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Andreas Genoni

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# Status and Ethnic Identity

A Study on First- and Second-Generation  
Migrants in Germany



Verlag Barbara Budrich

Andreas Genoni  
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This book is based upon the dissertation of Andreas Genoni. It was written at and approved by the Faculty of Education at Universität Hamburg.

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## Preface

This volume of the Series of Population Studies features the dissertation of Andreas Genoni in which he studies the relationship between the social status of migrants and to what extent they identify with their group of origin and the majority group in Germany. The author shows that combinations of minority and majority identity levels do not only vary among migrants with different status positions, but also among migrants with similar status positions. Using the recognisability of migrants' migration background, education-occupation mismatch and exposure time as explaining factors, he showcases the complex interrelation of social status and ethnic identity among first- and second-generation migrants. The volume provides new insights on migrants with relatively weak ethnic identity and on the so-called "integration paradox", thereby contributing to the important discussion about migrant assimilation and alternative forms of incorporation.

Talking about alternative forms, we at the Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB), as in many other institutions, have ongoing discussions about the most appropriate ways for us to distribute our research. For decades printed books have been an important platform for scientific publishing. Since 1975, when this book series was launched, 56 monographs and collective volumes have been published. Many authors from the BiB and other institutions from Germany and abroad were involved. But as time goes by, new forms of publications have been developed and become popular and influential. In many disciplines, for example, dissertations are increasingly written cumulative and published as single papers. As is often said, it is best to go out on top, or in other words, one should end something when there is still a high demand for it, even if it is a declining demand. Therefore, we at the BiB have decided to invest in other ways of sharing our research to the public. This means, this will be the final volume of the Series of Population Studies.

We are indebted to the many people who have contributed to the success of the Series on Population Studies, however, all efforts to compile a full list of all those involved over the years will probably be incomplete. But we do want to express our gratitude to all the authors who trusted us to publish their work and the many reviewers who contributed their time and efforts to maintain the high standard of our publications. Since 2014, the series has been published by Barbara Budrich Publishers. We are thankful for their professional cooperation on all matters regarding the book series. We would also like to mention the outstanding efforts of several current and former colleagues at BiB, who contributed to the success of the book series in many different ways with their expertise, such as managing the book series, providing language editing, typesetting and formatting, designing flyers for distributing and advertising the books, and much more. For preparing the current volume, thanks are owed to Sybille Steinmetz for her thorough work in typesetting and formatting this manuscript in close collaboration with Andreas Genoni.

We wish all readers an informative and stimulating read. And please stay in contact with us via our other publications, which you can find on our website [www.bib.bund.de/EN](http://www.bib.bund.de/EN).

Wiesbaden, December 2021

Jasmin Passet-Wittig  
(Managing Editor)

C. Katharina Spieß  
(Director of the Federal Institute for Population Research, BiB)



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A long journey comes to an end. I count myself lucky that I have not been alone on this trip. Many friends and colleagues advised and supported me along the way.

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During my time in Hamburg, I have greatly benefitted from talking and listening to my colleagues, who quickly became good friends and an important part of my life. Special thanks go to Julia Heimler, my good friend and fellow student, who was always willing to listen to my thoughts and to discuss important matters—including our dissertation projects. Further special thanks go to my dear friend Tobias Schroedler. He was a good listener and always kind enough to lend me his ear. I fondly remember our coffee breaks at our favourite bakery. I wonder how they can make ends meet these days without our daily orders. Many thanks to Marina Lagemann, who greatly supported me in the early Hamburg years. I benefitted a lot from discussions with her about early drafts of my research project. And without her insights on coding, I would probably still be clicking my way through the Stata menu today. I also want to thank the rest of the “ATeam”, who made my time in Hamburg an experience that I will remember with fondness. This particularly includes Hanne Brandt, Nora Dünkel, Christin Güldemund, Antje Hansen, Sarah McMonagle, and Katharina Rybarski.

Fast forward to my time in Wiesbaden, I want to express my deep gratitude to the Federal Institute for Population Research, for allowing me to combine my full-time job with my dissertation project. The whole team has placed a great deal of trust in me and has always been keen to help. In this regard, I particularly thank Norbert F. Schneider for granting me a mini doctorate sabbatical, Nikola Sander for her patience and great understanding, Andreas Ette for his encouragement, and Nils Witte and Nico Stawarz for commenting on earlier drafts of my research project—and for being good friends.

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Wiesbaden, December 2021  
Andreas Genoni





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# 1 Introduction

There was a great relief when the news of the newly discovered COVID-19 vaccine finally came out. Özlem TÜreci and Uğur Şahin, a scientist couple located in Germany, were largely involved in the discovery. Since the announcement, they have been all over the news. However, news coverage was not only about the vaccine, but also about their non-German roots.

TÜreci and Şahin both have Turkish migration backgrounds. Şahin migrated to Germany when he was four years old. He and his mother joined Şahin's father, who was working as a "guest worker" at Ford. At the same age, TÜreci's parents brought her to Germany, where her father was working as a doctor.

In the media, TÜreci and Şahin are described as "good role models"<sup>1</sup> and are praised as examples of successful integration.<sup>2</sup> As author Samira El Ouassil points out, the narrative behind such attributions equals migrants' high socioeconomic status with successful assimilation.<sup>3</sup> The narrative thus conveys a simplified picture in which higher-status migrants leave their cultural heritage behind and manage to adapt, while their lower-status counterparts do not.

However, even though successful and having grown up in Germany, TÜreci and Şahin deviate from this ideal-typical narrative. TÜreci once described herself as "Prussian Turk,"<sup>4</sup> and Şahin's attachment to his origin is expressed in his faith. TÜreci and Şahin are not the only exception. For example, German state secretary Şerap Güler once pronounced how important her Turkish roots are to her.<sup>5</sup> She considered them as part of her identity, just as her homeland Germany. The same applies to Naika Foroutan, a Professor for Integration Research and Social Policy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. In an interview, she attached high importance to both her birth country Germany and to her Iranian background.<sup>6</sup>

How come some higher-status individuals with migration background consider their origin as the essential part of their ethnic identity, while others emphasise only their German allegiance or stress their emotional bond to both their origin and to Germany? And how, if at all, does the ethnic identity of these individuals differ from those of lower status? Exploring the link between status and ethnic identity and addressing these questions is the main interest of this book.

## 1.1 The notion of ethnic identity

Throughout this book, the term "minority identity" refers to migrants' emotional identification with their family's group of origin, which often represents a minority group in receiving

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<sup>1</sup> Broadcast of "ZDF Heute" from March 10, 2021, 7 pm on the German tv channel ZDF.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. [https://rp-online.de/panorama/coronavirus/biontech-gruender-ugur-sahin-vom-gastarbeiterkind-zum-retter-der-menschheit\\_aid-54532197](https://rp-online.de/panorama/coronavirus/biontech-gruender-ugur-sahin-vom-gastarbeiterkind-zum-retter-der-menschheit_aid-54532197), accessed on March 13, 2021; <https://plus.tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/von-einwandererkindern-zu-multi-milliardaeren-das-ist-das-paar-hinter-dem-corona-impfstoff-66836.html>, accessed on March 13, 2021; [https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/impfstoffforscher-eine-migrantisches-erfolgsgeschichte.1005.de.html?dram:article\\_id=487428](https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/impfstoffforscher-eine-migrantisches-erfolgsgeschichte.1005.de.html?dram:article_id=487428), accessed on March 13, 2021.

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/impfstoff-forscherpaar-ugur-sahin-und-oezlem-tuereci-die-super-migranten-kolumne-a-156c445e-1515-4dc5-8252-3573048d9501>, accessed on March 13, 2021.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/oezlem-tuereci-eine-preussische-tuerkin-1.5160120>, accessed on March 13, 2021.

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/serap-gueler-meine-heimat-ist-deutschland-15118853.html>, accessed on March 13, 2021.

<sup>6</sup> [https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/naika-foroutan-ueber-die-postmigrantisches-gesellschaft-wo.974.de.html?dram:article\\_id=478980](https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/naika-foroutan-ueber-die-postmigrantisches-gesellschaft-wo.974.de.html?dram:article_id=478980), accessed on March 13, 2021.



societies. The term “majority identity” refers to migrants’ emotional identification with the majority group in their receiving society. Emotional identification reflects the affective dimension of identity (Brubaker 2006: 2; Esser 2001; Leszczensky/Gräbs Santiago 2015). According to many scholars, the affective dimension depicts the key identity dimension, with feelings of belonging and attachment comprising its central aspects (Ashmore et al. 2004; Ellemers et al. 1999; Jackson 2002; Phinney/Ong 2007).

In this book, migrants are referred to as members of the first and second generation. Migrants of both generations vary in their extent of identification with the minority and the majority group. I subsume the different combinations of these various degrees of minority and majority identification under the term “ethnic identity.” In the literature, ethnic identity often solely refers to migrants’ emotional identification with the minority group. This one-sided use of the term neglects the fact that majority groups in receiving societies are mostly defined along ethnic boundaries as well, making them another ethnic group to identify with, like Germans in Germany or Austrians in Austria.<sup>7</sup>


Accordingly, I adhere to Max Weber’s (1978) notion of ethnic groups, defining them as people with a subjective belief in a shared community. This belief is based on presumed shared characteristics such as origin, ancestry, visual traits, value orientations, language, and religion. Depending on the subjective importance of these characteristics, identification with an ethnic group may be based on one or more characteristics and differ between individuals who also identify with this ethnic group. For example, being born in Germany may be crucial for some Germans’ identification with other Germans.<sup>8</sup> However, for first-generation migrants living in Germany, being born in Germany is not a characteristic they share with Germans. Nevertheless, first-generation migrants in Germany may emotionally identify with Germans. This may be the case if they largely feel accepted and if they cherish values and norms upheld by Germans.

A well-established approach to describe migrants’ ethnic identity is the fourfold acculturation typology by John Berry (1997, 1980). Originally, the acculturation typology results out of cross tabulating two issues in situations of interethnic contact: The first issue addresses migrants’ wish to be part of their families’ ethnic group of origin and their willingness to maintain contact to it and its members. The second issue is about migrants’ wish to be part of the majority group in the receiving society and the readiness to engage with majority members (Sam/Berry 2010: 476). Applying the approach to migrants’ emotional identification with the majority group and the minority group, a typology of their ethnic identity can be created. Figure 1-1 below depicts this typology, reflecting the diversity of migrants’ emotional identification. Accordingly, migrants lack or show comparably weak ethnic identity if they hardly identify with the minority and the majority group. Separated identity refers to a comparably strong emotional identification with the minority group and a comparably weak identification with the majority group. Migrants show assimilated identity if they identify comparably strong with the majority group and comparably weak with the minority group. The last type depicts dual identity, describing a comparably strong emotional identification with both groups.

<sup>7</sup> A more complex case in point would be the USA with its ethnically diverse population. There, the status “native” belongs to indigenous groups who represent ethnic minority groups in the USA. The majority group, in turn, refers to White Americans who are in fact mostly descendants of immigrants from Europe.

<sup>8</sup> Note that in some societies, the majority group can be further divided into smaller ethnic groups, like for instance in Belgium or Switzerland. Taking the latter country as an example, majority members (“the Swiss”) comprise four different ethno-linguistic groups that may all be native to Switzerland but primarily distinguish themselves from each other by means of their first language, Romansh, Italian, French and Swiss-German. It is reasonable to assume that migrants may also identify with smaller ethnic groups. Emotional identification with smaller ethnic groups is, however, not addressed in this book.

Figure 1-1: Four types of ethnic identity



Source: Adapted from Berry (1997, 1980).

## 1.2 Studying ethnic identity

Studying migrants' ethnic identity—with its components minority and majority identity—is worth to be studied in and for itself. Scholars frequently highlight the challenge of migrants to cope with their minority and majority identification (Benet-Martínez/Haritatos 2005; Berry 1997; Phinney et al. 2006; Tadmor/Tetlock 2006). This challenge is considered to reflect the way how the society at large and migrants themselves deal with the broader challenges of interethnic contact and integration.

For a better understanding of these processes, it is necessary to consider both, minority and majority identity and investigate migrants' ethnic identity from a bidimensional perspective. Empirical research has repeatedly found minority and majority identity to be relatively independent from each other (e.g. Berry et al. 2006; Flannery et al. 2001; Hochman et al. 2018; Oetting/Beauvais 1991; Phinney et al. 2001a; Ryder et al. 2000). Minority and majority identity may be positively or negatively correlated or even uncorrelated. Consequently, migrants' minority and majority identity do not necessarily tell us the same thing about how societies and migrants deal with migration related challenges.

Considering society at large, ethnic identity can be considered as a barometer of society (see Parekh 2000).<sup>9</sup> Migrants' ethnic identity reveals the boundaries between migrants and minority members and informs about their permeability (National Academies of Science 2015). Minority identity is often argued to be an indicator for community cohesion, particularly at the familial level. Majority identity, in turn, is argued to indicate social cohesion, referring to reduced negative feelings and discrimination between ethnic groups (Huntington 2005; Verkuyten/Martinovic 2012). In contrast, no/weak ethnic identity is often considered as a severe problem, indicating a state in which migrants are marginalised (Berry 1997; Rumbaut 2005). Marginalised migrants are more likely to experience social deprivation and are argued to be at a greater risk of drifting into radicalised milieus (Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015; Stroink 2007). Consequently, when investigated combined, minority identity and majority identity provide a

<sup>9</sup> Parekh himself uses the term only in relation to majority identity.

more comprehensive picture of the social climate within societies than when investigated individually.

Considering migrants, scholars often relate ethnic identity to well-being. Minority identity and majority identity have both been associated with subjective well-being and with reduced stress and other mental health issues (e.g. Berry et al. 2006; Bobowik et al. 2017; Bratt 2015). Importantly, benefits and detriments related to migrants' minority and majority identity are each considered to accumulate (Benet-Martínez/Haritato 2005; Berry 2005; Tadmor/Tetlock 2006). From this perspective, migrants who strongly identify with both groups are considered to be the "happiest" migrants with the smallest amount of acculturative stress, while migrants who weakly identify with both groups are those with the lowest well-being and highest stress level. Correspondingly, scholars also highlight the substitutive character of ethnic identity. That is, benefits related to one identity and detriments related to the other can compensate each other. This places migrants with assimilated and separated identity somewhere in-between those migrants with comparably weak and dual identity. Therefore, it is crucial to consider minority and majority identity combined to gain a more comprehensive picture of migrants' condition.

### 1.3 The role of status

We now know why studying ethnic identity matters. The different outcomes tell us something about social climate, interethnic dialogue, and migrants' individual condition. Investigating migrants' emotional identification one-dimensionally in the sense of either their minority or majority identity would only provide an incomplete picture of their situation. What is the role of status in this? As the example of Türeci and Şahin has illustrated, status often conveys this incomplete picture because the link between status and ethnic identity is prevalently viewed from an assimilation perspective.

#### *1.3.1 One-dimensionality and dichotomisation: The case of classical assimilation theory*

In migration research, classical assimilation theory belongs to the most enduring and most popular theoretical perspectives on migrants' incorporation, not least because it is often the dominant outcome in the majority of the migrant population from an intergenerational perspective. The core assumption of classical assimilation theory is that sooner or later, ethnic distinctiveness between migrants and majority members become smaller and migrants become more integrated into the mainstream society—that is: they become less oriented towards the minority group and assimilate to majority members and their culture (Alba 2008; Gordon 1964; Warner/Srole 1945). Thereby, migrants are also considered to develop assimilated identity (e.g. Alba/Nee 1997; Esser 2006; Gordon 1964; Nauck 2001a). This implies that classical assimilation theory assumes minority and majority identity to be mutually exclusive.

Apart from time, classical assimilation theory conceives status to be of "paramount significance" for migrants' assimilation (Alba/Nee 1997: 835). In the present context, status can be defined as migrants' socioeconomic position in the receiving society. It is usually measured by indicators such as level of education, occupational position, and income. According to assimilation theorists, the major reason of the high importance of status for

migrants' assimilation grounds in the prospect of status achievement (Alba 2008; Gans 2007). Status-related benefits are considered to strongly increase migrants' motivation for assimilation as high status positions can only be reached with abilities, skills and knowledge that are deemed valuable in the receiving society. Educational certificates and previous occupations are thereby very important as they signal the availability of the aforementioned resources (Arrow 1986). By highlighting the motivational character of status for migrants' assimilation, scholars consider migrants' status position as strong and reliable indicator for their level of assimilation.

Given the dominance of classical assimilation theory and the popular perspective on the role of status within the theory's framework, the incomplete picture about the link between status and ethnic identity provided so far surprises less. From the bottom to the top of the social hierarchy, classical assimilation theory assumes a switch from separated to assimilated identity. That is, while lower-status migrants are expected to show separated identity, higher-status migrants are expected to show assimilated identity. This dichotomised and mutually exclusive understanding of how status relates to migrants' emotional identification is too simplistic. The relationship between status and migrants' emotional identification with ethnic groups is arguably more diverse.

For example, higher-status migrants with greater cognitive capacities could be better prepared for the challenges associated with interethnic contact, allowing them to combine the best of two cultural worlds, eventually resulting in a dual identity. On the other hand, migrants may feel treated unequally compared to majority members despite similar resources and same status positions. In this regard, migrants perceive that their life chances are worse and that they are shown less respect by majority members, although they equally contribute to society. Such perceptions likely weaken migrants' emotional identification with the majority group. At higher status levels, such perceptions could empower migrants to advocate for minority group interests. But the same perceptions could also evoke the fear of losing hard earned privileges, promoting migrants to avoid being associated with their group of origin.

However, parity in life chances and equal treatment by majority members could also matter less. Migrants do not necessarily compare themselves to majority members in the first place, but to non-migrated relatives who still live in the society of origin. In this context, migrants on low or intermediate status positions could very well have positive attitudes towards majority members, facilitating majority identification (Diehl et al. 2016a). For some migrants, in turn, felt and self-imposed pressure to succeed may be so high that failure results in humiliation, disappointment, and shame, causing emotional withdrawal even from the minority group. These latter issues also raise questions about intergenerational differences in how status is linked to ethnic identity.

### *1.3.2 Empirical evidence raises questions*

Previous empirical findings for first- and second-generation migrants hint on a story that is more complex than the assumptions of dichotomisation and mutual exclusiveness. If we review the findings of studies that either investigated migrants' minority or majority identity, we see that overall, the relationship between status and migrants' emotional identification is not that clear.

There are studies that report a positive relationship between status and majority identity. This is the case in the study on first-generation migrant parents of Casey and Dustmann (2010). They conducted random effects analyses using information from 22 waves of the German *Socio-Economic Panel* (SOEP) and years of education as indicator for status. Fleischmann and Phalet (2016) also find a positive relationship in their study on second-

generation Muslim minorities across five European countries, using a dummy variable for tertiary education. A positive relationship between status and majority identity has also been found in studies across migrant generations. In their study on first-, second- and third-generation migrants in Baden-Württemberg, Germany, Hochman et al. (2018) find a positive relationship between high socio-economic status and majority identification. De Vroome et al. (2014b) also report a positive relationship across first- and second-generation migrants from Turkey and Morocco living in the Netherlands. They drew on the *Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study* (NELLS) and used the educational certificate that is formally required for migrants' current job position as indicator for status.

There are also studies that provide hardly any evidence for a relationship between status and majority identity. This is the case in the cross-sectional study on first-generation migrants in Germany by Zimmermann et al. (2006). They used SOEP data from the years 2000, 2001 and 2002 and migrants' level of education, documenting inconsistent and largely statistically non-significant relationships between status and majority identity. In another approach, Diehl and Schnell (2006) investigated whether Turkish migrants in Germany, who are known to be structurally more disadvantaged than migrants from former Yugoslavia and the EU identify less with Germans. The authors drew on data from the "foreigner's sample" of the SOEP and investigated the time between 1984 and 2001 cross-sectionally by reporting the means of German identification for each observed year. The comparison revealed small and decreasing differences over the years between Turkish migrants and those from the EU and former Yugoslavia regarding the share of those who totally feel German. They concluded that lower-status Turks identify no less with Germans than other, higher-status migrants.

Some studies also report status and majority identity to be negatively related. A random effects analysis by Esser (2009) based on 24 SOEP-waves finds a weak but significantly negative effect of migrants' level of education on first-generation migrants' identification with Germans. Importantly, this effect is prevalent when controlling for parents' education, which likely lowers the explanatory power of their children's education. In another German study on recently immigrated Poles and Turks, Diehl et al. (2016b) also find a negative effect of status on majority identification. Using data from the international survey project *Socio-cultural Integration Processes among New Immigrants in Europe* (SCIP) they report that tertiary educated migrants from both groups identify significantly less with Germans than their lower educated counterparts. A negative relationship between status and majority identity has further been found among German emigrants. Based on data from the *German Emigration and Remigration Panel Study*, Décieux and Murdock (2021) provide evidence that recently emigrated Germans with comparably higher education identify less with their receiving society and its majority group than their lower-educated counterparts.

Regarding the relationship between status and minority identity, empirical evidence is scarcer but conveys a similar picture. The already mentioned studies by Zimmermann et al. (2006), Diehl and Schnell (2006) and Hochman et al. (2018) report no empirical evidence for an effect of first- respectively second-generation migrants' status on the minority identification. The random effects analysis by Casey and Dustmann (2010), in turn, finds that more years of education negatively affect first-generation parents' minority identification.

Concluding ad interim, empirical research studying ethnic identity one-dimensionally suggests variation in the way how status relates to migrants' emotional identification. Variation is thereby found across and within migrant generations. At least, the latter is the case for first-generation migrants since empirical evidence for second-generation migrants alone is comparably scarce. However, owed to their one-dimensional approach, the studies do not shed light on how first- and second-generation migrants' status is linked to their minority identity in tandem with their majority identity. But by assuming status to be one-dimensionally related to migrants' emotional identification, we risk of conveying the

impression that status is a panacea against interethnic conflict and alienation, and that it does not support, or even reduce, cultural diversity. There is need for studies with a bidimensional approach, taking into account minority identity in tandem with majority identity. Further, these studies need to distinguish between the first and second generation and investigate conditions that interact with migrants' status. This way, we can improve our understanding of how status is linked to ethnic identity.

Empirical research applying a bidimensional approach is scarce. Unfortunately, even more scarce are studies that distinguish between first- and second-generation migrants and look at interaction effects. A cross-sectional analysis by Feliciano (2009) investigated the relationship between education and ethnic identity among first- and second-generation migrants with Latin American and Caribbean background based on the *Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study* (CILS). Employing a multinomial logistic regression at the time when migrants were in their early adulthood, she finds that higher educated migrants are significantly more likely than lower educated migrants to show dual identity compared to assimilated and separated identity. Additionally, descriptive findings show assimilated identity to be similarly distributed across the different educational categories while separated identity is less prevalent the higher the educational category.

There is also support from two Swedish studies that investigate first- and second-generation migrants' ethnic identity, using data from the *Follow-up Surveys of Pupils* from Statistics Sweden (Nekby et al. 2009; Nekby/Rödin 2010). The survey contains information on students who graduated from nine-year compulsory school in 1988, which were then surveyed 1990, 1992 and 1995. Both studies used information from the survey wave which took place in 1995. However, sample sizes differed between the studies due to variations in the studies' empirical set-up. In both studies, multinomial logistic regressions of migrants' ethnic identity reveal that those migrants who commenced university were more likely to show dual identity than assimilated identity than those who did not commence university.

Empirical evidence is also provided for first-generation migrants by another German study, using SOEP data from the year 2001 and level of education as indicator for status (Zimmermann et al. 2007). To the best of my knowledge, this study belongs to the few that indicate how the diverse influence of status on migrants' ethnic identity may partly be explained. The authors conduct binary probit analyses for males and females and reveal for females that, compared to having lower education from Germany, having no education and having higher education increase the likelihood of dual identity compared to other types of ethnic identity. Furthermore, having higher education from Germany compared to lower education decreases the likelihood of no/weak ethnic identity in contrast to other ethnic identity types. Those women who have no education from Germany, in turn, do not have a higher probability of showing no/weak ethnic identity than those with lower education. In contrast to females, the relationship between education and ethnic identity is not statistically significant for men.

In sum, research with a bidimensional approach on ethnic identity confirms the impression we got from empirical research with a one-dimensional approach: Status and ethnic identity are indeed related in a more diverse way. Apart from this finding, however, these studies do not provide much further information that helps us addressing the previously formulated desiderata, i.e. intergenerational differences and interaction effects.

## 1.4 Research interest

The credit of previous research lies in establishing that the relationship between status and migrants' emotional identification is more complex than simply expecting lower-status migrants to show separated identity and higher-status migrants to show assimilated identity. However, research did not get much further so far. At this point, the intriguing questions thus are: How is status linked to migrants' minority identity in tandem with their majority identity? How does this relationship differ between the first and second generation? And what conditions affect the association between status and migrants' ethnic identity? In this book, I address this lacuna and move towards a better understanding of how status is linked to migrants' ethnic identity.

First, a theoretical model is needed that goes beyond a one-dimensional approach, allowing to generally study determinants of migrants' ethnic identity. Applying Berry's fourfold acculturation typology to describe different ethnic identity types already provides a fruitful theoretical baseline for this purpose (see Section 1). However, Berry's approach is useful only on a descriptive level. The typology cannot explain why and how migrants differ in the outcome (Benet-Martínez/Haritatos 2005; Nauck 2008; Rudmin 2009). The first task in this book is thus a theoretical one, namely developing such a theoretical model.

Berry's typology is extended by combining it with social production function (SPF) theory. In short, SPF theory posits that all individuals want to maintain physical well-being and produce social approval. Applied to the situation of migrants, I show that migrants' production of social approval is largely dependent on the production of comfort, behavioural confirmation, affection and status. These goods can be produced within the minority and/or the majority context, therefore generating context-specific social approval. Context-specific social approval, in turn, is argued to affect the way in which migrants identify with the minority and the majority group.

Informed by existing identity theories, I consider different theoretical mechanisms that explain why migrants show specific ethnic identity types. With the help of SPF theory and Berry's typology, these mechanisms are integrated in a general theoretical model. The proposed model serves the purpose to guide theoretical considerations in the empirical sections of this book. Overall, these empirical sections address four research questions. The first research question is part of Analysis 1 (Section 4.2) and is probably the most straightforward in this book:

**Research Question 1:** How is status linked to first- and second-generation migrants' ethnic identity and how does this link differ between migrant generations?

By addressing this general question, I tackle the first two desiderata and take a bidimensional perspective on ethnic identity and investigate its generation-specific link to status. Thus, addressing this first research question is a contribution in and for itself. It adds empirical evidence to the scarce literature on the relationship between status and migrants' ethnic identity by going beyond a mutually exclusive understanding of migrants' emotional identification and by considering intergenerational differences. Simultaneously, this turns out to be the point of departure of my further empirical investigation. The subsequent analyses all take bidimensional and intergenerational perspectives and investigate specific conditions that influence the link between status and ethnic identity.

The literature suggests one such condition to be the recognisability of migrants' migration background. A second research question that is addressed in Analysis 1 therefore asks

**Research Question 2:** How is the relationship between status and ethnic identity influenced by first- and second-generation migrants' recognisability to majority members?

Recent empirical research shows that higher educated migrants perceive more discrimination if majority members recognise their migration background (Tuppat/Gerhards 2020). This finding contributes to the explanation of a central link of the so-called "integration paradox." The paradox posits that higher educated migrants are particularly prone to feel deprived compared to majority members, which reduces their majority identification (Verkuyten 2016). The integration paradox thus counters the perspective of classical assimilation theory, which expects status and majority identity to be positively related because of status-based differences in migrants' resources.

While migrant recognisability establishes a link between high status and relative deprivation, it is an open empirical question whether migrant recognisability is also negatively related to higher-status migrants' majority identity. Analysis 1 addresses this question and extends it to migrants' minority identity. The integration paradox focuses exclusively on migrants' majority identity and not on their ethnic identity as a whole. However, if migrant recognisability indeed promotes feelings of relative deprivation among higher-status migrants, there is reason to believe that their minority identity is affected as well (e.g. Fleischmann et al. 2019; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2009).

Developing an improved understanding of how status relates to ethnic identity also requires awareness of status discrepancies and their potential effects on migrants' ethnic identity. Thus, the second analysis in this book (Section 4.3) addresses the issue of education-occupation mismatch.

**Research Question 3:** How does education-occupation mismatch affect ethnic identity?

I refer to education-occupation mismatch if individuals' educational level is higher than required for occupying their current job position. Previous research documents that education-occupation mismatch occurs more often among first- and second-generation migrants than among majority members and that it is particularly prevalent among first-generation migrants (Aleksynska/Tritah 2013; Boll et al. 2014; Dunlavy et al. 2016). If researchers want to better understand how status relates to ethnic identity, investigating how inadequate status conversions affect migrants' ethnic identity could thus turn out to be crucial.

Education-occupation mismatch can represent a state of missed opportunities, humiliation, and disappointment due to unmet status expectations. Status expectations are known to be high in migrant populations across different societies (e.g. Brinbaum/Cebolla-Boado 2007; Glick/White 2004; Goyette/Xie 1999; Kristen/Dollmann 2009; Nauck/Genoni 2019). Status-mismatched migrants may feel deprived of their expectations of adequate status return and related life chances. This lack could trigger feelings of not being respected and valued, of unequal treatment and chances in the receiving society. Consequently, status-mismatched migrants may emotionally distance themselves from the receiving society instead. They may seek comfort, closeness, and security among minority members. However, status-mismatched migrants could also emotionally detach themselves from the minority group since they are unable to meet the high upward-mobility expectations of their family.

Analysis 2 further assesses whether status mismatch is another candidate that provides an explanation for the integration paradox. There are, however, contrasting assumptions regarding the influence of education-occupations mismatch on ethnic identity of higher educated migrants. The influence could be weaker among higher than lower educated migrants since higher educated migrants may have the necessary cognitive resources for coping. On the other hand, the influence could be stronger because higher educated migrants



may be more sensitive to unmet expectations of equal treatment. Furthermore, there may be more at stake for higher educated migrants regarding the consequences of status loss.

The third analysis in this book (Section 4.4) investigates the relationship between status and ethnic identity from a broader perspective by focussing on migrants' exposure time. In contrast to Analyses 1 and 2, Analysis 3 thus aims to assess the role of status differences in ethnic identity within a longer-term context. The corresponding research question asks

**Research Question 4:** Are there intra- and intergenerational status differences in migrants' ethnic identity over different exposure time points?

Besides status, exposure time is perhaps the most significant variable in the framework of assimilation theory. It is part of the empirically widely supported "mainstream assimilation" Hypothesis, which posits that the majority of the migrant population assimilates the longer their exposure in the receiving society (Alba 2008). As is the case for status, the principal argument of classical assimilation theory why assimilation occurs over time is also a resource argument: A decrease in origin- and an increase in destination-specific resources promote assimilation over time. Correspondingly, assimilation theorists state that over time, lower-status migrants assimilate slower compared to higher-status migrants (Alba/Nee 1997).

However, there are valid reasons to expect that not all higher-status migrants show a change in their ethnic identity over exposure time that resembles a faster assimilation process compared to their lower-status counterparts. Specifically, there could be intergenerational status differences in the pace of such a presumed assimilation process. For example, exposure always starts later in life for first- compared to second-generation migrants. Early-life exposure is considered crucial for faster integration into the majority group. Younger individuals are more efficient and better guided in learning new things, which for example includes language acquisition (Newport 1990). These early advantages—before status even consolidates—may shape second-generation migrants' incentives for engaging with majority members in the future. Thus, such early advantages could render future status-related integration advantages (e.g. cognitive sophistication, more opportunities to interact with majority members) obsolete. This should be less the case for first-generation migrants, who often miss these early years and thus depend more on status-related advantages. The accelerating joint effect of exposure time and status proposed by assimilation theorists might therefore only occur in the first generation. The goal of Analysis 3 is to address this hypothesis and to explore other potential scenarios in the first and second generation.

## 1.5 Outline of this book

The introductory Chapter is followed by four chapters. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical basis, Chapter 3 introduces the data, Chapter 4 comprises the empirical investigation and Chapter 5 closes the book with concluding remarks. Two Appendices provide further information regarding data preparation and analysis. Chapter 2 proposes a general theoretical model which intends to explain migrants' minority identity in tandem with their majority identity (i.e. their ethnic identity). The model therefore combines Berry's fourfold acculturation typology as a framework and social production function (SPF) theory for theoretical reasoning. Chapter 3 introduces the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) and its data, which form the empirical basis of the empirical investigation. Note that Chapter 3 dispenses with variable selection/operationalisation and a method part. Since theoretical

arguments for the empirical investigation are developed in the empirical sections themselves, variable selection and operationalisation is discussed for each empirical section separately. This is also the case for model specification and analytical strategy, which vary in each empirical section. Hence, they are all part of Chapter 4. Chapter 4 contains the empirical analyses on the relationship between first- and second-generation migrants' status and ethnic identity. Three different empirical analyses are conducted, each dedicated to address my research interests formulated in the previous Section 1.4. Chapter 5 closes the book with some concluding remarks. It thereby addresses limitations of the empirical investigation, summarises its main results and discusses avenues for future research. To limit redundancy throughout the empirical section of the book, an overview of all variables and their operationalisation is given in Appendix A. In relation to that, Appendix A also features a section about how missing values are dealt with. Lastly, Appendix B includes results of two sensitivity analyses that are related to Analysis 3.



## 2 Theoretical Framework

Drawing on the seminal work of Berry (1997, 1980; Sam/Berry 2010), I conceptualise migrants' ethnic identity from a bidimensional perspective, namely as migrants' minority identity in tandem with their majority identity. Considering this bidimensionality, this chapter proposes a general theoretical model to explain migrants' ethnic identity (Figure 2-2). For this purpose, Section 2.1 introduces social production function (SPF) theory. It explains why and how individuals generally aim to maintain their physical well-being and produce social approval through achieving various instrumental goals. In Section 2.2, I explain how the desire for need satisfaction is affected by the contexts within which individuals live. Section 2.3 builds on the knowledge gained that producing social approval is context specific and is guiding human action. Thus, it discusses whether and how migrants achieve the instrumental goals that are relevant to produce social approval (comfort, behavioural confirmation, affection and status) within the minority and/or majority context. The role of status for producing social approval is thereby highlighted. After this, social approval and ethnic identity are linked. This allows the explanation of migrants' ethnic identity based on achieving and missing context-specific instrumental goals. Section 2.4 summarises the theoretical propositions.

### 2.1 The two building blocks of social production function theory

Two theories are needed to explain why and how migrants (dis)identify with the minority and/or with the majority group. For addressing the “why” question, a theory is needed that explains why migrants behave and, relatedly, feel certain ways. This is a theory about the value of specific goods and related preferences. For addressing the “how” question, we need a theory that explains how migrants can obtain the goods they prefer and value. A theoretical approach that subsumes these two kinds of theories under one theoretical framework is the social production function (SPF) theory, developed by Siegwart Lindenberg and advanced by himself and his colleagues (Lindenberg 1996, 1984; Lindenberg/Frey 1993; Ormel et al. 1999; Steverink et al. 1998).


SPF theory posits that individuals always strive to maximise their utility, whereby utility indicates the satisfactory power of any goods available by individuals. Individuals try to maximise their utility by aiming to satisfy their fundamental human needs. These human needs in turn are satisfied by achieving certain instrumental goals, which can be accomplished with the help of resources. The result is a hierarchical structure of utility, fundamental needs, goals and resources (see Figure 2-1), in which social behaviour can best be understood as a chain of production, where resources are invested to produce goods (i.e. other resources and goods located on a higher level in the hierarchy), that serve the purpose of satisfying fundamental needs and ultimately utility maximisation. In the following Section 2.1.1, this hierarchy will be addressed as a first building block of SPF theory, before social behaviour is introduced as the second building block in Section 2.1.2.

#### 2.1.1 *Resources, goals, needs and utility: The hierarchy of social production functions*

In the framework of SPF theory, the first theoretical building block is about the value of goods and the related preferences. This translates into a hierarchy with four levels (Figure 2-1) with

utility at the top, resources at the bottom and universal needs and instrumental goals in-between (Ormel et al. 1999: 67–68).

Figure 2-1: The four-level hierarchy of social production functions



Source: Adapted from (Ormel et al. 1999).

Level IV depicts individuals' utility. In SPF theory, utility refers to individuals' subjective well-being. The assumption underlying this connection is that the value of a certain good or action is determined based on the amount of subjective well-being gained by obtaining the respective good or performing the specific action (Esser 1999). One could say that "if a person were allowed to choose between two states of life, he or she would always choose the one which offers a high degree of [subjective] well-being [in the end]" (Böhnke/Kohler 2010: 629).

Level III depicts the two fundamental needs, physical well-being and social approval. Lindenberg (e.g. 1989: 190) refers to Adam Smith (1759) to define these fundamental human needs. Individuals improve their subjective well-being if they satisfy the third-level needs. According to SPF theory, physical well-being and social approval are fundamental because all individuals try to satisfy them, independent of context (Ormel et al. 1999). The importance of both needs is explained by securing biological reproduction and survivability. While this explanation is straightforward regarding physical well-being, the need for social approval expresses a feeling of security regarding one's social actions. Producing social approval is important, as individuals' genetic predispositions are not designed to fully control their social actions. Receiving social approval thus indicates that individuals are capable of living in groups, which is beneficial for survivability and reproduction. According to Esser (1999), producing social approval is the fundamental need that guides individuals' actions.

Level II depicts five specific instrumental goals that individuals pursue to satisfy their fundamental needs: In case of physical well-being, individuals need stimulation (or activation)

and comfort (Wippler 1990, 1987). Stimulation/activation directly refer to activities that optimise individuals' level of arousal in a mental, sensory or physical way. Related examples would be reading an interesting book, degustation of wine or doing competitive sports. Comfort is characterised by a safe and pleasant environment. It marks the absence of unpleasant states such as thirst, hunger, pain or depressive feelings (Ormel et al. 1999: 67–68).

To generate social approval, individuals strive for three instrumental goals, which are also called “social needs:” Status, behavioural confirmation, and affection. While status and behavioural confirmation constitute esteem-needs that express an individual's wish to be valued and respected by others, affection refers to the love-need, expressing the desire of being liked and loved by relevant others (Lindenberg 1996: 171; see also Maslow 1970; Ormel et al. 1999: 69).

Individuals achieve status if they control scarce and socially valued resources, as it would be the case for professional athletes, famous persons or individuals with high occupational status. High status is regarded as the most desired goal regarding the production of social approval. It can only be achieved by some members of society and is more difficult to satiate than the other social needs (Nieboer/Lindenberg 2002). This is also the reason why it can be considered as a powerful good for maximising subjective well-being: Producing less satiated goods has greater positive effects on subjective well-being than producing overproduced goods. Overproduction is argued to be more likely regarding the satisfaction of the remaining instrumental goals (Ormel et al. 1999: 68).

Individuals satisfy their need for behavioural confirmation if they gain approval for things they do. Behavioural confirmation is received by conforming to social norms and is produced by exerting social control. Approval is only beneficial for behavioural confirmation, if it is received from relevant others (e.g. Steverink/Lindenberg 2006: 282). This mainly includes family members, but also friends, work colleagues and individuals who are important for social comparison. It is also possible that individuals exert self-confirmation if they fulfil their own expectations or if they anticipate the reaction of others (Lindenberg 1984: 175). Behavioural confirmation is less difficult to produce than status, but it does not constitute a social need that can be satisfied without interruption. The need of behavioural confirmation must be satisfied anew constantly, in order to maximise subjective well-being (Steverink/Lindenberg 2006). Ideally, behavioural confirmation constitutes a commonly occurring event, that positively influences individuals' subjective well-being.

The third social need, “affection,” refers to positive inputs from others who care. Affection is produced in case of mutual dependence, social similarity and continuous informal social interaction (Lindenberg 1984: 177). For example, affection is produced by maintaining supportive and intimate relationships with a partner or (grand)children. Affection is considered to be the simplest social need to satisfy (Steverink/Lindenberg 2006). Compared to status, most individuals are assumed to have a minimum level of affection, provided by family and/or friends; and unlike behavioural confirmation, the production of affection can be assumed to be rather constant, because affection is related to meaningful and long-lasting contacts and relationships (Baumeister/Leary 1995; Steverink/Lindenberg 2006). In contrast to behavioural confirmation, affection therefore constitutes no event that is followed by affective responses. Instead, it can be considered as the only social need that most individuals are able to satisfy constantly.

Level I depicts resources, which build the fundament of the SPF hierarchy. Resources (e.g. education, cognition or money) help satisfying second-level needs like affection, comfort and status. Besides their function as investment goods, some resources are also endowments, like wealth or long-time good health, meaning that they contribute to need satisfaction without any investments (Ormel et al. 1999: 74).

