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Südliche Demokratien und der Streit über die
internationale Ordnung

Analyse der Positionen Indiens und Südafrikas zur
Responsibility to Protect

Anhang

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Interviewtranskripte und Fragebogen

Interviews Indien in chronologischer Reihenfolge

1) Prakash, BS	23.11.2015
2) Dahiya, Rumel	24.11.2015
3) Sharma, Sheel Kant	24.11.2015
4) Behuria, Ashok K.	24./26.11.2015
5) Stobdan, Phunchok	26.11.2015
6) Sinha, Uttam Kumar	27.11.2015
7) Iyer-Mitra, Abhijit	29.11.2015
8) Chakravarty, Pinak	01.12.2015
9) Jaganathan, Madhan Mohan	02.12.2015
10) Joshi, Manoj	03.12.2015
11) Mohan, C. Raja	03.12.2015
12) Banerjee, Dipankar	04.12.2015

Interview with Ambassador BS Prakash¹

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Garten des India International Center, New Delhi
Datum des Interviews: 23.11.2015, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:47h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What from your perspective, are the most decisive and influential factors that shape Indian foreign policy/India's foreign policy identity?

E: *I'm not going to describe that in a structured way like, this is first most important, and this is second most important a.s.o., but I will tell you some elements. One is that it (India) must be independent, non-aligned, off the influence of the great powers. Secondly it must play a role in the world, it cannot be limited to India's narrow national interests and it has a certain, different profile. Thirdly it had from the beginning, from the independence to consolidate its statehood. We never had in our thinking a philosophy of suppressing people but first came the consolidation of the state.*

India is not a country with a homogenous population, we have so many diversities, in culture, in linguistic, in religion and in addition the division of the subcontinent.

This question of consolidation of the state within its present territory has always been an issue, has always been a problem.

I: India's role in international politics is constantly evolving. How does India see itself? What kind of an actor in international politics is India, what kind of an actor would it like to be and what foreign policy instruments are deemed to be suitable for an actor like India?

E: *There are different perspectives on this within India and unlike some other countries we don't have a clearly defined national mission statement or a national doctrine, national strategic doctrine. We feel that India is a big civilization entity, it encompasses enough attributes and assets to have a profile in the world. The question of what kind of a power India would like to be depends on how we look at power.*

¹ Die Transkripte umfassen alle wortwörtlich, inhaltlich oder gedanklich zitierten bzw. in dieser Arbeit genutzten Inhalte der durchgeführten Interviews. Die vollständigen Original-Audiodateien sind beim Autor dieser Arbeit verfügbar.

India is an Asian power and, whether it likes it or not, should be the preeminent South Asian power, one of the major Asian powers and one of the emerging powers. Emerging because we still do not have the GDP. We have the size, we have the population, but we do not have the per capita income, we have the GDP also [...] but we do not have the per capita income and we do not have the kind of assets and skills to get all the outcomes that we want. But we are growing also in other aspects of power, military power, science and technology, human resources, skill sets and the ability to play a role in foreign policy. If you look on it in a multipolar world, India believes that it will be one of the poles.

That is why India should have an interest in every aspect of the global agenda be it IPR, WTO, nuclear, space etc. but India should have a position, India should have a perspective.

But there is another view [...] What is most important today is to have an external environment to be a power where India's potential to grow is unhindered by external influences domestically and economical to secure its minimal interest.

I: How does the NAM movement come into play in that regard?

E: Currently or historically?

I: Currently.

E: Currently I think non-aligned movement is more a slogan and a rhetorical tool but a useful one. Nobody, no official in India or even the foreign policy analysts in India will say the NAM is wrong or is totally irrelevant. Because it is defined in a way it is stating the obvious that India is too big a country to be just a camp follower or member of a bloc. It cannot secure its interests, or it cannot give a greater security and it would even be morally wrong I would say to automatically assume positions as a member of an alliance or as a group. So non-alignment defined as freedom of judgement on any international issue and also as freedom of action on any international issue that it is obvious for a country like India.

For smaller countries, for more vulnerable countries, for a small country being a member of the EU we can understand that it makes sense. It would not make sense for Russia or the US. So it is there at a doctrinal level or rhetorical but if you take a foreign policy position it doesn't really come into that.

If you ask people, is it important, they would say well it is there but nobody will say it is unimportant but I would be surprised if people would say that is what defines Indian foreign policy today in terms to make a judgement on any international issue.

I: How does India perceive the current existing international order, from New Delhi?

E: *It is a debatable point, but I would say India believes that the current international order that has formed after the Second World War has served us well because it included India and China in that order and we are members of most of the institutions as the IMF, Worldbank, WTO, UNSC etc. but that is all changing.*

So first, the international order is in a state of great flux. There is now a movement towards a multipolar world, the US is of course still the predominant power in economic sense, military

sense in every sense but the EU, Russia, China, Japan, India... India would also like to be seen as a pol in this movement towards a multipolar constellation. We see the beginning of trends of non-accepting or questioning in some sense of some of the principles of the current order, distribution of power, also questioning of the institutions, democratization of the institutions. Like for instance many of the things that we are doing in BRICS, saying there should be a greater voice for India, Brazil, China in the IMF, UNSC you know the issue very well, we are saying we are not rebels, but this is completely ridiculous to take the UNSC so serious, but this is the last word in international law. We believe it has to change; it has to evolve. [...] In the international order, as it has to change, there is greater weight for Asia.

There are also these global commons issues like space or climate change, where we believe emerging countries should have a greater say. Thus, in a nutshell: The international order is in transition and India believes it must play a larger role.

I: How does India perceives the West? Like one bloc, diverse, as a rival or as a partner?

We clearly see and we could see as well in the past that there are important difference within the West, especially between USA and Europe and within Europe there a lot of liberal and enlightened countries with which we have very good relations as for instance the Scandinavian countries, the Dutch for a long time, with Germany throughout with France and I think because of the way the EU evolved nowadays bilateral relations with only a few EU countries are important, the rest falls under India-EU relations/foreign policy.

Some of the defining marks are what happened in 1971 during the Bangladesh crisis. What was the position that countries took towards human rights issues in Punjab, in Kashmir and so on. What was the position in regard with India's nuclear stance?

Countries in the West over all these questions had different positions. Canada, Europa, the US, Japan, which in this sense is also a part of the West.

The West has never been seen as a rival; I think the West has been seen as a threat only during the 1971 period.

Compared to many other developing countries or emerging powers we had good equations with the West, and we benefitted a lot in terms of aid and development policies. In recent we have looked at West with some wariness on issues of terrorism or the India-Pakistan issue because we think that the West does not completely understand India in terms of terrorism, cross-border-terrorism etc. but now it is a common fight (since the West is also threatened by terrorism). We believe in a lot of the western values as human rights, pluralism, democracy and in a way as well in capitalism with welfare, the SPD kind of a thing. If you take this a cluster our values are very close, our interests may differ on certain cases, the West has never been seen as a threat (!) but as a partner.

I: How does India see BRICS and IBSA, what are the differences, what are the commonalities?

E: IBSA came before BRICS, was a more natural grouping and the idea came from Thabo Mbeki first and then Lula became very enthusiastic about. The three largest democracies from all three countries where emerging countries are, Africa, Asia and America. We are big vibrant

democracies from the South, we have the same challenges and problems, why don't we do more things together. Not so much internationally but between each other. And the other motivation was to give the developing countries a bigger voice and more competence in international forums like WTO etc. because in these three countries you have the think tanks etc. so let us put our heads together and develop idea and share ideas and competence.

We have not been sufficiently ambitious, or action oriented in IBSA because one of the things IBSA could have done very successfully was to take some issues and see what are the best ways in which these three developing countries can look at solving those issues. Let us say sanitation, let us say city development...South Africa has shanty towns, India has slums, Brazil has favelas. How do you address it? China does things very differently because when you are not a democracy you can do many things which a democracy can't.

These are large issues whether it is hunger, water, sports. So, this kind of action-oriented agenda could have been and can be a very good building block for IBSA. The political views on all those values we talked about like pluralism, liberty, human rights, ethnic diversity etc. very much converge within IBSA very naturally and our international view can also converge very naturally. We are all not in the UNSC but candidates.

Meanwhile what happened we had this Goldman-Sachs report and BRICS came into being. And BRICS was in that sense a little sexier because it was all based on this market advantages and market principles, very fast-growing economies. Thus, BRICS received more international and unfortunately as well more domestic attention than IBSA. The differences are clear: BRICS has two UNSC members, IBSA only candidates, all three IBSA members are democracies, BRICS not, BRICS does not have a clear political identity and there are many differences on many issues and on security issues as well. The advantage of BRICS is/was the economic orientation and the growth story which is again changing.

I think one should now relate both these to the G-20 which I think in India's view, in my view, is the most promising grouping.

You have all the major powers and emerging powers there. India believes in both, IBSA and BRICS but at the moment it seems as if the momentum has gone out of IBSA and BRICS, we will see it is evolving differently.

I: How does India sees the UN?

E: The Indian public, the Indian politicians they have a kind of an unquestioned believe in the UN. If you come to the foreign policy experts, analysts, diplomats, people like me we are less committed to the UN but India as a country and the Indian people they are firm believers in the UN as an international body of all good.

UN that means three different parts, the security part, the human rights part and the developmental issue. This UN system as a whole has been beneficial at a high cost but beneficial.

The human right as I said, we believe in human rights. Not so much in the promotion of human rights and not so much in finger pointing and the punitive aspects but it is there.

In the security part, we did all the things you mentioned, peacekeeping etc. We do not really calculate our efforts in terms of what does it bring for India to keep peace in places like Liberia or Sierra Leone, we simply think it is good because it is the UN. But a system that now for sixty, seventy years shows that it is not able to bring about reform in the processes and the structures etc. so there must be a greater questioning of the UN. That brings us to R2P in a sense.

On the security side, on war and peace side of the UN we have structures which are not responsive to contemporary needs in terms of structure, in terms of analysis.

And I believe that people in India question the decisions taken by the UNSC for that reasons and don't believe that is the final wisdom that in international right terms it is. I think we are seeing, and we will see a development of/towards multilateral organizations on different tracks. Some are based on regional identities some are based on regional factors or other kind of identities.

This is a view that I take in public, but it is not a publicly held view in India: A permanently unreformed UN will lose its credibility and its legitimacy.

I: On norms and principles like sovereignty, non-intervention and human right are there differences between western and southern democracies because of different domestic situation and challenges?

Let us start with human rights. Do we talk about the same human rights when Indians, Brazilians etc. or people from Western countries talk about human rights? What are we talking about, the personal liberties or the social rights like right to have food, health care, a job, housing etc.?

E: [...] It is a deeply problematic question because in India at the level of thinking, the level of any thinking person in India, policy maker or politician, writer etc. there is this very ideal conception of human rights based on [...] freedom, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, freedom of expression and freedom starting with the right to live.

The classical John Stuart Mill or Western thinking that is also in Indian philosophy. Indian philosophy I believe for instance is based on the primacy of the individual and not the community. You will not find in India a sentence like in China "For the sake of the country we sacrifice a village" or so.

On the other hand, a country with this massive poverty in which the right for education, the right for gender equality, the right for food [...] to acquire skills all this we defend, or we even legislate, we made them into right, but we don't have a capacity to provide that. So, there is this deep dichotomy.

In the UN we often say that it is important not only to strengthen the political and civil right but also the economic and social rights. And I would not say that there is a choice between different rights and freedoms and except for the state of emergency as under Indira Gandhi we always followed all of these rights and there are a lot of success stories, where people defended their civil and political freedoms against politicians and media with the help of the constitutional court. On the other hand, people would say that for us it is absolutely necessary to prevent child labor, educate children, prevent hunger and provide economic rights etc. but India does not have

the capacity to guarantee these rights in every sense, it has the commitment to, it has an unfulfilled commitment to do this right, it is not a choice...unfortunately.

I: On no-intervention and non-interference, I read about the panchsheel and the Asian culture in that sense, so when we as Europeans that shifted a lot of sovereignty to the supranational level and Indians talk about sovereignty and non-interference do we have a different feeling where interference begins, where the threshold lies? And are there different understanding and motivations in terms of non-intervention due to the high level of domestic, internal violence, the AFSPA, the Naxalite insurgency or the Jammu and Kashmir conflict?

E: *Non-intervention and non-interference also is a cardinal principle because of the UN system, the classic notion of sovereignty. Panchsheel is not as important (as the principle of sovereignty) but it would be stated as a basic principle like most countries would do. I think the time has certainly passed when India was afraid of being affected by international human rights pressure or issue because of domestic affairs. There may be a period where this was a concern but now nobody seriously.*

I would say today the more interesting or more troubling question for India in the past but even more today is what has been India's own role when it had to play a role in Nepal, in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or the Maldives. Official India has always been very careful to put it in a framework in which it is seen as non-interventionist, but it has always done at the request of the state concerned, with explicit request of the state concerned that is the case with Sri Lanka. But both in 1971 India's assistance to the freedom fighters in Bangladesh and the aerial drops of food supplies in 1987 in Sri Lanka, these are clear examples of India's humanitarian interventions but not so labeled, we never called it humanitarian interventions. But we are aware that in our own neighborhood given these very close linkages that India has with whatever happens in the neighborhood given the geography, the history, the ethnic, linguistic links that absolute non-interference, non-involvement...let's call it non-involvement is a myth. They are involved in our affairs in the border-states, and we are involved in their things.

The line between what is regarded as internal and what as external is a thin line, a grey line, an ambiguous line and we are aware of it. But in terms of principles, it is safest to stick to the ideas of non-intervention, non-interference and so on. It goes back until the Tibetan case and the Dalai Lama seeking refuge in India. Maldives was quite straight forward because there was an official request for India's assistance and then the operation was carried out. Sri Lanka was a more problematic case and now we have Nepal. We are not concerned about the input on India's domestic behavior but we are conscious of how a doctrine like this might impinge on relations with our close neighbors.

I think [...] the shift of doctrine from right to intervene to responsibility to protect was a good shift.

Interview with Brig. Rumel Dahiya, Deputy Director General, IDSA, New Delhi

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I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What from your perspective are the most decisive and influential factors that influence Indian foreign policy?

E: India's foreign policy to my mind is a factor of its internal policies. India wants its people to be prosperous, India wants the internal cohesion of the country, avoids influences that come in the way of the development of India as prosperous, secure nation free from threats like terrorism, intervention in India's internal affairs, a secure neighborhood, free trade, security of the global commons and also to have a very positive and beneficial interaction with all the countries in the world, the major powers but I think the central focus of India's foreign policy because it impacts India's internal situation more is India's neighborhood.

Three concentric circles – neighborhood, extended neighborhood, major powers and beyond the neighborhood. India's interest in bilateral (strategic) partnerships, especially in Africa, where its interests lie as well. Stable neighborhood, free flow of transport, economy and especially IOR must be free of conflict and India doesn't want hegemons. With the new government (Modi) a more forceful articulation of foreign policy.

Non-alignment was a product of times, it allowed to develop an independent foreign policy, not dictated by power blocs and it gave India a leadership role as well.

India's own experience when we showed so much faith in multilateralism and United Nations, I think we do not get a fair deal when we would take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations. We felt that the P5, particularly the Western bloc did not really concern so much about India's complain and India's position and that was a kind of negative feedback that we received from how our complains in the was considered. That did shape relations with other countries because there was an element of suspicion about how other countries will react towards India's concerns.

We had a difficult neighborhood and ever since our independence we have had wars with our neighbors and who did support us at what time or did not support us at those critical moments also impinged on our relations with those countries. And the most prominent role played by some

Western countries, including United States, during the 1971 war [...] when ten million out of a total population of 70 million Bangladeshis came to India and became a grave national security concern for India.

Despite those experiences we tried to have a pragmatic approach in our foreign policy to all countries incl. those countries mentioned and for instance with our colonial power Great Britain we have good relations to our mutual benefit.

The transformation in our relationship with the United States is the most phenomenal change that has taken place in the foreign policy (of India).

Despite differences on Pakistan, border, and other issues we have a pragmatic approach towards China. And despite huge differences in the socio-economic development India shows for instance on the climate issue that it wants to be a constructive contributing force in international politics and wants to play a positive role.

I: India's role in international politics is constantly evolving. What kind of an actor in international politics is India, what kind of an actor would it like to be and what foreign policy instruments are deemed to be suitable for an actor like India?

E: India wants to be an actor that doesn't follow the balance-of-power theory, it wants to be an actor that can help economically, politically, and wherever possible militarily but in the manner that other countries require that help.

Like our development aid in Africa and our neighborhood follows the principle of user demand.

And for instance, capacity building, which is Pillar II of R2P, is something that we really do better than anybody else. We trained not only the peacekeepers, we will train the civil servants, we try to help them in development of their institutions, the election commissions, be it their justice systems, it education, communication and like that.

Large numbers of people from Africa, Afghanistan, India's neighborhood and other countries come to India for training. India wants to be a different power in normative and practical terms, other than the powers the world has seen, not a hegemon etc.

We fully understand that our capacities so far are limited, these capacities are bound to go up with economic growth. [...] With more resources available I think India's contribution in this sphere is going to improve. Similarly in the sphere of security, with growing capacity we will be able to address issues like humanitarian disasters better. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relieve we will be able to provide that better, we will be able to provide more security assistance to other countries, particularly in areas where India's security concerns are greater but even elsewhere if required. India has a biding(?) interest that UN peacekeeping operations are likely to continue.

I: How does India perceive the current existing international order, from New Delhi?

My personal believe is that some of the global institutions do not reflect the realities of today. Bretton Woods institutions, UNSC and other institutions like that [...]

Today India sees it differently. First because the role of global power has been coming down in our time, their capacity to govern the world has been going down. Many other countries have grown, economically, politically, militarily. India thinks there should be a greater share with the developing world on all issues of global governance. [...]

These institutions need to be reformed and we have been trying to reform them but so far, the countries in power have been reluctant to reform these institutions. And as a result, new institutions are founded as everybody can see like AIIB, BRICS development bank etc. and this development will continue in the future if no reform takes place.

I: How does India see BRICS and IBSA, what are the differences, what are the commonalities?

E: BRICS are five different countries with different trajectories in economic terms, different security concerns and all the countries have internal problems to solve which are at the same time common challenges in some regards. Their combined economic heft nevertheless is growing, and their impact will grow in the short and medium term because of their potential in many regards. But again, this group has come up because especially the West refused to bring about changes in the international order/system like UNSC, IMF etc. Thus, despite challenges and differences the five countries have common interests that bring them together but up to now they were not able in BRICS to realize their potential.

I: How does India see the West?

All over I would say India sees West in a positive light, some of its institutions, it shares its liberalism, appreciates the founding and development of EU. But on some issues, we have our concerns.

India believes that the West still believes in the balance-of-power theory. It still tries to checkmate other countries [...]. In some parts India sees West as being arrogant in how it conducts its affairs and refuses to contribute adequately even in climate issues, cause most of the damage that has been done to climate emanates from industrialized West.

Instead of contributing (in climate issues) it tends to pressurize countries in cost of their development. But in many other democracy aspects, freedom of expression, multi-culturalism, liberalism, rule of law etc. these values we share.

We see the West as a very valuable partner for India's own development and also but not only to improve global governance and for global security as well.

I: How does India see the UN?

India believes and had always faith in UN. Our contributions to peacekeeping show our long commitment to UN and its principles. We have problems with decisions of the P5 when the suit their own interests rather than the global interests. Latest case was the option of the UN without a new mandate to advice the peacekeepers to act more robust when necessary but at the same time the UN wants to have the right to criticize the actions taken by the peacekeepers. We don't appreciate that.

If the situation deteriorates on ground the UNSC must immediately take a decision, alright it must not be peacekeeping it must be peace-enforcement and provide resources, provide a political backing for that kind of operation and not leaving it to the people and criticizing them for doing or not doing.

Overall, we think UN has played a useful role in global affairs, global security, albeit sometimes being undermined by major powers working against the charter by intervening in other affairs. We have certain questions about reform and more representation. We don't see why countries like GB or France need to be permanent members of the UNSC while countries like India or Brazil are out of it. That doesn't reflect the current realities.

I: On norms and principals like sovereignty, non-intervention and human right are there differences between western and southern democracies because of different domestic situation and challenges?

E: *Due to our history in the freedom struggle and as well the principles of panchsheel show that sovereignty is weighted very high in India. That is why India has nearly always resisted attempts to intervene in the affairs of other countries.*

At the same time, on the normative level, India has always supported Pillar I and Pillar II of R2P. [...] Our problem lies with Pillar III in that a card blanche given to outside powers to intervene when they want. For example, in Libya, in Kosovo or in the Balkans in general, during cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and in many issues like that. We say the state must request for an aid when there is a huge problem. Primarily the government of any country is responsible to its people, more responsible it should be than any other country from outside, because other countries will play their own games. They will do it for their personal reasons primarily. We are mainly worried about the implementation part.

1971, the principle of R2P, 10 million refugees, intervention in East-Pakistan/Bangladesh because of national security and because the international community did not want to do anything about it because of their own interests. US-China-Pakistan-relations and the question of where were those concerns for human rights and R2P in this situation. Action or non-action determined by interest, cause etc. and not by the amount of human suffering. And Libya is a case in point that we (India) should be careful about R2P and its implementation.

I: Is there a difference or different opinion on the threshold of when to intervene because of a much bigger level of domestic violence in India? And when we talk about human rights are we talking about the same human rights, like individual human rights vs. social human rights?

