-employed. This “stable high” trajectory seems more purely tributary

¹¹ It is interesting to note that for all trajectory types except Nonmobile Worker, the rate of actual occupancy of high occupational positions is clearly higher than the rate of training for such positions. This reflects the general upward mobility due to the economic expansion Switzerland has enjoyed during the 25-30 years after World War II.

of higher levels of education, corresponding to the meritocratic perspective, than High Career where we found also hints at the alternative mechanism of capital inheritance.

Overall, then, we find two patterns of upward mobility and two patterns of hierarchical stability, the mobile patterns representing 48% of all male trajectories, the stable patterns 52%. All four trajectory types are based on full-time employment and can therefore be considered employment-centred. No specific type of downward mobility emerges from the data.¹² Intergenerational reproduction of social position shows up quite strongly, in accordance with other findings from Switzerland and other countries, with a major importance of educational positioning (a more meritocratic track, but backed up by cultural inheritance as we know from studies of intergenerational mobility, see Levy et al., 1997) and a minor one of capital inheritance (a more patrimonial track).

Mother's employment varies little between the types with the exception of a high value among Middle Management trajectories, probably due to the general mechanism of educational homogamy and the well-known relationship between women's higher education and their maintaining employment throughout the family life cycle.

By and large, the male trajectory types confirm the selectivity of upward mobility, the existence of different mechanisms of mobility (meritocratic vs. patrimonial), and a rather high overall level of intergenerational reproduction (as postulated by Bourdieu, 1970). To come back to our initial vocabulary, we observe two career-earner types, and two non-career earner types among men, but no non-earner trajectory type.

Female trajectories

What about the *female trajectories*? Some of the five types resemble closely to types obtained for men, others not at all. Fig. 5 shows a first type which we call, here also, *Slow Career*.


Its temporal profile shows a prolonged importance of education, job entry at bottom, and signs of – rather modest – upward mobility, mainly into middle management or self-employment but hardly to higher management. We also see a modest presence of housewives, i.e., exclusive family work – a category absent from the male trajectories. Middle Management position as well as self-employment disappear towards retirement age, but the small N in this category makes it too hazardous to interpret the graph for higher ages.

Slow careers start out from intermediate or higher social origins, including self-employed fathers (table A2), have a comparatively high occupational training that can be supposed to “help” them attain middle to higher occupational levels, including self-employment, but does not prevent them from gaining middle to lower incomes. These women tend to be younger than those in other trajectory types. We

¹² A downward movement before retirement seems to be included in the three trajectory types other than Nonmobile Worker, but it shows up only for the highest years of age where the N are too small to warrant interpretation.

can see here a hint at a lower “conversion rate” of formal qualification into occupational position for women, one of the more insidious components of sex discrimination in the working of social stratification.

Fig. 5, Slow Career (n=61, 11%)



The profile of the High Career type (fig. 6) is very different from the previous one. Education diminishes with age but remains important all along, there are very few job entries at bottom level, more on the level of middle management, and some directly on that of higher management or as self-employed. We refrain from interpreting the tendencies after midlife because of the dwindling N with age in this particularly small category. There is a strong indication of upward mobility in this profile; nevertheless, there is some presence of family obligations in the form of – probably short – spells of “housewifery” that disappear, however, at mid-life.

Table A2 shows that *High Career* women’s social origins are not higher than for the previous type, but parental self-employment is particularly prominent, they have also the highest frequency of an employed mother as a role model (although not significant – the same holds for their higher rate of self-employed fathers), the highest rates of upward educational mobility and of higher occupational training, and the highest rate of high positions actually occupied.¹³ Accordingly, they have also the highest rate of high incomes and an equally low rate of part-time employment as the previous type, and their age distribution is rather young (but less so than for Slow Careers). We can interpret this trajectory type in parallel with that of men, upward mobility seems to

¹³ Let us note that to the contrary of men, a positive difference between the rate of high actual positions compared to the rate of training for jobs in such positions is not generalised among women, but a specific characteristic of the High Career trajectory.

be mainly due to educational assets, but also to capital inheritance, although to a smaller extent than among men – and the trajectory is clearly less frequent among women than among men (7% vs. 21%).

Fig. 6, High Career (n=39, 7%)





Fig. 7, Nonmobile Worker (165, 29%)



As among male trajectories, and with more or less the same numerical importance, we find also a female trajectory type of continuous labour-force participation on the bottom level (fig. 7), without upward mobility, but also with only a modest proportion of housewife periods.

Table A2 tells us that female *Nonmobile Workers* have modest social origins, especially with respect to parental self-employment, mean educational mobility, and vocational training principally for lower job levels; their actual occupations are, correspondingly, of rather low level, as are their incomes, which is partially also explained by their maximally high rate of part-time work. Their age distribution is not particularly skewed. The discrepancy between mean education and consistently low occupational position that characterises this type has also been found among men and seems due to what has been termed “educational inflation” rather than dequalification due to job interruptions. This trajectory type corresponds to the hypothesis of financial need explaining female employment maintenance.

Fig. 8, Motherhood and Return (n=129, 23%)



The fourth type (fig. 8) resembles to none of the types found among men, it is specifically female. After a rather early job entry at bottom level, these women interrupt their employment and become housewives to a degree that becomes predominant early in their thirties. After this motherhood period, and very progressively, most of them resume gainful employment.


According to table A2, this trajectory type is frequent among women with rather low social origins, with particularly rare upward educational mobility, low-level occupational training and a correspondingly low rate of higher occupational attainment, the highest rate of part-time occupation and very low income; the age distribution is the highest of the female trajectory types. These elements hint to the fact

that the interruption of employment that defines this type is particularly concentrated on lower levels of qualification and occupational position, in accordance with the hypothesis that it is not only financial need as found for type three, but also job satisfaction, income potential and the independence potential based on it that motivate female employment maintenance throughout the life course.

The last type (fig. 9) again does not exist among men and is once more different from those we have seen up to now. After quitting education rather quickly (with a tiny exception of return to educational in later years), most of these women enter the work-force at bottom level, but leave it quickly during their twenties (a small proportion even seems never to take up a job), and most of these women remain housewives for the remainder of their lives.

Housewife trajectories are characterised, according to table A2, by rather low social origins, tend to be less upwardly mobile on education than women in other types, have rather low occupational training, but those among them who are employed at the moment of the interview nevertheless occupy mostly middle-level positions, unlike the two previous types. Their income is very low (probably owing to the fact that even women without employment indicated some income, and much less to part-time work that has its lowest proportion in this category). The age distribution is second-highest among the five female trajectory types. Here again, results tend to confirm the idea that reduction of female employment is characteristic of lower positions in the social stratification.

Fig. 9, Housewife (n=174, 31%)



The overall picture of women's trajectories is quite different from men's. Whereas all the male trajectory types are employment-centred, we find for women two strongly family-centred types, Motherhood and Return, and Housewife, adding up to 54% of all

individual trajectories, along with an almost equal presence of employment, divided between upwardly mobile trajectories (Slow and High Career, together 18%), and stable, low-ranking trajectories (Nonmobile Worker with 29%), totalling 47% employment-centred trajectories. Consistent upward mobility is much rarer among women than among men. This being said, paid work exists in practically all female trajectories, in the form of sometimes shorter, sometimes longer employment episodes.¹⁴

To sum up, the comparison of our empirically based typologies reveals a strong, if partial, sex-typing of occupational trajectories, with upward mobility considerably rarer among women than among men (17% vs. 49%), and family-centred trajectories inexistent among men, but very important (54%) among women. Non-earner trajectories are a typically female phenomenon (31%). Female pathways reflect also tougher conditions of upward mobility than male pathways: higher qualification “pays” less in terms of occupational position for women than for men, and inheritance of capital (as indicated by the intergenerational reproduction of self-employment) is rarer for daughters than for sons. The descriptive differences between male and female trajectory types are strong, in degree (inequality) and in profile (difference), principally due to the existence of two women-only trajectory types, Housewives and Motherhood and Return, and the absence of a Middle Management trajectory among women.

Linked lives – linked occupational trajectories?

Are there empirical links of co-occurrence between the trajectories of partners living together, whatever be their semantic resemblance? For a first overview, we used correspondence analysis, a statistical method designed to uncover patterns of associations among variables without assuming a causal order (Greenacre, 1993). It shows that men and women with High Careers tend to over-associate with each other. This is also the case of individuals with Slow Careers. As those couples are only a small minority (about 10%), a large majority of couples comprising Nonmobile Worker, Middle Management, Motherhood trajectories, etc., do not show specific forms of trajectory homogeneity. In order to get statistically defensible categories of couple constellations, some female and male trajectory types have to be com-

¹⁴ Contrary to men's trajectories, age differences between female types are significant, even though they do not appear very strong in absolute terms; the difference between the mean ages of the “youngest” and the “oldest” type is 7.7 years, probably less than a socially significant generational cohort. Nevertheless it is noteworthy that women who follow one of the two family-centred trajectory types tend to be somewhat older than those following one of the occupation-centred types. Rather than corresponding to a generational difference, this might be due to a stronger commitment to their role obligations as a mother that leads to prospective postponement of childbirth. Age seems to indicate in this analysis the phase in one's life course rather than cohort or generation (cfr. also the influence of age in our multinomial analysis, table 3). Other analyses attest that value change in favour of gender egalitarianism has generalised in Switzerland since the 1980s, without concomitant institutional change, however. This may explain the rather weak influence of age we find here.

bined.¹⁵ Table 1 shows how male and female trajectory types combine and indicates how they are grouped together to form couple constellations for the subsequent analysis, based on the results of correspondence analysis.

Table 1: Association of male and female trajectory types (table percent, N=505)

| Male trajectory types | | Female trajectory types | | | | | Total |
|--------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------|
| | | Upward career | | Stable worker | | Exclusive family worker | |
| | | Slow career | High career | Nonmobile workers | Motherhood and return | Housewives | |
| Slow career | Upward | 3.3 | 1.4 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 8.5 | 21.0 |
| High career | career | 2.2 | 3.2 | 9.1 | 7.5 | 6.3 | 27.7 |
| Nonmobile workers | Stable worker | 2.8 | 0.8 | 10.9 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 31.3 |
| Stable middle management | | 2.0 | 1.6 | 5.1 | 4.0 | 7.3 | 20.0 |
| Total | | 10.3 | 7.0 | 29.1 | 23.0 | 30.6 | 100.0 |

The two upwardly mobile female types are combined to an Upward Career type totaling 100 cases or 17.3% of all female trajectories, the two other occupation-related female types are combined to a Stable Worker category (several analyses show that the Motherhood-and-Return trajectory contains more occupational decline or at best stability rather than upward mobility, so we can consider these women as basically employed, but without upward mobility), and Housewife becomes the third category. For men, the two upwardly mobile types are grouped together to Upward career as for women, and the two nonmobile types become a Stable Worker category (earner, no career) of which we know that it is heterogeneous with respect to hierarchical position; in the thematic context of the present article, this is acceptable.

On the basis of this “recoding”, and taking up our initial terminology, we bring down the twenty partner constellations of table 1 to six as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Couples’ occupational situation (N = 505)

| | |
|----------------------------|-------|
| Dual-career | 10.1 |
| Dual-earner, female career | 7.1 |
| Dual-earner, male career | 23.8 |
| Dual-earner, no career | 28.3 |
| Male earner with career | 14.9 |
| Male earner, no career | 15.8 |
| Total | 100.0 |

Despite our recoding, Dual-career couples are still rare, they represent only one tenth of all couples. One of the categories is a-typical and also particularly rare, i.e., Dual-earner, female career. Another one, even more a-typical, would be Female earner only. It did not show up in the biographical data, probably because it corresponds more to specific and limited biographical periods than to entire trajectories. According to results from analyses of actual situations irrespective of the whole

¹⁵ Although it would be interesting to look more precisely at the double career situation proper, the very low number of cases (17 couples out of 505) would make results too shaky.

trajectories, it makes up roughly 5% and concerns mainly couples with men who are non-employed for reasons of retirement, unemployment or physical impairment. The two most frequent constellations are Dual-earner, with or without male career. Together, they represent more than half of the couples (Dual earner, no career is composed by 9% of higher social status according to the male position and 19% of lower status). Male earner trajectories, with or without (male) career, i.e., the most traditional constellations, represent another third.¹⁶

Double career couples and others

On the basis of the above-defined couple constellations, we are able to examine the structural factors favouring or hindering the unfolding of double careers or other couple constellations by means of multinomial regression analysis. The dependent variable in this analysis is the typology of table 2, with Dual earner, no career as reference category. The set of independent variables includes both partners' social origin, but considers only men's civic status, men's age at the birth of the first child, and men's age at the beginning of the partnership (but not necessarily cohabitation) because of the strong homogamy with respect to these three variables. Partners' trajectory types would be interesting candidates as well, but can not be included here since their combination forms the dependent variable.

Table 3 displays some significant (*) or very significant (**) ratios that focus our attention on three aspects. First, Dual career couples as well as Dual earner, female career couples are highly disfavoured by men's lower or middle class origins when compared with the reference category of Dual earner, no career couples, and particularly favoured by upper middle class or higher origins. So the rather atypical Dual earner, female career constellation appears as an upper-class phenomenon to the same extent as the more typical Dual career constellation. Second, women's social origin plays a much more modest role, even though we may see a tendency according to which women's fathers' intermediary and employee positions (i.e. lower middle-class origins) lessen the probability of all constellations with a male career, especially in the form of Male earner with career. Women of middle class origin seem mostly promised to enter into couples characterised by male hypogamy. Fi-

16 We should bear in mind that partners' occupational trajectories often start out before they form a couple, these trajectories (or the projects concerning them) may even be a direct cause for the postponement of partnership or parenthood. But then, we can also assume that when partners form a couple, they take into account their mutual occupational pathways and outlooks. What we are interested in for the present analysis is how male and female trajectories combine, and whether there are empirical indications of factors favouring or discouraging specific combinations, in order to see to what extent we can spot and begin to explain some kind of homogamy with respect not primarily to resources held, but to trajectories. We may add that this type of "causal intertwinement" is characteristic of many interrogations about trajectories and their possible linking and should warn us against too direct causal interpretations of regression results.

Table 3: Multinomial analysis of couple constellations (odds ratios)

| | Dual Career | Dual earner, female career | Dual earner, male career | Male earner, with career | Male earner, no career |
|--|-------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Men's fathers' occupational category | | | | | |
| Top and middle management, liberal professions | 14.721** | 12.729* | 1.876 | 6.370 | 1.877 |
| Self-employed | 1.983 | 2.244 | 1.003 | 2.571 | .895 |
| Intermediary professions and employees | 1.930 | 1.479 | 1.338 | 1.596 | 1.523 |
| Qualified and unqualified workers | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Women's fathers' occupational category | | | | | |
| Top and middle management, liberal professions | 1.391 | 6.776* | .913 | .777 | 1.110 |
| Self-employed | .573 | 3.729 | .508 | .419 | .473 |
| Intermediary professions and employees | .253 | 1.200 | .477 | .188** | .487 |
| Qualified and unqualified workers | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Men's civic status | | | | | |
| Alien | .915 | 1.434 | 1.003 | .274 | .363 |
| Swiss | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Children | | | | | |
| 3+ Children | 2.012 | .121* | 1.001 | 3.806 | 9.743** |
| 2 Children | .756 | .274* | 1.095 | 2.623 | 8.232** |
| 1 or no Child | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Men's age at birth of first child | | | | | |
| -25 | 2.613 | 1.728 | 2.908 | 4.674 | 4.960* |
| 25-30 | 1.656 | .963 | 1.208 | 3.782* | .999 |
| No Child or 30+ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Men's age at partnership formation | | | | | |
| 30 + | 6.355* | .603 | 1.760 | 1.585 | .784 |
| 25 to 29 | 6.319* | .353 | 1.198 | 2.115 | 1.130 |
| 15 to 24 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Category of reference in dependent variable is "Dual earner, no career"

nally, the presence of two or more children strongly reinforces the Male earner, no career constellation, only tendentially also the Male earner with career constellation, and diminishes particularly the atypical Dual earner, female career situation. Put brutally, a family situation with more than one child in the household squeezes the mother out of the labour market, especially so if the first child is born early. Early couple formation (Men's age) is strongly incompatible with the Dual career situation, but non-significant for the other constellations.

These results confirm separate regression analyses of the male and female trajectory types, not shown here for lack of space, in which the partner's trajectory type was included among the independent variables. Social origin as indicated by father's occupational status, especially high status, is less decisive for male trajectories than for women's, the presence and number of children is much more decisive for female trajectories than for male ones. Another gender difference has already been mentioned: male trajectories bear signs of two distinctive logics of upward careers, a meritocratic one based on education and a patrimonial one based on inheritance of social and economic capital; the second logic is largely absent from female trajectories. Women's occupational trajectories are strongly conditioned by their mothering functions, fatherhood does not seem to influence men's trajectories. The interlinkage of partner trajectories appears to be asymmetric: not only are female trajectories somewhat more structuring for men's than men's for women's, but they reflect to various degrees and by different patterns the unilaterally female "responsibility" for family work. This is in line with the argument that female renouncement to an own occupational career (or just plain employment) is instrumental for men's upward-oriented or high-placed trajectories.

Summary and discussion

Male and female occupational trajectories have been defined by the biographical sequence of different states or life-course locations, some of them describing labour-force participation and occupational status, others describing other predominant social participations such as getting an education or doing family work. Optimal matching and clustering of individual trajectories has allowed to identify five trajectory types among women and four among men, three of which are similar between the sexes, the others being clearly sex-specific. Biographical sex-typing is revealed as persistently strong in contemporary Swiss society, probably even stronger when looked at in a life-course perspective than in a more positional or purely mobility-oriented perspective (as usually offered by statistical data). Men's trajectories are strongly influenced by their social origin, and early family formation does not seem to be career-friendly for them. These factors somehow "sort" men into more or less upward-oriented pathways, with two types of mobility motors being at work, the meritocratic one of education and the patrimonial one of capital inheritance. Women's trajectories show more radical differences than men's in that only about half of them are employment-centred, the other half family-centred; secondarily, the only mobility motor that counts for female trajectories is the meritocratic one.

The “switch factor” that distinguishes between the two female trajectory groups is principally the presence and number of children, at least on the surface of the results. If we look at the results in a more encompassing perspective, it seems likely that this presence makes trajectories tip towards a family logic on the sole female side only in a societal gender order that is so constructed, i.e., that fixes a much higher price to pay for male than for female job reduction, by way of various forms of gender discrimination in the labour market (men get higher salaries than women for equivalent work, female education “pays less” in terms of attainment of hierarchical position and promotion than male education, the sexual segregation of occupational training and of the labour market parks a majority of women in jobs with lesser perspectives of upward mobility than men, etc.), and that moreover provides cultural justification for male privilege and female submission by discriminating social representations – which is the case of Switzerland despite generalised declarations of gender egalitarianism, including by legal provisions. Their political incorrectness makes such representations publicly indefensible, but prevents neither their being handed down between the generations by various forms of socialisation nor their informal effectiveness.

To take up again our initial questions, our results clearly indicate the necessity to distinguish couples’ trajectory constellations more finely than by a simple dichotomy, since only a small minority of them can be qualified as dual-career couples and the remaining large majority, far from being homogenous, shows considerable variability, as expressed by our six-fold classification. Furthermore, the analysis has shown some strong elements of positioning with respect to both social position, inherited and own, and presence of children, and these enter into the processes of structuring couples’ strategies.

Taking stock of our results, we must admit that dual career couples are of a rare kind in Swiss society, even if “career” is defined largely, including any kind of upward mobility. They stand out as an elitist phenomenon, strongly based on privileged social assets – individually achieved as well as intergenerationally inherited – and are thus related to the basic mechanisms of social reproduction in inequalities, including those between men and women. Against this backdrop, they appear to be an additional mechanism enhancing rather than compensating social inequality and stratification without basically breaking gender discrimination.

In a broader perspective and with a view to further investigations, the results may be interpreted with reference to the thesis that contemporary Western societies, and more particularly some of them (such as Germany and Switzerland), have a gender regime characterised by two sex-specific master statuses (Krüger & Levy 2001) in the sense that men are dominantly assigned to paid work, and women to family work. This gendered dissymmetry of dominant social participation is not necessarily exclusive, but implies that both men and women have their dominant and gendered field of participation. They may participate in non-dominant fields as long and to the extent that this does not interfere with their task profile in the dominant field. The present as well as earlier results (Widmer, Levy et al. 2003, Widmer et al. 2004) point strongly to the fact that the birth of the first child constitutes the very turning point for families to get reorganised according to that tradition-close model, as highlighted in our regression analysis by the differentiated and sex-specific effects of the presence and number of children. An interesting line of exploration suggested

by this kind of results concerns the relation between different types of welfare state and a society's gender regime (see for a first attempt Levy 2006), another one consists in enlarging the set of dimensions, especially in the direction of contextual and institutional factors that tend to be equally neglected by family and stratification research. It would be interesting to include other explanatory factors in the analysis than those at hand in this study, such as the precise timing of crucial transitions of the partners, especially with respect to one another. Another limitation lies in the fact that only trajectories of people living in couples were analysed. This calls for an extension to singles' trajectories and their sex-typing – we would hypothesise that they are gendered as well, but to a lesser extent because they lack the impact of childbirth and the linked-lives effect related to being part of a couple.

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
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Appendix 1: Optimal matching analysis

Since the method of optimal matching is not yet largely known in the sociological community, let us briefly present its basic analytical logic (for more detailed accounts, see Abbott 1988, 1992; Abbott & Hrycak 1990; Erzberger & Prein 1997; Chan 1999; Aisenbrey 2000).

Optimal matching: determining the difference between sequences



Transforming sequence 2 into sequence 1:

- insert 1 blue,
- substitute 3 yellows by 3 reds,
- delete 1 violet,

i.e., 5 actions (1 insertions, 3 substitutions, 1 deletion), or 8 elementary actions (substitution = deletion + insertion)

Transforming sequence 3 into sequence 1:

- substitute 2 violets by 2 reds,
- insert 1 red,
- insert 1 green,

i.e., 4 actions (2 insertions, 2 substitutions), or 6 elementary actions

Thus, sequence 1 is more different from sequence 2 (8 actions) than from sequence 3 (6 actions)

This method originated in biology where it is used for genome sequencing (e.g., Delcher et al. 1999). It allows to compare sequences of states that may have variable lengths or durations¹⁷ as to their degree of resemblance; it imposes little restrictions on the number of states or periods. The figure illustrates how individual sequences are compared pairwise by determining for each pair the minimal number and type of operations needed to transform one sequence into the other, the three possible operations being *insertion* of a supplementary element or state, *deletion* of an element, or *substitution* of one kind of element by another.¹⁸ Each of these operations can be “taxed” or weighted by a specific “cost” expressed in fractions of 1; the sum of these costs for the comparison of sequences measures the difference or distance between them. The costs of the three operations are set by the analyst for each analysis.¹⁹ The resulting distance matrix can then be cluster-analysed in order to identify trajectory types.

17 Obviously, the applicability of the method is not limited to temporal sequences.

18 We used the software TDA developed by Götz Rohwer (Rohwer & Pötter 1999).

19 In principle, there are three options for cost setting: a) set substitution costs to 1 and INDEL to 0.5 (because substitution corresponds logically – if not semantically – to the combination of deletion plus insertion), b) use differentiated costs according to a theoretical

Appendix table A1: Empirical description of male trajectory types (% per type)

| Descriptors (%) | Trajectory types | | | | Cramer's V |
|---------------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------------|----------------|------------|
| | Slow career | High career | Nonmobile workers | Middle managmt | |
| Father higher occupation | 5.0 | 8.8 | 1.9 | 10.7 | 0.146* |
| Father self-employed | 25.2 | 44.1 | 33.1 | 24.5 | 0.158** |
| Mother employed | 38.5 | 40.3 | 38.1 | 68.9 | 0.042 |
| Upward educ. mobility | 56.1 | 54.1 | 51.4 | 32.9 | 0.129* |
| Higher occupation trained | 11.1 | 21.1 | 6.2 | 50.5 | 0.278** |
| Higher occupation actual | 22.4 | 31.2 | 7.3 | 72.2 | 0.361** |
| Self-employed actual | 8.8 | 22.6 | 3.3 | 1.0 | 0.575** |
| income > 8.000 SFr. | 25.6 | 43.2 | 6.5 | 36.5 | 0.292** |
| Part-time | 6.2 | 11.3 | 6.9 | 12.6 | .080 |
| Not employed | 21.7 | 21.0 | 16.4 | 16.8 | 0.062 |
| Age > 50 | 41.0 | 49.2 | 37.6 | 43.7 | 0.086 |
| N | 161 | 124 | 189 | 119 | |

Note: In order to simplify the table, descriptors are shown as dichotomies, each line giving the proportion of high values for a descriptor variable. We cut income at 8.000 SFr. for men and 6.000 SFr. for women in order to avoid extreme distributions because so many women work less than full-time and moreover in little-paid occupations. N varies somewhat owing to missing values, we give the N of each trajectory type.

Appendix table A2: Empirical description of female trajectory types (% per type)

| Descriptors (%) | Trajectory types | | | | | Cramer's V |
|---------------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------------|--------|-------------|------------|
| | Slow career | High career | Nonmobile workers | Return | House-wives | |
| Father higher occupation | 20.0 | 17.6 | 8.3 | 4.6 | 6.7 | 0.174** |
| Father self-employed | 32.0 | 44.1 | 27.1 | 36.1 | 32.0 | 0.098 |
| Mother employed | 45.9 | 53.8 | 38.8 | 47.7 | 42.5 | 0.072 |
| Upward educ. mobility | 43.1 | 55.3 | 47.8 | 32.0 | 41.8 | 0.135* |
| Higher occupation trained | 13.5 | 20.0 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 5.4 | 0.258** |
| Higher occupation actual | 15.2 | 44.8 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 11.4 | 0.442** |
| Self-employed actual | 28.3 | 27.6 | 4.8 | 0.0 | 11.4 | 0.346** |
| Income > 6.000 SFr. | 10.3 | 23.7 | 2.5 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 0.298** |
| Part-time | 55.7 | 51.3 | 64.8 | 51.9 | 23.6 | 0.328** |
| Not employed | 24.6 | 25.6 | 23.6 | 45.0 | 73.6 | 0.428** |
| Age > 50 | 16.4 | 28.2 | 32.1 | 43.4 | 41.4 | 0.176** |
| N | 61 | 39 | 165 | 129 | 174 | |

Note: In order to simplify the table, descriptors are shown as dichotomies, each line giving the proportion of high values for a descriptor variable. N varies somewhat owing to missing values, we give the N of each trajectory type.

judgement of the “difficulty“ or “heaviness“ of various substitutions or, in our case, transitions (higher costs for transitions that appear to be more challenging, i.e., higher cost for quitting employment than for reducing it), and c) differentiate costs according to (inversed) empirically determined relative frequencies of transitions (considering more frequent transitions to be less “costly“ than less frequent ones). Experience shows that the basic algorithm is relatively robust with respect to costs, cost matrices have to be very different in order to generate clearly different results. In the present analysis, we have opted for the first possibility.

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Dual-earner and dual-career couples in contemporary Italy

Zweiverdiener- und Doppelkarrieren-Haushalte im heutigen Italien

Abstract

Based on a national longitudinal data set, this essay analyses the conditions that favour the formation of dual earner, and specifically dual-career couples in Italy, i.e., in a country characterized by comparatively low women's labour force participation and intra-generational mobility. Dual-career couples include all couples in which both spouses belong to the higher occupational classes according to Erikson's and Goldthorpe's classification. Using EHA and cross-lag models, we have tested the role of women's education and occupational position in supporting their attachment to the labour market throughout the family formation years. We found that, although dual-earner couples are comparatively fewer in Italy than in other countries, dual career ones are, in relative terms, the most common kind within them. We have also explored the role of homogamous marriages in shaping the possibility that a couple develops first as a dual-earner and second as a dual-career one. The school credentials possessed and the occupations performed by the spouses do not affect their respective career mobility chances. Particularly, contrary to findings of other studies, the husband's education and occupational position has no impact on the wife's occupation, except, negatively, when he is better educated than she is. Dual career marriages seem to be more the result of original homogamous characteristics of spouses than of a reinforcing im-

Zusammenfassung

Auf der Grundlage eines nationalen longitudinalen Datensatzes analysiert der Beitrag die Bedingungen, die das Entstehen von Zweiverdiener-Haushalten und berufstätigen Ehepartnern in Italien begünstigen, d.h. in einem Land, das durch eine relativ geringe Partizipation von Frauen am Berufsleben und geringe Mobilität zwischen den Generationen gekennzeichnet ist. Als berufstätige Ehepartner werden auch alle Paare gefasst, bei denen beide Ehepartner höheren Berufsklassen nach der Klassifizierung von Erikson und Goldthorpe angehören. Mittels EHA und Cross-Lag-Modellen haben wir untersucht, wie die Bildung von Frauen und ihre Stellung ihrer Zugehörigkeit zum Arbeitsmarkt über die gesamte Dauer der Familienbildung bestimmen. Wir haben festgestellt, dass in Italien zwar relativ weniger Zweiverdienerhaushalte als in anderen Ländern bestehen, dass jedoch in diesem Fall in der Regel beide Ehepartner eine anspruchsvolle Laufbahn verfolgen. Weiterhin haben wir die Rolle homogamer Ehen im Hinblick darauf untersucht, dass ein Paar zunächst als Zweiverdiener-Haushalt beginnt und sich anschließend zu einer Partnerschaft entwickelt, in der beide Partner eine Karriere verfolgen. Schulbildung und Beruf der Ehegatten haben keinen Einfluss auf ihre jeweiligen Karriere- und Mobilitätschancen. Insbesondere haben Bildung und berufliche Stellung des Ehemannes im Gegensatz zu den Ergebnissen anderer

pact of the social capital of highly educated husbands.

Studien keinen Einfluss auf die Berufstätigkeit der Ehefrau, es sei denn, im negativen Sinne, wenn der Ehemann über eine höhere Bildung verfügt als die Ehefrau. Ehen, in denen beide Ehepartner eine Karriere verfolgen, scheinen eher Ergebnis originär homogamer Merkmale der Ehepartner denn die Folge einer verstärkenden Wirkung des Sozialkapitals hoch gebildeter Ehemänner zu sein.

Key words: education, gender, homogamy, intra-generational mobility

Schlagworte: Bildung, Geschlecht, Homogamie, intragenerationale Mobilität

Introduction

This article deals with the conditions underlying the formation of dual-earner and dual-career couples in contemporary Italy. Dual-career couples are a specific subgroup of dual-earner couples, and comprise couples in which both partners not only are in paid work, but are at the top of the occupational ladder. Adopting a class approach to the study of occupational stratification, and following the class schema developed by Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe (1992), for the purposes of this study we consider a couple to be dual-career when both partners have an occupation belonging to class I or II; that is, to the service class (entrepreneurs, professionals, managers of large and medium-size firms) and to the higher grades of white-collar workers.

One could object that this operational definition of dual-career couples is too broad because white-collar jobs cannot properly be classified as top occupational positions. Theoretical and empirical considerations, however, can justify this decision. Although the market position (in the sense of Lockwood 1958) of higher grades of non-manual employees, in fact, is weaker than that of members of the service class, their employment relation (in the sense of Goldthorpe 1982 and Rose 2002) is pretty much the same. Members of the white-collar class are hired on the basis of a service contract and not on the basis of a labour contract or a mixed contract, which is the case, respectively, for manual workers and the lower grades of routine non-manual employees.

As we turn to the central theme of this article, it is worth noting that in Italy, as in other developed countries, the number of both dual-earner and dual-career couples has been increasing in the past decade as a result of the growth of women's participation in the labour force.¹ Yet, the activity rate of Italian women is still lower than

¹ During the period 1990–2006, the activity rate of 20–64 year old Italian women increased by 8.5 percentage points (from 45.6% to 54.1%). As for men, 79.6% of the 20–64-year-olds were in the labour market in 2006. The percentage is higher, 84.6%, for men who are married (ISTAT 2007). These male rates have been stable over the last half century (Bison

that recorded in most European Union countries.² Thus, the proportions of dual-earner and dual-career couples are smaller, too (Saraceno 2005), a circumstance that is particularly true for middle-aged and older cohorts.

The low rate of Italian women's labour market participation can be attributed to several factors. First, there are wide regional differences: women's employment and participation are particularly low in the South, where also men's employment is relatively low. Moreover, part-time jobs, which might help women to combine work and family responsibilities during the most demanding phases of family formation, are still comparatively scarce in Italy, though they have increased in number over the past fifteen years following a change in regulations.

Second, the familistic and undeveloped Italian welfare system does not adequately support families and women with children (Saraceno 2003). The supply of care services for children under age three is not only quite varied at the regional level, but generally among the most modest in Europe (Plantenga and Remery 2005). According to the 2003 survey *Famiglia e soggetti sociali* by the *Istituto nazionale di statistica* (ISTAT), only 15.4% of Italian children aged 0–2 attend public or private day care (Cicotti and Sabbadini 2005). This share has doubled since the early 1990s, however, following an increase in the supply of public and private services.