Successfully investing resources always generates resource returns. For example, doing sports not only increases physical well-being, but also leads to the acquisition of physical health, specific skills and perhaps friends. Likewise, investing time in education not only contributes to status production, but also to the production of general knowledge, various competencies and prospective financial gains, further supporting maximisation of subjective well-being. This circulation of resource investments and returns is related to model of resource conservation (Hobfoll 2002, 1989). It states that individuals invest their resources in a way that they are able to maintain their resource level, meaning that investments are only considered worthwhile if they do not lead to severe resource losses—or in the framework of SPF theory, to a decrease in the level of need satisfaction.

Many resources such as education, time and money are multifunctional, indicating that they can be used to produce not only one but various goods important for subjective well-being (Lindenberg 1996: 176–177). The multifunctionality of resources is positively associated with an individuals' resource-return rate. Used wisely, multifunctional resources thus have a high productivity and can be considered as crucial regarding the maximisation of subjective well-being. For instance, money constitutes a multifunctional resource. It directly produces status but is also required for various activities such as buying food to maintain physical well-being or investing in leisure activities to cultivate friendships. If resources get lost or are devalued, they can have great negative impact on individuals' level of need satisfaction, which is especially the case for resources with high multifunctionality.

The four-level SPF hierarchy does not indicate bottom-up causality only. For example, having achieved high status, which constitutes a second-level good, likely increases one's attractiveness, which constitutes a resource and therefore a first-level good. Investment and production also take place on the same hierarchical level. Considering resources, for instance, education can become a need if it is lacking to produce status. This implies that every good can become a need, if the respective good is not available by individuals and if it is beneficial for satisfying fundamental needs.

Furthermore, it must be highlighted that resource maintenance and investment are considered crucial for maintaining or improving individuals' level of need satisfaction. Maintenance and investment are how resources are linked to the production of other goods in the SPF hierarchy. Maintaining and investing resources thus always refer to human behaviour that is aimed towards retaining and/or obtaining certain goods to maximise fundamental need satisfaction. Resource maintenance and investment constitute the crucial processes of SPF theory, that are founded in the second building block, the behavioural part of the SPF theory.

### *2.1.2 Maintaining and improving personal need satisfaction*

The second building block in the framework of SPF theory is a theory of social behaviour. Social behaviour links individuals' resources to their needs in the way that resources are maintained and invested to achieve instrumental goals and to maximally satisfy fundamental needs.

Due to the tendency of resource conservation, individuals will always try to substitute unsatisfied needs with increased effort by satisfying another need, so that their satisfaction level can—at least—be maintained. For example, because most individuals lose their occupational status when they retire, they must substitute their status loss by focussing on other instrumental goals, if they want to maintain their satisfaction level. A possible substitution would be the incrementation of behavioural confirmation and affection by caring for their grandchildren (Lindenberg 1996: 172). However, substitution is heavily dependent on the extent and diversity of resources at an individual's disposal (Ormel et al. 1999: 171). Depending on the individual and its resources, only certain needs can be satisfied to a certain

degree for compensating dissatisfied needs. Therefore, substitution can also fail. If this is the case, individuals' satisfaction level decreases. With respect to the example before, if retired individuals do not start a family earlier in their lives or if they live far away from their children, substituting status through increased production of affection might fail and might cause a serious decrease in need satisfaction if there are no relevant others in close distance.

Substitution also has its limits. Social approval cannot wholly substitute for physical well-being. Individuals require at least some level of physical well-being in order to be capable of living. Another limit is that the better individuals fare in satisfying a specific need, the lower is this need's contribution to maximizing subjective well-being (Ormel et al. 1999: 68; Steverink/Lindenberg 2006: 282).

By combining the theory of value of goods and related preferences with the theory of social behaviour, the core principle of SPF theory can be captured: Individuals pursue various ways in order to maximise fundamental need satisfaction by investing and maintaining resources in order to accomplish instrumental goals.

## **2.2 Social production functions and context**

If individuals aim to satisfy their needs, the contexts in which they grow up and live turn out to be crucial (Lindenberg, 1989; also Huinink and Schröder 2008). The strong relationship between context and need satisfaction is expressed in the notion of "social" production functions. Contexts set the conditions of need satisfaction. Together with individuals' resources, these conditions co-determine individuals' need satisfaction possibilities and with it the ways of optimal need satisfaction. In the labour market, for example, the most important goal is to achieve status by means of good education and influential contacts. Contrastingly, the main goals in the family are receiving behavioural confirmation and producing affection with the help of family members by forming and maintaining close relationships and strong emotional bonds. The example illustrates that the conditions of need satisfaction evaluate the contextual fit of individuals' resources. If resources match the relevant context and are collectively considered to be of value within this context, they serve as efficient means for need satisfaction in the respective context. However, if resources do not match the context within which individuals are embedded, they will devalue their resources. In this latter case, the conditions function as constraints that decrease individuals' level of need satisfaction.

Contexts and their conditions not only set the value of individuals' resources, they also determine to a certain degree which resources are obtainable and accessible. For example, education is primarily obtained in the education system and not in the labour market. However, not all individuals within the same education system have access to the same education because some individuals leave the education system earlier than others. Thus, if individuals aim at maximising their subjective well-being in the most productive way, they must be aware of and consider the contextual conditions of need satisfaction in their investments.

## **2.3 A general model to explain migrants' ethnic identity**


Since social production function (SPF) theory constitutes a general theory of action preferences and social behaviour, its basic mechanisms also apply to first- and second-generation migrants.



However, due to the complexity of migrants’ incorporation process, migrants are in a special situation. In contrast to majority members, their ways of need satisfaction can be much more diverse: Migrants may satisfy their needs within the minority and within the majority context. On the other hand, migrants may experience difficulties in satisfying their needs within either one specific ethnic context or both ethnic contexts. Given this diversity in need satisfaction, applying SPF theory to migrants’ situation could prove useful for explaining migrants’ ethnic identity from a bidimensional perspective—but only if ethnic identity can be linked to migrants’ need satisfaction. Establishing this link is what I intend to do in this Section.

Figure 2-2 proposes a general model that conceptualises migrants’ minority identity in tandem with their majority identity as an indicator for the individual production of social approval that is linked to the majority and the minority context. The model integrates Berry’s fourfold acculturation typology and Lindenberg’s SPF theory in one theoretical framework. Thus, the model adapts and extends Berry’s original typology to address the questions of why and how migrants ethnically identify in different ways.

Figure 2-2: A general and integrated model to explain migrants’ ethnic identity



Source: Author’s own representation.

Note that in the proposed model, causality is assumed to run in both directions. An increasing number of empirical studies challenge the classical view of stable ethnic identity as the final stage of migrants' integration, thus considering reverse causality. Scholars now highlight the interrelation between various dimensions of migrants' integration and find corresponding evidence (e.g. Esser 2009; Kalter 2008; Leszczensky 2016; Leszczensky/Pink 2019; Martinovic et al. 2009). In this book, I focus on one causal direction and explain ethnic identity. I do this since I am primarily interested in how status affects migrants' ethnic identity, and not vice versa.<sup>10</sup>

I proceed with Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, which briefly introduce the lowest model segment "individual resources & contextual conditions" and the intermediate segment, which discusses the instrumental goals to produce social approval from a context-specific view. Particular attention is thereby paid to the role of status for the production of social approval since this connection is central for the empirical analysis in Chapter 4. In Section 2.3.3, I outline the third and upper model segment, which links the context-specific production of social approval to ethnic identity through two basic mechanisms. Based on the theoretical model in Figure 2-2 and supported by empirical evidence, Sections 2.3.4 to 2.3.7 finally explain the ethnic identity types of first- and second-generation migrants.

### *2.3.1 Individual resources and contextual conditions*

The lowest model segment depicted in Figure 2-2 refers to first- and second-generation migrants' individual resources and the contextual conditions they face. To understand the role of migrants' resources for their social need satisfaction, distinguishing two categories of resources is particularly important. I refer to these two categories as origin-specific and destination-specific resources.

Origin-specific resources refer to resources that are strongly bound to the context of migrants' minority group. They are usually obtained in the society of origin or within the minority context in the receiving society, where origin-specific resources are likely valued high as well. Typically, origin-specific resources comprise cultural resources like minority language skills and knowledge about the minority culture. Furthermore, origin-specific resources include social resources such as relationships with migrant family members and minority members.

Destination-specific resources in turn refer to resources that are strongly bound to the majority context. They are mainly obtained in the receiving society by means of interethnic interaction and engaging with majority culture. Accordingly, destination-specific resources comprise cultural and social resources as is the case with origin-specific resources. Examples for destination-specific resources constitute majority language skills, knowledge about the majority culture and relationships with majority members.

Essentially, origin-specific and destination-specific resources are of great value in the contexts in which they have been obtained and in which they are embedded. Taking language skills of Turkish migrants in Germany as an example, such skills are highly valuable in communicating with Turkish peers and obtaining information from Turkish newspapers, books or television programmes. German language skills in turn are highly valuable regarding interaction with Germans, obtaining education and coping with everyday life in Germany. Thus, depending on Turkish migrants' Turkish and German language skills, the consequences to produce social approval within the majority context and the minority context differ. Profound skills in German language would improve their chances to feel valued, respected and loved within the majority context, whereas profound skills in Turkish language would improve their chances to receive social approval within the minority context.

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
<sup>10</sup> See the Sections in Chapter 4 for discussions on reverse causality and related issues regarding my empirical analyses.

Note that the provided example only serves illustration purposes. The example reflects a rather conservative and narrow perspective on how migrants' resources affect their social need satisfaction. The perspective is rather conservative because destination-specific resources can also be of value in the minority group, for example in conversations with siblings (Strobel/Seuring 2016). The perspective is rather narrow because social conditions like reservations towards migrants or minority group size also influence migrants' production of social approval. In fact, contexts and related conditions may also enhance or even negate the benefits of speaking one language or the other.

Besides individual resources, the lowest segment features contexts and their conditions. I distinguish two main contexts in which first- and second-generation migrants are primarily embedded: The minority context and the majority context. Figure 2-3 depicts the two ethnic contexts and differentiates three levels within each: the macro, meso and micro level. For each level, Esser (2006: 37–38) identifies the sub-context that is considered most influential for migrants' lives in their receiving society. With respect to the minority context, migrants' and their families' society of origin lies at the macro level. The minority group (both in the society of origin and the receiving society) is placed at the meso level while the migrant family is placed at the micro level. Regarding the majority context, the receiving society lies at the macro level. At the meso level, the relevant context represents the majority group.

While the majority context is dominated by majority members, the minority context is dominated by peers from the minority group. The dominant group in a context usually determines the conditions for achieving instrumental goals and producing social approval therein, for example through specific behaviour of its members, institutions and policies. Contexts thus only value and offer certain resources (e.g. a specific language) and regulate access to further resources (e.g. through law and certificates). It is therefore crucial for migrants' pursuit of instrumental goals whether a context is dominated by minority or majority members.

Figure 2-3: Minority and majority context and their sub-contexts within which migrants pursue need satisfaction



Source: Author's own representation.

### 2.3.2 *Instrumental goals for social approval*

The intermediate segment of the general model includes the four instrumental goals that are considered crucial for the production of social approval: comfort, behavioural confirmation, affection, and status. SPF theory originally links the latter three goals to the production of social approval (see Section 6). The main function of comfort, on the other hand, is deemed to maintain physical well-being because comfort implies the absence of unpleasant states such as hunger or depressive feelings. However, depending on the type of unpleasant state, comfort can also be considered as an important good for the production of social approval. Baumeister and Leary (1995: 500) point out that in order to produce social approval and orient towards groups, individuals need to feel comfortable in their social environment. They need to feel secure and welcomed, which primarily indicates that discrimination, rejection and hostility need to be absent. For migrants, comfort thus also constitutes a crucial factor for the production of social approval within a specific ethnic context as it promotes a social environment in which migrants can feel valued, respected and loved. In the remainder of this Section, it is exemplified how first- and second-generation migrants can or cannot achieve the four instrumental goals within the minority and majority context, thus linking the lowest and the intermediate segment of the general model. With respect to the key instrumental goal in this book, status, I also establish a link to the upper segment by discussing the role of status for the production of social approval.

#### Comfort

Basically, migrants' comfort is influenced by factors across all contextual levels that are depicted in Figure 2-3. Some factors, however, can be considered more influential than others. With respect to the minority context, family as main supplier of basic human needs (i.e. food and security) plays an outstanding role. The family's importance for feeling secure and comfortable is for example illustrated in the established model of intergenerational solidarity by Bengtson and Roberts (1991). Their notion of functional solidarity capture the supportive dimension within the family. Family members help each other in everyday matters and exchange valuable resources such as money and knowledge. As social beings, individuals strongly rely on familial support, particularly when they are children, of high age, or threatened from outside the family.

Migrant families are often characterised by a high degree of functionality and commitment (e.g. Genoni/Nauck 2020; Kwak/Berry 2001). These advantageous characteristics may be shown when experiencing discrimination from majority members (Branscombe et al. 1999). They may be also reflected in filial responsibilities such as language and cultural brokering (Medvedeva 2012). Migrant children often support their parents to cope with everyday life in the receiving society because they may not (yet) have the necessary skills and knowledge to do so. This not only increases comfort among migrant parents but also among their children since they substantially contribute to their families' well-being. However, fulfilling filial responsibilities can also be stressful. In this regard, particularly early immigrated and second-generation migrants can have difficulties producing comfort as they may perceive familial expectations and responsibilities as impairing, rather reducing the comfort level (e.g. Berry et al. 2006). There is empirical evidence that filial responsibilities are most beneficial for migrant children if the parent-child relationship is strong and supportive (e.g. Oznobishin/Kurman 2009; Tilghman-Osborne et al. 2016; Weisskirch 2013). Such findings illustrate that familial cohesion also plays a crucial role in satisfying migrants' comfort needs within the minority context.

Regarding the majority context, comfort is produced if migrants do not feel discriminated or rejected by members of the majority group. This requires migrants to feel “normal” and secure among majority members in everyday life. For example, research on attitudes towards migrants repeatedly shows that first- as well as second-generation migrants may be perceived as “cultural threat” or “economic threat” by majority members, particularly if the migrant group is relatively large and if migrants’ visual traits are distinct to those of majority members (Hainmueller/Hopkins 2014 for an overview). Situations like these promote risks for social sanctions. They make majority members refrain from approving migrants for who they are, lowering migrants’ sense of security within the majority context. As Bourhis et al. (1997) argue, however, migrants’ well-being within the majority context cannot only be threatened at the group, but also at the country level through integration policies and their consequences. With reference to Castles (1984), for instance, first-generation migrants’ sense of security may be weakened through lacking civil and political rights and by having no permanent residence status, preventing them from optimally taking care of themselves in the receiving society.

### Behavioural confirmation

Migrant family members are also a particularly important source for behavioural confirmation. Scholars generally characterise intergenerational relationships in migrant families as strong bonds. These bonds come with a high degree of familial responsibilities, duties and social control, which help to satisfy the need for behavioural confirmation. There are three major explanations for these strong family bonds.

First, some scholars argue that they are the result of conditions back in the society of origin. In Germany (and many other western countries), migrant families often originate from societies without elaborated systems of social security (Nauck 2004). In such societies, the state provides hardly any resources for producing comfort and stimulation to maintain physical well-being. Thus, migrants and their families who originate from such societies are prompted to take care of each other. This promotes interdependency, social control and thus behavioural confirmation in the family. Second, family bonds are strengthened through the migration experience (Nauck 2001a: 171). Migration often constitutes a family project that may only be realised and proves gainful from an intergenerational perspective. Migration is thus not only meant to change the life of one individual but also the lives of its relevant others, including second-generation migrants. Therefore, migration may increase mutual expectations to comply with the social norms within the migrant family in order to accomplish shared goals. The third reason are deprivation experiences, for example through discrimination by majority members who show disrespectful and disparaging behaviour towards migrants. Discrimination is thereby argued to actively lower behavioural confirmation, prompting migrants to compensate for potential losses within the family or other minority members, regaining social approval (Branscombe et al. 1999).

Strong family bonds in migrant families are not always deemed useful for behavioural confirmation. This particularly refers to early immigrated and second-generation migrants. Through growing up in the receiving society and partial cultural transmission, these migrants may perceive more often that their families do not fulfil their roles as important provider of behavioural confirmation. Their behaviour likely differs from the behaviour that migrant parents expect from their children. Thus, migrants can also perceive behavioural confirmation as a constraint and rather burdensome (Berry et al. 2006). This experience likely fosters feelings of not being taken seriously.

With regard to the majority context, receiving behavioural confirmation from majority members implies that the latter reinforce migrants’ behaviour, triggering a feeling of being respected. Behavioural confirmation from majority members increases if migrants more often

successfully interact with majority members, both privately and professionally, building friendships, romantic relationships as well as productive and appreciative teams. Thus, it is largely exposure that increases migrants' chances of behavioural confirmation. However, behavioural confirmation can also increase if majority members are open-minded towards migrants. If majority members have reservations or resentments towards migrants, it is less likely that migrants perceive to be valued and socially approved. Even though migrants may show high motivation to contribute to society, they may feel excluded and question their belonging if their efforts are not recognised by majority members (Rouvoet et al. 2017).

### Affection

As affection is comparably simple to maintain and enduring, individuals almost always experience some affection. The family is arguably the primary source in this regard. Even though scholars argue parent-child relationships within families to be ambivalent and potentially conflictual (Bengtson et al. 2002), the emotional bonds between family members do not have to be harmed (Goodnow 1994). Ambivalence is an important issue in migrant families, as some distance between parents' and children's value orientations is considered to emerge through partial cultural transmission (Nauck 2001a; Phalet/Schönpflug 2001) and intergenerational differences with respect to the integration process (Sam/Virta 2003). Consequently, first- and second-generation migrants may lack comfort and behavioural confirmation within the family, but they may nevertheless receive affection. Receiving affection is thereby not only limited to migrants' family members (and minority members) within the receiving society. For instance, research on Turkish migrants has shown that Turks who emigrated and left their families in Turkey maintained contact with their non-migrated family members, primarily using these contacts for emotional support and counselling (Baykara-Krumme/Fokkema 2019).

Since the family is the main source of affection, migrants' chances to receive affection within the majority context depends on strong and affective ties to majority members outside the family, which need to be build up by forming close friendships and romantic relationships. Entering meaningful relationships with majority members proves difficult if majority members have reservations against migrants, but also if communication is exacerbated and if there are high risks for misunderstanding.

### Status

Status usually refers to individuals' socioeconomic position in the society in which they live. With respect to migrants, the production of status is therefore mostly happens in the receiving society. The production of status in the receiving society requires migrants to have more advanced social production functions that are adapted to the majority context. Status production in the receiving society largely depends on education and destination-specific resources like proficiency in majority language and influential contacts to majority members (Esser 2006; Kalter 2006; Kalter/Granato 2007, 2002; Kogan 2011). However, it is not only a lack of these resources that endangers migrants' status achievement, but also the confrontation with unfavourable conditions within the receiving society (Heath/Brinbaum 2007). This includes blocked opportunities that are prominently discussed by segmented assimilation theorists (e.g. Zhou 1997). Besides resource disadvantages, blocked opportunities are for example caused by discrimination, residential segregation in poor areas, legal status and non-recognition of educational certificate with respect to first-generation migrants.

Arguably, status plays an outstanding role for migrants' social approval because migrants and their families are typically found to have high expectations of status achievement and

status retention in the receiving society (e.g. Brinbaum/Cebolla-Boado 2007; Nauck/Genoni 2019), which may not only reinforce the production but also the perceived losses of social approval within the majority context. However, the high expectations are not the only reason why the way in which status influences social approval significantly differs from that of the other instrumental goals.

As implied in Section 6, comfort, behavioural confirmation and affection are highly accessible goods which can be produced with comparably small effort. Status, on the other hand, constitutes an uncommon and positional good. Its production presupposes the possession of rare and valuable resources, making status itself comparably rare, valuable, desirable and costly (Nieboer/Lindenberg 2002; Ormel et al. 1999). Less surprisingly, SPF theorists therefore consider status the most important but simultaneously the least achieved instrumental goal (Nieboer/Lindenberg 2002). As a consequence, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of status on social approval is rather strong but short-termed.

The impact of status on social approval should be strong because status achievement is often desired and expected. The strength of status effects can be expected to be bidirectional: Not only status achievement but also status loss influences the production of social approval, because expected status gains failed to materialise and may cause feelings of unequal treatment, disappointment and humiliation. Similarly, high desirability and status expectations should also make unrealised status achievements, status inconsistencies and impending status losses (e.g. if the minority group is lower in status than the individual) to affect the production of social approval.

The impact of status on social approval should further be short-termed because status is less often achieved compared to the remaining instrumental goals, which are more consistent in the production of social approval and likely replace status effects over time. In this regard, however, it is important to note that status should also have long-term but indirect effects on the production of social approval. Status opens up opportunities for the production of comfort (e.g. through increased living standards), behavioural confirmation (e.g. through being successful in one's job) and affection (e.g. through increased attractiveness as contact partner). However, it could also reduce the satisfaction of comfort and social needs due to increased exposure and higher chances of discrimination (e.g. Tuppatt/Gerhards 2020). In contrast to higher status positions, a lack of status may sustainably reduce the comfort level (e.g. through precarious housing) and behavioural confirmation (e.g. through feeling unnoticed by society).

### 2.3.3 *Social approval and ethnic identity*

The upper segment of the general model in Figure 2-2 links migrants' social approval to their ethnic identity. Following SPF theory, the production of social approval depends on individual resources and on the conditions of production within the two ethnic contexts within which migrants are mostly embedded. The production of social approval is therefore context-specific and can differ between the majority and the minority context. Arguably, this context-specificity of social approval is related to the four different types of ethnic identity that have been introduced in Chapter 1: separated identity, assimilated identity, dual identity and no/weak identity.

Basically, ethnic identity is closely linked to both social approval and physical well-being. As previously noted in Section 2.1, however, the need for social approval is what guides individuals' actions, making it the relevant fundamental need to explain migrants' ethnic identity. Explaining the link between social approval and ethnic identity leads to the broader construct of social identity. Like gender identity, political identity or occupational

identity, scholars perceive ethnic identity as a specific strand of social identity (Ashmore et al. 2004: 81; Weinreich 2009: 129). Social identity, as Ashmore et al. (2004: 81) aptly put it, “is first and foremost a statement about categorical membership.” The neat definition brought forward by Ashmore and colleagues implies that whatever strand of social identity individuals express, the group they identify with is subjectively perceived important. Their argument is supported by other renowned contributors in the field such as Baumeister and Leary. They, too, argue that “cognitive and emotional responses [in the form of expressing a sense of belonging] reflect subjective importance and concern” (Baumeister/Leary 1995: 498).

Belonging to groups is important to individuals because groups provide protection, competitive advantages and access to important resources such as social support and potential partners (Baumeister/Leary 1995; Caporael 2001). This evolutionary importance of groups indicates that groups provide survival and reproduction benefits exclusively for recognised group members. It therefore comes as no surprise that individuals strive to produce social approval in attractive groups and with the help of its members. Baumeister and Leary (1995: 449) argue that these group benefits result in a set of internal, affective mechanisms which not only strengthen individuals’ desire to belong but also increase their motivation to form and maintain social relationships. The orientation towards group members or the emotional identification with them is such an affective mechanism. Baumeister and Leary echo other scholars who theorise about social or ethnic identity and who directly associate it with the reception of social approval (e.g. Baumeister/Leary 1995; Branscombe et al. 1999; Deaux/Martin 2003; Ellemers et al. 2002; Phinney/Ong 2007; Tajfel/Turner 1986; Thoits/Virshup 1997).

As already noted in Section 8.2, social approval is dependent on an adequate level of comfort and the production of status, behavioural confirmation and affection. To promote group identity, a group must therefore provide a stimulating environment and realistic opportunities for status attainment and improved living standards. Also, individuals need to perceive that group members value them for who they are (e.g. Tajfel/Turner 1986). Individuals further need to perceive that group members can show and develop affection to them. In this sense, individuals identifying with a group hold high expectations regarding the production of social approval therein. Importantly, however, Baumeister and Leary (1995) note that such perceptions do not have to be mutual. Thus, it suffices if individuals assume others to be affirmative and to show affection.

Individuals’ social identity is driven by group comparison, a fundamental mechanism that is inherent to the pursuit of social approval. As individuals constantly look for ways to produce social approval, they constantly evaluate opportunities to do so within different groups. SPF theory suggests that individuals are not meant to live in a social vacuum. They depend on significant others to produce social approval that ultimately increases their well-being. Individuals thus continuously evaluate whether they can produce the most social approval within their own group or in another. If individuals generally or partly expect comparably better production of social approval within another group, identity change is a viable option.

In virtually every theory on social identity, group comparison is part of explaining social identification. It is for example inherent to the concept of maximum difference (Tajfel/Turner 1986), the concept of group distinctiveness (Ellemers et al. 2002), the concept of relative deprivation (Pettigrew et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2012), the “optimal distinctiveness” theory (Brewer 1991), and the distinctiveness model (McGuire et al. 1978). Basically, these theoretical concepts suggest that individuals constantly compare groups in order to identify the group that provides the best prospects for producing social approval.

Group comparison particularly matters for migrants’ emotional identification with ethnic groups. According to the distinctiveness model (McGuire et al. 1978), certain identities



become more salient than others in specific situations. Arguably, migration and the subsequent challenges of interethnic contact constitute such specific situations. Through interethnic contact, first- and second-generation migrants become particularly aware of the cultural values, norms and behaviour of their origin group and also of potentially new and unknown cultural features they learn about in the receiving society (Benet-Martínez/Haritato 2005; Tadmor/Tetlock 2006). They start to recognise and evaluate the possibilities and chances for producing social approval within the minority and majority context and anticipate the relative effort they have to make in order to satisfy their social needs. Migrating to another country and engaging with majority members thus sets the basis for ethnic identity types different to exclusive minority (or separated) identity. If migrants feel comfortable in their receiving society, they are principally able to show dual or assimilated identity. However, if opportunities for receiving social approval are generally missing, then weak identity or even disidentification may occur.

Nevertheless, first- and second-generation migrants are likely to exclusively show minority (i.e. separated) identity in the first place. This is a wide-spread—and often implicit—assumption (e.g. Berry 1997; Gordon 1964; Rumbaut 2005; Schulz/Leszczensky 2016; Zimmermann et al. 2007).<sup>11</sup> Arguably, migrants primarily identify with the minority group with support of their family (Bratt 2015). In general, families are considered those groups with the highest degree of solidarity (Weber 1978: 379). Particularly at younger age, families constitute the most important reference group in individuals' lives (Giordano 2003). Individuals primarily strive for the satisfaction of safety and love needs. They are heavily dependent on the protection and support of the family and show relatively little autonomy. Within the familial environment, individuals learn to become relatively autonomous human beings that may eventually strive for own status achievement in later life.

The family is particularly important for developing a minority identity among migrants who grow up in the receiving society. While second-culture exposure in the society of origin may not be perceived as a threat for the parent-child relationship, the case is different in the receiving society. There, migrants' culture often constitutes a minority culture, contrasting the dominant culture of the majority group. Migrant parents are highly motivated to pass on norms, values and behaviour that are characteristic for their culture of origin (Nauck 2001a; Phalet/Schönpflug 2001). For them, intergenerational transmission of culture can turn out to be an important strategy to ensure and maintain the relationships with their children in an environment that exerts culturally different influences on their children, potentially causing alienation in the parent-child relationship.

Taken together, it surprises less that research suggests associations between parental cultural maintenance and children's minority identity (Phinney et al. 2001b), between family socialisation and minority identity formation (Knight et al. 1993; Sabatier 2008; Supple et al. 2006), between migrant parents' and their children's minority identity (Casey/Dustmann 2010; Nauck 2001a). Consequently, it seems reasonable that migrants' family identity strongly and positively affects their minority identity (Bratt 2015). The family as first provider of comfort and behavioural confirmation and affection explains why many migrants solely identify with the minority group in the first place, showing separated identity. Figure 2-4 below illustrates this scenario as well as the possible identity changes and outcomes based on this perspective.

In the following, I elaborate the different ethnic identity types by orienting on Figure 2-4. By doing that, I also cast light on differences between first- and second-generation migrants.


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<sup>11</sup> Even though separated identity may mostly be migrants' emotional point of departure, other starting points are also reasonable to assume. A case in point are German repatriates. Their migration to Germany is discussed as a consequence of initially strong identification with Germans (Nauck 2001b).

2.3.4 Separated identity

As alluded to above, the family may be helpful for explaining why first- and second-generation migrants solely show minority (or separated) identity in the first place. However, we also need to consider the opportunities for social approval within the majority group to explain why first- and second-generation migrants maintain or even strengthen minority identity and simultaneously refrain from identifying with the majority group despite interethnic contact (see Figure 2-4). Arguably, migrants maintain or even strengthen separated identity if they feel relatively more comfortable among minority members and produce substantially more social approval within the minority context than within the majority context. Drawing on the general model in Section 8, there are two explanations why migrants with separated identity feel more comfortable and have more opportunities for social approval among minority than majority members. The first explanation is linked to migrants' resource allocation. Migrants with separated identity possess origin-specific resources which increase their comfort-level and opportunities for social approval in the minority group. Simultaneously, however, they lack destination-specific resources that would promote their comfort-level in the majority group. The second explanation draws on detrimental contextual conditions: Migrants with separated identity feel rejected by majority members and are thus forced to stick to the minority group to ensure the production of social approval. This second explanation is relatively independent of migrants' resource allocation.

Figure 2-4: Ethnic identity with an emphasis on identity change, using separated identity as starting point



Source: Author's own representation.

### Resource allocation

On average, migrants with separated identity have more origin-specific resources and less destination-specific resources at their disposal. For them, need satisfaction within the minority context is comparably more comfortable and attractive. It is thus not surprising that empirical studies have repeatedly found separated identity to be more likely among first- than second-generation migrants (Battu/Zenou 2010; Gorinas 2014; Nandi/Platt 2015; Nekby/Rödin 2010; Platt 2014; Tovar/Feliciano 2009). Moreover, previous cross-sectional research indicates that separated identity is more likely the shorter first-generation migrants' residence duration (Battu/Zenou 2010; Nekby et al. 2009; Walters et al. 2007). It has also been documented that separated identity is negatively related to proficiency in majority language (Battu/Zenou 2010) and with contact to and the amount of minority friends (Lubbers et al. 2007; Walters et al. 2007). Also, separated identity has been linked to lower levels of education compared to assimilated and dual identity (Nekby et al. 2009; Nekby/Rödin 2010). Separated identity further seems positively related to religious affiliation (Walters et al. 2007). Arguably, belonging to a minority religion is most important in this regard as sharing religious beliefs of an ethnic group may promote stimulation. In line with this argument, empirical evidence shows that minority identity is positively related to belonging to a minority religion and negatively related to belonging to the majority religion (Constant et al. 2009; Fleischmann et al. 2013; Fleischmann/Phalet 2016).

In addition to resource differences, separated identity is more likely given favourable conditions regarding need satisfaction within the minority context and unfavourable conditions within the majority context. Accordingly, previous studies have for example found separated identity to be more likely among migrants living in neighbourhoods with a higher share of minority members (Battu/Zenou 2010; Nekby et al. 2009) and among first-generation migrants who are not eligible to vote (Walters et al. 2007).

### Relative deprivation

In contrast to simply choosing to maintain separated identity based on resource allocation within the minority context, separated identity may also result out of unfavourable conditions within the majority context that cause migrants' to experience relative deprivation. Generally speaking, relative deprivation refers to unequal treatment in comparison to others, which is perceived as unfair (Pettigrew et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2012). In the migration context, those "others" typically refer to the majority group and its members who are perceived to behave particularly unfriendly, discriminatory (also through institutions or policies) or even hostile towards migrants. In this regard, relative deprivation highlights the importance of comfort, status, behavioural confirmation and affection for producing social approval because it reduces migrants' feelings of acceptance and well-being in the receiving society.

Scholars argue that relative deprivation leads to relatively strong minority identity and persistently weak majority identity or sustained disidentification. Separated identity based on relative deprivation mainly roots in unfavourable conditions within the majority context and less so in resource allocation. Group comparison thus matters less in this case because external forces block access to the majority group and the production of social approval within their group context.

There are two established models in the literature that capture the relationship between relative deprivation and ethnic identity: The rejection-identification model (RIM), suggesting strengthened minority identity due to rejection by majority members (Branscombe et al. 1999), and the rejection-disidentification model (RDIM), suggesting weak majority identity due to rejection by majority members (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2009; Verkuyten/Yildiz 2007). Both

models combined make scholars expect that migrants who feel discriminated or rejected by majority members show separated identity. Accordingly, migrants not only show comparably weaker majority identity or even disidentification (referring to RDIM) but also comparably stronger minority identity (referring to RIM) than those migrants without such feelings. A strengthened minority identity is thereby argued to be the result of a coping strategy, targeted at protecting against psychological stress and the threat of social exclusion (Branscombe et al. 1999; Hogg 2000; Mazzoni et al. 2020 for empirical evidence; Pak et al. 1991; Tajfel/Turner 1986). The RIM and RDIM thus precisely capture the notion of the substitution mechanism within SPF theory. As outlined in Section 6.2, substitution only triggers if needs cannot be satisfied or if they are threatened not to be satisfied. Perceived discrimination or rejection pose serious and general threats to migrants' production of social approval. Migrants therefore need to counter these threats if they want to prevent a decrease in their overall satisfaction level.

Empirical studies often measure migrants' feelings of relative deprivation through their perceived discrimination by majority members. Perceived discrimination thereby usually refers to personal experiences of discrimination or to perceived discrimination against members of the minority group in general. There is empirical support for a negative relationship between perceived discrimination and majority identity (i.e. for the RDIM) across migrant groups, migrant generations, ethnic groups and different receiving societies (Bobowik et al. 2017; Diehl et al. 2016b; Hochman et al. 2018; Mazzoni et al. 2020; Skrobanek 2009; Verkuyten/Martinovic 2012; Verkuyten/Yildiz 2007; Wiley et al. 2013). However, empirical evidence for the relationship between perceived discrimination and minority identity (i.e. RIM) is mixed (see Bobowik et al. 2017: 818–819 for an overview; see also Cronin et al. 2012; Hochman et al. 2018; Wiley et al. 2013). Research suggests that whether rejection by majority members is indeed positively related to minority identity or not depends on additional factors such as the severity of experienced discrimination (Schmitt/Branscombe 2002), on migrants' perceived non-permeability of majority group boundaries (Skrobanek 2009), on minority groups collectively responding to rejection (Bobowik et al. 2017), on generation status owed to immigrant optimism (Wiley et al. 2012), on residence duration and cultural distance (Wiley et al. 2013). These intricacies regarding minority identification also suggest that, even in situations of perceived unequal treatment, it may prove too simplistic to assume general mutual exclusiveness of majority and minority identity.

Note that the way in which I reported empirical evidence related to resource allocation and relative deprivation is for illustration purposes. It is empirically challenging to separate the two mechanisms. For example, having more minority friends or being more proficient in the minority language may also be tied to discriminatory behaviour by majority members in the sense that staying among minority members provokes discrimination. In the same vein, it should be noted that the majority of studies that indicate support for the causality claimed by the RIM and DRIM rely on cross-sectional data (see Fleischmann et al. 2019; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2009 for two exceptions). Causality can also run the other way round, for example suggesting that migrants' strong minority identity may at least partly motivate discriminatory behaviour by majority members (e.g. Leach et al. 2010).

### 2.3.5 *Assimilated identity*

Assimilated identity contrasts separated identity because it indicates that migrants' production of social approval is better within the majority context than within the minority context. From a minority-group perspective, assimilated identity thus presupposes an unfavourable group comparison, causing migrants to switch their allegiance, rather seeking social approval within the majority context than within the minority context.

Assimilated identity is facilitated by the possession of destination-specific resources and it tends to be less likely if migrants are in possession of origin-specific resources. Thus, assimilated identity mainly emerges due to increased exposure to majority members. Correspondingly, and in line with Section 7.3, previous research has found second-generation migrants to be generally more likely to show assimilated identity compared to first-generation migrants (Gorinas 2014; Nandi/Platt 2015; Nekby/Rödin 2010; Platt 2014). Assimilated identity has also found to be related to increasing residence duration regarding first-generation migrants (Walters et al. 2007). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that assimilated identity is more likely if migrants have less minority friends, if the minority language is different to the majority language and with higher levels of education (Nekby/Rödin 2010; Walters et al. 2007).

Favourable conditions within the majority context are also crucial for migrants in order to show assimilated identity. As shown and discussed in the previous section on separated identity, this first and foremost refers to the absence of perceived discrimination and other conditions that indicate difficulties regarding need satisfaction among majority members.

### 2.3.6 *Dual identity*

Starting from separated identity, dual identity indicates that migrants maintain their minority identity and strengthen identification with the majority group. Migrants' identification with the minority and majority group is promoted if they feel comfortable among minority and majority members, if the production of behavioural confirmation and affection is possible and attractive within both ethnic contexts, and if they are able to produce status in the receiving society.

Migrants with dual identity draw on origin-specific and destination-specific resources and they perceive favourable conditions within both ethnic contexts. Essentially, this implies that these migrants' ways of need satisfaction are flexible and diverse because they may satisfy their needs in different ways. As a consequence, migrants with dual identity are among those migrants with the highest need satisfaction levels. Not surprisingly, researchers thus often find them to be more satisfied, less stressed and better adapted compared to migrants with other types of ethnic identity (e.g. Berry et al. 2006; Bobowik et al. 2017; Hutnik 1991; Nekby et al. 2009; Phinney et al. 2001a).

Correspondingly, dual identity basically represents an advantageous combination of separated and assimilated identity with respect to the production of social approval. But even though there are obvious parallels between single and dual identity, there is also an important difference. Scholars theorising about migrants with dual identity (also referred to as "biculturals") note that simultaneously belonging to the minority and the majority group is associated with comparably high risks for conflict situations and high individual effort (Benet-Martínez/Haritatos 2005; Roccas/Brewer 2002; Tadmor/Tetlock 2006). Producing social approval for migrants with stronger dual identity is likely more complex and effortful than for migrants with assimilated or separated identity. If migrants strive to continuously produce social approval across ethnic contexts, they continuously need optimal conditions that guarantee a high comfort-level among members of both groups and opportunities to satisfy their social needs. Thus, it is important that these migrants access and obtain as many diverse resources as necessary to legitimise further pursuing this strategy. First and foremost, this requires time and cognitive effort.

It is these two resources, time and cognition, allowing an important distinction between two modes of dual identity that can be found in the literature: The first mode emphasises the costs related to dual identity. In this mode, dual identity may be perceived as a rather privileged ethnic identity type that few migrants maintain in the longer term (Nauck 2008). The second mode emphasizes the transitory character of dual identity. Here, this ethnic identity

type is viewed from a classical assimilation perspective, representing a transition type that migrants enter when changing from separated to assimilated identity (Alba/Nee 1997; e.g. Bourhis et al. 1997; Zimmermann et al. 2007). Therefore, the notion in the second mode is on time, respectively on the temporal limitation of dual identity.

### Exclusive mode

Maintaining dual identity requires migrants to have origin- and destination-specific resources. Otherwise, they would have difficulties to produce social approval within the respective group. Maintaining such resource diversity is expensive. On the one hand, it requires more time to successfully manage a diverse resource portfolio. On the other hand, moving between both ethnic contexts can be cognitively and emotionally challenging. Interethnic conflicts may arise that suddenly threaten status production in the receiving society, the comfort-level and the production of behavioural confirmation and affection within both contexts. Both issues may intensify if cultural differences to majority members are greater and if interethnic relations become tenser, further challenging migrants in maintaining dual identity. Consequently, identifying with both groups has to be worth the high costs.

Migrants who indeed perceive advantages by operating across ethnic contexts have been argued to occupy “middlemen positions” in the labour market (Esser 2009; Nauck 2008). These migrants play specific economic roles such as translators, labour contractors, brokers, or money lenders, linking “producer and consumer, employer and employee, owner and renter, elite and masses” (Bonacich 1973: 583). Their mediating role often allows them to occupy intermediate status positions in society.

However, there may also be other, potentially more prestigious roles that focus on inter-ethnic dialogue such as internationally working politicians, migrant teachers, or lawyers specialised in international relations. Besides these examples, high-status migrants may be generally more likely to show dual identity than lower-status migrants. They likely have the cognitive capacities to successfully manage a diverse resource portfolio and are likely to cope with potential conflicts given the interethnic context within which they operate. Moreover, while being more integrated in the majority group due to their structural success, their families may still provide them a low-cost and highly valuable source for comfort, behavioural confirmation and affection. There is empirical evidence for a positive relationship between education and dual identity among first- and second-generation migrants (see Feliciano 2009 for children of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants; Nekby/Rödin 2010 for first- and second-generation migrants in Sweden; for female immigrants in Germany Zimmermann et al. 2007). Importantly, these studies, which are based on large-scale data, have found migrants with stronger dual identity to be significantly better educated compared to migrants with separated and assimilated identity (see also Section 1.3).