E: [...] The first order needs of any society should be safety and security and the livelihood. [...] The first part of human rights is human security and in that also the first order thing the person should feel secure and not be traumatized every day, not sure of its own safety, its own life. And second, a person must be able to eat well, it must be able to realize his or hers potential etc. [...]

If the first two pillars of R2P are fulfilled, we can avoid a large number of situations in which an intervention would become a necessity.

Catastrophes and natural disasters beyond the capacity of a state on request by this state to help in disaster relief are probably the best R2P cases. In case of internal troubles, it is very, very difficult and interventions and regime change like in Iraq or Libya have shown the situation after deteriorated.

We went into Sri Lanka on the invitation of the Sri Lankan government, it went not well, things got worse, we lost about a thousand soldiers or so, but one thing stood out – as well in the Maldives – we went in, we did what we had been requested to do and what had been required and went out.

I: What does R2P stand for in your understanding? Since you mentioned disasters and earthquakes there seem to be room from your point of view to discuss and further evolve what R2P is (about) in the future?

E: Yes, of course! One thing is certain, that there can't be a perfect template for R2P anyway, it will depend from situation to situation. Cyclone Nargis is an important reference point. We must understand if a discussion had taken place, then there would have been a realization that probably the degree of a situation deteriorating to a level where R2P becomes necessary wasn't there in case of cyclone Nargis. I think the discussion at that time was more framed by the question of what kind of government existed at that time in Myanmar. And therefore, the assessments made for its inability deliberate because of lack of capacity etc. that kind of discussion was formed more by how we looked at that government over there and not so much by the situation.

A total objective assessment of potential R2P situations without influence of national interests, geography etc. is an utopia but a wider and more fair and equal deliberation with more countries willing to help would produce an agreement of whether to intervene or not intervene with which more countries could agree with. There is a need for a greater kind of consultation process to avoid interventions going for regime change not described in the mandate.

What kind of a political system a country will ultimately follow has to be left to the people of that country and they need to decide what kind of a government they would like to have.

I: The change in the Indian position from 2005 to 2009, from a very harsh critique to a nuanced and balanced attitude in favor of R2P but with reservations about Pillar III: Had it been driven by the permanent representative in 2005 and why did the change, expressed by Hardeep Singh Puri, come about? What were the reasons for it?

E: When R2P came up we were internally debating whether it is wrong or right under what circumstances, we saw what happened in the Balkans, we had our own experiences in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives etc. And all those events unfolding were shaping the debate in India.

So obviously 2005 was early and 2009 gave us four more years to think about it, to get things clearer and articulate our position and ideas clearer.

We are very enthusiastic supporters of Pillar I and Pillar II [...]. Our basic problem lies with Pillar III.

It is the question of implementation and I think even the most enthusiastic western countries in support of R2P still have their difficulties with figuring out, when is it right to do, when is it not right to do, who is going to do it, how much to do etc.

After Libya I think there is less talk about R2P than before albeit terrorism has become the theme that most important overall. But I also think that recent experiences will provide time for thinking more deeply about this. Everybody concerned with peace, security and stability in the world will have to deal with these issues even when it is not under the phrase R2P.

If the debate becomes more inclusive, if the debate becomes more flexible in thinking about other ideas as well than I think there is a possibility that the global standards of R2P could be achieved.

I: Is the way R2P has been followed, carried out, implemented after the Kenyan election crisis in 2007/08 the R2P India is okay with?

E: Absolutely! [...] First: It involved those people who are much closer to Kenya than anybody else. That means involvement of regional countries will have some influence and also a moral influence because they are one of them. [...] Thus, instead of decisions being taken in New York or elsewhere, I think if you involve the regional countries in the discussion [...] and consultation process that is one [very important point we would appreciate]. Second: It was not done so much by force, but it was more done with host state consent and trying to develop in a way with kind of consensus amongst the people, trying to point out with them together what was going to be harmful for them and that kind of thing. So that is a perfect example of R2P, also I know that some violence still took place and irregularities were still reported in the Kenyan election but by and large the situation became less explosive than what it was before.

I: in 2011 we had the UNSC resolutions 1975 on Ivory Coast and 1973 on Libya. India agreed on 1975 and abstained on Libya...

E: *We were mostly in favor of the position of the African Union because there were affected the most and the events thereafter that unfolded in Mali and elsewhere proved that position to be true. The countries of the AU were the countries mostly affected and the biggest stakeholder in that region – with some capacity lacking and some problems but they were the people to be involved because they know things better, they will always have greater moral pressure and can talk to all parties more freely than outsiders.*

I: Yes, but at the same time the probably in this case had the biggest constraints because Ghaddafi used to be the biggest sponsor of the African Union.

E: Absolutely and sometimes an immediate neighbor can also be more part of the problem than part of the solution. But if you involve a regional organization like AU with 53 states it will have definitely greater weight.

It might be quicker sometimes to take a decision from outside and send a few airplanes from an aircraft-carrier but with more and regional countries involved it will be more durable for sure.

I: Can you elaborate just short – because we already touched on this – why India did abstain on 1973 and what were the main points of critique after the NATO-/AL-operation?

E: *What had happened before in places like Iraq did influence us as well. We did never admire Ghaddafi in Libya; we understood what kind of regime it was and we also did not like his eccentric nut sometimes even leaders in democratic systems behave eccentric and all this is not enough for deciding to intervene. He stood for stability and external interventions that were aimed on regime change mostly produce instability. Weapons and extremists are coming from Libya to Syria and thousands of men and women from Europe as well. But from history and recent events we all knew before that a regime change would produce more instability. That was the main reason why we didn't want it in Libya. And the same countries that went for regime change were involved in a lot of business and deals with that very regime before.*

Even though we had several thousand Indian working in Libya which we had a responsibility to protect we had from the beginning the aim of finding a solution that will help for more stability in the region and not less, regardless of R2P or not. We have an interest in stability in this region because we depend on energy supply from that region, we don't want to see the region in flames.

I: After the Libyan disaster the Brazilians came up with the RwP proposal and first the West reacted quite arrogant to this proposal but after some time many people started to recognize that actually it was a good way of calm down the tensions between critics and proponents and to find new ground for future discussions about R2P...

E: There are three ways you can deal with this issue. One: despite the experiences and the worth outcomes that have emerged out of interventions like in Libya you still press ahead with it in the believe that it was right, and you will go ahead with this. Second: you abandon the whole thing and let take countries take action where their interests are involved and the third one is: Responsibility while Protecting. I think this is a very good synthesis of norms and experiences.

There need to be a consultation process about when and why and what is at stake between the countries involved and the countries willing and capable to intervene. And then during intervention don't change the goals while doing it and behave responsible while doing an intervention. And there is enough scope for things like in the case of disaster when with host state consent countries can come for help and show their good will.

I personally feel that the concept is not bad at all, the concept is good. Everybody who believes in human brotherhood, who believes in doing good, I think, has a reason to believe in this.

We should fix the norms first and then deliberate more about the implementation.

And a display of good conduct while doing it will encourage anybody else to come on board.

I: Unfortunately, Brazil gave up on its RwP proposal. Can we expect future contributions by India on the R2P debate about norms and principles?

E: *Brazil mainly lost interest because they did not receive good reactions from the West, also for domestic problems, because the debate was mainly led by Western people and not by others and because of the things that happened on "the ground" during crises in the name of R2P. R2P is a good concept. Not all countries will agree to follow the same path in all situations, because national interest will influence their decisions. Helping states in cases of disaster catastrophe*

etc. under the umbrella of humanitarian assistance will help to widen the scope and make things more receptive for the idea of R2P.

India being part of R2P is not something that is being ruled out. It depends on what label you give to R2P, under what circumstances you do R2P and with what intentions.

So, the question of intentions, with what intentions you go there and what is the aim of doing all that, I think is extremely important and this must form part of the debate before coming to some kind of workable normative parameters. [...]

When you go for an intervention, your purpose should be defined very well in advance and this purpose should not in any way change in way of life of the people or the form of democracy they want reach or something like that. If the main aim (of R2P) is humanitarian assistance and if you are trying to reduce the conflict and the suffering of the people if that be so than R2P will succeed. But if you either shift the goalpost later or if you go with an intention of trying to make the people more like us than you will fail and not very many people will come on board.

Interview with Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, Coordinator of the South Asia Centre, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Büro des Interviewpartners
Datum des Interviews: 24.11.2016, vormittags und 26.11.2016 nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 01:59h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What from your perspective and your view are the most decisive and influential factors that influence Indian foreign policy?

E: [...] If you want to analyze India's foreign policy you have to bring in a whole host of things. One is the idea of India. You cannot underestimate the ideas that saved India. [...] The idea of panchsheel. [...] For a long period of time India took pride in the fact that it achieved its independence without violent means.

That is why in India's foreign policy pronouncement the non-use of force was very important. Its natural sympathies lie with the West because it is a free country and a democracy. But because so much of disparity and so much poor people India resorted to a command economy. So India started as a democracy with Fabian socialist means because of its socio-economic realities and for more egalitarian distribution of resources that was needed. The level of poverty was incredible high at that time.

India was always conscious of its poverty, its lack of power. Our first prime minister in many of his speeches dwelled on this fact. India is destined to play a big role in international politics, but this is not our moment. We are poor, we do not have adequate power to make our voice heard. [...]

But at the same time Nehru talked about a lot of normative issues such as non-alignment, the need for a peaceful world, without being divided into power blocs. India wanted to avoid choosing side, but it could not entirely avoid this bloc thing but it chooses deliberately and conscious the politic of non-alignment. But when it came to protect Indian interest, they chose a very much realistic line. So, it turned to the US in 1962 (Indo-China-War) for help. Nehru anecdote in NY about being introduced to businesspeople and then the businesspeople introduced to him as very important because their wealth were so many times higher than the Indian GDP. Nehru asking his foreign secretary "did they brought me here to make me small, insult me, humiliate me?". Made a deep negative impact on him.

A country which was waking up from colonialism, tremendously aware of its own poverty and powerlessness but not surrendering its dignity. This characterizes, I would say, the Indian approach to global affairs. [...] until today this effects India's foreign policy: extreme awareness of its weakness and at the same time non-readiness to surrender its dignity. [...]

The awareness of its rich cultural past, the consciousness that it had a potential at one point of time, at some stage of history to be one of the dominant powers in the world. [...] Thus India will never like to be seen as a follower. A tremendous sense of pride about it. You can find a similar trace of pride in Iranians, Chinese, Russians... [...] They are so conscious about their civilization and cultural legacy that they would not like to be seen as subordinate to anybody. [...] That (attitude) is there and that defines the Indian identity.

I: India's role in international politics is constantly evolving. What kind of an actor in international politics is India, what kind of an actor would it like to be and what foreign policy instruments are deemed to be suitable for an actor like India?

E: *India has never tried to spell out, India is a country who doesn't have a grand strategy or a white paper. But if you look at the annual reports of the MEA it says that India will assume its rightful place but in a peaceful world with liberty, justice equity without blocs but a multipolar world without a single or more countries that impose their will on others.*

The whole Kashmir issue had a pivotal role in regard to India's attitude towards the West. There was a plebiscite in 1951 and we regard this as the will of the people, but it was not accepted by the UN. The Anglo-Saxon camp did treat India not fair in regard to Kashmir because Pakistan was an ally of them despite the fact that India was a democracy and Pakistan a dictatorship. The tried to blame India and to launch UN resolutions against India. In 1959 there was again a try to force their will on India and since then India looked away from the West. But without asking them, Soviet Union did bloc UN resolution incl. chapter VII measures and that was the beginning we looked positively at Soviet Union. And in 1971 there was the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship not of alliance but defense cooperation. But India's non-alignment is also not cast in stone. There is always room to maneuver but non-alignment was our way of keep our head up high and to keep our strategic autonomy. [...]

All efforts from the American side on track one and track two level to get India again as an ally will fail. We will have strategic partnership agreement but not alliance. A lot of Americans are coming here and tell us, when you become an ally all the goodies will start flowing in and we say "thank you, we will never be an ally". [...] India will rather be an Asian France but never become a second Japan in regard to the US.

India liberalizes its economy; it develops and thus its foreign policy outlook might change a little bit, but it will not give up on the guiding principles of its foreign policy which is the quest for strategic autonomy. That is why India will never join in an alliance with the Americans. "walk-alone-policy"

Anti-Alliance, pro strategic autonomy, I think these are the two principles that define India's foreign policy.

I: How does India perceives the current existing international order?

E: India is very reluctant to be projected as a world power. Because power brings so much of responsibilities, this is one reason. The other is a great awareness of the incapacity to assume that role. We have still not arrived, like China.

India is still such a poor country. Go just 10km out of Delhi and you will find how poor India is. 40 to 50 percent of the people living below 1 Dollar a day. People overestimate India's ability to be a world power. We have not sufficiently addressed the issue of economic disparity, we still lacking jobs, houses, access to education, energy etc. that is why we still have this massive left-wing extremism in India.

We have a long, long way to go until we can India consider to be a world power.

There are so many mutinies and revolutions in India every day because of poverty and social issues. The cast issue is die-hard even today. There are so many issues to deal with at home, domestically that India simply does not have the resources to fulfil the role the world expects from India or would like India to play. India is aware of its own deficiencies, but other people grossly exaggerate India's capacities and thus call India a free rider, not a responsible stakeholder etc.

While India is shy of making its mark on international politics it is still very jealously guarding its pre-eminence in the region. So, India's foreign policy outlook, I would say, has several, different layers to it. The first layer the region and then the extended region and then the wider world.

First cycle, the region, it is natural pre-eminence not hegemony and India is very sensitive to extra-regional power influence/intervention except for US intervention in Afghanistan. It is not about controlling the region but to make sure that countries in the region do not work against India's (security) interests.

India never wanted to impose its ideology on others. [...] If there are democracies (in the neighborhood/region) we will be happy, but we will not impose it.

I: How does India see “the West”, BRICS, IBSA, UN?

E: There is something called the “new international economic order” and India thought the international order is anarchical, a typical realist perception, but there is need for norm to come in and give it a sense of purpose and order and in that sense India regards UN as a very, very useful instrument, a useful institution.

That is the reason for India's very positive approach towards the UN even if India does not have the ambition to be a world power, but it wants to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. UN is a very well-regarded institution in India.

But India believes the reality of the 1940's when UN was founded holds no longer true and UN needs to reinvent itself, has to reform itself and India as a rising economy, not a rising power, has its role to play. [...] In the cold war years India regarded the UN also as an institution

manipulated by the world powers, P5, and a lot of discrimination there, for example non-proliferation, NPT and other regimes like that. [...] India never joined NPT and other clubs because it did not want to become a member of such clubs which does not respect its own norms.

It took a moral position for that reason or even a realist position when you see that Nehru who said India won its independence through non-violent means turned to the US to ask for military assistance, signed a military treatment with Russia or later when India became a nuclear power. After the cold war the Indian and US interests, liberal values etc. did converge and economic reforms took place and that all lead to the sign of the Indo-US-civil-treatment but still India will not give up its strategic autonomy and is looking for a multipolar world or better non-polar world. India always has a non-polar outlook.

If you look at IBSA, BRICS or SCO, India does not regard these institutions as poles or nodes that dictate norms to the rest of the international community. They are partners for economic growth and helping to ensure that not one single power like the US will be dominant as a pole anymore and dominate others.

India is reflexively averse to polarity in international politics/order. [...] In questions of India's security or survival, there India is a realist. [...]

But even its nuclear tests are not offensive but rather defensive deterrence. India is torn between being a civilization and a bordered Westphalian nation state.

I: On norms and principals like sovereignty, non-intervention and human right are there differences between Western and Southern democracies because of different domestic situation and challenges? We are using the same words, but do they mean the same thing?

E: [...] India is very sensitive to these concepts – again here the cultural issue comes up. Cultural speaking India has always been a stratified society, very stratified. Each cast had its own role to play, its own status in society. [...] For a hierarchical society to adopt this non-hierarchical norm was fabulous. In 1947 when the world was not ready for women rights, India adopted them.

But these norms still have not been adopted and there are fight and mutinies going on, every day, at different levels. [...] India is still a very intense stratified society, and each cast does have its own outlook. The interaction of imposing a non-hierarchical set of values on a hierarchical society to eliminate those hierarchies is still going on and will go on for a long time. You had several hundred years of struggle in Europe and North America to adopt those values and for us they were alien but we welcomed them in our freedom movement. Thus, India is not opposed to those norms, but it is certainly opposed to the way these norms are practiced. The international consciousness did not awake to certain realities like the killing of the Belutschistans in Pakistan, many thousands of people in Rwanda or Bosnia. If we have certain norms, they should be followed and have a meaning in total and not selectively. Thus, India has a problem with the selectively enforcement of these norms, values etc. but no problem with the norms at all. All the conventions had been there before R2P came up; they were there like the convention on genocide, but they have not been followed in many cases.

End of Part I

Part II

I: What does R2P stands for in your understanding, what comes to your mind?

E: [...] We have moved from 1940's when the UN came up, there were a lot of emphasis on individual liberty, from individual liberty we came to human rights – it was a quantum jump I would say in terms of the responsibility evoked. [...] The R2p is a concept that has taken all this discourse to a new level, quite an acceptable level. And as a concept, as a norm I think it is universally accepted. But the problem about R2P was how it was pursued in practice. [...]

I: There are several explanations for the change in the Indian position from 2005 to 2009. What do you think, from your point of view, was decisive for the change? Was it a change?

E: [...] The hangover of the cold war, this reflex was pretty much there (in 2005), which persists even to this date, the suspicion about the west [...]. And when the Bosnian thing came up, Kosovo came up and this Rwanda thing came up and during that time you had the Kashmir burning as well here. So, there was also a fear that if this instrument is being given to the P5, then it will be misused, it will be misused by them to intervene in different areas. And at the time India had just beginning to open up to the West. Between 2002 and 2005 the discussion was going on between the US and India about this nuclear issue.

And the Americans told India during that discussion that they should reduce the number of their nuclear facilities and put them under international control. That is why a lot of suspicion was there. India was coming out of this cold war mindset into these discussions about opening up to the free world and R2P. So, albeit the economy went better and better, there was still this cold war mindset predominant in the diplomatic corps. And they really had the fear that if they welcome the R2P it will be more difficult to criticize the concept when the P5 might use it to intervene in India's affairs. And in 2005 we had 71 or more districts heavily affected by Naxalite terrorism and uprising, a huge wave of left-wing extremism. So, you had a lot of internal problems that one could probably link up with the human rights issue of R2P and be used against India.

And the cold-war-reflex, anti-Western-reflex was still there, and Nirupam (Sen) was a bright example of that. [...] In fact, he was very, very pro-Soviet Union in his outlook. So, there was this personality factor, but I would say that more than only the personality factor that was the combined outlook didn't approve of India joining this campaign wholeheartedly.

The memory of the West and China (P4) to nail India, to bully India during the 50's and 60's with anti-India resolutions in the UNSC that memory died hard. India was a democracy and Pakistan was not a democracy and India was blamed for even ostensibly clear facts that were in favor of the Indian argumentation and decision. It was so strange that the "free world" took the side of Pakistan and not of India and the Anglo-American camp even produced false stories about Soviet Union invasion to get Pakistan as an ally.

The principle was not a problem, but India and Nirupam kept also referring to the double standards of the West/the world powers. Nirupam Sen was more emotional on this topic than later Hardeep Singh Puri. By 2009 we were in a different position.

By 2009 the civil-nuclear-deal had been signed, by 2009 our economy grew by 9 to 10 percent rate of growth. We had a lot of confidence then but still we did think we shouldn't support a norm which can be misused, still that thing died hard. Was Hardeep Puri infected by that cold war virus? Never! He was a very pragmatic guy, very open, pragmatic, pro West kind of a person but still when it came to protect Indian interest [...] we don't trust the Americans that much. I must tell you another thing. All this while even the civil-nuclear-deal was signed there was a constant effort by the Americans during the discussions on India to sing into an Alliance, which we did not like.

A lot of Americans came to India, IDSA etc. and at the end always told us what kind of a benefit it would be to be an American ally. It was distressful because every discussion even about topics like Iran or climate change, they brought it to this question, we are really disgusted by this question. The two most tailed embassies in Delhi by our intelligence are still the embassy of Pakistan and the US not Chinese or others. One high ranked intelligence officer I did ask why the US embassy, I do understand the reasons for the Pakistani embassy, but why the US? Answer: You can never trust these bastards. And this albeit there is so much convergence between India and America, but the bully image of the US persists.

And that explains that the more enthusiastic US is about R2P the more suspicious one becomes.

And even the more open stance in 2009, Hardeep Puri's speech underlines this attitude and the believe that this R2P will be only followed if (US) strategic interests are touched. And we were very much in favor of the Brazilian RwP proposal but some of the Indian diplomats were disappointed by the fact that the Brazilians turned it down after being blackmailed by the Americans.

I: What do you think about the R2P practice in the case of the Kenyan election crisis? Is that a practice of R2P India is in line with?

E: [...] India said – if I remember correctly – we have problems with R2P but there are cases where this principle might be invoked. [...] Because AU was involved, and I think in Hardeep Puri's statement he referred to that. In certain cases, the regional organizations are being overlooked.

The Iraq war of 2003 India could not accept. Because how it was done, because US didn't bring it to the UN and because Saddam Hussein was one of our finest friends in that area, despite his sometimes-bad behavior and they have not found an alternative to him yet. He was one of the most secular faces in this entire region.