Third, there is still a strong asymmetry between husbands and wives in the division of domestic labour. On average, Italian married women spend 6.11 hours each day looking after the needs of the household and its members, whereas Italian married men dedicate to the same tasks only 1.19 hours (ISTAT 2003). According to comparative data on time-use, Italian men are the least collaborative among Europeans with regard to family work, and Italian working women, together with their Slovenian counterparts, have the longest workday if one counts both paid work and family work (Eurostat 2004; ISTAT 2006, ch. 4). This gender disparity in the amount of efforts expended for domestic well-being is generally stable across areas of residence, birth cohorts, and the labour market positions of both partners. Only highly educated wives in high occupational positions seem to be able to reduce the amount of time devoted daily to domestic tasks (Schizzerotto 2007). And when such a reduction is achieved, it is not because their husbands are more sensitive to gender inequalities and thus increase their own domestic commitment, but rather simply because these couples can afford to pay for household help.

Fourth, it is well known that education plays a crucial role in determining both women's chances of participating in the labour market and the continuity of their participation even in the face of family responsibilities. In Italy, however, the gender gap in education was closed only in the late 1970s – about ten years later than in most advanced European countries (see De Sandre 1991; Schizzerotto 2002). This means that only in the past thirty years could a sizeable proportion of Italian couples

et al. 1996; ISTAT 2007). For this reason, in the following we address only the conditions affecting women's labour market participation.

2 In 2006, the activity rate of women in the 20–64 age bracket was 71.5% in the United Kingdom, 73.2% in Germany, and 80.7% in Sweden, compared to 54.1% in Italy (Eurostat 2007).

have partners who share the same level of high education. And women, in particular, had the educational characteristics that favoured their labour market attachment throughout the family formation years.

Even defined in our very broad terms, dual-career couples represent a minority of dual-earner couples in any country. In Italy, however, there are specific constraints. During the last twenty years, the development of the tertiary sector and the process of occupational upgrading have proceeded quite slowly. As a consequence, the size of the upper classes has grown at a snail's pace. Furthermore, the overall rate of intra-generational mobility is definitely lower than that recorded in most developed societies, and the career chances of women are, *ceteris paribus*, far smaller than those of men (Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1994; Pisati and Schizzerotto 1999, 2004; Schizzerotto 2002; Sabbadini 2004; Almalaurea 2006). For instance, fewer female than male university graduates hold a job at the level of their qualification: 43% compared to 49%. And whereas about 20% of female university graduates hold an under-qualified job, this is true for only 9% of men. These gender differences limit the possibility of forming a dual-career couple even in the broad sense indicated above. If we had used a narrower definition, including only couples in which both partners have clear upward professional mobility as a consequence of strategic professional and educational choices taken over the life course (e.g., Hiller and Dyehouse 1987; Clement and Clement 2001), then we would have been left with only a handful of couples.

The features of the Italian context summarized above allow us to critically examine the prevalent theories concerning the mechanisms that facilitate or hinder the formation of dual-earner couples and of their subgroup, dual-career couples.

Theories and Hypothesis

In the current sociological literature, three main groups of theories aim at explaining the process of formation of dual-earner and dual-career couples and their persistence over time.³ The preference theory of Catherine Hakim (2000) suggests that the probability of forming a dual-earner couple in contemporary advanced democratic societies sharing the value of gender equality depends mainly on wives' preferences and motivations. Some women strongly prefer to perform conjugal and parental roles, whereas others wish to invest in a professional career. When they get married, the former will leave the labour market or reduce their commitment in it, whereas the latter will continue to invest in their career.

Gary Becker's theory of optimality of specialization (1981) offers a different kind of explanation. As is well known, Becker maintains that married women's participation in the labour market depends on a rational decision, agreed upon by both partners and irrespective of their personal preferences, intended to maximize the household's economic utility and the psychological well-being of its members. In so far as the husband's human capital is higher than that of the wife and/or offers better

3 For an overview, see also Blossfeld and Drobnič (2001), Halleröd (2005), and the introduction to this issue.

returns in the labour market, he specializes in performing market work, while she specializes in family work. Over time, this specialization becomes increasingly convenient from the point of view of the household (if, of course, nothing wrong happens to either spouse, or to their relationship).

Fabrizio Bernardi (2001) uses this approach to explain the existence of dual-career couples. According to him, husbands possessing a large amount of human capital and placed at the top of the occupational ladder can boost or even provide career opportunities for their well-educated working wives in order to improve the standard of living of the entire family.

The resource bargaining theory (Sørensen and McLanhan 1987; Blood and Wolfe 1960; McRae 1986; Brines 1993, 1994; Coltrane 2000) was developed explicitly as a critical counterpoint to Becker's thesis that the division of paid and unpaid work within couples is an altruistic and rational decision, based on a single utility function within the couple and the family. The resource bargaining theory holds that this decision represents the outcome of negotiations, which are based in the resources of power controlled by each partner. Highly educated women are able to bargain for a smaller role in family work, and possibly for using family income toward paying for part of the family work that other women do unpaid, therefore freeing up time and energy to exploit their human capital in the labour market (Brines 1994; Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001). According to this analytical perspective, the permanence of highly educated wives in the labour market does not derive from the support they receive from their equally highly qualified husbands within the framework of a single utility function – that is, the maximization of the household's economic well-being. Rather, the level of schooling of these wives offsets the potentially negative impact of having highly educated husbands who usually earn more and therefore give priority to their own career and labour market investment (see also Bielby and Bielby 1989). By remaining in the labour force, these women further enhance their human capital and reduce, even if they do not completely eliminate, the negative impact – on wages and career – of the time they invest in motherhood and family work (Hersch and Stratton 2002).

The available empirical knowledge on the Italian context offers little support both to the preference theory and to the theory of the optimality of decisions; it provides stronger support to the resource bargaining theory. Actually, one aspect of the Italian pattern of women's participation in the labour market would – at first sight – seem to support Hakim's thesis. Italian women with family responsibilities appear to be divided into two groups: those – a growing minority – who are in full-time jobs and have continuous work attachment throughout the family formation years, and those who exit the labour market once they marry, and particularly when they have a child. They seem to perfectly represent the two opposite preference categories in Hakim's theory. The incidence of the two clusters of women across geographical areas and social groups, however, casts some doubt on this theory. First, the proportion of married women in the labour market changes strongly according to the macroeconomic situation of their area of residence. Married women living in the most developed Italian regions display much higher activity rates than their counterparts residing in less developed areas, particularly in the South (ISTAT 2000; Sabbadini 2004). Of course, Hakim might rightly argue that Southern Italy does not have the

conditions she sets for the implementation of the preference theory; that is, given the scarcity of labour demand, women are not really free to choose according to their preferences. But the comparatively high incidence of working wives and mothers in the Central-North regions, where labour demand is higher and social services are more abundant, suggests that options and resources are as important as individual preferences. The strongest critique of Hakim's thesis, however, is drawn from a second phenomenon: as in countries with a higher level of activity and employment among women (see McRae 2003; Crompton 2006), within the same area of residence wives' chances of being employed and staying in employment – even after pregnancy and childbirth – strongly vary according to the level of education. The higher the school qualifications of a married woman, the greater the likelihood that she will remain employed throughout the family formation years (Lo Conte and Prati 2003). The same holds in the case of occupational position. The more advantageous the position, the greater the probability that women will remain in the labour market after marriage and childbirth. "Preferences", therefore, seem to be highly structured by individual resources.

The empirical evidence for Italy does not entirely support Becker's and Bernardi's theses either. Although it is true, that Italian women who are less educated (and thus possess a lower amount of human capital) than their partners are less likely to participate in the labour market than those who have the same level of education (Bernardi 2001), the opposite is not true. When wives are more educated than their husbands, the latter do not assume the main responsibility for unpaid household work and care. At best, wives can buy themselves out of some of it. Sharing an equal level of education and being in the labour market also does not cause a symmetrical sharing of household and care work (Romano 2005; Schizzerotto 2007). The decrease in the gender asymmetry in time spent in family work found in Italy, as in other countries (Baxter 1993; Brines 1993), among couples where women are highly educated and in the labour market, is more the result of women decreasing the time devoted to family work than of men increasing it. Further, Alessandro Rosina and Chiara Saraceno (2008), on the basis of a retrospective study on work history performed by ISTAT in 2003, found that being more educated than one's own husband in Italy does not seem to increase the chances that a woman remains in the labour market throughout the family formation years, when compared to those of a woman who is as educated as her husband. These two phenomena seem to confirm William Bielby and Denise Bielby's (1989) thesis that gender scripts, not just rational choices, are involved when couples decide on who does what. Resources and opportunities affecting women's options certainly have an impact on how women define their investments in family and work, but have very little impact on how men define theirs. And a non-traditional gender imbalance in human capital may even cause the strengthening of the traditional imbalance in family work. Finally, the high level of educational homogamy that characterizes contemporary Italy (Schizzerotto 2002), together with the low rate of career mobility and the quite strong positive relation between level of schooling and chances of both being employed and arriving at higher occupational positions, suggest that wives' opportunities of being employed mainly depend on their own educational credentials, rather than on the schooling differentials that exist between them and their partners.

These observations lead us to argue that the empirical evidence offers more grounds for the resources bargaining approach in explaining the formation of dual-earner and – even more so – dual-career couples, given the strong role played not only by actual labour market opportunities but particularly by women's education.

In this study, we test this theory by means of a set of specific hypotheses that can be summarized as follows: First, the formation of dual-earner couples strongly depends on the wife's level of schooling and the position of her occupation within social stratification. Second, family events, namely, childbirth and child-rearing, represent the main barrier to the continuity of the labour market participation of Italian wives; married working women who are highly educated and at the top of the occupational ladder are in a far better position to elude this risk than are all other working wives. Third, the work histories of Italian wives are almost completely independent of those of their husbands. Fourth, the formation of dual-career couples is not a process that starts after marriage, but before it. In other words, we hypothesize that it is the high level of homogamy with respect to education, occupation, and, even more, social origin that drives the formation of dual-career couples, and not specific joint strategies followed by wives and husbands after marriage. Before testing these hypotheses, we provide some descriptive statistics intended to give basic information on the numbers and characteristics of dual-earner and dual-career couples in contemporary Italy.

Data, variables, and methods

The data used to assess the proportion of dual-earner and dual-career couples and to test the above hypotheses come from the 1997, 1999, and 2001 waves of the Italian Longitudinal Household Study (ILFI). This study is a perspective panel with a first retrospective wave. It is carried out on a national representative sample of about ten thousand Italian men and women aged 18 and more and belonging to about 4,900 households. Members of the panel sample are interviewed by means of Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) every two years.⁴ They are asked to give detailed information about several aspects of their own and their families' lives. In the following analyses we have used information regarding (a) school participation events, (b) labour market events, (c) family events, and (d) geo-graphical mobility events.

The descriptive analyses regarding dual-earner and dual-career couples are quite simple. We pooled the data originating from the above-mentioned three waves of ILFI and identified 2,271 couples aged 18–65 in 2001. By means of a two-way cross-tabulation of labour market positions of husbands and wives of these couples, we identified dual-earner couples within them. We then constructed an occupational

4 ILFI data originating from waves 2003 and 2005 are available at the following website: www.sociologia/ilfi/unitn.it. We did not use them because they are still in a raw form—that is, not yet ready to carry out rather complex multivariate analyses like those presented in this article.

homo/heterogamy table in order to ascertain how many dual-earner couples are also dual-career couples. It is worth mentioning that the occupational positions appearing in this table represent a collapsed version of Erikson and Goldthorpe's class schema. In accordance with our operational definition of dual-career couples, the three occupational classes are as follows: (a) I+II (i.e., service class and higher grades of non-manual employees); (b) IVab+IVc (i.e., self-employed in whatever economic sector); (c) IIIab+V+VI+VIIab (i.e., lower grades of non-manual employees, foremen, skilled and unskilled manual workers of whatever economic sector).⁵

After computing the proportions of dual-earner and dual-career couples, we studied their variations according to the school qualification level of wives. We followed this analytical strategy because, as mentioned in the introduction,⁶ the large majority of Italian husbands participate in the labour market irrespective of their level of schooling, whereas this is not the case for wives.

In order to detect the mechanisms facilitating or impeding the formation of dual-earner and dual-career couples, we carried out two longitudinal analyses. The first analysis is an attempt to identify respectively the role of family events and of wives' and husbands' individual characteristics in the formation and persistence over time of dual-earner and dual-career couples. As stressed in the first and second sections of this article, the relatively small number of dual-earner and dual-career couples in Italy mainly derives from the considerably large proportion of Italian wives with work experience who leave the labour market and enter full-time homemaking after marriage and particularly after the birth of a child. To understand the characteristics and the mechanisms of this phenomenon, we selected a sample of 1,925 women from ILFI interviewees, who were married during the twentieth century and who experienced at least one occupational episode in the period lasting from two years before the marriage to ten years after it. We then carried out an Event History Analysis (EHA) on them. More precisely, we specified a piece-wise constant exponential model (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1998) of the transition from the labour market to full-time homemaking by these wives, controlling for the effects of two sets of variables: one regarding wives' characteristics and family events, the other referring to disparities between the educational and occupational status of husbands and wives. The EHA model, therefore, controls for the following for the wives: (a) birth cohort; (b) age; (c) area of residence; (d) level of education; (e) age at first job; (f) prestige score – measured on the occupational stratification scale of Antonio De Lillo and Antonio Schizzerotto (1985) – of the occupation performed; (g) economic sector of employment; (h) type of employment contract; (i) pre-marriage cohabitation; (j) pregnancy; (k) number of children younger than three years old; (l) number of children aged three to five years old; and (m) number of children aged six years or older. "Pregnancy" is a dichotomous variable, assuming the value 1 for the nine

5 Though a bit crude, the above class schema captures the main class cleavages in the probabilities of forming dual-earner and dual-career couples. This statement is based on a set of Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival times in the labour market of Italian working wives whose occupations were classified according to the standard seven-tier schema of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). For the sake of brevity, these analyses are not reported here.

6 See footnotes 1 and 2.

months lasting from its beginning to birth of the child. With regard to the second set of variables, the EHA model controls for (a) the difference between the husband's and the wife's level of education; (b) the difference between the husband's and the wife's occupational score; and (c) the husband's employment sector.

The variables expressing the husband's educational and occupational positions are intended to check whether the risks of leaving the labour market are higher when the husband is more educated and has a stronger occupational position – both from a symbolic and from an economic point of view – than his wife does.

All variables in the model – except birth cohort, age at first job, and experience of pre-marriage cohabitation – are, of course, time-variables. As mentioned earlier, the observation window of the EHA model starts two years before marriage in order to take into account the possibility that some couples may start negotiating and arranging their respective future economic and domestic roles before actually getting married, but in view of doing so. The observation window closes either when the wife experiences the transition to full-time homemaking or ten years after marriage. We believe that this period is an appropriate minimum time-span to allow for crucial events in the couple's life history that potentially affect wives' exit from the labour market, such as pregnancy, childbirth, and child-rearing.

Two more comments are needed to better understand the logic underlying our EHA model. Period effects do not appear in it because they proved to be collinear with wives' birth cohort.⁷ For a similar reason, in the model husbands' educational and occupational characteristics are expressed in terms of differentials with those of their wives.

As mentioned, the analysis of the labour market behavior of married women sheds light on the variables affecting the formation and the persistence over time of dual-earner and dual-career couples, but it does not allow assessment of whether the individual careers of spouses influence each other reciprocally. In order to address this issue, we first selected a new sample (once again from the ILFI data set) made up of 1,611 couples, married during the twentieth century, whose marriage lasted at least fifteen years and in which the female spouses experienced at least one occupational episode (of whatever length) during that period. We then specified a cross-lag model in order to detect the features of possible links between the occupational histories of the spouses.

The reason we selected an observation window of fifteen, and not ten, years for this last analysis is linked to the characteristics of social mobility in Italy. Given the low level of intra-generational mobility in contemporary Italy (Pisati and Schizzerotto 1999; Schizzerotto 2002; Cuppié and Mansuy 2003; Gangl 2003), the process of career development, above all in the case of wives, takes a considerably long period of time. Fifteen years seems to be a reasonable time-span to observe possible

7 We have specified an EHA model containing a variable expressing a period effect. In particular, we have individuated four periods – 1900–1950, 1951–1970, 1971–1977, and 1978–2001 – linked to important changes in the legislation concerning maternity and parental leaves. Unfortunately, these period effects were not significant and reduced the values of the parameters expressing the effect of wives' birth cohorts.

significant events in the careers of both spouses and to test whether husbands and wives influence each other's respective job histories.

The model we specified in order to detect the links potentially occurring between the respective occupational destination of the spouses is, like any other cross-lag model, a structural equations model, in which two variables vary over time and are allowed to influence each other. In our model, these two variables are represented, respectively, by the score on the prestige scale of the husband's occupation and the corresponding score of the wife's occupation. We recorded the score of both occupations at four points in time: at marriage and five, ten, and fifteen years later. By means of the cross-lag model, we attempted to measure (a) the strength of the relation between the occupational scores of each partner when they began their union and (b) the relation between the prestige score of the possible subsequent occupation(s) performed by a spouse (five, ten, and fifteen years after marriage) and the prestige scores of both his or her previous occupation (i.e., the occupation held at marriage and five and ten years after it) and that of his or her partner. In addition to the $4 \times 2 = 8$ occupational scores, the cross-lag model contains four variables: the level of education of each spouse (measured by means of the statutory duration in years of the qualification attained), and two latent variables expressing the social origins of each spouse, determined on the basis of the level of education and occupational position of their respective fathers.

The inclusion in the model of a variable expressing the social origins of both spouses aims at testing our fourth hypothesis, which holds that in contemporary Italy, possibly even more than in most developed countries, homogamy does not only refer to educational level and occupational positions of individuals, but also to their respective social origins.

A final technical remark about the cross-lag model refers to the measure of its goodness of fit. Instead of the usual likelihood ratio, which is strongly influenced by sample size, we used the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Schumacker and Lomax 1996).

Differential risks for wives of leaving the labour market: The role of education and occupational position

The analysis of the labour market positions of Italian husbands and wives, aged 18–65, clearly shows that dual-earner couples represent a minority – less than two-fifths – of Italian couples (table 1). The picture changes only marginally when one takes into account employed and unemployed partners, that is to say, all couples in which both members are active. The same holds if one adds current pensioners to these two groups. The sum of these three groups barely reaches 52.3% of all couples. The reason for this result is that almost one half of these Italian wives never entered the labour market, or entered it only occasionally and for very short periods.

Tab. 1 Labour market positions of husbands and wives aged 18-65. Italy 2001. Cell percentages

| Husbands' position | Wives' position | | | | All | N |
|-------------------------|-----------------|------------|-----------|-------------------------|-------|-------|
| | Employed | Unemployed | Pensioner | Not in the labour force | | |
| Employed | 38.1 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 31.9 | 75.7 | 1,718 |
| Unemployed | 0.8 | 0.2 | — | 2.0 | 3.0 | 69 |
| Pensioner | 4.0 | 0.3 | 3.3 | 9.9 | 17.5 | 398 |
| Not in the labour force | 1.0 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 2.4 | 3.8 | 86 |
| All | 43.9 | 3.6 | 6.3 | 46.2 | 100.0 | 2,271 |

It is not surprising, then, that dual-career couples, even in our wide definition, constitute an absolutely marginal proportion of all Italian couples. As can be easily computed from the figures provided in tables 1 and 2, they amount to only one-tenth of them (11.6%). Nonetheless, they are the most frequent variety of dual-earner couples (table 2). These two results prove, though indirectly, that women who did arrive at high occupational destinations remain more frequently in the labour market, even after marriage and during the family formation process.

Tab. 2 Homo/heterogamy in dual-earner couples aged 18-65. Occupational classes of husbands and wives. Italy 2001. Cell percentages

| Husbands' classes | Wives' classes | | | All | N |
|---|----------------|-------|--------------------|-------|-----|
| | I-II | IVabc | IIIab, V-VI, VIIab | | |
| I-II (Service class and routine non manual employees, higher grade) | 31.3 | 3.7 | 8.1 | 43.2 | 362 |
| IVabc (Self employed in primary, secondary and tertiary sector) | 8.0 | 10.9 | 6.1 | 24.9 | 209 |
| IIIab, V-VI, VIIab (routine non manual employees, lower grade; foremen, skilled and unskilled manual workers) | 10.2 | 2.8 | 18.9 | 31.9 | 268 |
| All | 49.5 | 17.4 | 33.1 | 100.0 | 839 |

The role of the characteristics of wives in the formation of dual-earner and dual-career couples is clearly visible when one looks at the variations in their occurrence conditional on wives' level of schooling.

Only one-fourth of couples with wives who completed compulsory education (or less) are dual-earner couples (table 3), and less than one in twenty are also dual-career (table 4). Both these shares strongly increase for couples with wives who have a higher secondary school certificate, and increase even more for those with a university degree (tables 3 and 4). It is also worth noting that the differences in the proportions of dual-career couples conditional on wives' level of schooling are much more pronounced than the corresponding proportions of dual-earner couples (tables 3 and 4).⁸ In other words, while only one-third of dual-earner couples with a wife with a higher secondary school education are also dual-career couples, the same holds for almost four-fifths of dual-earner couples with a wife with a university degree.

⁸ We did not carry out any comparison involving less-educated wives because, as shown in table 4, almost none of them belongs to a dual-career couple.

Tab. 3 Proportions of dual-earner couples, aged 18-65, by wives' level of schooling. Italy 2001. Percentages

| Wives' level of schooling | Proportions of dual earner couples | N ^(a) |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------|
| Lower secondary school (or less) | 24.3 | 1,343 |
| Higher secondary school | 52.7 | 715 |
| Tertiary education | 77.0 | 213 |
| All | 38.1 | 2,271 |

(a) As it can be realised from the figures in table 1, N is the number of wives in our sample of couples who attained each level of schooling (see tab. 1).

Tab. 4 Proportions of dual-career couples, aged 18-65, by wives' level of schooling. Italy 2001. Percentages

| Wives' level of schooling | Proportions of dual earner couples | N ^(a) |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------|
| Lower secondary school (or less) | 4.8 | 314 |
| Higher secondary school | 36.0 | 364 |
| Tertiary education | 72.7 | 161 |
| All | 31.3 | 839 |

(a) As it can be realised from the figures in table 2, N is the number of wives in our sample of dual earner couples who attained each level of schooling (see tab.2).

Furthermore, whereas in less than one-tenth (9.4%) of the Italian couples aged 18–65 there is a wife who attained a university degree, in more than three-fifths (61.2%) of the dual-career couples the wife has such a degree.

These results support and further specify our first two hypotheses, namely, that the formation of dual-earner couples depends mainly on the characteristics of the wives. These characteristics, in turn, particularly education, skew dual-earner couples toward dual-career ones through the role played by homogamous marriages, as we show in the next section. Given the strong credentialist character of the Italian labour market,⁹ as well as the negative discrimination suffered by women in it, only the highly educated have access to real opportunities of reaching the service class and the higher grades of white-collar workers.

The parameters of the EHA model (table 5) confirm that wives characteristics count much more than those of their husbands in the persistence over time of dual-earner and dual-career couples.

⁹ The strength of links occurring between level of education and occupational destinations in contemporary Italy, even in the case of women, has been demonstrated several times (Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1994; Schizzerotto and Cobalti 1998; Pisati and Schizzerotto 1999; Schizzerotto 2002).

Table 5 Transition from employment to housework among Italian wives. Piece-wise constant exponential model.

| Covariates | β | $\sigma(\beta)$ | p |
|---|----------|-----------------|------|
| <i>Duration:</i> | | | |
| 2-4 years | -0,47 | 0,11 | 0,00 |
| 5-6 years | -0,64 | 0,13 | 0,00 |
| 7-8 years | -0,65 | 0,15 | 0,00 |
| more than 8 years | -0,34 | 0,16 | 0,03 |
| <i>Birth Cohort</i> | | | |
| cohort 1900-27 (ref.) | — | — | — |
| cohort 1928-37 | 0,15 | 0,21 | 0,46 |
| cohort 1938-47 | 0,29 | 0,20 | 0,15 |
| cohort 1948-57 | -0,12 | 0,20 | 0,57 |
| cohort 1948-67 | 0,08 | 0,21 | 0,70 |
| <i>Age</i> | -0,02 | 0,01 | 0,02 |
| <i>Age</i> ² | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,64 |
| <i>Area of residence</i> | | | |
| North-Western regions (ref.) | — | — | — |
| North-Eastern regions | 0,21 | 0,10 | 0,03 |
| Centre regions | 0,06 | 0,11 | 0,58 |
| South regions | -0,07 | 0,12 | 0,58 |
| Islands | 0,29 | 0,16 | 0,07 |
| <i>Education</i> | | | |
| primary school (ref.) | — | — | — |
| lower secondary school | -0,11 | 0,10 | 0,27 |
| higher secondary school | -0,21 | 0,16 | 0,17 |
| university | -1,26 | 0,40 | 0,00 |
| <i>Age at first job</i> | -0,01 | 0,01 | 0,53 |
| <i>Occupational score</i> | -0,02 | 0,00 | 0,00 |
| <i>Employment sector</i> | | | |
| private sector (ref.) | — | — | — |
| public sector | -1,18 | 0,17 | 0,00 |
| <i>Employment relation</i> | | | |
| self-employed (ref.) | — | — | — |
| Apprenticeship | -0,07 | 0,27 | 0,79 |
| temporary contract | 0,28 | 0,19 | 0,13 |
| permanent contract | -0,16 | 0,12 | 0,18 |
| moonlightning | 0,40 | 0,15 | 0,01 |
| <i>Experience of pre-marriage cohabitation</i> | 0,04 | 0,38 | 0,92 |
| <i>Pregnancy</i> | 1,28 | 0,11 | 0,00 |
| <i>Number of children aged 0-3</i> | 0,32 | 0,09 | 0,00 |
| <i>Number of children aged 3-6</i> | -0,15 | 0,09 | 0,11 |
| <i>Number of children older than 6</i> | -0,57 | 0,09 | 0,00 |
| <i>Husband's educational differentials</i> | | | |
| Husband as educated as wife (ref.) | — | — | — |
| Husband less educated than wife | -0,04 | 0,13 | 0,76 |
| Husband more educated than wife | 0,25 | 0,09 | 0,00 |
| <i>Difference between husband occupational score and that of wife</i> | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,92 |
| <i>Husband working in the primary sector</i> | -1,46 | 0,22 | 0,00 |
| Constant | -4,04 | 0,29 | 0,00 |
| Number of subjects | 1,925 | | |
| Number of events | 744 | | |
| Number of episodes (after splitting) | 36,219 | | |
| Log likelihood | -1880,17 | | |

First, the model shows that the husband's level of schooling has a limited influence on his working wife's risks of transition to full-time homemaking. Husbands with higher education levels increase the spouse's risks of exiting the labour market. But husbands who are as educated as or less educated than their wives do not affect in any significant measure the likelihood that the latter make the transition to full-time homemaking (table 5).¹⁰ On the contrary, working wives' school attainment strongly influences their risks of abandoning their occupation. There is a negative relationship between the education credentials of wives and the likelihood that they leave employment. The higher the level of schooling of a working wife, the lower her probability of leaving the labour market and entering full-time homemaking.

Second, the EHA model proves that the husbands' occupational score, relative to that of their wives, has no effect on the risks of the latter to leave their occupation for full-time homemaking. On the contrary, working wives' own occupational score has a dramatic negative effect on these risks. The higher the occupational position of a wife, the lower her likelihood of exiting the labour market. The employment sector of wives also plays a role: Italian wives working in the public sector have clearly stronger chances to stay longer in the labour market than those working in the private sector, as also found in studies carried out for other countries (Taniguki and Rosenfeld 2002). This is the only sector where there is a significant number of part-time jobs.

Only in the case of employment in the primary sector does the husband's position affect that of his wife: having a husband working in the primary sector (agriculture) strongly reduces a wife's risks of moving from employment to full-time homemaking. But it should be stressed that employment sector does not coincide with occupational position. Moreover, in interpreting the above result, one should take into account that (a) the economic returns of occupations in the primary sector are lower than those guaranteed by comparable occupations carried out in the secondary and tertiary sectors; (b) most wives of men working in agriculture share the same occupation of their husbands; and (c) in the rural areas there is substantial continuity between work place and home.

The type of women's employment contract does not seem to affect substantially the risk of exiting the labour market, except in the case of women in the informal economy and hence hired without a contract.

Work history has an effect on the likelihood of a wife's transition from employment to full-time homemaking. Married women who started to work at younger ages show higher risks of leaving the labour market than those who started at (relatively) older ages. This may depend on two phenomena. First, women whose work history starts at a very young age reach the minimum contributory period earlier than those who start later, and thus have the possibility (and the incentive) to retire earlier. Second, this result points once again to the role of education. Usually, women who start work for pay early are less educated than those who start later; they thus have less desirable jobs and lower incentives to remain in the labour market.

Quite interestingly, individual characteristics such as birth cohort and area of residence have almost no influence on the risks of leaving the labour market among Italian wives. Only the youngest generation of Italian wives seems to be a bit more

10 The above results confirm both Bernardi's (2001) and Rosina and Saraceno's (2008) findings.

inclined not to leave the labour market. But no significant difference can be detected between the older cohorts of wives that we studied. By and large, also the effect of the area of residence is rather negligible. The only significant, but puzzling, difference regards wives living in the North-Eastern regions who show higher risks of exiting, although their overall activity and employment rates are also higher, as already found by Rosina and Saraceno (2008).

There is one ascriptive variable that has a remarkable influence on the risk that working wives become full-time homemakers, however: (younger) age. The relevant parameter of the model shows that the exiting risk declines in a linear fashion as age increases.¹¹ Once past the most critical and time-intensive phases of family formation, if a woman has succeeded in remaining in the labour market, she experiences a progressive relief from family-work demands. Therefore, the balancing act of conciliating work and family becomes somewhat easier, while work income and prospects often improve.

The above interpretation is strongly supported by the effects of family events. Becoming a mother remarkably increases the risks of leaving the labour market. Pregnancy and looking after children aged 0–2 represent tremendous obstacles to continuous labour market participation.¹² As children grow up and start to attend kindergarten and then primary school, the mothers' risks of abandoning their jobs are almost linearly reduced (table 5). This phenomenon supports the argument that the lack of childcare services for children under the age of three is one of the main constraints on the participation of Italian women in the labour market.

Taken together, all the effects of the covariates controlled for in our EHA model confirm and reinforce those of the descriptive analyses. The individual characteristics of working wives, together with family events, are much more influential on their likelihood of remaining in the labour force than the occupational position and level of education of their husbands. We can, therefore, conclude that the chances of forming dual-earner and dual-career couples are mainly conditioned by the characteristics of the wives, as well as by family demands. The higher the wives' level of education, the more advantageous their occupational position. And the lower the burden of their domestic responsibilities, the greater their opportunities to stay in the labour market and, as a consequence, to form part of a dual-earner couple which, given their own characteristics as well as those of their husbands, is also likely – because of occupational homogamy – to be a dual-career couple. Our first and second hypotheses are thus confirmed. There is some ground for confirming also the third one (the relative independence of husbands' and wives' work histories).

Do working spouses really influence their respective careers?

The results presented in the previous section cast a heavy shadow also on the idea that the individual work histories of husbands and wives mutually influence each


11 Actually, the squared effect of age is statistically and substantially non significant.

12 Women on maternity or parental leave are counted as being in employment.

other. In particular, they do not support Bernardi's (2001) thesis that the husband's social and human capital supports that of his wife.

The cross-lag model further confirms this picture and therefore also our third research hypothesis on the substantial independence of the respective job histories of Italian working wives and husbands. It shows that both husbands' and wives' occupational positions fifteen years after marriage are strongly influenced by their individual level of education and, above all, by the occupation that they held at marriage and five and ten years later (figure 1). On the contrary, the coefficients expressing the cross-lagged effects of the spouses' education and occupation are very small and statistically not significant. In other words, the individual occupational careers of Italian spouses forming dual-earner and dual-career couples appear to be completely independent of each other.

Figure 1 Reciprocal effects between husbands' and wife's work careers. Cross-lag model: standardised path coefficients.



N=1,611; CFI=.972; RMSEA=.053

One could argue that this finding is far from surprising, as husbands and wives may display different abilities and commitments in the workplace. Moreover, they often are employed by different organizations, which follow different strategies in selecting their employees for promotion. Typically, women are more often employed than men in the public sector (where one's career is based mostly on seniority) and in small private enterprises (which offer fewer career opportunities). Thus, direct spousal support is unlikely. The spousal support thesis, however, assumes that the spouses of dual-career couples promote the improvement of their respective careers mainly indirectly: providing information, promoting social contacts, increasing social capital resources, and the like. Our findings, however, do not show any evidence of the presence and efficacy of this kind of indirect support, particularly from husbands to wives.