### Transitory mode

The second mode implies that dual identity occurs for low- and high-status migrants alike. The time required for and the effort related to social need satisfaction across both ethnic contexts cannot be maintained long unless it is legitimised (see exclusive mode). If this is not the case, dual identity likely becomes transitory, often indicating a switch in ethnic identity from separated to assimilated identity (see Figure 2-4). The switch implies a reduced production of social approval within the minority context and an increased production of social approval within the majority context. Substituting one group for the other enables migrants to keep investment costs at a moderate level by simultaneously switching to the majority group.

Given favourable conditions within the majority context, this switch can be expected due to increasing exposure to majority members and increasing detachment from the minority group over time. As already mentioned earlier, the majority context thus becomes superior regarding social need satisfaction in the long run. For many migrants, a benefit and additional driver in this regard may also be that status—the most valued and simultaneously least achieved goal—is argued to be generally better achievable in the mainstream economy than in ethnic economies of the receiving society (Alba/Nee 1997: 839; Nee/Sanders 2001: 407). Ethnic economies can play an important role for self-employment, entrepreneurialism and social upward mobility (e.g. Clark/Drinkwater 2002; Xie/Gough 2011; Zhou/Xiong 2005). Working in ethnic economies can therefore support migrants in producing some status in the receiving society—despite relatively lacking education and destination-specific resources (see Schaeffer et al. 2016). However, status achievement in the mainstream economy is often more socially recognised and rewarding than in ethnic economies.

### 2.3.7 *No/weak identity*

Viewed from the point of separated identity, no/weak identity suggests that migrants' minority identity weakens while majority identity remains weak. Social need satisfaction of migrants who only marginally identify with both groups is not tied to the majority and minority contexts. For these migrants, the majority and minority contexts provide less opportunities for continuously producing social approval (e.g. Nauck 2008). There are two explanations for this, of which the first relates to social deprivation while the second relates to individualism.

#### Social deprivation

Social deprivation can be interpreted as a more severe state than relative deprivation. While relative deprivation implies substitution, social deprivation indicates substitution problems. Socially deprived migrants not only lack meaningful interaction, experience rejection, conflicts and other adverse situations within the majority group but also within the minority group. This often leaves them no choice but to withdraw from both ethnic groups. Social deprivation implies a considerable threat to individuals' fundamental need satisfaction and well-being. Since individuals are strongly dependent from others to satisfy their fundamental needs, being socially deprived likely deprives individuals of almost all their expectations regarding comfort and the production of social approval. It is therefore not surprising that individuals with no/weak identity are argued to feel deprived of their purpose and meaning in their life (e.g. Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015: 2).

Migrants with no/weak identity based on social deprivation usually have comparably few resources at their disposal. Perhaps even more important than relative resource deprivation, these migrants are confronted with unfavourable contextual conditions that reduce their comfort-level and drastically limit their prospects for producing social approval. No/weak identity based on social deprivation thus cannot be considered as an opportunistic choice by migrants. The major issues of these migrants let one assume that they are among those migrants with the lowest need satisfaction levels. Indeed, previous studies document that migrants who marginally identify with both groups are less satisfied, less adapted and more stressed compared to migrants with other types of ethnic identity (Berry et al. 2006; Nekby et al. 2009; Phinney et al. 2001a).

There are three different explanations that relate no/weak identity to social deprivation. First, no/weak identity may result out of a serious conflict owed to being "situated between two cultural worlds" (Rumbaut 2005: 120). This explanation is often discussed with respect

to migrants growing up in the receiving society. Migrants may be discriminated by majority members, for example due to distinct phenotypical markers or due to their parents' migration background (Rumbaut 2005). At the same time, migrants growing up in the receiving society may not "pass" as full members of the minority group and experience rejection or high pressure to conform to values and norms characteristic for their parents' culture of origin. Migrants growing up in the receiving society are socialised therein, and culture is only partly transmitted within the family. These migrants thus have less in common with the minority group from a cultural perspective. Rumbaut illustrates this conflictual situation by referring to a young Korean woman in the United States whose minority members call her "twinkie" (meaning "yellow on the outside, white on the inside") because she grew up in a white suburb and was a cheerleader. Furthermore, she is expected by their parents to marry a Korean man (while dreaming in English and of dating a non-Korean man).

Second, besides being trapped between two cultural worlds, no/weak identity with respect to social deprivation may also result out of helplessness or resignation. This refers to the earlier discussion about the rejection-identification model (RIM). According to the RIM, migrants who experience rejection or discrimination by majority members seek comfort and approval in the minority group, for example by banding together (see Wiley et al. 2012). Such social cohesion within the minority group may however be lacking. There may be not enough minority members in the receiving society or immigration and integration policies may prevent migrants from collectively responding to unfair treatment. In such situations, support for rejected migrants from within the minority group fails, promoting withdrawal from the minority group. Arguably, this may lower migrants' satisfaction level and result in no/weak ethnic identity (Bobowik et al. 2017: 819).

Third, no/weak identity based on social deprivation can further emerge if migrants are detached from social structures and formal settings, losing their social roles within both ethnic groups (Drouhot/Nee 2019: 213). This situation is exemplified by migrants living in economically deprived and residentially segregated areas. In his seminal article on ethnic diversity and social capital, Putnam (2007) uses migrants' level of trust in their US neighbours as an indicator for social deprivation. Based on nationwide large-scale data, he finds that in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, migrants trust their neighbours less. Importantly, this holds for trust in neighbours from other ethnic groups as well as in neighbours from migrants' minority group (see also Nekby/Rödin 2010). Putnam notes that ethnically diverse neighbourhoods also often happen to be areas with higher crime rates and increased poverty (see also Oeltjen/Windzio 2019). Consequently, he also finds that lower educated and economically rather deprived individuals trust their neighbours less.

### Individualism

Individualism is a mechanism discussed in cross-cultural psychology (Bourhis et al. 1997) and organisational psychology (Elsbach 1999; Kreiner/Ashforth 2004). It is associated with the same identity outcome as social deprivation. However, individualist migrants who refrain from ethnic identification are less considered to do so because they are subject to rejection, discrimination, or exclusion. Rather, individualist migrants can be considered to perceive a high level of comfort and to make their production of social approval independent from the majority and the minority group.

From a SPF theoretical perspective, individualism can be perceived as an alternative way to belonging to a group while producing social approval nevertheless. However, SPFT considers groups of evolutionary importance in terms of survival, reproduction and social approval. Thus, the only possible explanations why migrants would deliberately refrain from



seeking ethnic group belonging and profiting from group related benefits is that their comfort is less dependent on majority and minority members and that they perceive more efficient ways to produce social approval than if they were to orient themselves on ethnic groups.

According to Bourhis et al. (1997: 381), migrants who generally refrain from ethnic identification do so because they emphasise their individual value. Individualist migrants highlight their own skills and efforts they put into achieving certain life goals. Relatedly, they perceive themselves and others as individual human beings with unique characteristics than as members of groups within which certain characteristics and potentially related (dis)advantages are shared. Individualist migrants who do not particularly belong to an ethnic group want to interact similarly with others no matter whether these others belong to the majority group or the minority group. This assumption implies that individualists can interact with a wider range of contact partners, surpassing symbolic boundaries and accessing a higher quantity of and more diverse resources to increase their comfort-level and to produce social approval. The assumptions further imply that by emotionally detaching from groups, individualists pursue a strategy with which they avoid to be personally affected by group-based discrimination and rejection (see also Kreiner/Ashforth 2004: 5). Consequently, migrants who emphasise their individual value might do so because they believe that belonging to ethnic groups rather limits their production of social approval. For example, migrants who seek to belong to the minority and the majority group often feel pressured to choose either one group or the other due to high distinctiveness and less permeable boundaries between groups (Alba 2005). In such cases, expressing allegiance for one group is often associated with denied access to or at least reduced benevolence from the other group. By declaring to be impartial and generally refraining from ethnic identification, migrants may bypass this issue and benefit from members of both groups.

Expressing group belongingness may further be less attractive for migrants with high status. Higher-status migrants have more valued resources than most individuals in the receiving society. These valued resources make them highly attractive individuals to engage with. Their resources provide them with more power, influence, and credibility, and they may easily access valuable information and social approval through their status (Lin 2001). Migrants with high status should thus have a higher chance of being approached by other individuals with the desire to satisfy personal needs. Moreover, their resources give them good reason to belief in their own skills and abilities. Consequently, higher-status migrants can afford to distance themselves from ethnic groups as they do not necessarily depend on them for social approval. Arguably, such a strategy may prove useful if the status of migrants in the receiving society is higher than the status of their group of origin.

## 2.4 Summary

The purpose of this Chapter was to introduce a general model to explain migrants' minority identity in tandem with their majority identity. Scholars interested in ethnic identity often fail to explain why migrants ethnically identify in certain ways or explain ethnic identity only one-dimensionally. That is, they theorise about mechanisms that either focus on explaining migrants' minority or majority identity or on a specific combination of both (e.g. dual identity). The here proposed theoretical model represents an attempt to move beyond these one-dimensional approaches. The model implements various mechanisms underlying migrants' ethnic identity into one theoretical framework to better understand the intricacies of minority identity in tandem with majority identity.

The theoretical model (Figure 2-2) builds on work from John Berry and Siegwart Lindenberg. It is informed by theories on social and ethnic identity. Berry's fourfold acculturation typology is used as point of departure. The typology helps in taking a bidimensional perspective on migrants' ethnic identity. The proposed model further uses social production function (SPF) theory as approach to explain why and how migrants identify as suggested by Berry's typology. The model draws on social and ethnic identity theories to identify established and empirically supported mechanisms that link migrants' need satisfaction to their ethnic identity.

Against this background, it is proposed that first- and second-generation migrants identify with ethnic groups if migrants are able to produce social approval in the groups. Consequently, ethnic identity is not only dependent on migrants' resources; it also depends on contextual conditions that affect migrants' level of comfort and, relatedly, their deprivation experiences within the minority and majority contexts. Such experiences worse the production of behavioural confirmation, affection and status, of which the latter has been argued to play a unique and particularly important role for migrants' production of social approval. However, deprivation experiences may also trigger substitutional behaviour with the intention to maintain social approval.

In the proposed theoretical model, *pursuing social approval* and *group comparison* constitute the key mechanisms of ethnic identity. While the desire for social approval explains why migrants identify with ethnic groups at all, group comparison explains why group preferences may occur as individuals always seek group access within the group that provides the better prospects for social approval. The importance of social approval highlights the role of deprivation experiences that prevent migrants from their desire to feel comfortable, welcomed, valued, respected and loved. *Deprivation* constitutes an opposing mechanism that does not strengthen but weaken identification with ethnic groups. *Individualism*, too, relates to weak identification with ethnic groups. Instead of deprivation, however, individualism is argued to emphasise the pursuit of an even better but costly strategy to produce social approval than adhering to an ethnic group. Migrants refrain to take sides and try to bypass exclusionary actions by minority and majority group members, thereby trying to maintain high comfort levels among members of both groups and trying to receive recognition from both sides.

Taken together, the mechanisms explain how achieving and missing instrumental goals are linked to migrants' ethnic identity. Migrants are expected to show separated identity if they only have origin-resource at their disposal, rendering the achievement of most instrumental goals (i.e. comfort, behavioural confirmation and affection) in the minority context the most promising strategy to produce social approval. Migrants, however, also show separated identity if they have destination-specific resources but experience deprivation, reducing comfort among majority members and potentially reducing opportunities for behavioural confirmation and affection within the majority context. This not only lets most of their needs unsatisfied but threatens their well-being, calling for substitution through the minority group. Social bonds and liabilities are strengthened to reinforce returns, which ultimately strengthens minority identity.

Migrants are expected to show assimilated identity if they feel comfortable among majority members and if they deem the satisfaction of their social needs within the majority context comparably more important for their overall social approval than in the minority context. This is the case if migrants have destination-specific resources such as majority language skills at their disposal. They increase the chances for status attainment and facilitate interethnic contact, thus increasing the chances to form social bonds with majority members that create the feeling to be needed, provide appreciation, and possibly affection. However,

prospects in the majority context can also increase if migrants have comparably few destination-specific resources at their disposal. For example, if the majority group signals openness, solidarity and equal treatment that reduce the fear of being rejected, promote a sense of comfort, and beliefs in meritocracy.

Migrants are expected to show dual identity if the benefits related to separated and assimilated identity converge. Efficient production of social approval within both contexts requires migrants to have destination- and origin-specific resources. This can be time-consuming and challenging, particularly in case of greater cultural differences to majority members and if majority members have rather negative attitudes towards migrants. Consequently, dual identity may be prevalent among migrants for whom the temporal and cognitive efforts are realisable and worth the returns. This may particularly refer to migrants with sophisticated cognitive abilities, which enable them to adapt to dissimilar contexts more easily. It may also refer to migrants with “ethnic middlemen” functions like translators or migrant teachers that are needed by minority and majority members alike. This produces some status and promotes behavioural confirmation by members of both groups. On the other hand, dual identity may be shown by migrants who are in a transitory mode from separated to assimilated identity. Since pursuing instrumental goals in both contexts is time-consuming and can be cognitively challenging, dual identity likely becomes transitory over time as the resource balance changes in favour of destination-specific resources, decreasing the returns from achieved instrumental goals within the minority context and improving the production of social approval in the majority context.

Lastly, migrants are expected to show no/weak identity if they are socially deprived, perceiving hardly any opportunities to produce social approval. For example, social deprivation may occur in situations of economic deprivation, where migrants are confronted with existential fears that drastically lower their comfort level. They conserve the last resources they have, increasing self-protection and the risk of isolation, reducing social participation and the chance to experience support and affection from others. No/weak identity may, however, also occur under excellent conditions for personal need satisfaction. Migrants finding themselves in such situations have been described as individualists (Bourhis et al. 1997), for whom emotionally identifying with ethnic groups could rather limit their received social approval. Individualist migrants are most likely to be resourceful and attractive to other individuals in order to dispense the benefits that come with ethnic group belonging.

Overall, the proposed general model along with its theoretical considerations and those about the special role of status for social approval lay the foundation for addressing this book’s primary research interest, which is empirically investigating the relationship between first- and second-generation migrants’ status and ethnic identity. This task will be the focus in Chapter 4.

### 3 Data

As I outlined in Chapter 1, this book is about first- and second-generation migrants' ethnic identity and how it differs regarding their status. Chapter 2 laid the theoretical foundation for this endeavour. The present Chapter elaborates the empirical basis. To explore differences in ethnic identity, I require high quality data with adequate measuring instruments and a sound methodological approach. The data from the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) fulfil these requirements. NEPS is financed by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Science and is located at the Leibniz-Institute for Educational Trajectories. It collects data on individuals' educational and occupational trajectories as well as on the development of individuals' competencies over time (Blossfeld et al. 2011). Overall, NEPS initially followed over 60,000 individuals over their life course, including migrants. The study follows these individuals at different stages in their lives. This approach is facilitated by a multi-cohort-sequence design, incorporating six different starting cohorts (SC). The different kick-offs took place in early childhood (SC1), kindergarten (SC2), primary school (SC3), secondary school (SC4), higher education (SC5) and in adulthood (SC6).

To investigate the link between migrants' status and their ethnic identity from an inter-generational perspective, I draw on cross-sectional and spell data from SC6 of NEPS.<sup>12</sup> In the following, this data is introduced in detail. Further, it is explained why NEPS SC6 enables the investigation of the relationship between status and ethnic identity among first- and second-generation migrants.

#### 3.1 The German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS): Starting cohort (SC) 6

The empirical investigation of this study builds on wave-4 data from SC6 (Drasch et al. 2016). SC6 provides excellent opportunities to study differences in ethnic identity between low- and high-status migrants in the context of education-occupation mismatch, in relation to cultural distance, and during adulthood. First, it offers extensive information on individuals' educational and professional history. It thereby enables researchers to analyse migrants' status. Second, it covers other dimensions of integration by asking migrants about their language proficiency, cultural habits, their social embeddedness and, most importantly, about their identification with the majority group and with the minority group. Third, the adult cohort surveys individuals born between 1944 and 1955, thus providing data for researchers who address research questions that focus on adulthood. Fourth and finally, NEPS enables the differentiation of migrants according to their families' societies of origin. It is thus particularly suitable for measuring the concept of cultural distance.

SC6 is based on the study *Arbeiten und Lernen im Wandel* (ALWA) (Kleinert et al. 2008), conducted at the German institute for employment research. ALWA surveys persons living in Germany who were born between 1956 and 1988, independent of their primary language, nationality and their employment status. Excluded are, however, persons living in

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<sup>12</sup> This paper uses data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS): Starting Cohort Adults, doi:10.5157/NEPS:SC6:10.0.1. From 2008 to 2013, NEPS data was collected as part of the Framework Program for the Promotion of Empirical Educational Research funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). As of 2014, NEPS has been carried out by the Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories (LifBi) at the University of Bamberg in cooperation with a nationwide network.

community facilities such as retirement homes or mental hospitals. Similar to NEPS, ALWA aims at investigating cognitive competences and educational and occupational trajectories of adults in a longitudinal perspective. Moreover, ALWA collects retrospective data on their respondents' residence, partner and family history.

The population of ALWA's first wave was sampled in a two-staged sampling process: In a first step, the survey organisers determined 281 sample points in 250 municipalities in Germany. In a second step, the register offices from these 250 municipalities drew a list of personal addresses for each sample point by systematic sampling. For the field process of the first wave, a random sample was drawn from each list. ALWA conducted its first wave from August 2007 to April 2008. NEPS installed the first wave of ALWA (henceforth: wave 1) as their base line survey for SC6. Wave 1 thus comprises ALWA respondents from the first ALWA survey who were born between 1956 and 1986 and who gave their consent for future survey participation.

NEPS gradually increased their initial ALWA sample in waves 2 and 4 to create a database representative of the adult population living in Germany. The second wave of SC6 took place during November 2009 and August 2010. In this second survey, NEPS stocked up its initial sample with persons born between 1956 and 1986. Furthermore, a first refreshment sample took place, adding persons born between 1944 and 1956. In wave 4, NEPS conducted second refreshment sample, adding persons born between 1944 and 1986. Wave 4 was conducted from October 2011 to May 2012. Both, the stock-up and refreshment samplings followed the procedure of the initial ALWA sampling (Aust et al. 2011).

In wave 1, ALWA directly contacted and surveyed its participants by telephone. However, the telephone number could not be determined for all potential participants. To assess potential selection effects, ALWA sent a postal survey invitation including a short paper questionnaire to a subsample of individuals for whom they had no telephone number (Gilberg et al. 2011). In the preceding waves, NEPS recruited its participants in two steps: First, sample members received a postal letter with the information that they had been nominated for voluntary participation in the study. In this letter, potential participants were also informed about the further procedure and the incentive in case of survey participation (e.g. Aust et al. 2011).

Regarding incentives in wave 1, ALWA initiated a lottery among all individuals who participated by telephone, raffling off 60 prizes (Gilberg et al. 2011). In the second wave, there was a conditional 10 euro incentive for all participants during the first six months and a conditional 50 euro incentive in the last four months (Aust et al. 2011). The conditional incentives in waves 3 and 4 were 25 euro and 20 euro respectively (Aust et al. 2012a, 2012b).

During the field processes of all waves, participants were surveyed in one of two survey modes: Computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) or face-to-face interviews. Waves 3, 5 and 7 additionally included competence tests in reading and arithmetic. The tests were only conducted in face-to-face mode. Interviews without testing were primarily conducted using CATI. Except for the additional competence test in the face-to-face mode, both survey modes were based on the same computer-assisted survey instrument. The institute of applied science (infas) in Bonn, Germany, conducts the NEPS field processes. They surveyed participants in either German, Turkish or Russian. The interviews in Turkish or Russian language were only conducted in CATI mode.<sup>13</sup>

Table 3-1 depicts the coverage of first- and second-generation migrants in the first four waves of NEPS SC6. I define first- and second-generation migrants following the official definition of NEPS (Olczyk et al. 2016). Accordingly, first-generation migrants are individuals born outside of Germany, i.e. who immigrated to Germany themselves. Second-generation migrants are defined as individuals born in Germany, who have at least one parent who once immigrated to Germany.

<sup>13</sup> For more information about sampling, recruiting and the field processes in NEPS SC6, visit [www.neps-data.de](http://www.neps-data.de).

Table 3-1: Coverage of first- and second-generation migrants in NEPS SC6, waves 1 to 4

	Wave 1 (ALWA)	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
Stock-up		x		
Refreshment		x		x
First generation	473	1,120	786	1,344
Second generation	655	1,060	871	1,289
Other	5,650	10,589	7,665	11,479
Total	6,778	11,649	9,322	14,112

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

In total, NEPS managed to start the panel survey with 6,778 participants. They all gave their panel consent during the first wave of ALWA. Among the panel-ready participants, there were 473 first-generation migrants and 655 second-generation migrants. With the stock-up and refreshment in wave 2, NEPS realised 11,649 interviews in total, including 1,120 first-generation and 1,060 second-generation migrants. In wave 3, NEPS realised 9,322 interviews, including 786 first-generation and 871 second-generation migrants. With the refreshment sample in wave 4, NEPS markedly increased its sample size and realised another 14,112 interviews. Among the over 14,000 interviews, 1,344 were carried out with first-generation migrants and 1,289 with second-generation migrants.

### 3.2 The sample

The sample used in this book to investigate the relationship between status and ethnic identity is cross-sectional and comprises 1,951 first- and second-generation migrants. By the time when the empirical analyses in this book were conducted, NEPS SC6 consisted of ten waves, covering a period of roughly ten years. Despite NEPS' panel structure, extended information on migrants' ethnic identity is only available in wave 4. Furthermore, additional variables relevant for the forthcoming analyses are distributed over different waves. This suggests a cross-sectional dataset with pooled information. Therefore, I only kept observations from wave 4. To arrive at the sample, I first excluded majority members, migrants who reported to be German repatriates and third-generation migrants ( $n = 11,927$  in total). I further dropped  $n = 28$  migrants whose families' society of origin could not be determined. Third, migrants older than 65 ( $n = 63$ ) were excluded, since most of these migrants have left the labour market and provide no further status information. Migrants who attended vocational training at the time of the interview ( $n = 143$ ) were excluded as well since their status has not yet consolidated. The deletion process eventually resulted in a cross-sectional and pooled dataset, comprising  $n = 784$  first-generation and  $n = 1,167$  second-generation migrants aged between 25 and 65 years.

The families of first- and second-generation migrants in the present sample originate from over 100 countries. Within the first generation, 15.6 percent migrants originate from Turkey, by far constituting the largest group. They are followed by Poles (8.8 %), Russians (5.6 %) and Romanians (4.5 %). Over 50 percent of first-generation migrants in the sample report family

reunion to be their main migration motive. This motive is followed by “other motives” (15.0 %) seeking asylum (13.5 %), working (12.5 %), and studying (6.0 %). The majority of second-generation migrants originates from Europe. Almost one third (32.9 %) of migrants’ families originate from the Czech Republic (or from Slovakia or the former Czechoslovakia respectively), followed by Poland (16.2 %), Austria (6.9 %), Turkey (5.5 %) and Hungary (4.0 %).

## 4 Empirical Investigation

The aim of the empirical investigation is to gain a better understanding of the relationship between migrants' status and their ethnic identity from a bidimensional and intergenerational perspective. This is done in three distinct analyses, which are distributed over three empirical sections. Previous to the empirical sections, Section 4.1 briefly explains the use of multinomial logistic regression analyses, the regression technique used throughout the empirical sections to address this book's research questions. In Section 4.1, it is also elaborated on the caveats associated with non-linear regression techniques like multinomial logistic regressions and how they are dealt with.

The empirical investigation begins with Section 4.2 and a straightforward analysis of how status is linked to ethnic identity in general. This analysis represents the point of departure for the subsequent analyses because it takes a bidimensional perspective on ethnic identity and explores its relation to status from an intergenerational point of view. The subsequent analyses then move on and investigate specific conditions that might influence the link between status and ethnic identity in the first and second generation. In this regard, an additional analysis in Section 4.2 investigates the role of migrant recognisability for how status relates to ethnic identity. One goal of this analysis is to explain the so-called "integration paradox," which posits that particularly higher-status migrants should refrain from majority identification due to feelings of relative deprivation.

The role of status-related feelings of relative deprivation for ethnic identity is further investigated in Section 4.3. Improving the understanding of how status relates to ethnic identity also requires awareness of status discrepancies and their potential consequences on migrants' ethnic identity. The featured analysis thus studies the ethnic identity of migrants with status mismatch. They are defined as migrants whose educational qualification exceeds the educational qualification required by their current occupation. This analysis further aims at providing another explanation to the integration paradox as it investigates whether status mismatch and ethnic identity are particularly related among higher educated migrants.

Lastly, the goal of the analysis in Section 4.4 is to investigate the relationship between status and ethnic identity within a longer-term context by focussing on the role of migrants' exposure time in the receiving society. The analysis therefore addresses the importance of status differences in ethnic identity in view of temporal changes of ethnic identity.

All empirical sections follow the same structure: First, the theoretical arguments are outlined and an overview of the hypotheses is provided. Second, the analytical strategy for testing the hypotheses is suggested and the empirical model is specified. Third, empirical results are reported before the findings are discussed in the last step.

### 4.1 A note on multinomial logistic regression analysis

I analyse migrants' ethnic identity by employing multinomial logistic regressions (Kühnel/Krebs 2010; Long 2015). In ethnic identity research, the majority of scholars view minority identity and majority identity as two independent dimensions. In this respect, migrants' ethnic identification does not simply follow a unilinear or unidirectional path and cannot be ranked in a specific order. The four ethnic identity types that are captured by my dependent variable "ethnic identity" thus reflect a nominal scale that is best captured by the multinomial logistic regression method.



In the following analyses, I refrain from reporting odds ratios or logarithmic odds (log-odds) and instead report predicted probabilities, test statistics, and goodness of fit statistics to ease interpretation of results. Log-odds and odds ratios are the ordinary coefficients reported in non-linear regression models, as these models apply likelihood estimation techniques. However, log-odds and odds ratios are difficult to interpret (see Best/Wolf 2010; Breen et al. 2018; Mood 2010 for a discussion). They reflect coefficients which are non-linearly related to the regression outcome. It is often difficult to grasp the meaning of odds, which can cause misunderstandings and false interpretations. Moreover, log-odds and odds ratios are also biased by correlated and uncorrelated unobserved heterogeneity. Uncorrelated unobserved heterogeneity describes the phenomenon that independent variables are biased by covariates that are (a) uncorrelated with explaining variables and (b) not considered in non-linear regression models. Non-linear regressions differ from linear regressions in this regard. Independent variables in linear regressions are “only” affected by correlated unobserved heterogeneity, which refers to unobserved variables that are correlated with independent model variables. Thus, in non-linear regression models, adding previously omitted variables potentially changes the extent of overall unobserved heterogeneity and with it the log-odds and odds ratios of independent variables already in the model. As a consequence, assessing whether the added variables are correlated or uncorrelated with their independent variables turns out to be a difficult task, which increases the risk of erroneous interpretations and conclusions.

There are various solutions for these issues of which reporting predicted probabilities is by far the most important one. In non-linear regression models, predicted probabilities are obtained by calculating marginal effects. According to Mize (2019: 84), “marginal effects summarise an independent variable’s effect in terms of a model’s predictions.” Marginal effects are more robust to interpret than odds because they are expressed and interpreted in a different metric and thus largely avoid the issue of uncorrelated unobserved heterogeneity of odds (Best/Wolf 2012; Breen et al. 2018; Long 1997; Long/Freese 2014). Mize points out that odds are in fact already a conversion of predicted probabilities. Consequently, he argues that non-linear regression results should be reported in predicted probabilities as they represent the original or “natural” metric of dependent variables.

Marginal effects are complemented by reporting average marginal effects (AMEs), which represent a specific type of marginal effects. AMEs “are estimated by calculating marginal effects for each observation in the sample and then averaging these effects” (Mize 2019: 86). As such, they refer to the additive average effects of an independent variable on the probability of a dependent variable (Best/Wolf 2012: 383). With respect to ethnic identity, AMEs would indicate average differences in ethnic identity probabilities between selected values of covariates. For example, a negative AME for education-occupation mismatch on assimilated identity for migrants would indicate that status-mismatched migrants are on average less likely to show assimilated identity compared to their non-mismatched counterparts. In contrast, a positive AME would indicate an increased probability of status-mismatched migrants to show assimilated identity compared to their non-mismatched counterparts (i.e. the reference category). Thus, while marginal effects would depict the probability to show assimilated identity for migrants with and without education-occupation mismatch, AMEs depict the difference between the marginal effects for assimilated identity between migrants with and without education-occupation mismatch.

Importantly, marginal effects and AMEs not only allow robust interpretation of the effect of binary variables in non-linear regression models. They also allow robust interpretation of the effect of continuous variables when calculated across different values of a specific independent variable. Predicted probabilities can therefore capture non-linear relationships in non-linear models. To easily assess the nature of relationships between continuous independent and dependent variables in non-linear regression models, Long (2009) and others (e.g. Best/Wolf 2010; Mize 2019) recommend graphical plotting of predicted probabilities.

In addition to predicted probabilities, there are other statistical values that ease interpretation of multinomial logistic regression results. With respect to test statistics,  $z$ -statistics allow assessing the relative effect strength of regression coefficients in non-linear regression models. By comparing  $z$ -statistics in a non-linear regression model, one can for example determine the importance of education-occupation mismatch for migrants to show separated identity compared to other variables such as migrants' age, their cultural distance or education. In contrast to  $z$ -statistics, the Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test allows for analysing the significance of overall effects of independent variables on dependent variables. This is done by comparing so-called nested models. Nested models refer to models of which one is basically an extension of the other as it includes additional variables. Goodness of fit statistics such as pseudo- $R^2$  measures, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indicate how strong a specific independent variable affects the dependent variable by comparing models with and without the respective independent variable(s). These statistics thus provide information on the importance of specific independent variables for explaining a dependent variable. Importantly, AIC and BIC also enable comparisons between un-nested models. They thus allow the comparison of relationships between independent and dependent variables across migrant generations, even though generation-specific regression models are estimated.

Considering the outlined statistical repertoire that is available to researchers, I will report various statistical indicators including test statistics, goodness of fit statistics and predicted probabilities to ensure valid interpretation of the results in this book. Furthermore, I will investigate outcomes on ethnic identity graphically by plotting its predicted probabilities in profile plots and conditional effect plots (see Bauer 2010). Overall, these solutions enable me to test various hypotheses by investigating the direction that variables affect each other, relative effect strengths and overall effects of my explaining variables as well as non-linear and interaction effects. Moreover, I am able to compare coefficients across models and groups, which is crucial for analysing structural and intergenerational differences in migrants' ethnic identity.

## **4.2 Analysis 1: Status and ethnic identity: The role of generation status and migrant recognisability**

Analysis 1 explores the relationship between status and ethnic identity among first- and second-generation migrants and investigates whether the recognisability of migrants' migration background affects this relationship. As discussed in Chapter 1, research that provides empirical evidence on the relationship between migrants' status and their minority identity in tandem with their majority identity is scarce. Many studies that provide empirical evidence on the relationship between status and ethnic identity take a one-dimensional instead of a bidimensional perspective on migrants' emotional identification. Arguably, a major reason for this one-dimensional perspective is that these studies often depart from classical assimilation theory.

Considering the role of status for migrants' ethnic identity, classical assimilation theory has a dichotomised and mutually exclusive understanding. That is, it expects lower-status migrants to show separated identity and higher-status migrants to show assimilated identity. However, the existing research reviewed in Section 3 implies that the relationship between migrants' status and their ethnic identity is more complex than assuming dichotomisation and mutual exclusiveness. Previous empirical studies that take a one-dimensional perspective

find positive, negative as well as statistically non-significant links between migrants' status and their majority identity (e.g. de Vroome et al. 2014b; Diehl et al. 2016b; Esser 2009; Fleischmann/Phalet 2016). This also applies for migrants' minority identity (e.g. Casey/Dustmann 2010; Diehl/Schnell 2006; Hochman et al. 2018; Zimmermann et al. 2006). Importantly, the scarce literature that actually takes a bidimensional perspective on ethnic identity confirms "one-dimensional studies" by providing empirical evidence on alternative outcomes for lower- and higher-status migrants than separated and assimilated identity (Feliciano 2009; Nekby et al. 2009; Nekby/Rödin 2010; Zimmermann et al. 2007).

However, many studies do not distinguish between first- and second-generation migrants in their empirical models, therefore providing no information on intra- and intergenerational differences in the relationship between status and ethnic identity. Unfortunately, this largely applies to the previously mentioned studies that are of high interest in the context of this book, namely those studies that take a bidimensional perspective on ethnic identity. To better understand the link between status and ethnic identity, distinguishing first- and second-generation migrants is considered crucial. For example, many scholars assume that the groups to which first- and second-generation migrants compare themselves differ. This likely results in different evaluations of their own status and, ultimately, in different ethnic identity outcomes.

Against this background, the first aim of Analysis 1 is to disentangle the first from the second generation and to investigate the relationship between status and ethnic identity with a bidimensional approach. In this regard, this first analysis builds the foundation for the subsequent analyses which are dedicated to further study the link between status and ethnic identity by highlighting specific conditions that may influence this link.

The literature suggests that one such condition is the recognisability of migrants' migration background. According to recent empirical findings, the recognisability of migration background could be a major factor in explaining the so-called "integration paradox." The integration paradox posits that migrants on higher status positions should be particularly prone to feel deprived compared to majority members, consequently being less likely to identify with the majority group (ten Teije et al. 2013; Verkuyten 2016). Thus, the paradox represents a counter argument to classical assimilation theory, which posits a positive relationship between status and majority identity.

Findings of a recent empirical study from Germany with SOEP data suggests that the integration paradox may particularly apply to higher-status migrants who majority members can easily recognise as migrants (Tuppat/Gerhards 2020). For a sample largely consisting of first-generation migrants, the study found that higher educated migrants with foreign sounding first names perceived more discrimination than those with German names and lower educated migrants. The rationale of the interaction between status and migrant recognisability is that higher educated migrants whose migration background is easily recognised by majority members are more likely to perceive discrimination than lower educated migrants and than higher educated migrants whose migration background is less recognisable. Thus, especially higher educated, more recognisable migrants should perceive hardly any approval by majority members and feel rather uncomfortable among them.

Foreign sounding first as well as last names refer to physically invisible markers of migration background, as it is also the case for accents. However, there are also physically visible markers. In Europe, for example, this includes cultural markers such as headscarves, turbans, or burkas, but also phenotypical markers such as darker skin colour or epicanthic folds. There is empirical evidence from a European-wide, large-scale survey including immigrants with different origins showing that names rank very high among characteristics that cause migrants to feel discriminated. Only physically visible characteristics have been

ranked higher (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017: 40; SVR-Forschungsbereich 2018). Hence, if “non-visible” higher-status migrants with foreign sounding names already perceive more discrimination, it should be particularly the case for “visible” higher-status migrants. In this regard, the study by Tuppatt and Gerhards (2020) found that the interaction effect between education and foreign sounding first names on perceived discrimination disappeared if recognisability by phenotypical markers was controlled. The authors interpreted this finding as a sign for the greater significance of visible markers of migration background.

In sum, empirical evidence so far has shown that higher educated, more recognisable migrants are more likely to perceive discrimination than lower educated and less recognisable migrants. As such, the findings shed light on one of the central links within the integration paradox, namely the relationship between status and relative deprivation. However, the question about the role of migrant recognisability for the ethnic identity of higher-status migrants remains empirically open. From this book’s point of view, the question also remains partly unanswered from a theoretical perspective, as theoretical considerations regarding the integration paradox so far approached the question one-dimensionally, focussing only on majority identity. Thus, the second aim of Analysis 1 is to address this question comprehensively from both perspectives. It aims to shed light on whether and how migrant recognisability—specifically visible markers of migration background—affects the link between status and ethnic identity.

#### 4.2.1 *An intergenerational perspective on status and ethnic identity*

The assumptions of dichotomisation and mutual exclusiveness

Classical assimilation theory suggests that migrants’ ethnic identity is dichotomised by status, causing migrants’ minority and majority identity to be mutually exclusive. This leads to the claim that lower-status migrants show separated identity and higher-status migrants show assimilated identity. The established explanation why lower- and higher-status migrants differ in their ethnic identity primarily builds on indirect status effects through differences in resources, therefore highlighting the lower segment of the general model proposed in Section 2.3. The resource argument suggests that higher-status migrants have comparably more cognitive, destination-specific, and financial resources than their lower-status counterparts. These differently distributed resources relate to different opportunities for producing social approval within the minority and majority contexts. While lower-status migrants’ opportunities to produce social approval within the majority context are assumed to be reduced, the opportunities for higher-status migrants are expected to improve. Consequently, this should result in minority-group favouritism of lower-status migrants and in majority-group favouritism of higher-status migrants.

Individuals with higher status tend to have unique cognitive skills that enable them to better adapt to complex and challenging situations than individuals who are lower in status. Higher-status individuals’ relative advantage in cognitive resources roots in their higher education compared to lower-status individuals. Education has been related to the development of new cognitive strategies that improve the organisation of knowledge—and relatedly its availability to individuals (Calfee 1981). There is empirical evidence showing that education is positively associated with cognition (e.g. Kerckhoff et al. 2001). Higher educated individuals are thus believed to be relatively efficient in tasks such as problem solving, decision making, and reasoning, and flexible in adapting to any kind of situation. Thus, they are more efficient and successful in finding their way in unknown and challenging situations.

Ultimately, this means that higher educated individuals have more knowledge about how they can achieve status, receive behavioural confirmation, produce comfort and other instrumental goals in order to prevent their level of need satisfaction from decreasing (Hadjar et al. 2008: 374). Furthermore, they develop more efficient and promising strategies than lower-status migrants to actually achieve these goals.

Regarding migrants, cognitive sophistication is argued to facilitate living in the receiving society. Scholars assume that higher education implies a better understanding of situations of interethnic contact (Verkuyten 2016) and efficient adaptation to such situations (Chiswick/Miller 2001; van Tubergen/Mentjox 2014). Higher-status migrants thus feel more comfortable with living in the receiving society while lower-status migrants do not. They have a higher chance to feel overwhelmed by situations of interethnic contact. Lower-status migrants are thus more likely to feel stressed and less likely to cope with such situations, which reduces their level of comfort in the majority context.

Higher-status migrants are further argued to possess more destination-specific resources (e.g. majority language skills and knowledge about dominant norms and values) than lower-status migrants. One reason for this difference is higher-status migrants' advantage in cognitive resources, which positively influences their obtainment of destination-specific resources. Another reason is that higher-status migrants have more opportunities to obtain destination-specific resources compared to lower-status migrants. Most western receiving countries deal with ethnic inequality in the education system and in the labour market (Heath et al. 2008; van Tubergen et al. 2004). In such countries, the share of migrants with high status in relation to that of majority members is relatively small. As a result, higher-status migrants tend to encounter and interact with comparably more majority members in their learning and working environments compared to lower-status migrants. In addition, ethnic inequality manifests itself through residential segregation. This argument is put forward by the widely acknowledged spatial assimilation model by Massey (1985). It posits that higher-status individuals tend to live in areas with higher shares of majority members (e.g. Dill/Jirjahn 2014; Friedrichs/Triemer 2009). Considering existing ethnic inequalities in most western receiving countries, Massey's model indicates that those migrants who are higher in status are likely to live in residential areas where there are less minority members, but more majority members.

Since lower-status migrants relatively lack proficiency in skills and knowledge that increase successful interaction with majority members, they feel more comfortable among members of the minority group. Their fewer destination-specific resources and fewer opportunities for contact also make their production of affection and behavioural confirmation more dependent on minority members. Higher-status migrants, in turn, have easier access to the majority group, allowing them to open up and seize not only more but more attractive opportunities to increase their well-being.

An additional resource explanation for why migrants with higher status possess relatively more destination-specific resources is because they can afford it. An advantage in financial resources not only makes higher-status migrants more likely to afford a living in more expensive areas with a higher share of the majority population, it also makes them more prone to adapt more expensive mainstream life styles (Chiswick 2006; Gans 2007).

Together, these comparative resource advantages are argued to increase higher-status migrants' prospects to produce social approval in the majority context. Assimilation theorists thereby view the majority context as more profitable for migrants than the minority context in the long run, because the former offers manifold and greater opportunities to improve living standards and status. Classical assimilation theory thus suggests that for higher-status migrants, the importance of the minority group should be low compared to lower-status migrants, while the importance of the majority group should be comparably high. Ultimately, this results in the renowned dichotomies of low status/separated identity and high status/assimilated identity.

### An intergenerational perspective

From an intergenerational perspective, there is reason to expect that status also relates to the other two ethnic identity outcomes, dual and no/weak identity. Building on the remarks in Section 2.3, there are three reasons why we can expect status to be related to more than just separated and assimilated identity.