I: In 2011 India, Brazil, South Africa, and Germany was in the UNSC. We had two cases: Ivory Coast and Libya. On the Libyan case the Resolution 1973 went through with 10 members voting in favor and 5 members that abstained, beneath them India, Brazil, and Germany. After the NATO-AL-campaign many countries criticized NATO for exceeding the mandate and going for regime change. Is that how the Indian argument goes?

E: All the things India was afraid of became true. [...] It was ostensibly more anti Gaddafi than pro R2P that is how it was conceived. Even in our private discussion here everybody was pointing out this is not R2P. It was conceived as simply getting Gaddafi out of the way.

It was not about helping the people that Gaddafi threatened to kill, because we believe he was trying to bluff them into submission. But the way this whole drama was orchestrated was more about getting his head than anything else. And from there to Syria and the drama was repeated.

I would not say India felt betrayed but confirmed in its doubts and suspicions. [...] States are rational entities they pursue their interests first and invoke norms next. Norms are basically tools to serve their interests, that is exactly what the world powers are doing. [...] How world powers use norms to push their agendas is something that is deep in the Indian minds.

In its own sphere of interest, India interprets its own moral values in its own way.

I: After Libya and in the beginning on the case of Syria it looked as if the IBSA countries will join camp with Russia and China and there will be a homogenous BRICS position on that issue in the future but pretty soon the IBSA positions differed more and more from the Russian and Chinese ones. Was it because of Rwp proposed by the Brazilians, or because of the different situation between Russia and China and IBSA countries or what were the reasons?

E: *The West reacted very arrogant to the Brazilian Rwp proposal and later changed this approach towards this very good idea. But this first approach of the West and especially the US, the initial arrogance was interpreted here as another evidence for the fact that the West, the Americans did not want to shackle themselves by the norms and principles and their restrictions they came up with. The refused the important point of accountability that came in with Rwp.*

I: Can we expect India – albeit its huge domestic challenges - in the nearer future to contribute to all this norm discussions, discussions on new world order etc. in a way comparable to what the Brazilians did with Rwp, not specifically on R2P but on important discussions about values, guidelines, rules, norms in different areas of international politics?

E: *The more we fix our problems and become self-confident, there will be a growing aptitude for India to become a responsible player in the Western sense of the term because I would say India is very much a responsible player in international politics even today. If you look at the geopolitical, geostrategic context in which India is operating you will understand why India did not sign into the refugee laws even though it respects universal values. There are 15 million people from Bangladesh in India today, there Tibetans, there Pakistani refugee or from Afghanistan. Here the situation is less a Westphalian and more that of a South Asian context of Indian civilization.*

So, in that sense India's responses will be conditioned by its own experiences as well. Just imagine it would sign in into the refugee thing. India could not afford to ensure the required standard of living for the refugees that it cannot grant to its own people. [...] I'm not sure that India has the intention to come out with a counter norm [...] and I think India is so enmeshed with its problems all around that it will not have time for that kind of norm setting.

That will take time until this will happen. It is not there at the moment because of its deep, deep awareness of its powerlessness and poverty. And the thing with the refugees is as well true for the climate change. We must have a lot of cheap energy to get our poor people, 60 percent that live with less than a Dollar a day, out of poverty. If we talk about the per capita emission, it is hypocrisy. In the place where I come from, they still have only two hours electricity per day, 22 hours there is no electricity. Things have not developed there, and people continue to live primitive lives. But when we tell them to talk about per capita emissions, they refuse to accept and recognize our responsibility to our people.

And this is where our trust in the existing international order disappears.

And that fuels India's unwillingness to take part in this norm contestation and its mistrust in the West.

I: Is there anything you would like to add or to ask me?

E: No thank you.

Interview with Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, now Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
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I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What from your perspective are the most influential factors of Indian foreign policy?

E: Obfuscation, the whole world is illusion. So, you keep looking for something distant, try to make it sound profound while it actually isn't. And that is a big part of our foreign policy. It was necessary at some point to play when India didn't had an economy to go on. It was necessary to play on India's soft power, which is all this philosophical mumbo-jumbo but what India needs to realize is that Western thinking has moved on. Our foreign policy is suited to a racist 40's, 50's, early 60's Western thinking and not to an 80's, 90's, 2000 style thinking. It's an over reliance on soft power. I think soft power is one of them, and the soft power aspects of history. That is the most influential element in foreign policy.

I: India's role in international politics is constantly evolving. How does India see itself? What kind of an actor in international relations is India, what kind of an actor would it like to be and what foreign policy instruments are deemed to be suitable for an actor like India?

E: (?) *aspiring, refusing to accept responsibility. Simple example: Even though anti-colonialism is no longer a force, why is it that we find ourselves so comfortable to align with Russia, China, Brazil, and South Africa grouping, and not with America, Italy, Germany or someone like that? They are not colonial power anymore, so why do you feel the need to oppose them all the time. The second thing is: Now that India got a nuclear acceptance for itself it doesn't seem to give a damn about what happened after it. It is still up to the old powers to do the enforcement and India is only there to get on the table. If it is there on the table, it is there to offer its opinions and not back it up with any hard power or bring any jurisdiction, intelligence etc. to the table. So, India is always looking out for getting into things that it isn't and it does nothing to justify its position that table.*

I: We will talk about that later, when we talk about own contributions toward norm contesting, where India is very reluctant like other countries as well...

E: But India doesn't contest norms. It accepts those norms, or it says no. But it wants to join those norms as a rule maker and not a rule follower even though it doesn't have the intellectual capacity or diplomatic skill to contribute in any positive way to rule making. Rulemaking requires a very strong rule of law at home, huge amount of mid-career-training for your diplomats and bureaucrats to understand norms and things. It requires massive resource which we don't invest. Investing in human resources, the Indian economy won't allow it. We are an agricultural economy, an overwhelmingly agricultural economy in which human beings are dispensable. You don't understand value addition, especially not human resources value addition, which is very important in an industrial or a Western society. It is essentially like the poor man, the plebeian sitting on a patrician table, deciding what should happen when a bred ride happens. He feels like a plebeian because he knows he is poor even he is sitting on a table in Rom with these Julius Cesar etc. and he does not have any options when Cesar decides to send out his legions to kill all these writers, but he will not raise his voice for the writers either. [...]

I: How does India perceives the existing international order?

E: The honest answer to that question is India doesn't know. It feels that there are some elements of it that suited. Justice doesn't enter the discourse, the thinking. It will pass it off as justice, but it will always look at what is good for me or what is not good for me and it wants everywhere something that is good for it, claiming that it is a rule abider, and it needs a place at the high table. Everything that it doesn't suit – intellectual property rights for instance, it will never accept intellectual property rights this one of the things India rejects completely based on social justice. Social justice cannot be achieved through property rights. IPR is a capitalist advanced country thing. In fact, it is much more ambiguous than the Chinese position. The Chinese position is very clear. Now that they are one of the big boys, they want things to change to suit their interpretations as well. With India is not like that and unlike the Chinese who come up with hundreds of bogus theories – at least I think they are bogus theories – India doesn't even come up with these bogus theories. It is a “cut and paste approach” to international politics. I will take an IPR definition from China but a German industrial law code from Germany or such thing...there is no ideational capacity there. So, your question is based on the existence of ideational capacity. If ideational capacity doesn't exist, your answer has to be “I don't know”. I'm going to be like a chimpanzee that doesn't know how to make a car but I'm going to pretend to make a car.

I: But are there still people in India's government or foreign office that perceive the current international order as still imperialist or colonial like in the Nehruvian time...

E: Very frequently. I think the difference is venom has gone out of the discourse. It is not couched in those nasty anti-colonial “Oh you are a white imperialist pig” things like that but that resentment is still there. The inferiority complex is very much there, which is why they keep saying “oh, Bretton-Woods”. Bretton-Woods institution actually serves us quite well and yet this childish enthusiasm about this new BRICS bank. The Chines blocked every development loan to India's Northeast in the Asian Development Bank. Why are they going to allow you to use this money for your development if they continue blocking it in the ADB. But there is this childish enthusiasm “wow BRICS bank” but still stuck in this anti-colonial...it's a biological reflex. We can't separate material interest from our biological inherited group thing.

I: How does India perceives “the West”?

E: [...] We compartmentalize the West into lots of different categories. In the security category, there is the West with which we are extremely comfortable with. There is Russia...no, that is not the West, not the way you define West, but for us they still white European people. But for us in the security environment we are very comfortable with talking to the Israeli or the French. The Israelis I would say are closer to us than the Russians are and the French only slightly less close than the Russians. [...] With the rest of it ...again, it depends on the situation. It is largely mistrust with the Americans and the British and with the rest it is indifference. India seems to give a damn even about Britain these days, it is mostly America centric. Mistrust, indifference, trust depending on the countries that is in the security sphere.

Culturally America is everything. We don't look at culture beyond America or sometimes Britain. We don't have any primary language expertise in any other language. No primary one in French, Spanish, German [...] so whole of Europe is completely unknown quantity.

We don't spent money on research, researchers to go there. What we read about Europe comes from Europhobic British or American publication. “Europe is the biggest open-air museum” or “the European experiment failed” nonsense like this you will hear very often. With Europe there is only an unnuanced fragmented picture out of different statements. With America is much more complex because we seek their approval more than anybody else and yet we don't trust them.

I: How does India see the UN nowadays? How does India navigate between sticking to the UN while at the same time due to the UN not being reformed looking at club governance like IBSA, BRICS, G20. Can you elaborate a little bit on this relationship in regard to India's foreign policy?

E: BRICS is something we got out of the reaction of a jilted lover. *G4 group, yeah, we got BRICS another forum to give us a voice.* What is the actual benefit of BRICS? What I said about the BRICS bank before. We actually did put some 50 or 25 billion dollars into something we will never see a return on, or probably never will see a return on. With the UN I found it surprisingly a single point focus and this is permanent membership. Everything we do is aimed at permanent membership.

It is not a holistic approach of (UN) engagement. We used to be big in peacekeeping, but that share is declining now with a quite significant drop. The more prosperous a country gets the least it contributes troops to the UN missions.

Everything India does at the UN is not deliberate it is just happened. If you look how India works at the UN it doesn't actually gives anybody any confidence in India's leadership. There is no visible cost-benefit-analysis in India's foreign policy in regard to the UN and India's decision taking, sponsoring resolutions etc. It's all about we want to be a permanent member. Other members don't trust India because that can't see why India acts how it acts, because there is no cost-benefit-analysis that would make India predictable, and no one wants an unpredictable power at the UNSC. Everything revolves permanent membership.

I: On norms and principals like sovereignty, non-interference, non-intervention and human rights are there differences between Western and Southern democracies because of different domestic situation and challenges?

E: Indians don't value freedom of speech or freedom of expression very highly. *In one of the latest opinion polls only 44 percent thought they are important. The maintenance of law and order was more important than freedom of speech. That is because of the rude environment and the socio-economic situation we live in with brutal police oppressing people. You need to reach a certain development level to think of the liberal freedoms. The way India analyzes it is "sovereignty", which comes from this biological reflexive anti-colonialism, and which is that sovereignty is absolute. Interestingly some of the countries we aligned with in the anti-colonial movement were far more worth than the imperialist we used to condemn. Mugabe killed more of his people than Cecil Rhodes (Ian Smith) did. Mao killed seven times as much Chinese than the Japanese Imperial Army. [...] But we stay always against the imperialists/colonialists, reflexively, without thinking, because that is what school teaching and college teaching did indoctrinate us. Sovereignty means absolute sovereignty including the right to kill your own people. They (Indian officials) will never say that out in public, but if you add up everything that is what it adds up to. All our friends during the cold war were repressive regimes, which confused the Americans.*

Sovereignty is absolute in Indian thinking. If Assad uses chemical weapons, that is his right. Let him use chemical weapons, that is fine. He has to do, what he has to do to re-establish order. This all reflects "anti-colonialism-theme/reflex", our socio-economic situation and our economic reality that still prefers order/status quo over a lack of order (if justice means a lack of order or India is afraid that a lack of order might be the result of attempts to bring justice as in the Libya case etc.).

Prohibition on the use of force is Hardeep Puri's speech where he talks about the six (?) pillars and why the use of force should be the absolute last pillar. Now the question is where was that last pillar when India corresponded on the Mali resolution with France? I mean you hadn't exhausted any other option and the only Indian interest were to protect our uranium mines in Niger. So, at some level there is this pragmatism, but it is extremely rare and remember India never did anything in Mali. [...] But to be fair to India: Mali was no regime change operation whereas Libya was a regime change operation. [...]

I: Maybe some of India's convictions come from the historical experience of 1971 and the condemnation of its Bangladesh intervention which actually looked like a perfect R2P case even though there was no R2P at that time.

E: [...] India did have a problem with Pakistan killing its people. India did have a problem with Pakistan importing its problems to India. It was the refugee problem in India which people don't realize. It was a massive economic...India was a dirty poor country at that time. [...] India will use R2P when it suits India's interests. As any particular bureaucrat perceives who is most powerful at that time perceives it to be, because policy making in the MEA is so heavily personalized. It depends on which diplomat is at what post at what time, what his proximity to the prime minister is, or what his proximity to the foreign minister is and what the proximity of the foreign minister and national security adviser to the prime minister is. There is no institutional systematic approach to this. [...]

Use of force is in India a very shade of grey kind of subject. In Europe there is a much more linkage to interest. You intervene or threaten the use of force in countries where you have interest or political or economic stakes. But this is not the fact for India because it is not a completely globalized country which can afford to take an armed chair drivers view in countries where it doesn't have an interest. It can afford to be moral because you can afford to be moral if you don't have a horse in the race.

I: What comes first to your mind if you hear the term R2P, what does it stand for in your view?

E: Regime change. From everything I did hear about R2P it was designed to stop something like Rwanda happening again. But the point is everything you have seen about R2P would have not stopped Rwanda. [...]

I: Where do you see the reason for the change in India's position 2005 and 2009 towards R2P from harsh criticism in 2005 to nuanced critical acceptance in 2009? Personality of Nirupam Sen as some people argue?

E: I would agree, and we already talked about how much personality influences policy in India. [...] But the problem remains, we never developed a cost-benefit-analysis, what is India's interest, how do you calculate India's interest. *And if you don't have a framework, a theory and don't know how to find out what your interest is, then of course you become much more unpredictable, and it is possible that individuals can bring their heavily personalized interpretation of things into policy making. When you lack all this, you will sometimes have this rock star/superstar ambassadors which can pretty much hijack a certain agenda. And the change from Nirupam Sen to Hardeep Singh Puri is exactly a result of that. If you look at pillars one and two: assistance and things like that are like world peace, motherhood, apple pie etc. everyone can agree to that, everyone supports it but the use of force is where it becomes important, the test, where decisions have to be made. Would any country really object to pillar one or two.*

I: 2011 IBSA and Germany in the UNSC. Two "R2P resolutions" in Ivory Coast and Libya. You already told me that the biggest complain about Libya here in India is that NATO and Arab League changed the operation from protecting the people of Benghazi to becoming the "Airforce of the rebels" and regime change...

E: ...yeah, that is the biggest argument...it is the only argument here in India and it just perpetually feeds into that great conspiracy theory that the West don't really care about human rights and other things accept their own interest and it was an interest-based decision to go into Libya. [...]

We had that former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans. I was at a panel with him and we were talking about R2P. *He argued that the whole Libyan situation was unpredictable, and they expected the Gaddafi forces to do revenge killings and another Rwanda to happen. And I can understand because when you are in the field, in the thick of things, you have to take decisions you cannot talk long about philosophical questions and things look different. [...] India is not involved and thus we have the luxury of looking at it from a far distance, we can afford*

philosophizing. We don't want to be hurt on R2P and we will talk a lot, but will India contribute constructively to R2P? Never!

I: The Brazilian RwP initiative...

E: I don't know. I know that there was a proposal called RwP when it first came about. And at that time, I remember there was Turkish-Brazilian proposal on Iran's nuclear program as well. I don't know what the Indian position or thinking was at that time but for me the thing is: there was this irritation of countries in the field being driven by operational reality, 50 percent operational reality, 50 percent realpolitik [...] getting irritated by armed chair generals coming and trying to micromanage a war that they weren't fighting. [...] Countries that wanted to lecture without doing. [...] When I see Human Rights Watch or Amnesty etc. talking about things happenings in Israel or India, I can see there is a huge difference between what they are saying and what is actually happening. [...]

And I believe the first Western reaction towards the RwP proposal was mainly driven by the reaction of countries in the field lectured by others not doing anything.

I: Can we expect India in the future to make more contributions to the changing world order, to the norm contesting, engage more in the ongoing discussions about the global commons etc.?

E: No, India's capacity deficit is so acute. If you look at Indian think tanks here in Delhi, all stuffed with former bureaucrats. [...] They have never said anything new; they never came up with new proposals, they only rehearsing old things. Value addition, zero. [...] And the way I see it for the next 20 or 25 years at least: we can't come up with any credible alternate proposal on anything.

India only has a view on its neighborhood. Beyond that it likes to ignore and allow other people to deal with it. I'm against the principle of representation in regard to UN reform/UNSC, permanent seat of India etc. just because it is a big country with a big population. If you don't know what is going on in the rest of the world and why...a big population is not enough to give you the right to decide about what is going on in the rest of the world. It is a capacity deficit over the whole board not just diplomatic corps size. In international negotiations like defense negotiation, we don't take international lawyers with us, we don't understand contract negotiations. It is only the bureaucrats, and we are not bringing any knowledge from outside into those processes, negotiations etc. It is a generalized trained bureaucracy without any specialization dealing with very complex and micro-specialized things and this is why the keep thinking of things in esoteric terms. If they would start going into the details anybody would soon find out they don't know the subject.

That is why I think our future contribution will be non-existent to negligible at best.

Interview with Ambassador Sheel Kant Sharma, former Secretary General of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: India International Center
Datum des Interviews: 24.11.2015, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:55h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What from your perspective are the most decisive and influential factors that influence Indian foreign policy?

E: Indian foreign policy is firmly rooted in its domestic concerns. In the sense that for the last ten years under Manmohan Singh and now under Modi the focus is on comprehensive domestic uplift. And foreign policy has to play complementary to this thing. That is a transformation which has come about slowly though it was there at the time of Nehru after independence. He also felt [...] that the focus has to be on this poor country to maintain democracy, maintain the country together and to do nation building. That is why he chose to keep the country out of conflicts – non-alignment. [...]

But the sense of strategic autonomy which is a kind of a function of non-alignment is there today though with a closer relationship with the US. The reason is: misunderstanding with the US during Cold War cost India very much. [...] Politically in D.C., in Washington, India was treated as an enemy and Pakistan as a friend. That has been turned around. [...]

I: India's role in international politics is constantly evolving. What kind of an actor in international politics is India, what kind of an actor would it like to be and what foreign policy instruments are deemed to be suitable for an actor like India?

E: India today is an active actor in foreign policy. It's role is not at all passive, not at all isolationist, it is reaching out and engaged with the international community. [...] It is engaging with UN; it is engaging with the US and the major powers bilaterally. Then they have these groups like BRICS, G20, SCO, ASEAN, EAS, ASEAN-India-Summit [...]. India absolutely believes, without a doubt, that interdependence and links within this interdependence are vital. In our neighborhood, despite problems, in the last twelve, thirteen years, we have been trying to engage asymmetrical, non-reciprocal with our neighbors because we think this is best for our region, for the stability that you remain engaged. And it is very active engagement.

There is as well interest to push SAARC and cautious engagement in Middle East.

But Africa for instance, India is very active. We just had an Africa Summit in Delhi, where 53 states came. [...] With Latin America our trade has expanded.

I: On norms and principals like sovereignty, non-intervention and human right are there differences between western and southern democracies because of different domestic situation and challenges?

E: Our media is louder and more alert than in some countries of the West, also when it comes to issues against the prime minister, and as well in the rural areas. *We have an open system that has taken root and cannot be reversed by single person or party.*

Violations of human rights in a sense that could happen in other countries are difficult here. They might be hidden, there might be institutionalized violence like the caste violence which takes place or violence at home which might take place against women [...]. We have strict laws. [...] So, I would say that these liberal principles are ingrained now in our system (*and cannot be reversed albeit they are not followed by everybody and law abidance is a problem*). *But we have a growing middle class of hundred or two hundred million people.*

If you see India's foreign policy, you must read Nehru's "Tryst with Destiny-Speech". [...] We know what sovereignty is and we are very jealous, very concerned about it. So, violation of sovereignty it means a lot to us. And the way the world has moved. We were in 50's and 60's in the decolonization movement very much upfront. About South Africa we were strongly against the rule of apartheid. That was all because of our own experience. So, because of the colonial yoke today we cherish our independence and sovereignty. So even in the UN our basic point is sovereign equality of nations.

Take the example of Maldives. They did things we actually cannot tolerate. We had a positive vote from all SAARC countries that those things cannot be tolerated. Shouldn't we intervene. Look at the US, they intervene in their backyard, like in Grenada, Nicaragua etc. Maldives is very much our strategic backyard, but we kept counseling, trying to give advice, talk etc. But we did not intervene. The same in Nepal and in Sri Lanka. We kept talking, counseling don't do this, don't do that. We tried not to bully, not to embarrass them. We try to avoid the "big country-syndrome". And in our environment, it is very smart to talk peace instead of aggression. It's an area with a huge population of about 1.6, 1.7 billion people, the majority of them younger than 30. They are looking for sports, jobs, education, entertainment. If you don't give them this you will have insecurity and terrorism.