There are some quite strong relationships between the level of education and the occupation at marriage of both spouses (figure 1). These links, however, simply confirm our fourth hypothesis: in contemporary Italy, individuals choosing a partner pay close attention to the person's socio-cultural features. In other words, educational and occupational homogamy is the basic mechanism underlying the process of couple formation in Italy.

Of course, this result is not peculiar to Italy. Analyses on homo/heterogamy show that several developed countries record an increasing propensity toward educational homogamy (Blossfeld, Tim and Dasko 1998) and a quite strong, though stable, tendency toward occupational homogamy (Ultee and Luijkx 1990; Schizzerotto 2002).

But the cross-lag model shows a further interesting effect that seems to be much more pronounced in Italy than elsewhere and that provides strong support for our fourth hypothesis.¹³ The individual characteristics of spouses that are reciprocally linked by the highest coefficient are their respective social/family origins (figure 1). Hence, it can be maintained that the high propensity to homogamy of Italian men and women extends beyond the current social and cultural features of the future spouse as an individual person, to include his/her social origin.

From the point of view of the process of the formation of dual-earner and dual-career couples, this result proves that (a) the job histories of Italian working husbands and wives are always largely, if not to say completely, independent from each other; (b) these histories may be similar in several cases simply because of the similarity of spouses' social origins, levels of education, and occupational positions when their joint history as a couple started; and (c) dual-career couples are possible only by means of the woman's human capital, with no further support from that of the husband and with the constraints imposed by gender arrangements both in the family and in the labour market.

¹³ In addition to those discussed in the main text, the cross-lag model contains four parameters expressing high associations between the variables studied. These parameters refer, respectively, to the influence of social origins of both husbands and wives on their respective level of education and occupation at marriage. These effects are well known and have been documented numerous times in the literature on educational and occupational inequalities in contemporary Italy (Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1994; Schizzerotto and Cobalti 1999; Pisati 2001; Schizzerotto and Barone 2006). Yet, although interesting, they do not really matter for the topic we are dealing with in this article.

Conclusions

By means of the analyses presented in the previous pages, and particularly by means of the EHA and cross-lag models, we have been able to go beyond what has already been well documented in the literature, particularly with respect to the Italian case: namely, the dual constraint on the formation of dual-career couples through the relatively low (although increasing) incidence of continuously dual-earner couples, on the one hand, and the low degree of intra-generational mobility, on the other. At the same time, we have shown that dual-career couples – that is, couples belonging to the higher occupational classes of Erikson and Goldthorpe's (1992) classification – are, in relative terms, the most common kind of dual-earner couples in contemporary Italy.

We also have explored in detail the role of homogamous marriages in shaping the possibility that a couple develops first as a dual-earner and then as a dual-career couple. We have shown that the proportion of dual-earner and, above all, dual-career couples increases from the lower educated (wives and couples) to the higher educated. Yet this linear increase seems to be best explained by the wives' own education than by that of their husbands. This explanation also holds when husbands are less educated than their wives. In particular, we have found that having a husband with a similar or a lower education level and a similar or a lower occupational position has no impact on the wife's chances of remaining in the labour market. Only in the case of the traditional asymmetry in education does there seem to be an impact, in so far as having a husband who is better educated than oneself reduces the chances of remaining in the labour market.

Moreover, the school credentials possessed and the occupations performed by the spouses do not affect their respective chances of career mobility. The human capital resources with which women and men enter marriage and the process of decision-making about labour market participation are not affected by those of their partners, except through the mediation of gender roles and arrangements within the household as well as within society. The similarities they may manifest in their work histories are the consequence of their original similarities, dating back to their social origins. The dissimilarities, on the other hand, are the consequence of the gender arrangements in which they are embedded. In a country with a low degree of social mobility – both inter- and intra-generational – and with a persistent high degree of gender inequality in the division of domestic labour (although not in education), marital homogamy seems to be an instrument of social immobility, rather than of new forms of social stratification and social polarization, as it seems to be the case for other countries (Hyslop 2001; Esping-Andersen 2006).

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Determinants of and obstacles to dual careers in Germany

Determinanten und Hindernisse für Doppelkarrieren in Deutschland

Abstract

Education expansion has led to an increasing proportion of couples in which both partners hold an academic degree. Although in these couples the potential for dual careers is high, their realization remains a great challenge, mostly due to restrictions on female careers. We argue that the chances of achieving dual careers depend not only on individual characteristics of each partner, but also on the constellation within couples with regard to age, profession, and child-rearing. We therefore look first at different characteristics within German academic couples and analyze how these enhance or constrain the chances of achieving dual careers. Then, we examine recruitment practices at German universities, especially their sensitivity regarding dual-career issues. Our results show that child rearing contributes to the risk of couples having a one-career coordination strategy and that gender-blind recruitment criteria contribute to a large extent to this risk. We further test two common explanations of the hindrance of dual careers and show that neither are women generally disadvantaged, nor does the age difference in couples gender-neutrally define the older partner's career as the leading one.

Zusammenfassung:

Die Bildungsexpansion hat dazu beigetragen, dass bei einem zunehmenden Anteil der Paare beide Partner über einen akademischen Abschluss verfügen. Obgleich diese Partnerschaften ein hohes Potential für Doppelkarrieren besitzen, so bleibt dessen Realisierung eine große Herausforderung – oft aufgrund von Einschränkungen weiblicher Karrieren. Wir zeigen, dass nicht nur individuelle Merkmale der beiden Partner die Realisierungschancen von Doppelkarrieren beeinflussen, sondern auch Konstellationen innerhalb der Partnerschaft im Bezug auf Alter, Beruf und Kinder. Mit Blick auf Akademikerpaare untersuchen wir zunächst, wie unterschiedliche Paarkonstellationen die Realisierungschancen von Doppelkarrieren fördern oder behindern. In einem weiteren Schritt untersuchen wir Einstellungspraktiken an deutschen Hochschulen und deren Sensibilität gegenüber Doppelkarrieren. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kinder das Risiko bei Paaren erhöhen, nur eine Karriere zu verfolgen, und dass geschlechtsblinde Einstellungskriterien zu diesem Risiko beitragen. Zudem werden wir die zwei herkömmlichen Erklärungen zur Behinderung von Doppelkarrieren überprüfen und dabei zeigen, dass weder Frauen generell benachteiligt sind, noch dass ein Altersunterschied der Partner den Karrierevorrang des älteren Partners geschlechtsneutral definiert.

Key words: dual careers, academic couples, Germany, family relationships, university, employment, careers

Schlagworte: Doppelkarrieren, Akademikerpaare, Deutschland, familiäre Beziehungen, Universität, Hochschulen, Beruf, Karriere

1. Introduction

For a long time, the gender gap in career chances connected with a hierarchical one-career pattern in couples was explained by differences in educational degrees attained by men and women. Yet, in many Western countries educational expansion has resulted in an enormous reduction of educational gender differences. In 2004 about 19.5 percent of German men and 14.5 percent of women – aged 30 to 49 – held an academic degree.¹ And not only did the number of highly qualified individuals – and especially women – increase; there was also considerable growth in the number of couples in which both partners hold an academic degree (in the following: “academic couples”). In Germany today, one third of the men holding a university degree live with an academically-trained woman, and almost half of the female academics live together with a male academic (cf. Table 1). Dual-career couples – couples in which both partners pursue a professional career – are nonetheless quite seldom in Germany.

In academic couples, both partners have made substantial training investments and often show a pronounced interest in professional careers – leading to a high potential for entwining individual professional careers into dual careers. Yet dual careers still remain a great challenge: often dual-career efforts fail, most frequently because of restrictions on female professional careers. Among the academic women aged between 30 to 49 years, about 38 percent were unable to translate their academic degree into a (full-time or part-time) professional job in 2004. These women were either not employed or (only) working in non-professional jobs. Among the academic men only 22 percent could not do so. That the interest in professional careers by male and female academics is increasing, however, is indicated by the large and, for men, rising proportion of academics *not* living with a partner. In the career-intensive period between ages 30 to 50, every third academically trained man and woman is not “committed” to living together with a partner (see Table 1). Between 1971 to 2004, for men this figure increased from only 11 percent to 27 percent, indicating the decreasing chances of men to find “traditional” women for a partnership and/or their increasing interest to first establish their career before entering a (dual-career) family.

1 In 1971, 7 percent of the men and less than 2 percent of the West German women held an academic degree.

Table 1: Qualification levels of partners of academically trained men and women in 1971, 1997, 2004 (in rounded percentages)

| | Partner holding an academic degree ("academic couples") | Partner without an academic degree | No partner* |
|-------|---|------------------------------------|-------------|
| | | <u>1971**</u> | |
| Men | 15 | 72 | 11 |
| Women | 50 | 13 | 33 |
| | | <u>1997</u> | |
| Men | 27 | 47 | 25 |
| Women | 46 | 20 | 34 |
| | | <u>2004</u> | |
| Men | 33 | 39 | 27 |
| Women | 47 | 23 | 30 |

Case selection: German academics aged between 30 and 49 years.

Difference to 100 percent = missing information on partner's qualification.

Due to data restriction:

* this category includes women and men – aged between 30 and 49 years – without partners and in living-apart-together-arrangements.

** this year only includes married couples.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 1971, 1997, 2004, weighted by individual projection factor.

Although the number of academic couples increased from 1.1 percent of all couples in 1971 to about 9 percent in 2004, the one-career-pattern is still common in Germany. Even in academic couples, often only the male partner pursues a professional career. In 2004 in about every third academic couple, the woman was either not employed or did not pursue a professional job, despite her academic degree (cf. section 3).²

The goal of this article is to reveal alternative explanations for this gendered career gap that go beyond the educational-career resource argument. Therefore, we study career chances of academic couples, i.e., we keep the (initial) educational resources between the two partners equal. This allows us to explore further determinants and obstacles for dual careers of German academic couples. In the following, we theoretically outline and empirically show that dual-career chances depend not only on individual characteristics of each partner, but also on the constellation within couples with regard to age, profession, and child-rearing (sections 2 and 3). We then continue with a case study of employers' perspective on dual careers and a description of obstacles and constraints to dual careers caused by recruitment practices of German higher education institutions (section 4). In the concluding section, we summarize the main constraints and determinants of dual careers among academic couples.

2 Own calculations based on the Micro-census 2004 (cf. information at Table 1).

2. Determinants of dual careers – Theoretical considerations on the presence of children, couples' age difference and professional constellation

A large body of literature – especially on gender differences in career opportunities – focuses on how individual features (such as age, gender, educational level, professional field and experience) influence employment and career chances (e.g. Geenen 1993; Lauterbach 1994; Stroh & Reilly 1999; Allmendinger, Fuchs & Stebut 2000; Blossfeld & Drobnič 2001; Born & Krüger 2001; Baecker 2003). However, scholars have paid far less attention to the couple as unit of analysis and thus underestimated the importance of the *constellation* of the partners' individual characteristics within the couple. In this article, we therefore favor such a *relational* approach in which not only the individual age and professional field of the two partners as career determinants are taken into account, but the age and professional constellation of the two partners as well. In addition, we investigate the effect of children in order to reveal whether childlessness is a “dual-career strategy” to reduce family duties for both partners. Before presenting our empirical findings (in section 3), we will outline how the age difference between partners and couples' professional heterogeneity or homogeneity may influence dual-career opportunities.

In the literature, the *age difference* between partners is often seen as a gender-neutral determinant of the career chances of the two partners. This explanation appears to be straightforward on first glance: careers and career steps take time, and if the age of the two partners is unequal, unequal time periods have been available for each of their respective careers. Given the age difference between the partners and the resulting differences in career time, the older partner typically has already proceeded further in his/her career. According to the New Household Economics, it is therefore in the household's common interest for the older partner to have the “primary” career during a significant proportion of the life course (e.g. Hawkes, Nicola & Fish 1980; Kalter 1998; Becker & Moen 1999). A similar argument is made by resource-exchange theories, here the older partner has already accumulated more resources to assert his/her interests (e.g., Blood & Wolfe 1960). Since typically women are younger than their male partners (see Table 2), men will have the “primary” and women the “secondary” career.³ Correspondingly, one of the dominant explanations in the literature for the hindrance of female career efforts and thereby of dual careers addresses the age constellation, but from a gender-neutral perspective.

Here, we will add a gendered perspective on how the age constellation affects dual-career opportunities of academic couples. Age is not only a natural, but also a socially constructed characteristic. According to the naturalization of social relationships (cf. Douglas 1991), couples' age constellation may also define hierarchical and power relations between partners – i.e., the “older” partner is seen as the more experienced individual, legitimating his (or, less often, her) more powerful position in the couple. The typical age difference between men and women in couples may

3 The mean age difference between partners is about 3 years, which appears being a quite stable feature over time and across countries.

therefore “naturalize” hierarchical gender roles. In other words, different types of gender relations might be hidden behind or connected to the age difference between partners. The choice of the “typical” age constellation in heterosexual couples – i.e., the choice of an older man or a younger woman as a partner – may indicate a preference for hierarchical gender relations rather than simply a temporal career advantage of the man; whereas the choice of an “atypical” age constellation – i.e., the choice of a younger man or an older woman as a partner – might express a more egalitarian gender relationship between the two partners.

Table 2: Age constellations in German academic couples, 2004
(in rounded column percentages)

| | Total | Female partner is 30–39 yrs old | Female partner is 40–49 yrs old |
|--|------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <i>a) Typical age constellations</i> | | | |
| – No age difference: Age difference is max. 2 years (man is up to 2 yrs older/younger than the woman) | 52 | 53 | 52 |
| – Man is 3 to 7 yrs older than the woman | 32 | 34 | 31 |
| – Man is 8 or more yrs older than the woman* | 10 | 9 | 10 |
| <i>b) Atypical age constellation</i> | | | |
| – Woman is 3 or more yrs older than the man | 6 | 4 | 7 |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>100</i> | <i>100</i> | <i>100</i> |

Case selection: Heterosexual couples, only German citizens, women between 30 and 49 years old, men born after 1943.

* The mean age difference in these couples is 11 years.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 2004, weight by family projection factor.

In both (relational) perspectives, it is not only the individual age that may affect one’s own career opportunities, but also his/her age *relative* to his/her partner’s age. A gender-neutral effect of the age constellation would be indicated if the older partner – irrespective of gender – has a head start in terms of career and enjoys the “leading” career in comparison to the younger partner. Thus, dual careers should be more frequently found in couples in which the two partners are of similar age than in couples with a pronounced age difference. In contrast, according to a gender perspective on age constellation we would expect that couples in which the woman is older than the male partner more often have egalitarian arrangements. Thus, they should more frequently realize dual careers than age-typical couples.

Past research has also shown that *professional fields* are an important determinant of career opportunities. Their influence is connected to the relationship between labor market supply and demand at a given time as well as field-specific career-pathway patterns. Additionally, whether the professional fields of the two partners define *occupational homo- or heterogeneity* is of special importance. Firstly, in small local labor markets, partners in occupationally homogeneous couples might have to search for a job with the same employer. If (un)official anti-nepotism regulations exist, occupational homogeneity might constrain the professional career of (at least) one of the two partners and thereby hinder dual careers. Secondly, applying Parsons’ idea (1959) of stability of and competition within couples, occupational homogeneity might lead to greater competition between partners, for example with regard to mobility decisions

and the division of household (family) duties, and therefore restrict the realization of dual careers for the sake of the “relationship”. Alternatively, occupational homogeneity understood as shared social capital might instead constitute an opportunity for advantageous cooperation or mutual understanding for career steps and demands and thereby support dual careers (for a discussion see Bernasco, de Graaf & Ultee 1998; Sonnert 2005). Competition between partners or limitations in labor markets would be indicated if partners working in the same occupational field have a lower probability of a dual career than heterogeneous couples, whereas increased cooperative relationships through occupational homogeneity would be corroborated if dual careers exist more frequently in homogenous couples.

Finally, the *presence of children* as well as their age(s) are known to influence females’ professional careers and, therefore, should determine dual careers as well. Dual-career couples with children not only face the challenge of how to combine two careers, but also of how to intertwine occupational demands with childcare duties (e.g. Adler et al. 1989; Moen & Wethington 1992; Nock 1998). Several scholars note that many couples often start on an egalitarian basis, but after the birth of a child – or after mobility decisions for the benefit of the male career – they move towards a more traditional division of labor within the family (Gilbert 1985; Hensel 1991; Levy & Ernst 2002). This shift reflects still prevalent gender roles that also apply to academic women according to which, after childbirth, female partners should take on the main burden of child-rearing and show greater flexibility in order to accommodate family duties, whereas male partners are expected to ensure the financial resources of the family. As a consequence, the chances for female partners to pursue their own careers diminish, since even temporary career compromises often have enduring negative consequences for professional careers.⁴

This impact of children may vary, however, with employment-family-coordination patterns of couples. Past research has identified three main patterns. The first one is the *hierarchical (traditional) model* in which only one partner – most often the man – has the dominant career role, while the other partner supports (t)his leading career through primary responsibility for “private/family matters”. Explanations for the wide prevalence of this hierarchical relationship between partners are gender role ideologies (Bielby & Bielby 1992), considerations by the literature on new household economics (Becker 1991) and resource-exchange explanations (e.g. Blood & Wolfe 1960; Emerson 1976). In the *individualistic model*, each of the two partners independently pursues his/her own career and the partnership itself plays a secondary role. This arrangement is frequently linked with long-distance or commuter living arrangements, with the goal of optimally structuring the career chances of both partners (Kilpatrick 1982). However, as soon as children are born, this individualistic arrangement begins to waver, as it is based above all on the absence of the male’s resistance with regard to the female career – and this only as long as his own career is not jeopardized by it (Hertz 1986;

4 Research has shown, however, that due to different professional cultures and the availability of alternative career patterns, professions vary in their potential for the achievement of a work/life balance and, thus, the realization of dual careers (for medicine and psychology in Germany, see Hoff et al. 2002; Dettmer & Hoff 2005).

Levy & Ernst 2002).⁵ Public and private childcare and external household assistance are mostly considered as paid substitutions for the woman. If the costs are high, the risk of a re-traditionalization, i.e., a transition to the hierarchical pattern increases. Common strategies by academic women to avoid such a collision between family and career cycles, are to remain childless (Gilbert 1985) or to postpone having children (Austin & Pilat 1990; Costa & Kahn 2000; Gappa 1980; Monk-Turner & Turner 1987).⁶ The third coordination pattern, the *egalitarian model*, is considerably less frequent than the other two patterns. Here, professional careers and the family are of equal importance to the partners. Both partners therefore make compromises in their careers (or are willing to do so) in favor of their “relationship” and career opportunities for both partners (e.g. Becker & Moen 1999; Hardill et al. 1999; Costa & Kahn 2000).

With the data at hand, we are unable to observe directly couples’ coordination strategies and, thus, their influence on dual careers. Using our idea of a gendered age constellation in couples (see above), however, we are able to indirectly derive indications on couples’ career-household strategies. A gendered influence of the age constellation would be indicated by a “positive” main effect of the age-atypical constellation, i.e. age-atypical couples more often realize dual careers than age-typical couples. Given that there is a significant main effect of couples’ age constellation, the results of models that simultaneously control for children could signal the following: a) if the main effect disappears after controlling for children then age-atypical couples are more often childless – indicating (indirectly) that they follow more often the individualistic model than do age-typical couples; b) if the main effect of couples’ age constellation remains unchanged after controlling for children, then age-atypical couples realize dual careers to a larger extent than age-typical couples, and that regardless of children. This might indicate that age-atypical couples more often follow an egalitarian coordination pattern. Furthermore, we will control for differences between birth cohorts, in order to determine whether the relevance of individualistic and/or egalitarian coordination patterns has risen in recent years.

3. Empirical findings

In this section we empirically analyze the impact of the age constellation, occupational homogeneity and children on dual careers. We use the German Micro-census of 2004 (see methodological appendix).⁷ Our focus is on heterosexual *academic couples*, de-

5 Although highly qualified men more frequently show an egalitarian attitude to the work of women and division of labor in the household, in practice they rarely show egalitarian behavior (Hardill et al. 1999).

6 According to a study on academic careers (Krimmer et al. 2003), 26 percent of present-day German female professors consciously elected not to have children; this figure was only 10 per cent for male professors. As a result, in Germany today 50 per cent of female professors, but only 20 per cent of male professors are childless.

7 With this cross-sectional survey dual careers cannot be reconstructed in terms of decision situations, negotiation processes and decision outcomes. However, there is currently no alternative data base for investigating academic couples. In existing longitudinal studies, such as the Socio-economic panel of the German Institute for Economic Research and

defined as couples in which both partners hold an academic degree. Due to limited career information, we have defined *dual-career couples* as couples in which both partners carried out a professional occupation at the time of the survey (2004).⁸ We have defined *professional jobs* as those that formally require an academic degree or are usually occupied by persons holding an advanced academic degree.

According to this (broad) definition, half of the academic couples had dual-career arrangements, however, a significant proportion of these dual-career couples followed the “traditional” working-time pattern, i.e., the woman worked part-time (see Table 3).⁹ Although both partners held an academic degree, 27 percent of the couples have a (traditional) hierarchical career arrangement: the man was pursuing a professional occupation, while the woman was either not employed (14 percent) or not carrying out a professional occupation (13 percent).

Table 3: Employment/Career constellation depending on age of the woman and presence of underage children* in academic couples, 2004 (in rounded row percentages)

| | Dual Careers | | | No Dual Career | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------|------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|
| | Both full-time | Man full-time/Woman part-time | Unusual DC | Man career/Woman job | Man career/Woman not employed | Woman career/Man job | Woman career/Man not employed | Other |
| 30-39 yrs (Total) | 31 | 18 | 3 | 11 | 16 | 7 | 2 | 11 |
| No children | 52 | 6 | 2 | 10 | 6 | 11 | 3 | 9 |
| With children | 19 | 24 | 3 | 12 | 21 | 6 | 2 | 12 |
| 40-49 yrs (Total) | 24 | 23 | 2 | 14 | 12 | 9 | 2 | 12 |
| No children | 39 | 10 | 2 | 16 | 5 | 11 | 4 | 13 |
| With children | 18 | 29 | 3 | 13 | 16 | 9 | 2 | 11 |
| Total | 27 | 21 | 3 | 13 | 14 | 9 | 2 | 11 |

Case selection: Heterosexual couples, only German citizens, women between 30 and 49 years old, men born after 1943.

* The Micro-census’ category “children” includes biological, adopted, foster and stepchildren insofar as they live together with at least one parent in the household.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 2004, weight by family projection factor.

Our analyses will take place in three steps. As an essential precondition of dual careers we investigate first whether both partners are employed – regardless of the qualification level of jobs. As a second precondition we examine whether the female

German Life History Studies of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, the number of academic couples is too small.

8 The classification of *professional jobs* is based on the classification of occupations by the German Federal Statistical Office (it is a 3-digit code comparable to the International Standard Classification of Occupations, ISCO).

9 In the last 10 years, the chances of realizing dual careers have not changed. In 1997, only half of the academic couples had a dual-career arrangement; in 29 percent of the couples both partners pursued a professional job full-time and another 19 percent of the couples followed a traditional working-time arrangement (man full-time – woman part-time) (cf. Solga, Rusconi & Krüger 2005).

partners have access to professional jobs. And finally – as a “result” – we estimate a model on dual careers. For all three steps we present results of multinomial logistic regressions, as each of the dependent variables has several categories. In the regression tables, we display the odds ratios. Odds ratios greater than 1 signify a greater chance/risk, odds ratios smaller than 1 indicate a lower chance/risk in comparison to the respective reference category (which has the value 1).

Starting with the first precondition for dual careers, the *employment of both partners*, we note that the overwhelming majority of the academic couples realize dual-earner arrangements (79 percent). Only 17 percent of the couples follow the male-breadwinner model or the hierarchical coordination pattern (i.e., only the male partner is employed). However, Table 4 shows that female employment – particularly full-time – is strongly related to the presence of underage children in the family household. Among childless academic couples only a minority follows a traditional employment constellation in which the woman is either not employed (6 percent) or has only a part-time job (15 percent). In over two thirds of these childless couples both partners are employed full-time. Quite to the contrary, less than one third of couples with underage children shows a full-time dual-earner arrangement. A far more common strategy for academic couples with children is the part-time employment of the female partner (40 percent) or her complete withdrawal from the labor market (22 percent). Thus, once children are born, even couples in which both partners have made considerable educational investments are characterized by a more traditional (gendered) division of labor. By reducing the female commitment to the labor market, this traditional arrangement may also hinder dual careers because professional careers are seldom achieved in part-time positions and/or with (temporal) interruptions in employment careers.

Table 4: Employment constellation depending on age constellation and presence of underage children in academic couples, 2004 (in rounded row percentages)

| | Both full-time | Man full-time/ woman part-time | Only man employed | Unusual employment constellation* |
|--|----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| No children | | | | |
| Total | 69 | 15 | 6 | 10 |
| No age difference (max. 2 yrs) | 70 | 15 | 6 | 9 |
| Man is 3-7 yrs older | 67 | 15 | 7 | 11 |
| Man is 8 or more yrs older | 68 | 15 | 6 | 11 |
| Woman is 3 or more yrs older (= atypical) | 72 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| With children | | | | |
| Total | 30 | 40 | 22 | 7 |
| No age difference (max. 2 yrs) | 29 | 41 | 22 | 8 |
| Man is 3-7 yrs older | 31 | 40 | 22 | 7 |
| Man is 8 or more yrs older | 33 | 40 | 19 | 8 |
| Woman is 3 or more yrs older (= atypical) | 31 | 39 | 22 | 8 |

* Both partners work part-time; woman full-time/man part-time; only woman employed; both partners not employed.

Case selection: Heterosexual couples, only German citizens, women between 30 and 49 years old, men born after 1943.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 2004, weighted by family projection factor.

Noteworthy, 29 percent of the dual-earner academic couples show an occupational homogeneity; i.e., both partners are employed in the same occupational sector. With regard to the age constellation, atypical couples (i.e., in couples in which women are the older partner) do not differ in their employment arrangement from couples with a typical age constellation.

By means of multivariate analyses we will now determine the (net) influence of the age constellation, occupational homogeneity and children on the chances of realizing *dual-earner arrangements*. The findings presented in Table 5 (model 1 and 2) disclose that for the classical gendered division of labor not children as such but *underage children* prove to be of tremendous importance, particularly if they are younger than three years old. In comparison to childless couples, in families with small children the female partners are twice more likely to be not employed than to pursue at least a part-time job, while their male partners are full-time employed. Thus, even in academic couples, children hinder an egalitarian employment constellation. And this negative effect of children on dual-earner arrangements does not vary among couples with different age constellations (data not shown).¹⁰

The *age constellation* of couples also has an influence on the employment arrangements. Yet, as revealed by the interaction terms, this effect varies by women's birth cohort (cf. model 2 in Table 5). For the *younger cohort* (i.e., women aged between 30 and 39), in couples in which the partners are of the same age, the question appears to be either all or nothing: either both partners have a full-time job (odds ratio = 1,68), or the woman forgoes formal employment altogether (odds ratio = 1,58).¹¹ Thus, female part-time employment does not appear a "favored" strategy for these couples. In terms of full-time or part-time dual-earner arrangement, both age atypical couples (woman is older) and those with a very typical age constellation (i.e., woman is 3 to 7 years younger) are not different from same-aged couples. In contrast, couples in which the man is 8 or more years older than the woman have a lower chance of following a full-time dual-earner arrangement than couples of other age constellations.¹² In terms of traditional employment arrangements ("only the man is employed"), however, couples in which male partners are 8 years older than the women are not different from same-aged or age atypical couples. In addition, couples with a very typical age constellation show even lower odds for this traditional division of labor than couples of other age constellations, but also "unusual" employment constellations are found less often among such traditional couples.¹³

10 For space reasons the results of the model with interaction effects between age constellation and children is not included in Table 5. Data is available from the corresponding author on request.

11 Because of the included interaction effects (in model 2) the odds of employment pattern of same-aged couples (reference category) are displayed by the main effects of "age of the women" (or women's birth cohort).

12 Odds ratio difference = $1.43 * 0.49 = 0,7$

13 For "only man employed" the odds ratio difference for couples in which the man is 3 to 7 year older than the woman is $1,23$ (n.s.) $* 0,70 = 0,86$ (n.s. means not significant); for "unusual employment constellation" the odds ratio difference is $1,37 * 0,54 = 0,74$.

Table 5: Multinomial logistic regressions on the employment constellation in academic couples (reference category: Man full-time – Woman part-time) (odds ratios, N = 4,308 couples)

| | Both full-time employed | | Only man employed | | Unusual constellation+ | |
|--|----------------------------|---------|-------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|
| | Mod. 1 | Mod. 2 | Mod. 1 | Mod. 2 | Mod. 1 | Mod. 2 |
| <i>Age constellation</i> (Ref: No age difference, max. 2 yrs.) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Man is 3-7 yrs older | 1,00 | 1,06 | 1,05 | 1,23 | 1,05 | 1,37* |
| Man is 8 or more yrs older | 1,07 | 1,43** | 1,04 | 0,98 | 1,10 | 1,31 |
| Woman is 3 or more yrs older | 1,20 | 1,21 | 1,33 | 1,18 | 1,07 | 0,88 |
| <i>Age of the woman</i> (Ref: 40-49 yrs old) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 30-39 yrs old | 1,49*** | 1,68*** | 1,44*** | 1,58*** | 0,97 | 1,20 |
| <i>Number of children</i> (Ref: No children under 18 yrs) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 child | 0,30*** | 0,30*** | 0,71* | 0,71* | 0,36*** | 0,36*** |
| 2 children | 0,18*** | 0,18*** | 0,66** | 0,66** | 0,25*** | 0,25*** |
| 3 or more children | 0,14*** | 0,14*** | 1,37 | 1,36 | 0,25*** | 0,25*** |
| <i>Age of the youngest child</i> (Ref: no child under 11 yrs) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Under 3 yrs | 1,09 | 1,08 | 2,15*** | 2,17*** | 1,77** | 1,80** |
| 3-10 yrs | 0,60*** | 0,60*** | 1,46*** | 1,49*** | 1,07 | 1,10 |
| Interaction: Age of woman * Age constellation | | | | | | |
| 30-39 yrs old * Man is 3-7 yrs older | | 0,85 | | 0,70* | | 0,54** |
| 30-39 yrs old * Man is 8 or more yrs older | | 0,49** | | 1,03 | | 0,64 |
| 30-39 yrs old * Woman is 3 or more yrs older | | 1,18 | | 1,62 | | 1,95 |
| <i>Improvement of fit</i> (df): | 1249,84 (42) *** (Model 1) | | | | | |
| | 1267,65 (51) *** (Model 2) | | | | | |

+ Unusual employment constellation: Both work part-time; woman full-time/man part-time; only woman employed; both partners not employed.

Controlled for size of residence, place of residence in East or West Germany, married/unmarried cohabitation

Coefficients are significant: $p < 0.01$ ***; $p < 0.05$ **; $p < 0.1$

Case selection: Heterosexual couples, both partners German citizens, women between 30 and 49 years old, men born after 1943.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 2004, unweighted.

For the *older cohort* (i.e., women aged between 40 and 49), differences between couples are less pronounced. In contrast to the younger cohort, “unusual” employment constellations are found surprisingly to a higher extent in age-typical couples (odds ratio = 1,37) than in couples with other age constellations. In addition, if their partner is 8 or more years older, the 40-to-49-year-old female partners have a greater probability to work full-time than to follow a part-time dual-earner arrangement (odds ratio = 1,43). In sum, in *both cohorts*, contrary to our expectations, age-atypical couples do not have a higher probability of dual-earner arrangements.

All together, underage children lower the chances of female academics’ labor force participation and thereof dual-earner arrangements. Moreover, our results indicate that this employment constellation varies by both women’s birth cohort and couples’ age constellation. In academic couples belonging to the *younger cohort*, men are more likely to enjoy an employment advantage. More or less independently of couples’ age constellation, in this cohort there exists an employment “divide” because full-time dual-earner arrangements or the male-breadwinner model are more common than the part-time dual-earner model. In the *older cohort*, an older male

partner appears to enhance the chances of a dual full-time arrangement for couples in which women are 8 years younger than the men and of unusual employment constellations for age-typical couples (man 3 to 7 years older). These variations in the impact of the age constellation by women's birth cohorts are not caused by (a composition effect with regard to) children, as these were simultaneously taken into account in the models (see also Appendix, Table A3). Therefore another reason may lie behind this cohort-specific influence of the age constellation. The variation might indicate that when the woman is still young and in the process of positioning herself on the labor market, more couples might give priority to the employment of the (older) already more established male partner. Once couples and thus women age, they might (be able to) develop more egalitarian employment arrangements. In contrast to this age-effect explanation, there might be also a *cohort* explanation according to which women and men of the 1955-to-1964-cohort, for example, have more egalitarian gender roles or had better career (labor market) conditions at the beginning of their professional careers (i.e., in the 1980s). Given the limitations of the cross-sectional data used here, we are unable to differentiate between the two explanations.