First, the resource argument of classical assimilation theory neglects the role of origin-specific resources and with it their potential to also produce social approval. The efficiency of first-generation migrants' social production functions is particularly dependent on migrated and non-migrated members of the minority group. Within the minority group, the migrant family offers broad and attractive possibilities to produce social approval by providing comfort, behavioural confirmation, and affection (see Section 2.3.2). Importantly, this familial support in instrumental goal achievement is available to first-generation migrants with lower and higher status alike. In combination with the previously mentioned resource advantages of higher-status migrants, it is reasonable to assume that it is not assimilated but also dual identity which is positively associated with status in the first generation.

Second, driven by optimistic attitudes about life in the receiving society and own success, pronounced individualism among higher-status first-generation migrants may generally weaken their ethnic identity. First-generation migrants are often argued to leave their society of origin for improved living conditions, more prosperity and an overall happier life in another country (Kao/Tienda 1995). First-generation migrants thereby regularly perceive to be better off in their receiving society if they compare their situation with their non-migrated counterparts. They often migrate to countries with higher living standards and better job perspectives, where they may advance their and their family's social production functions in the long run. The result is a comparably optimistic perspective about their current situation and future.

Scholars argue that first-generation migrants' optimism can promote meritocratic beliefs (Wiley et al. 2012). The literature thereby suggests that beliefs in meritocracy relate to individualist attitudes and ego strength that relates to a high level of self-confirmation. As alluded to in Section 2.3.7, individualists are argued to reject group ascriptions and to be more convinced that everyone can be successful and improve their position in society through high individual effort and good performance (Bourhis et al. 1997; Moghaddam 1992). The rationale is that first-generation migrants' optimism supports them in taking their lives in their own hands, reducing dependency from others. In the same vein, their optimism can make them overlook vertical ethnic inequalities (Major et al. 2007), developing greater resistance to feelings of inferiority and frustration that could otherwise foster separated identity. Following this argumentation, particularly first-generation migrants on higher status positions should be prone to refrain from ethnic identification, as they see their meritocratic beliefs supported by their successes, which may in turn foster beliefs in their own skills and pride in the efforts put into achieving their goals. In this sense, first-generation migrants with higher status could be more self-confident and self-affirmative than their lower-status counterparts. This could make them less dependent on others confirmation and benevolence, and more resistant to deprivation experiences such as group-based discrimination, rejection and feelings of inferiority, that may otherwise lower their social approval (see also Kreiner/Ashforth 2004: 5).

Third, deprivation experiences on lower status positions could be a reason why to rather expect no/weak identity than assimilated and separated identity. Arguably, these deprivation experiences are less severe in the first than in the second generation. One explanation why first-generation migrants suffer less from low status in the receiving society is because they are aware of their modest chances in the labour market of the receiving society, which is less

the case for second-generation migrants. First-generation migrants' general lack of destination-specific resources prompts them to take a long-term perspective when it comes to improving their living conditions in the receiving society. In this regard, a primary goal becomes investing in the future of their offspring, who can then also help increasing their parents' status. Consequently, this reduces the importance of status achievement for social approval among first-generation migrants and increases the pressure on second-generation migrants.

Another explanation why first-generation migrants can be expected to suffer less from low status is because their families are less likely to feel disappointed by their migrated family members' struggle in the receiving society. Many first-generation migrants already benefit by working in lower-status jobs in the receiving society. First-generation migrants with lower status may still experience an increase in their income compared to their former jobs in the society of origin, improving their level of comfort compared to their non-migrated counterparts. Their higher income also helps them supporting their non-migrated family members, which increases first-generation migrants' status compared to members of their reference group back in the society of origin. Eventually, the unbroken familial support for first-generation migrants despite their often low or modest status positions further enables them to substitute potential deprivation experiences with little effort through social and emotional support from their family.

Contrastingly, second-generation migrants are mostly argued to compare their situation with majority members. Second-generation migrants grow up in the receiving society and learn the majority language from early on. Scholars thus suppose them to expect similar outcomes in their lives as is the case for majority members. Furthermore, empirical research across many western countries and various migrant groups has established that second-generation migrants aim high for structural success (see Dollmann/Weißmann 2019 for an overview). Perceived blocked opportunities through social and structural barriers in education and labour market are thereby assumed to spur second-generation migrants' ambitions (Salikutluk 2016).

Supporters of segmented assimilation theory argue that second-generation migrants' perception of being hold back by social and structural barriers fosters their feelings of relative deprivation compared to majority members. As a consequence, lower-status second-generation migrants are argued to feel particularly deprived of their aspirations by majority members, becoming disillusioned with the prospects of increased comfort and status through social mobility. They further perceive a lack of behavioural confirmation by majority members, creating feelings of unfair treatment and rejection. Second-generation migrants with lower status should thus rather perceive that the advancement of their social production functions is impaired as opposed to their more optimistic, first-generation counterparts. Segmented assimilation theory perceives these migrants to be on a path of "downward assimilation," on which they seek emotional support and appreciation within the minority group and embrace ascriptive minority characteristics to compensate for dissatisfaction caused by the majority group. As a consequence, second-generation migrants with lower status are assumed to wilfully refuse values and norms from the dominant culture in the receiving society and "construct resistance" against the majority group (Zhou 1997: 989). The corresponding "downward assimilation" Hypothesis expects that lower-status second-generation migrants should be more prone to show separated identity than their first-generation counterparts.

As already noted, however, failure to achieve high status for second-generation migrants often means failing to meet high individual and familial status expectations. Disappointed expectations can evoke frustration and feelings of humiliation in migrants and their families. Migrant parents often support the status attainment process of their offspring and therefore have placed high stakes in the success of this endeavour. The discrepancy between second-generation migrants' realised status position and the status expectations may thus promote

shame and displeasure in the family. In addition, lacking cognitive resources makes it more difficult for lower-status migrants to build up resilience in such situations. The result should be an increased risk of social deprivation among lower-status second-generation migrants.

### Expectations

The resource argument of classical assimilation claims higher-status migrants to generally have more cognitive, destination-specific, and financial resources than their lower-status counterparts. Therefore, being on a higher status position reduces the exclusive dependency on the minority group in both generations. It further increases the chance for comfort production by reducing insecurity in dealing with the majority group and it increases the chance for receiving social approval by making social interactions with majority members more likely and successful. Against this background, the first Hypothesis states that

**H1.1** Status and separated identity are negatively related in the first and second generation

However, the comparative resources advantage of higher status positions does not automatically increase the chance of higher-status migrants to refrain from minority identification and to identify in an assimilated way. In the latter case, origin-specific resources would need to be relatively low and/or less important for need satisfaction. This situation is more likely for second- than for first-generation migrants. First-generation migrants are still strongly dependent on the minority group, particularly on non-migrated and migrated family members, which provide low-cost opportunities to achieve instrumental goals and well-being. Thus, it can be expected that

**H1.2a** Status and assimilated identity are unrelated in the first generation

Second-generation migrants, in turn, are more distanced from the minority group and stronger oriented towards the majority group. They aim at efficiently catching up with majority peers and their high ambitions for social mobility are argued to spur the motivation for aligning with majorities and their culture. Many scholars suggest that this assimilation process in the second generation to be the main integration outcome, including cultural, social, structural, and emotional dimensions of integration (e.g. Alba 2008). The following assimilation Hypothesis states

**H1.2b** Status and assimilated identity are positively related in the second generation

First- and second-generation migrants are also expected to differ regarding the relationship between status and dual identity. First-generation migrants' familial low-cost opportunities to improve their well-being combined with the better access to the majority group on higher status positions facilitates tapping into and benefitting from both groups. Higher-status migrants' cognitive sophistication thereby facilitates coping with potential interethnic conflicts and misunderstandings, increasing potential returns to well-being and their quality. The following hypothesis therefore states that

**H1.3a** Status and dual identity are positively related in the first generation

Second-generation migrants on higher status positions also have the cognitive capacities, time and skills to maintain social relationships in both ethnic groups and to consume goods



from both cultural worlds. However, maintaining access to both groups and cultures should be too much of an effort to them. At higher status positions, migrants' and their immediate environments' (e.g. family, partner, children) social production functions are more adapted to the majority context. This reduces the importance of the minority context for maintaining overall well-being and it weakens the emotional bond to the minority group. The positive cognition effect on the chance to show dual identity among higher-status second-generation migrants should thus be countered. Accordingly, it is assumed that

**H1.3b** Status and dual identity are unrelated in the second generation

First-generation migrants' more optimistic evaluation of lower status positions and the higher chance of lasting familial support and approval while being on low-status positions promotes their well-being and reduces their risk of social deprivation. Further, their optimism is argued to promote meritocratic beliefs, which likely enhances the positive relationship between status and individualist attitudes. In contrast to second-generation migrants, particularly first-generation migrants with higher status should thus have a comparably strong faith in their own abilities and a lower chance to be affected by ethnic inequalities, discrimination, and rejection. In sum, it can thus be expected that

**H1.4a** Status and no/weak identity are positively related in the first generation

In contrast, second-generation migrants are assumed to be more pressured by themselves and their families to be successful, more aware of ethnic inequalities and blocked opportunities, and ultimately less optimistic about equal treatment and chances of success. Among second-generation migrants with low status, the risk of social deprivation should therefore be comparably high. Against this background, the following hypothesis posits that

**H1.4b** Status and no/weak identity are negatively related in the second generation

Table 4-1: Schematic overview of hypotheses about the relationship between status and ethnic identity in the first and second generation

Hypothesis	Migrant generation	Separated	Assimilated	Dual	No/weak
H1.1	1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup>	-			
H1.2a	1 <sup>st</sup>		none		
H1.2b	2 <sup>nd</sup>		+		
H1.3a	1 <sup>st</sup>			+	
H1.3b	2 <sup>nd</sup>			none	
H1.4a	1 <sup>st</sup>				+
H1.4b	2 <sup>nd</sup>				-

Note: The signs (+ | -) in the cells indicate positive and negative correlations.

Source: Author's own representation.

### 4.2.2 *The role of migrant recognisability*

#### The integration paradox

While most scholars assume that relative deprivation is more prevalent among lower- than among higher-status migrants, some scholars assume the opposite. Ultimately, they argue that despite their resource advantages and status position, higher-status migrants likely struggle to identify with the majority group (e.g. Verkuyten 2016). This opposite assumption refers to the integration paradox. It is explained by three mechanisms that increase experienced deprivation and therefore lower migrants' production of social approval: (1) Increased awareness of and (2) sensitivity to discrimination of higher-status migrants, and (3) their higher chances to perceive discrimination due to stronger majority exposure.

(1) The relationship between status and discrimination awareness roots in the higher educational level of higher-status migrants compared to their lower-status counterparts. Education promotes maturity and critical thinking, provides knowledge and advanced intellectual training. Education has also been found to be positively related to interest in politics (Westle 2011), where ethnic inequalities and other integration issues are often part of the main agenda. It is therefore less surprising that migrants are argued to profit from education by increasing their understanding of processes of discrimination and social inequality through deeper reflection (e.g. Azmitia et al. 2008). Also, higher educated migrants are considered to be more aware of ethnic inequalities and discriminatory situations, increasing the chance to develop feelings of relative deprivation and to reduce majority identity (Feliciano 2009; Kane/Kyyrö 2001; Neckerman et al. 1999; Slootman 2018; Verkuyten 2016; Wodtke 2012).

(2) Higher educated migrants are argued to be more sensitive to discrimination experiences than lower educated migrants. A possible explanation for the relationship between status and discrimination sensitivity is the disappointment of high expectations. Compared to lower educated migrants, higher educated migrants are better in catching up with majority members in terms of acquiring destination-specific resources. The resulting increasing similarity between higher educated migrants and majority members thereby increases higher educated migrants' expectations to be treated equally and fairly by majority members and to receive the same educational returns (Schaeffer 2019; Tuppatt/Gerhards 2020). However, these expectations do not always match higher educated migrants' experiences and observations, causing disappointment and feelings of relative deprivation compared to majority members.

Greater discrimination awareness and sensitivity can turn higher-status migrants into better informed social critics who—empowered through their high-status position—advocate against dominant ideologies about social and racial inequality and in favour of ideals such as ethnic equality (Wodtke 2012). As a consequence, higher-status migrants can further struggle to perceive themselves as valuable members of the majority group that institutionalized these ideologies and established corresponding social hierarchies.

(3) As previously outlined, status is positively associated with opportunities for inter-ethnic contact and for majority-cultural input. Key places where higher-status migrants learn about the majority culture and meet comparably more majority members than migrants on lower status positions include the education system (due to different years of education), but also the labour market and the residential area. The integration paradox highlights the downside of these opportunities: they increase the chance to perceive discrimination (de Vroome et al. 2014a; McLaren 2003). Such negative experiences not only increase feelings of being treated unequally but also feelings of belonging to a subordinated minority group (Feliciano 2009). They thus lower the chance of voluntarily engaging with majority members and incorporating and practicing their culture.

Higher-status migrants' greater awareness of discrimination and their greater sensitivity and exposure to it may not only weaken their majority identity, as claimed by the integration paradox. Additionally, it could strengthen their minority identity. The literature on relative deprivation suggests that feelings of relative deprivation are not only negatively associated with majority identification, but also positively associated with minority identification (Branscombe et al. 1999; Fleischmann et al. 2019; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2009; Mazzone et al. 2020; Verkuyten/Yildiz 2007). With respect to higher-status migrants, emphasising minority characteristics, as well as upholding and practicing family traditions can represent a secure strategy to compensate for the perceived unequal treatment and status gap between themselves and the majority group (Slootman 2018). Thus, in contrast to the perspective of classical assimilation, the integration paradox suggests that higher-status migrants should be less likely to show assimilated identity and more likely to show separated identity than their lower-status counterparts.

### The role of migrant recognisability

Recent empirical evidence (Tuppat/Gerhards 2020) suggests that the positive link between status and perceived discrimination is only activated if higher-status migrants' migration background is recognised by members of the majority group (see Table 4-2). From the perspective of the integration paradox, more recognisable higher-status migrants should be particularly prone to feel relatively deprived compared to majority members, reducing higher-status migrants' chance of majority identification and increasing their chance of minority identification.

Table 4-2: Assumed relationship between aspects of discrimination and migrant recognisability among high-status migrants

	Low recognisability	High recognisability
Increased awareness of discrimination	yes	yes
Increased sensitivity to discrimination	yes	yes
Increased perception of discrimination	no	yes

Source: Author's own representation.

However, I argue that embracing minority identity cannot be considered a valuable option for higher-status migrants whose migration background is more recognisable to majority members. Migrant recognisability does not only make the origin of migrants and their families more visible to majority members. It spurs migration-related fears in the majority population and consequently discriminatory behaviour towards migrants too. For example, majority members may develop a fear that migrants are less willing to integrate into the society and pose a potential threat to social cohesion (Tuppat/Gerhards 2020). Also, they may worry that migrants either take away jobs or exploit the social security system, or think that migrants pose a "cultural threat" to society, challenging and subtly changing dominant cultural values (Hainmueller/Hopkins 2014).

Higher-status migrants with recognisable migration background may want to avoid such negative stereotyping, which can be triggered when majority members recognise individuals as migrants. The stereotyping prevents recognisable migrants from safe expression of minority

belonging as means of compensation and lowers the status and attractivity of minority characteristics. Instead, such negative stereotyping pronounces status discrepancies between higher-status migrants' minority group and themselves. As a consequence, recognisable migrants on higher status positions should not only have a lower chance of majority identification, but also a lower chance of minority identification. This strategy is captured by the individualism mechanism (see also Section 2.3.7), as higher-status migrants highlight their otherness and emphasise their individual skills with which they managed to achieve status in the receiving society against all odds. It is also reasonable to assume that recognisable higher-status migrants stress inequalities by upholding meritocratic standards, implying that minority members are themselves responsible for their unfavourable situation (Wodtke 2012: 85). Compared to their lower-status and less-recognisable counterparts, more recognisable higher-status migrants should therefore have a higher chance to refrain from general ethnic identification, making the other three ethnic identity types less probable.

### Recognisability gap and generation status

The extent to which less and more recognisable migrants differ in their ethnic identity should depend on the size of the recognisability gap between less and more recognisable migrants. As noted in the introduction part of Analysis 1, migrant recognisability can be expressed through various markers, some of which are physically visible, and some of which are physically invisible and are therefore not immediately recognised. Physically visible characteristics such as clothing or skin colour are among the most distinct markers that increase migrants' perceived discrimination. Accordingly, migrants whose migration background can be recognised through visible characteristics tend to perceive more discrimination (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017: 40; SVR-Forschungsbereich 2018). It is also these "visible" migrants with high status that should be particularly prone to show the expected ethnic identity outcomes.

However, the recognisability gap between migrants with and without visible markers should differ in the first and second generation. In the first generation, the recognisability gap between migrants with and without visible markers should be smaller than in the second generation. This is because first-generation migrants without visible markers tend to be more recognisable to the majority group than their second-generation counterparts. Thus, the recognisability gap in the first generation is narrowed towards first-generation migrants with visible markers. Two important factors that tend to narrow the recognisability gap in the first generation are the prevalence of foreign accents and having foreign sounding first names, both of which are also considered to increase (perceived) discrimination (e.g. Timming 2017; Tuppat/Gerhards 2020).

First, although first-generation may master the majority language after some time in the receiving society, many of them struggle to ever achieve native-like proficiency. Their struggle mainly occurs because most of them arrive after puberty. Puberty, however, is considered to be the critical period of native-like language learning (Lenneberg 1967). There is empirical evidence that particularly migrants' accentedness of speech and pronunciation in the majority language of the receiving society are negatively affected when language exposure begins after this critical period (e.g. Bongaerts 1999; Moyer 2014a, 2014b; Scovel 1988). It is thus less surprising that many first-generation migrants have a foreign sounding accent when they speak in the majority language of the receiving society. This particularly increases the recognisability of first-generation migrants without visible markers, as these migrants are less able to blend in with the majority group. As second-generation migrants grow up in the receiving society, their majority language exposure begins early, before the critical period. Second-generation migrants

are thus more likely to achieve native-like language proficiency, which facilitates blending in with the majority population for second-generation migrants without visible markers.

Second, in addition to language differences, first-generation migrants without visible markers are more recognisable because first-generation migrants tend to be more likely to have foreign sounding first names than second-generation migrants (Lieberson 2010; Sue/Telles 2007). Naming practices in migrants' origin and receiving societies often differ, which increases the chance that first-generation migrants' first name is unfamiliar to majority members. With respect to the second generation, the chances that migrated parents change their naming practices are comparably higher. They are already exposed to the majority culture and may also have a child with a partner from the receiving society. Empirical findings suggest a change of naming practices with parents' increasing residence duration, if they have German friends and acquaintances and if one parent is born in or a citizen of the receiving society (Becker 2009; Gerhards/Tuppat 2020).

To conclude, the smaller recognisability gap among "non-visible" and "visible" first-generation migrants should increase the likelihood of first-generation migrants without visible markers to ethnically identify in similar ways as is the case for first-generation migrants with visible markers. In contrast, the greater recognisability gap between "non-visible" and "visible" second-generation migrants should increase ethnic identity differences. More specifically, "non-visible" second-generation migrants should blend in with the majority group more easily. This should not only prevent stigmatisation based on their families' origin and facilitate valuable expression of minority belongingness, but also facilitate majority identification.

### Expectations

The following hypotheses explicitly focus on migrants on intermediate- and high-status positions. In the context of the integration paradox, expectations about differences in ethnic identity outcomes should particularly refer to "non-visible" and "visible" migrants with intermediate and high status. This is because the lower migrants' status positions, the greater the likelihood that migrants deal with problems other than or additional to perceived discrimination based on migrant recognisability. Such problems, for example, include unmet and disappointed familial and self-expectations, feelings of helplessness and resignation, perceptions of blocked opportunities, and poverty (see also Section 4.2.1). They exert additional and strong influence on ethnic identity, particularly on the chance to show stronger minority identification and weaker majority identification.

Consequently, the precarious situation of low-status migrants theoretically enables mainstream assumptions (see Section 4.2.1) and integration paradox to coexist. Mainstream assumptions about overall relationships between status and ethnic identity may not be affected if the integration paradox particularly applies to differences between intermediate-status and high-status positions. In this sense, the integration paradox could resemble some kind of saturation effect of migrants' status on their ethnic identity in the upper social hierarchy, without necessarily contradicting general trends.

The integration paradox suggests that high-status migrants differ from intermediate-status migrants, as those on higher status positions tend to be more aware of and sensitive to discrimination (see Table 4-2). Higher-status migrants' education thereby plays an important role as it is argued to improve the understanding of social inequalities and discrimination processes, as well as to raise expectations to be treated equally. Being confronted with social inequalities and disappointed expectations, feelings of relative deprivation are assumed to be more likely among migrants on high-status positions. Moreover, enlightened through education and generally empowered by their status, high-status migrants may more likely become informed critics of dominant ideals that promote ethnic inequality. They more likely struggle to perceive themselves as

valued members of the larger society, blaming the majority group for establishing and protecting ideologies that reinforce ethnic inequalities and secure their privileges. Against this background, high-status migrants should be more likely to question their belongingness, emotionally distancing themselves from the majority group and embracing minority identity. Regarding differences in ethnic identity between intermediate- and high-status migrants, the integration paradox indicates a higher probability of separated identity for high-status than for intermediate-status migrants, while it should be vice versa for the other three types of ethnic identity.

However, embracing minority identity has been argued to be no valuable option for “visible” high-status migrants. Given greater contact opportunities with majority members at high status positions, “visible” migrants’ recognisability may more likely spur discriminatory behaviour by members of the majority group.

Moreover, the increased recognisability makes stigmatisation based on minority characteristics more likely, thereby devaluing them. The status mismatch between stigmatised minority characteristics and structurally successful, “visible” migrants, reduces the benefits of embracing minority characteristics. Their function as powerful low-cost source to create a safe environment and to improve self-confirmation and self-worth lessens significantly. Embracing minority characteristic and expressing minority identity would therefore threaten individual status and further promote negative stereotyping, discrimination, and sanctions by majority members, threatening comfort and approval even more. “Visible” high-status migrants may cope with this situation by emphasising their individual skills or by stressing ethnic inequalities and upholding meritocratic ideals, trying to make themselves more independent from complicated or conflicted intergroup relations. This should increase their probability of no/weak identity compared to intermediate-status migrants and compared to “non-visible” migrants.

The role of migrant visibility should vary intergenerationally. With respect to the first generation, “non-visible” migrants should be more recognisable due to their likelihood of speaking with foreign accents and having foreign-sounding names. Thus, high-status first-generation migrants without visible markers should also show an increased probability of no/weak identity—as is the case for high-status migrants with visible markers.

Therefore, the hypotheses for “non-visible” first-generation migrants propose that

- H1.5** There is a positive status effect on the probability to show separated and no/weak identity for “non-visible” migrants from intermediate status to high status level
- H1.6** There is a negative status effect on the probability to show assimilated and dual identity for “non-visible” migrants from intermediate status to high status level

The hypotheses for “visible” first-generation migrants, in turn, state that

- H1.7** There is a negative status effect on the probability to show separated, assimilated and dual identity for “visible” migrants from intermediate status to high status level
- H1.8** There is a positive status effect on the probability of no/weak identity for “visible” migrants from intermediate status to high status level

In the second generation, the recognisability gap between “non-visible” and “visible” high-status migrants is greater than in the first generation. High-status second-generation migrants

without visible markers blend in with the majority group more easily than their visible and first-generation counterparts. The lower recognisability provides more protection from devaluation of minority characteristics. This facilitates compensation of perceived unequal treatment and status discrepancies to majority group members by involving with the minority group and expressing minority identity.

Importantly, blending in more easily also provides protection from discrimination (Tuppat/Gerhards 2020). Considering increased majority exposure of high-status migrants, the probability that “non-visible” high-status migrants feel accepted and part of the majority group should therefore be increased as well, increasing the chance of majority identification. Against this background, the following hypotheses for “non-visible” second-generation migrants posit that

- H1.9** There is a positive status effect on the probability to show separated, assimilated and dual identity for “non-visible” migrants from intermediate status to high status level
- H1.10** There is a negative status effect on the probability of no/weak identity for “non-visible” migrants from intermediate status to high status level

Since recognisability of migrants with visible markers may hardly change from the first to the second generation, the expectations for “visible” second-generation migrants are identical to those for their first-generation counterparts:

- H1.11** There is a negative status effect on the probability to show separated, assimilated and dual identity for “visible” migrants from intermediate status to high status level
- H1.12** There is a positive status effect on the probability of no/weak identity for “visible” migrants from intermediate status to high status level

Table 4-3: Schematic overview of hypotheses about the integration paradox in the first and second generation

Hypothesis	Migrant visibility	Separated	Assimilated	Dual	No/weak
<i>First-generation migrants</i>					
H1.5	“non-visible”	+			+
H1.6	“non-visible”		-	-	
H1.7	“visible”	-	-	-	
H1.8	“visible”				+
<i>Second-generation migrants</i>					
H1.9	“non-visible”				-
H1.10	“non-visible”	+	+	+	
H1.11	“visible”	-	-	-	
H1.12	“visible”				+


Note: The signs (+ | -) in the cells indicate positive and negative effects.

Source: Author’s own representation.

### 4.2.3 Model specification and analytical strategy

Figure 4-1 depicts the set-up of the empirical model to investigate the relationship between status and ethnic identity. The interest lies in analysing the relationships depicted by the two bold arrows. The base analysis, depicted by number ①, focuses on the relationship between status and ethnic identity. A second moderator analysis focuses on how migrant visibility influences the relationship between status and ethnic identity. Thus, the moderator analysis depicted by number ② investigates whether status and migrant visibility are interacted. The dashed arrows depict the other relationships in the model. Accounting for these relationships is necessary to reduce the risk that the relationship between status and ethnic identity is biased. The model is applied to first- and second-generation migrants. The estimation samples include 784 first- and 1,167 second-generation migrants.

Figure 4-1: Empirical model set-up for analysing the relationship between status and ethnic identity and the role of migrant visibility



Note: Covariates in parentheses are only included in models for first-generation migrants.

Source: Author's own representation.

The samples and model variables base on cross-sectional data from the sixth starting cohort (SC6) of the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS). I provide detailed information about the NEPS in Chapter 3. Note that the majority of model variables used in this section is also used in the other empirical sections. To reduce redundancy throughout the book, I only give a brief overview of the model variables at this point. A description of each variable can be found in Appendix A.

The dependent variable *ethnic identity* is a result of cross-tabulating migrants' minority and majority identification in dichotomized form, using the median as cut-off criteria. The dependent variable thus consists of four categories, one for each ethnic identity type. I measure the main explaining variable *status* with migrants' ISEI (Ganzeboom et al. 1992; Ganzeboom/Treiman 2010). ISEI is used as a continuous variable in the first analysis. In the second analysis, where ISEI is interacted with migrant visibility, ISEI is implemented as categorical variable to distinguish low-status from intermediate- and high-status migrants. I differentiate



between different ISEI categories by assigning migrants to different quartiles of the ISEI scale (0 = “lower quartile/low status,” 1 = “middle quartiles/intermediate status,” 2 = “upper quartile/high status”). ISEI also considers unemployed migrants by assigning them the lowest category or lowest value of the scale. The other explaining variable is the dummy variable *migrant visibility*. Similar to other researchers who lack detailed information on migrant visibility (Flores 2015; Tuppatt/Gerhards 2020), this variable is based on rough proxy information of the origin country of migrants’ families. Visible markers (e.g. skin colour, epicanthic folds, or wearing headscarves or turbans) are expected to increase recognisability of migration background and to be most significant for perceiving discrimination. The dummy variable distinguishes between migrants from origin countries in which inhabitants are often perceived to have a similar (= 0) and different (= 1) appearance to Germans. For the sake of better readability, these groups are distinguished as “non-visible” (= 0) and “visible” (= 1) migrants. Origin countries with inhabitants who tend to be physically more distinct than Germans are considered to be Asian, African, and Latin American countries. Origin countries with inhabitants who tend to be physically less distinct than Germans are considered to be North American and European countries. A detailed list of the origin countries cannot be provided due to reasons of data protection. The covariates include migrants’ *gender* and *age*. I also control for two survey design factors to reduce bias risk from measurement errors. These are self-reports of NEPS interviewers about *comprehension problems during the survey* and *NEPS interviewers’ experience*, measured by their employment time in the survey institute. With respect to first-generation migrants, I additionally control for their *age at migration* and their *residence duration* in Germany. However, due to issues of perfect collinearity, simultaneously accounting for age at migration, age and residence duration is only possible under certain restrictions. Regarding the analyses for first-generation migrants, age is thus collapsed into five categories. Lastly, I control for migrants’ *time of their migration to Germany*, a variable with four categories that serves as a proxy for migrant cohort. In both generations, all continuous variables are centred at their mean to deal with multicollinearity.

Table 4-4 depicts descriptive statistics for first- and second-generation migrants with different status levels. To distinguish different status groups, migrants are assigned to one of the three categories of the categorical ISEI variable which was introduced before. The lowest status level includes unemployed migrants and professions such as cook or security guard. The intermediate status level includes a broader range of professions such as shopkeepers, ambulance workers, trade brokers, journalists, or creative and performing artists. The highest status level for example comprises medical doctors, dentists, (social) scientists, or IT professionals such as system administrators and software developers. Overall, the results provide an ambivalent picture of migrants’ state of incorporation across status levels. On the one hand, the findings indicate higher levels of adaptation to the receiving society among second- compared to first-generation migrants and with increasing status level in both generations. On the other hand, a higher status level of first- and second-generation migrants is associated with more reports of feeling uncomfortable among Germans. In the first generation, there are over twice as many migrants on lower than on higher status positions. The situation is reversed in the second generation, where there are relatively more migrants on higher than on lower status positions. In both generations, about 35 percent of migrants in the low status group are unemployed. Educational levels generally increase the higher the status level. In both generations, there are more female than male migrants on an intermediate status level. The gender distribution is less noticeable on lower and higher status positions. Note that although men tend to migrate more often than women (Carling 2021), the table implies a comparatively higher proportion of female first-generation migrants. The higher share of women matches the finding that over 50 percent of the sample’s first-generation migrants reported family reunion to be the main migration motive (see also Section 3.2). When men with family migrate, women often stay behind, look after the children, and follow later.

Table 4-4: Descriptive statistics for first- and second-generation migrants across status levels

	First generation			Second generation			
	Min	Max	Int. [46.9]	High [16.6]	Low [17.1]	Int. [52.3]	High [30.7]
Unemployed	0	1	0.35		0.35		
Education	0	3	1.06	2.49	1.07	1.45	2.39
Female	0	1	0.46	0.52	0.48	0.58	0.48
Age (years)	25	65	43	44	45	48	47
Age at migration (0 = below the age of one)	0	58	22	20			
Residence duration (0 = below one year)	0	63	21	24			
Share of "visible" migrants	0	1	0.53	0.42	0.18	0.12	0.11
Self-reported proficiency in German	0	5	3.48	4.30	4.90	4.92	4.96
Feeling uncomfortable among Germans	0	1	0.38	0.48	0.45	0.50	0.63

Note: The table reports variable means if not stated otherwise. Int. = intermediate status level. Status is proxied by ISEI.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

On average, first- and second-generation migrants on lower status positions are younger than migrants on upper status levels. But first-generation migrants on higher status positions are also comparably young. In addition, their mean age at migration is comparably low and the average residence duration is rather short, indicating that this group largely consists of recently migrated and relatively young individuals with above-average jobs. A closer look at the data shows that they partly come from EU countries and migrated after the agreement of free movement of persons. However, many also originate from outside Europe and North America as indicated by the relatively large share of “visible” migrants in this high-status group. Nevertheless, the share of “visible” migrants is generally highest on lower status positions. Reasons for this unequal distribution may be manifold, including low education, discrimination, lacking recognition of certificates, precarious legal status and missing work permissions.

Migrants in both generations rate their German language skills better with increasing status, with second-generation migrants consistently reporting better majority language skills than first-generation migrants do. An inverse distribution can be observed for reports on feeling uncomfortable among Germans. Second-generation migrants who tend to show higher adaptation to the receiving society than first-generation migrants more often report discomfort when being among Germans. Furthermore, the share of migrants who sometimes feel uncomfortable among Germans generally increases the higher the status level. Note that this variable is not equal to migrants’ perceived discrimination as feeling uncomfortable may also be the result of lacking compatibility between migrants and the majority population without the perception of being discriminated. However, feeling uncomfortable among Germans may very well be related to discrimination experiences of migrants, thus stimulating further research into the integration paradox and ethnic identity outcomes.

The analytical strategy in the following section consists of three steps. First, I separately analyse the relationship between status and ethnic identity for first- and second-generation migrants. I thereby use multinomial logistic regressions with robust standard errors and ethnic identity as dependent variable. Second, I compare the results between first- and second-generation migrants to investigate intergenerational differences in the relationship between status and ethnic identity. For this purpose, I also draw on model fit statistics of the models I estimated in the first step. In the third step, I investigate whether the relationship between status and ethnic identity differs between “non-visible” and “visible” migrants. I therefore include an interaction term in the multinomial logistic regression models from the first step by interacting proxies for status and migrant visibility.

#### 4.2.4 Findings


##### Status and ethnic identity among first-generation migrants

Figure 4-2 shows the relationship between first-generation migrants’ status and their ethnic identity. Note that the results base on cross-sectional data and therefore do not show the effect of status change on ethnic identity. Instead, the plot exhibits ethnic identity probabilities of migrants on different status positions.

The findings support the hypotheses about the relationship between first-generation migrants’ status and their ethnic identity. Therefore, status is first and foremost positively related to majority identity and origin-specific resources seem to matter across status levels. There is a generally high probability of separated identity among first-generation migrants. The probability decreases the higher the ISEI value. Accordingly, first-generation migrants with a low ISEI value are more likely to show separated identity, whereas migrants whose current occupation has a higher ISEI are less likely to show separated identity. As noted in

the plot legend, the decline in the probability of separated identity with increasing ISEI values is statistically highly significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). Furthermore, Figure 4-2 shows a generally low probability of assimilated identity among first-generation migrants. There is no indication for substantial ISEI differences in first-generation migrants' probability to show assimilated identity. The results further reveal that first-generation migrants are generally likely to show dual identity. The probability to show dual identity even increases the higher the ISEI of migrants' current occupation. The positive relationship between migrants' status and dual identity is statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ). First-generation migrants' probability of no/weak identity is rather low among first-generation migrants. However, the probability to generally refrain from ethnic identifications is higher for migrants with higher ISEI. The positive relationship between first-generation migrants' status and their probability of no/weak identity is statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ).

Figure 4-2: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for first-generation migrants across status levels



\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ ;  $p$ -values refer to AME of each ethnic identity type.

Note: Estimates based on one multinomial logistic regression model with robust standard errors. Results are shown in predicted probabilities. For each ISEI value, summarising the predicted probabilities of all ethnic identity types results in 100 percent.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.


To check the robustness of the reported findings, I estimated models in which I controlled for additional factors that could bias the results. In one model, I additionally controlled for migrants' cultural distance to Germany (see Appendix A for variable operationalisation). Migrants' cultural distance to the receiving society is not only argued to affect migrants'

ethnic identification (Berry 1997) but also their placement in the labour market of the receiving society (Esser 2006). Therefore, not controlling for cultural distance may have caused the reported results to be biased.

In a series of additional models, I investigated whether ethnic composition in the first-generation sample and the size of migrant groups potentially bias the results. To check for biases due to ethnic composition, I included dummy variables in the base model that controlled for the two largest migrant groups in the first-generation sample, Turks and Poles. To check for biases with respect to migrant group size, I estimated an additional model in which I controlled for the three largest migrant groups in Germany, migrants from Turkey, from Russia and from Poland. Controlling for these groups serves as a proxy for a higher degree of institutional completeness that fosters jobs in ethnic economies. Further, it is a proxy for the existence of minority networks that give access to these jobs. Empirical research suggests that minority networks provide first-generation migrants with faster but less favourable labour market integration through working in ethnic economies (Kalter/Kogan 2014). Also, working in ethnic economies likely reduces majority exposure in contrast to working in the mainstream economy, eventually affecting ethnic identity. The size of migrant groups may thus confound the results. The coefficients in all robustness checks hardly changed, indicating no substantial influence of cultural distance, ethnic composition, and migrant group size.

#### Status and ethnic identity among second-generation migrants

Figure 4-3: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for second-generation migrants across status levels



\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ;  $p$ -values refer to AME of each ethnic identity type.

Note: Estimates based on one multinomial logistic regression model with robust standard errors. Results are shown in predicted probabilities. For each ISEI value, summarising the predicted probabilities of all ethnic identity types results in 100 percent.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

Figure 4-3 exhibits the relationship between their status and ethnic identity. It can be read and interpreted in the same way as Figure 4-2. Overall, the findings for second-generation migrants also support the hypotheses about the relationship between status and ethnic identity. We can observe a clear and general assimilation trend.

The probability to show separated identity is generally low probability among second-generation migrants. The probability is smaller at higher ISEI values. The negative ISEI effect is statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ), underlining the negative relationship between status and separated identity. Figure 4-3 further exhibits a generally high probability of assimilated identity among second-generation migrants. Migrants whose current occupation has a low ISEI value show a noticeably lower probability of assimilated identity than migrants with high ISEI occupations. The negative relationship between second-generation migrants' status and assimilated identity is statistically highly significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). Dual identity is generally less likely among second-generation migrants. The findings suggest no substantial ISEI differences in second-generation migrants' probability to identify with both groups. The results further indicate that second-generation migrants tend to generally refrain from ethnic identifications. In addition, the probability of no/weak identification with both groups decreases with higher levels of status. However, the negative relationship between second-generation migrants' status and their ethnic identity is not significant.

As for the first-generation estimates, I additionally conducted robustness checks by controlling for migrants' cultural distance, ethnic group composition in the sample, and migrant group size. The robustness checks were conducted based on the same arguments brought forward regarding the first-generation estimates. However, ethnic group composition in the second generation was accounted by including dummy variables for Czechs and Poles, as these groups represent the largest migrant groups in the second-generation sample. Controlling for above-mentioned factors, the estimated status coefficients did not change interpretation of results.

#### Intergenerational differences in the effect of status on ethnic identity

In the second step of Analysis 1, I investigate whether there are differences in the relationship of status and ethnic identity between first- and second-generation migrants. To investigate overall intergenerational differences in the relationship between status and ethnic identity, Table 4-5 provides several model fit statistics. In sum, the results suggest that status and ethnic identity are similarly related in both generations. This finding is reflected in almost all indices, including the intergenerationally similar changes in AIC and BIC.

Both LR-tests suggest that overall, ISEI is statistically significantly related to ethnic identity in both generations (both  $p < 0.001$ ). The increase in Pseudo- $R^2$  measures from the un-nested to the nested models is not that large in both generations and points to a rather small overall relationship between ISEI and ethnic identity. However, this is less surprising and should not be overinterpreted. We saw that some ethnic identity types are not statistically significantly related to ISEI, while other types show substantial relationships. These findings are supported by the changes in the AIC and BIC. The AIC decreases in both generation models when adding the ISEI variable to the model. According to the AIC, we thus achieve generally better model fits by adding the ISEI variable. The decrease in AIC is similar in both generation models, which indicates a similar overall relationship between status and ethnic identity in both generations. The more conservative BIC also increases similarly in both generation models when adding the ISEI variable. In general, an increase in BIC suggests that the model without the previously added variable (in this case, the ISEI variable) fits the data better. But with an increase below 2, the BIC provides no support for the simpler models (see Kass/Raftery 1995).

Table 4-5: Intergenerational comparison of change in model fit by including migrants' status

Indices	First generation			Second generation		
	1) ISEI excluded	2) ISEI included	Change in indices	1) ISEI excluded	2) ISEI included	Change in indices
LR-test: 2) nested in 1)				$\chi^2(3) = 19.33, p = 0.000$		
McFadden's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.118	0.129	+ <b>0.011</b>	0.035	0.041	+ <b>0.006</b>
McFadden's adjusted Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.076	0.083	+ <b>0.007</b>	0.020	0.025	+ <b>0.005</b>
Nagelkerke's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.256	0.276	+ <b>0.020</b>	0.089	0.106	+ <b>0.017</b>
AIC	1576.700	1564.247	- <b>12.453</b>	2825.065	2811.730	- <b>16.335</b>
BIC ( <i>df</i> )	1744.619 (36)	1746.159 (39)	+ <b>1.540</b>	2931.371 (21)	2933.223 (24)	+ <b>1.852</b>
Observations	784	784		1,167	1,167	

Note: LR-tests based on estimations without robust standard errors.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

### Status, ethnic identity and migrant visibility

In the third analytical step, I address the integration paradox and investigate status effects on ethnic identity for “non-visible” and “visible” migrants. Figures 4-4 and 4-5 visualise the results for first- and second-generation migrants separately. They show ethnic identity probabilities across status levels for migrants without visible markers (on the left) and for migrants with visible markers (on the right). Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 provide direct tests for the hypotheses depicted in Table 4-3. Thus, the tables exhibit whether status effects on ethnic identity of “non-visible” and “visible” migrants are statistically significant. In addition, the tables report second differences, i.e. how the status effects differ between “non-visible” and “visible” migrants.