I: What does R2P stands for in your understanding, what comes to your mind?

E: On the one hand it is a good idea, a noble vision, the global governance ideas. India cannot but subscribe to those ideas, but in practice each of these noble ideas have been subservient to very crass and cynical politics. [...] The UN is a dangerous place. That stigma remains with the UN. It is dangerous because beneath the cloak of noble ideas people have been pursuing very, very limited, very, very cynical, almost mercenarily goals. So "right to protect" for instance, interventions have not acquitted themselves wherever they have gone with that. So many unanswered questions. [...]

Many of these noble ideas come from Europeans and they have been pushed by Nordic countries but when they hit the ground of reality many of them grow. And their actual version of today is grossly distorted. And 2015 with the background of Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Mali it makes you shrink a little bit. But even without them, even the 90's version, see for instance Cambodia. [...] We had Cambodia conferences. All the world powers were there. The P5, Japan, Korea, India, ASEAN. And they settled under the auspices of the UN a UN transitional authority, which held elections in Cambodia to have a representative government. That Cambodia today, who is ruling there. The same Hun Sen, who was there before all this, started. [...] He is China's protégé and he sits in ASEAN and when they try to do anything Cambodia takes China's side. This is how all the global governance ideas end. [...] Or Yugoslavia even today is unsolved. [...] In that respect one has to be always a bit realistic with all those un-scrutinized ideas.

In SAARC they will support this (R2P), in ASEAN they will support it, in Non-Alignment or G-77 they might support it. The thing is, we have a saying in India: the teeth of the Elephant, there are different one to show and different one to eat. The teeth for eating and the ivory are very different, more impressive. The same thing this within the multilateral system. You take a posture and a lot of the time you are posturing. That posturing is also necessary in a sense [...] but when it comes to actual praxis, people are different. India should be cautious because I think we took a too strong view in the 50's and 60's in many of these issues. Like Africa, India was in the forefront for African rights, for African de-colonization, for South Africa. But when South Africa became independent, Nelson Mandela gave us lip-service, lip-sympathy but he started playing politics, triumphalism with the West who had won the Cold War. I personally believe that this triumphalism in the 90's did a lot of damage to all these ideas. Because it is not Europe so much, but Americans and their old buddies in the cold war, China and Pakistan, their thought was there and it used to work. I was in the UN, IAE, and I saw how these people behaved. When you talk about a norm for instance: When the CTBT came into signature, it is a norm, and when India tested, the Chinese joined with Clinton, and they issued a statement in June 1998 telling India will be open out and saying Pakistan had to do it. Look at the asymmetry in that. [...] And still there were Gods sitting in the UNSC and telling us what to do. India will never take this.

The same China behaves totally different in the case of North Korea, telling everybody to engage with DPRK.

When you talk about global norms, it is that P5 respecting the norms. Like with the Law on Seas. What is China's position? Look at any global rule, Chinese are not bound by anything. [...]

So, in every sense the world remains the might is right kind of world. Good ideas are good, and I believe they should always be supported. So, you will find no thinking in India that is against such thing, but India's position is, we are very cautious. Like if you want to intervene in Syria and want to overthrow Assad it is not R2P, it is regime change and is not acceptable.

I: The change in the Indian position from 2005 to 2009, was it a personality thing?

E: Nirupam Sen, he was there in the atmosphere of the 1960's, when India was treated unkindly. Ethnic cleansing happened in Pakistan against the Hindu. [...] But nothing happened against Pakistan. [...]

I: Did the Libya experience from 2011 influence India's stance on Syria?

E: *The praxis of the Libya intervention did many scars and a sober level. These Europeans and the Americans please don't take it amiss - they don't know the reality of the South. They believe that supplicants they throw crumbs at will tell them about their countries and are right, like Sharabi in Iraq. Everything he said about his country was wrong. The South is far more complicated, everybody knew that if Gaddafi will be removed there will be instability. He was a tyrant, Saddam was a horrible tyrant, but he provided stability. With the experience of what happened in Iraq, how could the West have such an attitude towards Libya and the Gaddafi removal process?*

Norway and the Nordic countries tried to solve things in Sri Lanka without any knowledge about the horrors and complexity just with talking and money they tried and it didn't work. The same thing in Nepal with the Maoists or with trillions of Dollars in Afghanistan, it didn't work. In the South there are many countries that have that feeling, even the Chinese and the Pakistanis. They will draw you in and suck you dry. Those good ideas will work out in North Europe or even in Greece, because the European project will go to the maximum, and it is Europe. But if the Europeans go to Mali for instance, the people in Mali will take the money and run, because cultures are different, cultures are very different. Money is not a solution for problems. In your own area it could solve things under strict conditions. On global governance I place a lot of hope and stake on the success of the European Union because those noble ideas take time and success like with the EU.

Interview with Ambassador Phunchok Stobdan, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Büro des Interviewpartners
Datum: 26.11.2015, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 01:13h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What from your perspective are the most influential factors of Indian foreign policy?

E: I think the most important factors that actually shaped Indian foreign policy, Indian security policy, the grand strategic thinking in terms of how it places itself in the world, under the sun stems from certain historical, cultural facts. [...]

India's way is a very careful balancing. You could call it balancing, you could call it ambiguity, you could call it anything, indifferent, indecisive, neutral, non-alignment. Essentially the Indian grand strategy comes from the philosophical concept of peace. Only through peace and non-violence we got our independence also. [...] For us the peace is much more internal, for the West the peace is more external. If there is no war, that is peace. If there is no conflict, peace is there. For us it is not that. Peace is much more inside, linked with individual mind and heart and thinking. [...]

We believe, when you have peace, then you have security. Probably for other parts of the world it is different. When you have security, then you have peace. [...] The reason why India does not have a military doctrine is because Indian military is based on peace, we cannot, our identity is peace. There is no other identity for India. [...]

Naxal is a law-and-order problem, a socio-economic problem which is not dealt with military. AFSPA is different.

The military only steps in against external attempts of destabilization against China and Pakistan in the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir otherwise there is no military response.

There is no possibility for the Indian system to collapse (like the Soviet Union) because we haven't built it, we haven't even thought about building it. You have to understand the Indian philosophy to understand the Indian foreign policy. *We are doing a middle way. Not too fast not too slow but we reach our aim. Like the Ganges/Ganga River who flows very slowly but in the end it reaches the ocean. That is the philosophical picture of Ganga.*

We think in civilizational time and space which is different from nation. Our civilization exists for 5000 years and 50 years we have conflict with Pakistan. What is 50 years? Will Pakistan exist in 50 years? Maybe it will come back to India the Indian civilization. Let time solve the problem. Another concept that influences our thinking is theory of impermanence, nothing is permanent, everything is transient. Our non-alignment during the Cold War just meant we did not believe in what other countries, blocs etc. did. We reject what you do but we can't influence it, so we will not take part and remain what we are.

I: India's role in international politics is constantly evolving. What kind of an actor in international politics is India, what kind of an actor would it like to be and what foreign policy instruments are deemed to be suitable for an actor like India?

E: The world seems to expect India to fulfil a balancing role, against China, against Russia or the West and is disappointed because India does not. This is not how India looks at it. We are not a balancing power. We are certainly a rising power, but not in the sense of other power that rise, like China at the cost of others. [...] There is no expansionist way of rising India. Rising India means look whatever we have we want to share. We want to achieve something; we have a potential, and we will exploit this potential for the good of everybody. [...] The whole world is one family. That is our deepest philosophy, all our statecraft flows from there. [...]

When India goes to Africa it is not about exploitation like the Chines do. It is for the benefit of the Africans and our benefit together. That is why right from the beginning we had this South-South cooperation, cooperation among the developing countries etc.

The Indian medical science is about not creating another disease. It is about containing the disease not treating the disease (and possibly do more harm). [...]

That is why we did never sign NPT. Only some countries are allowed to have nuclear weapons and the rest don't. Maybe it is correct, but philosophical it is not rational. There is the power of the sun, but it should only shine for America the rest should be dark.

I: How does India perceives the existing international order and within the order "the West", IBSA, BRICS and the UN?

E: India did never believe in a world getting divide into blocs. The reason why we did never join any bloc. Fortunately, the world today is not aligned, the world is non-aligned. I think it was not the end of non-alignment it was the victory of non-alignment. [...] More multipolar power, more centers of power will create more balance. Surely this is not a perfect solution and the idea of UN when came it had a different philosophy and India contributed to the birth of the UN. [...]

But the problem with us, with Indian thinking is that we are always confronted with aspirations and our capabilities. Our aspiration is different, it comes from deep philosophical underpinnings. But when it comes to doing something practically, we can't remain in the philosophy. [...] This is where we get problem. We are not able to meet our aspiration to what we think. We are always confronted with challenges all the time and most of these challenges are very disappointing at every level. BRICS is on effort, the AIB or Russia, China, India is another effort. [...] Today I think India is proactive in the sense that whenever good things are happening in the world you must join it except if it is a military alliance. ASEAN is not military, be there. BRICS is not

military, be there. But India is certainly not excited about NATO, it is certainly not excited about that collective security thing of the ex-soviet-countries. [...] But trade, culture, commerce, economics... So, your effort is to be trying more to create institutions that can diffuse this bipolar structure in the world. So, the idea is to be prepared for the transformation. [...]

I: On norms and principals like sovereignty, non-intervention and human right are there differences between western and southern democracies because of different domestic situation and challenges?

E: Unfortunately, today the whole world believes in the Westphalian system. Once you have accepted the Westphalian system, whatever norms or values or principles that goes in the Westphalian system are applied to every nation state. And the UN itself was based on the theories and principles enshrined there in the UN Charta is based on certain principles. There is no alternative model that has been evolved. India may like to have its own values and principles to impose on the world, but the rest of the Asian countries is not going to support India. [...] But the problem than comes that the pace of development in the world is not equal. Some countries are developed in material terms, in industrial terms, other countries are not developed. So, the pace of development, social evolution, economic evolution in every country is different. So therefore, the understanding of what we are talking itself changes. [...] The concept of human rights came up as a post-colonial idea. Wherever it was Portuguese or French or the British who colonized Africa and Asia, when they were leaving the post-colonial period, they had to leave the people and the land. [...] But there were many things which the colonial powers left behind which could not be taken away back home. For example, they build a lot of church, cemeteries, nunneries, schools by missionaries. They could not be taken back to London, so they had to be left behind. [...] So, the colonial powers used the phrase called human rights, you have to protect them under the human rights. They are human beings they are not colonizer. So, this is how the concept of human rights came into being as an additional discourse. Of course, now today this has become an international discourse, and everything now is human rights. But when it comes to the reality, the human rights here in India is quite different. [...] Democracy is different in India; we still have our own thinking. For instance, when we have elections, democracy is just a means. But I don't know whether the Western democratic norms and principles are followed except the voting itself. The rest of the process is different of what you do in the West.

Our democratic perception is different from yours. In the 1980's a lot of Western delegations came to India and wanted to talk about human rights, the Kashmir issue. Now they want to talk about what can India do in Africa or how can India contribute in Afghanistan. So those things (human rights) are relative. If India is more developed (socially and economically) this will change.

That doesn't mean that human rights are not important, but we have our own way of measuring human rights. When you talk about EU, India in fact is a nation of union, a union state, a union of 25 states. What European Union achieved 25 years ago; we achieved 60 years ago. [...]

I: What does R2P stands for in your understanding, what comes to your mind?

E: [...] If the UN Charta allows you to do certain things, yes. Because than you don't come into conflict with the rest because you are covered under certain law. There is no other third

mechanism, UN mechanism is the only way. So, wherever we go, we go under the UN Charta. Maybe our Philosophical believes are different when we go to Angola. Maybe I'm humanitarian or idealistic. But I cannot go there because of my philosophy. I need a cover; I cannot just go there and experiment with my philosophy or so. [...] You are a representing a state and when your military troops are going there you need a cover and the best way have been under the UN whatever it calls for. [...]

The basic reason for the Indian intervention in Pakistan was that we had two Pakistan. The East-Pakistan and the West-Pakistan. We made it very difficult for the two Pakistan to connect with each other because we didn't give them a corridor, so they had to go all the way around through the Indian Ocean. But nonetheless the military dimension of harming Indian stability one from the East and one from the West and squeezing India that loomed large in our decision making, not just that. India again had a portion on the other side of Bangladesh, India's northeast, a very thin corridor, called chicken neck corridor. So, it was more a military, strategic consideration rather than humanitarian aspects.

We could only do it with the backing of the Soviet Union because the US was against that and backing Pakistan. You have to take the international system into consideration, you are not acting in a vacuum.

Certainly, the question of R2P is therefore linked with our desire to be in the UNSC. This transformation is very important. If you want to have effective R2P than the whole concept of UN has to change, the UN Charta has to change, it is not humanistic, we know. It is highly ineffective and unbalanced. It's a club of a few countries that decide whatever they want is good within the international system. [...] So, the idea of India going into the UNSC is not just go there to assure you are one of the powerful men. No! I think the idea is to transform, the Charta. We are going there to save Kashmir. That is a very narrow way of looking at it. Kashmir we can save without being in the UNSC. [...] India has this deep philosophical desire to be there and change the whole and contribute to the global system.

I: Can we expect India in the future to make more contributions to the changing world order, to the norm contesting, engage more in the ongoing discussions about the global commons etc.?

E: India is already doing all those things on the "democracy front" on the "peacebuilding front". We have built special institutions. Within the Indian parliament we have an institution on how to build a parliamentary democracy and all our experiences with democracy etc. have been shared with every developing country. By training methods, by sharing, by getting delegations and I think many people are watching India. [...] You will probably be surprised but immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union many of the newborn republics they did not go to Western countries, they came here to see how India functions. [...] So, take the case of Mongolia, we introduced democracy there. [...] Similarly, I think we have now built a sufficient infrastructure to share our peacekeeping approaches. [...] We trained a lot of people and since 2010 we send a military training team to respective countries at our own cost (to train them and share our peacekeeping experience in accordance with international standard/UN standard). [...] We are using peacekeeping as part of our foreign policy.

I: Can you elaborate a little bit about the Indian debate on Libya, the critique afterwards and whether it changed something in the R2P debate, the perception of R2P or Western interventions etc.?

E: I don't think the Indian position is going to change, even let's say in the case of Ukraine today or even Libya what have happened. Our good friend Russia has supported that Libya thing. Later they said it was an aberration, a mistake. [...] But our approach anyway wouldn't have been like that. Abstention is the best way at the moment. [...] That is typical you will find in all our foreign policy decision making process. Some where we cannot decide, we just ignore it. Like an ostrich putting its head in the sand. [...] That is our foreign policy behavior. But there is a problem. Even with the US we have so many things going on right now. Building a bilateral relationship is one thing but sacrificing on our principles is another thing. [...] In hindsight it was the right thing to do (to absent). By removing Gaddafi, you were creating a vacuum and in vacuum terrorist grow. And we have the same position on Syria. After Assad what?! What is the alternative for Assad? [...] People are getting killed. At the end of the day, we see that R2P doesn't exist. [...] Obama thinks this way, Cameron thinks that way, it is a lot about national interest. Cold realism they called it.

I: Is there anything you would like to add or to ask me?

E: [...] I think all those values are there in the Indian thinking, but it is not articulated in the manner that you are. It requires a special interest in this, that is not driven at the moment to come to this stage. This concept of RoP here is still at the very nascent stage of thinking. Probably it has something to do with the development level also. The more India will get rid of poverty and come to a different stage of development, all these things will come automatically and more and more proactive. You can see in our television that we are obsessed with our own issues, elections, social issues...holding elections cost India more than the military. Actually, we are solving our security issues only through election. Without elections India would be far more insecure. We have all the separatist, secessionists etc. that don't want to be part of India. But we invite them via elections to come to the parliament and debate there and once the anger is out in the parliament, there is no anger left in the stomach. [...] It's like a pressure cooker. You have to allow the pressure to blow the whistle otherwise this thing explodes. Or TV is full with elections, all the time [...]. It is a big machinery. It actually cost us more money than our military, but it is much easier to control the Indian military than the Indian democracy and it is better to spent money for democracy than for the military. [...] When India is economically capable, politically capable, you have a wise in the international system then more innovative ideas could be implemented, pushed forward with other partners. [...]

Interview with Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, IDSA)

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Büro des Interviewpartners
Datum des Interviews: 27.11.2015, vormittags
Dauer des Interviews: 01:02h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: From your experience and your point of view what are most influential and decisive factors that shape Indian foreign policy in 2015?

E: The things that shape our policies today are still very much the things that determined our initial policies at the time of independence. And that is our experience, the colonial experience that we had, the freedom movement, the freedom struggle, collectively bringing people together and thereby bringing the ethos, the culture, the mosaic of the country together in the freedom movement. And I think this togetherness, the diversity and the unity were I think the principal starter to our foreign policy and the way we look at the world. It clearly meant that it had to be democratic. And so, by nature and by our experience and through our ethos democracy was sort of inherent in our thinking and in our functioning. So, the first principle of our foreign policy was democracy and a democratic system, a government that is accountable to the people. The second principle which soon followed the time of our independence and as I said is still very relevant today is a world of peaceful coexistence because of the hardship we face because of the bloodshed we saw because of the long struggle and millions having lost their lives we felt a peaceful world was the end objective of every state. A world that would cooperate, a world that would have engagement, a world that would see people prosper was sort of foundation for Indian foreign policy and it exists very much today. The third principle that is the emphasis of our foreign policy was sort of cultivated and that is how do we place ourselves in the politics of the world and we choose a path of equidistance between the democratic west, the market-oriented west and the socialist bloc. And it was an equidistance approach and it wasn't an issue of which is good or which is bad or which is good and which is evil and was about gaining through the experience of both the system and I think as I said the first principle being pluralistic in nature a society the diversity that it had it required various streams of thoughts and ideology to bring in a sort of robust country with a robust policy so it was less to do with which is better or which is worth it was more to do with taking the best of both the system and therefore we had something called non-alignment or the equal distance between the two ideologies that existed. I thought it was quite brilliantly conceived. It was what I would say a diplomatic coup to strike a balance in the world. It might have displeased more the western world and that was what our diplomacy

was all about to convince the West it is not so the case, we are after all democratic, we do after all follow the electoral process, we are probably the most democratic populous country in the world. So, when we convinced the western world of that there was an element of suspicion and mistrust that we probably we were probably camouflaging our democracy, we were leaning more towards communism and the socialist pattern of society, but me when you place this in the current context of 2015 what we describe today as strategic autonomy was something practiced very soon after independence called non-alignment. It was the choice we made and the equal distance we maintained between two contesting ideologies.

The principles and the emphasis that we had in the beginning are very much alive today, only the semantics might have changed in terms we talk about strategic autonomy and a far more influential India, but I think we also remain very influential in our policy in the early years of non-alignment and decolonization. The next principle of our foreign policy which sort of, in a sense, fits even into our current world approach is what we describe as the concentric circles of influence. Our first circle of influence is always the neighborhood, and it is still remaining very the same today in fact even much more now I the emphasis is stronger in the policy statements that come out in the prime minister speeches. So, the neighborhood is our immediate concern and is the first of the circles that we have to pay attention to. We did that in the early years, but we also did not manage very well in the early years given our lack of experience, given that the wounds of partition were very, very young and very, very ripe(?). It hadn't settled, so there were emotional difficulties in crossing these sorts of difficulties in the region. But now I think we are much more settled with the partition, with the two-nation theory. We know very much Pakistan is a state, India is a state, that India has other states as well. So there has been a generational shift in the thinking of how India looks at the neighborhood. I think today it looks at it more functionally than it did in the earlier days (when) it looked at it more emotionally. That is the big shift that we have, and we are more functional now in our approach, we look at constructive ways of engagement. We look at prosperity, trade and sort of business engagement so that the larger life and the welfare of the people can be taken care of. But also, we have not really forgotten that the region is also conflict written and there are stresses and strains that we have to negotiate all the time, and these are historical images as well. So why the current dynamics tells us to be functional and more operational and to look at South Asia in terms of coexistence and economic engagement, but there are certain deep-rooted tensions that go back into yesteryears. So, I think the challenge for policy makers is to balance the two, to deal with all these conflicts head on but also to open space for to use for greater engagement because that is what the future is. Often what happens is the past sort of clashes with the present initiatives as can be seen. And often then South Asia becomes a sort of a paradox, not knowing where it is heading to. While the intensions and the objectives seem to be quite correct, the deep-rooted conflicts often create disturbances we can't overcome. This is a sort of paradox that is happening and the challenge that is happening in the region. What we are seeing also in the region is that India as a very central force as, the force in the region is given the impression that it is becoming less hegemonic in its approach. We cannot pick our neighbors; it is the given geography that determines who you neighbors are. And therefore, the neighborhood also realizes that India is a reality, that India is an important, critical big actor in the region. But what has happening in the region is that there is what I can describe as a further partitioning of the region. We had a partition in the early phase, when Pakistan split from India and then Bangladesh split from Pakistan, but we are seeing this time a sort of a

functional partition I would describe in which there is a group of sub-regional countries like Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh coming together and thinking constructively with India including Sri Lanka. Whereas Pakistan and India seem to be caught in the historical quagmire in which there are not been able to pull out of and moving to a constructive path. So, what has happened is that we are functional partitioning South Asia and that we have sort of kept Pakistan (out) and do deal with Pakistan at a different level. But we have framed a certain sub-regional grouping in which you can quickly bring in policies together. So, the longer Pakistan becomes a stumbling block in the regional cooperation so that's a sort of a recalibrating the region I would say, and India is looking at it in a much more pragmatic, realistic and far more functional sense of getting things going rather than being pulled down and drawn by the Pakistan fact.