As labor market research has shown, a second major constraint for dual careers are the career chances of women. Table 6 presents the results for the influence of the age constellation, occupational homogeneity and children on the chances of *employed* female partners (in academic couples) to follow a professional occupation. Similar to the employment constellation, the presence of underage children reduces the probability of female full-time professional employment (indicated in model 1 by the odds ratios for women with children for the category "full-time professional job" which are smaller than 1). This negative effect of children on female full-time professional engagement does not vary between couples with different age constellations (data not shown).¹⁴ Academic women with children do however, have a *greater* likelihood in comparison to childless women, of being able to at least pursue a professional job part-time (indicated in model 1 by the odds ratios for women with children for the category "no professional job" which are smaller than 1). Thus, those women who succeed in being employed "in spite of" children are then more likely to pursue a professional occupation (at least part-time) than just a "job".

¹⁴ For space reasons the results of the model with an interaction effects between age constellation and children is not included in Table 6. Data is available from the corresponding author on request.

Table 6: Multinomial logistic regressions on the chance of being employed in a professional job by *female academics* in academic couples (reference category: Part-time professional job) (odds ratios, N = 3,538 only employed female academics)

| | No professional job | | Full-time professional job | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------|
| | Mod. 1 | Mod. 2 | Mod. 1 | Mod. 2 |
| <i>Age constellation</i> (Ref: No age difference, max. 2 yrs.) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Man is 3-7 yrs older | 0,85 | 0,80 | 0,97 | 1,03 |
| Man is 8 or more yrs older | 0,87 | 0,73 | 0,97 | 1,23 |
| Woman is 3 or more yrs older | 0,81 | 0,67 | 1,13 | 1,05 |
| <i>Age of the woman</i> (Ref: 40-49 yrs old) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 30-39 yrs old | 1,03 | 0,86 | 1,38*** | 2,12*** |
| Occupational homogeneity (defined by occupational field) (Ref: <i>Heterogeneous couples, man in sales/office jobs</i>) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Man is not in employment | 1,23 | 1,20 | 1,50 | 1,49 |
| Homogeneous – sales/office jobs | 1,56** | 1,58** | 1,55** | 1,56** |
| Homogeneous – health | 0,09*** | 0,09*** | 1,36 | 1,33 |
| Homogeneous – education and teaching | 0,06*** | 0,06*** | 0,83 | 0,83 |
| Homogeneous – technical jobs | 0,18*** | 0,18*** | 1,48 | 1,52* |
| Homogeneous – other job areas | 0,66 | 0,66 | 0,88 | 0,89 |
| Heterogeneous – Man in health, education, technical & other jobs | 0,89 | 0,89 | 0,86 | 0,85 |
| <i>Age of the youngest child</i> (Ref: No children under 18 yrs) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Under 3 yrs | 0,38*** | 0,35*** | 0,22*** | 0,25*** |
| 3-10 yrs | 0,30*** | 0,28*** | 0,12*** | 0,19*** |
| 11-17 yrs | 0,46*** | 0,42*** | 0,24*** | 0,27*** |
| Interaction: Age of woman * Age of youngest child | | | | |
| 30-39 yrs old * Child under 3 yrs | | 1,17 | | 0,71 |
| 30-39 yrs old * Child 3-10 yrs | | 1,13 | | 0,36*** |
| 30-39 yrs old * Child 11-17 yrs | | 3,23** | | 1,41 |
| Interaction: Age of woman * Age constellation | | | | |
| 30-39 yrs old * Man is 3-7 yrs older | | 1,13 | | 0,90 |
| 30-39 yrs old * Man is 8 or more yrs older | | 1,44 | | 0,57* |
| 30-39 yrs old * Woman is 3 or more yrs older | | 1,98 | | 1,37 |
| <i>Improvement of fit (df):</i> | | | | |
| | | 946,22 (38) *** (Model 1) | | |
| | | 991,89 (50) *** (Model 2) | | |

Controlled for size of residence, place of residence in East or West Germany, married/unmarried cohabitation

Coefficients are significant: $p < 0.01$ ***; $p < 0.05$ **; $p < 0.1$

Case selection: Employed female academics in heterosexual couples, both partners German citizens, women between 30 and 49 years old, men born after 1943.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 2004, unweighted.

The interaction effect between age of children and women's birth cohort reveals that this strategy of reconciling work and family duties through the woman's reduced working hours is followed more often by older rather than younger female academics.¹⁵

¹⁵ This corresponds with the finding that in older cohort, part-time and full-time dual-earner arrangements were equally likely, whereas in the younger there was a division between full-time dual-earner or male-breadwinner families.

Younger female academics with 11-to-17-year-old children – who thus had their children at a relatively early age compared to older female academics with children of the same age – have a higher risk of being employed in a non-professional position.¹⁶ In addition, younger female academics with 3-to-10-year-old children have clearly lower chances of carrying out a full-time professional occupation (than a part-time professional job) compared to older female academics with children of the same age.¹⁷

With regard to age constellation, our results reveal almost no effects (cf. model 1 in Table 6). If women are employed, female academics of the *younger* cohort have higher chances to have a full-time professional occupation than a part-time one and in this regard differences among couples' age constellations are rather small. Only in the younger cohort do women with a considerably older partner (8 or more years) have a lower probability of a full-time rather than part-time professional occupation compared to women in couples with other age constellations.¹⁸

Finally, occupational homogeneity between partners generally enhances women's chances not only of being employed, but also of pursuing a professional occupation. Female academics in homogeneous couples in health and education/teaching have a higher likelihood of being employed (at least) part-time in a professional occupation (odds ratios for "no professional jobs" versus part-time professional jobs/reference category are smaller than 1 and for "full-time professional positions" are not significant). Employed female academics in homogeneous couples in technical jobs have higher chances of working in part-time and full-time professional positions (see also section 4). Among homogeneous couples, the chances for female professional careers in sales/clerical occupations seem to be divided because, on the one hand, they have a higher risk of being employed in non-professional jobs (odds ratio = 1,58), yet on the other hand, if they do practice a professional occupation, they have a greater chance of doing so full-time (odds ratio = 1,56). All together, these results speak in favor of more cooperative (rather than competitive) relationships within occupationally homogeneous couples.

To conclude, children constrain the opportunities for full-time professional careers of women in academic couples, and this more so in the younger than the older cohort. Given the same age of children in 2004, this cohort difference expresses the women's age at the transition to motherhood. It indicates that the younger female academics are at child birth, the lower are their career chances. The couples' age constellation plays a minor role in shifting the likelihood of female employment in a professional position. And finally, occupational homogeneity between partners seems to enhance the professional careers of women, which suggests that such homogeneity constitutes shared (borrowed) social capital in couples rather than increasing (hierarchical) competition between the partners.

In our final step, we now examine the importance of the age constellation, occupational homogeneity and children for the *realization of dual careers* in academic couples, given that the hurdle of a dual-earner arrangement has already been successfully overcome. Accordingly, our multivariate analyses only include couples in

16 Odds ratio difference = 0,86 (n.s.)*3,23 = 2,8

17 Odds ratio difference = 2,12*0,36 = 0,76

18 Odds ratio difference = 1,23 (n.s.)*0,57 = 0,70

which both partners are employed (Table 7). The results show that children and occupational homogeneity are the main factors that hinder or increase the chances of academic couples to pursue dual careers.

Table 7: Multinomial logistic regressions on the chance of realizing dual careers in academic couples (reference category: no dual career) (odds ratios, N = 3,284 couples in which both partners are employed)

| | Dual career: both partner full-time | | | Dual career: man full-time – woman part-time | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|---------|----------------------------|--|---------|---------|
| | Mod. 1 | Mod. 2 | Mod. 3 | Mod. 1 | Mod. 2 | Mod. 3 |
| <i>Age constellation</i> (Ref: No age difference, max. 2 yrs.) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Man is 3-7 yrs older | 1,16 | 1,22 | 1,22 | 1,14 | 1,08 | 1,09 |
| Man is 8 or more yrs older | 1,29 | 1,55** | 1,52** | 1,36* | 1,34 | 1,34 |
| Woman is 3 or more yrs older | 1,02 | 0,98 | 0,99 | 0,94 | 0,99 | 0,99 |
| <i>Age of the woman</i> (Ref: 40-49 yrs old) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 30-39 yrs old | 1,32*** | 1,74*** | 1,96*** | 0,91 | 0,73 | 0,75 |
| <i>Occupational homogeneity</i> (Ref: Heterogeneous couple) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Homogeneous couple | 5,52*** | 5,59*** | 7,40*** | 3,97*** | 3,94*** | 4,74*** |
| <i>Age of the youngest child</i> (Ref: No children under 18 yrs) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Under 3 yrs | 0,63*** | 0,80 | 0,79 | 3,40*** | 3,82*** | 3,80*** |
| 3-10 yrs | 0,42*** | 0,63*** | 0,63*** | 4,17*** | 3,72*** | 3,72*** |
| 11-17 yrs | 0,56*** | 0,59*** | 0,58*** | 2,68*** | 2,57*** | 2,55*** |
| <i>Interaction: Age of woman * Age of youngest child</i> | | | | | | |
| 30-39 yrs old * Child under 3 yrs | | 0,68 | 0,70 | | 0,96 | 0,97 |
| 30-39 yrs old * Child 3-10 yrs | | 0,40*** | 0,41*** | | 1,33 | 1,35 |
| 30-39 yrs old * Child 11-17 yrs | | 1,17 | 1,14 | | 0,50 | 0,50 |
| <i>Interaction: Age of woman * Age constellation</i> | | | | | | |
| 30-39 yrs old * Man is 3-7 yrs older | | 0,92 | 0,92 | | 1,12 | 1,11 |
| 30-39 yrs old * Man is 8 or more yrs older | | 0,67 | 0,70 | | 1,03 | 1,04 |
| 30-39 yrs old * Woman is 3 or more yrs older | | 1,05 | 1,05 | | 0,69 | 0,69 |
| <i>Interaction: Age of woman * Occupational homogeneity</i> | | | | | | |
| 30-39 yrs old * Homogeneous couple | | | 0,57** | | | 0,69 |
| <i>Improvement of fit (df):</i> | | | | | | |
| | | | 1002,63 (28) *** (Model 1) | | | |
| | | | 1034,74 (40) *** (Model 2) | | | |
| | | | 1044,00 (44) *** (Model 3) | | | |

Controlled for place size, place of residence in East or West Germany, married/unmarried cohabitation.

Coefficients are significant: p<0.01***; p<0.05**, p<0.1*

Case selection: Both partners employed, heterosexual couples, both partners German citizens, women between 30 and 49 years old, men born after 1943. Couples with atypical dual-career constellation were not taken into account due to the small sample size.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 2004, unweighted.

As expected, children reduce the probability of full-time dual careers (indicated by the significant main effect of children in model 1)¹⁹ and particularly the chances of

19 The negative effect of children on full-time dual-careers does not vary among couples with different age constellation (data not shown). For space reasons, the results of the

those couples in which the female partner is between 30 and 39 years old.²⁰ However, academic couples with children have a greater likelihood of pursuing “at least” a dual-career arrangement with a traditional working-time arrangement (man full-time, woman part-time) than childless couples. Thus, among childless dual-earner couples there is a larger divide between egalitarian couples (full-time dual career) and traditional (one-career) couples, whereas among the dual-earner couples with children there is a larger number of *partial* egalitarian couples (dual careers with a traditional working-time pattern). However, we must keep in mind that the models in table 7 considered only couples in which both partners are employed. As our previous results have shown, the existence of children determines whether or not couples follow dual-earner arrangements in the first place (see Table 5). Nonetheless, those couples – or more precisely, those women who with the support or against the will of their partner – succeed in being employed “in spite of” children are then more likely to pursue dual careers (albeit with unequal working hours).

Occupational homogeneity in academic couples seems to foster full-time dual careers (positive odds ratio), and this to a larger extent in the older than the younger cohort,²¹ as well as dual careers with a traditional working-time pattern (odds ratio = approximately 4) – caused through better cooperation or “only” by better understanding career requirements.

Finally, with regard to the age difference between partners, the main effects in models 2 and 3 show that – especially in the older cohort²² – couples in which the male partner is considerably older than the woman (i.e., at least 8 years) have a higher likelihood to pursue dual careers full-time. Given that both partners are employed, this finding suggests that a temporal career advantage of the man does not necessarily imply that the female partner suffers disadvantage. Rather, if the age difference is “large enough” and thus the partners are at very different stages in their careers, this age constellation may be congruent with egalitarian dual-career arrangements.

model with an interaction effects between age constellation and children is not included in Table 7. Data is available from the corresponding author on request.

20 Odds ratio difference = $1,96 * 0,41 = 0,8$ in model 3

21 The odds ratio difference to heterogeneous couples within cohorts for “full-time dual career” are: for 40-to-49-year old women = 7,4 compared to 30-to-39-year-old women = $7,4 * 0,57 = 4,22$.

22 The comparison of model 1 and 2 suggests that this positive effect is especially true for couples in which the woman is between 40 and 49 years old. The effect of the age constellation becomes first significant in model 2 with the introduction of the interaction effect with women’s age, which is – though not significant – less than 1 for couples in which the woman is 30 to 39 years old and 8 or more years younger than the male partner.

4. Institutional constraints on dual careers in Germany's academia

Besides the characteristics of individuals and couples, normative and structural constraints hinder the achievement of dual careers. Recruitment and promotion practices in professional fields shape the work histories and career opportunities of individuals as well as couples. If organizations ignore the family and/or partnership context (e.g., if they follow un/official anti-nepotism regulations that forbid both individuals' employment in the same organization – which eventually discriminate against the younger, usually female, partner) they are powerful constraints for the realization of dual careers. In North America, for example, anti-nepotism policies are allowed only when they are applied without a gender bias. However, given their adverse impact on female careers they have been largely abolished since the 1970s (Dagg 1993; McNeil & Sher 2001). Instead, recruitment practices that accommodate dual-career partners and take into account the “family context” of male and female academics have been increasingly developed in order to successfully recruit and retain qualified candidates (for a review of ‘spouse-hiring’ programs at US universities, see Rusconi 2002). The situation in Germany is different: the interest in dual-career arrangements and institutional support for dual careers are still relatively new in both scholarly debates and personnel strategies. Private enterprises were the first to recognize the need to accommodate dual-career couples (Domsch 1989; 1992; Domsch & Ladwig 1997; Domsch & Krüger-Basener 1999), and the public sector continues to trail behind.²³

Given the lack of adequate data on general employers' practices toward dual careers couples, we have to limit our analysis to a case study. In this section, we will therefore report on some institutional constraints for *dual careers* at German universities and advanced colleges. They provide an example of academics' employers that delivers insights into the (external) normative and institutional context in which academic couples try to realize dual careers. Although only a minority of individuals and couples with a university degree pursue (or seek) a career in academia, the focus on higher education institutions is particularly interesting because it appears that the very institution that provides the precondition or resources (i.e., academic education) for equal opportunities between men and women denies them in practice: careers in German academia are to a great extent *male* careers.²⁴ Moreover, academia is a clear example of a tight labor market and thus if both partners pursue academic careers they will more likely have to apply (and possibly even compete) for the same jobs or jobs offered by the same employer.

We will use data of a survey conducted by Germany's Young Academy of Science (*Junge Akademie*) in 2001. In this survey, top administrators and affirmative

23 In Berlin, for example, an anti-nepotism law from 1954 still applies which forbids the employment of spouses in the same institution in the public sector.

24 In 2004, 49 percent of the university graduates were women, but the female ratio among the PhDs was only 39 percent, among the academics with the “second German PhD” (called “Habilitation”) only 23 percent and among the professors only 14 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006).

action officers of German universities and colleges (in the following, “universities”) were asked about their opinions about family issues and their support for dual-careers – key issues for being able to successfully transfer couples’ dual-career efforts into *real* dual careers.²⁵

With regard to external dual-career constraints for German academic couples, we will report on three important questions: (1) Do partners’ career prospects play a role in offers for professorships, and how does their influence vary by gender and academic field of candidates? Answers to these questions reveal the increasing interest in dual careers by academic couples and – given gender and field differences – variations in negotiation power and/or opportunity structures for professional careers in local labor markets outside universities. (2) How do German universities react to dual career (including family) requests by professorship candidates? These reactions constrain opportunities for academic couples to coordinate two careers and their family life. And (3) how do universities support academic careers with children and, thus in a broader sense, not only dual-career couples, but also dual-career families?

With respect to the first question, the results of this survey show that dual careers are an *issue* at German universities. Over 60 percent of the participating top administrators reported that they had been confronted with dual-career issues during job interviews for professorships. This issue appears to be addressed more frequently by candidates from the humanities or social sciences than by candidates from natural sciences or medical schools. Given the quite large number of academic couples which is homogeneous with regard to partners’ professional fields (see section 3 and Appendix, Table 2a), this difference suggests that, depending on the partner’s professional background and thus his/her chances on the local labor market (which are usually poorer for the humanities and social sciences), academic couples need active support by universities to find an adequate employment for their partner to varying extents.²⁶

In addition, whereas over half of the affirmative action officers reported that this issue had been raised equally often by male and female candidates, the majority of the top administrators stated that especially male candidates addressed this subject (67 percent). This difference is partially due to the fact that affirmative action officers and top administrators are engaged at different stages in the appointment procedure: whereas the former are member of the appointment committee, top administrators become active once a candidate has been offered a position. So fewer dual-career requests by women mentioned by top administrators is partially due to the fact that women are still appointed as professors much less frequently than men.²⁷

25 The response rate of this mailed survey was very high: 181 top administrators from 322 universities (56 percent) and 149 affirmative action officers (46 percent). For further information see Rusconi & Solga (2002), available at www.diejungeakademie.de.

26 This interpretation is corroborated by our analyses using the Micro-census 2004 (see section 3, Table 6). Female academics in occupationally homogeneous couples in technical fields have higher chances to pursue a full-time professional job. (The positive, but not significant, magnitude of the effect for “health” couples suggests the same).

27 In 2005, only 14 percent of the (associate and full) professors at German universities and colleges were women, among the full (C4/W3) professors there were less than 10 percent women (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006).

The increase of dual-career couples who are not willing to sacrifice one partner's career in favor of the other partner's career is reflected in rejected offers of a professorship due to a lack of adequate professional opportunities for the partner. Almost half of the universities reported that, within the last two years, they had received refusals which were solely or partially motivated by career considerations for the partner. Because such rejections are becoming increasingly problematic in the world-wide competition for the best candidates,²⁸ 58 percent of the top administrators and 55 percent of the affirmative action officers at German universities think that the partner's employment prospects *should be* part of the negotiation process for professorships. Particularly affirmative action officers are aware that universities' support for dual-career couples is essential to achieve equal opportunities between men and women.

Given this high degree of consensus on the increasing relevance of dual-career issues at German universities, how do universities respond to such requests by professorship candidates? Although official spouse-hiring programs do not exist at German universities, more than half of the top administrator respondents – confronted with a candidate's dual-career requests – reported that they provided different types of assistance for the partner's employment. However, only a minority offered jobs within the same university (less than 10 percent). Supporting partners' employment/careers mainly meant contacting employers outside the university.

Our multivariate analyses have shown, however, that support was offered more often when male candidates addressed the employment prospects of their partner (see Solga & Rusconi 2004: 82). Two reasons might explain why it appears to be easier for universities to help female "partners" to find a new job. Firstly, women are usually younger than their male partners and therefore seldom eligible for a professorship themselves; whereas this might not be the case for male (typically older) partners of female candidates (see also section 2). Secondly, female partners are often school teachers (cf. Appendix, Table A2) and, thus, job moves can be initiated by universities' close contacts to the ministry of education.

These reported reactions by top administrators are, however, only part of the story. Since top administrators are involved in the recruitment process once a candidate has been offered a position, they may have an interest in solving problems, which may hinder the appointment. The answers of affirmative action officers reveal that appointment committees are less "sympathetic" to dual-career issues; especially when they are brought forward by female candidates (Rusconi & Solga 2002). Women who inquire about employment opportunities for their partners are often regarded as not being "serious" candidates. But even if female candidates do not raise this issue themselves, their chances of getting on the short list is often lower than that of male applicants because the committee's members often assume traditional gender roles and doubt that male partners will be willing to relocate. In addition, commuting as a private solution of geographical mobility in academic couples is often seen critically and penalized by appointment committees as well. All in all, nowadays it seems to be easier

28 According to a study on German academics resident abroad, for married academics the second most important criterion for returning to Germany is a satisfying job offer for the partner (Backhaus, Ninke & Over 2002).

to address dual-career issues, at least as a top candidate. Yet, practical and not only rhetorical support remains quite exceptional nevertheless.

With regard to the third and last question, in spite of the increasing awareness of dual-career issues at German universities, child-care issues still get less attention. In over 60 percent of the universities, the time spent for childcare is either never or only very rarely taken into account by measuring and assessing candidates' publication productivity. Only one-quarter of the German universities regularly take into account time spent for childrearing – but usually only when candidates made use of parental leave. This “ignorance” of not considering parental duties – which is often considered to be gender-blind or gender-neutral – has, however, quite gendered consequences because predominantly mothers try to reconcile career and childcare without parental leave or by taking an abbreviated leave. Consequently, if the presence of children (regardless of parental leave) is not given due credit, there is a risk that female academics with children will be indirectly discriminated against, because they might be considered less productive than male or childless female academics. Furthermore, over half of the universities provide *no* childcare facilities. Academics with children have to rely upon childcare facilities of the local community, whose opening times are often incompatible with the “flexible full-time job” prevalent in academia.

The results of the survey show that German universities lack institutionalized dual-career policies, even if the majority of top administrators and affirmative action officers acknowledge the importance of and the advantages for institutions to accommodate dual-career couples. Moreover, the situation of younger academic couples – at career stages below professorships – is even worse, given their lack of status power and mostly fixed-term contracts.

5. Conclusions

Our results have shown that German academia is still a man's world with rather traditional employment/career arrangements, even among academic couples. It is mostly the constraints on professional careers of academically trained women that hinder dual careers in academic couples.

The first critical point is the employment arrangement within the couple, which is dependent on the presence of underage children, on the woman's birth cohort and on the couples' age constellation. With regard to women's birth cohort, in the younger cohort female academics were less willing (or likely) to work part-time than women of the older cohort. In the older cohort, especially couples in which the gender “typical” age difference was very large (i.e., woman is 8 or more years younger), followed full-time dual-earner arrangements. The second critical point for dual careers is the probability that female academics will not only be employed, but also pursue a professional career. Here, we found that if female academics with (underage) children are employed then they have higher odds of occupying professional positions than childless academics – however, often they do so (only) part-time. Interestingly, occupational homogeneity seems to enhance females' professional careers. Finally, what are the main obstacles and determinants of realizing dual careers

in German academic couples? Considering only dual-earner couples, children reduce the chances of full-time dual careers, occupational homogeneity increases the odds of dual careers, and age-typical couples in which the woman is much younger (8 years and more) than the man have heightened chances to achieve dual careers.

All together, “childlessness” can be seen as a “strategy” to promote and realize dual careers. On each “dimension of dual careers” (partners’ labor force participation and working time, the female’s professional position, and professional positions for both partners), children add to the risk of couples having a one-career (hierarchical) coordination strategy. As the survey results of top administrators and affirmative actions officers at German universities have revealed, “gender-blind” recruitment criteria contribute to a large extent to this risk. To avoid or reduce this hazard, German academic couples often (successfully) try to establish (at least) a part-time career for the female partner. This was more accepted by women of our older cohort (i.e., 40-to-49-years-old) than by women of our younger birth cohort (i.e., 30-to-39-years-old). Our findings from the German university survey (see section 4) corroborate this cohort difference: today, German academic couples – male and female partners – express the dual-career issue more pronouncedly and publicly than in the past. In addition, regardless of age, occupationally homogeneous couples are more often dual-career couples than heterogeneous couples – supporting the idea that in the former, support and understanding for career demands are higher and shared social networks increase career opportunities.

Our hypotheses on gender-neutral versus gendered consequences of couples’ age constellation are not fully resolved as we have found supporting as well as contradictory results for each perspective. The main result is that the age constellation of couples very rarely had an impact on dual-career chances. Thus, with respect to the (dominant) gender-neutral explanation, it is not the age difference in partnerships that defines a “leading” career of the older partner (most often the man). Our findings also speak against the other common explanation of the hindrance of dual careers – namely that women are *generally* disadvantaged. In fact, couples in which women are much younger than their male partners, actually have a higher chance of realizing full-time dual-career arrangements – and this is not caused by having fewer children. These and other findings illustrate that the age constellation in partnerships does *not* refer to a purely temporal relationship, but rather to a *relational* social characteristic of couples which might be linked with partnership arrangements. From such an interactive perspective, the age constellation of couples would not be an unintended result of partner choice – resulting from the age structure and constraints of the partner market²⁹ – but rather a deliberate aspect of partnership formation.

29 “An interesting finding is that with increasing age, women choose increasingly younger partners. But this has little to do with increasing emancipation or the like. For men it is also the case that the older the man the younger the partner. And the simple reason lies in the age structure of the marriage market: The older the man or woman is himself or herself, the more potential partners of the same or a higher age are already committed and the more strongly the opportunity structure shifts in favor of a younger partner” (Klein 2000: 237, translation by the authors).

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Appendix:

The German Micro-census is the official representative census on the population living in Germany, in which 1 per cent of all households participate. Each year data from approximately 820,000 persons living in 370,000 households are gathered. For these analyses, the German Micro-census from 2004 was used. From the available data pool, the unit of analysis is *academic couples*, defined as partnerships in which both partners hold an academic degree and who live together in shared living quarters (whether in a marriage or domestic partnership). Couples who run separate households (“living apart together”) cannot be identified with the German Micro-census. Only *heterosexual* academic couples in which both partners hold *German citizenship* were considered. This selection was necessary, as the case numbers for same-sex and bi-national couples are too small for their necessary consideration in the analyses. In addition, only couples were analyzed in which the women were between 30 and 49 years old in 2004. In light of the examination of professional careers, we focus on the “prime age” in the career at which time labor market entry processes should already have ensued. Finally, we have excluded all of those couples in which the man was born before 1943 (in order to rule out processes of exit from the labor market).

Table A1: Case selection from the German Micro-census 2004

| | Number unweighted | Number weighted* |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------|
| Academic partnerships in the German Micro-census 2004 in <i>total</i> | 8,528 (100%) | 1,418,422 (100%) |
| From these: | | |
| – only German-German couples | 7,783 (91.3%) | 1,270,060 (89.5%) |
| – only heterosexual couples | 7,748 (90.8%) | 1,264,321 (89.1%) |
| – only couples in which women were between 30 and 49 yrs (2004) | 4,377 (51.3%) | 713,706 (50.3%) |
| – only couples in which the men were born after 1943 | 4,308 (50.5%) | 702,462 (49.5%) |

* Weighted by family projection factor.

Table A2: Occupational homogeneity and occupational field of the woman in academic couples (only couples in which both partners are employed) (in rounded row percentages)

| | % occupational field of female partner (column percentages) | Occupational heterogeneous | Occupational homogeneous | Not specified |
|------------------------|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|
| sales/office jobs | 29 | 74 | 25 | 1 |
| health | 13 | 64 | 36 | 1 |
| education and teaching | 38 | 71 | 28 | 1 |
| technical jobs | 7 | 49 | 49 | 2 |
| Other fields | 13 | 66 | 25 | 9 |
| Total | 100 | 69 | 29 | 2 |

Case selection: Heterosexual couples, only German citizens, women between 30 and 49 years old, men born after 1943.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 2004, weighted by family projection factor.

Table A3: Presence and age of underage children* and age of the woman in academic couples, 2004 (in rounded column percentages)

| | Total | 30-39 yrs old | 40-49 yrs old |
|----------------------|------------|---------------|---------------|
| No children under 18 | 32 | 35 | 30 |
| Under 3 yrs | 21 | 39 | 5 |
| 3-10 yrs | 26 | 23 | 30 |
| 11-17 yrs | 20 | 3 | 35 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Case selection: Heterosexual couples, only German citizens, women between 30 and 49 years old, men born after 1943.

* The Micro-census' category "children" includes biological, adopted, foster and stepchildren insofar as they live together with at least one parent in the household.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 2004, weighted by family projection factor.

Table A4: Female employment and presence and age of underage children in academic couples, 2004 (in rounded row percentages)

| | Not employed | Job | Prof. occupation full-time | Prof. occupation part-time |
|----------------------|--------------|-----------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| No children under 18 | 8 | 22 | 59 | 12 |
| Under 3 yrs | 29 | 17 | 27 | 27 |
| 3-10 yrs | 25 | 18 | 19 | 38 |
| 11-17 yrs | 13 | 25 | 30 | 32 |
| Total | 18 | 20 | 36 | 26 |

Case selection: Heterosexual couples, only German citizens, women between 30 and 49 years old, men born after 1943.

* The Micro-census' category "children" includes biological, adopted, foster and stepchildren insofar as they live together with at least one parent in the household.

Source: Own calculations, German Micro-census 2004, weighted by family projection factor.

Elisabeth Reichart, Noelle Chesley & Phyllis Moen¹

The end of the career mystique?

Policy and cultural frameworks that structure the work-family interface in the United States and Germany

Erwerbszentrierter Normallebenslauf am Ende? Die politische und kulturelle Strukturierung der Schnittstelle zwischen Beruf und Familie in den USA und Deutschland

Abstract

Both Germany and the United States endorse the culture of the “career mystique,” the belief that a lifetime of continuous hard work is the path to occupational and personal success. The career mystique was the mirror image of the feminine mystique in the 1950s, and both cultural templates together reified a gendered work-family divide epitomized in the breadwinner-homemaker family norm in the middle of the 20th century. Today men and women increasingly see continuous full-time paid work as “given,” with policies in Germany and the US reifying this pattern. However, very few employees – men or women – now have the luxury of a full-time

Zusammenfassung

In den USA und in Deutschland prägt ein falscher Karriereglaube die Vorstellung des Normallebenslaufs; der Glaube nämlich, dass lebenslange, kontinuierliche und aufstiegsorientierte Erwerbsarbeit der Schlüssel zu einem beruflich und privat erfolgreichen Leben sei. Dieser „Karrierewahn“ ist die Kehrseite des „Weiblichkeitswahns“ (Friedan 1963) der 1950er Jahre; beide kulturelle Leitbilder versinnbildlichten die Trennung der Sphären von Beruf und Familie nach Geschlecht und fanden ihren Ausdruck im Ernährermodell als Norm des Familienlebens. Im Arbeitsmarkt und im Modus der sozialen Absicherung ist die Erwartung lebenslanger Erwerbsarbeit rei-

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homemaker available to support the commitment necessary to sustain this lock-step career mystique path. Most notably, as workers become parents, the contradictions inherent in fulfilling the career mystique (absent reliable back-up on the domestic front) become obvious and problematic. Since couples frequently reconfigure both work and family roles with the arrival of children, we illustrate the significance of policy, institutional and cultural contexts in shaping the work/family choices these couples make. We highlight three case examples (the US, West and East Germany) to demonstrate how policy regimes and cultural schema combine to produce distinctive and gendered work patterns, thereby serving to reinforce and reproduce both gender and class disparities.

Key words: comparative welfare states research, dual-earner couples, family policy, gender inequality, transition to parenthood

fiziert, und Männer *und* Frauen streben heute eine kontinuierliche Vollzeittätigkeit an. So haben immer weniger Beschäftigte eine „Hausfrau“, die sie in ihrer Karriere unterstützt. Erst recht wenn Arbeitnehmer(innen) Eltern werden, brechen die Konflikte zwischen den Anforderungen der Erwerbsarbeit und der erhöhten Sorge- und Hausarbeit voll auf. Bei der Geburt von Kindern werden Berufs- und Familienrollen in der Paarbeziehung neu konfiguriert; die Vereinbarkeitsmodelle, die Paare dann wählen, sind mit geprägt durch Gelegenheitsstrukturen des jeweiligen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen, institutionellen und kulturellen Kontexts. In diesem Beitrag richten wir den Fokus auf drei Fallbeispiele (die USA, West- und Ostdeutschland), um darzustellen, wie wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik und kulturelle Schemata zusammenspielen, und dabei bestimmte, geschlechertypisierende Erwerbsmuster bei Elternpaaren und damit soziale Ungleichheiten hervorbringen und verstärken.

Schlagworte: Vergleichende Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung, Doppelverdienerfamilien, Familienpolitik, Geschlechterungleichheit, Übergang zur Elternschaft

The 20th century witnessed a remarkable rise in dual-earner households, although the scope of this trend varies across industrialized countries. In the US and East Germany, for example, 64,5% and 64% (US and East Germany, respectively) of couples with children have both parents in the labor force, while just over half (54%) of couples with children are dual-earners in West Germany (Schulze Buschoff 2000; US Census Bureau 2006, Table 588).² The dual-earner trend has occurred in tandem with cultural changes in gender roles, the destabilization of family ties, and, more recently, growing risk and uncertainty in labor markets that are connected to the dominance of service economies and a global labor market (Klammer 1999; Moen & Roehling 2005). Dual earning is also linked to entrenched cultural norms that attach increasing importance and status to extensive involvement in paid work (Moen & Roehling 2005).