I proceed by reporting the results for first-generation migrants, separated by ethnic identity types. The focus thereby lies explicitly on status effects from intermediate to high status level to address Hypotheses H1.5 to H1.12. Afterwards, I turn to low-status migrants and findings across status levels. This way of reporting is repeated for second-generation migrants. Note that the following results base on cross-sectional data. Thus, the results depict differences in ethnic identity probabilities across status levels for different migrant groups, and not effects of individual status changes.


All findings support the assumptions about the status effects on ethnic identity for “non-visible” and “visible” first-generation migrants (H1.5 to H1.8). This means that we can indeed observe an integration paradox for “visible” high-status migrants, and to a lesser extent also for their “non-visible” counterparts. However, the majority of the reported coefficients does not reach common alpha levels, therefore rather depicting tendencies than substantial relationships.

The left plot in Figure 4-4 shows a higher probability of separated identity for “non-visible” migrants on high-status positions compared to those on intermediate-status positions. In contrast, the right plot in Figure 4-4 shows a lower probability of separated identity for “visible” migrants on high-status positions than for those on intermediate-status positions. Table 4-6 reveals that the difference in the status effects between “non-visible” and “visible” migrants is almost 10 percentage points. Regarding the already low assimilated identity probability, the results in Figure 4-4 indicate a slightly lower probability of assimilated identity on high compared to intermediate status levels, independent of first-generation migrants’ visibility. However, the status difference for “visible” migrants is almost non-existent as it is only 0.3 percentage points (see Table 4-6). The probability difference from intermediate to high status between “non-visible” and “visible” migrants is 1.8 percentage points. The status differences in dual identity are also negative for “non-visible” and “visible” migrants, but larger as is the case for assimilated identity. Table 4-6 shows a larger negative status effect for “visible” than for “non-visible” migrants. However, the status difference between the groups is only 3.3 percentage points. With respect to no/weak identity, Figure 4-4 and Table 4-6 indicate hardly any differences for “non-visible” migrants on intermediate- and high-status positions. However, marked differences can be observed for “visible” migrants: “Visible” migrants on high-status positions have a higher probability of no/weak identity than their intermediate-status counterparts. Table 4-6 depicts that the increase of 12.2 percentage points is statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ). The status difference between “non-visible” and “visible” migrants is 11.2 percentage points and indicates a comparably large status effect on no/weak identity for “visible” migrants.

Concerning “non-visible” and “visible” migrants with low status, Figure 4-4 reveals that in almost all cases, they are either least or most likely to show a certain ethnic identity type. As expected, this is particularly pronounced regarding the probability to show separated identity. Their extreme positions do not counter the previously reported findings about the more general relationship between status and ethnic identity, despite the reverse status effects that can particularly be observed for separated and dual identity across status levels.



Figure 4-4: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for “non-visible” and “visible” first-generation migrants across status levels



Note: Estimates based on one multinomial logistic regression model with robust standard errors. Results are shown in predicted probabilities. For each status level on the x-axis, summarising the predicted probabilities of all ethnic identity types results in 100 percent.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

Table 4-6: How status and migrant visibility are associated with ethnic identity: Tests of average marginal effects (AME) of intermediate to high status and AME-differences in the first generation

Ethnic identity	“non-visible” migrants	“visible” migrants	AME-differences
Separated	0.044 (0.061)	-0.053 (0.071)	0.096 (0.093)
Assimilated	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.041)	0.018 (0.050)
Dual	-0.033 (0.062)	-0.066 (0.070)	0.033 (0.093)
No/weak	0.010 (0.038)	0.122* (0.057)	0.112 (0.069)

\*  $p < 0.05$ .


Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

With respect to the second generation, almost all findings support the assumption how status relates to the ethnic identity of “non-visible” and “visible” migrants (H1.9 to H1.12). Thus, we observe an integration paradox for “visible” high-status migrants amidst a general assimilation trend. Most coefficients are thereby above a common alpha level, first and foremost depicting tendencies.

The left plot in Figure 4-5 shows hardly any differences in the probability of separated identity for “non-visible” migrants on intermediate- and high-status positions. The right plot, on the other hand, indicates that “visible” migrants on high-status positions are more likely to show separated identity than their intermediate-status counterparts. Table 4-7 reveals that the difference in the status effects is 3.5 percentage points, thus largely mirroring the negative status effect of “visible” migrants. “Non-visible” and “visible” migrants on high-status positions are more likely to show assimilated identity than their intermediate-status counterparts. Table 4-7 shows that the status effect for “non-visible” migrants is statistically significant ( $p < 0.1$ ) and somewhat larger than the status effect for “visible” migrants (6.7 vs. 5.2 percentage points). Concerning dual identity, the status effects of “non-visible” and “visible” migrants contrast each other. While “non-visible” migrants on high status positions are more likely to identify with both groups, “visible” migrants on high status positions are noticeably less likely. Table 4-7 demonstrates a relatively large difference of 11.7 percentage points in the status effect, which is statistically significant ( $p < 0.1$ ). Contrasting status effects between “non-visible” and “visible” migrants can also be observed for no/weak identity. “Non-visible” migrants on high status positions are less likely to refrain from ethnic identification than “non-visible” migrants on intermediate status positions. “Visible” migrants on high status positions, in turn, are more likely to refrain from ethnic identification than their intermediate-status counterparts. The status effects for “non-visible” and “visible” migrants are large (9.7 and 7.0 percentage points). The status effect for “non-visible” migrants is statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ) and differs significantly from the status effect for “visible” migrants ( $p < 0.1$ ), which indicates a substantial interaction effect between status and migrant visibility.

Figure 4-5: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for “non-visible” and “visible” second-generation migrants across status levels



Note: Estimates based on one multinomial logistic regression model with robust standard errors. Results are shown in predicted probabilities. For each status level on the x-axis, summarising the predicted probabilities of all ethnic identity types results in 100 percent.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

As is the case for the first generation, almost all “non-visible” and “visible” second-generation migrants on low status positions are least respectively most likely to show a certain ethnic identity type. Considering all status levels, low-status migrants’ extreme values fit into the previously reported findings about the overall relationship between status and separated/assimilated identity. This is also the case with respect to dual and no/weak identity. Here, however, the contrasting status effects for “non-visible” and “visible” migrants tend to be even more pronounced if low-status migrants are considered. The contrasting status effects provide an empirical explanation for the previously reported statistically non-significant relationship between status and dual respectively no/weak identity in the second generation.

Table 4-7: How status and migrant visibility are associated with ethnic identity: Tests of average marginal effects (AME) of intermediate to high status and AME-differences in the second generation

Ethnic identity	“non-visible” migrants	“visible” migrants	AME-differences
Separated	0.003 (0.020)	-0.032 (0.064)	0.035 (0.067)
Assimilated	0.067+ (0.035)	0.052 (0.098)	0.015 (0.104)
Dual	0.026 (0.023)	-0.091 (0.068)	0.117+ (0.071)
No/weak	-0.097** (0.033)	0.070 (0.092)	0.167+ (0.098)

\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , +  $p < 0.1$ .

Note: Columns 2 and 3 report AMEs of intermediate to high status on ethnic identity. The 4th column reports respective AME-differences between “non-visible” and “visible” migrants. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

#### 4.2.5 Discussion

This book’s purpose is to improve our understanding of how status is linked to migrants’ ethnic identity. Analysis 1 approached this overarching aim in two ways: First, it studied the relationship between migrants’ status and their ethnic identity from an intergenerational perspective. Second, it investigated whether migrant visibility plays a role for how status relates to ethnic identity. Theoretical and empirical work so far suggests that accounting for intergenerational differences is crucial to better understand the relationship between status and ethnic identity. Previous studies with a bidimensional perspective on ethnic identity missed to point this out since they largely reported findings for first- and second-generation migrants combined (Feliciano 2009; Nekby et al. 2009; Nekby/Rödin 2010). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the recognisability of migrants’ migration background is positively related to high-status migrants’ perceived discrimination. This particularly accounts for visible markers such as skin colour and clothing. Considering the connection between discrimination and migrants’ ethnic identity (Fleischmann et al. 2019; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al.

2009), migrant recognisability based on visible markers could thus turn out to be a particularly important factor to improve our understanding of how status is linked to ethnic identity.

The results reveal that status and ethnic identity are similarly related in the second and first generation. In both generations, there is a positive relationship between status and majority identification, which supports a core argument of classical assimilation theory. Nevertheless, I find that the relationship between status and migrants' ethnic identity is more complex than just assuming dichotomisation and mutual exclusiveness between minority and majority identity with respect to migrants' status. In this regard, I find marked differences in the relationship between migrants' status and ethnic identity types with respect to generation status and regarding migrant visibility.

For first-generation migrants, the data supports all hypotheses about the relationship between status and ethnic identity (see Table 4-1). Hence, I find a negative relationship between status and separated identity. Furthermore, the data expectedly show no substantial relationship between status and assimilated identity. I also find support for the assumption that the probability of showing dual identity increases with increasing level of status. The results also support the assumption that no/weak identification becomes more likely the higher first-generations migrants' status.

Furthermore, the hypotheses on the role of migrant visibility for intermediate- and high-status migrants (see Table 4-3) are supported by the moderator analysis. For "non-visible" first-generation migrants, there is a negative intermediate-to-high-status effect on the probability to show assimilated and dual identity. The status effect is positive for separated and no/weak identity. For "visible" migrants, the results expectedly show negative intermediate-to-high-status effects on separated, assimilated and dual identity and a positive status effect on no/weak identity. Although the observed relationships match the assumptions, most results are statistically non-significant except for the comparably large and positive status effect on no/weak identity of "visible" migrants. This means that "visible" migrants on high status positions are substantially more likely to refrain from ethnic identification than their "visible" counterparts on intermediate status positions. Moreover, the difference in the status effect between "non-visible" and "visible" migrants is largest with regard to no/weak identity.

The findings for less and more recognisable first-generation migrants echo the general trends that were observed in the base analysis, in which migrant visibility was not considered. Importantly, however, interacting migrant visibility with status reveals that the relationship between status and ethnic identity is not as dichotomous as suggested by the arguments of classical assimilation.

The results for first-generation migrants have three implications. First, the analyses suggest that status primarily relates to first-generation migrants' majority identity and to a lesser extent their minority identity. Thus, the resource argument of classical assimilation theory finds strong support in the data. However, this does not automatically indicate a positive relationship between status and majority identity. The moderator analysis about the role of migrant visibility suggests a strong and positive relationship between status and majority identity from low to intermediate status for "non-visible" and "visible" migrants. From intermediate to high status, however, the relationship is negative, particularly so for "visible" migrants. The negative relationship points to the potential downside of status-related majority-contact opportunities: increased chances of discrimination. In this regard, the finding provides strong indication for the existence of the integration paradox. Relative deprivation seems to occur particularly among high-status migrants with visible markers. Accordingly, "visible" high-status migrants could be particularly likely to develop feelings of relative deprivation and distance themselves from the majority group, but struggle to seek comfort and approval in the potentially stigmatised minority group. For high-status migrants, no/weak identity thus seems to be less choice-driven as theoretically expected. As originally suggested

by the individualism mechanism, high-status migrants who generally refrain from ethnic identification may indeed pursue a need satisfaction strategy that is perceived as most effective. However, the situation of these migrants seems far from reflecting excellent conditions that outweigh group related benefits (see Section 2.3.7). As is the case for migrants on low status positions, “visible” high-status migrants likely have no alternative to generally refraining from ethnic identification. The strong support for the integration paradox questions the assumed connection between immigrant optimism and meritocratic beliefs (Wiley et al. 2012). It could be the case that while immigrants’ optimism fades away over time, meritocratic ideals could still play an important role. In this regard, the findings suggest that perhaps more disillusioned high-status migrants instrumentalise meritocratic ideals to pronounce status discrepancies between themselves and the minority group (Wodtke 2012). According to this logic, these migrants made great effort and achieved their goal in contrast to most of their minority peers. By distancing themselves from the minority group, they may avoid status loss and with it a greater reduction in their satisfaction level (see Section 2.3.7).

Second, it must be noted that despite the support for the integration paradox, we can also observe a positive relationship between status and majority identity in the first generation. This is mainly owed to the comparably large ethnic identity differences between low- and intermediate-status migrants. Consequently, even though relative deprivation seems to be an issue for migrants on high-status positions, we observe a tendency of an overall positive relationship between status and majority identity, which supports the resource argument of classical assimilation theory. Importantly, however, this positive relationship does not reflect the theoretically suggested dichotomisation. Rather, there seems to be an upper limit with regard to status-related majority-contact opportunities at which related benefits fail or from which issues related to majority exposure start to predominate. The degree of migrant visibility thereby seems to influence the outcome.

Third, the results of the moderator analysis question the role of cognition for migrants’ dual identity. Cognitive sophistication was argued to enable first-generation migrants to tap into and benefit from both groups as it was suggested to increase intercultural competence and prevents misunderstandings in social interactions. Although tendentious, the findings provide no support for such an argument. This is demonstrated by the decrease in dual identity probability from intermediate to high status for “non-visible” and “visible” migrants. In combination with high status, cognitive resources may indeed help to deal with interethnic conflicts, but unlikely in a reconciling way that promotes dual identity. On the one hand, status may empower migrants to deploy their cognitive resources to advocate against the majority group. The overall negative but non-linear relationship between status and separated identity for “non-visible” migrants reflects this idea. On the other hand, the cognitive resources are useful to develop destination-specific social production functions more efficiently, as argued by classical assimilation theory.

The findings about the relationship between status and ethnic identity in the second generation support all hypotheses (see Table 4-1). The results reveal a negative relationship between status and separated identity. Simultaneously, higher-status migrants are noticeably more likely to show assimilated identity than lower-status migrants. The data further indicates that status and dual identity are unrelated. Also, there is no substantial relationship between status and no/weak identity.

The results of the moderator analysis indicate support for almost all hypotheses about how status relates to the ethnic identity of “non-visible” and “visible” migrants (see Table 4-3). For “non-visible” second-generation migrants, we observe a positive intermediate-to-high-status effect on the probability to show separated, assimilated, and dual identity. A negative status effect exists regarding the probability of no/weak identity. For “visible” migrants, I

expectedly find a negative intermediate-to-high-status effect on separated and dual identity. A rather unexpected finding is that status also positively affects assimilated identity of “visible” second-generation migrants. As assumed, a positive intermediate-to-high-status effect on no/weak identity is also observed. Similar to the findings from the first generation, most results are not statistically significant. Exceptions are the positive effect on assimilated identity and the negative status effect on no/weak identity for “non-visible” migrants, which also belong to the largest status effects in the analysis. Additionally, the difference in the status effect on no/weak identity between “non-visible” and “visible” migrants is statistically significant as well. This indicates a substantial interaction between status and migrant visibility, with status having a large negative effect for “non-visible” migrants and a large positive effect for “visible” migrants.

The findings of the moderator analysis are in line with the observed general trends depicted by the base analysis. An overall negative relationship between status and separated identity and an overall positive relationship between status and assimilated identity are also suggested by the moderator analysis. However, while the positive relationship between status and assimilated identity is also rather linear in the moderator analysis, the negative relationship between status and separated identity tends to be non-linear, resembling a v-shape. Furthermore, the moderator analysis provides an empirical explanation for the lacking relationship between status and dual respectively no/weak identity in the base analysis. The status effects across status levels for “non-visible” and “visible” migrants sharply contrast each other.

Four implications can be drawn from these results. First, much like in the first generation, status is mainly positively related to majority identity in the second generation. The positive and rather linear relationship is also confirmed in the moderator analysis. The positive association between status and majority identity is the strongest and most dominant observed relationship in the second generation. This echoes the argument of classical assimilation theory that the positive relationship between status and integration into the majority group is the general pattern.

Second, the positive association between status and majority identity is also observed for “visible” second-generation migrants, which were initially argued to mainly refrain from ethnic identification. Although the downside of status-related majority-contact opportunities for second-generation migrants is strongly supported by the data, “visible” high-status migrants seem more likely to benefit from increased interaction with the majority group despite their visible markers. A possible explanation is that resource advantages could mitigate potential negative effects of visible markers. However, despite their relatively high probability to integrate into the majority group, “visible” high-status migrants’ freedom of choice regarding their incorporation still seems limited. Although the costs of dual identity in the second generation are generally high, the data indicates that “visible” high-status migrants could be most pressured “to choose a side.” This is reflected in comparably high probabilities of one-sided ethnic identity and no/weak identity and the very low probability to show dual identity. Ethnic boundaries between “visible” high-status migrants and the majority group may still be too bright in the second generation to facilitate tapping into both groups.

Third, the findings for the second generation also indicate that status relates to minority identity. Relative deprivation thereby not only appears to play a role for second-generation migrants on high status positions but on both ends of the social hierarchy. This is exemplified by the moderator analysis, showing a general variation in separated identity probability across status levels that resembles a v-shape. It is also illustrated by the marked bump at the intermediate-status level for “non-visible” migrants on the one hand, and by the large gap in no/weak identity between “non-visible” and “visible” migrants on high status positions on the other hand. Importantly, the fact that we observe a comparably high probability of no/weak identity among “visible” high-status migrants in the second generation further supports the idea that meritocratic ideals may be instrumentalised by more successful migrants to set themselves apart from the minority peers.

Fourth, considering the indication for relative deprivation on low- and high-status positions as well as the positive association between status and majority identity, the analysis for the second generation not only supports the proposition of classical assimilation theory but also the idea of an integration paradox. However, this necessarily implies that the classical assimilation assumption of a dichotomisation of migrants' ethnic identity by their status is not supported by the results (as is the case in the first generation).

From an intergenerational perspective, the previously reported findings let one conclude that status plays a similar role for first- and second-generation migrants' ethnic identity. In both generations, status is related to majority and minority identity. The comparison of fit statistics between the first- and second-generation models supports this conclusion.

The base analysis provides inconclusive results regarding the "downward assimilation" Hypothesis (see Section 4.2.1). On the one hand, the analysis suggests separated identity to be more likely among lower-status migrants from the first- than from the second-generation. On the other hand, it suggests status and no/weak identity to be unrelated in the second generation. The moderator analysis provides more insights in this respect. It suggests to refute the "downward assimilation" Hypothesis, therefore being in line with previous studies that also raised questions about the proposition of the "downward assimilation" Hypothesis in the European context (e.g. Diehl/Schnell 2006; Nauck 2020; Platt 2014). The moderator analysis shows that "non-visible" and "visible" second-generation migrants on intermediate status positions have a similar probability of no/weak identity than their low-status counterparts. The descriptive statistics (Table 4-4) support this view as second-generation migrants across status levels more often reported to feel uncomfortable among Germans than their first-generation counterparts. Thus, relative deprivation does not seem to be a particular issue among low-status second-generation migrants. The observation rather points to a more general phenomenon in the second generation, which is perhaps best described with finding one's place between two cultural worlds and the related struggle of reconciliation (Benet-Martínez/Haritatos 2005; Berry 1997; Tadmor/Tetlock 2006).

Overall, Analysis 1 contributes by examining the relationship between migrants' status and their ethnic identity from an intergenerational perspective and the moderating role of migrant visibility. The results are in line with the perspective of classical assimilation theory—however, they also echo with the implication drawn from previous research that the relationship between status and ethnic identity is more complex than simply associating lower status with separated identity and higher status with assimilated identity. Although there is a similar relationship between status and ethnic identity in both generations, the first and second generation differ markedly in how this relationship manifests with respect to specific types of ethnic identity.

There is a dominant and overall positive relationship between status and majority identity across generations. However, this relationship is weaker among first- and second-generation high-status migrants, and particularly for "visible" migrants. The relationship between status and minority identity is more complex, revealing a stronger overall relationship between status and ethnic identity in the second generation. From the perspective of intermediate status positions, the ethnic identity patterns suggest that in the first and second generation, minority identity is negatively related to "visible" migrants on high status positions. In the second generation, however, minority identity is further positively related to "non-visible" migrants on high status positions and negatively related to migrants on low status positions in general.

By investigating majority and minority identity in tandem, Analysis 1 particularly highlights the situation of "visible" high-status migrants. In case of migrant visibility, there are



large and positive status effects on the probability to generally refrain from ethnic identification. Analysis 1 additionally reveals marked intergenerational differences in ethnic identity, thus pointing to the need for generation-specific analyses of ethnic identity—a strategy that previous studies in the field hardly pursued.

### 4.3 Analysis 2: Status mismatch and ethnic identity

The second analysis in this book investigates whether education-occupation mismatch is related to first- and second-generation migrants' ethnic identity. Developing an improved understanding of how status relates to ethnic identity also requires awareness of status discrepancies and their potential effects on migrants' ethnic identity. Migrants' status cannot always be clearly determined if information on their educational level and occupational position is used. This is the case in situations of education-occupation mismatch. Education-occupation mismatch principally implies inequality between individuals' educational and occupational status. In migration research, however, education-occupation mismatch often refers to the specific situation in which migrants' educational qualification exceeds the qualification level required for their current job (see e.g. Chiswick/Miller 2010).

Basically, such status mismatches occur among majority members and migrants alike. The prevalence of status mismatch is affected by demographic, regional, national and policy related factors that shape supply and demand in a society's labour market (Aleksynska/Tritah 2013). Also, pregnancy, motherhood and the way parents plan and organize family formation are considered more general causes of status mismatch (Boll et al. 2014; Frank 1978). However, studies repeatedly showed that status mismatch is more prevalent among migrants—particularly among first-generation migrants (Aleksynska/Tritah 2013; Boll et al. 2014; Dunlavy et al. 2016; Platt 2019). First-generation migrants face unfavourable conditions like these due to non-recognition of foreign qualifications, wrong screening of foreign qualifications (Chiswick & Miller, 2009), devaluation of skills or a lack of skill transferability (Chiswick/Miller 2009; Friedberg 2000), missing work permit, missing destination-specific cultural resources such as language proficiency (Chiswick 1979, 1978; Esser 2006; Green et al. 2007; Rydgren 2004), and discrimination (Quillian et al. 2019). Discrimination and a relative lack of destination-specific cultural resources compared to majority members are also two issues that cause second-generation migrants to experience status mismatch (Rydgren 2004).

Assessing the role of status mismatch for migrants' ethnic identity is crucial for three reasons: First, status mismatch may affect migrants' majority identity by means of perceived unequal treatment by the majority group. Second, and relatedly, status mismatch is another candidate to explain the integration paradox. In light of their higher expectations of equal treatment and fears of status loss, higher educated migrants could show particularly strong emotional reactions to status mismatch. Third, status mismatch might simultaneously affect migrants' minority identity by means of a resulting desire for protection, comfort, and confirmation. In this regard, studying the role of status mismatch for migrants' ethnic identity contributes to the literature on relative deprivation (e.g. Branscombe et al. 1999; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2009; Verkuyten/Yildiz 2007). As discussed in Section 2.3.3, this strand of literature argues that migrants' ethnic identity is affected if migrants feel deprived compared to majority members, resulting in weakened majority identity and strengthened minority identity.

To the best of my knowledge, the role of status mismatch for migrants' ethnic identity has not yet been subject to empirical studies. However, in light of its potential role in explaining the integration paradox and its potential impact on migrants' feelings of relative deprivation,

the role of status mismatch for migrants' ethnic identity needs to be clarified. This is particularly the case if we consider the high prevalence of status mismatch among migrants.

#### *4.3.1 Theoretical considerations and expectations*

##### Status mismatch and ethnic identity

The reason to expect differences in ethnic identity between mismatched and non-mismatched migrants is the assumption that status mismatch reduces the production of social approval as it evokes feelings of relative deprivation, which likely leads to a state of social deprivation. As I described in Section 2.3.3, relative deprivation generally refers to feelings of unequal and unfair treatment compared to others (Pettigrew et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2012). Regarding migrants, those "others" are mostly majority members. Social deprivation, on the other hand, refers to a more extreme situation than relative deprivation. Social deprivation not only indicates a lack of meaningful social interactions with majority members, but also with minority members (see also Section 2.3.7). Relative and social deprivation mainly negatively affect migrants' achievement of the instrumental goals, such as behavioural confirmation, affection, and comfort.

Status-mismatched migrants should be particularly prone to experience relative and social deprivation. Status mismatch poses a threat for meeting migrants' and their family's status expectations and for gaining returns that match their educational qualification. Migrants are generally known to have high status expectations (e.g. Brinbaum/Cebolla-Boado 2007; Glick/White 2004; Goyette/Xie 1999; Kristen/Dollmann 2009; Nauck/Genoni 2019). First-generation migrants often aim for better living conditions compared to those in their society of origin; second-generation migrants aim to improve or maintain the living conditions of their family. Thereby, second-generation migrants often strive to catch up or keep up with their majority peers, or even strive to surpass them.

Status mismatch, however, disappoints migrants' status expectations in the receiving society, in which they intend to realise their status goals and improve their life chances. In this regard, status mismatch can make migrants feel relatively deprived of their opportunities for upward mobility or status retention. Status-mismatched migrants could thus particularly feel refused and unequally treated by the majority group. Moreover, given that status achievement constitutes an esteem need and one of the most valuable and desired needs in general, failing to reach expected status in the receiving society can also threaten migrants' self-esteem (Slootman 2018). Migrants' impression of not being respected and valued by the majority group may thus be reinforced (Skrobanek 2009).

The literature suggests that migrants who experience relative deprivation compared to majority members refrain from identifying with the majority group and strengthen emotional identification with the minority group instead (Branscombe et al. 1999; Fleischmann et al. 2019; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2009; Mazzoni et al. 2020; Verkuyten/Yildiz 2007). Embracing minority identity is thereby argued to reflect a coping strategy to deal with experienced disappointment, psychological stress and rejection (Branscombe et al. 1999; Hogg 2000; Pak et al. 1991; Tajfel/Turner 1986). This strategy can be seen as one that generates self-esteem and comfort by clinging to ascriptive, minority characteristics such as descent, skin colour, race, and religious affiliation (e.g. Branscombe et al. 1999; Fleischmann et al. 2019). Ascriptive characteristics are perceived as given and difficult or even impossible to lose. Migrants thus do not need to achieve them like citizenship or status in the receiving society (Wright 2011). Ascriptive minority characteristics thus represent a cheap way for status-mismatched migrants to at least mitigate the damage to their overall well-being.

Highlighting minority group belonging through embracing ascriptive minority characteristics should not be an option for all status-mismatched migrants. On the one hand, salient ascriptive minority characteristics are not always available, for example because migrants do not differ from majority members with respect to skin colour or religious beliefs. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the great discrepancy between status-mismatched migrants' status and the high status expectations of themselves and their families creates great tension that likely results in strong emotional responses. The discrepancy promotes shame in status-mismatched migrants and displeasure in their families. Status-mismatched migrants may have caused their family to socially decline, and they have disappointed their and their families' hopes for social upward mobility or status retention. In either way, status-mismatched migrants could feel as they have disgraced their families and perceive displeasure from their families that made considerable investments to enable their offspring a promising future. Against this background, status mismatch should not only increase the risk of relative deprivation. It should also increase the risk of social deprivation as status mismatch additionally blocks opportunities for generating comfort, behavioural confirmation and affection within the minority context.

### Intergenerational differences

There is reason to assume that the influence of status mismatch on migrants' ethnic identity is dependent on migrants' generation status. Possible explanations provide the so-called "immigrant optimism" argument, failed status expectations and different processes of social comparison.

First-generation migrants are often argued to be a positively selected and predisposed group (Kao/Tienda 1995; Platt 2019; Portes/Rumbaut 1996). Their arrival in the receiving society is mostly seen as a strategy to improve their and their children's living conditions, using the conditions in their society of origin as a frame of reference (Massey 1998; Ogbu 1991; Suarez-Orozco 1987). Thus, although first-generation migrants often find themselves in the lower segments of the receiving society, they already experience an improvement in living conditions through migration. While first-generation migrants might lose their occupational status when they migrate, they can compensate their status loss by benefitting from more elaborated welfare systems and by experiencing an increase in comfort through rising income. Increased income is of particular importance as it helps first-generation migrants to improve their status compared to their non-migrated counterparts. By sending remittances to those that stayed behind, first-generation migrants' status increases even though their labour market entrance in the receiving society might be accompanied by status loss. As a consequence, mismatched migrants of the first generation should feel less deprived compared to majority members and they should feel less ashamed in front of minority members in contrast to second-generation migrants.

In addition, first-generation migrants are likely aware of their comparably modest chances of status achievement in the receiving society's labour market. They mostly lack important resources such as majority language skills, contacts to majority members, and knowledge about how the society functions at large. However, they perceive these disadvantages as necessary opportunity costs in order to start a better life in their new home. As such, they are willing to make the effort to get along in a presumably unfamiliar environment in order to enable their offspring a better life as well. As a result, first-generation migrants do not necessarily expect educational returns that match their educational qualification and they do not necessarily perceive status mismatch as a deliberate act of disapproval by majority members.

The situation is different for second-generation migrants. Their fear of failing to achieve desired status is particularly high. The humiliation associated with status mismatch thus

weighs heavier among second-generation migrants. They not only fail to meet their own high status expectations but also disappoint their family members and especially their parents, who gave up their lives in their country of birth and invested in the future of their offspring. Second-generation migrants with status mismatch should therefore not only have a higher risk to feel relatively deprived compared to majority members. They should also have a higher risk to experience social deprivation and generally refrain from ethnic identification, as they are more likely to feel disgraced and to feel the displeasure of their family.

Moreover, second-generation migrants have less reason to expect status mismatch. They obtain their education in the receiving society and master the majority language early on. In contrast to first-generation migrants, they thus do not expect their educational returns to differ from similarly educated majority members. Consequently, second-generation migrants should be more likely to relate experiences of status mismatches to unequal and unfair treatment compared to majority members.

### Educational differences

The roles of relative and social deprivation for migrants' ethnic identity in the context of status mismatch may further be associated with migrants' level of educational qualification. However, there are two contrasting explanations why status-mismatched migrants might show different ethnic identity types depending on their education.

First, higher educated migrants' perception of unequal treatment and humiliation in case of status mismatch may be particularly pronounced, promoting social deprivation. On the one hand, they are argued to be more sensitive to unequal treatment and more aware of social inequalities, which evokes stronger emotional reactions in case of unmet expectations of equal treatment (see Section 4.2.2). On the other hand, higher educated migrants should fear status loss more than migrants with intermediate education. A higher educational qualification simply increases the chance and severity for inadequate status conversion because there is more room for occupational degradation than for occupational match or improvement. Hence, higher educated migrants who experience status mismatch could feel particularly disadvantaged and ashamed and the higher but failed investments of the family put a greater strain on the family relationship.

Second, particularly assimilation theorists assume that higher educated migrants have greater capacities to adapt to the receiving society than lower educated migrants. For example, this difference has been discussed in the context of second language acquisition, arguing that higher educated migrants are more efficient in learning the majority language in their receiving society than lower educated migrants (Chiswick/Miller 2001; van Tubergen/Mentjox 2014). Such skills could prevent a reduction in comfort, behavioural confirmation, and affection as they make migrants more flexible and efficient in dealing with stressful situations. Furthermore, such skills could make higher educated migrants less dependent on the comfort, closeness, and security provided by minority members than lower educated migrants. The ethnic identity of higher educated migrants may thus be less affected by experiences of status mismatch compared to lower educated migrants.

### Expectations

Migrants with status mismatch fail to realise returns in the labour market that match their educational qualification. Unmet expectations and disappointment are assumed to evoke feelings of rejection, of unequal and unfair treatment by the majority group. As a consequence, migrants' minority and majority identity can become mutually exclusive in the sense that

they emotionally disengage with the majority group and instead aim at generating self-esteem and comfort by clinging to ascriptive, minority characteristics for dealing with experienced disappointment, psychological stress and rejection. Thus, the first three hypotheses posit that

**H2.1** Separated identity is more likely in case of status mismatch

**H2.2** Assimilated identity is less likely in case of status mismatch

**H2.3** Dual identity is less likely in case of status mismatch

As discussed before, not all status-mismatched migrants withdraw from majority members and embrace salient ascriptive minority characteristics. Some enter a state of social deprivation, indicating emotional withdrawal from majority members and minority members. However, this scenario is more likely for second- than for first-generation migrants. Second-generation migrants are more pressured to perform well in the receiving society in order to meet high parental investments and familial expectations, including those from second-generation migrants themselves. In contrast, mismatched migrants of the first generation can make up for this status loss and potential humiliation. They increase their income in comparison to their job before migration, generating comfort and status in contrast to their non-migrated counterparts, who potentially benefit from migrants' remittances and provide approval in return.

Following these arguments, I assume that mismatched migrants of the first generation should not be affected by social deprivation, while mismatched migrants of the second generation should be. Thus,

**H2.4a** Among first-generation migrants, no/weak ethnic identity is unrelated to status mismatch

**H2.4b** Among second-generation migrants, no/weak ethnic identity is more likely in case of status mismatch

The generation-specific arguments leading to Hypotheses 2.4a and 2.4b also support the assumption that relative deprivation is a comparably smaller issue for mismatched migrants of the first generation. Their income-related increase in comfort and status compared to their non-migrated counterparts and the provided approval of non-migrated minority members do not necessarily make them feel deprived compared to majority members. Mismatched migrants of the second generation, in turn, are pressured to attain high status, making them pursue high educational returns. Therefore, they should more often feel unfairly treated and discriminated in situations of status mismatch.

Additionally, comparably weak feelings of relative deprivation among first-generation migrants can be assumed since they more likely expect their conditions in the labour market to be inferior to majority members. They are aware of lacking important resources that facilitate status achievement in the labour market of the receiving society. Second-generation migrants, on the other hand, grew up in the receiving society and have little reason to expect smaller educational returns compared to similarly educated majority members, who function as their reference group.

In sum, status mismatch is less likely to be a source of social *and* relative deprivation in the first generation. The following hypothesis therefore assumes that overall,

**H2.5** The relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity is stronger in the second than in the first generation

The degree to which status mismatch is associated with relative and social deprivation is not only expected to vary across generations, but also across levels of educational qualification. I outlined two contrasting arguments why this could be the case.

The first argument posits that migrants' ethnic identity should be particularly affected by status mismatch if migrants' educational level is comparably high. From a social mobility perspective, higher educated migrants have more to lose than migrants with intermediate or lower educational qualifications. Migrants with lower educational qualifications are closer to the bottom of social hierarchy. Options for downward mobility in occupational status are thus less diverse and downward mobility is less steep than for migrants with higher educational qualifications. The steeper the downward movement, the greater the status discrepancy and the stronger the emotional reaction should be. Moreover, some scholars expect higher educated migrants to have higher expectations regarding equal treatment and status returns. Since migrants are particularly likely to experience status mismatch, this state likely creates the impression of unequal treatment, promoting strong emotional reactions as well. Following the first argument, status mismatch should therefore be a greater issue for migrants' emotional identification the higher their educational qualification.

The second argument posits that higher educated migrants should be more successful in dealing with disappointment, negative and humiliating feelings, and psychological stress than lower educated migrants. In addition, higher educated migrants' cognitive capabilities should make them less dependent on supportive resources from within the minority group.

Although the two arguments contrast each other, they both suggest that

## H2.6 The effect of status mismatch on ethnic identity differs across levels of educational qualification

Table 4-8: Schematic overview of hypotheses about the relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity in the first and second generation

Hypothesis	Migrant generation	Separated	Assimilated	Dual	No/weak
<i>Relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity</i>					
H2.1	1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup>	+			
H2.2	1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup>		-		
H2.3	1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup>			-	
H2.4a	1 <sup>st</sup>				none
H2.4b	2 <sup>nd</sup>				+
H2.5	1 <sup>st</sup>   2 <sup>nd</sup>		weaker   stronger (overall)		
<i>Effect of status mismatch on ethnic identity across levels of educational qualification</i>					
H2.6	1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup>		unequal (overall)		

Note: The signs (+ | -) in the cells indicate positive and negative correlations.

Source: Author's own representation.

### 4.3.2 Model specification and analytical strategy


Figure 4-6 exhibits the empirical model set-ups to analyse the relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity. The aim is to study the relationships depicted by the bold arrows and corresponding numbers. Accordingly, model 1 focuses on analysing the general influence of status mismatch on migrants' ethnic identity, which is depicted by number ①. Model 2 investigates whether the influence of status mismatch on ethnic identity varies with migrants' educational qualification. The interaction of interest is depicted by number ②. The dashed arrows depict potential confounding effects that need to be considered to reduce the risk of biased results. This is done by controlling for several covariates that are displayed in the lower left boxes of Models 1 and 2 in Figure 4-6. The models apply to the first and second generation. The estimation samples exclude migrants attending vocational training. Migrants in vocational training are difficult to grasp from an analytical perspective since it is not yet clear whether they enter status mismatch or not after training completion. As a result, Model 1 includes 784 first- and 1,167 second-generation migrants. The estimation sample for Model 2 is smaller, comprising 666 first- and 1,126 second-generation migrants. The smaller estimation sample results out of excluding migrants with low educational qualifications in order to mitigate noise in the data. Migrants with low educational qualification can experience status mismatch if they are unemployed. However, migrants with low educational qualification are already at the bottom of the social hierarchy. They arguably face many more challenges besides status mismatch that would complicate interpretation.

The analyses are based on cross-sectional data which are part of the sixth starting cohort (SC6) of the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS). Chapter 3 introduces the data in detail, including the definition of the sample. Information about the operationalisation of all variables is kept at a minimum to reduce redundancy throughout the book. A comprehensive variable overview can be found in Appendix A. In the following, I thus provide only a brief overview of the model variables.


The depending variable *ethnic identity* reflects a composite variable with nominal scale. It bases on dichotomising the variables *minority identity* and *majority identity* by splitting them at their median. Afterwards, the resulting dummy variables are cross tabulated to arrive at the four different ethnic identity types. *Status mismatch* is a dummy variable indicating whether migrants' educational qualification is higher than required by their current job. Unemployed migrants are thereby labelled as experiencing status mismatch. Status mismatch constitutes the main explaining variable and is measured by using the job analysis approach (e.g. Hartog 2000). Accordingly, the educational requirement level of migrants' job was determined using the German Classification of Occupations (KldB) 2010. To identify potential status mismatches, the educational requirement level was then compared with migrants' highest educational level. Migrants' *education* reflects the other explaining variable. It depicts migrants' highest educational qualification. The variable is a four-categorical variable where each category reflects one of the four job-based levels of educational requirement. Migrants who may have some general education but no vocational education are labelled as having low educational qualification (= 0). Migrants with intermediate educational qualification (= 1) are those who at least completed two years of vocational education (e.g. through vocational schools or apprenticeships). Migrants with high educational qualification (= 2) includes migrants with a Master's/foreman's certificate (*Meisterbrief*), a Technician's certificate (*Technikerausbildung*) or a Bachelor's degree. Finally, migrants with very high educational qualification (= 3) refer to migrants that for example obtained a Master's degree, a Doctorate's degree or Habilitation.

Figure 4-6: Empirical model set-ups for analysing the relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity

Model 1



Model 2



Note: Covariates in parentheses are only included in models for first-generation migrants.

Source: Author’s own representation.

To reduce the risk of biased results, the empirical models include several covariates. This includes migrants’ self-reported *gender* and their *age*. Migrants’ *cultural distance* to Germany is another covariate and introduced as continuous variable. It is not only assumed to influence migrants’ labour market placement (Esser 2006) but also ethnic identification (Berry 1997).



Two additional variables account for biasing factors on the survey level: Self-reports of NEPS interviewers about *comprehension problems during the survey* and *NEPS interviewers' experience*, measured by their employment time in the survey institute.

The empirical models for first-generation migrants further account for migrant cohort by including the four-category variable *time of migration to Germany*. First-generation migrants' *age at migration* and their *residence duration* are controlled as well. To avoid perfect collinearity between age, age at migration and residence duration, "age" is transformed from a continuous to categorical variable. Migrants' age and residence duration serve as indicators for their adaptation to the majority group. Accounting for migrants' adaptation status is central for the following analysis. This is because status mismatch may also affect ethnic identity as status-mismatched migrants do not have the destination-specific resources required to adequately convert their educational qualification in the labour market of the receiving society. These migrants could show separated identity because they simply cannot access the majority group due to lack of resources, and not because they feel relatively deprived or socially isolated. Therefore, controlling for migrants' adaptation status prevents the effect of status mismatch on ethnic identity from being spurious and ensures capturing the mechanism of relative and social deprivation. All continuous variables used in the estimation models of both generations are centred at their mean to deal with multicollinearity (Best/Wolf 2010).

Table 4-9 shows descriptive statistics for migrants with and without status mismatch, grouped by their generation status. The overall picture suggests that status mismatch in the first generation is largely driven by an initial lack of skills relevant for labour market placement, which is however less the case in the second generation.