What we also see in our foreign policy today is great emphasis on India taking a lead role, I think. So, India can be described as an influencing player. Earlier India at some point of time India has been seen as a balancing player, trying to balance between Russia and the US in the cold war days. Now being seen as balancing between China and the US from the pivot concept etc. and I think we need to move away, and we have gradually moved away from India being viewed as a balancer in the region. We have a far more greater role to play. I think we need to be an influencer in the larger global dynamics than just be seen as a balancer to certain things. And therefore I think India wants to play that role, wants particular in the region and it starts from the region, and therefore what we are seeing in the foreign policy now is a greater emphasis, greater innovative approaches, India willing to take an element of risk in certain things with the neighborhood, willing to reach out and talk even if it means from a position of strength, but yet still talk out and listen, that is very important. Listening to the others has been becoming an important part of our policy restructuring. And I think what has happening and which had not really happened in the earlier times is that we are taking far greater collective knowledge in our policy making exercise than we had earlier. Earlier foreign policies were largely framed on personalities or what a certain political party thought or what a certain historical notion was. I think now it is far more collective in its approach to foreign policy. We are not only taken the idea of the state and what the state centric approaches are, but we also bringing in the people's issue and we are bringing in science into the whole debate about policy making. And that is very important for South Asia because we are dealing with unknown threats, unknown challenges in terms of climate change, non-traditional issues have become a very important component of the connect in South Asia and that is driving policies to a great extent. So, we are seeing what we call geo-philosophy rather than geo-strategy emerging in the neighborhood approach, where we bring in spirituality, philosophy, the ancient text, the role of science, the importance of people and of course the relevance of the state in the equation of things. So, these are some of the immediate concentric circles of the neighborhood. In the extended sort of circle, in the next concentric circle, I think India also has a role to play. As an aspiring country of a certain global role and position India very much wants to be part of the exercise of rulemaking now rather than just rule following which happened in the past. And I think that is a very important turn for India here. And they need to do that very effectively and for that they also need to strengthen the domestic setup and make themselves stronger at home before they can articulate a position of rulemaking rather than rule following. So, India's larger global aspiration cannot be disconnected from its larger domestic policies. You cannot have two India operating at different level because that would mean hypocrisy and charade. India's larger global aspiration report has to made up

with his larger domestic reform and larger domestic ideas and policies. At the global affairs I think India wants to lead the debate particularly on for example climate change, it is very important and therefore it talks about a just climate change, which is quite critical in which the wrongs and the rights come together for the collective good of the world. So that is an important emphasis. I think UN has always been an aspiration, I don't think it is a very big thing now for India really because there are larger multilateral forums which India can engage with, India is engaging with the G20, the BRICS, the BASIC and there are many other forums where India is articulating its position. Does that mean that the United Nations is irrelevant for India? I don't think it is. What can be less stress upon is the United Nations Security Council seat. We can talk more about and put more emphasis is the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, that is where the real strength and the voice of the collective world can come through rather than just keep emphasizing on a seat in UNSC. I think India has also in the larger global governance space, pitched in its voice when it is required to be rather than just look at selective grouping sort of power currency. So, I think these are the three concentric circles. It means that India's neighborhood policy is very important, it means that India wants actively participating in rule making exercise and I think another important element of India is its cultural connect that it has. Bringing back its ancient glories, its ancient reach and I think it wants to reestablish this once again and in that sense its Look East approach which is now a Look East action (Act East) towards the Southeast Asian countries is very, very important.

I: There the “new” principal of non-reciprocity comes also into play?

E: Yes, very much it does, and it brings in a new sphere, a new area of engagement, which brings in history and culture, these softer elements that define its foreign policy approach. And then a fourth element that now comes in this current time is the importance of the oceans. So, the Indian Ocean connecting to the Pacific and the Indo-Pacific-Region emerges as an important sphere of engagement, a sphere of challenges, a sphere of cooperation and dealing with those challenges brings in huge and diverse countries around it and makes India sort of fare more engaged with the world through oceans rather than just through the land itself. That is also very critical. So, these are important elements that sort of defining India's approach to the world and shaping its foreign policy which is of course connected very much to its own domestic approach.

I: How does India perceive the current existing international order from New Delhi and within this order what is India's approach to players like “the West”, the UN, or new forms of club governance like IBSA or the BRICS?

E: I think at any point of time the global order is always in a situation of flux. I think the ultimate search for a global order is harmony between the power centers and therefore bring in a certain degree of balance. Quite clearly India wants to be in the power centers one of the powers that sort of create a certain balancing effect and a certain equilibrium in the global order. If you go by what the current policy is India believes there is no balance of power so to speak but balance of power has to be created through various factors. Either through alliances or either through...it can act as a balancer to some of the power games that are happening around the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific but having sad that it would then be contradicting my earlier statement that India does not want to be the balancer but there a phases in how India approaches it...often I think India wants the balances alright rather than being

influenced to balance someone else. It has to take a slightly detached approach. It cannot be seen as a proxy of the US in balancing China it would rather balance China through its own strength and through its own approach. So, it likes to have an India-China approach or an India-Japan approach which can itself balance China's hegemony so to speak. So, India has its own interpretation of international relations and how it balances the game very well and it is playing that hard game as well. It is playing the hard game of power equation, of balancing power in the region but does not want to be seen as influenced to balance power. And it wants to take a distance approach from the US as much as a distanced approach from China. So, you are getting back to the same non-alignment/strategic autonomy so to speak. India wants to be influential now in the global affairs, so it is actively involved in many of the institutions that are emerging. So, the institutions could be West driven or West influenced that doesn't really matter or it could be Asia driven for example the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank) set up by China which India wants to lend its first CEO to the bank. So various shapes and sizes India is trying to balance the global order and we are actively involved in creating a harmony in the order itself.

I: R2P is seen as an idea that comes from the West albeit the ICISS tried to represent a lot of different countries from different regions of the world. Thus, in order to make R2P a more global and less western idea it is necessary to talk about and exchange views on norms and principles that define or underlie the R2P concept, and which might be understood differently in different parts of world while using the same wording. So, are we talking about the same thing when we talk about human rights, non-interference/non-intervention, sovereignty, and the prohibition on the use of force? Or are people in the west, for instance on human rights, talking about personal rights and people from the South more interested in second and third generation human rights etc.?

E: I think how we look at human securities is sometimes very different or how the West looks at human security. Our human security is very fundamental, defined by our fundamental rights and the constitution and if that is not protected that is a matter of human rights and human concern. So, I think the basic issues are food, right of employment, right to live or to have clean water are very important elements of human rights and therefore our human security approach is being accessibly defined by the constitutional fundamental rights that we have enshrined for the people, which the state has not fulfilled and which the people can challenge the state to some of these rights conceived.

On the other issues: Sovereignty is very, very important for us. It is largely defined in our international approach or the global sort of relationship that we have. We keep sovereignty as an important principle, and we sometimes defend our sovereignty to no end rather than define it differently in the changing times. So sometimes the argument goes that India is instead of defining what its sovereignty is or what its national interest is, it tends to blindly defend it. Therefore, we get into a situation in which there are a lot of clashes in policies and the approaches. And often the policy people at a certain level fail to see the changes that are happening internally as well as externally. But the emphasis of policies still remains on sovereignty, it is a very strong principle. But as India becomes far more engaged globally with institutions and it wants to play a role of an influencer then I think it has to re-conceptualize what sovereignty means here. Sovereignty would mean to have another relook and not be in a position where you cannot – I would not say compromise on sovereignty, but I think a little re-look on what it means and how

it should be valued – if that does not come about then your participation and engagement in the larger global affairs would be quiet meaningless and would not have the weight around it.

On the issue of non-interference: By and large we do not believe in interference. We believe in a non-interference approach. We believe in the internal strength of the system and the internal representation of the country resolving certain issues. Therefore, from time to time our own role in the region has been limited by our own understanding of what intervention and non-intervention approaches are. We have at times intervened. (19)71 is a classic case, also in Sri Lanka in 1998. But that has been through a sort of national consensus, and it has been defended internationally, also the reasons and the objectives why we had to intervene. '71 was a crisis of humanity large numbers of people were coming into our country as refugees and therefore we had to take that particular action, and so the case with Sri Lanka. That came with the Tamil representation in Sri Lanka and the way they were been mishandled by the government it felt that we had to intervene for the sake of our own ethnic group, the Tamils. So, we took specific reasons to specifically intervene in these two situations. But India in principle agrees with non-intervention. It agrees with the internal strength of a political system of a country to resolve what it defines as internal matters.

I: When I say R2P, what comes to your mind? What does R2P stands for in your understanding?

E: I don't know much about R2P but I think it is an important element of states participation in global affairs, how it approaches certain issues. Not all states can internally handle many complex issues. So, what does the world look at, just silently sit and watch the chaos unfolding and the misery happening or does it then very selectively and carefully with much reason and thought to intervene and try to resolve the issue. So that is my way of looking at the R2P, which is I think reasonable to say so and there are parts of the world and countries which would require certain support and certain right interventions. But how do you divide something that is right intervention or just intervention. As a theme and as an issue it is so critical important in our world today to help certain weak states or failing states to manage the situation, isn't that what it is?

I: There is a discussion about R2P internationally and I think in my understanding it is not a new norm or new international law, but it is a concept. Because in the UN Charta you have those contesting norms to prevent human beings from suffering and being killed and at the same time, we have the principle of sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force and those norms and principles in some case, Rwanda for example, or now in Syria, there is a built-in conflict in the Charta. And the first attempt to resolve that conflict was Humanitarian Intervention and that approach failed as the majority even in the West would agree. Thus, as a consequence now there is R2P with different focus on the people to be protected and not the state that intervenes, a different emphasis on prevention and assistance instead of intervention militarily in the name of humanity etc. And it is in the UN system, on the agenda, we have to discuss it and develop it for a long time, because as in the case of the Geneva Convention those norm evolution processes take decades.

But let us come to the evolvement of India's position on R2P. When R2P came out as a suggestion, a concept, there was actually no response at all from India. When it was presented at the UN World Summit 2005 and tried to introduce in the Outcome Document India was one of

the harshest critics. The then permanent representative of India at the UN, Nirupam Sen, tried every means possible to prevent it from becoming part of the WSOD. Nobody really expected India to act like this and join camp with North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. But in 2009 when the implementation report by the UN General Secretary took place at the General Assembly. Then Hardeep Singh Puri was permanent representative of India at the UN, who took a much softer and nuanced approach, even welcoming the R2P, albeit being sceptic of pillar three of the R2P. So what was the reason for the harsh critic in 2005, was it only the personality of Nirupam Sen, was India kind of unsure about its international standing at that time, was it R2P being not on the agenda and a lot of room to maneuver for Sen, was it the influence of the left front in the then coalition government and what changed India's position up to 2009, if there really was a change?

E: That is very interesting question and though I have not looked at that issue broadly capturing the inner dynamics of decision making during that time we are in the first phase of the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) period, which is being described as a very progressive phase an enlightened phase, that is how the left front and liberals would like to put it which was a phase of reasoning and understanding and careful articulation of important issues. It was a coalition government of the congress and for the first time a very strong representation of the left parties. So that was very important. Never in the history of the Indian political system had the left a representation in such large numbers in a coalition. So, in a sense they had a great deal of influence in certain decision and policy making issues. The lefts by nature are quite aware of global affairs. They want to position their thoughts in certain global debates and therefore the Left was increasingly becoming influential in setting India's agenda on certain international issues and norms. And therefore, the R2P became an important sort of issue in which the left could reflect a certain position, a certain ideology. While the Left in the rest of the world by and large failed, in India it reemerged and therefore the felt it was almost a crusade. They had to bring communism and the left ideology back into the center stage of world affairs. So, they took it far more serious than required and they looked at each international global issues as a matter of an ideological war. Anything that was emerging was a matter of western driven agenda setting, evil oriented, people unfriendly sort of issue and that is why it needed to be challenged strongly by an ideology that meant equality, egalitarian, that meant just etc., etc. So, there was at the conceptional level this ideological battle happening very strongly. And we felt the tremors of that in many of the global issues in which India was being engaged with at that time. So, as you put this with Nirupam Sen in New York and the issue of R2P it came at a time when the political setting in India challenged such sort of western driven motions and norms. It also happened in various other issues. The nuclear deal was a classic case, when the establishment, the Indian establishment wanted to sign a nuclear deal with the United States the left resistance to that was very strong within the government and they and they pulled-out of the government at one stage to show that they were completely disinterested in that nuclear deal with what they describe as an evil force the United States. So yes, you are quite right. The Left as an important party in the coalition government had a conceptual say in larger global affairs, certain conceptual issues, the R2P and various other issues that had emerged at that time and they were throwing their weight quite strongly. And therefore, your analysis on what happened with Nirupam Sen is quite right it actually links to the domestic political setup of India.

What you could probably do is you pick up some of the statements from the parliamentary debate during the time of the R2P, also the debate about climate change is high on the agenda at that time and our government is trying to defend India's position taking it as a sort of imperialism vs. anti-imperialism, colonization vs. de-colonization approach. These are the interesting sort of back up your argument on the R2P. You could also bring in other issues such as the nuclear deal, how the Left generated such a great debate within the Indian constituency on an issue which largely remains non-partisan. Foreign policy largely is a non-partisan issue where you collectively come to an agreement. But during that phase of time, it was very bipartisan.

The Left party in India is very international in its orientation.

I: After skipping some of the R2P questions, you already said that it is not anymore enough for a country like India to only make contribution on the regional circle it also has to make an outreach to the global level. Can we expect in the future that India, albeit being very busy at the domestic challenges, to come up with substantial proposals or initiatives on global norms like R2P, or other issues like climate change or poverty in a way as the Brazilians did with their RWP proposal?

E: This is a very good question and one of the biggest challenges of the foreign ministry as an establishment how to re-tool it and how to make it stronger and much more dynamic than it has been. India has reached a stage where it does aspire, it does wants to be an influencer, it does wants to reach out, but does it have the sufficient capacity and the strength to do it. So these are certain very practical questions one has to deal with. And I think at that stage the ministry is not capable of doing it in terms of sheer manpower strength. I think for instance Singapore has more diplomatic strength in terms of numbers than India has. We have to functionally factor those things into a larger grand plans and approaches that we have. We are strengthening the diplomatic cadre now; we are increasing the number by almost sixty percent a year to get a critical number with which we can play a far more active role. So that is one thing. Also, there is a feeling that the ministry of foreign or external affairs has largely been stayed in a status-quo approach and it had not really brought in new ideas or talked about new ways of doing things. It has not been very smart in approaching certain issues, followed the tried and tested path being largely cautious in its approach rather than being risk taking. Over the last one and a half year there has been a new dynamism emerged in the ministry. This has been possible because the prime minister himself has taken lead role in global affairs. After Jawaharlal Nehru Narendra Modi is the first prime minister who seems to be actively participating and very engaged with what happens around the world and what he wants to do. I think it is quite clear in his policy that if investment and business is what India is looking for at this stage, therefore it is connected with the world and its constituency is very important. So, it is business driven at the moment largely to bring in investment, to bring technology, to bring in ideas and help strengthen this country.

As India growth and gains in strength it also needs to articulate a certain position, a certain worldview and for that it needs the diplomatic strength both in terms of conceptual thinking, smart approaches as well as in number. While we are fulfilling the numbers also the approach needs to change quickly and therefore it is important that the cadre is made to think differently. Maybe we need to bring in diversity in the ministry of external affairs and probably people from different walk of life can come as an advisory capacity, a certain guidance, a certain policy

direction. Also, India should have some long-term approaches rather than only short and medium planning. Our strategic thinking is only five years maybe. We have no strategic documents, no white paper etc. We need to build in the research input, we need the knowledge trust in our policy. We need to do a lot of things.

Interview with Ambassador Pinak Chakravarty (Observer Research Foundation, ORF)

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Büro des Interviewpartners
Datum: 01.12.2015, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:53h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: How does India understand and see norms and principles like sovereignty, non-intervention/non-interference and human rights and are there differences between a Western and an Indian understanding?

E: *India is a democracy with free debates, free press and human rights commission and other institutions, the institutions are all there, we have the freedom of speech and the constitution etc.*

But as you know having all the institutions does not mean that you solved every problem, we have not. And our biggest problem still remains development and the people who remain below the poverty line, which is a large number given our size and the number of people we have in our country. But we are making progress [...] with the liberalization of the economy in the '90's many people have been brought out of poverty. China should get the Olympic Gold Medal for bringing the largest number of people out of poverty in the human history and we would be probably second.

Since we have a pervasive poverty at a certain level, naturally the governments attentions goes towards providing jobs, providing employment, food security, health security...I mean these are huge tasks for so many people, it is more than the EU altogether. They have no excess to commercial energy, in the climate debate our prime minister mentioned that. [...] In some rural areas the police might be a bit authoritarian. [...] One could argue that poor people don't have access to justice because they can't afford it. That is perhaps true.

[...] India was very sensitive about sovereignty in the beginning, I think. But as we entered into treaties and other agreements globally...every treaty means a slight surrender of a slice of sovereignty because you accept certain norms or certain ways of behavior in the treaty. So sovereignty is never absolute. [...] When India has agreed to a treaty than it has been very careful about not violating treaties, because we feel that this is something...or we have not entered in a treaty like the NPT. But if you enter a treaty you have to fully, 100 percent be loyal to the norms that you accepted, that is the Indian position. [...]

India looks at global norms favorably provided it has been arrived at after consultations or under the UN etc. India's general position on "intervention" or "responsibility to protect" or called "regime change", called what you like has been that unilateral intervention by any great power...India is against that unless authorized by the UNSC. [...] If it is multilateral and with a mandate of the UNSC India will be cooperative. [...] So R2P provided it is under a legal international norm (law?) and India believes that the only international norm is basically either a bilateral agreement with the government in power or through the UNSC that has been India's general position. You may argue that in 1971 when India intervened in Bangladesh for example. But India did not want to do it. When you study history today you will find that India was very reluctant. We went to great powers; we went to the UN and all that but the configuration of the Cold War and all that we found that there was no support for India to either solve the problem or to do anything about it. The US was supporting Pakistan and reaching out to China. So, India had to decide and when it comes to our neighborhood and our national interest...it was a choice of last resort really. So, we did what we had to do to protect ourselves and India will continue to do [...]. We never saw ourselves as being aggressive, but we found out that being weak also has its disadvantages. If the economic development continues, if it grows for nine, ten percent we will obviously transform the economic activity in India, but we will also build a very powerful military, there is no doubt about that. Every means available we will deploy because we continue to live in a dangerous neighborhood because you have China [...]

But our primary foreign policy goal still remains the transformation of India. The transformation of India in the domestic economy, whatever social, cultural etc., our foreign policy remained geared to that aspect rather than anything else. Because we don't seek territory...and of course to protect the global commons, there we have an interest in [...] because it directly impinges on our economy.

I: Because you already mentioned R2P, and you said "regime change" or whatever you want to call it...what is your understanding of R2P?

E: The first thing that comes to my mind is that something very bad has happened [...] human beings are being killed because of ethnic or religion or something else [...], people are dying because of some kind of violence.

I: When R2P came out India was very reluctant, the main position was it is all there, we don't need R2P, but for the WS in 2005 India had to find a position. The then permanent representative of India, Nirupam Sen was hostile towards R2P...

E: Yes, he was hostile...

I: ...he joined camp with North Korea etc. The West and even some African countries were kind of shocked, because no one expected India to be so critic. Reluctance, yes but so harsh opposition... It changed from 2005 to 2009 when Hardeep Singh Puri expressed the Indian position. There are differing explanations for that. What do you think, just the personality of Nirupam Sen and H.S.P. or what were the main reasons?

E: Obviously not only personality, because I know both this gentleman. Nirupam Sen had a particular world view [...] but I do not think Nirupam was articulating a personal view. He was

a good diplomat; articulated diplomat and he would never go and say look this is our view without the government's approval. I don't think he would that, that is not the way we (diplomats) functioning. So, he was articulating a position which was approved by the government of India. [...] It was an India of 2003/04/05 and the intervention in Iraq did impact on the minds not only in India but also in the developing world. [...] A unipolar world in which the US could decide alone we don't like Mister X and he is the president of Y and they will just walk in and remove him...we were against that kind of thing. And we saw R2P as some kind of a western thing to maintain the western hegemony and dominance. [...] And then from there the position evolved a bit slowly because we did realize sometimes there may be a responsibility to protect but how it would evolve and how we could make it to have a greater consensus on how to go about it. [...] And you know our philosophical basis comes down from Sanskrit which says “?”, “The whole world is one family.” Is a very ancient saying in India and we constantly say that to reiterate our sense of a global community. But we still don't like the concept in the sense that “What is the need? You have the UNSC.” because we have always suspected that the R2P if it is divorced from the UN system will be misused.

Some people in the US administration decided that they will bring democracy to the Middle East or something like this (is laughing). India was always against that, we never agreed with the Americans. We had huge debates with them [...], they were trying to persuade India to join in in Iraq for example. There was a debate in India also [...] and we thought about it for a very long time but then we said “No” [...] if there is no mandate under the system that we have under the UNSC.