Despite a lack of support from policies by the state or employers, the dual-earner household is becoming the new family norm for raising the next generation of young children in both the US and Germany. This renders scholarship on *how* dual-earner parents manage work and family both theoretically important and policy relevant (Engstler & Menning 2003; US Census Bureau 2006). Few households in the United States and Germany now follow the traditional male breadwinner/female

2 The US figure documents families with children under 18 where both parents are in the labor force. The figures for West and East Germany refer to families with children under 16.

homemaker model, although there are important differences in details of dual-earner adoption across countries.

The “career mystique” refers to the belief that personal fulfillment and occupational success come from investing one’s time, energy, and commitment in paid work on a continuous basis. Historically, the career mystique is linked to the lock-step life course that consists of education, continuous full-time employment, and retirement (Moen & Roehling 2005, see also Kohli 1985). Today, the career mystique is not only a false myth, it is one that is difficult for parents to fulfill. Attempting to do so may highlight gender inequalities, in particular, since cultural ideals about motherhood often result in mothers’ “scaling back” on their time and emotional investments in their jobs (c.f. Becker & Moen 1999) while cultural ideals about fatherhood reinforce breadwinning, encouraging some new fathers to increase their hours at work (Townsend 2002). In this way couples’ *joint* work and family patterns around the transition to parenthood serve to create, sustain, or amplify already existing within-couples gender inequalities (Padavic & Reskin 2002; Sweet & Moen 2006). Alternatively, couples may outsource household activities, including some childcare responsibilities, or else hire a “wife” (in the form of a nanny) so that both parents may continue to invest in their jobs. But this is an expensive strategy, and thus not available to all households raising children. In addition, changes in fatherhood norms encouraging fathers to spend more time with their children mean that fathers as well as mothers can suffer from policies embodying the career mystique of total commitment to paid work (Padavic & Reskin 2002).

The transition to parenthood is one of the most consequential life course transitions, often requiring fundamental adjustments in how individuals live and work (Moen & Roehling 2005). Dual-earner couples strategize about how to find adequate time and money resources to meet individual and family needs and goals, but their choices are constrained by the outmoded regime of employment policies and practices, as well as prevailing state and societal cultural scripts and structural arrangements – all predicated on the career mystique. We therefore view the transition to parenthood by dual-earner couples as a “strategic research site” (Merton 1959) in which to investigate the ways macro-level economic, cultural, and policy ecologies shape the adoption of particular work-family strategies that, in turn, often perpetuate distinctive and gendered life courses for men and women.

A pattern of comparably high fertility, high level of dual-earner couples and low level of policy interventions distinguishes the United States from most European countries, including West and East Germany. While the U.S. birth rate reflects a convergence of demographical trends (higher level of immigration, lower level of childlessness, more children per woman, lower age at first birth), there are also cultural considerations (such as a focus on the family), and a different labor market situation with lower unemployment that drive these patterns (Balter 2006, US Census Bureau 2005). In this paper, we concentrate on dual-earner couples with children and analyze how existing policy, economic, and cultural contexts in the United States and Germany (analyzing East and West separately) shape the transition into parenthood and the ways these couples combine jobs and family.

The US and Germany specifically represent distinctive structural and cultural contexts regarding paid work, unpaid care work, and gender—with the US offering

few supports to families yet positing gender equality at work as an important value. West and East Germany differ in important respects; although since German reunification in 1990 both now have the same legal framework, some policies, especially childcare, still differ. Labor market opportunities differ as well (worse in East Germany), and there remains a different culture regarding motherhood and female employment inspired by the former socialist state. Thus we offer three, not two, comparative case examples of alternative micro-level responses to the fundamental mismatch that exists between the expectations of and rules enforcing the lock-step career mystique of total investment in one's job and the needs and values of new parents and their families. These examples also point to the ways in which existing welfare state policies support or fail to support contemporary families with young children and how thereby different forms of inequality by gender and class are produced and reproduced around child bearing.

Theoretical Framework

Welfare states have been characterized as specific combinations of state, market, and family involvement that operate together to manage social risks (Esping-Andersen 1999). But what aspects of "state," "market," and "family" are relevant, and how do we define "social risks?" Transitions in individual life courses are directly structured or influenced by the state as a way of managing social risks (Leisering 2003; Mayer 2004). We argue that the transition to parenthood is risky because unpaid infant and child care work often conflicts with paid work. In other words, job expectations tend to be at odds with the care needs of young children. Importantly, we theorize that it is during times of micro-level transitions (such as new parenthood) that existing policy regimes and cultural scripts serve to create or reinforce macro-level gender and income inequalities.

Feminist scholars have argued that including care work in welfare state analysis – by documenting who provides it and who receives it – is crucial for uncovering built-in gender inequalities (Lewis & Ostner 1994). The models of "universal caregiving" (Fraser 1996), or the "dual earner/dual carer society" (Crompton 1999) have been discussed as the most gender-equitable models of gender relations. However, the existing regime of labor market rules and regulations emerged in the 1950s in tandem with the culture of the career mystique, a time when full-time homemakers provided back up and support to much of the skilled workforce. These outdated policies and practices of paid work ignore the reality of contemporary employees' unpaid care work. Thus families with young children lie at the nexus of policy, market, and family ecologies – all at odds with one another. We draw on the scholarship of different welfare state theorists to develop a framework for identifying policies relevant to the parenthood transition and for linking these policies to two important social outcomes: gender and income inequality.

Thenner (2000) classifies family policy measures into three categories: 1) those that directly or indirectly provide money (e.g., money transfers, tax credits), 2) those that directly provide time off from work (e.g. maternity leave, parental leave, part-time

hours), and 3) those that support a family-relevant infrastructure (such as public care resources). These resources are interchangeable: money can be used to opt out of employment for a while in order to provide care or to purchase care, and infrastructure (such as publicly available childcare) can support parents' employment. However, governments differ in their approach to providing these three types of support.

Scholars have shown that different mixes of publicly-provided family support (cash child allowances, family tax benefits, parental leaves, and child and elderly care provisions) and varying reliance on markets (where individuals must individually purchase family support services) are linked to different levels of gender and income inequality (Folbre 2001; Gornick & Meyers 2003; McFate, Lawson & Wilson 1995; Padavic & Reskin 2002) and thus offer different approaches to dealing with social risks. Several scholars have suggested that the US mix of few state-provided family supports in combination with a high reliance on market solutions is linked to gender inequality in paid work (Gornick & Meyers 2004) and high levels of class inequality, measured by the Gini-coefficient or poverty rates (Korpi 2000; Woods 2003). By contrast, Germany as a whole provides higher levels of public family support and relies on markets less, although differences between West and East suggest that even within Germany there are two different policy "mixes." In a recent classification of policy contexts for families with children, West and East Germany fall into different categories. In West Germany, policy interventions are mostly economic (providing money for families) while in East Germany, ecological interventions (such as public child care support) play a greater role in policies (Künzler, Schulze & van Hekken 1999, Künzler 1999; see also Kaufmann 1995). Thus, West Germany is known for a high level of gender inequality and a medium level of class inequality (Korpi 2000) and East Germany is rarely considered in such typologies. However, using similar measures (female labor force participation and Gini-coefficient), East Germany has lower levels of both gender and class inequality than West Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004a).

Focusing on the case of two-parent families with young children in a comparative framework (United States, West and East Germany) can, we believe, lead to better understanding of the links between varying levels of government-provided family support and sources of both gender and income inequality. We highlight differences in formal policies, economic and labor market conditions, and culture between the US and Germany and within the two Germanys to show how these societies shape the options of two-parent families with young children, and in doing so both perpetuate particular work/family trajectories and reinforce the career mystique as a cultural ideal.

The Policy Context in the United States, West, and East Germany

The existence or absence of public policies, along with their corresponding family supporting structural ecologies, influence families' options at the micro-level. Individual couples strategically divide paid work and unpaid family care work in light of the opportunity structures provided by public monetary transfers for families,

leave policies, and available childcare options. In the following section, we compare US and German policies and discuss the ways in which these policies structure two-parent-families' access to two key resources: money and time.

United States

Monetary Transfers

Most American families bear the economic costs associated with having children. Apart from direct subsidies and grants directed at small numbers of low-income parents, financial supports for most American families with children come in the form of tax breaks (Kelly 2005). There are two central forms of tax relief. The first is a Federal income tax credit of US\$1000 per child available to married couple families with incomes less than US\$110,000 and to single-parent families with incomes less than US\$75,000. This credit does not depend on the work status of the parent(s). There is an additional credit for childcare expenses incurred to support paid work. In 2005, a maximum tax credit of US\$3000 for one child and US\$6000 for two or more children was possible. Figures from tax data collected in 2001 show that the average annual childcare credit received by families was US\$440³ (Committee on Ways and Means, Table 13-5). A second type of financial support comes in the form of a flexible spending account in which pre-tax income (up to US\$5000) is accrued in a personal account and used to reimburse eligible childcare expenses. Both the tax credit and the flexible spending account can be used simultaneously, although they cannot be used for the same expenses. Furthermore, the amount of financial assistance actually provided by these credits is highly dependent on individual families' tax situations. Additionally, individual states within the United States may also offer varying levels of tax relief for children and dependent care expenses, adding to the complexity of understanding how this system of transfers and monetary supports influences the distribution of money resources.

Parental Leave

Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In the United States, there is no national policy to provide new parents with paid leave after the birth of a child. Eligible US employees are entitled to take up to twelve weeks of *unpaid* leave from work through the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Estimates suggest that approximately 60% of the US workforce can access FMLA benefits, although research also indicates that only half of US workers who are eligible for the leave actually use it. Survey data indicate that the unpaid nature of FMLA-provided leave is a serious deterrent to its use; among those who could have taken an unpaid leave but did not, money was the most frequently cited reason for not taking a leave (see review in Moen & Roehling 2005).

³ This estimate reflects credits provided for care of eligible children and adults since the credit can be used to offset expenses for either an eligible child under 13 or an elderly or disabled adult.

Temporary Disability Insurance. Use of temporary disability insurance is one way new mothers (but not fathers) can take a limited *paid* leave after a birth. Five states (California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island) and Puerto Rico require employers to provide this insurance; in the remaining 45 states, temporary disability insurance is an optional benefit provided by some, but not all, employers. Finally, for residents of California, eligible workers are allotted six weeks of leave paid at 55% of their normal wages (see Kelly 2005).

Given the unpaid nature of the Federal FMLA leave and wage and income disparities between men and women, in dual-earner households, it is the wives who are more likely to take a leave to care for a new child than are their husbands. Further, leave offered through temporary disability insurance is only available to new mothers, not new fathers. Taken together, evidence about leave-taking in the US suggests that the design of leave policies provides incentives that favor leave-taking for new mothers, but not new fathers (Kelly 2005), a pattern that may reinforce existing gender inequalities.

Public Childcare Provision

Government support for childcare in the United States is limited, relative to East and West Germany, and is largely indirect. State support rarely comes in the form of government-run centers or programs that are accessible to large numbers of families. Such centers and programs, when they exist, are typically designed for and targeted to children in low-income families to meet other policy goals, like school readiness (e.g., Head Start) or employment of poor mothers (e.g., TANF childcare programs). In 2000, a negligible number of American infants were in government-provided care, with only 6% of children aged one to two years in some form of publicly-funded care, and 53% of children three to five in a public care setting (Gornick & Meyers 2003).

Most American families who need non-family care turn to the private market to purchase care for their children (Moen and Roehling 2005). In 1999, 73% of children under five with employed parents were in non-parental care, and 46% of these children were in non-relative care (child care centers, family day care settings, or nannies – see Sonenstein et al. 2002). Furthermore, use of “patchwork” arrangements is common by working parents and their children (Gornick & Meyers 2003; Smith 2000); 46% of children under five regularly spend time in more than one childcare arrangement per week (Gornick & Meyers 2003). Availability (particularly for children with special needs or for care during non-standard work times), price, and quality of care can vary widely in the private market and government regulation of childcare providers is minimal (Gornick & Meyers 2003).

How much do working parents in the US spend on private care for their children? Data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) show that in 1999 employed mothers with children under five spent an average of \$78 per week if they worked part-time hours and \$99 per week if they worked full-time hours (US Census Bureau Spring 1999). Childcare spending is also dependent on family income. These same data show that the poorest families spent an average of \$68 per week on care while those with more income spent \$113 per week, on average (US

Census Bureau Spring 1999). More recent analyses indicate that childcare costs in the United States are growing fast, outstripping housing, food, and college education costs (Shellenbarger 2002). While annual childcare costs depend on geographic location, quality, and type of provider, private-sector survey data suggest that childcare centers average \$6,000 to \$9,000 per year, while family day care centers average \$3,600 to \$7,800 per year. US families typically pay about 8.7 percent of their income in childcare costs and poor families can expect to pay as much as 25% of their income to meet childcare expenses (Shellenbarger 2002).

In sum, relative to other industrialized countries, US government policy does little to provide time off from work around the birth of a child or to support the provision of childcare services needed to resume employment (Gornick and Meyers 2003). Many working parents must rely on the good will of employers to get time off (typically unpaid) and they turn to a complex and poorly regulated private market to access increasingly expensive childcare services. Existing research indicates that unpaid FMLA leave has a limited impact on women's labor market attachment, although paid leaves of several months to a year strengthen women's attachment to the labor force. High childcare costs depress maternal employment, particularly among lower-income mothers (see review in Gornick and Meyers 2003). Further, Folbre (2001) argues that the American private market approach to childcare provision constrains the educational opportunities of the poorest children, thus perpetuating income disparities.

Germany

Monetary Transfers for Families

In Germany, monetary transfers for families are designed to reduce the financial burden related to child-rearing and are therefore called "Familienlastenausgleich", *compensation for families' burdens*, a term common in policy debates. A child benefit of € 154 (approx. US\$195)⁴ per child per month⁵ is paid to the main caregiver in whose household the child lives. Higher income families can choose to use a yearly tax credit (€ 3,648 in 2005, approx. US\$4,620) instead if the gain from the tax credit exceeds the benefit. There is another tax credit for childcare and education of € 2,160 (2005, approx. US\$2,736) per year for each child under age 18, which is extended to age 27 (from 2007: age 25) as long as the child is in school or training (BMFSFJ 2004b).

Joint taxation for married couples is another source of tax relief for married couples with or without children. The two partners' incomes are combined and then split and taxed, resulting in a lower tax rate than would otherwise apply. The more the husband earns and the greater the difference between the husband's and the wife's income, the greater the tax relief. The net gains also rise with income. Other relevant policy meas-

4 Exchange rate for this and the following mentions of US currency as of 09/19/06, according to www.oanda.com

5 € 179 (approx. US\$227) for every fourth and further child.

ures include free health coverage of minor⁶ children and a non-employed spouse. These monetary benefits have been criticized for strengthening the role of one earner and lowering the opportunity costs of homemaking, thus reinforcing traditional breadwinner-homemaker gender roles. Furthermore, high-income families and couples without children are disproportionately advantaged by the split taxation. Low-income families and spouses with similar income levels have few gains from this measure (Dingeldey 2000, Schratzenstaller 2002). In sum, monetary transfers only partly alleviate the poverty risk that is connected with the transition to parenthood (Günther 2002).

Parental Leave

Employed mothers-to-be in Germany are entitled to a paid maternity leave of 14 weeks (6 weeks before and 8 weeks after birth) which is jointly paid by the health insurance and the employer and which allows for full wage replacement. In addition, both mothers and fathers are legally entitled to take a leave from their employment for up to three years, with the right to return to a "similar" workplace following this extended employment break. During this leave, a low, means-tested benefit is paid for part of the time (income limits are moderate for the first six months but quite low for the rest of the time).⁷ Instead of exclusively staying at home, a parent can work up to 30 hours per week. Moreover, since 2001 both mothers and fathers are entitled to simultaneously reduce their working time.

Despite the gender-neutral entitlement to parental leave, this leave is overwhelmingly taken by mothers. The percentage of German fathers who used parental leave by either staying at home for a period or working reduced hours while the child was under age two was 4,9% in 2003, according to a report by the Federal Ministry for Family, Elderly, Women, and Youth (BMFSFJ 2004a). Apart from the traditional notions of motherhood that require mothers and children to be together, one major reason for this outcome is that a man's income before birth is usually higher than a women's, and both women and men do not want to forego this income, given the low replacement benefit (Schneider & Rost 1998).

Thus, the design of the parental leave policy, in combination with existing income disparities between men and women, reinforces the traditional division of labor in both West and East Germany. Taking a "baby break" has become a standard, institutionally and normatively backed "time out" in the female life course (Gottschall & Bird 2003). There are, however, differences in the length of women's leave-taking, with higher qualified mothers tending to return earlier than the legal entitlement (Lauterbach 1994). In addition, East German women tend to return earlier than West German women, mainly because of economic needs and the general labor market insecurity in East Germany (Falk & Schaeper 2001).

6 Children under age 18, in certain conditions under age 25 or even higher.

7 The federal parental leave benefit is paid for up to two years and can amount to € 300 per month, or to € 450 per month, if paid for only one year. Some states pay an additional benefit for a longer period after the federal benefit (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Saxony, Thuringia) (BMFSFJ 2004 b).

Policies changed in 2007. Now, the parental leave benefit is limited to one year, but the payment replaces the net income earned before birth by 67%.⁸ Two additional months of parental leave under the same conditions are granted if the father takes them. Further research will show whether this wage-bound and gender-bound leave benefit will be able to substantially alter gender relations within new parent couples.

Public Childcare Provision

The availability of publicly provided childcare differs widely between West and East Germany, creating different opportunities for couples to pursue a dual-earner model of employment. In 2002, there was a spot in a public day-care site for only 2,7% of all 0- under 3 year-olds in West Germany (4,0% for 1- under 3-year olds), with places for 37,0% of children aged 0-3 and 54,9% of children aged 1-3 in East Germany⁹ (Statistisches Bundesamt 2003). In addition, some young children (about 3% of 0 - 3 year olds) are cared for by "day-mothers" who do not have to be licensed by state agencies (mothers with children of their own who care for additional – not more than three – children in their homes during the day). Day mothers are used more frequently in West Germany due to the lack of public care facilities as well as in larger cities (Dittrich, Peucker & Schneider 2002).

The situation is different for pre-school children. Since 1996, every child aged three and older is legally entitled to a spot in a kindergarten until he or she enters school (usually at age six or seven). However, this right typically refers to a half-day spot only, and research has shown that it is only full-day day care that enables mothers of pre-schoolers to be employed in West Germany (Büchel and Spieß 2002). In 2002, 88% of all West German children aged 3 to 6 1/2 had a spot in a kindergarten, and there was a surplus of spots (105%) for East German children.

The situation changes again for children of elementary school age (ages six to eleven). The school day (in most federal states, the first four years of school) is usually only in the morning; thus, additional care is often required in the afternoon, particularly for parents with non-standard shifts or with afternoon work schedules (Stöbe-Blossey 2004). After-school childcare has been neglected in West Germany, but was a regular service in East Germany. In 2002, there were spots in an after-school day care center for 7,3% of elementary school children in West Germany, but for 68,5% of elementary school children in East Germany (figures referring to children aged 6 1/2 to 10) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2003).

To summarize, East Germany has a higher provision of childcare, particularly full-time care, than West Germany (Hank and Tillmann 2001). East Germany thus provides a stronger childcare infrastructure that supports paid work by both mothers and fathers than West Germany. In all of Germany and in contrast to the US, market-based childcare plays a minor role due to license requirements for any childcare setting with more than three children. For many parents (especially in West Germany), relatives (mostly grandmothers), care regularly for about one quarter of all

⁸ Non-employed parents receive a flatrate benefit of € 300 per month.

⁹ Statistics cannot distinguish East or West Berlin. However, previous investigations (1998) suggest that there is no substantial difference in childcare availability in West, vs. East Berlin.

zero to six year-olds, (see Dittrich, Peucker & Schneider 2002), and provide much of the care that supports parents' employment.

Comparing the US, West, and East Germany

Table 1 shows how the United States, West, and East Germany compare in their provision of time and money support to families with young children. At first glance, the US scores low on most of the observed policy indicators. That means that US parents must depend on their own income to purchase private-market child-care services and on the goodwill of employers for suitable work hours, employment benefits and leave. Given this structure, new parents in the US tend to have the wife scale back on work hours or else exit the workforce if they cannot afford good child care, or else use relatives or lower-quality childcare services. Given the frequent trade-offs between income and family care, the US system of low-levels of (often unpaid) parental leave coupled with market-based care is likely to generate or reinforce existing income inequality (Folbre 2001) and reinforce a traditional division of labor which ultimately perpetuates unequal access to income and sources of social power (Moen & Roehling 2005).

Table 1 Comparison of Policies that Provide Money or Time to Families in the United States, West, and East Germany

| Policy Area | United States | West Germany | East Germany |
|----------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Direct Financial Support | Low (support is inconsistent and idiosyncratic) | Moderate (favors middle-class and one-earner families) | Moderate (favors middle-class and one-earner families) |
| Parental Leave | Low (leave is unpaid) | Moderate for Money, High for Time (universal maternity leave, ¹⁰ long parental leave with low, means-tested benefit) | Moderate for Money, High for Time (universal maternity leave, ¹¹ long parental leave with low, means-tested benefit) |
| Government Support for Childcare | Low (children < 3) | Low (children < 3) | Moderate (children < 3, mostly full-day services) |
| | Moderate (children > 3, indirect support) | Moderate (children > 3, mostly half-day services) | High (children > 3, mostly full-day services) |

(Own compilation)

West Germany supports a traditional model but, by contrast to the US, also acknowledges the care work that is done by mothers, via the leave entitlement and the (however low) paid leave. There is, however, little support for dual earning, especially for parents of the youngest kids. This situation contributes to gender inequality in the labor market. East Germany shows a somewhat contradictory picture: the traditionalizing forces of financial support and leave policies encourage maternal

¹⁰ Applies only to employed mothers that receive full wage replacement during maternity leave (6 weeks before and 8 weeks after birth).

care, but they are counteracted by the quite comfortable provision of childcare, which again, is a prerequisite for dual earning.

In sum, policies in the US offer families little in the way of time or money, and expect new parents to manage any work-family conflicts and overloads through individual, private solutions. In West Germany, families get time (for mothering, but not fathering) and some money, but little support for mothers' employment. In East Germany, families get time off, even as a strong childcare infrastructure tends to support both mothers' and fathers' employment.

The Employment Context in the United States, West and East Germany

Different labor market conditions and government regulations shape the employment context in the United States and Germany. In the United States, employment is key not just for income provision to individuals and families, but also as an access point for important benefits (retirement insurance, health insurance, and others) that shape couples' decisions about who will work for pay and for how much time (Singley & Hynes 2005). In Germany, employment is also the main source of income for families, and health and retirement benefits are typically obtained through employment. But, in contrast to the US, there are other ways in Germany to obtain statutory health insurance for non-employed persons. We focus next on hours spent in paid employment, as, logically, time on the job is not available for family, even as time spent in paid work is a critical source of family income and benefits.

The United States

Labor Market Trends

The US labor market is characterized by relatively low unemployment and is less-regulated and more flexible (for employers) than the German labor market. In recent years, the US has had one of the lowest jobless rates and one of the highest job creation rates of the G7 industrialized countries (US, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy and the UK – see Sorrentino & Moy 2002). Even so, America is a large country geographically with a racially and culturally diverse population, and unemployment rates can be high in particular areas of the country (inner cities, for example), and for particular sub-populations (such as youth and African-American men, see Wilson 1997).

The US workforce is also characterized as one of the hardest working in the world. Americans work longer hours than employees in other industrialized nations and they take fewer and shorter vacations (Gornick & Meyers 2003). And, as in many other countries, the American contingent workforce is growing, with greater numbers of temporary and contract employees without the traditional protections and benefits provided by US labor law (Marler 2004; Marler & Moen 2005).

In comparison to other industrialized countries, including Germany, US labor regulations most closely align with the myth of the career mystique, offering working parents few options for controlling or limiting their work hours (Kelly 2005; Kelly & Moen 2007; Moen & Kelly 2007; Moen & Roehling 2005). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), the central law regulating working time for American workers, does not cap working hours, although it does certify that *covered* (non-exempt from the FLSA) workers receive 1.5 times their normal wage for overtime hours (over 40 hours per week – see Kelly 2005). The growing numbers of workers classified as supervisors or managers (who are therefore *exempt* from FLSA) means that fewer US workers benefit from the overtime provisions provided by the law (Gornick & Meyers 2003). Most employees, then, must negotiate work schedules with individual employers and supervisors, doing so without benefit of extensive government protections relative to other industrialized nations, including Germany.

Trends in Work Hours for Mothers, Fathers, and Couples

Dual-earning may be the dominant form among US couples with young children, but research suggests that, following parenthood, couples tend to adopt a *neo-traditional* strategy, with one parent (typically the father) pursuing the career mystique as the other parent (typically the mother) works less, moves to a less demanding job, or moves in & out of employment (Becker & Moen 1999; Moen & Huang 2007; Moen & Sweet 2003; Moen & Roehling 2005). Thus, gender disparities in the US typically widen following parenthood, in that fathers typically remain in “good” jobs with health care and other benefits, while new mothers scale back. This happens because “good” jobs come prepackaged in ways that assume employees are without family responsibilities. In order to make it possible for new parents (fathers) to have such jobs, few mothers of young children work full-time in the US. However, the older the child, the higher the percentage of mothers in the labor force. A recent survey indicates that labor force participation among mothers whose youngest child is aged three to five years reached 67% in 2004, of which 47% were full-time workers, 16% were part-time employed and 4 % unemployed (US Census Bureau 2005, figure 3). Consequently, at the couple-level, having at least one parent – and often both – working long hours (well over 40 hours per week) is becoming the norm across income, occupational, and educational categories (Gornick & Meyers 2003, p. 32; Jacobs & Gerson 2004). Figures from the mid-1990s show that among US dual-earner couples with children, the majority jointly work two full-time jobs, with 54% of couples putting in 80 to 99 hours in paid work per week, on average, while 10 percent jointly work 100 or more hours (Gornick & Meyers 2003). Dual-(fulltime)-earning may both be a response to families’ enhanced income needs (children’s costs, housing, child care) and a necessity to gain adequate benefits, such as health insurance, for both partners.

*Part-time employment.*¹¹ National employment policies allow employers in the US to treat part-time workers differently from full-time workers, in contrast to the

11 Part-time employment is defined by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics as working 1 to 34 hours per week.

situation in Germany. The general trend is that US part-time workers, many of whom are mothers, do not have access to a range of employee benefits (Kelly 2005), although possibilities of more “good” part-time jobs may be emerging (Barnett 2004). Other strategies to temporarily reduce work hours through use of vacation, sick leave, etc. largely rely on availability through individual employers and their use is generally less frequent in the US than in many other countries (Gornick & Meyers 2003).

West and East Germany

Labor Market Trends

In contrast to the US, unemployment in Germany is problematic, especially in East Germany. As a consequence of unification, unemployment rates in East Germany are very high. The average unemployment rate was 18,5% in 2003, as opposed to 8,4% in West Germany.¹² And, as in the US, the contingent workforce has also grown in Germany during the last decade. According to data from EUROSTAT (cited in Hoffmann & Walwei 2000), the percentage of West-German part-time, temporary, and self-employed workers has risen from 19,7% in 1988 to 27,0% in 1998. In East Germany, 22,0% of all workers had such non-standard contracts (1998).

Working time in Germany is, on average, shorter than in the United States, on a weekly as well as on a yearly basis. The collectively bargained average working time in Germany for a full-time position was 37.7 hours per week in 2000 (Gornick & Meyers 2003: 159). However, since not all businesses are subject to collective bargaining, and overtime expectations are quite common, the actual (full-time) working time tends to be 40 hours per week (Lehndorff 2003).

Trends in Work Hours for Mothers, Fathers, and Couples

Maternal employment varies with age and number of children, as well as between East and West Germany. In 2000, only 11% of the mothers of a youngest child aged 3-5 in West Germany were employed full time (36 or more hours) while 36% of East German mothers of 3-5 year olds were full time workers. Similarly, more (43%) West German mothers than East German mothers (27%) were employed part-time (less than 36 hours). More than two-fifths of West German mothers were not working for pay (7% registered as unemployed and 38% as not employed). Among East German mothers, three in ten were registered as unemployed (29%), with 8% non-employed (Engstler & Menning 2003: 111). Thus — more mothers of young children are employed, and employed full time, in East Germany. If high unemployment were not such a problem, the great majority of East German mothers of three- to five-year-old children would be working for pay. Due to the parental leave entitlement that extends to age three, the number of working mothers of infants and

¹² According to tables from the Federal Statistical Office, <http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/erwerb/erwerbt3.php>, and <http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/erwerb/erwerbt4.php>.

toddlers is declining in West Germany, with a higher percentage working more hours in East Germany. The most recent numbers suggest the rate was 29% in West Germany (10% full-time, 19% part-time) and 40% in East Germany (25% full-time, 15% part-time) (2000, see Engstler & Menning 2003: 111).

Fathers' employment in East and West Germany does not depend on age or number of children, or on the mothers' employment status (Engstler & Menning 2003: 113), with full time employment the male norm. Fathers in East Germany tend to be somewhat more affected by unemployment than fathers in West Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004b, Table 4). As in the United States, research shows that men's average hours of paid work often increase after the birth of a child (Notz 1991; Vaskovics & Rupp 1995). In 2003, 86,2% of fathers with a child three to five years old were employed full-time, & only 3,1% were employed part time (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004b, no differentiation between East and West German fathers).

Part-Time Employment

There are two types of part-time work in Germany – part-time work that is within the same legal and insurance framework as full-time work (with health insurance, social security, unemployment insurance) – and the so-called “marginal” part-time work with fewer hours and very limited benefits. About one-half of part-time employees (of the total German part-time working population) have a “marginal” working contract with few or no social insurance benefits (Wanger 2004: 2).

Part-time employment can be obtained in different ways. Mothers and fathers of a child under age three have a legal entitlement to reduce their working time through the parental leave law. Since 2001, all employees are legally entitled to ask for reduced working time (less than full-time) following at least six months of employment with the same employer.¹³ Further, there are some branches and businesses, mostly in the services sector, that typically offer mostly part-time positions that are usually filled with female workers (Engelbrech 2002). In 2004, 84% of all part-time employees were women; with more women working part-time in West than in East Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004c).

Part-time work is one major strategy that is pursued by some German workers, usually mothers, to combine work and family. Although their income might not be high, mothers' employment raises the family income and still allows for parental (mostly maternal) time to be spent with the child. A disadvantage of this strategy is that (even in the better-secured form), it rarely offers career prospects, and is often less skilled, more encumbering, and poorly paid. The reasons for working part-time differ in West and East Germany: Asked about their personal motives for working part-time, 68% of West German women, but only 22% of East German women named personal or family reasons for their part-time employment, whereas, for 52% of East German women working part-time, the main reason was a lack of available full-time positions (West: 8%). (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004c). As can be seen,

13 The law is only applicable to businesses that regularly employ at least 15 employees.

part-time employment is considered an opportunity by some mothers, but seen as a restriction, basically of their earning capacity, by other mothers.

Given these patterns, one can assume that joint work hours for couples with children in Germany do not peak to the high levels observed in the US. There is no systematic compilation of joint working hours of parents at the couple level for West and East Germany. Looking at working times of mothers and fathers from two-parent families with children under age six separately, we see that men in both parts of Germany spent on average of 51.6 (West; East: 51.3) hours on employment, while women spent only 11.3 (West; East: 18.6) hours (Künzler, Wolfgang, Reichart, & Pfister 2001: 142f., all figures as of 2000). According to Gornick and Meyers (2003), (West) German dual-earner couples have an average joint working time of 69 hours per week, as opposed to 80 hours in the United States.

From what we know about East German mothers and fathers, we expect them to work longer joint hours than West German couples because more women work full-time, provided that both partners have a job. Even so, it is doubtful that there are as many East German couples as in the United States with long (more than 80) or very long (over 100) weekly joint hours, given high unemployment and a shorter full-time work week. However, as men in recent years fared better in the East German labor market than women, there is a better chance that the father is employed than the mother on a couple-level (Reichart 2007).

Comparing Employment Conditions in the US, West, and East Germany

Table 2 highlights the specific labor market features that shape parents' work patterns. In the United States and East Germany, many of these features appear linked to labor market attachment for both women and men. This is in spite of a striking difference in the amount and strength of regulations governing work hours (or otherwise regulating working conditions) between the US and Germany. Furthermore, more East German mothers are in the labor force than West German mothers, in spite of high unemployment rates in East Germany. Once they have employment, East German parents seem to benefit from a more regulated and protective labor market that offers full-time work for many parents, but does not require the long hours that dominate US employment.

Table 2 also makes another US/Germany difference more clear. Fathers tend to work full time or longer in the US while longer hours are not as prevalent among men in either West or East Germany. This is not surprising given that workers collectively set work hours in Germany while workers in the United States have little say in setting work hours (see Schor 2004). It seems that, once children reach age three, dual-earner constellations where both spouses work full-time are prevalent in both East Germany and the US, but that time pressures in East Germany are not as bad, given the greater German restrictions governing full-time work hours. However, the chances for dual-earning seem better in the United States, given the high unemployment that hinders a considerable number of East German couples from pursuing a dual-earner constellation. Note that, in spite of similar employment re-

gulations across Germany, West German mothers are much less likely to work full-time than are East German mothers. Clearly, forces other than these regulations shape mothers' and fathers' work patterns.