Status mismatch is prevalent in both migrant generations. The share of status-mismatched migrants is thereby larger in the first generation. Unemployment accounts for a larger part of status mismatch in both generations (38 percent in the first and 28 percent in the second generation). In the first generation, more than half of those with status mismatch endure their mismatch situation for more than three years. In the second generation, over half of all status-mismatched migrants endure the situation for more than four years. There are even some migrants with a mismatch duration of over 40 years, which explains the relatively high average mismatch duration.

Classic demographic characteristics are less telling when differentiating non-mismatched and status-mismatched migrants. In both generations, women and men are similarly distributed and the average age is similar across non-mismatched and status-mismatched migrants and across generations. As expected, migrants with status mismatch are on average better educated than non-mismatched migrants. However, the difference between non-mismatched and status-mismatched migrants is rather small and similar in both generations.

Clearly more important than demographic characteristics are migration characteristics. With respect to the first generation, status-mismatched migrants in the sample on average arrived a couple of years later in Germany than their non-mismatched counterparts. The residence duration of status-mismatched first-generation migrants is on average several years shorter. Furthermore, mismatched migrants of the first generation have slightly greater cultural distance, have more foreign educational qualifications, and report to be less proficient in German than their non-mismatched counterparts. With respect to the second generation, there is no difference in cultural distance but status-mismatched migrants report to be slightly less proficient in German. Non-mismatched and mismatched migrants of the second generation report rather similar feelings of discomfort among Germans as the case for mismatched migrants of the first generation. The exception are non-mismatched first-generation migrants, who report lower levels of discomfort among Germans. A possible explanation for the relatively low value could be their success of adequate status conversion against the odds.

Table 4-9: Descriptive statistics for migrants with and without status mismatch, by generation status

	Min	Max	First generation		Second generation	
			w/o mismatch [63.5%]	with mismatch [36.5]	w/o mismatch [77.4]	with mismatch [22.6]
Unemployed	0	1		0.38		0.28
Duration of status mismatch (months)	0	564		71 (37)		91 (49)
Female	0	1	0.53	0.56	0.53	0.55
Age (years)	25	65	45	44	48	46
Education	0	3	1.41	1.68	1.61	1.86
Age at migration (0 = below the age of one)	0	58	19	24		
Residence duration (0 = below one year)	0	63	26	19		
Cultural distance to Germany	0.08	0.50	0.24	0.26	0.19	0.19
Foreign educational qualification	0	1	0.62	0.74		
Self-reported proficiency in German	0	5	4.01	3.60	4.93	4.89
Feeling uncomfortable among Germans	0	1	0.28	0.50	0.53	0.52

Note: The table reports variable means if not stated otherwise. Median in parentheses.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

In the following, the analytical strategy comprises three steps: First, the effect of status mismatch on migrants' ethnic identity in both migrant generations is investigated separately. I do this by employing multinomial logistic regressions with robust standard errors and "ethnic identity" as dependent variable. Second, the results between first- and second-generation migrants are compared to investigate intergenerational differences in the relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity. For this purpose, I compare model fit statistics of models that exclude and include status mismatch. Third, it is investigated whether the effect of status mismatch on migrants' ethnic identity depends on migrants' level of educational qualification. In this last step, interaction terms are added to the multinomial logistic regression models by interacting status mismatch with education.

### 4.3.3 Findings

#### Status mismatch and ethnic identity among first-generation migrants

Table 4-10 depicts regression results for assessing the relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity among first-generation migrants. Since the model is specifically designed for this purpose, I focus on reporting the coefficients for status mismatch. I also compare  $z$ -statistics between status mismatch and the covariates to assess the relative effect strength of status mismatch.

Overall, the findings support the assumptions about how status mismatch relates to first-generation migrants' ethnic identity. The average marginal effects (AMEs) of status mismatch show that the probability to show separated identity is 15.4 percentage points higher for mismatched than for non-mismatched migrants. In contrast, the probability to show assimilated identity is 2.9 percentage points lower for mismatched than for non-mismatched migrants. The probability to show dual identity is also lower among status-mismatched migrants. They are 14.2 percentage points less likely to identify with both groups than their non-mismatched counterparts. All findings are statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ;  $p < 0.1$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ). The case is different regarding the effect of status mismatch on the probability to show no/weak identity. The results suggest that status mismatch does not substantially affect migrants' probability to refrain from ethnic identification.

A comparison of the  $z$ -statistics for status mismatch and the remaining covariates reveals that the effects of status mismatch on migrants' ethnic identity are relatively strong. The  $z$ -statistics of status mismatch are among the highest in the regression model. They are particularly strong regarding the probability to show separated and dual identity. Other influential covariates associated with first-generation migrants' ethnic identity are their education qualification level, cultural distance, and time of migration.

To check the robustness of the results, I conduct additional analyses. In two analyses, I separately account for the two largest migrant groups in the sample of first-generation migrants, Turks and Poles. A third analysis replaces status mismatch with a four-categorical measure that additionally captures different durations of status mismatch.

Turks and Poles constitute the two largest migrant groups in the sample of the first generation. Considering these groups in separate analyses thus provides more information about whether ethnic composition in the first generation influences the role of status mismatch for ethnic identity. The analyses reveal that the effect of status mismatch on ethnic identity is quite robust and does not change substantially when separately accounting for Turks and Poles.

Table 4-10: Average marginal effects (AMEs) of ethnic identity for first-generation migrants in case of status mismatch

	Separated	Assimilated	Dual	No/weak
Status mismatch	0.154***	-0.029+	-0.142***	0.016
(ref.: no mismatch)	(4.45)	(-1.64)	(-4.14)	(0.76)
Female (ref.: male)	-0.017	-0.015	0.048	-0.016
	(-0.53)	(-0.93)	(1.53)	(-0.87)
Age	0.024	-0.012	-0.025	0.013
	(0.43)	(-0.37)	(-0.44)	(0.41)
<i>Educational qualification (ref.: low)</i>				
Intermediate	-0.215***	0.006	0.154**	0.054**
	(-4.46)	(0.27)	(3.42)	(3.04)
High	-0.168**	0.032	0.068	0.069 *
	(-2.95)	(1.00)	(1.25)	(2.53)
Very high	-0.194***	0.011	0.074	0.108***
	(-3.54)	(0.38)	(1.43)	(3.83)
<i>Time of migration (ref.: 1948-1972)</i>				
1973-1988	-0.154**	0.005	0.096 +	0.053 *
	(-2.78)	(0.25)	(1.65)	(2.39)
1989-2001	-0.137	0.005	-0.024	0.156**
	(-1.53)	(0.11)	(-0.25)	(2.92)
2002-2011	-0.197	0.033	-0.167	0.331**
	(-1.64)	(0.35)	(-1.58)	(2.79)
Age at migration	-0.002	0.001	0.005	-0.004
	(-0.33)	(0.23)	(0.84)	(-1.16)
Residence duration	-0.018**	0.006	0.008	0.005
	(-2.66)	(1.48)	(1.09)	(1.39)
Cultural distance	0.012	0.017*	-0.039*	0.010
	(0.81)	(2.42)	(-2.53)	(1.18)
Mc Fadden's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>		0.156		
Mc Fadden's adjusted Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>		0.096		
Nagelkerke's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>		0.324		

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ ; ref. = reference group.

Note:  $N = 784$ . Estimations based on multinomial logistic regressions with robust standard errors.  $z$ -statistics in parentheses. To avoid perfect collinearity between age, age at migration and residence duration, age has been collapsed into a variable with five categories. Additional covariates: Interviewer reports on comprehension problems during interview and interviewer experience.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.


The rationale behind the third assessment is that status mismatch may differ in its effect on ethnic identity depending on its duration. On the one hand, status mismatch might only have an immediate impact on migrants' ethnic identity. This effect could disappear the longer the status mismatch persists because migrants get used to their situation and integration progresses. On the other hand, status mismatch could have a lasting effect, reflecting some kind of "relative downward assimilation." This could indicate integration into lower segments of society than individually and socially expected, and it could also promote refusal of majority culture and values. Mismatch duration (0 = "no mismatch," 1 = "up to 1 year," 2 = "1 – 2 years," 3 = "+ 2 years") is measured by calculating status-mismatched migrants' duration of their current employment or unemployment period.

It turns out that considering the duration of migrants' status mismatch helps to better understand the results from the regression model depicted in Table 4-10. Figure 4-7 below depicts the relationship between the duration of status mismatch and migrants' ethnic identity. The upper plot shows ethnic identity probabilities of non-mismatched migrants and of migrants with different mismatch durations. The lower four plots show differences in effects on ethnic identity probabilities between non-mismatched migrants (represented by the solid horizontal line at value zero) and status-mismatched migrants with different mismatch duration for each ethnic identity type. Overall, there are large effects of status mismatch on ethnic identity if the situation of status mismatch is not older than one year. The effects reverse and become smaller with longer status mismatch duration. This pattern is reflected in first-generation migrants' probability to show separated identity. Migrants who just entered status mismatch are most likely to show separated identity. Afterwards, status-mismatched migrants' probability to show separated identity decreases slightly but remains at a comparably high probability level. Thus, those migrants whose mismatch has already lasted for over two years are still more likely to identify in a separated way than non-mismatched migrants. The differential plot for separated identity in the lower left part of Figure 4-7 shows the reverse trend and that the differences between non-mismatched and status-mismatched migrants from all duration categories are statistically significant (i.e.  $p < 0.05$ ). The resulting overall positive effect of mismatch duration on first-generation migrants' separated identity echoes with the finding from the regression model shown in Table 4-10.

For assimilated identity, Figure 4-7 below reveals a small negative linear effect of mismatch duration. Non-mismatched migrants are rather likely to show assimilated identity than status-mismatched migrants. Among first-generation migrants with status mismatch, the probability of assimilated identity decreases with increasing mismatch duration, although the probability of assimilated ethnic identification is already very low. The differential plot for assimilated identity in the lower right part of Figure 4-7 exhibits statistically significant differences between non-mismatched migrants and migrants who have been affected by status mismatch for more than two years. This late significant negative effect of mismatch duration on assimilated identity reflects the small effect found in the original regression model (see Table 4-10).

The influence of mismatch duration on migrants' probability to show dual identity mirrors the effect of mismatch duration on separated identity. Showing dual identity is most likely for non-mismatched migrants and least likely within the first year of status mismatch. With increasing mismatch duration, migrants' dual identity starts to become more likely. Status-mismatched migrants' probability to show dual identity thereby remains lower than that of non-mismatched migrants. The differential plot for dual identity in the lower left part of Figure 4-7 reveals the rapprochement trend between non-mismatched and status-mismatched migrants with increasing mismatch duration. Thereby, it also reveals that the differences in dual identity between non-mismatched and status-mismatched migrants is most substantial right after first-generation migrants enter status mismatch.

Figure 4-7: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for first-generation migrants with different durations of status mismatch



Note:  $N = 784$ . Estimates based on one multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors. The model includes same covariates as the model in Table 4-10. The upper plot shows predicted probabilities of migrants without mismatch and with different mismatch durations. For each value on the x-axis, summarising the predicted probabilities of all ethnic identity types results in 100 percent. The lower plots show differences in effects on ethnic identity probabilities (95%-CI) between migrants without mismatch and with different mismatch durations for each ethnic identity type. Migrants without status mismatch constitute the reference group, represented by the solid horizontal line at value zero.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

Regarding no/weak identity, the findings in Figure 4-7 show hardly any differences between non-mismatched and status-mismatched migrants and no systematic effect of mismatch duration. There are no statistically significant effects, which corroborates the finding from the original model shown in Table 4-10.

#### Status mismatch and ethnic identity among second-generation migrants

Table 4-11 shows regression results for the relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity among second-generation migrants. As for the first generation before, I focus on the effect of status mismatch on ethnic identity and address relative effect strengths.

In sum, the findings suggest a substantial relationship between status mismatch and second-generation migrants' ethnic identity that is largely in line with the hypotheses overviewed in Table 4-8. The probability of separated identity is 9.4 percentage points higher for mismatched than for non-mismatched migrants. Furthermore, status-mismatched migrants' probability to show assimilated identity is 17.6 percentage points lower than that of non-mismatched migrants. Both coefficients are statistically highly significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). In contrast, status mismatch is not substantially related to migrants' dual identity. The effect is comparably small and statistically non-significant. Lastly, status-mismatched migrants are 6.3 percentage points more likely to disidentify or weakly identify with both groups compared to non-mismatched migrants. The effect is statistically significant ( $p < 0.1$ ). Compared to the remaining covariates, the effects of status mismatch on second-generation migrants' ethnic identity are strong. All statistically significant effects of status mismatch have high  $z$ -statistics. The  $z$ -statistics also indicate that status mismatch is most influential for second-generation migrants' separated and assimilated identity. Besides status mismatch, second-generation migrants' gender and particularly their cultural distance and age have strong influence on their ethnic identity. Additional robustness checks are conducted for the same reasons as for first-generation migrants. Accordingly, I account for the two largest migrant groups in the sample of second-generation migrants, Czechs (including migrants from Slovakia and former Czechoslovakia) and Poles and consider the duration of second-generation migrants' status mismatch. Analyses that separately consider Czechs and Poles suggest that the influence of status mismatch on ethnic identity is robust against ethnic effects. The estimations yield results that are similar to those from the initial analysis.

Figure 4-8 exhibits results for the relationship between mismatch duration and ethnic identity. The setup is identical to that of Figure 4-7. The upper plot depicts ethnic identity probabilities of non-mismatched migrants and for migrants with different mismatch durations. The lower four plots exhibit differences in effects on ethnic identity probabilities between non-mismatched migrants (represented by the solid horizontal line at value zero) and status-mismatched migrants with different mismatch durations for each ethnic identity type.

Overall, the results for second-generation migrants show a more complex picture than that for first-generation migrants. There are also pronounced short-term effects of mismatch duration on migrants' ethnic identity which reverse with increasing mismatch duration. In addition, there is indication for longer-term effects. The results reveal that the duration of status mismatch strongly influences second-generation migrants' probability of separated identity. Showing separated identity is most likely among migrants who entered status mismatch up to one year ago. Separated identity becomes comparably less likely with increasing mismatch duration until there is almost no more difference to non-mismatched migrants. The differential plot for separated identity in the lower left part of Figure 4-8 shows that only the initial effect is statistically significant. Thus, the corresponding positive effect of status mismatch on separated identity from the original model in Table 4-11 is primarily owed to this initial effect.

Table 4-11: Average marginal effects (AMEs) of ethnic identity for second-generation migrants in case of status mismatch

	Separated	Assimilated	Dual	No/weak
Status mismatch	0.094***	-0.176***	0.019	0.063+
(ref.: no mismatch)	(3.69)	(-5.39)	(0.77)	(1.87)
Female (ref.: male)	0.006	-0.095**	-0.001	0.090**
	(0.36)	(-3.35)	(-0.07)	(3.25)
Age	-0.004***	0.008***	-0.003**	-0.001
	(-4.30)	(6.24)	(-3.04)	(-0.88)
<i>Education (ref.: low)</i>				
Intermediate	-0.034	0.051	0.026	-0.042
	(-0.59)	(0.67)	(0.54)	(-0.56)
High	-0.084	0.039	0.040	0.005
	(-1.43)	(0.50)	(0.80)	(0.06)
Very high	-0.053	0.069	0.011	-0.027
	(-0.89)	(0.87)	(0.21)	(-0.34)
Cultural distance	0.015*	-0.033**	0.002	0.016+
	(2.59)	(-3.41)	(0.36)	(1.75)
Mc Fadden's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>		0.054		
Mc Fadden's adjusted Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>		0.029		
Nagelkerke's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>		0.137		

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ ; ref. = reference group.

Note: N = 1,167. Estimations based on multinomial logistic regressions with robust standard errors. z-statistics in parentheses. Additional covariates: Interviewer reports on comprehension problems during interview and interviewer experience.


Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

Regarding assimilated identity, we observe an almost mirror-inverted effect of mismatch duration compared to separated identity. Showing assimilated identity is least likely for migrants who entered status mismatch up to one year ago. With increasing duration of status mismatch, migrants' probability to show assimilated identity increases but remains lower than for non-mismatched migrants. The differential plot for assimilated identity in the lower right part of Figure 4-8 shows that despite the clear rapprochement trend, all differences between status-mismatched migrants and non-mismatched migrants are statistically significant, corroborating the noticeable negative effect of status mismatch on assimilated identity reported by the original model in Table 4-11.

The influence of mismatch duration on migrants' dual identity is similar to that on separated identity. Hence, dual identity is most likely when migrants have just entered status mismatch. Then, the probability of dual identity decreases with increasing mismatch duration. Eventually, showing dual identity is less likely among migrants who have been affected by status mismatch the longest than among non-mismatched migrants. The differential plot for dual identity in the lower left part of Figure 4-8 shows that the initial and the last effect are statistically significant. These contrasting effects of strong dual ethnic cancel each other out and therefore explain why status mismatch did not turn statistically significant in Table 4-11.



Figure 4-8: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for second-generation migrants with different durations of status mismatch



Note:  $N = 1,167$ . Estimates based on one multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors. The model includes same covariates as the model in Table 4-11. The upper plot shows predicted probabilities of migrants without mismatch and with different mismatch durations. For each value on the x-axis, summarising the predicted probabilities of all ethnic identity types results in 100 percent. The lower plots show differences in effects on ethnic identity probabilities (95%-CI) between migrants without mismatch and with different mismatch durations for each ethnic identity type. Migrants without mismatch constitute the reference group, represented by the solid horizontal line at value zero.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

Regarding no/weak identity, Figure 4-8 suggests that mismatch duration has a positive influence over the long run. Non-mismatched migrants and migrants who entered status mismatch up to one year ago are least likely to disidentify or weakly identify with the minority and majority group. The probability of no/weak identity then increases with increasing duration of status mismatch. The differential plot in the lower right part of Figure 4-8 shows that migrants who have been affected by status mismatch the longest are significantly more likely than non-mismatched migrants to generally refrain from ethnic identifications. The steady increase in status-mismatched migrants' probability to generally refrain from ethnic identifications with increasing mismatch duration corroborates the positive relationship between status mismatch and no/weak identity showed by the original model in Table 4-11.

#### Intergenerational differences in the effect of status mismatch on ethnic identity

In the second step, I investigate potential differences in how status mismatch affects migrants' ethnic identity between first- and second-generation migrants. For this purpose, I compare model fit statistics of models excluding and including the explaining variables "status mismatch" and "mismatch duration," to see how the fit statistics in both generations change. Table 4-12 depicts several indices for status mismatch in its upper part and mismatch duration in its lower part.

Overall, the indices indeed suggest a stronger relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity in the second generation. With respect to the variable "status mismatch," adding it to the models improves model fits in both generations. The LR-tests and the Pseudo- $R^2$  measures suggest statistically highly significant and similar overall effects of status mismatch on ethnic identity for both generations. A comparison of AIC and BIC across generations reveals that the relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity is stronger in the second generation. In the second generation, AIC and BIC decrease after adding status mismatch to the regression model, which suggests a better fit between the data and the regression model after including status mismatch. In the first generation, on the other hand, the AIC also decreases but less strongly, and the BIC increases.

Regarding the variable "mismatch duration," the model fit statistics also support a stronger relationship with ethnic identity in the second generation. A comparison of the changes in the Pseudo- $R^2$  measures clearly suggests favouring the second-generation model. This is also the case for AIC and BIC. The decrease in AIC is stronger in the second generation. The more conservative BIC increases in both generations after including mismatch duration, rather disapproving another parametrisation by including mismatch duration. However, the other indices suggest otherwise. Besides, the increase in the second generation is marginal compared to the increase in the first generation.

Table 4-12: Intergenerational comparison of change in model fit by separately including status mismatch and duration of status mismatch

Indices	First generation		Second generation		Change in indices
	1) Variable excluded	2) Variable included	1) Variable excluded	2) Variable included	
<i>Variable "status mismatch"</i>					
LR-test: 2) nested in 1)		$\chi^2(3) = 23.84, p = 0.000$		$\chi^2(3) = 34.61, p = 0.000$	
McFadden's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.142	0.156	+ 0.014	0.054	+ 0.012
McFadden's adjusted Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.086	0.096	+ 0.010	0.029	+ 0.009
Nagelkerke's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.300	0.324	+ 0.024	0.137	+ 0.028
AIC	1560.166	1542.329	- 17.837	2826.388	- 28.613
BIC (df)	1784.058 (48)	1780.213 (51)	+ 3.845	2993.440 (33)	- 13.426
<i>Variable "mismatch duration"</i>					
LR-test: 2) nested in 1)		$\chi^2(9) = 30.06, p = 0.000$		$\chi^2(9) = 62.85, p = 0.000$	
McFadden's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.142	0.160	+ 0.018	0.064	+ 0.022
McFadden's adjusted Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.086	0.093	+ 0.007	0.035	+ 0.015
Nagelkerke's Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.300	0.331	+ 0.031	0.160	+ 0.051
AIC	1560.166	1548.109	- 12.057	2826.388	- 44.852
BIC (df)	1784.058 (48)	1813.980 (57)	+ 29.922	2994.148 (42)	+ 0.708
Observations	784	784		1,167	

Note: LR-tests based on estimations without robust standard errors.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.


## Status mismatch and ethnic identity across levels of educational qualification

In the third step, I address the question whether the role status mismatch for migrants' ethnic identity differs across levels of educational qualification. For this purpose, I allow the effect of status mismatch on ethnic identity to vary across levels of educational qualification. Figure 4-9 visualises the results for first- and second-generation migrants separately. Table 4-13 basically contains the same information as Figure 4-9 along with tests for whether the effect of status mismatch significantly differs between migrants with different educational qualifications.

In the first generation, there are similar effects of status mismatch on ethnic identity across levels of educational qualification, except for no/weak identity. Hence, the assumption H2.6 from Table 4-8 finds some support in the first generation. The left plot in Figure 4-9 illustrates that the probability to show separated identity slightly decreases the higher migrants' educational qualification. However, Table 4-13 reveals that this negative trend is statistically non-significant. Figure 4-9 further shows hardly any differences in the probability to show assimilated identity across levels of educational qualification. Table 4-13 corroborates this finding as the effects of status mismatch on assimilated identity do not substantially differ across levels of education. There are also no systematic and statistically significant educational differences in the effect of status mismatch on the probability to show dual identity. However, Figure 4-9 reveals a comparably large effect of status mismatch on the probability to generally refrain from ethnic identification for migrants with very high educational qualification. Table 4-13 shows that this effect of status mismatch is significantly larger than the mismatch effects for migrants with intermediate educational qualifications ( $p < 0.1$ ) and high educational qualifications ( $p < 0.01$ ).

In the second generation, there are similar but more pronounced educational differences in the effect of status mismatch on ethnic identity. Thus, H2.6 finds stronger support in the second generation, which also aligns with H2.5. The right plot in Figure 4-9 exhibits a comparably small effect of status mismatch on separated identity for migrants with high and very high educational qualifications. Table 4-13 reveals that both effects are significantly smaller than the effect of status mismatch for migrants with intermediate educational qualification ( $p < 0.01$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ). There are no significant educational differences in status-mismatched migrants' probability to show assimilated identity. The same is the case for the probability to show dual identity. Figure 4-9 illustrates that the probabilities are similar across levels of educational qualification. With respect to no/weak ethnic identity, however, Figure 4-9 demonstrates growing mismatch effects the higher migrants' educational qualification. Table 4-13 shows that the effect of status mismatch for migrants with an intermediate educational qualification is significantly smaller than the effect for migrants with high educational qualifications ( $p < 0.05$ ) and very high educational qualifications ( $p < 0.01$ ). The difference in the effect between migrants with high and very high educational qualification is non-significant, despite the clearly visible trend depicted in Figure 4-9.

Figure 4-9: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for status-mismatched migrants: Does ethnic identity differ with across levels of educational qualification?



Note:  $N = 666$  first- and 1,126 second-generation migrants. Estimates based on generation-specific multinomial logistic regressions with robust standard errors. The model includes same covariates as those in Table 4-10 and Table 4-11. Results are shown in predicted probabilities. For each level of educational qualification, summarising the predicted probabilities of all ethnic identity types results in 100 percent.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

Table 4-13: Ethnic identity of status-mismatched migrants: Testing differences between levels of educational qualification

Ethnic identity	(a) inter- mediate	(b) high	(c) very high	Contrasts between qualifications
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>				
Separated	0.560	0.547	0.499	
Assimilated	0.035	0.054	0.036	
Dual	0.319	0.356	0.286	
No/weak	0.086	0.043	0.180	+ (a) and (c) ** (b) and (c)
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>				
Separated	0.261	0.125	0.114	* (a) and (b) ** (a) and (c)
Assimilated	0.309	0.281	0.296	
Dual	0.158	0.154	0.104	
No/weak	0.272	0.440	0.485	* (a) and (b) ** (a) and (c)

\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ .

Note: Columns 2 to 4 report status-mismatch effects in terms of predicted probabilities. The last column reports which effects on ethnic identity are significantly different from each other across levels of educational qualification.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

#### 4.3.4 Discussion

This second analysis addressed the question whether status mismatch, i.e. having a higher educational qualification than formally required for the current job, plays a role for migrants' ethnic identity. Empirical research shows that migrants' ethnic identity is affected if they perceive to be treated unequally and unfairly compared to majority members. The present analysis contributes to this strand of research by investigating whether this is also the case for status mismatch.

I provide empirical evidence for the effect of status mismatch on migrants' ethnic identity. Thereby, I investigate potential differences between first- and second-generation migrants. Also, I explore whether status mismatch contributes to explaining the integration paradox. In this regard, higher educated migrants' ethnic identity could be more sensitive to influences of experienced status mismatch than lower educated migrants' ethnic identity. The findings suggest that status mismatch indeed plays an important role for migrants' ethnic identity. The relationship between status mismatch and ethnic identity strongly depends on the duration of status mismatch, on migrants' generation status and varies across levels of educational qualification.

Regarding first-generation migrants, I find support for the argument that status mismatch evokes feelings of relative deprivation. Status mismatch not only negatively affects migrants'

majority identity but also positively affects their minority identity. Compared to non-mismatched first-generation migrants, this results in lower probabilities of assimilated identity and dual identity on the one side, and in higher probabilities of separated identity on the other side. Status mismatch thus poses a situation in which identification with these ethnic groups can be mutually exclusive.

However, additional analyses suggest that the influence of status mismatch is rather short-termed and mainly affects first-generation migrants who have recently entered status mismatch. The emerging pattern with increasing mismatch duration is dominated by reversing the initial effects, reducing the differences between non-mismatched and status-mismatched migrants with longer mismatch duration. This decrease likely points to an integration process into the majority group. This is best exemplified by the subsequent decrease in the likelihood for separated identity and the increase in the probability of dual identity. The changes are mirror-inverted, indicating that they are mainly owed to an increase in status-mismatched migrants' majority identity. It thus seems that status mismatch loses its relevance for first-generation migrants' emotional identification over time. This finding refutes the idea that relatively unfavourable situations in the labour market generally lead migrants onto paths that impair their emotional integration into the receiving society in the long term (Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997).

It needs to be mentioned that the observed reverse effects could partly result out of a selection effect. mismatched migrants of the first generation could be particularly prone to return to their society of origin if they equate their status discrepancy with failing at implementing their migration plans. For example, it is probable that particularly status-mismatched migrants with separated identity return as they did not manage to emotionally engage with the majority group. But it is less clear whether such a selection effect would apply to migrants with separated and dual identity or to only one of these groups. On the other hand, it could also be the case that remigration rather happens in the non-mismatched group since non-mismatched migrants are likely those who realise their migration plans and may thus be more likely to end their stay abroad and return home successfully. The issue of remigration needs to be addressed in the future, for example with the help of specific samples of emigrants and recent return migrants who share the same society of origin and receiving society (see for example the recently launched *German Emigration and Remigration Panel Study* by Ette et al. (2020)).

The findings for second-generation migrants echo with those for first-generation migrants in the sense that they also support the argument of relative deprivation. I observe effects of status mismatch on second-generation migrants' ethnic identity that indicate mutual exclusiveness of minority and majority identity. Accordingly, while separated identity is more likely among mismatched than among non-mismatched migrants, assimilated identity is less likely.

Further analyses reveal that these findings are most pronounced in the short term, that is, in the first year after second-generation migrants entered status mismatch. After this initial period, the emerging patterns among mismatched migrants of the second generation also resemble that of an integration process into the majority group: while the probability of assimilated identity strongly increases, the probability of separated identity decreases. Simultaneously, the probability of dual identity begins to decrease as well. Together, these results support the idea of classical assimilation theory, pointing to a shift from minority to majority identification over time.

However, the picture drawn by the findings for the second generation is more complex than that in the first generation as it also supports the argument of social deprivation. Thus, the results not only reveal pronounced short term and reversible effects of status mismatch on second-generation migrants' ethnic identity but also signs of lasting effects. Second-genera-

tion migrants' probability to generally refrain from ethnic identifications increases with increasing mismatch duration. This result lines up with segmented assimilation theory, which argues for persisting feelings of relative deprivation among second-generation migrants and which points to second-generation migrants' struggle of meeting familial expectations of social mobility (Portes/Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994). In this regard, mismatched migrants of the second generation do not only feel deprived compared to majority members. They have also disappointed their and their families' expectations for upward mobility or status maintenance, which also increases the risk of withdrawal from their family and with it from the minority group.

The analysis reveals that status mismatch plays a more important role for second-generation migrants' ethnic identity than is the case for first-generation migrants. This is less surprising given the more pronounced short- and long-termed effects of status mismatch on ethnic identity among second-generation migrants. The finding is in line with the idea that mismatched migrants of the second generation feel more deprived compared to majority members than the arguably more optimistic first-generation migrants. However, the argument of relative deprivation only seems applicable from a short-term perspective.

Much more important is the support for the argument of an increased risk of social deprivation among mismatched migrants of the second generation, as this seems to be more relevant from a long-term perspective. The risk of social deprivation is comparably small among mismatched migrants of the first generation because they can better compensate their status discrepancies. First-generation migrants likely experience higher income than in their society of origin despite status mismatch. The income increase provides them comfort and approval by their minority members, particularly if this enables migrants to provide their non-migrated family members or other relevant others with financial support.

Lastly, I find that status mismatch varies in its effect on ethnic identity depending on migrants' educational qualification. The first arguments posit great sensitivity to unmet expectations of equal treatment and greater fear for status loss at higher levels of educational qualification, resulting in stronger emotional reactions of status-mismatched migrants with comparably high levels of educational qualification. The second argument posits higher educated individuals to pursue more effective coping strategies for dealing with negative feelings related to status mismatch. The educational differences are similar in both migrant generations and show strong support for the first arguments, thus providing another explanation for the integration paradox (see also Analysis 1).

Support for the first arguments are provided by the higher probability to generally refrain from ethnic identification among status-mismatched migrants with higher than with lower educational qualifications. I find this educational difference in both migrant generations but to a greater extent among second-generation migrants. In the second generation, it refers to status-mismatched migrants with high educational qualifications (i.e. bachelor's degree) and very high educational qualifications (i.e. master's degree or doctorate's degree). In the first generation, only status-mismatched migrants with very high educational qualifications show a comparably higher probability to generally refrain from ethnic identification. This inter-generational difference could reflect mismatched migrants of the second generation' greater struggle to cope with (familial) expectations. Strong support for this assumption is given by the striking finding that the decrease in separated identity mirrors the increase in no/weak identity. The mirror effect suggests an identity trade-off, i.e. a loss in connection to the minority group which cannot be replaced, resulting in social deprivation and a general reduction in ethnic identification.

Overall, the present analysis contributes by examining the role of status mismatch for migrants' ethnic identity. The results forward the assumption that status mismatch initially evokes feelings of relative deprivation compared to majority members, which positively



affects migrants' minority and negatively affects their majority identity. Furthermore, the findings support the assumption that status mismatch increases the risk of social deprivation and thereby emotional withdrawal from both groups. This is observed in the long run, for second-generation migrants in particular, and at higher educational level. With respect to the last point, the findings also contribute to explaining the integration paradox.

#### **4.4 Analysis 3: Exposure time, ethnic identity and the role of status**

The third analysis investigates the relationship between exposure time and ethnic identity from an intergenerational perspective and thereby addresses status differences. Besides status, exposure time can be considered as the other variable of paramount significance to assimilation theorists. Exposure time is part of one of the core assumptions of classical assimilation theory, which is also referred to as the "mainstream assimilation" Hypothesis. It posits that with increasing exposure time, the majority of the migrant population orients less towards the minority group and stronger towards the majority group (Alba 2008). Exposure time is often used to explain assimilation across migrant generations, which is one of the most prominent and consistent findings of assimilation research (Alba/Nee 1997). There is also empirical evidence for migrants' increasing integration within migrant generations. Studies showed that with increasing exposure time, first- and particularly second-generation migrants tend to identify less with the minority and more with the majority group (e.g. Casey/Dustmann 2010; Esser 2009; Platt 2014).

As is the case for status, the principal argument of classical assimilation theory why assimilation takes place over time is also a resource argument: different time points and status levels indicate differences in origin- and particularly destination-specific resources and thus reflect the stage of migrants' assimilation process. Accordingly, assimilation theorists typically argue that over time, lower-status migrants integrate slower into the majority group compared to higher-status migrants (Alba/Nee 1997; Gans 2007). Since assimilation is considered a general process that penetrates social, structural, cultural and emotional dimensions of integration (Esser 1980), the argument of accelerated assimilation also includes the realm of ethnic identity.

However, higher-status migrants may not always show a change in their ethnic identity over exposure time that resembles a faster assimilation process compared to their lower-status counterparts. In fact, it is possible that there are no differences at all or that some higher-status migrants even show slower assimilation than their lower-status counterparts. Specifically, there could be intergenerational differences in lower- and higher-status migrants' pace of such a presumed assimilation process that support such claims. Theoretical work on the evolution of differences between social groups over time provides a valuable template for formulating assumptions about differences between lower- and higher-status migrants' assimilation with increasing exposure time in both generations (Kratz et al. 2018; O'Rand 2006, 1996; Yang 2008). This body of literature suggests cumulative or compensating effects that would either indicate changing, stable or no differences between lower- and higher-status migrants' ethnic identity with increasing exposure time. The aim of Analysis 3 is to develop arguments in support for these various exposure effects and to explore the related scenarios of whether and how status differences in ethnic identity show up over different exposure time points in the first and second generation.

#### 4.4.1 *An intergenerational perspective on exposure time and ethnic identity*

As a starting point, it is useful to assume that with increasing exposure time, the chance to identify in an assimilated way increases for the majority of the migrant population. Following the underlying logic of classical assimilation theory, one would intuitively expect that the probability of separated, dual, and no/weak identity decreases the longer migrants' exposure time. In the following, I treat the assumption of mainstream assimilation over exposure time as the "model trend" and discuss how it may develop for the groups under considerations or how the respective groups could deviate from it.

Identifying in an assimilated way implies a shift from minority- to majority-group favouritism. In migration research, this translates into first- and second-generation migrants' high motivation to change their social and material circumstances (Alba 2008; Gans 2007). Changing social and material circumstances usually requires the acquisition of skills and knowledge. In the receiving society, the most useful and valuable skills and knowledge that bring about the greatest improvement in social and material circumstances are destination-specific, such as majority language skills and knowledge about how status achievement, daily life and the local government function. According to assimilation theorists, the overlap of well-being maximisation and usefulness of destination-specific resources has the effect that over time, assimilation always occurs at least to some extent. With increasing exposure time, the time and opportunities for investments to realise goals on the path to more well-being increase and so does the cultural, social and economic ties to the receiving society (e.g. Massey 1986). The increased familiarity with customs, language and social norms in the receiving society enables better adaptation, integration and eventually increased approval by majority members and comfort among them. Overall, the majority context grows in subjective importance for securing migrants' well-being, increasing their emotional tie to the majority group (Esser 2009).

At the same time, the importance of the minority context for migrants' well-being is assumed to decrease. Minority contexts are often very small and can additionally be scattered across different regions in the receiving society, mostly resulting in a low degree of institutional completeness. Minority contexts are thus limited in their opportunities for achieving desired life changes, which is why investments in a life within a minority context are deemed less promising and less attractive, often reflecting a worse alternative or second choice by migrants (Alba 2008).

Considering the parallelism of the switch in group favouritism among migrant family members (although to various degrees) and the increasing independence from minority group members the greater the adaptation to the receiving society, an erosion of emotional ties to the minority group is argued to eventually occur.

From the perspective of mainstream assimilation, discrimination matters as well. However, its impact is discussed in the sense that it slows down rather than halts the assimilation process of the majority of the migrant population (Alba 2005; Gordon 1964). In this regard, increased exposure to majority members is ultimately viewed in the sense of Allport (1954), namely as a means to overcome or reduce prejudices and stereotypes in the long run.

#### Intergenerational differences

There are two reasons to expect that the presumed assimilation trend over exposure time differs between first- and second-generation migrants. While the first argument implies general intergenerational differences in migrants' ethnic identity across exposure time, the second argument highlights differences regarding separated and dual identity in particular.

First, and most importantly, second-generation migrants on average have an advantage in exposure time over first-generation migrants since the former are born in the receiving society. As a result, exposure begins earlier in life for second-generation migrants. The relatively earlier exposure of most second-generation migrants is crucial for a faster integration into the majority group. At younger age, individuals are generally more efficient in language learning (Chiswick/Miller 2001; Long 1990; Newport 1990), providing young migrants with an advantage compared to first-generation migrants who arrive after adolescence (Kristen et al. 2016). Moreover, migrants who go through the education system in the receiving society experience structured learning of the majority language and systematic accumulation of knowledge that is deemed necessary to understand systemic and social processes in the receiving society, promoting feelings of adaptation and comfort. Young migrants also have regular interactions with teachers and majority peers, which provide important opportunities to learn early about dominant social norms and values.

A second reason why the assimilation trend over exposure time differs between first- and second-generation migrant populations is the higher probability of remigration among first-generation migrants. Classic explanations why first-generation migrants return can be broadly distinguished into two strands of literature. While arguments within both strands agree upon the necessity of a pronounced feeling of belongingness to the minority group, ties with non-migrated individuals and minority language skills for returning home, they disagree regarding remigration motives. While the first strand relates remigration to problems in the receiving society, the second strand relates remigration to opportunities in the society of origin.

With respect to the first strand, the chance of remigration among first-generation migrants is argued to increase if expectations about economic returns and general life in receiving society are unmet (Borjas 1994). For example, first-generation migrants may stand before limited or blocked opportunities because their educational qualifications are not recognised. There is empirical evidence that the probability of remigration is positively associated with unfavourable labour market conditions such as unemployment or part-time employment (Constant/Massey 2002; Gundel/Peters 2008; Kuhlenkasper/Steinhardt 2012) and with experiences of discrimination (Kunuroglu et al. 2018).

However, not all remigrants are assumed to have failed in the receiving society. With respect to the second strand, Borjas (1994) notes that migrants may perceive remigration as a more valuable option to increase their economic returns and living conditions compared to settling down in the receiving society for good (see also de Haas et al. 2015). Often, remigrants have never planned to settle down in the receiving society (Bonacich 1973). Initially, they emigrated to accumulate financial resources for supporting their non-migrated family members and to build up a better life for themselves in their society of origin. These migrants are highly motivated to maintain minority language skills as well as social ties and status back home, making remigration worthwhile from the start of their initial emigration.

In relation to the second strand, remigration has also been discussed to be related to changing structural conditions in the society of origin (Cassarino 2004). Since initial emigration is usually considered as a strategy to improve personal living conditions, societal changes that make living in the origin society more attractive (e.g. economic development, peace, change of government) can also trigger the decision to remigrate.

With respect to ethnic identity, remigration likely causes a selection effect in the part of migrant population that decides to stay in the receiving society. First and foremost, this is because remigration is associated with increased minority identity. However, there is an important difference between migrants who remigrate due to problems in the receiving society and those who return because of opportunities in the society of origin. While the former hardly get a chance to develop belongingness with the majority group, the latter does. In correspondence with this argument, Diehl and Liebau (2015) found in their SOEP-based

study on remigration intentions and behaviour of first-generation Turks between 1984 and 2001 that those with return intentions identified more strongly with Turks than those without return intentions. In addition, Turks with return intentions did not feel more discriminated and did not identify less with Germans than those with intentions to stay. They explained this finding by improved economic opportunities in Turkey, thus joining Kuhlenkasper and Steinhardt (2012) in their conclusion concerning increased remigration rates among first-generation Turks in Germany after the year 2000.

To conclude, remigrants are either characterised by separated or dual identity, which likely promotes a selection effect over exposure time among stayer migrants towards no/weak and assimilated identity.