I: The Kenyan election crisis as an example for the prevention side of R2P and not for the R2P we mostly talk about, the military intervention part and the application of Pillar I and II of the R2P with host state consent within the UN system and the help of regional agreements as well as INGO's. Is that a way of R2P India would probably agree with/comply with.

E: I think that would be closer to what India feels comfortable with, the UN umbrella, a host nation that says okay come help us. So, this is like an agreement and as I said earlier then India would have no objection [...].

So, we believe that we have built up those (democratic) norms domestically and we in fact, the Election Commission of India gives support to many, many countries on how to conduct elections. We even have an electronic voting machine that is now being used in many parts of the world. [...] The Election Commission sends observers for elections [...], the idea is to help. How to conduct elections, how to map out the constitution, it is all technical aspects.

I: India was as well as Germany, South Africa, and Brazil member of the UNSC in 2011 and abstained on Res. 1973. How was the 2011 NATO/AL-Operation in Libya perceived here in India and what were the discussions after the fall of the Gaddafi regime?

E: Libya was seen as kind of exceeding all of the red line we thought would be maintained. [...] What good has it achieved for example, because Libya is destroyed now. [...]

In India we tend to blame the West for this (Iraq, Syria, Libya, ISIS, destabilized Middle East and all the victims and suffering) and it will be hard to find an Indian who will not tell you this.

That this is the result of Western intervention, arrogance to some extent that “we can fix everything” etc., etc. and we don’t want to be part of it.

I: After Libya many countries did feel betrayed and the atmosphere at the UN was kind of hostile but after some time the Brazilians came up with their RwP proposal. So, they decided not just to stay aside but to contribute to this norm contesting on R2P with an own proposal. It takes a lot of resources to do this and the big democracies from the South like India seem to be reluctant to contribute. Albeit you have these big demands and challenges coming from the domestic side, can we expect India to contribute in the way the Brazilians did with their RwP proposal to this whole debate on a new World Order that reflects the changed reality of 2016 of which R2P is only one part of the debate with other debates such as climate change, UNSC reform etc.?

E: India’s reluctance actually also stems from the fact that we think we are not yet ready to take on that kind of responsibility and many people in the West, the US and other countries there were commentaries on that India is not coming up to the plate and India is not accepting responsibility. It is not entirely true. For example, let’s take the Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean. India has made major contribution in terms of anti-piracy for example, the global commons etc. So, we have chosen where we want to contribute where we have seen, yes this is a very important factor. And high seas do not infringe on sovereignty, here you can tackle the pirates. India has the largest numbers of pirates in captivity. [...] So that is the kind of thing India is willing to do without infringing on sovereignty of countries because we believe in the system of the nation state. [...] That also comes from our history that we Indians don’t like that interference, foreign intervention, domination etc. [...] And we have contributed with our peacekeeping contributions in the UN, one of the largest forces. [...] One of the other reasons for India’s reluctance is that we are not a (permanent) member of the UNSC. And that is why India is saying “make me a member”. Maybe it is a kind of bargain that India is doing. Make me a member and I will take on more responsibility. [...]

We are still in a transition (phase), we are not yet a great power. We have some attributes of a great power but not all attributes. [...] India cannot be put in a black and white category. I think we are in the grey area still, where we feel that where we can, we will contribute, and where we can’t we can’t. [...]

We have a certain worldview, but we know that things are not idealistic. For instance, when you take democracy, India will never tell you we don’t want democracy in this or that country but we will never go there to push democracy down their through. That is not our approach. We will help, but democracy has to evolve from within, from bottom up, it cannot be implemented from outside. It will take a lot of time. [...]

India today is in transition. India wants to be a global player and will be a global player in another 50 years, hundred years. We believe that we have all the attributes, but we have to get our domestic act together etc. But I don’t see India as a very aggressive actor in terms of global issues. If consensus is developed on a particular issue India will certainly participate in a responsible way including with military force if necessary. But again, the whole thing is about how to build that consensus [...].

Some people say we don't have strategic thinking. [...] You should read Chanakya "Arthashastra", 300 B.C. [...] and much of it comes from that. Much of the strategic thinking in modern India comes from that.

Interview with Dr. Madhan Mohan Jaganathan (Assistant Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, JNU)

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Wohnung des Interviewpartners
Datum: 02.12.2015, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 01:13h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What are from your point of view the most influential and decisive factors in terms of historical, cultural experiences, world views, collectively shared ideas, geography etc. that in 2015 influence India's foreign policy identity?

E: Obviously history matters a lot in terms of colonial experience, geography in terms of the position of India in South Asia but I think the point to remember is the diversity within India and therefore it is difficult to theorize India's foreign policy. So, India is not a unitary rational actor in a very conventional sense of that term. Interestingly domestic factors which used to matter little more earlier now seem to matter less in foreign policy. So, India has been moving away from a phase of intervention in 70's and 80's, East-Pakistan in 1971, Sri Lanka in 1987, Maldives in 1988 to a phase of non-intervention even when there were opportunities for intervention for instance in Sri Lanka. It is also important to know that it is difficult to singularize India's identity. It's difficult to pinpoint which world view matters and to what extent. It depends very much on which party is in power, the center. Is it the Congress, is it BJP? If it is the Congress, it is more of a Nehruvian slant, if it is BJP maybe it is not so much of a Nehruvian slant and you find this debates in the domestic quarters. India's foreign policy is being influenced by factors at several levels. At the individual level idiosyncrasies, whims, and fancies of decision makers. They constitute a minority, but they constitute a privileged minority. It could be Nirupam Sen it could be Hardeep Singh Puri and of course at the second level, the domestic level, to what extent domestic factors influence remains to be seen. In spite of coalition politics – this government is not a coalition government – you do find that the government in the center is not necessarily responding to domestic demands. There is a tendency to deride domestic pressures as parochial as regional...As someone who is inspired by Critical Theory, I would be skeptical of such individual moves. The question is what is India's national interest? Why should India's national interest be Delhi driven? These are interesting questions, but I think right now is a period of flux.

I: Since the fall of the Berlin Wall there has been a big change in international politics and as well in India. What kind of an actor is India today in international relations and what kind of an actor would it like to be or what kind of a role would like to play?

E: The way India is perceived outside India is very different from the way it is seen within India. Outside India it is seen as emerging power, rising power. It has to do with relative power. Maybe India seems to be rising at that moment when other parts of the world are a bit stagnating like Europe. Internally speaking or wholistically speaking India has a long way to go. Precisely because the international community seems to be playing the tune that India is an emerging power. I think India at least officially, diplomatically will respond to such a move and what you do find in foreign policy is an alignment towards being proactive. This government, the Modi government, so Modi makes maybe disproportional high numbers of trips for this reason. Which is being critiqued internally but it does convey a message that India is no longer a laid-back (backward?) state. In a way it has to do with the BJP, the BJP in power. In a way it also has to do with what has happening since 1991. So even when Congress was in power, even when it was Manmohan Singh, India had this tendency to get more and more integrated with the rest of the world. Non-Alignment gets a new fashion, non-alignment 2.0, it's not so much about antagonism towards US, maybe there are still noises that India makes about but I think the Indian middle class goes gaga about the US [...].

The way I would consider India...I would consider India as a weak developing state. I'm not denying there has been a change within India but what I insist is that that change within India needs to be accompanied by recognition of the challenges also within India. So, it's not just about foreign direct investment or foreign institutional investment, increasing GDP and so on, it's also about poverty ratio, farmers suicide in some parts of the country. I think the key question is whether globalization is exclusionary or inclusionary and to what extent is it exclusionary and how can it be made inclusive. Those who have been advocates of liberalization [...] insist on that point but it is also about equity and equality. India hasn't really projected what it does internally in a positive way which is about its commitment to social justice. [...] That is why you find R2P as an anomaly, something in which there is very little interest. There is no coherence in what India does internally, there is no connect to what India does internally and what India does externally.

In terms of neighborhood, you do find again not so much concern with neighborhood because India has less influence in its neighborhood. Maybe it has aspiration to be a regional power, a regional hegemon but the tendency is more in terms of grasping the globe as a scholar put it and abandoning the region.

I: Does this role, the Indian history and experience or the domestic situation influence the foreign policy instruments an Indian government whether Congress or BJP would deem to be suitable in terms of diplomatic instruments or military instruments, the use of force in foreign policy etc.?

E: The difference between the Congress and BJP is a matter of degree, a matter of style. So whereas you would expect the BJP to be much more pro-nuclear [...] but it is not as if the Congress is opposed to nuclear weapons, even Nehru kept the nuclear option right from the beginning [...] ...community riots took place and were suppressed under BJP as well as under

Congress [...] but the (policy) style is different. And we never had a left party in power, so it is still very much between the center and right of the center. [...] ...even pseudo in terms of non-alignment because it was not exactly at center but with a tilt to the Soviet Union, how India responded to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. But I think later on there is this recognition that maybe there is no need of so much antagonism towards US. That has changed irrespective of whether it is BJP or Congress, and the government is in fact capitalizing on the sentiment of people. For many people, for the upper-middle class maybe just a section, the dream is to go to the USA or UK. If that is really the case, then why antagonize and not strike for a partnership or cooperation with these states. Modi has just recently made a visit in the UK.

I: How does India perceives the current existing international order (just/not just, inclusive/exclusive)? And within this order how is India's attitude towards a) the West, b) IBSA, c) BRICS, d) the UN?

E: I think India still considers the international order as unjust in fundamental terms, but it is not as Raja Mohan would say it India has changed its style in terms of not just making protest from outside but in terms of entering the negotiating table and becoming much more assertive, that has changed. It is assertive about its viewpoint, even about R2P – it is not just one single individual, it is not just Nirupam Sen – so it is increasingly assertive, but it still does think that the international order needs to change, needs to change in a much more practical way not so much in term of a radical way. That is why it is okay with it been given an exception in terms of the India-US civil-nuclear cooperation agreement. Would it been so normatively grounded it wouldn't even go ahead with the India-US civil-nuclear cooperation agreement. Towards the West...the change is now it is beginning to engage with the West much more substantively. The antagonism or the skepticism...maybe there is still a meaningless apprehension in that sense of the West, but I think this is getting diluted. The real tactic is to do business with the West and to work out a very beneficial payout structure. [...] IBSA/BRICS I'm not really sure but with regard to the UN I think India makes the right noises when it comes to the permanent membership (in the UNSC). [...] India is not intellectually responding very well (to norm debates in the UN) and I think on that India has failed miserably because you have MEA which is just nothing in terms of number and also in terms of substance and which is not very receptive to gets input from the academia. The problem is also that India still very centralized in terms of it Delhi-Focus...

E: When we talk about the norms and principles that underlay R2P do we mean the same, we probably might use the same phrase but probably we might mean something different. For instance, with human rights, we might think of the personal freedoms, and you might think of secondary human rights because of the high rate of domestic violence and poverty. So, what do you think how India understands sovereignty, non-interference/non-intervention, prohibit on the use of force or human rights...is there a difference to our understanding?

E: In a way I R2P is not new, I think maybe it is coming up at the right time but probably it is already there in political theory, the social contract etc. The critical question is there is this deviation between...there is this disconnect between theory and practice. And I think India is still preferring to be in the comfort zone of sovereignty. And I think I agree with you that sovereignty is much more sacrosanct in India. It is not as elastic or as flexible as it is for European states. Because I think by being in the comfort zone of sovereignty it can actually rule out a

potential crisis. It is probably a cliché point but it is nonetheless a valid point. What if tomorrow if the international community is pointing fingers at Jammu and Kashmir or Northeast, the AFSPA continues to exist. [...] The latitude India gives to the sovereign state is way too high, that is my personal opinion. So, I think I agree with you when you say there is a different notion of human rights. [...] Day to day social violence is so much regular that it is if not accepted it seems to be normalized. People regret to go to a police station but that is the only imagination they have of a police station. I don't think they have an imagination of a police station that implies a good treatment of those who visit the police station but bad more horrible things that could happen. It could be custody or dead it could be anything and I think it is not fair to just entirely blame the British. It has to do with the social order, which is also manifesting violence, patriarchy, caste. Maybe it is tactic but at the same time I think it is difficult for India to say no to R2P. The puzzle really is India seems to be doing well in terms of peacekeeping operations but those are situations where India has no sovereignty to override. But what does India do when there is a real concrete situation where a sovereign state is guilty of human rights violations. I mean India has done it, the credit goes to Indira Gandhi for having done something in East Pakistan but I think that tendency is shrinking. It has happened due to the individual decisiveness of leaders. So, sovereignty not as important as it was before is still in a way very important is still sacrosanct. And for India that is morality not to intervene in the business of host state that is morality. In a way that is post-colonial but in a way that is also convenient. That is my concern that you find a news where a Delhi infant is burned or killed or... things are changing. The Delhi rape incident did bring about a huge response not just for that incident, it is just a sample for several other incidents on a daily basis, but things are finally getting resolved. There is resistance to change, there is resistance to empowerment of women, there is resistance to the going away of the caste system. It is a mess but also a needed mess [...].

I: What does R2P stands for in your understanding, the broader ICISS version or the narrow 2005 version? What comes to your mind and/or how would you define R2P?

E: I think for reasons – right or wrong – the 2005 version comes to my mind [...]. There is a certain logic in it whether you agree with it or not [...]. There is a tendency or a bit of a fashion of conflate R2P with the protection of civilians. I don't know whether you have seen the recent publication that GPPI has come about with me and Gerrit on Sri Lanka. I think the ICISS disaster (?) is also pertinent but this (2005) is the core [...].

I: When the ICISS report came out there was nearly no response by India, even after the 2004 High Level Panel Report it was not on the agenda but in 2005 at the World Summit India had to respond and this response was very harsh. The West did not expect India to respond in such a way, they couldn't really believe what India was doing, joining camp with Nicaragua, Venezuela, North Korea etc. [...] And Nirupam Sen was even more than critical even after he was no longer India's permanent representative as in 2009. There are different explanations for this. What do you think actually was the reason for the first non-response, then harsh critique until the very last moment and the then softened and more open position in 2009 as expressed by Hardeep Singh Puri.

E: I think it is difficult to speculate what would have been India's response if you had a person other than Nirupam Sen in 2005. I think it is difficult to construct a counterfactual. But I don't

think it's entirely Nirupam Sen. Maybe on that day in 2005 any diplomat you pick from the Indian foreign service team may have had such apprehensions about R2P because that is a default position to be skeptical of R2P at least in the beginning. And I think what happened thereafter is to nuance that position much. We are not totally opposed to R2P, we are receptive to R2P because it would be difficult for India to totally negate R2P after that would invalidate whatever it has done in regard to peacekeeping. And I think you made that very valid point that in its entirety R2P is acceptable. However, in fact if you go into components of R2P there are certain components or there is this one component which is still not convincing. Maybe in a way it is also a generational change, a change in mindset. Nirupam Sen belonging to that generation of the Cold War and that generation is particularly skeptical of whatever the US does, but that generation is giving way to a new generation of diplomats, of bureaucrats and of academics who is much more receptive to whatever comes from the West.

So, I think India will probably try to advance its interest within the framework of R2P and not by making too many protests against R2P. Why there has not been such a proportionate response to R2P even in universities maybe that has to do with the way in which IR is taught, is practiced and researched upon. So, IR is essentially about nuclear weapons, it is essentially about India-Pakistan, about SAARC it is not so much about...it is there in JNU, it is coming up but if you go to Madras or so you have to introduce R2P, it is not so much about Human Security here, it is not so much about emancipation here, not so wholistic. [...] Until India engages ideationally and intellectually with these issues (Human Security, R2P, global norms etc.) I think it will be ill prepared to respond such as R2P. I'm not saying there is no intellectual response at all but just here and there only sporadic. [...] And the other thing is throughout India the major concern is with the issues of bread and butter. Foreign policy is not an issue, the Iraq War is not an issue for the average Indian on the street in any part of India. I did think that when the Sri Lankan crisis was going on maybe it was an issue, but it needs to be seen whether it was such an issue even in Tamil Nadu. It was an issue but the extent to which it was an issue remains to be seen. And people in Tamil Nadu do not bother about what is going on in Jammu and Kashmir. It is just local so there are engrossed with getting the next meal or other problems in their vicinity. It could be floods; it could be safety. And since Nehru there is a decline in intellectual dealing with international issues. He could attract people with such issues but since then there has been a significant decline with the new leaders. [...]

I: Did India take any notice of the Kenyan election crisis and the measures after that?

E: I don't think so.

I: I raise the question because it is one of the best examples of a R2P most countries seem to be in compliance with...

E: I think there was no coverage. Even celebrated newspapers have shrunk their coverage on international issues. The Hindu for instance at one point of time on a Sunday it had four columns on international issues, four correspondents, now it has none. The coverage giving to international news has shrunk. [...]

I: 2011 the Indian vote on UNSC resolution 1973. Can you elaborate a little bit about the motives of the Indian vote and especially about the position and debate after the fall of the Gaddafi regime

when many countries felt betrayed or saw an overstretched or even misused mandate, misused from protecting the people of Benghazi to regime change.

E: I mean India's position on Libya has not been consistent in terms of voting practice. So you have the UNSC resolution 1970 and then 1973 but I think I mentioned this that India probably was waiting for something like Libya to happen. It was also concerned about the plight of its own nationals and about how the Muslim community would respond to the crisis in Libya. What would be their opinion on that issue? In a way one could argue that one doesn't know the degree to which the domestic Muslim community had influenced but I would say India was in fact influenced by the manner in which...it was also the UPA government at that time, so it was very much receptive to the Muslim opinion. So, regime change was something India would not in any case support, but India was a non-permanent member, its actions were constraint and to that extent its position was very much calibrated, India was hamstrung by all these factors: non-permanent member of the UNSC, plight of its own nationals, the opinion of the Muslim population. [...] After Libya its position became even more tight, even more calibrated and constrained. [...] I think India reception to R2P is always conditioned, as you mentioned UN, consent of the host state, peaceful means, as a last resort etc. If you take a content analysis of Hardeep Singh Puri, then this what gets repeated. There is this mention of sovereignty...It is interesting that India's stance on R2P is not 100 percent driven by R2P it is also by this notion that India doesn't want to be seen as a protesting state all the time. Is about R2P primarily but it is also about certain things which are beyond R2P. What would be its normative positioning, it cannot say no to R2P that would be too detrimental. [...] R2P is moral loaded so you cannot say no to R2P, but you can also not totally accept R2P. [...]

There seem to be a wide variation in terms of how states think of sovereignty. It depends on the degree, the degree of which you would give benefit of doubt to the sovereign state. India would give it more, whereas states such as US and UK would give less. And what next, they would go for a regime change, which in a way makes sense to me, because if the regime is a problematic regime it has to go but not all the time. [...]

I: After the Libya disaster the Brazilians came up with the RwP proposal and after some time the tensions over Libya cooled down and the IBSA countries separated a little bit in terms of voting behavior in the UN from joining camp all the time with Russia and China. Can you elaborate a little bit on the Indian position if there was any towards the RwP proposal?

E: I think India had no other choice than to embrace or accept RwP. What is tragic is that India could have come up with something comparable with what Brazil had come about. [...] RwP if it is seen as counter to R2P in a way it makes sense to consider RwP as something that derails the moment of R2P. And I wouldn't think in fact that it has to do with the arrogance of the West. Maybe RwP wasn't flashed out very well. As you pointed out after some time Brazil lost interest on RwP, it does take time and space for states to react to certain notions or certain concepts. And Hardeep Singh Puri in one of its statements or in a couple of statements does make a mention of RwP. [...] But I think what is interesting is when you point out as to how there are differences within the democratic states, within IBSA or within Global South and I think there is a limitation in terms to the extent to which you can consider Global South as a singular category or as the democratic states because I think from democracy to democracy or even within a democracy

there could be multiplicity of perspectives of how far you can go on R2P. But I don't remember having come across any intellectual discussion on RWP in India. [...] The interest seems to be thin, less for R2P on the intellectual level and even less for RWP. If you do a content analysis, I haven't come across on any article on RWP on any of those newspapers or journals. Because I think the default position is to be skeptical of anything such as R2P, the West preaching about human rights, it is not only about human rights but that is the dominant interpretation.

I: Can we expect any contribution or engagement on the diplomatic level by India into the debates such as R2P, not only R2P, on a global level. The bigger India becomes the more the demand will come from the outside and your convenient default position will no longer be accepted.

E: I think we could expect India to contribute to the discourse but not in the near term, I think in the long term. Whichever government comes to power will be proactive at least for domestic electoral reasons. [...] India on the question of Sri Lanka missed a great strategic opportunity, also a normative, because there was certainly domestic demand from Tamil Nadu to do something in Sri Lanka and the Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee did use the term "responsibility to protect". But it could have been carried on forward and India not been struck or trapped in this Rajiv Gandhi assassination, the LTT. So had India had the (?) to think beyond what has happened to the Congress leader India would have come up with something conceptual, something theoretical and something more practical. That would have also ensured that Congress or BJP and the Congress party would have reaped benefits even in Tamil Nadu. I think a lot depends in a way on how India deals with its domestic constituencies which maybe not so logically explicable. Whether India becomes more majoritarian the way it is. If it becomes more majoritarian, I think it will just be left with permanently deal with the ban on beef and issues of such kind but if it becomes much more inclusive, if it takes everyone onboard, if it becomes much more accommodative to minorities, I think India will have a lot to say meaningful in international forums. It is not as if India is lacking in terms of the intellectual discourse, it is just that I think the right or the appropriate traces of such discourse needs to be seen as I mentioned in the works of Gandhi, Ambedkar or Nehru and it has to be articulated effectively. [...] Maybe there is a default position, maybe India is pretty sure of what it does, but it cannot publicly say that it will not care about what goes on in Sri Lanka. So, you find that change even in terms of Sri Lanka (?) in practice. Not saying much but suddenly voting in favor of a resolution that is critical of Sri Lanka. [...]