Table 2 Comparing Labor Market Contexts in the United States, West, and East Germany Using a Range of Indicators

| Labor Market Feature | United States | West Germany | East Germany |
|--|---|--|---|
| Work Hours Regulations | Little regulation controlling work hours or access to benefits; reduced hours must be individually negotiated | Collective bargaining of work hours; reduced hours accessed through parental leave legislation, or through part-time law | Collective bargaining of work hours; reduced hours accessed through parental leave legislation, or through part-time law; high unemployment |
| Labor Force Participation Rates | | | |
| Mothers | High | Moderate | High |
| Fathers | High | High | High |
| Trends in Paid Work Hours | | | |
| Mothers | Most work full-time, except for mothers of infants | Most work part-time, if employed; | Full-time/some Part-Time, if not unemployed; |
| Fathers | full-time or long hours (40 or 40+ hours per week) | Full-time (40 hours per week); | Full-time (40 hours per week); |
| Couples | Majority of dual-earner couples with children work 80+ joint hours per week, on average. | Average joint work hours of couples 69 hours/week. | No data available. |

(Own compilation)

Cultural Similarities and Differences in the United States and (West and East) Germany

Current cultural images about employment (what is an "ideal" worker), are rooted in the 1950s career mystique, while images of parenting (especially the "good" mother) provide working mothers with mixed messages (Moen & Roehling 2005). Even so, cultural images about good mothering and good fathering as well as what makes an "ideal" worker are changing, although at different rates in the US and West and East Germany. For example, survey questions designed to capture gender-role attitudes about parenting and work uncover substantially different beliefs about how best to care for children and gender roles in the US, West, and East Germany (see Table 3). In this section we describe the distinctive cultural conditions that may influence couples' work arrangements.

Table 3 Comparison of Cultural Attitudes Towards Work and Family in the United States, West and East Germany

| % Agreement (fully agree, agree) (% all/men/women) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
|--|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | all/men/women United States | all/men/women West Germany | all/men/women East Germany |
| "A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works" | 42/48/37 | 71/73/69 | 34/37/30 |
| "Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay" | 56/54/58 | 48/48/48 | 20/19/21 |
| "Both the woman and the man should contribute to the household income" | 58/56/59 | 67/65/70 | 94/92/95 |

(Adopted and translated from Schäffgen & Spellerberg 1998, Table 1; Translation: E.R.)

The United States

Cultural Images of Work and Parenthood

A minority of Americans and East Germans (42% and 34% respectively) believe children suffer when their mothers work, yet many Americans and West Germans (56% and 48%, respectively) agree that homemaking is just as fulfilling as paid work. Americans are less likely than either West or East Germans to agree that both men and women should contribute to a household income. This captures Americans' ambivalence about women's roles.

What then, does it mean to be an "ideal" worker or parent in the United States today? Joan Williams (1999) argues that most employers organize work to require full-time, full-year commitment, expect that employees will consistently meet requests for overtime, and will limit time out of the workforce for caregiving or anything else. In other words, jobs and occupational paths and expectations follow the career mystique (Moen & Roehling 2005). As Williams (1999) and Moen and Roehling (2005) have shown, such expectations are often difficult to mesh with personal needs, particularly the needs of young children, and tend to disadvantage women (see also Schor 2004). The diminishing presence of a stay-at-home wife means that men, as well, have trouble adhering to the occupational commitments required by the career mystique (Moen & Roehling 2005).

American cultural images of "good" mothers and fathers are thus rooted in highly gendered notions about the provision of both material resources and family care. The development of these cultural ideals has a long and nuanced history (for a synopsis, see Lopata 1993). In brief, good fathers are good economic providers, and even very involved fathers are unlikely to consider reducing their work hours to take care of their children (Risman 1998). Good mothers, on the other hand, are physically and emotionally available, the keepers of family time, and, if they work for pay, may distance themselves from the notion of having a "career" (Garey 1999). Mothering, is or should be "intensive," requiring large emotional and time investments that are difficult to combine with other demands (Hays 1996).

Preferred Working Time for Parents

Research indicates that most dual-earner couples prefer to spend fewer hours on the job (Clarkberg & Moen 2001). Mothers with young children are the most likely to act on this preference (Moen & Sweet 2004). The forces that drive this gap between actual and preferred hours are linked to the prevalence in the US of long-hour jobs, the paucity of “good” (with benefits) part-time jobs, and the gendered division of labor among married couples (Schor 2004).

West and East Germany

Cultural Images of Work and Parenthood

West and East Germany differ widely with respect to cultural images of work and parenthood (see Table 3). Attitudes towards motherhood and attitudes towards mothers' employment are strongly connected: while most West Germans see work and family as mutually exclusive for women (Oechsle 1998), East Germans believe that they can be combined (Dölling 1998). Scholars argue that these beliefs are deeply rooted in socialization, and probably will endure for quite some time (Trappe 1995). In West Germany, motherhood is culturally strongly connected with the notion of a childhood at home (Pfau-Effinger 1999; Pfau-Effinger 2000). Accordingly, a high percentage (71%) of West Germans state that a preschool child is likely to suffer when his or her mother works, although less than half agree that being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay (48%). In practice, the so-called “three-phase-model” of motherhood and employment, with a break from employment after birth and return to work as the children grow older, has been – and still is – the dominant model of work and family for women (Textor 2004). In recent years, however, the notion that both partners should work for pay and contribute to the household income has gained importance (67% in agreement).

East German women have traditionally maintained a strong orientation towards employment, even more than a decade after unification (Kreckel & Schenk 2001). As many as 94% of the East Germans agree that both the woman and the man should contribute to the household income, few (20%) see homemaking as fulfilling as paid work, and only a third (34%) of East Germans agree that “a preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.” East Germans widely accept public care facilities and believe that attending them does not harm the child (Schenk & Schlegel 1993: 380f.).

Father's career commitment has never been truly questioned; it is still a widely held cultural norm that fathers' contribution to childrearing is providing money through paid employment, and that being able to sustain a family is considered a precondition for fatherhood (Kurz 2005, Tölke 2005). However, in recent years, there has been a cultural shift towards a “new fatherhood.” In a representative study about fatherhood, 71% of the men viewed themselves mainly as “educators” of their children, whereas only 29% set a priority on breadwinning as their main contribution to raising children (“providers”) (Fthenakis & Minsel 2001). These attitudes, however, are not yet translating into changes in fathers' paid work commitments.

The widespread norm of “responsible parenting” (Kaufmann 1995) describes the expectations that German parents face. While it used to be okay for parents to provide the basics, it is now expected that parents will provide more for their children, usually in the form of a good education. This is a money- and time-consuming task, as it involves paying for enrichment activities, helping children with their homework, or driving them around to different activity sites for leisure time and education.

Preferred Working Time for Parents

Asked about their preferred working time constellation for parents with children up to age nine, about two-thirds of West and East German mothers prefer that one partner works full-time, and one partner works part-time. About one-fifth of the East German mothers still prefer the full-time/full-time constellation that was the rule in the German Democratic Republic (preferred by only 6% of West German mothers), and about 14% of the West German mothers prefer a one-full-time-earner (single breadwinner) constellation (which is very rarely even mentioned by East German mothers) (Engelbrech & Jungkunst 2001).

Comparing Cultural Conditions in the US, West, and East Germany

In all three contexts, there is a gender divide in ascribed parenthood responsibilities that is mainly borne by mothers, although this divide seems weakest in East Germany. Culturally, East Germans appear to have a strong preference for a dual-earner model supported by public childcare, whereas West Germans favor a maternal caregiver who is not mainly committed to employment. As a consequence, West German couples are more likely to enact a traditional breadwinner model, given policies and labor markets that enable and favor such a constellation. In contrast, East Germans’ modern gender attitudes might be able to buffer traditionalizing forces in policies. Attitudes in the US seem more agnostic and contradictory. Homemaking is an accepted alternative to paid work, yet non-parental care is not generally considered harmful. Being in the labor force requires full availability for the job, as rooted in the career mystique. While work constellations among parent couples may seem at first sight to be contingent on individual preferences, it is crucial to uncover discrepancies between attitudes and contexts by analyzing how far policies enable (or constrain) the different options.

Work and Family Configurations and the Transition to Parenthood

Given the specific policy, labor market, and cultural conditions in the US and West and East Germany, what do actual “outcomes” look like? How do couples specifically combine work and family after the birth of a child? Furthermore, are couple’s

different employment constellations linked to varying levels of social inequality? We draw on existing data and our own research to document couple-level configurations that prevail in the United States, West, and East Germany. We also outline which combinations allow parents access to sufficient time and money to meet family needs.

The United States

Parents' Employment

Several studies of US populations indicate that the transition to parenthood is a key factor shaping subsequent labor force behavior, particularly for women (Hynes & Clarkberg 2005; Moen & Sweet 2003; Raley, Mattingly & Bianchi 2006). For example, Hynes and Clarkberg (2005) examine how first and second births influence the employment trajectories of a nationally representative group of US women. They use a group-based trajectory method to analyze data from female respondents in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) who have experienced one or two births during the study time period. They find great variation in mother's employment patterns. Only 37% of women remain continuously employed after a first birth (this drops to 32% after a second birth). The remaining women exit the labor force, exit and re-enter, or experience various forms of intermittent employment (Hynes & Clarkberg 2005). Moen and Huang (2007) find women in middle-class dual-earner households in the Ecology of Careers study often exit the workforce within the two years between interviews because of motherhood, pregnancy, or else in order to become pregnant.

Moen and Sweet (2003) use cross-sectional, couple-level data and show that the most common couple-level work arrangements among dual-earners with young children are "neo-traditionalists," where a husband works 45+ hours per week and a wife works less. In their sample of dual-earner couples living in upstate New York, almost 40% of couples with preschool-age children follow a neo-traditionalist work strategy. Indeed couples with children have the greatest discrepancy in husbands' and wives' work hours because wives' "scale back" to accommodate family care needs. While the results from this study suggest that women in couples adopting a neo-traditionalist strategy are more likely to have higher levels of life quality throughout the life course, they also point to findings that show that privileging husbands' careers can reinforce existing gender inequalities (Moen & Sweet 2003). More recent analyses of Current Population Survey data from 1970 to 2001 show that presence and age of children continues to be a major factor shaping couple-level work patterns (Raley, Mattingly & Bianchi 2006).

While few studies have focused specifically on couple-level career trajectories, results from existing studies of individuals are suggestive. Multiple longitudinal studies suggest that there is more variability in women's career pathways than in men's pathways (Han & Moen 1999; Williams & Han 2003b) and that family demands contribute to career volatility (Williams & Han 2003a). At the couple-level, then, it is differences in women's employment trajectories that define differences in

couple's work/family patterns in the US in terms of major changes in hours, and US fathers are unlikely to exit the workforce following parenthood. Instead, US fathers follow the career mystique path of continuous full time (or more) employment. Second, the Hynes and Clarkberg (2005) analysis shows that while the transition to parenthood is an important factor shaping US women's labor force behavior, bearing children will not always have consistent effects on women's employment decisions over time, since they find that women's employment patterns can differ around a second versus a first birth. Further, we do not know enough about variability in fathers work patterns.

Work/Family Constellations and Inequality

Variation in US couples' work configurations, namely whether and how much both parents work, is linked to family income and time constraints. Not surprisingly, household income varies substantially depending on whether or not both parents are in the labor force. In 2003, for example, dual-earner households with children earned a median income of \$78,000 while breadwinner-homemaker households earned \$53,000 (US Census Bureau 2006).

Work hours for dual-earner parents also vary. Gornick and Meyers (2003) show, for example, that average weekly work hours for mothers with children under six range from 16 to 27 hours per week while weekly hours for fathers range from 39 to 47. Parents in lower income families or with less formal education tend to work fewer hours, on average, than parents with more education and income (Gornick & Meyers 2003). In spite of the trend to work less than full-time among new mothers in dual-earner households, significant numbers of working American families suffer from a time-squeeze (see also section on work hours). Many economic factors favor dual-earning in the United States, including inflation rates (only two-earner couples have been consistently beating inflation) and the increasing costs of housing and education.

The situation of dual-earner couples in the US illustrates the potential to trade-off one form of inequality for another. While dual-earner families may be more economically secure than some other family constellations, these families are also facing serious time pressures.

West and East Germany

Parents' Employment

Longitudinal research shows that German couples adopt a more traditional division of labor, including a decreasing attachment of the mother to the labor market at the transition to first parenthood (Notz 1991; Rosenkranz, Rost & Vaskovics 1998; Vaskovics & Rupp 1995). In a longitudinal study with panel data, Reichart (2007) observed the employment constellations of parent couples for a period of six months before birth and five years after birth of the first child. She found that in 68,8% of the couples studied ($N = 309$), both partners were employed six months before their first child was born. After birth, these couples follow six different pathways (identi-

fied by means of sequence analysis). Table 4 indicates the relative frequency of the types among West and East German couples.

Table 4 Employment Constellations among Young Parents after Birth of a First Child in West and East Germany, 1990-2002 (N=302); no data available for the United States)

| Type | <i>One-Earner-Couples</i> | | <i>Dual-Earner-Couples</i> | | | |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|---|--|---|
| | Traditional one-earner couples (Man full-time/ Woman home-maker) | New one-earner couples (Man full-time/ woman on leave) | Dis-continuous one-and-a-half-earner couples (Man full-time/woman intermittent part-time) | Continuous one-and-a-half-earner couples (Man full-time/ woman part-time) | Dual-full-time-earner couples (Both full-time) | Hindered dual-earner couples (Discontinuous careers of both partners) |
| % of West German couples | 25.8 | 18.1 | 29.4 | 12.5 | 8.1 | 3.6 |
| % of East German couples | 0.0 | 14.8 | 13.1 | 6.6 | 36.1 | 27.9 |

Data source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study, waves F-T; for details see Reichart (2007)

West German couples are more frequently in groups with steady or intermittent part-time employment of the women (with the male partner continuously full-time employed) after a period of parental leave taken by the mother. There are also groups of couples that seem to rely mostly on one earner – in one dominant pattern, the woman opts out of the labor market and becomes a homemaker, in the other, the couples have more children, resulting in continuous leave-taking by the mother, a pattern supported by the long leave entitlement. Unemployment plays a minor role among West German couples' employment histories. The records documenting publicly provided day-care for the child (crèche, kindergarten or childminder) show a low level of enrollment– consistent with the low coverage level that is supported formally in West Germany.

By contrast, the majority of East German couples, exhibit a pattern of (mostly continuous) full-time employment of both parents, or of parents that frequently experience unemployment, resulting in both partners having somewhat discontinuous careers. Both groups seem to be more in favor of full-time employment (as it is consistent with attitude surveys), and the prevalence of use of publicly provided childcare appears to support this option, though there is less use of childcare among the group of (sometimes unemployed) parents.

The difference in employment constellations between West and East Germany holds also for parents with somewhat older children. In 1996, there were more dual-earner couples with children aged 3-10 years in East Germany (58,4%) than in West Germany (49,0%), among all cohabiting couples. Furthermore, in nearly half of the East German couples, both partners worked more than 30 hours a week (48,2%), whereas in West Germany, mostly one partner worked less than 30 hours (39,1%) (Ludwig et al. 2002).

Work/Family Constellations and Inequality

In general, the average income level in East Germany is lower than in West Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004a: 351ff.). Thus, East and West Germany clearly differ with regard to the *need* for a (full-time) dual-earner constellation. Of the households of couple parents with children aged 3-10 with above-average income, in nearly three-quarters of the East German couples both partners work both more than 30 hours/week. Yet, 87,5% of West German couples with above-average income have one main earner, with the other partner neither non-employed or employed less than 30 hours per week (Ludwig et al. 2002).

Research has consistently shown that the risk of poverty for families with children is clearly reduced if the female partner is at least regularly part-time employed. This is even more true for East Germany (Becker 2002). Similarly, Joos and Nauck (1998) find that the strongest predictor of poverty among children (measured as an income of less than 50% of the median equivalent income) is the family constellation, including the employment constellation of the child(ren)'s parents, and again the effect is stronger in East than in West Germany. It has also become clear that the opportunity for parents to have a two-fulltime-earner constellation is connected with other inequalities, especially educational qualifications. Mothers and fathers with better educational credentials are also more likely to both be employed (Bauer 2000; Joos & Nauck 1998; Schenk 2000).

Another source of inequality is the issue of time, as time pressures strongly influence families' quality of life. Compared to American parents' time budgets, German parents appear to be somewhat less squeezed for time, probably because so many German mothers have substantially cut back their employment (see also section on work hours). The price, however, is a traditional division of labor at home and gender inequality in the labor market, with the mother not only doing more care work, but also substantially more housework than the father (Huinink & Reichart, forthcoming). Mothers who do work full time (as it is quite common in East Germany) usually have a second shift of carework on the home front. In a qualitative study with full-time employed mothers (at least one child between three and ten), close to all German mothers reported to be "chronically pressed for time" (Ludwig et al. 2002: 117).

Discussion and Conclusions

Pursuing the "career mystique" of continuous full-time (or more) time commitments to one's job has historically relied on the presence of a full-time homemaker (Friedan 1963; Moen & Roehling 2005). Today, few men or women have full-time homemakers but are still expected to follow the career mystique regime, producing time pressures and overloads for working families raising children. How are contemporary working parents managing? Research shows that 1) most work-family accommodations are made by mothers, placing them on the periphery of the labor market; and 2) having a child is a key event influencing women's employment tra-

jectories and couples' work/family configurations. Our comparisons of family policies, labor market conditions, and cultural factors in the United States, West, and East Germany suggest that work-behavior adaptations following the transition to parenthood differ in patterned ways across these three cultural and economic environments, with corresponding implications for gender and income inequality. Table 5 visualizes the data and information that we presented in the previous sections and provides an intuitive ranking of our three case examples along the three dimensions of public policies, labor market conditions and culture regarding motherhood and employment. We conclude by summarizing the potential for these combined environmental forces to alleviate or reinforce both gender and income inequality in the United States (US), West (WG) and East Germany (EG), and discuss potential policy implications.

Table 5 Ranking the United States (US), West Germany (WG), and East Germany (EG) along Three Important Context Variables

| | | | | | |
|---|--------|----|------------|----|-------------|
| Public support: childcare supply | high | EG | WG | US | low |
| Gender equality in the labor market | high | US | EG | WG | low |
| Culture regarding motherhood and employment | modern | EG | US liberal | WG | traditional |

(Own compilation)

In the US the focus on the market as a source of income, healthcare, and other childcare implies that parents who are more marketable (e.g. strong educational credentials or “hot” technical skills) both fare well in employment and can afford to pay for quality childcare. These parents also profit most from the tax credits offered to families with children, but often “pay” with a time squeeze. US families with less education and fewer marketable skills often have lower incomes (particularly if only one parent works for pay). Having fewer wage resources plays out in varying ways in terms of mothers' decisions about remaining in employment. On the one hand, families may need the extra income, a need that may “push” some mothers of infants back into the labor force quickly. On the other hand, they also need but may not be able to afford childcare, a force that may “pull” some new mothers (but not fathers) from employment. Although gender inequality seems comparatively low given the percentage of mothers in the labor market in the US relative to Germany, the US policy mix associated with couples' joint work and family configurations is also associated with high levels of class inequality across households raising children. Furthermore, it is not clear whether mothers with young children who are employed full time are doing so because they want to or because of a combination of income needs and the absence of supports—the lack of paid leave options as a case in point. The deeply embedded US cultural contradictions between a career mystique work ethic and a parenting ethic of time with children is borne primarily by American women. The degree to which this gender inequality can be evened out varies strongly by class.

In West Germany, the strong impact of policies – especially leave policies – can be observed by analyzing work/family configurations of parents with children under age three. The great majority of women take a “baby break” after birth of their child, and many do not return to the labor market before the end of the three-year-entitlement for leave, or even later. These configurations go hand-in-hand with cultural images about a childhood at home, and contribute to a traditional division of labor in most couples, with a clear cut-back in women’s employment that often goes beyond that supported by paid leave. Together with breadwinner wages that are still available to many West German men, the monetary transfers that support the breadwinner family produce only a moderate level of class inequality across families, but a high level of gender inequality. Mothers (but not fathers) have the time essential for the care of their children, but compromise their future employment. Moreover, there is still a considerable level of poverty in two-parent-families, and research suggests having both parents employed tends to alleviate the poverty risk of having children.

Childcare policies and a culture that is supportive of women’s employment in East Germany favor a higher prevalence of dual-earner families than in West Germany, at a level comparable to that observed in the US. Although East German mothers take parental leave after childbirth, many of them do not fully utilize the three-year entitlement, but take up work full-time again, an employment pattern facilitated by the public childcare infrastructure in the former East Germany. As a result, there is a much lower degree of gender inequality in the labor market than in West Germany, even with the higher unemployment in the East. However, even the most modern gender role attitudes cannot be put into practice absent sufficient jobs in the labor market. There, East Germany is similar to the US, as labor market chances basically depend on the worker’s resources, giving higher-qualified workers better chances. However, despite higher unemployment, there are more two-parent couples with both young children and two full-time jobs in East Germany than in the US. There is also a higher degree of labor market regulation in Germany that constrains escalating joint work hours as observed for many US couples. Together with welfare state policies that alleviate workers’ dependence on the market (unemployment benefits, childcare services), class inequality in East Germany seems considerably lower than in the US. However, in all of these three case studies mother’s double shifts (i.e. paid work and housework) remain entrenched.

What policy lessons can be drawn from this comparison of the parenthood transition in different cultural, economic and policy contexts? First, the career mystique privileging full-time continuous employment remains the expected “good worker” norm in all three contexts. Yet the degree it can be put into practice varies considerably by gender, class, and the surrounding policy, labor market, and cultural contexts. Even in dual-earner couples where both partners are highly committed to their jobs, gender plays a crucial role in reinforcing within-couple inequality (Behnke & Meuser 2003, Solga & Wimbauer 2005). In couples with young children, entrenched employment practices predicated on the career mystique, together with supportive or non-supportive family policies, strongly reinforce gender disparities on the job and at home (see also Schor 2004), as relatively few mothers can simultaneously pursue full-time careers and parenthood.

Our comparative analysis shows that available and affordable childcare is an absolute precondition towards moving beyond the career mystique. Even more radical is our conclusion of the necessity of rethinking existing clockworks of career paths and working time – the social organization of work weeks, work years and work lives. This reorganization would recognize that both women and men have non-work as well as paid work interests, goals, and obligations. Different social clockworks would support more gender equality in the labor market and a more equitable income distribution. It would also relieve fathers from their burden of being the main breadwinners in the household and allow them to step into more care responsibility for their children. Thus we need “time policies” that widen flexible work hour and career path options in all jobs, that legitimate affordable “time outs” for fathers and mothers as needed for family care, and that don’t damage long-term occupational prospects (see also BMFSFJ 2006). In this way, policies would recognize that life courses in the 21st century are not in lockstep any more (Moen & Roehling 2005). Such policies will come about only when the costs of the status quo outweigh the costs of change. We believe that both the United States and Germany are approaching that point. Couples in both countries often “manage” by delaying parenthood, forgoing it altogether, or else have fewer children (Balter, 2006).

The existing (career-mystique based) social organization of paid work and career paths is a cultural relic making it difficult if not impossible to succeed at both family and employment. The contradictions between the career mystique and the value of caring for children and family are strongly linked with gender inequalities, since women mostly “balance” these contradictions. They do so by either scaling back their job aspirations or else enduring chronic time pressures and strains that also affect their families’ quality of life. The three contexts we have studied favor different patterns of adaptation none of which is ideal for promoting both gender equality and family life quality. While caring for a new generation is an important value, present policies mostly work against its fulfillment by both parents. The career mystique is indeed a false myth, a cultural invention that, like the feminine mystique, *can* and should be discarded. “All” that is required is the imagination and the will to rethink policies constraining the ways men and women fit together the pieces of their lives.

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Sabine Beckmann

Die geteilte Arbeit?

Möglichkeiten einer sozialpolitischen Steuerung des Careverhaltens von Männern

Division of work?

The impact of social policy on men doing care

Zusammenfassung:

Gegenstand dieses Beitrags ist die Frage nach den sozialpolitischen Steuerungsmöglichkeiten einer geschlechtergerechten Verteilung von Arbeit zwischen Männern und Frauen. Der besondere Fokus der Untersuchung liegt auf der unbezahlten Arbeit und Männern. Es wird also die Frage behandelt, ob und wie verschiedene Wohlfahrtsstaatssysteme die Verteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit beeinflussen und welche Rolle hierbei Männer spielen.

Es wird zunächst ein Modell dargestellt, welches den Zusammenhang zwischen Wohlfahrtsregime, Arbeitsteilung und Geschlechterbeziehungen theoretisch umschreibt. Anhand dieses Modells wird die Entwicklung der auf Geschlechterleitbildern basierenden Wohlfahrtsstaatspolitik in Schweden, Frankreich und Deutschland analysiert und in Zusammenhang mit dem Wirken der Politik anhand der Verteilung von *Care* zwischen Männern und Frauen gebracht. Besondere Beachtung findet hierbei, inwieweit sich das Verhalten und die Interessen von Männern, beispielsweise hinsichtlich ihrer Bereitschaft Erziehungszeit zu übernehmen, verändert haben, und wie der entsprechende geschlechterkulturelle Wandel sozialpolitisch aufgegriffen und unterstützt wurde.

Darüber hinaus zeigt der Beitrag, dass die Erweiterung von Länderanalysen um den Faktor der unbezahlten Arbeit eine genauere Analyse der länderspezifischen Geschlechterordnung ermöglichen kann.

Abstract:

This paper examines the impact of political regulations on the gendered division of work between men and women. In particular it focuses on unpaid care and men and highlights, from a cross-national perspective, to what extent different policy frameworks constrain or facilitate the gendered division of unpaid care and men's contribution and aspirations in relation to care.

To address these concerns I firstly propose a model which describes the connection between welfare regimes, division of care, and gender relations on a theoretical basis. Secondly I analyse the development of welfare policies and policy outcomes in Sweden, France and Germany. I will particularly focus on the division of unpaid care between men and women and how men's behaviour and attitudes have altered over recent decades (e.g. by taking parental leave). Another aspect which will be considered examines how the modifications in gender culture have been supported by social policy in the three countries.

Finally I conclude that analysing the gendered division of unpaid care provides a further understanding of the gender order in Sweden, France and Germany.

Schlagworte: geschlechtsspezifische Arbeitsteilung, Männer, Vaterschaft, Deutschland, Frankreich, Schweden, Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung

Key words: care, gendered division of work, men, fatherhood, Germany, France, Sweden, welfare state research

Einleitung und Fragestellung

In der Familien- und Geschlechterforschung wie auch in der öffentlichen Diskussion werden in den letzten Jahren vermehrt die tatsächlichen oder notwendigen Veränderungen des männlichen Rollenbildes in den Blick genommen. Gesprochen wird von den neuen Männern und den aktiven Vätern. Hierbei interessiert vorrangig, wie sich diese Veränderungen auf die Konstitution von Familie und Partnerschaft auswirken, welche neuen Vaterschaftskonzepte sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten entwickelt haben und welche Rolle Männern in der Gesellschaft und in der Familie zukommt (Zulehner 2004; Fthenakis, Minsel 2002). Eine weitere Fragestellung ist die Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf für Männer und deren familiäres Engagement (Döge, Volz 2002; Vaskovics, Rost 1999). Diese Fragestellungen sind auch relevant für die Geschlechterforschung, weil Veränderungen der Einstellung von Männern gegenüber *Care*¹ Auswirkungen auf die geschlechtliche Verteilung von bezahlter und unbezahlter Arbeit haben und damit grundlegend für den Wandel der Geschlechterbeziehungen und die Förderung von Geschlechtergerechtigkeit sind.

An diesem Punkt, also hinsichtlich der Frage, wie die geschlechtliche Verteilung von Arbeit und Geschlechtergerechtigkeit etwa durch sozialpolitische Regulierungen gefördert werden können, kann eine weitere Forschungsrichtung auf den Plan treten, und zwar die Vergleichende Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung. In verschiedenen Arbeiten wurde der Einfluss der (wohlfahrtsstaats-)politischen Institutionen auf die Verteilung der Erwerbsarbeit zwischen Männern und Frauen und die internationalen Differenzen der Erwerbsbeteiligung von Frauen untersucht. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studien zeigten den spezifischen Zusammenhang zwischen Wohlfahrtsstaatsregime und Frauenerwerbstätigkeit und es konnten anhand unterschiedlicher Indikatoren Typen von Wohlfahrtsstaatsregimen erstellt werden (vgl. Lewis & Ostner 1994; Gornick & Myers 2003). In einer der jüngeren Untersuchungen hat Birgit Pfau-Effinger (2000) den Erklärungsansatz über die internationalen Unterschiede im Erwerbsverhalten von Frauen über den Einfluss der Institutionen hinaus um einen geschlechterkulturellen Rahmen erweitert.

1 Der aus dem angelsächsischen Sprachraum stammende Begriff *Care* umschreibt alle Tätigkeiten, die im Zusammenhang mit der Umsorgung anderer Menschen stehen, somit Haus- und Familienarbeit, die Erziehung von Kindern, die Pflege von älteren oder kranken Menschen. Im weiteren Sinne beschränkt sich *Care* nicht auf die unbezahlte Arbeit, sondern beinhaltet auch die bezahlte Sorgearbeit, sowohl im privaten wie auch öffentlichen Raum (*Careworker*, z.B. AltenpflegerInnen). Ich benutze *Care* als Begriff für die unbezahlte Sorgearbeit im Privaten. Synonym verwende ich auch den Begriff *unbezahlte Arbeit*.

Der Fokus dieser Arbeiten lag auf der einen Seite auf Frauen und auf der anderen Seite auf Erwerbsarbeit. Für die Entwicklung der Gesellschaft und der Geschlechterbeziehungen ist jedoch gerade auch die geschlechtliche Verteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit relevant, und eine Genderperspektive sollte auch den Blick auf Männer beinhalten. Es stellt sich also die Frage, ob sozialpolitische Regulierungen in verschiedenen Wohlfahrtsstaaten die Verteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit beeinflussen und welche Rolle hierbei Männer spielen.

Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit diesen Fragen und präsentiert die Ergebnisse einer vergleichenden Studie, in der die Wohlfahrtsstaaten Schweden, Frankreich und Deutschland daraufhin untersucht wurden, wie sich der Zusammenhang zwischen deren familien- und geschlechterbezogener Sozialpolitik und dem *Careverhalten* von Männern gestaltet. Für die vergleichende Studie wurden Schweden, Frankreich und Deutschland gewählt, weil diese in Studien der feministischen Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung hinsichtlich der Typisierung von *breadwinner models* jeweils unterschiedlichen Typen entsprechen² (vgl. etwa Lewis & Ostner 1994; Daly & Rake 2003). Durch den Fokus auf das *Careverhalten* von Männern konnte daher eine erweiterte Perspektive auf diese unterschiedlichen Wohlfahrtsstaatstypen ermöglicht werden.

Für die Untersuchung wurde zunächst der Zusammenhang zwischen wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Regulierung, *Care* und Geschlechterbeziehungen konzeptualisiert. Dieses soll kurz dargestellt sowie die methodische Umsetzung beschrieben werden. Anschließend werden die Forschungsergebnisse aus den drei Länderstudien präsentiert, um in einer Zusammenschau die daraus ableitbaren Ergebnisse über den Einfluss von Sozialpolitik auf die Verteilung von *Care* zwischen Männern und Frauen zu diskutieren.

Geschlechterordnung, *Care-Regime* und Geschlechterkultur

Den Zusammenhang zwischen wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Regulierung, *Care* und Geschlechterbeziehungen lehne ich metatheoretisch an den Ansatz der Geschlechterordnung von Robert W. Connell (1987) an. Für die methodologische Umsetzung, um den Zusammenhang zwischen familien- und geschlechterbezogenen sozialpolitischen Regulierungen und dem *Careverhalten* von Männern zu analysieren, wird der Begriff des *Care-Regimes* verwendet. Als ergänzende Analyseebene dient die Betrachtung der Geschlechterkultur, angelehnt an Pfau-Effinger, um über den Einfluss der Institutionen hinaus die gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen – auch in einer historisch-dynamischen Perspektive – einzubeziehen. Die drei Begriffe Geschlechterord-

2 Darüber hinaus bietet sich ein Vergleich dieser Länder an, da sie über strukturelle Ähnlichkeiten verfügen, wie etwa die Etablierung der Hausfrauenehe in den 1950er Jahren (in allen drei Ländern), die Zunahme der Frauenerwerbstätigkeit (vor allem in Schweden und Frankreich) und der Erosion der Geschlechterverhältnisse von den 1970er Jahren an, aber auch die Pluralisierung von männlichen Geschlechterleitbildern (insbesondere in Schweden und Deutschland).

nung, *Care-Regime* und Geschlechterkultur stehen in engem Zusammenhang und sollen im Folgenden erklärt werden. Nach der eher theoretischen Einführung soll dargestellt werden, wie die Analyse des Zusammenhangs zwischen sozialpolitischen Regulierungen und dem *Careverhalten* von Männern auf Grundlage des *Care-Regimes* operationalisiert wird.