### Expectations

Overall, the theoretical considerations about the beginning and length of exposure from the previous section suggest a pattern of ethnic identity probabilities over exposure time that resembles a faster assimilation trend in the second compared to the first generation. With respect to separated and assimilated identity in the first generation, a potential decrease and increase in assimilated identity may be reinforced by an increasing proportion of return migrants with separated or dual identity across exposure time. The first two hypotheses state that

- H3.1** The longer the exposure time, the lower the probability to show separated identity in both generations, but lower in the first generation
- H3.2** The longer the exposure time, the higher the probability to show assimilated identity in both generations, but higher in the second generation

From a long-term assimilation perspective, dual identity most likely reflects a transitory mode indicating a change from separated to assimilated identity with increasing exposure time (also see Section 2.3.6). The observable trajectory should be n-shaped. The decrease in the n-shaped trajectory is expected to be more pronounced than its initial increase. This is because the longer the exposure time, the higher the expected proportion of return migrants with dual identity and the smaller the proportion of migrants with dual identity (because they transition to assimilated identity). For first-generation migrants, it can be expected that

- H3.3b** Across exposure time, the probability to show dual identity first increases and then decreases in the first generation

The transitory character of dual identity should also be visible in the second generation. However, since second-generation migrants are more distanced to the minority group than first-generation migrants and experience comparably early majority exposure, the trend of dual identity probability described for the first generation should happen earlier and faster for second-generation migrants. Given that the present sample covers migrants aged 25 to 65, I only expect to observe a decline in dual identity probability of second-generation migrants.

- H3.3a** The longer the exposure time, the lower the probability to show dual identity in the second generation

From a long-term assimilation perspective, one may intuitively expect that the probability of no/weak identity should decrease with increasing exposure time, while assimilated identity

should become more likely. However, a decreasing probability of no/weak identity is unlikely to be observed in the first generation.

With respect to first-generation migrants, the probability of no/weak identity should be generally low in the first years of exposure, as first-generation migrants are generally strongly oriented towards the minority group. Consequently, the probability of no/weak identity can only remain stable or increase the longer first-generation migrants' exposure time. The odds are thereby against first-generation migrants, meaning that the probability to refrain from ethnic identification should increase the longer their exposure time. As classical assimilation theory suggests, first-generation migrants also emotionally detach themselves from the group of origin with increasing exposure time in the receiving society, though on a slower pace than second-generation migrants (see also the discussion in the following Section 4.4.2). The advancing emotional detachment from the minority group does not automatically indicate that migrants start to identify with the majority group. Migrants could feel less compatible with majority members or experience discrimination and rejection by majority members. As a consequence, first-generation migrants' risk of social deprivation is most likely to increase rather than to remain stable over exposure time. Furthermore, an increase in the probability to refrain from ethnic identification across exposure time in the first generation is likely reinforced by returning migrants with separated and dual identity. I therefore expect that

**H3.4a** The longer the exposure time, the higher the probability of no/weak identity in the first generation

Second-generation migrants, in turn, are confronted early with the struggle of living between two cultural worlds with distinct expectations (Rumbaut 2005). Their probability of no/weak identity should thus be relatively high in earlier exposure years when they are young and embedded in given structures such as the education system and the family, where social control is high and where social interactions are largely predetermined. The probability of no/weak identity should decrease with increasing exposure time, when second-generation migrants start to become more autonomous and decide for themselves with whom they interact. Accordingly, I expect that

**H3.4b** The longer the exposure time, the lower the probability of no/weak identity in the second generation

Table 4-14: Schematic overview of hypotheses about the change in ethnic identity probabilities with increasing exposure time, for the first and second generation

Hypothesis	Separated	Assimilated	Dual	No/weak
H3.1	↘   ↘			
H3.2		↗   ↗↗		
H3.3a   H3.3b			↗ ↘   ↘	
H3.4a   H3.4b				↗   ↘

Note: The arrows (↗ | ↘) in the cells indicate increased and decreased ethnic identity probabilities. Two arrows with same directions indicate a comparably stronger increase or decrease than one arrow.


Source: Author's own representation.

#### 4.4.2 Cumulative (dis)advantages? Identity differences between lower- and higher-status migrants over exposure time

The resource argument of classical assimilation theory suggests that higher-status migrants' ethnic identity should assimilate faster than that of their lower-status counterparts. This argument resembles a Matthew effect: migrants primarily accumulate destination-specific resources over time and as time passes, higher-status migrants who accumulate more resources extend their advantage over their lower-status counterparts. Such a development resonates with theoretical considerations about cumulative advantage/disadvantage over time. In essence the cumulation argument suggests that inequalities between groups diverge across time (O'Rand 2006, 1996).

Cumulative (dis)advantage theory has found application in research about the development of group differences in happiness over the life course (Kratz et al. 2018; Yang 2008). In addition to the divergence scenario, this research has reasoned about additional scenarios. Consequently, it has formulated three distinct hypotheses. These three hypotheses reflect three different scenarios, which are illustrated in Figure 4-10 by using the example of assimilated identity and its potential change across exposure time. The first scenario suggests diverging trajectories, indicating an increase in group differences over time. The second scenario suggests converging trajectories and decreasing group differences over time. The third scenario proposes stability, meaning that group trajectories develop parallelly.

Figure 4-10: Three possible scenarios of lower- and higher-status migrants' change in assimilated identity across exposure time



Source: Author's own representation, adapted from (Kratz et al. 2018).

As implied by Figure 4-10, the hypotheses can be applied to explore status differences in the presumed assimilation process of migrants' ethnic identity over exposure time. After all, it is reasonable to assume that there may be alternative outcomes to divergence since migrants' assimilation does not only depend on their destination-specific resources.

## Divergence

Divergence suggests evolving status differences between lower- and higher-status migrants' ethnic identity with increasing exposure time. In early years of exposure, status differences should thus be small or non-existent. As noted previously, the divergence scenario aligns with the mainstream assumption that with increasing exposure time, higher-status migrants should assimilate faster than lower-status migrants.

There is reason to expect a divergence scenario in the first generation, but less so in the second generation. This is because in contrast to first-generation migrants, second-generation migrants have the advantage of early majority exposure which could render later status advantages obsolete. As noted in the previous section, younger individuals are generally more efficient in learning things and they have the advantage of structured learning in the education system. Thus, before status position in society crystallises and consolidates, second-generation migrants may have already accumulated a crucial amount of resources and gathered many experiences to set strong incentives for future engagement with majority and minority members. Status-related advantages that evolve later on and often result in cumulative advantages might therefore become less important. These status-related advantages include the amount cognitive resources, opportunities to interact with majority members, to accumulate destination-specific resources, and to consume majority-cultural goods. In contrast to higher-status migrants of the second generation, higher-status migrants of the first generation could benefit from these cumulative advantages.

Cognitive resources accumulate the longer one's education endures, as intellectual training continues. The resulting higher efficiency of higher-status migrants reduces the time within which specific resources are accumulated and mentally organised in a way that makes them readily available and thus more useful. In this regard, advantages in cognitive resources may fasten majority language learning of higher-status compared to lower-status first-generation migrants after adolescence (Dollmann et al. 2020). It is thereby argued that language learning is positively influenced by pronounced problem-solving mechanisms (DeKeyser 2000) and the availability of cognitive learning strategies (Bley-Vroman 1989). Contact and consumption opportunities that fasten integration into the majority group are often argued to be strongly dependent on educational qualifications and jobs (e.g. Diehl et al. 2016a). Better education and jobs are assumed to fasten migrants' economic and residential mobility (Alba/Nee 1997). This may increase the speed at which higher-status migrants adapt to majority-cultural lifestyles (Gans 2007). They are more often confronted with such lifestyles and are more likely to afford them. As opportunities unfold, the chances for majority-cultural input cumulate. For example, being exposed to contact-intensive majority language environments increases majority language proficiency (Dollmann et al. 2020). Language proficiency, on the other hand, increases migrants' understanding of values and norms, and gives access to majority-cultural knowledge, facilitating further contact situations and increasing their success (Esser 2009).

Right after migration, opportunities are often limited for first-generation migrants regardless of whether they migrated with a relatively low or high status. In the context of the divergence scenario, however, higher-status first-generation migrants can be expected to overcome initial hardships faster compared to their lower-status counterparts, which would further contribute to a fastening assimilation process among higher-status migrants.

The previous argumentation claimed the existence of a divergence effect that indicates a faster assimilation process for first-generation migrants with higher status. However, there is also an argument in support for a divergence effect indicating a faster assimilation process for first-generation migrants with lower status.

A faster assimilation process of lower-status migrants with increasing exposure time may be possible because of status differences in the persistence of a so-called "dual-frame-of-

reference effect” in the first generation. The notion of “dual frame of reference” relates to a first-generation phenomenon where migrants compare their situation and opportunities in the receiving society with past experiences they made in the society of origin (Suarez-Orozco 1987). In the literature, the dual frame of reference is used to highlight migrants’ positive evaluation of their current situation. In this regard, the dual frame of reference is related to the argument of immigrant optimism, which posits that first-generation migrants draw a comparably more optimistic picture of their situation in the receiving society because they compare themselves with non-migrated peers (see also Section 4.2.1).

After migration, the salience of the home-country frame of reference allows lower- and higher-status migrants to perceive themselves being in a relatively better status position than before migration. They often profit from a comparably higher income (despite a possibly lower occupational position) and more comprehensive social benefits. As a consequence, they may appreciate the opportunities they were provided in the receiving society and react positively and favourably to the receiving society and its majority members, setting in motion an assimilation process.

However, empirical research suggests that the dual-frame-of-reference effect (or immigrant optimism) weakens the longer first-generation migrants’ exposure in the receiving society (Röder/Mühlau 2012). It is argued that the longer their exposure time, the less salient “the home-country frame of reference will become as memories of the past fade, [and] contacts with the home country become more sparse” (ebd. p. 779). With declining optimism over exposure time, first-generation migrants increasingly turn their attention to the receiving society and begin to evaluate their situation in comparison to majority members. First-generation migrants may then start to perceive that their situation is comparably less favourable than they previously thought. Such a realisation process could promote deprivation experiences (as often discussed for the second generation), promoting a decrease in majority identity and slowing down the assimilation process with increasing exposure time.

Optimism could diminish more rapidly among higher-status migrants, while it may be more persistent for lower-status migrants. Eventually, this time lag may cause a diverging effect regarding the presumed assimilation process of lower- and higher-status first-generation migrants. A low status immediately after migration likely lowers migrants’ expectations about chances for status achievement in the receiving society. In this regard, the offspring should be particularly important for first-generation migrants with lower status. They develop high hopes for the future of their children, emphasising the stark contrast between opportunities they lacked in the society of origin and opportunities the receiving society provides to their children (Relikowski et al. 2012; Suarez-Orozco 1987: 291). As a consequence, the home-country frame of reference and a comparably positive evaluation of the receiving society may prevail for lower-status first-generation migrants until their children are old enough to pursue and realise their status goals. If first-generation parents realise that their children fail, the positive picture of the receiving society may persist, nevertheless. The disappointment could then focus on the children failing to take advantage of the provided opportunities that have been worked towards as a family.

In contrast, optimism could diminish more rapidly among first-generation migrants with higher status. As discussed previously, first-generation migrants with higher status likely have advantages that facilitate integration into the majority group. Integration is usually argued to increase similarities between migrants and majority members. This should have the effect that higher-status migrants start earlier to increasingly compare themselves with majority members. As a consequence, optimism could disappear early among higher-status first-generation migrants as attention is drawn to ethnic inequalities in treatment and life chances and awareness of individual disadvantages is increased.



In contrast to the arguments in support for a faster assimilation process for first-generation migrants with higher status, their potentially faster decline in immigrant optimism emphasises the potential downside of their increased integration chances. With respect to the presumed assimilation process over exposure time, lower-status migrants could eventually end up assimilating faster over exposure time than their higher-status counterparts.

### Convergence

Convergence suggests initial status differences between lower- and higher-status migrants' ethnic identity which decrease the longer migrants' exposure time. If resources are crucial for how migrants' assimilation process develops over time, the convergence scenario suggests that the relative resource advantage of higher-status migrants disappears with increasing exposure time. That is, the assimilation process of higher-status migrants somehow slows down over exposure time and/or lower-status migrants' assimilation process accelerates with increasing exposure time so that they catch up with their higher-status counterparts.

Assuming a convergence scenario in the second generation is possible, but it is less reasonable to assume it in the first generation. In the first generation, lower- and higher-status migrants can be expected to be rather equal with respect to their integration efforts, integration experiences, and integration status in the receiving society immediately after migration.<sup>14</sup> Thus, there should be no substantial initial status difference regarding their level of assimilation, which is the prerequisite to assume a convergence scenario.

The case is different for second-generation migrants. Since the underlying sample of this study contains adult migrants aged 25 to 65, I cannot observe second-generation migrants' exposure years under 25. But it is possible that status-related advantages regarding the assimilation process in the second generation may have emerged before the 25<sup>th</sup> year of exposure through differences in years of education and first job experiences. A convergence Hypothesis for the second generation can be discussed in light of the theoretical considerations and findings from Analysis 1. In Analysis 1, I introduced the integration paradox and with it the argument that issues related to discrimination are particularly prevalent among higher-status migrants (see Section 4.2.2). Correspondingly, the descriptive results of Analysis 1 revealed that with increasing status levels, migrants tended to feel uncomfortable among majority members more often (see Table 4-4). Importantly, the reports were most frequent among higher-status migrants from the second generation.

Over time, higher-status migrants' issues related to discrimination may continue to occur and turn into self-fulfilling prophecies in the long run. That is, continuous perceptions of unequal treatment and ethnic inequalities lower expectations about beneficial outcomes of future social interactions and future policy changes that tackle inequalities (Röder/Mühlau 2011). As a result, particularly higher-status migrants could have increasingly less confidence in majority members and institutions and, relatedly, become less affected by positive experiences in the receiving society over time. Thus, potential advantages regarding the pace of assimilation among higher-status second-generation migrants could diminish over time, providing their lower-status counterparts the opportunity to catch up.

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<sup>14</sup> There are of course factors that influence initial integration status. However, they are unlikely to differ significantly between status groups. This may refer to factors such as cultural distance to the receiving society, majority language learning in the society of origin (Kristen et al. 2016), and pre-migration contact to majority members through their stay abroad or through one's family.

## Stability

Stability suggests that lower- and higher-status migrants' ethnic identity exhibits similar patterns over the entire exposure time. This means that lower- and higher-status migrants' ethnic identity does not differ over exposure time or that status differences exist but remain stable with increasing exposure time. For example, stability can arise if divergence and convergence effects overlap (Kratz et al. 2018: 76). Stability may further be observed if two contrasting divergence effects overlap.

The latter situation could occur in the first generation, as resource advantages of higher-status migrants could be negated by a faster decline in immigrant optimism. This would bring about a parallelism in the presumed assimilation process of lower- and higher-status first-generation migrants. With respect to the second generation, I noted earlier that the early exposure of second-generation migrants could be so profound that it decreases the importance of status for mainstream assimilation. Regardless of whether second-generation migrants' experiences in their early exposure years during (pre)adolescence are positive or negative, they likely have a profound and lasting impact on the motivation for future investments in origin- and destination-specific social production functions, thus determining early—and independent of status—how allegiances and ethnic identity change in the future. In this regard, a stability scenario could be observable in the second generation.

## Expectations

Considering the arguments for all three scenarios, three hypotheses can be formulated. The hypotheses make assumptions about potential status differences with regard to proposed generation-specific changes of ethnic identity probabilities over exposure time that resemble an assimilation process (see Section 4.4.1). It is not expected that remigration affects status differences in migrants' ethnic identity since it is assumed that lower- and higher-status migrants alike have motives to return home.

- H3.5** The longer the exposure time, the more status differences in ethnic identity probabilities diverge in the first generation
- H3.6** The longer the exposure time, the more status differences in ethnic identity probabilities converge in the second generation
- H3.7** Status differences in ethnic identity probabilities are stable and thus not influenced by migrants' exposure time in both generations

Table 4-15: Schematic overview of hypotheses about how status differences in ethnic identity evolve with increasing exposure time


Hypothesis	Migrant generation	Status differences in ethnic identity probabilities with increasing exposure time
H3.5	1 <sup>st</sup>	diverging
H3.6	2 <sup>nd</sup>	converging
H3.7	1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup>	stable

Source: Author's own representation.

#### 4.4.3 Model specification and analytical strategy

Figure 4-11 depicts the set-up of the empirical model to analyse the relationship between migrants' exposure time, their status and ethnic identity. The analysis focuses on the relationships represented by the two bold arrows. Accordingly, the focus lies ① on ethnic identity probabilities over exposure time and ② on how status may influence this relationship. The dashed arrows depict the remaining relationships between the variables of interest and the covariates to reduce bias risk. The model is estimated for first- and second-generation migrants separately. The estimation samples include 848 first- and 1,246 second-generation migrants.

Figure 4-11: Empirical model set-up for analysing the relationship between migrants' exposure time, their status and ethnic identity



Note: Covariates in parentheses are only included in models for first-generation migrants.

Source: Author's own representation.

Both samples and model variables draw on cross-sectional data from the sixth starting cohort (SC6) of the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS). Information about the data is provided in Chapter 3. Since used variables are similar across Analyses 1 to 3, further information on variable operationalisation is not provided at this point. Details on the operationalisation of all variables can be found in Appendix A.

In Analysis 3, there are four variables of interest: The dependent variable *ethnic identity* is a result of cross-tabulating migrants' minority and majority identification in dichotomised form, using the median as cut-off criteria. The resulting dependent variable consists of four categories, one for each ethnic identity type. Migrants' *years of exposure* in the receiving society is a generation-specific variable. In the first generation, years of exposure is proxied by migrants' *residence duration*. It ranges from 0 to 65 years, while 0 depicts migrants who migrated less than a year ago. In the second generation, it is proxied by *age*, comprising migrants of age 25 to 65. The second explaining variable *status* is a dummy variable. It is based on migrants' highest educational qualification and depicts whether migrants at least have a Bachelor's (or equivalent) degree as highest educational qualification (= 1) or not (= 0). Proxying status by migrants' highest educational qualification is particularly useful in

analyses with temporal perspectives. For adult individuals like in the present sample, education is usually a more stable predictor of status over time than individuals' occupational position (Yang 2008). While the level of educational qualification is often determined after leaving the education system, occupational positions are more likely to change over time.<sup>15</sup> Although the present data is cross-sectional and therefore contains no information on individual status changes over exposure time, using migrants' highest educational qualification level is useful since differences in ethnic identity probabilities of different exposure time points will be interpreted as changes due to differences in exposure time.

The models further include covariates to reduce confounder bias. I control for migrants' *gender* and *cultural distance* to Germany. Scholars expect cultural distance to affect migrants' ethnic identity and their status (Berry 1997; Esser 2006). Two survey design factors are also considered in the estimations. This refers to self-reports of NEPS interviewers about *comprehension problems during the survey* and *NEPS interviewers' experience*, measured by their employment time in the survey institute. The models for the first generation control for additional covariates. These include migrants' *age at migration* and migrants' *time of their migration to Germany*, a variable with four categories to proxy migrant cohort. The latter is considered as a proxy for migrant cohort. All continuous variables that are used in the estimations are centred at their mean to deal with multicollinearity.

Table 4-16 reports descriptive statistics for first- and second-generation migrants across grouped years of exposure. To increase comparability across generations, I grouped first- and second-generation migrants into identical exposure categories if possible. This resulted in three categories in the first generation, the first comprising the majority of cases and ranging from below one year to 24 years of exposure in the receiving society. This category is unique to the first generation, as observed years of exposure in the second generation start at 25 years. The remaining two categories are identical in the first and second generation.

In sum, the descriptive results do not counter the assumption of mainstream assimilation over exposure time in both generations. First- and second-generation migrants in groups with more exposure years are better adapted to life in the receiving society. This is exemplified by the decreasing mean of unemployment across grouped years of exposure. Further, it is demonstrated by the increasing mean of self-reported proficiency in German and the decreasing mean of reports to feel uncomfortable among Germans in groups with more exposure years.

For first-generation migrants in particular, the table also reveals that migrants under 25 exposure years are on average better educated than migrants who are over 25 years in the receiving society. This suggests more recent immigration of higher skilled migrants (Kogan 2011). By comparing the means for education and ISEI across the exposure groups in the first generation, a disruptive picture emerges. The comparison reveals that the educational certificates are not automatically translated into equivalent occupational positions. It suggests that first-generation migrants initially struggle to achieve adequate educational returns in the labour market but that educational and occupational status could converge with increasing exposure time. However, such a converging effect across groups cannot be proven by only looking at the descriptive results. Table 4-16 shows that first-generation migrants in the groups with longer exposure immigrated at a younger age. Thus, it is likely that they profited more from early exposure advantages, from receiving country institutions that provide educational and vocational training and thus from a better preparation for the local labour market. In addition, it can be seen that first- and also second-generation migrants' cultural distance to Germany is smaller in groups with higher exposure years, which may also contribute to better adaptation of migrants with longer exposure.

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<sup>15</sup> Note that migrants who are still in vocational training are excluded from the estimation samples. See Chapter 3 for more information on the sampling procedure.

Table 4-16: Descriptive statistics for first- and second-generation migrants across years of exposure

	Min	Max	First generation			Second generation		
			0 to 24 years [57.5%]	25 to 40 [30.0]	41 to 65 [12.5]	25 to 40 [24.2]	41 to 65 [75.8]	
Residence duration (0 = below one year)	25	63	14	34	46			
Age (years)	25	65	40	50	56	33	52	
Female	0	1	0.53	0.57	0.54	0.54	0.53	
Unemployed	0	1	0.17	0.12	0.05	0.11	0.05	
Self-reported proficiency in German	0	5	3.64	4.04	4.45	4.81	4.96	
Feeling uncomfortable among Germans	0	1	0.38	0.37	0.29	0.56	0.52	
Education	0	3	1.61	1.35	1.42	1.59	1.69	
ISEI	0	88	35	40	46	47	50	
Age at migration (0 = below the age of one)	0	38	26	17	10			
Cultural distance	0.08	0.50	0.26	0.24	0.21	0.21	0.19	

Note: Years of exposure is proxied by residence duration in the first generation and by age in the second generation. The table reports variable means if not stated otherwise.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

In the following, the analytical strategy consists of two steps. First, I compare ethnic identity probabilities over exposure time between first- and second-generation migrants to address the first set of Hypotheses (H3.1 to H3.4b). Second, I address the second set of Hypotheses (H3.5 to H3.7). For this purpose, I interact migrants' exposure time with their status and analyse the joint effect on ethnic identity probabilities of both generations separately. Since the dependent variable "ethnic identity" has nominal categories, I employ multinomial logistic regression techniques and use robust standard errors.

#### 4.4.4 Findings

##### Intergenerational comparison of exposure time and ethnic identity

Figure 4-12 depicts the relationship between exposure time and ethnic identity for first-generation migrants (left plot) and for second-generation migrants (right plot). The analyses are based on cross-sectional data and thus exhibit ethnic identity probabilities of migrants with different exposure time. It is assumed that migrants remain in the receiving society, which is why changes in ethnic identity probabilities between migrants with different exposure time are interpreted as changes in exposure time.<sup>16</sup>

Overall, the findings for ethnic identity probabilities suggest an assimilation process over exposure time in both generations, which is particularly pronounced in the second generation. The findings are thus largely in line with the assumptions about generation-specific changes in ethnic identity probabilities with increasing exposure time. There is a stark decrease in separated identity with increasing exposure time in the first generation. The decrease over exposure time is less steep, but also noticeable in the second generation. Both trajectories are statistically highly significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). It is worth noting that the picture remains the same if we compare the same duration of exposure, i.e. 25 to 60 years, as indicated by the grey shaded areas.

Regarding assimilated identity, we observe an increase in probability over exposure time in both generations. The increase is stronger in the second than in the first generation, but statistically highly significant in both groups (first generation:  $p < 0.01$ ; second generation:  $p < 0.001$ ).

The probability to show dual identity over exposure time resembles an n-shaped distribution in the first generation. It initially increases considerably, peaks around an exposure time of 35 years and then decreases, but not as dramatically. In contrast, the probability to show dual identity gradually decreases with increasing exposure time in the second generation. The decrease in the second generation is statistically significant at the 1 percent alpha level ( $p < 0.01$ ). The initial increase and subsequent decrease in the first generation are statistically significant as well (increase from 0 to 35 years of exposure:  $p < 0.001$ ; decrease from 35 to 60 years of exposure:  $p < 0.05$ ).

A marked increase in the probability of no/weak identity with increasing exposure time can be observed in the first generation. In the second generation, no/weak identity seems to slightly decrease with increasing exposure time. However, the decrease is far from being statistically significant and rather suggests ethnic identity and exposure time to be unrelated. In contrast, the observed increase in the first generation is statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ).

To test the robustness of the results, I conducted additional analyses in which I investigated whether ethnic composition in the two samples and the size of migrant groups potentially affect the reported results. With respect to the first-generation model, I included dummy variables that controlled for the two largest migrant groups in the sample, migrants from Turkey and Poland. In the second-generation sample, the two largest migrant groups are migrants from the Czech

<sup>16</sup> Issues of potentially biasing effects are addressed in Sections 4.4.5 and 0.

Republic (including Slovakia and former Czechoslovakia) and Poland. Another analysis for each generation separately accounted for the three largest migrant groups in Germany, Turks, Russians and Poles, by including a dummy variable which controls whether migrants' families originated from one of the respective countries. Particularly for first-generation migrants, being part of a large migrant group may lower incentives to engage with the majority group. Migrant group size in the receiving society could thus be a biasing factor. However, controlling for abovementioned factors did not change interpretation of results.

#### Differences in ethnic identity over exposure time between lower- and higher-status migrants

Figure 4-13 exhibits probabilities of ethnic identity for lower- and higher-status first-generation migrants over exposure time in the receiving society. The first plot depicts probabilities of lower-status migrants. The second plot depicts probabilities of higher-status migrants. On the subsequent page, Figure 4-13 provides a close up of status differences in the exposure effects on ethnic identity between lower- and higher-status migrants for each ethnic identity type.

Overall, the findings for the first generation suggest a slightly faster assimilation process over exposure time for higher-status migrants. Thus, the results indicate support for the divergence Hypothesis. With respect to separated identity, the probabilities decrease similarly strong and at a similar level with increasing exposure time for lower- and higher-status migrants.


Diverging status differences can be observed regarding assimilated identity. While there is an increase in assimilated identity probability with increasing exposure time for lower- and higher-status migrants, the increase becomes comparably stronger for higher-status migrants around 35 years of exposure. Although the diverging group difference is relatively clear and amounts up to almost 20 percentage points, the difference remains statistically non-significant. This is likely owed to the few observations in this category.

Diverging group differences are also observed for dual identity. Its probability with increasing exposure time takes the form of an n-shaped trajectory for lower- and higher-status migrants. The first two plots thereby reveal that the curve is flatter for higher-status migrants, which corresponds to the stronger increase in the probability to show assimilated identity. Eventually, the group difference is almost 20 percentage points. The diverging group differences after 30 years of exposure are either statistically significant at the 5 percent alpha level or close to this level (i.e. below the 10 percent alpha level).

A different picture emerges for no/weak identity. The probability to refrain from ethnic identification gradually increases among lower-status migrants. For higher-status migrants on the other hand, the probability to refrain from ethnic identification first increases comparably stronger compared to lower-status migrants, eventually resulting in a statistically significant status difference around 10 percentage points. The increase starts to weaken around 40 years of exposure and then flattens, which closes the status gap. The confidence intervals of this subsequent decrease are comparably large and cover large areas above and below the reference line as status differences disappeared.

As done previously for the intergenerational comparison, I checked with the same additional variables whether the models are sensitive to ethnic composition in the sample and migrant group size. Results suggest that this is not the case. The interpretation of results remains the same.

Figure 4-12: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for migrants with different years of exposure, by generation status



Note: The grey-shaded areas depict the same length of exposure. Estimates based on generation-specific multinomial logistic regressions with robust standard errors. Results are shown in predicted probabilities. For each depicted year of exposure, summarising the predicted probabilities of all ethnic identity types results in 100 percent.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.



Figure 4-13: Predicated probabilities of ethnic identity for lower- and higher-status migrants with different exposure years, first generation (figure continues over next page)





Figure 4-13: Predicated probabilities of ethnic identity for lower- and higher-status migrants with different exposure years, first generation (continued)



Note: Estimates based on one multinomial logistic regression model with robust standard errors. The two plots on the previous page show predicted probabilities of different exposure years. The plots on this page show differences in effects on ethnic identity probabilities (95%CI) between lower-status and higher-status migrants for each ethnic identity type. Lower-status migrants constitute the reference group, represented by the solid horizontal line at value zero.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

Turning to the second generation, Figure 4-14 contains their ethnic identity probabilities of lower- and higher-status positions over exposure time. The structure of the figure is identical to the one of Figure 4-13. The findings overall suggest a similar assimilation process for lower- and higher-status migrants, thus supporting the stability Hypothesis. However, there is also some indication for a slowdown in assimilation over exposure time among higher-status migrants, which corresponds to the convergence Hypothesis.

Figure 4-14: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for lower- and higher-status migrants with different exposure years, second generation (figure continues over next page)






Figure 4-14: Predicted probabilities of ethnic identity for lower- and higher-status migrants with different exposure years, second generation (continued)



Note: Estimates based on one multinomial logistic regression model with robust standard errors. The upper plots show predicted probabilities of different exposure years. The lower plots show differences in effects on ethnic identity probabilities (95%CI) between lower-status and higher-status migrants for each ethnic identity type. Lower-status migrants constitute the reference group, represented by the solid horizontal line at value zero.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

With increasing exposure time, the probability to show separated identity decreases similarly and at similar levels for lower- and higher-status migrants. The probability to show assimilated identity increases markedly in both groups. The data thereby indicates a weak converging effect that turns into a diverging effect over time. At around 25 years of exposure, higher-status migrants have a slightly higher probability to show assimilated identity, while at around 65 years of exposure, higher-status migrants' probability is comparably lower. However, the

status differences remain below 10 percentage points and statistically non-significant. Lower- and higher-status migrants are less likely to identify with both groups the longer their exposure time in the receiving society. The probabilities over exposure time in both status groups are thereby almost identical. Small status differences can be observed regarding the probability to refrain from ethnic identification. For lower-status migrants, the probability decreases slightly with increasing exposure time. For higher-status migrants, the probability is relatively stable. The status differences in the probability of no/weak identity increase with increasing exposure time but remain below 10 percentage points and statistically non-significant.

As was the case for the findings from the first-generation model, the findings from the second-generation model remain robust despite including variables that control for ethnic group composition in the sample and migrant group size.

#### 4.4.5 Discussion

This third analysis investigated the relationship between status and ethnic identity from a long-term perspective by focussing on migrants' exposure time. It was asked whether there are intra- and intergenerational status differences in migrants' ethnic identity over different exposure time points. Previous studies on migrants' ethnic identity suggest that with increasing exposure time, the majority of the migrant population tends to identify in an assimilated way. It is an open empirical question whether this tendency depends on migrants' status. Assimilation theory classically assumes that it does. Mainstream assimilation over exposure time is argued to run faster for higher-status migrants. Theoretical considerations regarding declining immigrant optimism and early exposure in the second generation, however, provide counter arguments to this hypothesis. Against this background, Analysis 3 investigated the joint effect of first- and second-generation migrants' exposure time and status on their ethnic identity. The empirical results thereby show that status differences are rather small in relation to the effects of exposure time in both generations. The findings about the relationship between exposure time and ethnic identity in the first and second generation are largely in line with the assumptions formulated in Section 4.4.1. This means that the data supports the assumption of a mainstream assimilation process in both generations over exposure time. As expected, there is a decrease in separated identity with increasing exposure time and this decrease appears to be much stronger for first-generation migrants. The probability to show assimilated identity, on the other hand, increases with increasing exposure time in both generations, with second-generation migrants showing a stronger increase. I further expected to find a parabolic relationship between exposure time and dual identity in the first generation in the sense of an initial increase and subsequent, less pronounced, decrease in probability. This expectation was confirmed, as well as expectations about a gradual decrease in dual identity over exposure time in the second generation. The findings further corroborate an increase in no/weak identity over exposure time among first-generation migrants. However, I do not find a decrease in no/weak identity over exposure time among second-generation migrants. Instead, the data suggests that there is no relationship.

The assumptions about status differences in ethnic identity probabilities with increasing exposure time find partial confirmation as well. More specifically, there are few but clear indications in the first generation that the presumed assimilation process happens faster for higher- than lower-status migrants. This is reflected by a comparably stronger increase in assimilated identity and a comparably earlier and flatter curve of dual identity over exposure time among higher-status migrants. There are no status differences over exposure time in the probability to show separated identity. Moreover, there are no systematic status differences over exposure time regarding the probability to refrain from ethnic identification. However, the prevalence increases relatively strong in both status groups, which is rather unexpected.

With respect to the second generation, there is strong support for the stability scenario, meaning that there are hardly any status differences in ethnic identity probabilities across exposure time. For assimilated identity, the data suggests that there might be a small convergence effect as assimilated identity is initially slightly more likely for higher-status migrants and later less likely. Parallel to this supposed trend, the probability to refrain from ethnic identification is rather stable over exposure time for higher-status migrants while it slightly decreases with increasing years of exposure for lower-status migrants.

The findings have several implications. The remarkable decrease in separated identity in the first generation strongly suggests that there is a selection effect which points to remigration of first-generation migrants. Importantly, this decrease is practically identical in both status groups. This indicates that not only resource-poor or unsuccessful first-generation migrants return home, but also those who have more resources at their disposal and better chances to integrate into the receiving society. There is no indication that dual identity is affected by remigration as the increase in dual identity is steeper than its subsequent decrease. If dual identity is affected by remigration, the subsequent decrease in dual identity would need to be more pronounced because the longer the exposure time, the higher the proportion of return migrants with dual identity and the smaller the proportion of migrants with dual identity (because they transitioned to assimilated identity).

The earlier and flatter curve of dual identity for higher-status first-generation migrants suggests a faster transition from separated to assimilated identity compared to their lower-status counterparts. This finding refutes the argument that higher-status migrants' cognitive sophistication makes them more likely to show dual identity. Rather, the advantage in cognitive resources seem to fasten adaptation to the majority group and thus the development of emotional ties, simultaneously making the minority context to become less important earlier. Also, the connection between cognitive sophistication and dual identity is not observed in the second generation, where dual identity decreases similarly with increasing exposure time. Analysis 3 therefore corroborates the findings from Analysis 1, which made similar discoveries.

There is strong support for the "mainstream assimilation" Hypothesis with increasing years of exposure. This highlights the importance of exposure time for migrants' ethnic identification and aligns with the short-termed effects of status mismatch found in Analysis 2. In relation to differences in ethnic identity across exposure time points, the observed status differences appear marginal. Nevertheless, there are status differences in the first generation that deserve some attention. The findings support the idea that first-generation migrants profit more from status-related integration advantages than it is the case for second-generation migrants. While first-generation migrants often miss the critical early exposure years in the receiving society, second-generation migrants do not. As a consequence, higher-status first-generation migrants seem to profit more from the cumulative integration advantages provided by their higher status position. In the second generation, migrants make important experiences in the receiving society before their status consolidates. These experiences seem to largely determine their future ethnic identity, thus relatively independent of their status. Importantly, this finding refutes the argument of segmented assimilation theory that the less successful ones are on a path of "downward assimilation" that is related to sustainably different ethnic identity outcomes than those of more successful migrants (e.g. Zhou 1997).

Moreover, higher-status first-generation migrants do not only show a stronger increase in assimilated identity probability with increasing exposure time. They also show a statistically significant increase in refraining from ethnic identification, which then seems to decrease again. However, it is worth noting that the subsequent decrease is accompanied by large confidence intervals due to issues with observation numbers for this particular type of ethnic identity. If we only focus on the significant increase, a possible explanation for higher-

status migrants' higher probability to refrain from ethnic identification would be a faster decline in immigrant optimism than is the case for lower-status migrants. If we were able to control for an indicator of relative deprivation, we could check whether this explanation is conclusive. I thus estimated an additional model in which I controlled for the variable *feeling uncomfortable among Germans*. The results can be found in Figure B-1 in Appendix B. Indeed, the status differences in no/weak identity disappear and higher-migrants' probability to show assimilated identity increases considerably. This provides some support for the idea that higher-status migrants experience a faster decline in optimism.

However, the additionally estimated model further suggests that the general increase in no/weak identity is not only related to perceived social distance or discrimination. A possible explanation for the residual increase in no/weak identity probability over exposure time may be a remigration effect, as those who generally struggle with life are less likely to return home—particularly after so many years abroad. These migrants could also represent sojourners who never managed to return home, for example because the economic advantages in the receiving society were too attractive (Bonacich 1973). Due to their intentions to remigrate, these migrants were never willing to fully participate in the receiving society. Given the increasing exposure time, however, they have since distanced themselves from the minority group, nevertheless. The sojourner argument seems particularly strong in the German context, where many individuals arrived in the framework of the guest worker recruitment. Being labelled as “guests” and considered as temporal stayers from the beginning likely supported migrants' self-image as sojourners. An additional explanation is that there are generation-specific period effects for which the analyses in this book cannot account due to the cross-sectional data design (see Section 5.3 for a discussion).

The impact of period effects could also be an explanation for the relatively stable probability of no/weak identity over exposure time in the second generation. An additional analysis that controls for whether migrants feel uncomfortable among Germans or not (see Figure B-2 in Appendix B) does not indicate that the stability is related to discrimination and migrants' discomfort among Germans. Considering the potential impact of period effects, the conclusiveness of the previous argument of more independent life choices over exposure time and the conclusiveness of the self-fulfilling prophecy Hypothesis remain unclear at this point.

Overall, Analysis 3 reveals that particularly in the second generation, ethnic identity probabilities differ across exposure time points in a way that resembles a mainstream assimilation process. In the first generation, there is also a noticeably increasing probability to refrain from ethnic identification with increasing exposure time. Further, there are signs for faster assimilation for higher- than lower-status migrants with increasing exposure time in the first generation. For the second generation, the findings suggest a very similar process for migrants on lower and higher status positions. Notwithstanding the observed status differences in the first generation, migrants' years of exposure are clearly the more important factor for migrants' ethnic identity. In both generations, exposure time is considerably stronger related to migrants' ethnic identity than to their status. This key finding helps to improve our understanding of how status is linked to migrants' ethnic identity. By taking a long-term perspective, Analysis 3 provides a better understanding of the importance of migrants' status in relation to time. In this context, the Analysis does not support concerns that first- and second-generation migrants with lower status feel more excluded with increasing exposure time. However, the application of a bidimensional ethnic identity framework reveals a general tendency to refrain from ethnic identification in both generations. Considering potential consequences for social cohesion, studying this specific group and its properties beyond the limitations of cross-sectional data and split procedures should direct future studies.

## 5 Concluding Remarks

The task of this book is to develop a better understanding of the link between status and ethnic identity among first- and second-generation migrants. Thereby, the book goes beyond previous studies that approached ethnic identity one-dimensionally, that is by either studying migrants' identification with the minority group or with the majority group. Departing from a bidimensional understanding of migrants' emotional identification, this book conceptualises ethnic identity as migrants' identification with the minority group in tandem with their identification with the majority group. It thereby offers empirical evidence that improves our understanding of how status relates to migrants' ethnic identity.

In the following, I briefly address this study's limitations which propose future research suggestions. Then, the main results across the conducted analyses are summarised and discussed. I close by addressing avenues for future research that arise from relevant findings.

### 5.1 Limitations

There are some limitations that open up future research possibilities. Given the four outcome categories of the dependent variable "ethnic identity" and group specific analyses, the samples used here are of moderate sample size. By operationalising the outcome variable through median split and conducting a series of additional analyses, measures were taken to alleviate these issues. However, it has to be noted that in the first generation, case numbers for two ethnic identity categories remained small because the median split was applied across generations to enable intergenerational comparison of results (see Table A-1 in Appendix A). If feasible, future studies should account for potential reliability issues by considering samples of larger size.

Median split procedures represent a straightforward way of applying Berry's fourfold typology to the data. But they do not necessarily reflect a direct and independent evaluation of each ethnic identity type (Nguyen/Benet-Martínez 2013). This particularly accounts for the differentiation between no/weak and dual identity as migrants seldomly show complete ethnic disidentification (Del Pilar/Udasco 2004). Further, median split procedures are limited as they restrict the comparability of results across studies (Schwartz et al. 2010: 239). However, median split procedures have the advantage of dealing with smaller sample sizes and skewed distributions of data points while simultaneously corresponding to the fourfold typology. This legitimates their application for analysing the data at hand. Given larger sample size and less skewed data, future studies could apply different approaches such as mean split or scalar midpoint split procedures to assess the results from this book and to generally increase empirical evidence on the studied topic.