Interview with Manoj Joshi (Observer Research Foundation, ORF)

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Büro des Interviewpartners, ORF
Datum des Interviews: 03.12.2015, vormittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:29h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: In our preliminary talk you just said one has to look back at history...

E: We need to look at the R2P concept because I remember attending a conference in Montreal, Canada in 1999. The US president addressed it, so it was a big in those days. With Somalia and so on there was a feeling someone has to intervene, with what happened in Bosnia and former Yugoslavia. So, there was a feeling that the international community has a responsibility to protect. But then has come the disaster after the Iraq War. So, the Iraq War was the water shed and since then of course we have had interventions in Libya and in Syria. So today the international community is very different. So, there are countries like India who say it's okay unless and until there is a UN sanction we are not going to get involved. And in any case [...] big powers like India, if their interests are affected, they don't really care. So, when we intervened in Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, we did not wait for any UN mandate or so. If we perceive our security – and this is true for all big powers – if they feel there is an immediate security challenge than they don't worry about the UN. But at the level of principle the always say that the UN...even after the attacks in Paris the UN has passed a resolution. The resolution is kind of a very comprehensive resolution, you can do whatever you want to do but it's still under chapter VI and not chapter VII. So, in that sense it is not a license for everyone to intervene everywhere.

I: The starting point of my project was that we think R2P is conceived as a mainly western driven concept. And we think that sometimes if the West speaks with the South or the East about global norms and principles, we probably might use the same phrase but probably we might mean something different. For instance, with human rights, we might think of the personal freedoms and you might think of secondary human rights. And I as a European from Germany I don't feel much interfered by the work of the EU-Commission that influences a lot of my daily life because we decided to shift sovereignty/power to the supranational level. Thus, even when we talk about interference or non-intervention, we might mean something different. So, what do you think how India understands sovereignty, non-interference/non-intervention, or human rights...

E: If you look at the intervention in Kashmir from 1990 onwards the Indian position has been that we have been very open in the sense that we permitted the international media to function in Kashmir. Through the '90s we allowed the ICRC access to the prisons etc., etc. but of course we had problems with agencies like AI or HRW etc. For many European countries they have not faced the external challenges we did. All conflicts by nature are dirty conflicts, no one can fight a clean war [...] and we have the AFSPA [...] so there is a certain ambiguity. But yes, when it comes to the principle of human rights a country like India does not see itself very different from European countries. We do uphold the individual human rights of liberty, freedom of expression etc. It is true in India under law the freedom of expression is constrained from preventing you of provoking some other community. So, it is not an absolute thing. But even European countries are learning this now with different communities that you have to be careful with provocative cartoons etc. [...] So I would hesitate to say there is a "south position" on this. We are a lot influenced by British law which had been introduced in the late 19th century and of which a lot is still operational today. [...]

I: Do you see a special Southern or Asian position on the notion of sovereignty?

E: The way Germans see sovereignty is also shaped by their history. The Germans have been tried to run away from being Germans. Whereas for many other people there is a pride in being...we in India are still in the process of becoming Indians, we are not yet Indians. In 1950 with our constitution, we began the process of becoming Indians. For us nation is a matter of pride. For the Germans the nation became a matter of embarrassment, so these are two different histories and obviously they have an impact on the concept of Sovereignty. If you ask an Indian, he will insist on 100 percent absolute sovereignty but of course under the UN Charter all of us have devolved some sovereignty to the UN. If we talk for instance about climate change, we cannot claim that it is our sovereign right to emit gases likewise the UN Charter circumscribe even defensive war is something you can only do with the permission of the UN. That is a law, people may not follow that law, but it is quite straightforward as far as sovereignty is concerned. So, we have shed sovereignty to the UN, and we continue to take the position that if there is which with its wisdom the UN decides we are willing to go along with it. But things outside the UN that effects sovereignty I don't think we would be willing to do.

I: I would now like to talk about two cases in regard to R2P, the implementation of R2P into the WSOD in 2005 and the UNGA discussion after the 2009 Implementation Report by the UNSG. I don't think the Indian position changed much but the expression did change a lot, the language and the position softened a lot from Nirupam Sen in 2005 to Hardeep Singh Puri in 2009. How would you explain this difference in the positions?

E: I don't think it got so much to do with the permanent representative as with the government of India. In 2004 the government of India changed, and we had a UPA government and that is really in my view the important element. The UPA government and yes, the Left was a strong component of that, also the UPA is more internationalist by nature. So that is really the reason for the change, of course by that time it was also clear that the R2P was not going anywhere, just another concept which was floating and the whole controversial around the Iraq War had taken place, so it was clear that everything was drawing back from that point. So, the real water shed was really 2001/2002.

I: But nevertheless, the West did not expect such a harsh opposition from India in 2005 and joining camp with countries like Nicaragua and North Korea...

E: I think the main reason was really the UPA government.

I: Is the Kenyan way of R2P after the violent elections in 2007/08 with prevention measures, host state consent, no military intervention, great role/involvement of the UN, AU etc. the version of R2P in practice India would comply with?

E: That is actually part of the UN Charter and what we have seen there the African Union have been much more active, in other places (of the world) there are no regional unions which can intervene in that sense. AU is a fairly unique regional arrangement that has intervened and even brought some people to trial so that has peculiarly something to do with Africa itself. Also, I think there were not too much big great power politics involved. If there was great power politics involved then you would have two sides... [...] Maybe it was a specific historical junction.

I: IBSA countries and Germany by historic coincidence in the UNSC where important decisions took place [...] On Libya, Res. 1973, India abstained as well as Germany abstained [...]. After the military operation of NATO and AL many countries felt betrayed by NATO and AL because they perceived the mandate as exceeded from protecting the people of Benghazi to "regime change". How did India perceive the Libya case and what were the main points of India's critique?

E: We had to evacuate citizens from there, so it created a bit of a humanitarian crisis for us. All the things had to do with success and failure. If the whole thing had succeeded with a successful transmission but since... Libya is not an area that we focus on, we don't have that expertise on Libya and giving where Libya is located, we thought that the Europeans would do what they were doing but it is clear now that they didn't know what they were doing. So, I think this is really what it is and I don't think there is really a big issue of principle involved. It had to do much with the failure and the subsequent breakdown of Libya.

I: Hardeep Singh Puri argued it gave R2P a bad name...

E: Yes!

I: Did it influence India's stance on Syria?

E: Definitely, it influenced our stance but again Syria is as well not a country where we have big interest. We were mindful of what had happened in Libya, and I think in retrospect we were probably right. It is a total mess.

I: R2P and the debate about norms and principles of a future more multipolar world. Countries of the South seem to be reluctant to come up with own proposals or contributions in this debate whether for the big internal challenges or not, but they are not responding so much to the demand coming from outside to engage in this debate. Do you see India in a position to come up with own contributions or engage in this norm contestation or will India continue to stay on the side and just watch and say yes or no?

E: I think we will continue to stay on the side because I think right now the Indian focus is on the economic change in India and we are very focused there and secondly, we still have a lot of

internal challenges. In Kashmir we still have a problem, in the Northeast we still have a problem, and we don't want to be some of this (R2P) done on us. We don't want to have people that are blaming us and saying you are doing this or that on your territory. And the third thing of course is you will just not get common ground in the South. We at least have a polity in which we are committed to protecting the culture and ethnicity of our constituent states. We have six or seven states in the Indian Union where outside people cannot buy agricultural property. The reason is we want to protect the ethnic integrity of those territories but other countries (in the South) like China don't have those norms. Their response often to such challenges is to topple or alter the ethnic composition of troubled areas. So here we have two different principles.

I: If India would be in a position to engage do you think it would get the resources, the diplomatic resources to engage, the thinking capacity in the MEA?

E: You know something like R2P requires a good integration of the civil and the military in foreign policy making. And it is true that we don't have good integration. Sometimes our foreign policy tends to be overtly relied on diplomacy not like the US where both go together or where sometimes the military leads, in India it doesn't. These are structural issues which certainly need to be addressed. The Indian military is kept out of position making in certain areas of foreign policy and if you would like to do some expeditionary activities, some activity has to be done across the seas ...there are no governmental structures to do that. If you go back and look at India's Sri Lanka intervention you will see many of these gaps. It was a poorly managed military intervention. It was first diplomatic than it became military and then diplomatic again but there was no combined or whole approach. That is a weakness of the Indian system.

I: Is there anything you would like to add or any question you would like to ask me?

E: The world is in an extremely fluid situation right now. We can't even predict what kind of challenges might be around the next corner. People are more depending on what they have rather than thinking of something new. The changing is very fast, and I don't think this is the time for new structures. Often crisis give birth to new structures, but even with the terrorism we have not been able to come up with a common global answer/platform, we still struggle for a convention on terrorism. I think there a limitation within the Westphalian state system, you can't do anything.

Interview with Prof. Dr. C. Raja Mohan (Observer Research Foundation, ORF)

Art des Interviews:	Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews:	Büro des Interviewpartners
Datum des Interviews:	03.12.2015, vormittags
Länge des Interviews:	00:42h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: Can you elaborate a bit on the question whether or not there is a difference between “the West” and the “Global South”, especially India on understanding norms and principles such as sovereignty, prohibition on the use of force, non-interference, non-intervention and human rights?

E: This whole division between “the East” and “the West” on R2P is not an argument either historically or in a practical sense. If you go back from India’s own experience: In 1971 India intervened in Bangladesh. When India intervened in fact the West opposed it. The West defended Pakistan no matter it was a dictatorship and the Soviet Union for political reasons supported India, there was nobody else in the West who actually supported it, some of the western civil society groups supported it. So, the West today to come to India and say look you guys are too dumb and you don’t realize it’s not about sovereignty it’s about protecting people. I mean it’s somewhat ingenious and it’s also for the Indians to say we are always for sovereignty we are against intervention. So, both sides neither have a historical perspective nor do they have an empirical sense of what has happened in the world in the last seventy years. There is a second example, take the case of Cambodia. In Cambodia in fact civil societies in the West took attention to the mass atrocities which took place. So, when the Vietnamese went in to oust the genocidal maniac Pol Pot the entire West, China, Japan, ASEAN, everybody opposed the Vietnamese, saying that intervention was illegal, unlawful. And everybody supported the genocidal maniacs against the Vietnamese. And India was one of the few countries that supported the Vietnamese. And with great costs on India’s foreign policy because India had a price to pay, especially with ASEAN. So now for Indians to hear this from the West “we got the religion now”, I discovered new principals of interventions, intervention as a principle”. And the Indians do say no, no, you are always wrong. I mean both sides...it’s a stupid debate, because it’s not empirical rooted, it’s not historical rooted this framing India is for sovereignty, the West is for intervention. It is completely a post ’89 debate, which falsely constructs this thing. And I think those who think they have to defend India’s record have any sense of India’s position or those who criticize India have any sense of what they are doing. And to go back to one more example 1945/47 it was the drafting on the Declaration of Human Rights. If you go back and look at the debates, it was Nehru

who was saying look there must be a more interventionist approach in the defense of human rights. Who was opposing the principle at that time? It was not the developing countries it was the European colonial nations who was saying Westphalia is supreme. South Africa must be free to do what it does with Apartheid, the Dutch must go back to Indonesia, France will go back to Indochina. That as legal sovereign of that space they have every right to do what they want. We talk about just seventy years ago. And now the same Europeans are coming, and lecturing India and the developing countries look you guys don't know what we are talking about. I doesn't excite me the whole way the framing of this issue has taken place has no consequence.

I: But when I say R2P how would you define R2P...

E: Look again you say R2P...just because the West has discovered some concept the rest of world doesn't have to follow its feet to debate that principle. India intervened, India has intervened in Nepal, India intervened in Bangladesh so for the Indians to say we don't intervene just again is a stupid thing for the Indians to say, because India intervenes. It's the whole framing...look if there is a case when the question is when people should intervene... It's not a law that is where the problem is. That is political judgement countries have to make. If there is a rule which can tell you the criteria, then you can have an algorithm for R2P. No problem, everybody can do what they want just turn on the algorithm. But in international politics there is no algorithm and countries will decide...the problem is not just to say when to intervene. Who is going to pay for it? What are the costs of it? In Libya the principle has been partly invoked in a different form where are the French and the British, hiding under the table now, four years later. Where are they now? Germany opposed it. Where are they now to protect the people? The academic debate goes on, let me explain the context. Post '89 there was a sense sovereignty does not matter, the international system can interfere and the western countries full of...discovered the new truth. The Soviet Union had collapsed, they can intervene, but the problem is look at the record post '89. How many interventions have been successful? So, what is the big deal? And it was not about R2P. The West had power and the argument was about can we put this power to good use. The Americans said look – within America there are two debates – the minority said respect sovereignty, don't make around, don't waste your power, don't go everywhere trying to do to things, you can't fix it, which is the realist/minimalist argument. The left and the right you had the interventionist, both the liberal interventionist as well as those who believed American power can be used on the right, both sides believed American power can be used through intervention, which what has been put to use in Iraq and Afghanistan. To date it is very difficult to sell that argument. Forget the principle. You can wright a PhD...Why did Obama the liberal democrat back away from Syria? Because there is no political support. He realizes what are the arguments in Washington City. You don't have the political support and you don't have the money to pay for it. That settles it. You can have a theory of R2P but that is of no consequence. When a leader judge is it worth it, should I pay the price, do I have the capacity to sustain it. Once those questions opposed even half an intervention you pull back like in Libya.

I: If I would put myself in the position of the concept it was designed not to legitimize the interveners case but to protect the people. And if you take the case of Syria, for us, for our government Syria for instance was not a R2P case, because R2P was supposed to do less harm than more suffering by the consequences of an intervention and if one would intervene in Syria one would do more harm...

E: Look that is a fairly simple thing, they teach you in medicine the first principle “do no harm”. But the point is Germany...Germany can have a sensible humanitarian algorithm when to intervene, but Germany has a problem; does it have the political will to do it when it wants to? The German history and the circumstances...why did Germany oppose in the case of Libya? They were with Indians actually...You don't tell your chancellor here is the theory, in this case the circumstances are right, go and intervene. Do you think the German chancellor will do it? Because of a theory or the circumstances? It has to...it comes from a political judgement. Is it worth doing it? What will be the costs? And are the German people ready to pay those costs? Post 2003 and the German position has been consistently avoiding intervention. Afghanistan you came in because you scored them in Iraq so be nice on Afghanistan. So, we can send troops, there is a war going on, we can help, we can build a nation out there, but the moment things start going bad the political support evaporated pretty quickly. So I think R2P is highly overdetermined and it doesn't change anything look if you go back in to the history of intervention and the rights of people, it goes back to the Westphalian System or even before...even under the Westphalian System the princess had some understanding if somebody is so crazy, so mad, some of the sovereigns, so oppressive to his people than it is alright for others to go in and oust him. That is common sense. The question is/was not whether it was right or wrong, the questions is who's going to do this, how will it be done, who will pay the cost, or you help someone other to achieve that object by revolt than it becomes a question of supporting revolution. In the western system it started by the question of defending the minorities, when Protestantism came to Europe. When the religion of the sovereign was different from the religion of a section of the people. How do you deal with the rights of different minorities, religious minorities. [...] Post '89 after there was no great power rivalry and no external threat like the defense against the Soviet Union things were different and Europe thought sovereignty doesn't matter because there is nobody threatening EU and you had so much power that you can actually go and do what you wanted. So, the story is about the tragedy of the post '89 experience and the paradox of it not about a theory.

I: Don't you think even though sovereignty still is important it changed a little? When Assad's father killed 30.000 people in the town of Hama when they did an uprising no one took notice or did really care about, and I would say nowadays it is a bit different...

E: What have they done (in Syria)?

I: Nothing yet, but sovereignty is no longer absolute...

E: But what have they done; I mean the people have intervened. Iran have intervened, Saudis have intervened etc. So, everybody has intervened except the West. Russia has intervened... [...]. So where is the R2P on all this? It's about interest and the West decided, Obama decide I will not do it because I already had two stupid wars, I don't want to have a third one. So, it was not theory driven it was politics driven. I think by focusing on the theory, the norms, which partly is the German discourse on international affairs...

I: ...and the African Union because...

E: ...yeah, that is true. But what are you going to do if something happens in Kongo, what are the countries around doing. Because the way the borders where drawn you have minority issues,

what happens in one country destabilizes another country so what do you do about it. The problem comes with the R2P debate from Gareth Evans downwards to frame it as a question of principle and that principle will form the basis of collective international action. All I'm saying is countries are intervening they are not asking for anybody's permission to intervene in Syria. [...]

The story gets interesting on how the world has dealt with internal challenges in another society. What the R2P guys say, what the humanitarian guys in general say, is no difference from what the mandate system was. If you go to the mandate system, the League of Nations, what were they saying? They said they can't be trusted with their own independence so we going to help them govern themselves, we going to be the trustees oversee them...so how was the failed state/I'll do nation-building argument different from the argument from the argument of the colonial mandate? You can claim it as a God's work, but you don't have the resources, you don't have the stamina, you don't have the energy to do God's work. What you do is half-hearted, mock around a little bit and in the moment, there is domestic pressure, you pull back. There is no championship in that sense.

I: What about the Kenyan case, where the focus was on prevention, with host state consent, local ownership, institutional and constitutional reform etc.?

E: I don't know the details of the Kenyan case. You can justify historical things that fits nice in with the theoretical concept but those are exceptions, right? Finally, if something is going on in Nepal tomorrow India has to decide is it going to do it or not. Maybe in the case of the African Union they have the resources, and everyone agrees to do it. But this is very context to context different circumstance so it's the variation that's interesting. Not do look here is something, a new law has been discovered and now we are going to see how this law works. All I'm saying is the post '89 hubris in the West that we can fix other people lives that hubris was shaken by Iraq and Afghanistan. There might be one or two good cases but the most are bad cases but it doesn't interest me whether or not it did prove the theory. What interests me is: what is it, that finally leads to stabilization, that is one question. Then again in history nowhere has society evolved without violence. Some people are going to win some people are going to lose. The German reunification, the French revolution, the Indian state today some of it is historical. Can the notion of collectively the international system get to together and fix somebody else's problem that is the dilution of the post '89 thing. I would say as a realist I have caution against it. I would not say I told you so, but it is quite clear. It was a passing moment between '89 and 2003 when this was a fanciful idea, seem workable and you had both the liberals as well as the hawks that said let's do it and burned their fingers and now there is a lot more caution in the West. But Russians now they think for different reasons they can bomb the shit out of Syrians that kind of thing goes on.

I: The "founding fathers" of R2P they would probably argue R2P is not new law it is more comparable with developments like the Geneva convention which means it will slowly make progress over let's say a hundred years...

E: *I don't know how old you are but okay we can wait until data is coming but look that's an academic exercise whether the data might prove my theory or not or we have the empirical data*

that is not an interesting thing. The interesting thing is the paradox when there were higher challenges major powers were looking at balancing, containing rather than trying to fix other people's inside problems. Post '89 there was a moment at the UN, Russians were weak, Chinese were just coming in, so they were going to questioning, they went to the bathroom every time there was vote on foreign intervention. But situation has changed, they challenged the US, the powers that still challenge the US are Russia and China. Meanwhile major regional powers are doing interventions on their own and it's leads to the classic case everybody is intervening in everybody's internal affairs. And everybody has their own legitimizing device. But this is not going to fix problems that ultimately the rights of minorities have to be respected. In the case of the Middle East sometimes the case of majorities has to be respected. In Syria Sunni majority doesn't get the rights. So, you have all these problems, and the problems are there. The question is that it is good to temper expectations that there is a going to be a collective wisdom that will decide where to intervene and how to do it right.

I: But would you say the whole Indian approach to R2P...

E: Look the whole official discourse is bullshit. I don't have time for that. They were doing it for particular reason. From the time of Kofi Annan's time or before that Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace also at that time when the whole thing started...look UN is captive to a bunch of bureaucrats, western liberal bureaucrats, the British guy, this guy, that guy you know who want to convert the UN into this generally supranational organization. UN was conceived as the four policemen. The four big boys will keep peace and roll against enemy nations like Japan and Germany. But post '89 the idea that you can transform this into a supranational institution, an international institution and you can come up with these concepts which will now legitimize the notion that we don't have to worry about that the Russian American rivalry blocked the balance of power system, now we don't have the problem, therefore we can use the UN for doing good. That was the theory. And it was a bunch of bureaucrats, UN bureaucrats and the liberals backed by them. For this there is very little support from the conservative in the US who say look if I want to intervene, I will intervene and I fu guys. You support me is useful multilateralism very convenient, unilateralism very necessary. So, Bush say you will back me? You don't back me I will do it anyway, so it's your problem. So that idea the international system can be used to fix problems inside was it a passing moment in which there was no power rivalry or there was a certain hubris in the West... India's problem was fairly simple one it was this. What will this mean on Kashmir? In 1992 the US took position against us in Kashmir and asked us why do you guys have a nuclear missile program? It is against peace and security which is what the '92 summit said. So, you have to roll back all this we have decided what is good for you. You guys no NPT; you sign up and give up. [...?], therefore, the foreign office was resisting this by saying sovereignty, sovereignty, sovereignty. Finally, how did we solve the problem? Not by saying sovereignty, we solved the problem by doing a deal with the Americans, which is what, engage with Bush as a democracy, that probably to contain or balance China. If you talking geopolitics give up your bullshit about Kashmir and NPT and we will be your comrade as a rising power and we will talk about it. And now nobody talks about Kashmir anymore.