Connells Begriff der Geschlechterordnung dient mir als metatheoretischer Rahmen, um Geschlechterverhältnisse in der Gesellschaft und in Institutionen zu untersuchen. Connell beschreibt die Gesellschaft anhand ihrer unterschiedlichen Institutionen, kollektiven und individuellen Akteure, die durch ein spezifisches Verständnis von Geschlechterbeziehungen strukturiert werden und diese Strukturen durch ihr Handeln reproduzieren. Hierdurch „besitzt“ jede Institution ihr eigenes Genderregime und wirkt als solches. Durch ein historisch sich veränderndes, wechselseitiges Zusammenspiel zwischen den gesellschaftlichen Institutionen konstituiert sich auf der Ebene der gesamten Gesellschaft die Geschlechterordnung. Sie ist kein fest gefügtes, unveränderbares Muster, sondern instabil und wandelbar und entsteht auf spezifische Weise und unter spezifischen Bedingungen (Connell 1987, 116). Grundlage der Geschlechterordnung sind *gender relations*, die Geschlechterbeziehungen, welche die Institutionen strukturieren, aber auch durch das institutionelle und individuelle Handeln geformt werden. Die Art und Weise, wie Frauen und Männer sich etwa bezahlte und unbezahlte Arbeit teilen, hängt somit grundlegend mit der Geschlechterordnung zusammen.

Connells Ansatz der Geschlechterordnung und seiner Beschreibung der Institutionen als Genderregime stellt einen produktiven theoretischen Rahmen dar, um Geschlechterbeziehungen in der Gesellschaft und in Wohlfahrtsstaaten zu analysieren. Für die empirische Untersuchung des Zusammenhangs zwischen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Regulierungen und der geschlechtsspezifischen Verteilung von unbezahlter Arbeit bedarf es allerdings der methodologischen Übersetzung des theoretischen Rahmens in ein Analysekonzept. Hierfür verwende ich den Begriff des *Care-Regimes*. Es handelt sich um einen Begriff, der etwa in Barbara Pococks Untersuchung des australischen *Work/Care-Regimes* auftaucht (Pocock 2005, 38). Unter *Care-Regime* wird die Art und Weise verstanden, in der *Care* in der Gesellschaft institutionalisiert wird. Das *Care-Regime* umfasst also das Muster, wie *Care* in einer Gesellschaft und im Wohlfahrtsstaat wahrgenommen, verortet, organisiert und ins Verhältnis zur bezahlten Arbeit gesetzt wird. Dieses basiert auf Geschlechterstereotypen (und reproduziert diese) und ist somit das Ergebnis der vorherrschenden Geschlechterordnung und seiner spezifischen Verkörperung in einem *Care-Regime*. Wesentlich für das *Care-Regime* ist die wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik, die zu den *outcomes* des *Care-Regimes* beiträgt. Die Organisation und Verortung von *Care* in der Gesellschaft basiert auf komplexen gesellschaftlichen, kulturellen und institutionellen Verflechtungen. Wie Frauen und Männer arbeiten, welche Arbeit wem geschlechtlich zugeordnet wird, wie unbezahlte Arbeit im Verhältnis zur bezahlten Arbeit betrachtet und organisiert wird, und in welcher Weise der Staat für diese Organisation verantwortlich zeichnet, sind Elemente, die das *Care-Regime* konstruieren. Diese Konstruktion basiert wesentlich auf bestimmten Geschlechterleitbildern.

Indem Pfau-Effingers Begriff der Geschlechterkultur in die Analyse des *Care-Regimes* einbezogen wird, kann über die Betonung institutioneller Rahmenbedin-

gungen hinaus auf die Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Individuen verwiesen werden. Pfau-Effinger bezeichnet die in jeder Gesellschaft existierenden kulturellen Werte und Leitbilder, die sich etwa „[...] auf die Formen der gesellschaftlichen Integration und die Arbeitsteilung zwischen Frauen und Männern beziehen“ (Pfau-Effinger 2000, 68 f.), als Geschlechterkultur. Somit ähnelt der Begriff der Geschlechterkultur von Birgit Pfau-Effinger Connells Verständnis der Geschlechterbeziehungen. Allerdings betont Pfau-Effinger in ihrem Ansatz explizit die Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Individuen und versteht den Einfluss von Kultur auf das Handeln der Individuen in nicht-deterministischer Weise. Die gesellschaftlich hegemoniale Geschlechterkultur kann von bestimmten sozialen Gruppen in Frage gestellt werden und hierdurch zu sozialen Aushandlungsprozessen führen (Pfau-Effinger 2000, 69). Sie ist somit sowohl Ursache als auch Folge des sozialen Handelns von Frauen und Männern. Die Geschlechterkultur wirkt sich jedoch nicht nur auf die einzelnen Individuen und ihr Zusammenleben aus, sondern beeinflusst auch die Ebene der sozialen Strukturen, die gesellschaftlichen Institutionen sowie die kollektiven und individuellen Akteure. Ferner können mehrere geschlechterkulturelle Leitbilder nebeneinander bestehen, unterschiedlich in Regionen oder gesellschaftlichen Gruppen (ebd.).

Den Zusammenhang zwischen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Regulierungen, Geschlechterbeziehungen und der Verteilung von *Care* verstehe ich daher so, dass die wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik in Schweden, Frankreich und Deutschland auf Annahmen über die Geschlechterbeziehungen und die Zuordnung und Organisation von unbezahlter Arbeit basiert. Durch sozialpolitische Regulierungen werden diese Annahmen reproduziert und konstruieren spezifische Rahmenbedingungen. Innerhalb dieser Rahmenbedingungen agieren Männer und Frauen, beeinflusst von eigenen geschlechterkulturellen Vorstellungen und Lebenskonzepten. Je mehr Möglichkeiten für eine Pluralität von Lebenskonzepten innerhalb der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Rahmenbedingungen gegeben sind, um so eher lassen sich unterschiedliche geschlechterkulturelle Vorstellungen verwirklichen. Das *Careverhalten* von Männern steht also in einem engen Zusammenhang zu den wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Rahmenbedingungen und der jeweiligen Geschlechterkultur und kann auf Basis dieser untersucht werden.

Um diese Annahmen zu operationalisieren, müssen erstens die unterschiedlichen Leitbilder der sozialpolitischen Regulierungen analysiert werden. Relevant für die Analyse des *Care-Regimes* sind die Arbeits-, Geschlechter- und Familienleitbilder der Sozialpolitik, weil sich in diesen Leitbildern erkennen lässt, wie unbezahlte und bezahlte Arbeit verortet und gesellschaftlich zueinander ins Verhältnis gesetzt werden, wie und auf welche Weise unbezahlte Arbeit den Geschlechtern zugeordnet wird und welchem Leitbild einer Organisation von Arbeit in der Familie die Sozialpolitik folgt. Methodisch wurden hierfür geschlechter- und familienbezogenen sozialpolitische Programme in den drei Ländern daraufhin untersucht, wie sich in diesen die Geschlechter-, Familien- und Arbeitsleitbilder niederschlagen. Die Entwicklung der sozialpolitischen Regulierungen wurde daraufhin untersucht, inwieweit diese eine geschlechtergerechte Arbeitsteilung unterstützen und Männer zur Übernahme von unbezahlter Arbeit auffordern. Anhand des Wandels der politischen Programme und Maßnahmen werden die sich verändernden sozialpolitischen Leitbilder erkennbar. Um die Politikfelder (*Policies*) einzugrenzen, wurden hierbei insbesondere fa-

milienpolitische Maßnahmen wie Erziehungsfreistellungen, Maßnahmen wie Arbeitszeitverkürzungs- und -flexibilisierungsprogramme für Menschen mit Betreuungsaufgaben sowie die Kinderbetreuungspolitik³ analysiert. Der Staat kann etwa eine geschlechtergerechte Arbeitsteilung unterstützen, indem bestimmte Formen des familiären Zusammenlebens und der Arbeitsorganisation besonders gefördert werden, beispielsweise durch die Einführung von Vätermonaten in der Elternzeit, wie sie in Schweden üblich sind. Es ist aber auch relevant, wie die Betreuung von Kindern verortet wird, etwa als staatliche Bildungsaufgabe wie in Frankreich oder als private Verantwortung innerhalb der Familie wie in Deutschland.

Zweitens wurde die Entwicklung der geschlechtlichen Arbeitsteilung betrachtet. Hierfür wurde die Verteilung der unbezahlten und bezahlten Arbeit zwischen Männern und Frauen anhand von Erwerbsdaten, Arbeitszeitmodellen, Zeitbudgetstudien zur Verteilung von unbezahlter Arbeit und ähnlichem überprüft⁴. Die Ergebnisse wurden in Zusammenhang mit den sozialpolitischen Regulierungen gestellt.

Drittens wurde die geschlechterkulturelle Entwicklung einbezogen, da Veränderungen in den Leitbildern einzelner gesellschaftlicher Gruppen zu neuen Aushandlungsprozessen auf der gesamtgesellschaftlichen Ebene führen können. Entsprechende Hinweise über diese Entwicklung und über den Wandel von Normen, Werten und Wünschen von Männern konnten aus verschiedenen Studien entnommen werden, die etwa die Arbeitszeitwünsche von Eltern, die Einstellung von Vätern bezüglich der Übernahme von Erziehungsverantwortung und Elternzeit, Vaterschaftskonzepte und das Verhältnis von Eltern zu ihren Kindern beleuchteten. Vielen dieser Studien konnten Hinweise darüber entnommen werden, inwieweit die Akteure ihre geschlechterkulturellen Leitbilder innerhalb der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen umsetzen konnten oder ob diese ihre Handlungsmöglichkeiten begrenzten. Die Analyse der drei Bereiche, also der wohlfahrtsstaatspolitischen Leitbilder und ihre Umsetzung in geschlechter- und familienbezogene sozialpolitische Programme, der faktischen Arbeitsteilung und der Geschlechterkultur gibt Auskunft über das vorherrschende *Care-Regime* in den drei Ländern und es wird der Einfluss der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politik auf die Verteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit erkennbar.

Im Folgenden sollen nun die Länderstudien und ihre Ergebnisse zusammengefasst werden.

3 Die Infrastruktur der öffentlichen Kinderbetreuung ist insofern von Bedeutung für die geschlechtliche Verteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit, als wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik, die die Bereitstellung von öffentlicher Kinderbetreuung vernachlässigt, hierdurch ein arbeitsteiliges Modell fördert. Während ein Elternteil für die Betreuung der Kinder verantwortlich sein muss und damit in der Regel den Hauptteil der unbezahlten Arbeit übernimmt, ist der andere Elternteil für die finanzielle Versorgung der Familie zuständig. Die geschlechtergerechte Verteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit hängt daher eng mit der geschlechtergerechten Verteilung der bezahlten Arbeit zusammen.

4 Trotz des Fokus auf Männer wurden in die Untersuchungen Frauen einbezogen, weil sich durch die vollständige Darstellung der Verteilung von Arbeit zwischen Männern und Frauen der Stellenwert, den das Engagement von Männern im Vergleich zu Frauen einnimmt, besser abbilden lässt.

Mit Blick auf die Geschlechteregalität: Schweden

Schweden ist bekannt für seinen hohen Grad an Gleichberechtigungsbestrebungen, auch in der Wohlfahrtsstaatspolitik. Schon in den späten 1960er Jahren begannen in Schweden unter dem Eindruck der sich wandelnden Geschlechterbeziehungen aufgrund der zunehmenden Erwerbsbeteiligung von Frauen Debatten in Öffentlichkeit und Parlament, wie die Gleichberechtigung zwischen Männern und Frauen gefördert werden könne (Bergman & Hobson 2002, 104 f.). Bis dahin war auch in Schweden die Hausfrauenehe vorherrschend gewesen. Nun wurden Pläne selbstverständlich, die Erwerbstätigkeit der Frauen zu unterstützen, etwa indem die öffentliche Kinderbetreuung ausgebaut werden sollte. Einmalig war jedoch die schon zu diesem Zeitpunkt geführte Diskussion, dass der Wandel der Geschlechterverhältnisse nicht vor den Veränderungen im Privaten halt machen dürfe und neben einer Umverteilung der bezahlten Arbeit auch die unbezahlte Arbeit geschlechtergerecht organisiert werden müsse (vgl. Kolbe 2002, 87 ff.). Politische Pläne waren aus diesen Analysen jedoch zunächst nicht erfolgt.

Mit dem Ausbau der öffentlichen Kinderbetreuung und einem individualisierten und universellen Steuer- und Sozialversicherungssystem stieg die Erwerbstätigenquote der Frauen ständig an. Lag sie in den 1950er Jahren noch bei etwa 35%, so stieg sie während der folgenden 20 Jahre auf 55% an. Im Jahr 2000 lag die Frauenerwerbsquote bereits bei 75%, 60% der Frauen waren Vollzeit erwerbstätig (Wallace 2003, 103). Auch die Erwerbstätigenquote der Mütter war sehr hoch. Laut OECD waren im Jahr 2000 65,7% aller Mütter in Schweden mit einem Kind jünger als sieben Jahre beschäftigt (OECD 2001, 155).

Tatsächliche Veränderungen der Arbeit im Privaten waren lange Zeit jedoch kaum zu verzeichnen, wie Studien feststellten. Und das, obwohl ein Interessen- und Verhaltenswandel bei den Männern auszumachen war (vgl. etwa Plantin 2001). Besonders die Geburt des ersten Kindes führte bei vielen schwedischen Paaren zur Retraditionalisierung der Arbeitsteilung, weshalb in den ersten politischen Programmen, die auf die Förderung von Geschlechteregalität im Privaten zielten, besonders junge Väter in den Blick genommen wurden. Als besonderer Indikator für Geschlechtergerechtigkeit galt die Übernahme von Elternzeit durch Väter, welche in Schweden als erstem europäischen Land seit 1974 berechtigt waren, sich die Elternzeit mit den Müttern zu teilen. 1995 wurden daher die obligatorischen 30 Tage „Papa-Monat“ im bezahlten Elternurlaub eingeführt, die 2002 auf 60 Tage erweitert wurden⁵. Zusätzlich hatten Eltern das Recht, umfangreich ihre Arbeitszeiten zur Betreuung der Kinder zu reduzieren, aber eben auch das Angebot umfassender Betreuungseinrichtungen für Kinder jeden Alters. Ein weiterer Faktor, der zur geschlechtergerechten Aufteilung der Elternzeit führen sollte, war der hohe Einkommensersatz des Elterngeldes. Anfangs bei 90% des Einkommens gelegen, wurde es in den letzten Jahren mehrmals verändert, fiel jedoch nie unter 75%. Hiermit sollte

5 Der durch Elterngeld bezahlte Elternurlaub ist in Schweden auf Mutter und Vater – ausgenommen Alleinerziehende – aufgeteilt. Die Eltern können jedoch den eigenen Anteil an Elterngeldtagen auf den anderen Elternteil übertragen. Von dieser Regelung sind aber 60 Tage ausgenommen.

garantiert werden, dass sich Eltern unabhängig vom jeweiligen Einkommen für die Verteilung der Elternzeit entscheiden konnten. Und tatsächlich stieg der Anteil der Elternzeittage, die pro Jahr von den Vätern übernommen wurden, von 0,5% im Jahr 1974 auf etwa 7% im Jahr 1987, um 1994 schließlich 10,9% zu erreichen (Riksför-säkringsverket 2003, 27). Nach der Erweiterung der Papa-Monat-Tage stieg der Anteil auf 18,7% in 2004 an.

Daneben glich sich langsam die Arbeitsverteilung zwischen Frauen und Männern an. Der Motor des Wandels waren zunächst jedoch die Frauen, die den Umfang ihrer Erwerbstätigkeit an den der Männer annäherten, und den Umfang der unbezahlten Arbeit reduzierten (Anxo et al. 2001, 3). Doch auch Männer übernahmen zunehmend mehr Hausarbeit und reduzierten die Arbeitszeiten zur Betreuung ihrer Kinder, während sich seit den 1990er Jahren die Zeitverwendung der Frauen kaum verändert hat (Statistiska Centralbyrån 2003, 194). Die folgende Abbildung verdeutlicht die Zeitverteilung zwischen Männern und Frauen mit Kindern. Einerseits ist zu erkennen, dass nach wie vor Männer mehr Zeit für Erwerbsarbeit und Frauen mehr Zeit für *Care* verwenden, jedoch ist der Anteil der Stunden, die Männer unbezahlt arbeiten, im europäischen Vergleich sehr hoch.

Tabelle 1: Zeitverwendung für Erwerbs- und Hausarbeit in Schweden, Personen in Paarhaushalten mit Kindern, deren jüngstes im Alter unter 7 Jahren ist, in Stunden pro Tag⁶

| | Frauen | Männer |
|------------------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| Erwerbsarbeit | 2,5 h | 5 h |
| Haushalt und Familienpflege | 5,5 h | 3,25 h |

Quelle: Eurostat 2003, 6

In den letzten drei Jahrzehnten lässt sich bei den Männern ein Wandel des Vaterschaftskonzeptes beobachten. Sie befürworten eine aktive Vaterschaft, wollen sich um ihre Kinder kümmern und Zeit mit ihnen verbringen, und sind weniger karriereorientiert als noch die Vorgängergeneration der Väter (Björnberg 1994). Auffällig ist aber auch, dass Väter ihren Anteil an *Care* stark auf das Kind beziehen, also die Betreuung der Kinder nicht zugleich einher geht mit Arbeit im Haushalt, wie es bei Frauen häufig üblich ist. Die neuen Väter werden daher auch als „kindorientiert“ (Bekkengen 2002) bezeichnet.

In der Analyse Schwedens wurde deutlich, dass im Wandel von Sozialpolitik und Geschlechterkultur der Herstellung von Geschlechteregalität eine besondere Bedeutung zukommt. Diese ist explizites Ziel der schwedischen Sozialpolitik und wird intensiv gefördert. Die der Wohlfahrtsstaatspolitik zugrunde liegenden Geschlechterleitbilder haben sich in den letzten 50 Jahren deutlich verändert. Die vermittelten Normen entsprechen nicht mehr der Zuordnung von Familienernährer und Hausfrau, an deren Stelle trat die universelle Erwerbsperson. Das Leitbild der StaatsbürgerInnen ist das einer Erwerbsperson mit Betreuungsaufgaben. Dieses beeinflusst auch das Familienleitbild, wo das Modell der dual earner/dual carer vorherrschend ist.

6 Zeitverwendung an einem durchschnittlichen Tag in der Woche.

Die politischen Auseinandersetzungen mit Ungleichheiten im Geschlechterverhältnis und mit Möglichkeiten der Förderung von Geschlechtergerechtigkeit unterstreichen deren Stellenwert. Dieses spiegelt sich im politischen Handeln und in den politischen Strategien wider. An erster Stelle stehen Maßnahmen, die die Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf unterstützen. Hiermit wurde zunächst die Gleichstellung der Frauen angestrebt. Durch die Gestaltung des Elternurlaubs und des Elterngeldes werden jedoch auch Väter aufgefordert, sich mehr für ihre Kinder zu engagieren.

Die Entwicklung der letzten Jahrzehnte zeigt, dass *Care* in Politik und Gesellschaft als gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe wahrgenommen wird und damit einen anderen Stellenwert gewonnen hat. Die Verortung und Organisation von *Care* sowie das Verhältnis, in dem *Care* zur bezahlten Arbeit gestellt wird, verdeutlichen, welches *Care-Regime* vorherrscht. Im Gegensatz zu vielen westlichen Wohlfahrtsstaaten, in denen das Alltagsleben sich im überwiegenden Maße an die Bedingungen der Erwerbsarbeit anpassen muss, versucht die schwedische Sozialpolitik hier, einen Ausgleich zwischen den Bedingungen der Arbeitswelt und den Bedingungen des Alltagsleben herzustellen. Das Ergebnis dieser Entwicklung ist die aktuell herrschende Geschlechterordnung, in der Geschlechteregalität im Vergleich zu den meisten anderen europäischen Ländern weiter fortgeschritten ist.

Aber es wird auch deutlich, dass die Veränderungen der Geschlechterordnung eng mit der vorherrschenden Geschlechterkultur in Schweden verbunden sind. So lässt sich erkennen, dass geschlechterkulturelle Vorstellungen sowohl auf der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen als auch auf der gesellschaftlichen Ebene ineinander gegriffen und so die aktuelle Geschlechterordnung geformt haben. Die bearbeiteten Daten, Studien und Untersuchungen zeigen, dass geschlechterkulturelle Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft auf staatlicher Ebene aufgegriffen wurden und die wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik versucht hat, diese Entwicklungen zu unterstützen. Als Ergebnis können Veränderungen wie etwa die Zunahme von Vätern in der Elternzeit beobachtet werden.

Deutschland: Vom modifizierten Familienernährermodell zur *dual earner/dual career family*?

Die Ausgestaltung der bundesdeutschen Sozialpolitik orientierte sich am Familienmodell des männlichen Allein- oder Haupternährers mit Hausfrau oder, in der modifizierten Form, mit Zuverdienerin. Geschlechtsspezifische Lohnunterschiede, die Struktur von Sozialversicherungs- und Steuersystem und vor allem mangelnde öffentliche Kinderbetreuungsangebote förderten einen Lebenslauf von Männern und Frauen, der sich mit der Entscheidung für Kinder stark zu unterscheiden begann. Während der Mann weiterhin Vollzeit erwerbstätig war, gliederte sich der Lebenslauf von Frauen in drei Phasen: Der Erwerbstätigkeit folgte mit der Geburt des ersten Kindes eine mehrjährige, durch Erziehungsgeld unterstützte Erwerbsunterbrechung zur Versorgung des Kindes, und der berufliche Wiedereinstieg in Form von Teilzeiterwerbstätigkeit.

Gerade die mangelnde öffentliche Kinderbetreuung sowie die Halbtagschule bewirkten, dass trotz des steigenden Erwerbswunsches der Frauen weiterhin das Modell des männlichen Alleinernährers dominierte. Es gab also deutliche Diskrepanzen zwischen den Erwerbswünschen der Eltern in Deutschland und dem staatlich

geförderten Familienbild. Die Ausweitung von Teilzeitarbeit ermöglichte schließlich eine zunehmende Erwerbstätigkeit von Müttern und führte zum modifizierten Modell des Hauptnährers mit Zuverdienerin. Hierzu trug auch bei, dass die Erziehung von Kindern viel stärker als in Schweden und Frankreich in der Familie verortet wurde – und diese Verortung auch kulturell eine wichtige Rolle spielte. Von Eltern am meisten favorisiert wurde daher ein Modell, bei dem Erwerbstätigkeit und familiäre Verantwortung von Eltern vereinbart werden können – etwa durch längere Teilzeitarbeit in Kombination mit öffentlicher Kinderbetreuung (vgl. Auth 2002).

Die sozialpolitischen und geschlechterkulturellen Faktoren bewirkten zwei gegensätzliche Entwicklungen: Während von staatlicher Seite der männliche Familienernährer gefördert wurde, wandelte sich geschlechterkulturell die Rolle von Männern und Vätern dahingehend, dass eine aktive Vaterschaft mit mehr zeitlichem Engagement für Kinder gewünscht wurde. Diese Entwicklung wurde jedoch durch die auf traditionellen Leitbildern von Familie, Männern und Frauen basierenden sozialpolitischen Regulierungen gehemmt (vgl. Kassner & Rüling 2005).

1986 wurden Erziehungsurlaub und Erziehungsgeld eingeführt. Der Erziehungsurlaub berechnete erwerbstätige Mütter und Väter seit einer Reform im Jahr 1992, nach der Geburt eines Kindes die Erwerbsarbeit bis zum dritten Geburtstag des Kindes zu unterbrechen. Für diesen Zeitraum bestand Kündigungsschutz. Allerdings konnte der Erziehungsurlaub nur dann in Anspruch genommen werden, wenn der andere Elternteil erwerbstätig oder in Ausbildung war, was eine geschlechtliche Arbeitsteilung förderte. Für maximal zwei Jahre sollte die Erziehungsleistung durch das Erziehungsgeld finanziell honoriert werden, weshalb es auch an nicht erwerbstätige Eltern gezahlt wurde. Nur wenige Väter nahmen den Erziehungsurlaub in Anspruch, unter anderem, weil das Erziehungsgeld ein Erwerbseinkommen nicht kompensieren konnte. Eltern benötigten das höhere Einkommen, welches in der Regel vom Vater verdient wurde, um den Familienunterhalt zu bestreiten. Trotz des in den folgenden Jahren zunehmenden Wunsches von Vätern, ebenfalls Erziehungsurlaub zu beanspruchen, gaben die meisten Familien an, dass es für sie finanziell nicht möglich sei, auf das Gehalt des Vaters zu verzichten (Vaskovics & Rost 1999). Entsprechend nahmen wenige Väter Erziehungsurlaub, 1999 machten sie einen Anteil von 2% der Personen im Erziehungsurlaub aus. Wegen des weitaus höheren Anteils von Frauen an Teilzeitarbeit und der immer noch hohen Zahl von Alleinernterfamilien leisteten Männer mehr Erwerbsarbeit und weniger Hausarbeit als Frauen, wie die folgende Tabelle zeigt.

Tabelle 2: Zeitverwendung für Erwerbs- und Hausarbeit in Deutschland, Personen in Paarhaushalten mit Kindern, nach Familienmodell, in Stunden und Minuten je Tag

| | Erwerbsarbeit | unbezahlte Arbeit | | Erwerbsarbeit | unbezahlte Arbeit |
|---------------------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Frau, nicht erwerbstätig | 00:09 | 7:20 | Frau, erwerbstätig | 3:13 | 5:11 |
| Mann, erwerbstätig | 5:36 | 3:03 | Mann, erwerbstätig | 5:52 | 2:43 |

Quelle: BMFSFJ; Statistisches Bundesamt 2003

Ein erster sozialpolitischer Wandel im Hinblick auf eine Akzeptanz der Erwerbstätigkeit beider Eltern zeigte sich 1996 mit der Einführung eines Rechtsanspruchs auf einen Kindergartenplatz ab dem dritten Geburtstag des Kindes. Dieser Rechtsanspruch galt jedoch nur für eine Betreuung von vier Stunden am Tag, und durch die immer noch desaströse Betreuungssituation bei Klein- und Grundschulkindern wurde weiterhin die Erwerbsunterbrechung und Teilzeitarbeit eines Elternteils – in der Regel der Mutter – forciert. Nach der Wiedervereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten konnte auch in Ostdeutschland eine Annäherung an westdeutsche Verhältnisse beobachtet werden, trotz der in der DDR üblichen vollzeitigen Erwerbstätigkeit von Müttern.

Die Reformen des Elternzeitgesetzes 2001 und 2004 zeigten, dass die Erwerbstätigkeit beider Elternteile zögernd akzeptiert wurde. Elternzeit und Erziehungsgeld konnten nun in Verbindung mit einer Teilzeitbeschäftigung bis zu 30 Stunden wöchentlich in Anspruch genommen werden, wie auch Eltern sich den Erziehungsurlaub flexibler teilen konnten. Bis 2004 stieg der Anteil der Väter in Elternzeit auf 5% an.

Die Entwicklung der Reformen beinhaltete eine zunehmende Auseinandersetzung mit der Verteilung von Erziehungsarbeit zwischen Männern und Frauen, die 2007 schließlich in der Einführung eines an das schwedische Modell angelehnten Elterngeldes mündete. Mit diesem Gesetz sollte die gesellschaftliche Realität einer Erwerbstätigkeit von Eltern anerkannt werden, weshalb der Bezug des Elterngeldes auf maximal 14 Monate herabgesetzt und in Höhe einer Lohnersatzleistung von 67% des letzten Einkommens festgelegt wurde. Zwei der 14 Monate können nur dann in Anspruch genommen werden, wenn die Eltern sich die Elternzeit teilen. Diese beiden Monate zielen wie in Schweden auf die Väter ab. Nicht erwerbstätige Eltern erhalten nach wie vor ein Elterngeld von 300 € monatlich. Die Änderung des Erziehungsgeldes in ein einkommensabhängiges Elterngeld entsprach einem Leitbildwandel in der Familienpolitik. Die neuen Regelungen orientieren sich am Leitbild einer egalitären Elternschaft, indem durch die Höhe des Elterngeldes und die Einführung von Vätern-Monaten Väter ermutigt werden sollen, sich an der Elternzeit zu beteiligen. Auch die Herabsetzung der Bezugsdauer des Elterngeldes orientiert sich an einer kürzeren Phase der Erwerbsunterbrechung als noch das Erziehungsgeld.

Um dieses Leitbild umsetzen zu können, bedarf es allerdings einer wesentlich verbesserten Infrastruktur von öffentlicher Kinderbetreuung. Hierzu war schon 2005 das Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz in Kraft getreten, welches unter anderem das Ziel festlegte, bis 2010 die Anzahl der Betreuungsplätze für Kinder um 230 000 Plätze zu erhöhen. Tatsächlich hat sich nach Einführung des Gesetzes bis Juli 2006 der Anteil an Betreuungsplätzen für Kinder unter drei Jahren in den alten Bundesländern verdoppelt. Bundesweit stand nun für 13,7% aller Kinder unter drei Jahren ein Betreuungsplatz zu Verfügung (BMFSFJ 2006, 6). Kritisch ist an diesem Gesetz die Betonung der Schaffung von Tagespflegeplätzen, welche finanziell günstig für die Kommunen, aber sehr teuer für die Eltern sind. Jedoch zeigte die Einführung des Gesetzes, dass die Betreuung von Kindern zunehmend auch beim Staat verortet wird und Eltern gemeinsam als Erwerbspersonen wahrgenommen werden.

Die Untersuchung der Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zeigt, dass es einen geschlechterkulturellen Wandel hinsichtlich der Verteilung von Arbeit zwischen Männern und Frauen gegeben hat, der auf der sozialpolitischen Ebene jedoch

lange nicht nachvollzogen wurde. Zunächst war die Erwerbstätigenquote von Frauen und Müttern angestiegen, 2003 waren 59% der Frauen erwerbstätig, im Vergleich zur allgemeinen Erwerbstätigenquote von 65% (Eurostat 2004, 2). Zugleich ist die Erwerbstätigenquote von Müttern mit Kindern unter sechs Jahren zwischen 1991 und 1999 von 42,6% auf 51,1% gestiegen (OECD 2001, 134). Im Gegenzug engagierten sich Männer zunehmend mehr in der Kinderbetreuung und im Haushalt und nahmen mehr Elternzeit in Anspruch. Die geschlechterkulturelle Haltung von Vätern differenzierte sich aus, immer weniger Väter sahen sich als Ernährer der Familie, sondern als Erzieher (Fthenakis & Minsel 2002, 13).

Trotz dieses geschlechterkulturellen Wandels wurde hingegen seitens der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politik an der Förderung des Familienernährers festgehalten. Noch in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren waren die Leitbilder der Sozialpolitik der Mann als Erwerbsperson und die Frau als Verantwortliche für die Erziehung der Kinder und für die Organisation der unbezahlten Arbeit. Auf der sozialpolitischen Ebene wurde daher die Verantwortung für *Care* allein im Privaten verortet und geschlechtsspezifisch der Frau zugeschrieben.

Der Widerspruch zu den geschlechterkulturellen Veränderungen zeigt im Ergebnis ein *Care-Regime*, welches noch immer eine starke geschlechtsspezifische Verteilung von bezahlter und unbezahlter Arbeit beinhaltet. Familien mit Kindern realisieren, häufig entgegen ihren Präferenzen, vor allem das Modell des Haupternährers mit Zuverdienerin (vgl. Auth 2002, 208 f.). Die Geschlechterordnung weist daher einen gesellschaftlichen Bruch auf, der sich dadurch auszeichnet, dass emanzipatorische Entwicklungen einer egalitäreren Arbeitsverteilung zwischen Männern und Frauen durch sozialpolitische Rahmenbedingungen begrenzt wurden. Erst die sozialpolitischen Initiativen der letzten Jahre und das 2007 eingeführte Elterngeldgesetz deuten darauf hin, dass die gesellschaftliche geschlechterkulturelle Realität auch politisch anerkannt wird.