Since the estimations base on cross-sectional data, the findings in this book can only be interpreted as correlations between explanatory variables and migrants' ethnic identity. To address the question of causality more thoroughly, panel data of sufficient duration is required to, for example, observe enough transitions into status mismatch to estimate reliable models on the consequences for ethnic identity. Regarding status mismatch, panel data is also required to further investigate long- and short-term effects of status mismatch on migrants' ethnic identity. In a similar vein, results from Analysis 3 are merely proxies for individual trajectories of ethnic identity across exposure time. For every observed time point, the results represent correlations between status and ethnic identity of different migrants with similar exposure time. Again, only longitudinal surveys of sufficient duration would enable researchers



to investigate individual changes in ethnic identity. This also holds for changes in status if migrants improve or worsen their occupational position across exposure time. Thus, panel data would also help to further disentangle the interrelation between status and ethnic identity over time to better address causal relationships.

Cross-sectional data further prevent researchers from accounting for period effects. There is a risk that the observed exposure time effects on the relationship between migrants' status and ethnic identity are confounded with period effects. With respect to Germany, reunification in 1989 marks an event that could have influenced ethnic identification of witnessing migrants living in East or West Germany. Accounting for period effects is only feasible with panel data that partly covers the respective period which researchers want to consider.

Even though the models accounted for biasing factors, the results may nevertheless be subject to some bias through omitted variables such as personality traits (Nekby/Rödin 2010) and through the use of proxy measures. Most importantly, this refers to the variable "migrant visibility" which could only be roughly proxied via the origin country of migrants' families. Future studies may address these potential issues, for example by including questions about personality traits and individual characteristics that cause migrants to feel discriminated or rejected. Another bias could complicate comparison of the results for first- and second-generation migrants. Ethnic composition in the sample of first- and second-generation migrants differs to some extent (see Section 3.2). Intergenerational differences between explaining variables and ethnic identity could thus partly be owed to differences between ethnic groups not accounted in the present analysis. By controlling for cultural distance, measures were taken to alleviate this issue. Furthermore, additional robustness checks that separately accounted for the two largest migrant groups in both generations (i.e. Turks and Poles in the first-generation sample and Czechs and Poles in the second-generation sample) provided no indication of substantial bias. Future studies with larger sample size and respective information might want to control for all ethnic groups in their sample to validate the intergenerational differences found in this book. Finally, results could partly be biased with respect to first-generation migrants and their probability to remigrate (see Sections 4.3.4 and 4.4.5 for further discussions on this subject).

## 5.2 Main results

### *Status relates positively to majority identity, but not necessarily to assimilated identity*

The analyses show that status is negatively related to separated identity and positively related to migrants' majority identity. However, this does not automatically mean that status is positively related to assimilated identity. The positive relationship between status and assimilated identity is particularly visible in the second generation, but less so in the first generation. There, status is positively related to dual identity, highlighting the fact that first-generation migrants' minority identity is comparably less dependent on status.

### *No signs of "downward assimilation"*

The analyses provide no empirical evidence for the "downward assimilation" Hypothesis. On the one hand, Analysis 1 showed that the probability to show separated identity is higher

among low-status first-generation migrants than among low-status second-generation migrants. Contrastingly, the probability to refrain from ethnic identification is comparably high among low-status second-generation migrants. This could basically indicate some support for the “downward assimilation” Hypothesis, i.e. that low-status second-generation migrants are more prone to develop feelings of relative deprivation than their first-generation counterparts. However, the probability was found to be similarly high among intermediate-status second-generation migrants, which suggests refuting the Hypothesis. Moreover, reports of feeling uncomfortable among Germans occurred more often in the second generation in general—and, importantly, increased in prevalence the higher migrants’ status position.

Analysis 3 supports this conclusion by revealing no status differences in ethnic identity in the second generation across different time points of exposure. This finding refutes the argument of segmented assimilation theory that less successful migrants are on a path of “downward assimilation” that is related to sustainably different ethnic identity outcomes than those of more successful ones (e.g. Zhou 1997).

### *A positive but non-linear relationship between status and majority identity*

From the bottom to the top of the social hierarchy, status seems positively related to majority identity. However, Analysis 1 does not imply that migrants’ ethnic identity is dichotomised by their status as theoretically assumed by classical assimilation theory. There seems to be a positive but diminishing, i.e. non-linear status effect on majority identity for a larger group of migrants across generations, an observation that is in line with the integration paradox.

### *Unravelling the integration paradox: Migrant visibility and status mismatch*

The empirical evidence of Analyses 1 and 2 sheds light on the integration paradox, which describes the phenomenon that higher-status migrants can be particularly prone to develop feelings of relative deprivation and emotionally withdraw from the majority group.

Analysis 1 shows that ethnic identification turns out to be particularly complicated for high-status migrants whose migration background is more visible to majority members. “Visible” high-status migrants across generations have a generally high probability to refrain from ethnic identification. In this regard, the analysis reveals large and positive status effects on “visible” migrants’ probability to refrain from ethnic identification across generations.

In a similar vein, Analysis 2 finds that higher educated migrants who experience status mismatch are more likely to emotionally withdraw from the majority and minority group compared to status-mismatched migrants with lower educational qualifications. Importantly, this not only holds for second-generation migrants but also—even though to a lesser extent—for first-generation migrants. This is interesting because first-generation migrants are often argued to be more able to compensate status loss through comparably better living conditions in the receiving society and increased approval by non-migrated minority members.

### *Beyond the integration paradox: Potential consequences for minority identification*

Importantly, the findings from Analysis 1 and 2 reveal identity patterns beyond those discussed in the integration paradox. The results do not only confirm the integration paradox by pointing to migrants’ struggle of identifying with the majority group. They additionally reveal that “visible” and status-mismatched migrants with high status also have a comparably

weak minority identity, which results in a higher chance to generally refrain from ethnic identification. As is the case for lower-status migrants, this finding suggests that for higher-status migrants, generally refraining from ethnic identification reflects an individual situation that is far from providing excellent conditions to thrive and to improve overall well-being. It rather reflects a strategy aiming at mitigating and preventing potential personal damage.

In this regard, there are two possible explanations for the findings. Regarding the interaction between education and migrant visibility, a possible explanation for the comparably weak minority identity is that “visible” high-status migrants emphasise their unique skills and own effort, thereby instrumentalising meritocratic ideals to pronounce status discrepancies between themselves and the “visible” individuals from the stigmatised minority group (Wodtke 2012). This enables them to distance themselves from the lower-status minority group and prevent them from individual status loss. Regarding the interaction between education and status mismatch on the other hand, withdrawal from the minority group may be associated with humiliating feelings, disappointment, and shame towards relevant others from the minority group who may have provided extensive support. And the higher the level of education, the higher might be the fall and disgrace in case of failure.

### *Cognitive sophistication may be advantageous, but less for promoting dual identity*

Analysis 1 and 3 do not support the argument that an advantage in cognitive resources increases the probability to show dual identity. Analysis 3 in fact suggests that even the contrary can be the case. Higher-status first-generation migrants who are assumed to be more cognitively sophisticated tend to identify less likely with both groups than their lower-status counterparts. In this regard, cognitive sophistication primarily makes higher-status migrants more efficient in integrating into the majority group. In addition, Analysis 1 suggests that combined with high status, an advantage in cognitive resources may also help migrants to advocate against the majority group, thus increasing the probability to show separated identity. The findings from Analysis 1 and 3 combined suggest that cognitive resources may indeed help to deal with interethnic conflicts, but less likely in a reconciling way that promotes dual identity.

### *Faster assimilation for higher- than for lower-status migrants in the first, but not in the second generation*

Analysis 3 reveals that higher-status migrants tend to identify faster in an assimilated way than their lower-status counterparts. This is not only demonstrated by higher-status migrants’ increasing probability to show assimilated identity with increasing exposure time. It is also reflected in a faster transition from separated to assimilated identity as observed in the different probabilities of dual identity. They resemble an n-shaped curve which occurs earlier and is flatter for higher-status migrants compared to the curve observed for lower-status migrants. In contrast, I observe no status differences in ethnic identity probabilities with increasing exposure time in the second generation.

A possible explanation of the comparably faster assimilation of higher-status migrants in the first generation are their cumulative integration advantages over their lower-status counterparts. Since first-generation migrants often miss the decisive early exposure years in the receiving society, status-related integration advantages that often cumulate become more important. In contrast, second-generation migrants make experiences in their early exposure years before proper status consolidation. These experiences likely set the incentives for further developing allegiances with minority and majority members, relatively independent of later status positions.

*“Time heals [almost] all wounds”—exposure time matters more than status*

Notwithstanding the observed status differences in this book’s analyses, migrants’ years of exposure are comparably more important for migrants’ ethnic identity. Analysis 3 shows that in both generations, exposure time is considerably stronger related to migrants’ ethnic identity than to their status. Across years of exposure, first- and particularly second-generation migrants’ ethnic identity differs in a way that resembles a process of mainstream assimilation. In both generations, this is most evident in the patterns of separated, assimilated and dual identity, and their interrelation.

In line with this result are those of Analysis 2, which indicate that effects of status mismatch on ethnic identity are mainly short-termed and occur strongest among migrants who entered status mismatch up to one year ago. Migrants who entered status mismatch up to one year ago are particularly more likely to identify with the minority group and less likely to identify with the majority group compared to migrants without status mismatch. This mismatch effect seems to weaken over time and disappears among second-generation migrants whose mismatch endures but not completely among their first-generation counterparts. There also seems to be an exception in the second generation. Analysis 2 suggests that situations of social deprivation occur in the longer term of status mismatch. Second-generation migrants whose status mismatch endures longer than one year are more likely to emotionally withdraw from both, the minority and majority group. The results thereby suggest that the probability of no/weak identity is higher for longer durations of status mismatch.

### 5.3 Future avenues

In addition to the research opportunities outlined in Section 5.1, the empirical evidence brought up in this book opens up research questions for future research. In the following, three main avenues for future research are briefly discussed.

First, future studies should aim to improve our understanding of how relative deprivation is linked to ethnic identity. This primarily targets at gaining a better understanding in what ways discrimination affects migrants’ ethnic identity. Discrimination is a broad collective term that can relate to phenomena of great variety, such as othering, informal practices, perceived and actual discrimination, lacking accommodation of diversity and perceived/experienced discrimination at the individual or group level. From an empirical-analytical perspective, this makes the concept difficult to apply.

Relatedly, Analyses 1 and 2 highlighted the role of deprivation experiences for higher-status migrants’ ethnic identity. The literature suggests that these deprivation experiences are caused by various factors which relate to discrimination, such as increased discrimination awareness, sensitivity and perceptions of discrimination. However, in light of migrants’ high aspirations across status levels (Dollmann 2017), such arguments can be controversially debated. Perceptions of blocked opportunities, economic deprivation and failed expectations could at least equally spur deprivation experiences of lower-status migrants. Thus, disentangling the relationship between aspects of discrimination and ethnic identity across status levels to assess the validity of the underlying theoretical arguments represents an important direction of future research.

A second avenue is the study of migrants with “positive” status mismatch. The status-mismatched migrants studied in Analysis 2 of this book can basically be referred to as migrants with “negative” status mismatch. Their educational qualification is higher than required by

their current job. The opposite are migrants with “positive” status mismatch whose educational qualification is below the requirements of their current job. The relationship between positive status mismatch and ethnic identity is particularly interesting with regard to the first generation. First-generation migrants with positive status mismatch could develop a particularly positive attitude towards the majority group that facilitates majority identification and assimilation. On the other hand, these migrants may not see the need for further adaptation because they are already overly successful, which could prevent stronger majority identification. In addition, positively mismatched migrants of the first generation could be more strongly perceived as economic threat, which may spur ethnic prejudices and discriminatory behaviours by majority members (Blalock 1967; Olzak 1993). In this sense, the study of positively status-mismatched migrants would allow approaching the integration paradox from another angle.

Third, in all analyses, migrants who generally refrain from ethnic identification emerged as important subject for future research. The literature predominantly suggests that weak or lacking ethnic identity is primarily related to resource-poor individuals at the bottom of social hierarchy who have no opportunities to improve their situation. This is the logical conclusion from a resource perspective on ethnic identity as it is popularly taken in assimilation theory. If ethnic identification is tied to resources and resources are tied to status, then, refraining from ethnic identification is not. However, all analyses in this book provide strong empirical evidence that generally refraining from ethnic identification is a phenomenon across status levels, which calls for further investigation.

For negatively status-mismatched migrants, the relatively stable probability of assimilated and dual ethnic identity and the simultaneous increase to refrain from ethnic identification with increasing level of education raises questions about the relationship between ethnic identity and personality traits such as neuroticism, stress tolerance and aversion. The chance of emotional withdrawal with increasing level of education could be lower for migrants with greater emotional stability. They would be more resilient in emotionally draining situations, which helps them to cope with the experienced status loss and feelings of shame.

Moreover, the particularly high prevalence to refrain from ethnic identification among “visible” higher-status migrants suggests deliberate emotional distancing from the minority group as a means to prevent individual status loss. To the extent that such a behaviour reflects some form of a compensatory strategy, it raises the question of how successful this strategy is in terms of maintaining these migrants’ overall well-being.

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## Appendix A: Variable overview

In the following, an overview of all variables used in the empirical sections is given. I first introduce the dependent variable ethnic identity and then provide an overview of all key explaining variables. Afterwards, other variables are introduced that are part of descriptive statistics or which are used for robustness and sensitivity checks. In an additional section, it is explained how I dealt with missingness in the data. At the end, a tabular overview of all the categories and summary statistics of all variables used in the empirical section is given (Table A-3). The table also shows which variables are used in which empirical sections.

### A.1 Dependent variable

The dependent variable in all empirical analyses reflects a measure for *ethnic identity*. Ethnic identity is a nominal variable, which draws on information from wave 4 of SC6 of NEPS. With reference to the fourfold typology from Section 1.1, the dependent variable comprises the following four categories:

- 0 = “separated identity;”
- 1 = “assimilated identity;”
- 2 = “Dual identity” and
- 3 = “no/weak identity.”

The variable results out of dichotomising and cross-tabulating two composite variables, one indicating the extent of migrants’ minority identity, the other indicating the extent of migrants’ majority identity. Each of the composite variables is based on a sum score of different items measuring migrants’ emotional identification with the respective ethnic group. These items are based on the established Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM), originally measuring migrants’ minority identification (Phinney 1992; Roberts et al. 1999). As many other studies, NEPS applied the original measure to also capture migrants’ majority identity.

The MEIM originally features items on the sense of ethnic belonging, on ethnic group attachment, on attitudes towards ethnic groups, on individual achievements related to an ethnic group and on ethnic behaviour. For time reasons, NEPS only included those MEIM based items in the SC6 questionnaire which they found to be reliable. Two items are used to create each composite variable. The composite variable minority identity draws on items that measure migrants’ sense of belonging and migrants’ attachment to the minority group. Both items are strongly and positively correlated in the first generation ( $\rho = 0.62$ ) and in the second generation ( $\rho = 0.70$ ). The composite variable *majority identity* draws on two identical items that however refer to the majority group: Migrants’ sense of belonging and attachment to the majority group. Pairwise correlations between belonging and attachment prove strong and positive, with  $\rho = 0.57$  in the first generation and with  $\rho = 0.56$  in the second generation. I dichotomised both composite variables by splitting them at the median (see Arends-Tóth et al. 2006; Nguyen/Benet-Martinez 2013 for reviews and discussions on different measurement methods). If the median was closer to the minimum value, I assigned individuals on the median to the lower value group. If the median was closer to the maximum value, I assigned individuals to the higher value group. By cross-tabulating the dichotomised variables, the four different ethnic identity types were created.

The variables were dichotomised and cross-tabulated across both generations to allow intergenerational comparison of ethnic identity. As shown in Table A-1, this resulted in unequal case numbers across the four ethnic identity types within each generation. In the first generation, separated and dual identity comprise most observations, while assimilated identity and no/weak identity comprise comparably few observations. In the second generation, on the other hand, assimilated identity and no/weak identity comprise most observations, while separated and dual identity have fewer observations. Table A-1 further depicts the four different ethnic identity types and the corresponding mean values of the composite variables for the first and second generation. Overall, the standard deviations indicate greater variance in minority identity than in majority identity in both generations. On average, first- and second-generation migrants generally identify stronger with the majority group than with the minority group. As a consequence, there are similar mean values of minority and majority identity in the separated identity of the second generation. This reflects a downside of the median split approach. However, this issue is less problematic because of two reasons. First, mean values of variable categories where the variable itself is based on a split procedure always need to be compared with mean values of other variable categories to get the full picture. With respect to separated identity, this means that as long as findings are interpreted in relation to the other ethnic identity types, the issue of similar mean values is less problematic. Second, it is widely acknowledged that minority and majority identity are relatively independent from each other. Some scholars also argue that they belong to different dimensions of social identity (Leszczensky/Gräbs Santiago 2015). In so far, unequal scale distribution could have been expected and should pose no problem regarding interpretation.

In this regard, comparing the mean values of majority and minority identity across the different ethnic identity types within each generation reveals expected results. Separated identity comprises a comparably high minority identity mean value and a comparably small majority identity mean value within both generations. Assimilated identity comprises a comparably small minority identity mean value and a comparably high majority identity mean value. Dual identity comprises comparably high mean values regarding both composite variables within both generations. Finally, no/weak ethnic identity expectedly comprises comparably small mean values of minority and majority identity.

Table A-1: Mean values of minority and majority identity across all ethnic identity types by generation status

	Separated	Assimilated	Dual	None/weak
<i>First generation</i>				
Minority identity	10.87 (1.88)	4.17 (2.44)	10.95 (2.06)	4.35 (2.32)
Majority identity	9.68 (1.61)	13.99 (1.29)	12.78 (1.32)	8.58 (2.39)
Obs. Nr.	381	48	294	61
<i>Second generation</i>				
Minority identity	10.43 (2.08)	4.34 (1.99)	10.58 (2.26)	3.65 (2.34)
Majority identity	9.97 (1.48)	12.98 (1.39)	13.60 (1.42)	9.84 (1.69)
Obs. Nr.	127	501	151	388

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

## A.2 Explaining variables

### *Status (ISEI and education)*

In Analysis 1, status is operationalised by migrants' *ISEI* (International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status) score at the time of wave 4. The ISEI reflects individuals' position in the social structure by drawing on information regarding education and income (Ganzeboom et al. 1992; Ganzeboom/Treiman 2010). For example, an ISEI score of 69 refers to social scientists, a score of 50 corresponds to biotechnicians, 40 refers to electricians and a score of 29 refers to painters. If migrants reported to have more than one occupation at the time of wave 4, I chose their highest ISEI score at that time. The variable also considers unemployed migrants (ISEI score = 0).

In the base analysis of Analysis 1, ISEI is used as continuous variable. It is used to investigate migrants' ethnic identity across the ISEI scale. In the moderator analysis of Analysis 1, the variable is collapsed into three categories to specifically investigate differences in ethnic identity of "non-visible" and "visible" migrants on intermediate- and high-status levels. The lowest category contains migrants with "low status," i.e. with an ISEI score from the lower quartile of the ISEI scale (ISEI score = 0 to 27). The middle category contains migrants with "intermediate status," i.e. with an ISEI score from the middle quartiles (ISEI score = 28 to 65). The highest category contains migrants with "high status," i.e. with an ISEI score from the upper quartile (ISEI score = 65 to 88). Migrants with ISEI scores on one of the cutting points were assigned to the lower or upper quartile.

In Analyses 2 and 3, migrants' status is proxied by their *highest educational qualification* at the time of wave 4. The variable comprises the following four categories: Migrants who may have some general education but no vocational education are labelled as having "low educational qualification" (= 0). Migrants with "intermediate educational qualification" (= 1) are those who at least completed two years of vocational education (e.g. through vocational schools or apprenticeships). Migrants with "high educational qualification" (= 2) include migrants with a Master's/foreman's certificate (*Meisterbrief*), a Technician's certificate (*Technikerausbildung*) or a Bachelor's degree. Finally, migrants with "very high educational qualification" (= 3) refer to migrants that for example obtained a Master's degree, a Doctorate's degree or Habilitation. Information from educational qualifications that migrants obtained abroad is also considered.

In Analysis 2, the variable is used to investigate the ethnic identity of status-mismatched migrants across levels of education. In Analysis 3, the four categories are collapsed into two categories to compare the ethnic identity of lower educated (= 0) and higher educated (= 1) migrants across exposure time. For this purpose, the two lowest and the two highest categories from the original variable are collapsed.

### *Migrant visibility*

The explaining variable *migrant visibility* is used in Analysis 1 to investigate differences in ethnic identity of "non-visible" and "visible" migrants across status levels. To differentiate between "non-visible" and "visible" migrants, the variable uses rough proxy information of the origin country of migrants' families (see Flores 2015; Tuppatt/Gerhards 2020 for similar approaches). The dummy variable distinguishes between origin countries in which inhabitants are often perceived to have a similar (= 0) and different (= 1) appearance to Germans. Origin countries with inhabitants who tend to be physically more distinct than Germans are

considered to be Asian, African, and Latin American countries. Origin countries with inhabitants who tend to be physically less distinct than Germans are considered to be North American and European countries. The categorisation of countries to the various world regions was thereby based on the United Nations geoscheme. A detailed list of the country categorisation cannot be provided due to data protection reasons.

### *Education-occupation/status mismatch*

In Analysis 2, the key explaining variable is migrants' education-occupation mismatch at the time of wave 4. I refer to education-occupation (henceforth: status) mismatch if migrants' educational qualification basically suggests a higher occupational position than they occupy. *Status mismatch* is a dummy variable, indicating whether migrants experience education-occupation mismatch (= 1) or not (= 0). Unemployed migrants are thereby considered to have status mismatch.

I calculate status mismatch by following the job analysis approach (e.g. Chiswick/Miller 2010; Rumberger 1981). To identify status mismatches, the job analysis approach measures required educational levels for specific occupations based on information from occupational classifications. I use the German Classification of Occupations (KldB) 2010, a 5-digit level index of occupations, that classifies occupations by their educational requirements at the fifth digit level. The KldB distinguishes four different levels of requirement. Occupations at the first digit level usually do not require vocational education. Occupations at the second digit level require at least two years of vocational education. Occupations at the third digit level require an educational qualification comparable to a Master's/foreman's certificate (*Meisterbrief*), a Technician's certificate (*Technikerausbildung*) or a Bachelor's degree. Occupations at the fourth digit level require a minimum of four years of higher education, therefore comprising qualifications such as a Master's degree, a Doctorate's degree or a Habilitation (Paulus/Matthes 2013).

For operationalisation, I first assigned migrants to one of the requirement levels through their KldB information at the time of wave 4 (see Table A-2 below). If migrants reported to have more than one occupation at this time, I chose the educational requirement level of the occupation with the highest ISEI score. Determining requirement levels with the help of migrants' ISEI score proves useful, since the ISEI builds on information about individuals' education and income. If migrants reported to be unemployed, they were given an ISEI value of 0, indicating lacking occupation. Second, I constructed an educational-level variable depicting migrants' highest educational level. This variable comprised four categories, where each category corresponded to one requirement level. Third, I compared the two variables, i.e. migrants' requirement level based on their job and based on their educational level. This comparison enabled me determining whether migrants' educational level was above the level formally required by their current occupation (i.e., whether they experienced status mismatch or not). If migrants reported to be unemployed, they were labelled as experiencing status mismatch. All migrants in the sample reported to have obtained at least some educational level.

Table A-2: Job requirement levels and required educational level

Requirement level of job	Required educational level	Corresponding educational qualification (examples)
1	No vocational education	lower secondary level school degree (“Hauptschulabschluss”)
2	At least two years of vocational education	apprenticeship (“Lehre”)
3	Less than four years of higher education	Bachelor’s degree
4	Minimum of four years of higher education	Master’s degree

Source: Author’s own representation.

The job analysis approach is one of three established approaches to operationalise status mismatches (see Hartog 2000; Leuven/Oosterbeek 2011 for overviews). I chose the approach because of its superiority compared to the other two approaches. The first of these remaining approaches is based on self-assessment. Respondents are directly asked about educational requirements of the occupation they hold. This approach may be the most straightforward, but answers may strongly depend on the wording of the questions (Green et al. 1999). This not only impairs comparability across different approaches but also within the approach. Furthermore, capturing status mismatch through self-assessment may be influenced by social desirability. It is argued that respondents may tend to report higher education requirements for their occupation to upgrade their occupational status (Hartog 2000). Contrastingly, the job analysis approach measures education-occupation mismatch indirectly, avoiding potential social desirability bias in this regard.

The second remaining approach uses information from realised matches and is often considered inferior to the job analysis and self-assessment approaches. Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) are often associated with this approach, which goes back to Sullivan (1978) and Clogg (1979). In common applications of this approach, researchers calculate the mean educational level (or mean year of schooling) for all individuals holding a certain occupation. Individuals are then labelled to experience status mismatch if their educational level is at least one standard deviation below the mean of their occupation. According to Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011), a problem of this approach is the arbitrary cut-off of one standard deviation. However, they see the main problem in the approach’s bias through supply and demand forces on the labour market. The corresponding mismatch measure thus not only reflects educational requirements but also cyclical fluctuations in the economy. This issue also applies to the self-assessment approach if the survey questions consider hiring standards. Kracke (2016) concludes that the job analysis approach is comparably more concise and objective, since realised matches are purely empirical and because self-assessment is strongly subjective. The job analysis approach is especially attractive if the used occupational classification concentrates on education requirements and not on social status (Leuven/Oosterbeek 2011). With regard to the educational requirement levels of the German classification of occupations, this is the case.

### *Duration of status mismatch*

Migrants' *mismatch duration* (0 = "no mismatch," 1 = "up to 1 year," 2 = "1 – 2 years," 3 = "+ 2 years") is measured by calculating status-mismatched migrants' duration of their current employment or unemployment period. For first-generation migrants, this means that status mismatch can only begin as early as after migration. Non-mismatched migrants are treated as having a mismatch duration of 0. This variable is used in Analysis 2 to compare the ethnic identity of status-mismatched migrants with different mismatch durations and to non-mismatched migrants.

### *Years of exposure*

The explaining variable *years of exposure* is used in Analysis 3 to explore status differences in ethnic identity across different years of exposure in the receiving society. The operationalisation of this variable differs between the first and second generation. While *age* is used as a proxy for exposure years in the second generation, *residence duration* is chosen as exposure proxy in the first generation (see respective entries in the section "other variables").

## **A.3 Other variables**

### *Employment status*

*Employment status* controls for unemployment at the time of wave 4 (0 = "employed," 1 = "unemployed"). This variable is used in the descriptive statistics of all three analyses.

### *Gender*

Migrants' self-reported *gender* is a dummy variable, where 0 stands for "male" and 1 stands for "female." Gender is used as control variable in all multinomial logistic regressions as well as in the descriptive statistics of all three analyses.

### *Age*

Migrants' *age* at the time of wave 4 represents a continuous variable, ranging from 25 to 65 years. Age is used in all descriptive statistics and in all multinomial logistic regressions for second-generation migrants. If age is used in the multinomial logistic regressions for first-generation migrants, the variable is collapsed to five categories (0 = "25-29 years," 1 = "30-39 years," 2 = "40-49 years," 3 = "50-59 years," 4 = "60-65 years") to avoid perfect collinearity with first-generation migrants' age at migration and residence duration. This is the case in Analysis 1 and Analysis 2.

### *Residence duration*

*Residence duration* at the time of wave 4 is an immigrant-specific variable. It ranges from 0 (i.e. below one year) to 67 years, indicating the time of first-generation migrants' stay in Germany. Residence duration is used in all descriptive statistics and regressions for first-generation migrants.

### *Age at migration*

Another immigrant-specific variable is age at migration. It ranges from age 0 (i.e. migration under the age of one) to age 63. As is the case for residence duration, it is used in descriptive statistics and in the regression analyses for first-generation migrants.

### *Time of migration*

The variable *time of migration* indicates periods within which first-generation migrants arrived in Germany. It serves as a proxy for migrant cohort and is used in all regression analyses for first-generation migrants. The variable comprises four categories (0 = "arrived between 1948 and 1973," 1 = "arrived between 1974 and 1988," 2 = "arrived between 1989 and 2001," 4 = "arrived after 2002"). The cutting points were selected in order to roughly distinguish between different migrant cohorts. In this sense, category 0 mainly captures migrants in the framework of the guest worker recruitment, as 1973 marks the year in which Germany stopped the program. Due to the related restriction of labour migration, the subsequent category 1 covering a migration period between 1974 and 1988 largely captures refugees and family members of "guest workers" who migrated to Germany for family reunion. The end of the Cold War marked another shift in migration, primarily towards immigration from Eastern Europe. The Free Movement of Persons Agreement in 2002 marks another important event, which strongly increased immigration to Germany across Europe (Olczyk et al. 2016).

### *Cultural distance*

The variable *cultural distance* indicates the extent of cultural differences between the origin country of migrants' families and Germany. The variable is used for robustness checks in Analysis 1, for descriptive statistics and as a basic covariate in Analyses 2 and 3.

It is based on Hofstede's approach of national culture (Hofstede 2001; Hofstede et al. 2010). Hofstede (2001: 9) defines culture as a "collective programming of the mind", implying value orientations and behaviours that are characteristic for members of a particular cultural group. His approach basically implies that members of a nation are on average more similar to each other in their way of thinking and behaving than to members of other nations. The major characteristics of national culture are captured with six value dimensions. The dimension "power distance" (PDI) indicates the degree to which less powerful individuals accept that power is distributed unequally. The dimension of "uncertainty avoidance" (UAI) indicates the degree society members feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. "Individualism" (IDV) implies whether national cultures are rather described as individualistic or collectivistic. The dimension therefore exhibits the degree to which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate family members. "Masculinity"



(MAS) indicates the preference in a society for achievement, heroism and material rewards. “Long Term Orientation” (LTO) indicates preferences for (educational) efforts to prepare for the future instead of maintaining traditions and viewing change with suspicion. “Indulgence” (IND) indicates the degree a society allows for rather free gratification, enjoying life and having fun. The six dimensions of national culture are based on multi-source validation procedures, e.g., with the World Values Survey (Esmer/Petterson 2007). They have been proven to be stable over long periods of time (Hofstede 2001), rendering the application of the concept attractive when dealing with different migrant cohorts and migrant generations.

Migrants’ cultural distance to Germany is operationalised by calculating a sum score that indicates the overall cultural distance from each origin country to Germany. The sum score was calculated in two steps. In the first step, the scales were scaled down by dividing them by 100 and the absolute difference between German and origin-country scores within each value dimension was calculated. In the second step, these differences were summarised and divided by six. Missing country scores were replaced by same-dimension scores from neighbour countries, thereby assuming more similar scores due to greater mutual influence and similarities over smaller geographical distance. The resulting index of cultural distance represents a continuous variable, ranging from 0.08 to 0.50. Migrants with a lower score are considered culturally closer to Germany, whereas migrants with a higher score are considered to be culturally more distant to Germany. For example, migrants from Romania score 0.32, those from Turkey score 0.25, and migrants from Switzerland score 0.08 on the index of cultural distance to Germany.

### *Migrant group size / ethnic group composition*

Specific migrant groups are captured by a set of dummy variables. These dummy variables are used for robustness checks in all analyses. The first dummy variable *migrant group size* indicates whether migrants and their families originate from Turkey, Russia or Poland (= 1) or not (= 0). In Germany, migrant groups from these countries belong to the largest minority groups.

A second group of dummy variables is used to account for *ethnic group composition* in the samples of first- and second-generation migrants. The variables indicate whether migrants and their families either originate from Turkey, Russia, Poland, or from the Czech Republic. Considering the historical connection between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Czech-dummy also includes migrants whose families originate from Slovakia or the former Czechoslovakia. First-generation migrants from Turkey and Poland represent the two largest migrant groups in the first-generation sample. Therefore, the Turkish and Polish dummy variables are used to check whether ethnic group composition affects the results for first-generation migrants. In the second-generation sample, Poland and the Czech Republic represent the countries from which most migrants’ families originate. Thus, the Polish and Czech dummy variables are used to check potential effects of sample-specific ethnic group composition on the results.

### *Self-reported proficiency in German*

Migrants’ self-reported proficiency in German is a composite variable with values ranging from 0 to 5. It is calculated by summing up scores from self-assessments of reading and speaking in the German language and then dividing the result by two. Reading and speaking were strongly and positively correlated in the first generation ( $\rho = 0.79$ ) and in the second

generation ( $\rho = 0.72$ ). NEPS collected information on self-reported language proficiency in waves 2, 6 and 10. If available, I drew on information from wave 2 because ethnic identity was measured in wave 4. For migrants where information in wave 2 was missing, I used information from wave 6. This largely concerned migrants who are part of the refreshment sample from wave 4 (see Chapter 3 for more information on the refreshment sample). Self-reported language proficiency is used in all descriptive statistics.

### *Feeling uncomfortable among Germans*

*Feeling uncomfortable among Germans* refers to a NEPS item measured in wave 4. It comprises the following four categories: 0 = “does not apply at all,” 1 = “does not really apply,” 2 = “applies to some extent,” 3 = “applies completely.” The item is used as a variable in the descriptive statistics across all analyses. Furthermore, a dummy version is used in sensitivity analyses in the context of Analysis 3 (see Section 4.4.5). The dummy version collapses the original categories 2 and 3. Collapsing the original variable for the regression analyses was necessary because only few migrants reported to feel uncomfortable to some extent or completely uncomfortable. The dummy variable thus indicates whether feeling uncomfortable among Germans does not apply at all (= 0) or whether there is some leeway for it (= 1).

### *Interviewers' employment duration*

One of two survey design factors that is included in all regression analyses is *interviewers' employment duration* at infas, which is the survey institute responsible for the NEPS SC6 field process. Interviewers' employment duration represents a categorical variable (0 = “up to 2 years,” 1 = “2 to 5 years,” 2 = “more than 5 years”) and refers to interviewers' survey experience at the time of wave 4. This variable is part of all regression models.

### *Comprehension problems*

The second survey design factor that is included in all regression analyses is the variable *comprehension problems*. It represents a categorical variable, ranging from 0 to 5 (0 = “hardly ever,” 1 = “rarely,” 2 = “sometimes,” 3 = “often,” 4 = “very often,” 5 = “almost always”). The information is based on interviewer self-reports after their conducted interviews in wave 4. Since the variable is heavily left-skewed, categories 2 to 5 were collapsed. It is the reduced variable version that is implemented in all regression models.

## **A.4 Dealing with missingness: Multiple imputation with chained equations**

I employ multiple imputation with chained equations (MICE) to deal with missing values (Azur et al. 2011). MICE generates a specified number of datasets by means of an imputation model. Depending on the amount of missing information in variables that researchers want to impute, they must specify the number of datasets to be created in order to mitigate power falloff in the following analyses. MICE regresses incomplete covariates along with auxiliary

variables on complete covariates and the outcome variable (Johnson/Young 2011; White et al. 2010). Auxiliary variables are thereby correlates of model variables or of their missingness. Research has demonstrated that MICE yields less biased results and more efficient estimates than complete case analysis does (Azur et al. 2011; Young/Johnson 2015).

There are two sources of missingness in panel studies like NEPS (Young/Johnson 2015): “Within-wave missingness” refers to missing values typically owed to respondents who participated in the survey wave but did not respond to all questions. Within-wave missingness also occurs if survey questions are not included in each wave or if they are not posed to all participants within one wave. “Whole-wave missingness” refers to missing values owed to temporal or final dropouts of respondents.

Since the present analysis does not fully exploit the panel structure of NEPS, within-wave missingness is the main source of missing values in the sample I use. Ethnic identity is particularly affected by within-wave missingness, because NEPS posed respective questions in wave 4 only to migrants of the already existing panel but not to migrants of the wave 4 refreshment sample. Fortunately, NEPS provides all the other information for migrants of the refreshment sample that are essential for the empirical analyses. Since MICE imputes missing values by using available information, missing information about migrants’ ethnic identity can be imputed as is the case for other missing information.

I employ MICE for the first and second generation separately because I analyse both migrant generations separately. Due to the amount of missing information, I created 20 imputed datasets in both subsamples to keep power falloff below one percent (Graham et al. 2007). The imputation model largely comprises information about variables that are part of the empirical analyses (i.e. model variables). If applicable, I directly included the model variables themselves. In case of collinearity issues, I included the baseline variables used for creating the model variables. This is for example the case for residence duration, which is captured by first-generation migrants’ age at migration and their age at the time of their interview in wave 4. In addition to the model variables, I included migrants’ self-reported proficiency in German and reports about feeling uncomfortable among Germans in the imputation models as auxiliary variables.

Research has demonstrated that MICE yields less biased results and more efficient estimates than complete case analysis does (Lee/Carlin 2010). To test the robustness of my results in this regard, I conducted sensitivity analyses for each empirical analysis depicted in Chapter 4 by dropping the refreshment sample from wave 4 and rerunning the regression analyses. This approach is similar to a complete case analysis, since in wave 4, NEPS asked all migrants about their ethnic identity except for those from the wave 4 refreshment sample. Even though the sensitivity analyses reduced the explanatory power of the estimated models due to reduced sample size, the direction of the effects and thus interpretation of the results remained the same in all analyses.

Table A-3: Overview of variables (table continues over next page)

	Min	Max	1 <sup>st</sup> generation		2 <sup>nd</sup> generation		Analysis		
			Mean	SD	Mean	SD	1	2	3
<i>Dependent variable</i>									
<i>Ethnic identity</i>							✓	✓	✓
Separated	0	1	0.48		0.11				
Assimilated	0	1	0.06		0.43				
Dual	0	1	0.38		0.13				
No/weak	0	1	0.08		0.33				
<i>Explaining variables</i>									
ISEI	0	88	38	23.83	50	22.73	✓		
<i>Education</i>								✓	✓
Low	0	1	0.15		0.04				
Intermediate	0	1	0.43		0.49				
High	0	1	0.18		0.24				
Very high	0	1	0.24		0.23				
“Visible” migrants	0	1	0.42		0.13		✓		
Status mismatch	0	1	0.36		0.23			✓	
<i>Duration of status mismatch</i>								✓	
No mismatch	0	1	0.64		0.77				
< 1 year	0	1	0.16		0.08				
1 to 2 years	0	1	0.05		0.03				
> 2 years	0	1	0.15		0.11				
Residence duration (0 = below 1 year)	0	63	24	13			✓	✓	✓
Age (years)	25	65	45	11	47	10	✓	✓	✓
<i>Other variables</i>									
Unemployed	0	1	0.14		0.06				
Female	0	1	0.54		0.53		✓	✓	✓



Table A-3: Overview of variables (continued)

	Min	Max	1 <sup>st</sup> generation		2 <sup>nd</sup> generation		Analysis		
			Mean	SD	Mean	SD	1	2	3
<i>Other variables</i>									
Age at migration (0 = below the age of one)	0	58	21	11			✓	✓	✓
<i>Time of migration</i>									
Between 1948 and 1973	0	1	0.21				✓	✓	✓
Between 1974 and 1988	0	1	0.25						
Between 1989 and 2010	0	1	0.39						
After 2002	0	1	0.15						
Cultural distance	0.08	0.50	0.25	0.07	0.19	0.07	✓	✓	✓
Larger migrant groups (Turkey, Poland, Russia)	0	1	0.30		0.23		✓	✓	✓
Turkish migrants	0	1	0.16		0.05		✓	✓	✓
Polish migrants	0	1	0.09		0.16		✓	✓	✓
Czech migrants (incl. Slovakia and former Czechoslovakia)	0	1	0.02		0.32		✓	✓	✓
Self-reported proficiency in German	0	5	3.86	0.88	4.92	0.25			
Feeling uncomfortable among Germans	0	1	0.34		0.50				✓
<i>Interviewers' employment duration</i>									
< 2 years	0	1	0.31		0.34		✓	✓	✓
2 to 5 years	0	1	0.51		0.49				
> 5 years	0	1	0.18		0.17				
<i>Comprehension problems</i>									
Hardly ever	0	1	0.56		0.85		✓	✓	✓
Rarely	0	1	0.26		0.12				
At least sometimes	0	1	0.17		0.03				

Note: SD = Standard deviation; data with imputed values;  $n = 784$  1<sup>st</sup> generation;  $n = 1,167$  2<sup>nd</sup> generation.

Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations

## Appendix B: Additional analyses

Figure B-1: Predicated probabilities of ethnic identity for lower- and higher-status migrants with different exposure years, first generation; controlled for feeling uncomfortable among Germans (figure continues over next page)






Figure B-1: Predicated probabilities of ethnic identity for lower- and higher-status migrants with different exposure years, first generation; controlled for feeling uncomfortable among Germans (continued)



Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

Figure B-2: Predicated probabilities of ethnic identity for lower- and higher-status migrants with different exposure years, second generation; controlled for feeling uncomfortable among Germans (figure continues over next page)








Figure B-2: Predicated probabilities of ethnic identity for lower- and higher-status migrants with different exposure years, second generation; controlled for feeling uncomfortable among Germans (continued)



Source: NEPS starting cohort 6, version 10.0.1. Own calculations.

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
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
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
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
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