Frankreich: Die Familie im Mittelpunkt

Im Gegensatz zum schwedischen und deutschen Wohlfahrtsstaatsregime lässt sich das französische nicht so eindeutig hinsichtlich seiner Geschlechterleitbilder analysieren. Frankreich stellt auch in meiner Analyse eine *exception française* (Veil 2002, 84) dar. Im Gegensatz zu Schweden, wo Geschlechteregalität explizit gefördert wird, und Deutschland, wo ein bestimmtes Familienernährermodell unterstützt wurde, zeichnet sich Frankreich in erster Linie durch eine natalistische Politik aus, wohingegen gegenüber den Familienmodellen eine staatliche Neutralität gewahrt wurde. Geburtenförderung und staatliche Neutralität gegenüber dem Familienmodell waren daher auch die Leitlinien der politischen Programme, mit denen auf die zunehmende Frauenerwerbstätigkeit seit den 1970er Jahren reagiert wurde. Der Ausbau der öffentlichen Kinderbetreuung und die Einführung des bezahlten Erziehungsurlaubes sollten Müttern erlauben, zwischen Erwerbstätigkeit oder Erwerbsunterbrechung zu wählen, um unabhängig von ihrer Entscheidung ein Leben mit Kindern realisieren zu können. Mit beiden Programmen sollte unter anderem die

Stabilität der Geburtenrate und der Familienstrukturen unter den veränderten gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen unterstützt werden.

Vor allem die Organisation der Erwerbsarbeit für Mütter stand im Mittelpunkt der Überlegungen. Deshalb steht heutzutage Eltern ein Betreuungsangebot zur Verfügung, was insbesondere im städtischen Raum die Versorgung von Kindern für bis zu zwölf Stunden am Tag bietet. Mit Eintritt der Dreijährigen in die *école maternelle* (Vorschule) ist die Betreuung zudem kostenlos. Der Staat übernimmt damit die Verantwortung für die Betreuung von Kindern während der Arbeitszeit der Eltern. Eine Reflektion über die Rolle des Mannes und die geschlechtergerechte Verteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit hatte hingegen nicht stattgefunden, noch wurden Männer wie in Schweden dazu ermuntert, sich mehr in der unbezahlten Arbeit und bei der Versorgung von Kindern zu engagieren.

Durch die Unterstützung der Integration von Frauen in den Arbeitsmarkt mit Hilfe des Ausbaus der öffentlichen Kinderbetreuung veränderte sich das gesellschaftliche und politische Leitbild der Frau von der Hausfrau und Mutter zur Vollzeit erwerbstätigen Mutter (Fagnani & Letablier 2005, 146). So stieg die Erwerbsquote von Frauen an, und lag 2003 bei 57,2%. Im Vergleich dazu waren Männer im entsprechenden Alter zu 69,4% beschäftigt, die allgemeine Erwerbsquote rangierte bei 63,2%. Besonders die Erwerbstätigenquote der Mütter war hoch, sie lag 2003 bei Müttern mit Kindern unter zwölf Jahren bei etwa 65%. Frauen, deren jüngstes Kind im Alter von 0 bis zwei Jahren war, waren zu etwa 55% erwerbstätig, betrug das Alter des jüngsten Kindes drei bis fünf Jahre, so lag die Quote schon bei fast 70%, und stieg mit der Zunahme des Alters des jüngsten Kindes auf sechs bis elf Jahre auf fast 80% (Eurostat 2005, 3). Auf die Erwerbstätigenquote der Väter wirkten sich Alter und Anzahl der Kinder hingegen nicht aus.

Frauenpolitisch ambivalent standen den Maßnahmen zur Kinderbetreuung familienpolitische Programme wie der bezahlte Erziehungsurlaub gegenüber, der 1985 eingeführt wurde. Das Erziehungsgeld, welches sowohl Müttern wie auch Vätern zu stand, spielte zunächst eine eher marginale Rolle und konnten anfangs auch erst ab dem dritten Kind, seit 1994 ab dem zweiten Kind und erst seit 2004 mit Einführung der *prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant* (PAJE) ab dem ersten Kind bezogen werden. Diese Leistungen sollten Müttern (oder Vätern⁷) die Möglichkeit geben, zwischen einer Berufstätigkeit und einer Erwerbsunterbrechung zu wählen. Es sollte somit nicht einseitig nur die Erwerbstätigkeit beider Elternteile durch die Ausweitung öffentlicher Kinderbetreuungseinrichtungen gefördert werden, sondern auch Eltern, die sich gegen dieses Modell entschieden, sollten staatlich unterstützt werden.

Während die Einführung des Erziehungsgeldes für Eltern ab dem dritten Kind zunächst keine besonderen Auswirkungen auf die Erwerbstätigkeit von Müttern zeigte, zog die 1994 erfolgte Erweiterung des Erziehungsgeldes auf Eltern mit zwei Kindern starke Veränderungen der Erwerbstätigkeit von Müttern mit zwei Kindern nach sich. Von Dezember 1994 bis Dezember 1995 sank die Erwerbstätigenquote von Frauen mit zwei Kindern, deren jüngstes Kind im Alter zwischen sechs und achtzehn Monaten war, um 26 Prozentpunkte – von 70% auf 44% (Reuter 2000,

7 Im Folgenden werde ich nur noch von Müttern sprechen, da von den Personen, die den bezahlten Erziehungsurlaub in Anspruch nehmen, nur 2% Männer sind.

18). Darüber hinaus waren ein großer Teil der Empfängerinnen des Erziehungsgeldes prekär Beschäftigte oder Erwerbslose (Reuter 2003, 44). Die Reform des Bezugs von Erziehungsgeld wurde daher von Silke Reuter als Instrumentalisierung für arbeitsmarktpolitische Ziele beurteilt, die sich als selektive Förderung des Arbeitsmarktrückzugs beziehungsweise in der Diskontinuität des Erwerbsverlaufs vor allem gering qualifizierter junger Frauen niederschläge (ebd.).

2004 wurde mit dem Gesamtpaket des PAJE ein Erziehungsgeld eingeführt, welches Eltern bereits nach der Geburt des ersten Kindes beziehen können, wenn sie ihre Erwerbstätigkeit unterbrechen oder reduzieren. Diese Leistung unterliegt einer strikten Einkommensgrenze und wird wieder vor allem von erwerbslosen Frauen und Frauen in prekären Beschäftigungsverhältnissen in Anspruch genommen.

Erziehungsgeld, öffentliche Kinderbetreuung sowie die zahlreichen finanziellen Transferleistungen, die Familien zustehen und oftmals an die Zahl der Kinder geknüpft sind, müssen im Rahmen der Familien“förder“politik gesehen werden. Paare sollen sich unabhängig von ihren Wünschen und von ihrer Lebensrealität für Kinder entscheiden können. Hierbei wird insbesondere die Entscheidung für zwei und mehr Kinder unterstützt. Vorrangiges Ziel der Sozialpolitik war lange Zeit die Förderung der Geburtenrate. Entsprechend wurde die Verortung und Verteilung von *Care* sowie die Rolle der Männer nur am Rande betrachtet. Für die politischen Akteure war *Care* reduziert auf die Betreuung und Bildung von Kindern während der erwerbsbedingten Abwesenheit der Eltern. Unbezahlte Arbeit, die darüber hinausging, wurde in der Familie und als private Arbeit verortet. Die traditionelle Verantwortung der Frauen für diese Aufgaben veränderte sich geschlechterkulturell weder in den Familien noch in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung. Daher wurde auch das männliche Geschlechterleitbild wenig in Frage gestellt, trotz der erhöhten Zeitanforderung an Frauen durch ihre zunehmende Erwerbstätigkeit (Letablier 2004, 205). Nach wie vor erledigen Frauen den größten Teil der unbezahlten Arbeit, wenn auch das Engagement der Männer in den letzten Jahren leicht zugenommen hat. Die folgenden Abbildungen zeigen die erheblich höhere Zeitbelastung von Frauen.

Tabelle 3: Zeitverwendung für Erwerbs- und Hausarbeit in Frankreich, Personen in Paarhaushalten mit Kindern, deren jüngstes im Alter unter 7 Jahren ist, in Stunden pro Tag

| | Frauen | Männer |
|--------------------------------------|------------|--------------|
| Erwerbsarbeit | 2,25 h | 6 h |
| Haushalts- und Familienpflege | 6 h | 2,5 h |

Quelle: Eurostat 2003, 6

Tabelle 4: Verteilung von Care zwischen Männern und Frauen mit Kindern in Frankreich, nach Erwerbsmodell, in Minuten und Stunden pro Woche

| | Versorgung von Kindern | Hausarbeit |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Vollzeit erwerbstätige Männer | 12:40 | 11:30 |
| Vollzeit erwerbstätige Frauen | 21:10 | 29:58 |
| Teilzeit erwerbstätige Frauen | 21:44 | 38:06 |

Quelle: Barrère-Maurisson et al. 2001, 3

Erst in den letzten Jahren ist die Bedeutung des Vaters für die Familie stärker ins Zentrum der öffentlichen Diskussionen gerückt, was auch im Zusammenhang mit geschlechterpolitischen Anregungen auf europäischer Ebene steht. Ein erster Schritt war daher 2002 die Einführung eines elftägigen, voll bezahlten Vaterschaftsurlaubs für Erwerbstätige (*cong  de paternit *).

Geschlechterkulturell l sst sich beobachten, dass sich die Rolle der V ter und M nner in Frankreich nur sehr langsam wandelt. Zwar  bernehmen V ter nach und nach mehr Verantwortung f r die Betreuung ihrer Kinder, oftmals jedoch, um f r die Zeiten einzuspringen, in denen die erwerbst tigen M tter nicht abk mmlich sind (Ridder et al. 2004, 45 ff.). Frauen sind nach wie vor f r Hausarbeit und die Betreuung von Kindern zust ndig, selbst wenn sie einer Vollzeitbesch ftigung nachgehen.

Die Analyse Frankreichs weist auf sozialpolitische Geschlechterleitbilder hin, die sich an Erwerbspersonen orientieren und die Organisation der Betreuungsaufgaben Frauen zuordnen. Erziehungsarbeit wird aber nicht nur als famili re, sondern auch als staatliche Aufgabe verortet. Dar ber hinaus wird die geschlechtliche Verteilung von *Care* von den politischen Akteuren wenig reflektiert. M nner k nnen zwar ebenso wie Frauen Erziehungsurlaub beanspruchen und haben das Recht auf einen elft gigen Vaterschaftsurlaub, sind sonst aber kaum Objekte politischer Programme – sie werden weder ermutigt noch unterst tzt, Erziehungsaufgaben zu  bernehmen. Im Zentrum der Wohlfahrtsstaatspolitik stehen vor allem familienf rdernde Ziele, und kaum geschlechterpolitische.

Frankreich l sst ein *Care-Regime* erkennen, in welchem die Erwerbsarbeit im Mittelpunkt steht und die Organisation von *Care*  ber die Kinderbetreuung hinaus kaum ber cksichtigt wird. Da sich die geschlechtsspezifische Zuschreibung der unbezahlten Arbeit auch auf geschlechterkultureller Ebene kaum ver ndert hat, entsprechen M nner nach wie vor im hohen Ma e der Rolle des Versorgers, w hrend die Verantwortung der Frauen f r *Care* weiterhin als selbstverst ndlich erachtet wird. Eine wichtige Bedeutung hierf r hat die Konzentration auf eine natalistische Familienpolitik, die Fragen der Organisation von Arbeit nur insoweit ber cksichtigt, wie diese der Best ndigkeit demographischer Belange dienlich ist.

In Frankreich existiert aktuell daher eine Geschlechterordnung, in der die unbezahlte Arbeit den Frauen zuordnet und eine Umverteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit an M nner kaum reflektiert wird. Dar ber hinaus orientieren sich M nner nach wie vor an eher traditionellen Leitbildern. Ein Wandel der Geschlechterbeziehungen ist daher ma geblich auf den Erwerbsbereich beschr nkt.

Fazit: Kann wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik das *Careverhalten* von M nnern beeinflussen?

Ausgangspunkt meiner vergleichenden L nderuntersuchung war die Annahme, dass sich die Entwicklung des *Careverhaltens* von M nnern auf Basis des Zusammenwirkens von familien- und geschlechterbezogenen sozialpolitischen Regulierungen und der Geschlechterkultur analysieren l sst. Innerhalb der auf Grundlage von Geschlechter-, Arbeits- und Familienleitbildern konstruierten wohlfahrtsstaatlichen

Rahmenbedingungen agieren Männer und Frauen, geleitet von ihren geschlechterkulturellen Vorstellungen. Hieraus ergeben sich die *outcomes* des *Care-Regimes*, also die Art und Weise, wie Männer und Frauen sich die unbezahlte Arbeit teilen.

Die Entwicklung der drei Länder zeigt, dass zunehmende Geschlechteregalität in der Verteilung der bezahlten Arbeit nicht einhergehen muss mit zunehmender Geschlechteregalität in der Verteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit. Erkennbar wird die geschlechterpolitische Bedeutung, wie die Verortung und Organisation von *Care* in den sozialpolitischen Leitbildern verankert ist und durch wohlfahrtsstaatliche Regulierungen umgesetzt wird. Die untersuchten Länder weisen ganz spezifische *Care-Regime* auf, in denen der Zusammenhang zwischen familien- und geschlechterbezogener Sozialpolitik und der Verteilung von unbezahlter Arbeit sehr unterschiedlich gelagert ist.

Für Schweden und Deutschland lassen sich eindeutige Zusammenhänge erkennen. In Schweden hat sich das *Careverhalten* von Männern in den letzten Jahren sowohl normativ als auch faktisch verändert. Männer nehmen in zunehmendem Maße Elternzeittage in Anspruch und engagieren sich verstärkt im Haushalt. Dieses Ergebnis steht in Verbindung mit den geschlechterkulturellen Entwicklungen und den Veränderungen der sozialpolitischen Leitbilder von Geschlecht, Arbeit und Familie. Beide Entwicklungen gingen Hand in Hand und bedingten sich gegenseitig. Die sozialpolitischen Geschlechter-, Arbeits- und Familienleitbilder wandelten sich in Schweden vom Modell des männlichen Alleinernährers zum Modell der *dual breadwinner/dual carer*. In den 1950er Jahren beruhte die Verortung und Organisation von Arbeit auf den Annahmen einer geschlechtlichen Verteilung von bezahlter und unbezahlter Arbeit zwischen Männern und Frauen. Die sozialpolitischen Regulierungen förderten diese Arbeitsteilung und die damit einhergehenden Familienmodelle mit dem erwerbstätigen, männlichen Versorger und der weiblichen Fürsorgerin. Die Analyse der späteren und aktuellen familien- und geschlechterbezogenen sozialpolitischen Programme zeigt jedoch den Wandel der Leitbilder: die Verortung und Organisation von Arbeit beinhaltet zunehmend die geschlechteregalitäre Verteilung von Erwerbsarbeit und *Care* zwischen Männern und Frauen. Wesentlich für die Verortung von *Care* ist hierbei das Verhältnis, in das die unbezahlte zur bezahlten Arbeit gestellt wird. Neben der Erwerbsarbeit erfährt *Care* eine zunehmende Anerkennung. Trotz Erwerbsarbeit soll *Care* ermöglicht und eine gute Vereinbarkeit von Erwerbs- und Familienarbeit erreicht werden. Deutlich wird dieses Arbeitsleitbild etwa in den sozialpolitisch geförderten Möglichkeiten, das Recht auf Teilzeitarbeit zur Betreuung eines Kindes mit der finanziellen Unterstützung durch Elterngeld wahrzunehmen, wie auch in der guten Infrastruktur der öffentlichen Kinderbetreuung. Das staatsbürgerliche Leitbild ist demnach die Erwerbsperson mit Betreuungsaufgaben. Deshalb werden Väter explizit aufgefordert, sich zu engagieren und mehr Zeit für die Betreuung von Kindern zu investieren. Die sozialpolitischen Rahmenbedingungen ermöglichen die geschlechteregalitäre Verteilung von *Care*, und fördern engagierte Väter, etwa durch die quotierten „Papa-Monate“ in der Elternzeit und durch die Anerkennung einer zeitweiligen Erwerbsunterbrechung oder -reduzierung zur Betreuung von Kindern durch finanzielle Leistungen in Höhe einer Lohnersatzleistung. Die sozialpolitischen Rahmenbedingungen begünstigen den geschlechterkulturellen Wandel des Männer- und Vaterbildes und ermöglichen geschlechteregalitäre Lebenskonzepte.

In Deutschland ist die politische Einflussnahme hingegen in die andere Richtung verlaufen. Trotz eines geschlechterkulturellen Wandels bei weiten Teilen der Bevölkerung förderte die Sozialpolitik das Modell des männlichen Familienernährers. Die Ergebnisse, wie Männer und Frauen sich die unbezahlte Arbeit teilen, zeigen einen nur geringen Wandel im Engagement der Männer für *Care*. Auf der anderen Seite belegen Studien den normativen Wandel des Männer- und Vaterbildes. Väter wollen zunehmend mehr Zeit für ihre Kinder verwenden und sehen sich als Erzieher und nicht nur als Versorger der Kinder (vgl. Fthenakis & Minsel 2002). Die Studien zeigen auch, dass die sozialpolitischen Rahmenbedingungen die Umsetzung der sich zunehmend an Geschlechteregalität orientierenden Lebenskonzepte von Paaren behindern (Kassner & Rüling 2005). Auch für Deutschland können die Ergebnisse des *Careverhaltens* von Männern in Zusammenhang mit den sozialpolitischen Geschlechter-, Arbeits- und Familienleitbildern und der Geschlechterkultur gebracht werden. Da die sozialpolitische Verortung von *Care* in der Familie und die Förderung der geschlechtsspezifischen Arbeitsteilung mit dem Mann als Familienversorger und der Frau als Fürsorgeperson über lange Jahre hinweg in Deutschland aufrecht erhalten wurden, war eine Vereinbarkeit von Erwerbsarbeit und der Versorgung von Kindern sehr schwierig. Allein der Mangel an Kinderbetreuungsplätzen bewirkte die Erwerbsunterbrechung eines Elternteils, in der Regel der Mutter. Das sozialpolitische Familienleitbild orientierte sich am Modell des Vollzeit beschäftigten Mannes und der die Kinder zu Hause versorgenden Frau. Unter diesen Bedingungen war die Umsetzung einer geschlechtergerechten Arbeitsteilung zwischen Vater und Mutter kaum möglich. Hingegen zeigen die aktuellen sozialpolitischen Entwicklungen einen Wandel der Leitbilder, in denen die zunehmende Erwerbstätigkeit der Mütter akzeptiert wird und die egalitäre Verteilung der unbezahlten Arbeit zwischen Männern und Frauen sowie eine aktive Vaterschaft gefördert werden soll – durch die Einführung von Vätern-Monaten in der neuen Elterngeldregelung und den geplanten Ausbau von Kinderbetreuungsangeboten. Es ist daher anzunehmen, dass diese Entwicklungen in Anbetracht des geschlechterkulturellen Wandels das Engagement von Vätern zunehmend unterstützen werden.

Die Analyse Frankreichs zeigt im besonderen Maße, dass die Förderung einer egalitäreren Verteilung von bezahlter Arbeit durch die Unterstützung der Frauenerwerbsarbeit nicht einhergehen muss mit einer egalitären Verteilung von *Care* zwischen Männern und Frauen. Trotz des seit vielen Jahren etablierten Familienmodells der *dual breadwinner family* hat sich die traditionelle geschlechtliche Zuordnung von *Care* kaum verändert. Die Ergebnisse des *Care-Regimes* in Frankreich, wo sich trotz der stetigen Zunahme der Erwerbstätigkeit von Müttern die Verteilung von unbezahlter Arbeit zwischen Frauen und Männern nur wenig geändert hat, sind auch auf das kaum veränderte, traditionelle männliche Rollenbild zurückzuführen. Das *Careverhalten* von Männern in Frankreich steht im Kontext einer traditionellen Geschlechterkultur in Bezug auf die geschlechtliche Verteilung von *Care*, einer neutralen Haltung des Staates gegenüber der Familienform und der zentralen Bedeutung von Erwerbsarbeit für die wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik. Das Leitbild des Bürgers und der Bürgerin ist in Frankreich die Vollzeit beschäftigte Erwerbsperson. Um Müttern die Erfüllung dieses Status zu ermöglichen, wurden umfangreiche öffentliche Kinderbetreuungseinrichtungen geschaffen. Diese Politik zielte zunächst

jedoch nicht auf die Förderung von Geschlechtergerechtigkeit und der egalitären Verteilung von bezahlter und unbezahlter Arbeit ab. Während in Schweden die familien- und geschlechterbezogene Sozialpolitik durchaus eine Veränderung der Organisation von Erwerbsarbeit intendierte, um Elternschaft mit Erwerbsarbeit verbinden zu können, hielt Frankreich am Konzept der uneingeschränkte Erwerbsarbeit fest, die mithilfe von öffentlicher Kinderbetreuung ermöglicht werden sollte. Im Gegensatz zu Schweden wurde in Frankreich weder eine im Hinblick auf *Care* veränderte Organisation der Erwerbsarbeit noch eine geschlechtergerechte Verteilung von *Care* diskutiert. Entsprechend gab es in Frankreich bis zur Einführung des Vaterschaftsurlaubs im Jahr 2002 keine sozialpolitischen Programme, die Väter zur Übernahme von unbezahlter Arbeit aufforderten. Die auf demographische Belange abzielenden, familienfördernden Aspekte der Sozialpolitik und das traditionelle männliche Rollenbild in der Geschlechterkultur perpetuierten die geschlechtsspezifische Verteilung von *Care*.

Während sich also für den französischen Fall feststellen lässt, dass das *Careverhalten* von Männern im Zusammenhang mit einer geschlechterkulturell eher traditionellen Männerrolle und einer geschlechterpolitisch neutralen Sozialpolitik steht, zeigen das deutsche und das schwedische Beispiel, dass die Entwicklung egalitärer Geschlechterbeziehungen auch in der Verteilung von *Care* durch sozialpolitische Regulierungen gehemmt oder unterstützt werden kann.

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Anhang

Übersicht über familienpolitische Maßnahmen und deren wichtigste Reformen in Schweden, Deutschland und Frankreich.

| Zeitraum | Schweden | Deutschland | Frankreich |
|-----------|--|--|---|
| 1970-1979 | <p>Schon in dieser Phase intensiver Ausbau der öffentlichen Kinderbetreuung (bis Mitte der 1980er Jahre).</p> <p>1. Januar 1974: Elternversicherung: 6 Monate Elterngeld nach der Geburt, 90% des letzten Bruttoeinkommens oder Garantieniveau, Mutter und Vater können sich bezahlten Elternurlaub teilen.</p> <p>1. Januar 1978: Elterngeld nach der Geburt nun für 9 Monate, die letzten 3 Monate können flexibel, auch in Kombination mit Arbeitszeitreduzierung, bis zum 8. Lebensjahr des Kindes genommen werden.</p> <p>1. Januar 1979: Recht auf Arbeitszeitverkürzung um ¼ für Eltern mit Kindern bis 8 Jahren.</p> | | |
| 1980-1989 | <p>1. Januar 1980: Einführung des 10-tägigen Vaterschaftsurlaubs nach der Geburt eines Kindes.</p> <p>1. Juli 1985: Elterngeld (seit 1980 für 12 Monate) kann flexibel bis zum 4. Lebensjahr des Kindes genommen werden, auch als Arbeitszeitreduzierung.</p> <p>1. Juli 1989: Elterngeld kann flexibel bis zum 8. Lebensjahr des Kindes genommen werden, auch als Arbeitszeitreduzierung.</p> | <p>1. Januar 1986: Erziehungsurlaub und Erziehungsgeld für 10 Monate, für Sorgeberechtigte (daher i.d.R. ausgenommen: unverheiratete Väter), Erziehungsgeld 600 DM monatlich. Einmaliger Wechsel zwischen Vater und Mutter möglich, Teilzeitbeschäftigung unter 19 Wochenstunden möglich.</p> | <p>In diesem Zeitraum intensiver Ausbau der öffentlichen Kinderbetreuung, vor allem für Kinder unter drei Jahren.</p> <p>4. Juli 1985: Einführung der <i>allocation parentale d'éducation</i>, des Erziehungsgeldes bei Erwerbsunterbrechung eines Elternteiles, für Familien ab der Geburt des dritten Kindes. Bezugsdauer zwei Jahre.</p> |
| 1990-1999 | <p>1. Januar 1995: Quotierung von Elterngeld: Hälfte des Anspruch erhalten jeweils Vater und Mutter, Anspruch jedoch übertragbar auf anderen Elternteil mit Ausnahme von 30 Tagen (Papa-Monat). Für Alleinerziehende Anspruch auf gesamtes Elterngeld.</p> | <p>1. Januar 1992: Erziehungsgeld für 18 Monate, Erziehungsurlaub 36 Monate. Unverheiratete Väter können Erziehungsurlaub und -geld beanspruchen. Dreimaliger Wechsel zwischen Vater und Mutter möglich. Teilzeitbeschäftigung seit 1989 unter 20 Stunden erlaubt.</p> <p>1. Januar 1993: Erziehungsgeld für 24 Monate.</p> <p>1. Januar 1996:</p> | <p>25. Juli 1994: Reform des Erziehungsgeldes, nun auch schon von der Geburt des zweiten Kindes an beziehbar. Bezug in Kombination mit Teilzeiterwerbstätigkeit möglich bis zu 32 Stunden wöchentlich.</p> |

| Zeitraum | Schweden | Deutschland | Frankreich |
|-----------|--|---|--|
| | | Einführung des Rechtsanspruchs auf einen Kindergartenplatz für Kinder ab dem 3. Geburtstag. Rechtsanspruch bezog sich auf einen Betreuung für vier Stunden am Tag. | |
| 2000-2007 | 1. Januar 2002: Elterngeld nun für 480 Tage, davon 240 für Vater, 240 für Mutter, übertragbar auf anderen Elternteil mit Ausnahme von 60 Tagen. Alleinerziehende haben Anspruch auf gesamte 480 Tage. Hiervon 390 Tage als Einkommensersatz von 80% und 90 Tage über Garantiebetrag von 60 SEK entgolten. Elterngeld kann in Kombination mit Arbeitszeitreduzierung um 75%, 50%, 25% oder 12,5% beansprucht werden. | 1. Januar 2001: Erziehungsgeld kann budgetiert werden: statt 24 Monate 600 DM auch 12 Monate 900 DM. Mutter und Vater können gemeinsam Erziehungsgeld beziehen und Elternzeit nehmen. Elternzeitanspruch wird jedoch auf Vater und Mutter aufgeteilt, bei gemeinsamer Beanspruchung reduziert sich die Gesamtdauer der Elternzeit. 1 Jahr der Elternzeit kann bis zum 8. Geburtstag des Kindes genommen werden. Erziehungsgeld in Kombination mit Teilzeitbeschäftigung bis zu 30 Stunden wöchentlich möglich, Recht auf Arbeitszeitreduzierung für beschäftigte Eltern in Betrieben mit mehr als 15 Angestellten. 1. Januar 2004 Elternzeit kann nun bis zum 3. Lebensjahr des Kindes gemeinsam von Vater und Mutter in Anspruch genommen werden, d.h. keine Reduzierung der Gesamtdauer bei zeitgleicher Elternzeit von Vater und Mutter. 1. Januar 2005: Tagesbetreuungsbaugesetz. Ziel soll sein, bis 2010 die Zahl der Kinderbetreuungsplätze für die unter Dreijährigen um 230 000 Plätze zu erhöhen. 1. Januar 2007: Einführung des Elterngeldes für 14 Monate (bis zum 14. Lebensmonat des Kindes). 67% des letzten Nettoeinkommens aus dem vergangenen Jahr oder 300 € monatlich. 12 Monate garantiert, weitere 2 Monate nur, wenn beide Elternteile bezahlte Elternzeit in Anspruch nehmen. Bei zeitgleicher gemeinsamer Inanspruchnahme verringert sich die Gesamtbezugsdauer. Teilzeitbeschäftigung bis zu 30 Stunden wöchentlich möglich. | 1. Januar 2002: Einführung des Vaterschaftsurlaubes. 11 Tage voll bezahlter Urlaub für den Vater nach der Geburt eines Kindes. 1. Januar 2004: Einführung der <i>prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant</i> mit Elternzeit und Erziehungsgeld. Erziehungsgeld kann nun schon vom ersten Kind an bezogen werden, jedoch nur bei geringem Einkommen und nur für sechs Monate. Ab dem zweiten und dritten Kind kann Erziehungsgeld auch für Familien mit höherem Einkommen und bis zum dritten Geburtstag des Kindes bezogen werden. Erziehungsgeld ist weiterhin in Kombination mit Teilzeiterwerbstätigkeit möglich. |

ifb – Mitteilungen

Das Staatsinstitut für Familienforschung an der Universität Bamberg (*ifb*) berichtet an dieser Stelle in loser Folge über aktuelle Forschungsprojekte, neue Forschungsvorhaben, Tagungen und Veröffentlichungen. Diesmal stellen wir ein neues Projekt am *ifb* vor.

Flexible Berufsbiographien – Flex Career

Aufgrund des gestiegenen Wettbewerbsdrucks der letzten Jahrzehnte sehen sich viele nationale Regierungen veranlasst, wirtschaftliche Reformen mit dem Ziel der Erleichterung von Beschäftigungsflexibilität einzuführen. Es liegt auf der Hand, dass diese Reformen potentiell Auswirkungen auf die sozialen Ungleichheitsstrukturen in diesen Gesellschaften haben. Ein neues Forschungsvorhaben am *ifb* befasst sich daher mit den Auswirkungen von Flexibilisierungsprozessen auf die späte Erwerbskarriere und den Übergang in die Rente, nachdem das Vorgängerprojekt sich auf frühe Berufsphase konzentrierte. Nicht nur bei Berufseinsteigern, die aufgrund fehlender Seniorität, Berufserfahrung, Interessenvertretung und Netzwerken in besonderem Maße von flexiblen und prekären Beschäftigungsverhältnissen betroffen sind, sind überdurchschnittliche Erwerbsrisiken entstanden, sondern auch für ältere Arbeitnehmer, die deshalb Gegenstand des Fortsetzungsprojektes sind. Denn mit dem beschleunigten technologischen Wandel und dem verstärkten globalen Wettbewerb sind die Qualifikationen der älteren Beschäftigten zunehmend überholt und auf den Arbeitsmärkten weniger nachgefragt. Darüber hinaus sind ältere Beschäftigte für Unternehmen vergleichsweise teuer. Frühverrentungen, Arbeitslosigkeit und berufliche Abstiege von älteren Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmern erscheinen daher wahrscheinlich. Prekäre Beschäftigungsformen wie auch längere Phasen der Arbeitslosigkeit stellen dabei nicht nur eine unsichere Phase im späten Erwerbsverlauf dar, sie dürften darüber hinaus Folgen für das Renteneinkommen und für das Risiko von Alterarmut haben.

Es ist jedoch zu erwarten, dass Richtung und Ausmaß von Veränderungsprozessen stark von nationalen institutionellen Kontexten geprägt sind. So dürften sich beispielsweise in (neo-)liberalen Systemen wie den USA, in denen bereits ein hoher Grad an Flexibilität erreicht ist, die Auswirkungen wachsenden Flexibilisierungsdrucks ganz anders äußern als in eher starren Systemen wie in Deutschland: In bereits flexibilisierten Systemen dürften sich numerische Flexibilitätsstrategien (d.h. der schnelle und einfache Auf- und Abbau der Belegschaft je nach Auftragslage und der damit verbundene Druck auf die Löhne) deutlich stärker zeigen als in starren,

regulierten Systemen, wo diese Form der Flexibilität stark eingeschränkt ist (z.B. durch das Arbeitsrecht). Die Unternehmen müssen sich dann anderer Strategien bedienen, um sich Spielraum zu verschaffen (z.B. über Frühverrentungen). Vor diesem Hintergrund wird erwartet, dass die nationale Prägung von unternehmerischen Flexibilitätsstrategien und der generelle Kontext der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Absicherung einen starken Einfluss darauf haben, wie sich die soziale Ungleichheit in verschiedenen Ländern im Prozess der Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung entwickelt. Während beispielsweise in bereits flexiblen Systemen individuelle Ressourcen (wie etwa Humankapital) eine sehr wichtige Rolle für eine flexible bzw. unsichere Beschäftigung spielen dürften, werden in starren, regulierten Systemen andere Mechanismen, wie etwa die Zugehörigkeit zu einem internen Arbeitsmarkt oder bestimmten Wirtschaftsbranchen, von größerer Bedeutung sein.

Das international vergleichend arbeitende Projekt wird zehn Länder einbeziehen, die sich in charakteristischer Weise in den institutionellen Kontexten, vor allem im Hinblick auf ihre Wohlfahrtsstaatsregime, Produktionsregime und Bildungssysteme unterscheiden: West- und Ostdeutschland, Großbritannien, USA, Italien, Spanien, Niederlande, Dänemark, Schweden, Ungarn und Estland. Für die Bearbeitung steht eine DFG-Förderung für zwei Jahre zur Verfügung.

Berichtigung der Redaktion:

Durch ein bedauerliches Versehen der Redaktion fehlten im Inhaltsverzeichnis von Heft 2/2007 beim Beitrag von Andrea Lengerer, Andrea Janssen und Jeanette Bohr die Namen der beiden Mitautorinnen. Richtig muss es also heißen:

Andrea Lengerer, Andrea Jansen & Jeanette Bohr: Familiensoziologische Analysepotenziale des Mikrozensus, S. 185-209.