I: What is the main driving factor, what influences the Indian foreign policy the most if it is not non-alignment anymore, if it is not Nehruvianism anymore?

E: No this is a false debate. When Nehru framed non-alignment, this was only one part of India's foreign policy, a power just being decolonized. It was doing just what George Washington was doing. I don't want to do European power politics I want to build my own capabilities. That is what we were doing but it is not some kind of an Indian invention, that is bullshit. [...] There were three or four treaties that Nehru signed. One was the Declaration of Universal Human Rights, very idealist, very liberal, very internationalist. Then he also signed security treaties with Nepal and Bhutan, which were big power arrangements with small neighbors. This again was the legacy of the Raj so again was he a liberal or an imperial leader. Much of the problem with political science you are framing you are setting categories and then you play around with it, which is heuristically what you need to do, it is helpful, but you have to see what this man did, what Nehru did for 17 years. You might say look he is an idealist, but he is not. He is not making it easy for political scientists, that is not his job. He is reigning a new country, he is putting it together, he is dealing with the legacy of the Raj, he is putting India on the platform. But he is not trying to make it neat and clean for the political science analysis. So, your capacity of make a political record of Nehru, why was he doing what he was doing, it's a complex record. There are power elements as well; Nehru was opposed to setting up non-alignment as a bloc, the Chinese screwed him, he went to the Americans. How does that fit in to those who say Nehru was an idealist, Indira Gandhi was a realist, Rajiv Gandhi was an optimist... This is where political science is distorted, a simplifying distorted evolution of India's foreign policy. There is no real empirical analysis, which is what I'm battling against. You have to explain why did India interventions? That will tell you more the story than those guys who served in the UN and tell you oh, we are against interventions, India is against interventions. What is the story in Goa? Why did Nehru intervene in Goa because after all it was a legitimate territory of the Portuguese. Why did he intervene, why did he use force. [...]

There is not enough empirical proof, examines of India's internationalist of India's use of force?

I: But how would you describe India's foreign policy 2015?

E: It is a nation trying to be a major power and adapting to the international circumstances. But it is only a small elite that debates it, is it non-alignment...

I: But is India's foreign policy more driven by domestic challenges, the environment, it's diversity.

E: It's all of it. We are driven by diversity, we are driven by biases, by the political classes, there is a lag between the objective demands on India and the subjective capacities of its leadership. Look at the last ten years. Why did Manmohan Singh do a deal with the Americans? All the liberals were panic saying this is an abandonment of non-alignment. But if you see consistently, Vajpayee said the same thing, Manmohan Singh said the same thing and Modi is saying the same thing. But at the same time there were a whole lot of people across that felt, you are giving away your freedom of action, giving up strategic autonomy so again I think you got to have empirical proof... [...]

Certain setup circumstances and the whole Indian national movement's response to the Second World War was a critical element in shaping how India dealt with the West. What happened with the partition, why did the Anglo-Americans support Pakistan? That goes back to the attitude of

the Congress and the Muslim-League...so it is much more complex than saying Nehru had an Epiphany in 1947 and invented non-alignment. This meaningless and doesn't tell you anything. [...] It's an academic discourse but not the inside and if you go here to all the think tanks, if you go to JNU, if you go to retired diplomats they will all tell you the same story, but none of them know the story in an empirical sense. [...] But they are not studying/looking at India's own intervention. What was the argument in 1971, they did justify it as a humanitarian intervention but be careful they pulled back again because thought somebody might use it against us. [...]

Don't do worry about R2P, look at India's use of force. Take three examples Goa 1961, 1971 and '87. What has India done, what was the discourse, the Indian argumentation, India had to defend it at the UN as well because it were not a merely regional thing, because India only intervene in its own neighborhood, it doesn't have the power to do it elsewhere, someday we will have the power so we will have to start having a bigger theory but how this India justify all that? Examine the debates, go to the UN debates, forget R2P instead look at what did India say in '71, in '87? How did it respond to the criticism or this Rajiv Gandhi thing? The post '89 thing, the whole issue of Kashmir, India was at the defense after '89. Kashmir was burning, Punjab was burning, the reforms are beginning to take place, the system had collapsed.

What was the main aim after '91? Buy me time, buy me time! My nuclear program is under pressure, the Americans are coming and saying the Kashmir accession is invalid, so the main thing was buy me time. Stall in the UN, use any argument to fend off the liberal idiots that say we go and come to fix your Kashmir problem, fend off the Americans by saying look we are a democracy, we open our markets, come and invest. Then I go back to the Russians because we don't want to lose them, we want to keep them so be nice to them. Try to manage the Chinese problem a little bit, keep talking to the Pakistanis, no results but keep talking. So, you try to create a structure to cope with your crisis in which you can reform your system, fix the economic crisis, no one had a majority so for the first time we were running a coalition government, not very stable and then you are preparing for the nuclear test. You had to fence this all with a set of arguments and then there is one guy at the UN which job is to say it is all about sovereignty. So, you can listen or read to all the speeches at the UN and find all this non-alignment, non-interventionist and sovereignty thing which you can frame to fit in your political science theories, but it is contextless not well contextualized. Thus, it is worth looking deeper at it.

I: Like looking not only on the tip of an iceberg. For instance, on the US-India-Nuclear they offered you much more like a decent place in the Central Command, but this was probably not feasible...

E: Oh it was feasible but the fear of doing something new, it was inertia, it is inertia, you are afraid of giving away too much and you are doing something you not done. [...] The final issue is about use of force, and use of force nationally or collectively and under what context do you use force. That is what the story is about. Don't worry too much about R2P, the philosophy of R2P, look where and why did India use force and with what arguments.

Interview with Dipankar Banerjee (Major General, ret.)

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Lounge des India International Center, New Delhi
Datum: 04.12.2015, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:51h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

I: On norms and principals like sovereignty, non-intervention and human right are there differences between western and southern democracies?

E: I don't consider distinct differences in other civilizations in basic essentials of governance both internally and international. But of course, there are distinct national characteristics which have evolved through history, even mythology and subsequently are part of a national identity, are national psyche [...]. In that context, if you look at (Indian) mythology for instance, the ideal for a king was one who looked after his citizens. So, the responsibility to look after the citizens and their welfare became an integral part of the whole governmental process. So therefore, we had different historical context by which of course nations define their interests as well as identities. So actually from 1648 the whole concept of a nation state came to existence, so the nation was responsible for everything within its own territory and was not accountable to anybody else. Whereas in the Eastern tradition the accountability essentially was the people and therefore especially in the India tradition, Indian Hindu tradition more than the Muslim tradition – India has multiple traditions – this was an integral part of the duty of a king, the responsibility to look after his citizens. [...] So therefore, it was the responsibility of a state, or the governing agencies or the sovereign of the state to maintain peace and stability within. [...] There is a certain amount of support and agreement that this is an important part of a state's responsibility that must be ensured. And essential difference in the R2P is that well if a state does not necessarily observe those principals [...] than the international community has a responsibility to also ensure those rights. So that is essentially where the clash came about. So, I think there is no essential contradiction in the Indian thinking to that of the R2P as such.

I: When the ICISS report came out there was nearly no response by India, even after the 2004 High Level Panel Report it was not on the agenda but in 2005 at the World Summit India had to respond and this response by Nirupam Sen, the then permanent representative, was very harsh. There are different explanations for this. What do you think actually was the reason for the first non-response, then harsh critique until the very last moment and the then softened and more open position in 2009 as expressed by Hardeep Singh Puri. Why was there first no response, then such a harsh response and why did it change from 2005 to 2009?

E: I was involved in the R2P process right from the beginning [...], Ramesh Thakur a friend of mine was member of the ICISS [...]. India was one of the parties that was consulted in the process

by the committee [...]. When the conference (on R2P) took place (in India) with the commission (ICISS), the government of India took no notice, I represented nobody but myself and there was one more person, a former ambassador, diplomat [...]. The government of India's position normally had been that these are independent commissions and therefore they are free to carry out their investigation etc. and the government may or may not get involved in the process. And the government of India usually does not feel itself compelled to interact with non-governmental initiatives. [...]

The principal concern in the government of India has always been that external influences could usually play the role of first regime change [...] The question of state sovereignty prevailed in nation states like India more than in any other country, especially those that have been colonized and lived many centuries under colonial rule or other foreign dominations (have feared) that this (R2P) could possibly be a wedge through which the possibility of regime change or any other external interferences could happen. [...] In 2005 the global response was so overwhelming positive that there was no scope for India to stay out of that. But those reservations remained very strong. And subsequently of course, what happened in the late '80's and '90's proved those points. And therefore [...] the responsibility to protect lost a lot of its legitimacy by the way it was implemented in a large number of countries.

Bemerkung: obige Äußerung ist ein hervorragender Beleg für die – auch bei derart R2P-affinen Experten wie General Banerjee – (nicht nur) in Indien weit verbreitete gedankliche oder tatsächliche Gleichsetzung von humanitärer Intervention mit R2P.

So, the tensions from that time prevailed from the time of the first gulf war and all the other things that were happening and then the attack on Iraq in 2003. So Indian response to R2P has essentially been along those lines but always accepting that it was a state's responsibility to ensure the protection of its people. It was in allowing external intervention to correct that situation or to decide whether an actual violation had been in place or not is where the tension is between the Indian policy and R2P principle.

[...]

Indian view has also been that R2P is a game of superpowers. It is a method by which state actions are justified under the guise of a noble and sacrosanct principle. But ultimately it is always, and every time state interests and national interests that dominate. And the finest example of that was the situation in Bangladesh in 1971 and is very strong in the memory of India. It was so clearly observable that it was such a violation of the state's responsibility towards its citizens and in spite of that it was national interest that ultimately prevailed. The dying of three million people was of no consequence as long as one's national interests was safeguarded. Much of that was not quite accepted at that time but subsequently as one looked at it this contrast between principles and action became so evident that the sanctity the purity of that principle became to be seen as an open ruthless big power play.

[...]

I: The Kenyan election crisis as an example for the implementation of R2P we do not talk about very often as a non-military intervention and the application of Pillar I and II of the R2P with

host state consent within the UN system and the help of regional organizations as well as INGO's. Is the way the R2P has been carried out in Kenya a way of which India would probably agree with/comply with.

E: In India the tension is between state sovereignty and external intervention. And therefore, anything that is in accordance with state sovereignty usually is considered in India as an acceptable situation. So, the tension comes where the state itself is the perpetrator of violence. But in the Indian perception the states legitimacy still remains very high. So, the state's legitimacy has to be undermined fundamentally in order to allow external intervention to take place. And that is why India took the position in such cases as Libya or Syria and other places. And in Libya it was the end result which was not what has been expected. So, it was not the security of the civilian population but a regime change [...]. So, as long as state sovereignty is given enough space and legitimacy it will be considered to be acceptable. As for the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka which took place because of the request of the legitimate and authorized state, recognized under all relevant international laws. There is the difference in the Indian perception.

I: The Indian position did not change much during the evolution of R2P. But interestingly even after the things that happened in Libya India voted for the funding of the post of a Special Adviser on R2P within the UN and remained quite open to the further implementation and debating of R2P. So after Libya there was the apprehension India might draw back its position on R2P and behave more like it did with Nirupam Sen in 2005.

E: I don't see a dichotomy in the Indian position even not in 2005 when we were probably not aware of all the things that were included in R2P, but we were convinced that under certain conditions it was the right thing to do.

I: Did the fact that India was just coming into the UNSC in 2011 a factor that influenced India's abstention on Res. 1973 because it didn't want to say "No" when so many countries said "Yes" or abstained?

E: No, it was never the intention of the resolution to target Gaddafi as such. It was to prevent the civilians (of Benghazi) from being killed. We are not against regime change (coming from inside) but it seemed as if the removing of Gaddafi was the primary objective and what we are seeing now where things are worth is the proof. It was support for the Libyan intervention with the hope that the force will be limited, consensual and not directed against the leaders to change the regime. [...]

And the reason the UN could not intervene in Syria was – as H.S. Puri argued - the bad name it (R2P) had been given in Libya. [...] It not only influenced the Indian position on Syria but the position of many countries in the world and especially the UNSC. So, a future application of R2P (by a military intervention) will be much more difficult.

I: After Libya the first UNSC resolutions brought about a voting behavior in which India was in line with Russia and China saying "No" on several resolutions on Syria and all the BRICS countries had a common voting behavior. But after some time, about six months and after the Brazilian RWP proposal, the voting behavior changed again, and India, like SA and Brazil

separated from the voting behavior of Russia and China, in one case even saying yes when Russia and China vetoed a resolution that condemned the Assad regime for doing cruelties. What are the reasons for that and got it something to do with a changed discussion after the RwP proposal by the Brazilians?

E: First answer is that the BRICS as such doesn't have a common foreign policy and they do not have a common policy on several issues. It is just a mechanism for facilitating cooperation among countries facing a similar economic reality. So, BRICS got nothing to do with it, Brazil is in Latin America and South Africa is a totally different environment etc. Outside the permanent-five-structure this was a forum, emerging countries did find. It will no longer be applicable today with all the given economic situations having changed so dramatically. But in that moment in time, it seemed to be an appropriate organization for cooperating on economic related issues, so not much cooperation on foreign policy.

I think the Brazilian proposal on RwP were reflecting the views very closely to that of India and I think also of South Africa [...] (avoiding the misuse of mandates with the RwP). Yes, I think South Africa, India and Brazil came to the same position – but It was not necessarily because we were moving away from China's or Russia's position. [...] We (IBSA) looked at the problem in a similar perspective. I think China's and Russia's (position/perspective) was more shaped by geopolitics than anything else.

I: Do you think that IBSA have more in common with each other than with Russia and China and if so, is it only because Russia and China are veto powers, established powers in the UNSC?

E: The (permanent) membership in the UNSC makes a great deal of difference that shapes the political power respective nations.

I: It took the Brazilians a lot of resources to put RwP forward in the international community. India's is doing a lot in regard to conflict prevention, peacekeeping etc. but mostly practical things and often on bilateral level. Can we expect India – while still having those enormous demands/challenges on the domestic side - to come up with own normative contributions like the RwP proposal of the Brazilians.

E: The Brazilians came up with that proposal at a time when their economy was booming. [...] In India's constitution it is enshrined to be a responsible player in international politics which is reflected by India's big contribution towards peacekeeping operations in the UN right from the beginning. [...]

The size of the Foreign Service is something India should be ashamed about. [...] No one in the Foreign Service would agree but it is only 1/10 of the size it should be. But that is mainly a bureaucratic problem and not of resources.

Finally, I would say it is an interesting topic you choose because many people thought this thing would die out after Libya. R2P is a wonderful idea but in order to bring it forward one has to make sure that the objectives of R2P are met. And the objective of R2P in today's world continues to remain valid and important. [...] But it will have a lot of problems on its way.

Interviews Südafrika in chronologischer Reihenfolge

1) Mabera, Faith	09.09.2016
2) Mutton, Jan	13.09.2016
3) Tladi, Dire	14.09.2016
4) Zondi, Siphamandla	14.09.2016
5) Geldenhuys, Deon	15.09.2016
6) Bizos, Anthony	21.09.2016
7) Spies, Yolanda	22.09.2016
8) Qobo, Mzukisi	22.09.2016
9) Interview A (South African Diplomat)	23.09.2016
10) Africa, Sandy	19.12.2016

Interview with Dr. Faith Mabera, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue, Pretoria

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Büro der Interviewpartnerin
Datum des Interviews: 09.09.2016, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 01:18h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What from your point of view are the most decisive and influential factors that SA's foreign policy in terms of identity, culture, commonly shared world views?

E: "Number one would be SA's solidarity with its African counterparts, in this sense the whole notion of constantly pushing against the imperialist intent of the West. Routinely exceeding to the notion of Anti-Imperialism that is one essence that comes out strongly in a lot of statements. Especially when there is debate around or where there is doubt around the intention of any sort of intervention on the continent, the Anti-Imperialism comes out very clearly. And this often now brings in the debate of whether South Africa is a member of the AU, of whether a shift in the AU from a notion of non-intervention to one of non-interference [non-indifference?], whether it's actually plausible or just aspirational. Whether in reality it's always been state security and regime security prioritized over human security and that brings in the whole notion of peer shielding in terms of the AU leaders."

And secondly, I would say SA is increasingly pushing for South-South solidarity. Not only because it is obviously located in the South but also that it identifies itself with the struggles of the South and this links to its own projection as a bridge builder between the North and the South and this comes via the BRICS formation, the G-20, its ascription of middle power status and by this again the connotation of a bridge builder and it always pulls out the bridge builder card in multilateral for a for African interests and not only African but as well the interests of the Global South and this fits in the whole debate around UN-reform etc..

And then the nexus between development and the security, the interrelation is always a key element of its foreign policy engagement, not only in terms of peace and security but also in terms of development partnership.

The African agenda also points to this whole thing of challenging the Euro-Atlantic hegemony. But the African Agenda also refers to the continental integration and regional integration and

the development issue also comes into play in the African Agenda. And I would say, putting in political and economic rights alongside security is also within the African agenda. [03:45 – 05:30 min]

Another premise of the South African identity as far as foreign policy is concerned is, its historical experiences and the transition from Apartheid into Democracy is considered to be a model. [05:40 min] *It constantly refers back to this as a clout, it is now seen as the preferred peace maker in terms of a capital for peacemaking. In the Kongo case, even in the Sudan case SA was seen as a broker.*

“SA’s contribution [towards R2P] should start from the transformation from the Organization of African Unity to the AU because South Africa actually played an instrumental role in ensuring that Art. 4(h) was included in the Constitutive Act and it pushed for the notion of responsible sovereignty as well.

Mbeki together with Obasanjo pushed for the liberal and transformative elements. But SA not only played a constructive role in 2000 but also in 2005 prior to the endorsement of R2P in the WSOD. Latin America was considered to be reluctant, and SA did a lot lobbying to manage the Latin-American and African group to come on board.

SA sees R2P in a graduated sense, as part of a wider conflict resolution process and not as an isolated thing. From Peacekeeping and negotiations and only when you did exhaust all the other options than you can resort to military action. Wider conflict resolution matrix. And the whole R2P debate is – especially after Libya – seen as rather procedural than substantive. When you look at the arguments of its partners in UNSC during that time there are similarities, but you can’t say this the BRICS position or this is the IBSA position, they stem from so many different sources and historical angles. And of course, SA’s contribution is good expressed in the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus.

I: When you look into official documents South Africa will always come up with Nelson Mandela and its foreign policy as a beacon of human rights and present its foreign policy as mainly value driven and that it circles around the promotion of human rights, good governance and democracy. But then other people say no, this is only rhetoric, first comes Anti-Imperialism, South-South Cooperation and African solidarity. Would you agree that the latter prevail over the rhetoric of the promotion of human rights, good governance and democracy?

E: *It is both, the following of the promotion of human rights and democracy but as well the heavily criticized voting on Myanmar and Zimbabwe. Puts a big hole in SA being a beacon for human rights. Quiet diplomacy versus megaphone diplomacy. What about human rights? Is it put in second place over solidarity or regime security? And it can be clearly seen in the Libyan case as well, when AU did not want an intervention, but South Africa left the AU position and voted for Resolution 1973. SA bandwagoning with the powers that wanted intervention, and then very fast pointing fingers at them in saying mission creep had occurred and did not acknowledge that it made a mistake but could not step back from the vote.*

I: SA's role in international politics is evolving. How does South Africa see itself? What kind of an actor in international politics is South Africa, what kind of an actor would it like to be or what role would it like to achieve?

E: *It will be very cautious about the whole topic of hegemony, because it has come under heavy criticism and that is why it is using the notion of bridge builder with its foot grounded and a speaker for the interest of the margins together with its Apartheid experience and its peaceful transition. This is a clout that is obviously used more often. In terms of the identity, it is four things, mainly solidarity between South and South but not at the expense of balancing Global South and Global North relation so the bridge building is one that comes out quite effectively and the centrality of human rights as a driving force. In terms of that and normative foreign policy it is still sticking to the tone of Mandela but between the capabilities and the expectations is wide gap. Too much expectations and too little capabilities. Anti-Imperialism, which comes more out when you look at it from an AU perspective, then the Anti-Imperialist notion comes more out clearly. And then it considers itself a middle power status.*

And when it comes to its position on R2P and R2P implementation we look at SA's statements on interactive dialogues or in debates. There SA presents itself as a balancer and bridge builder. I think it represents some sort of norm subsidiarity where it wants to counter and balance the influence of the powerful states especially when they come up against the weaker countries and there this whole idea sort of sinks with the whole idea of being a bridge builder in the South. And South Africa, the perception, especially on Africa being a continent that almost one of the biggest laboratories for R2P action, is considered of being a leading peace and security leader obviously because of peace and security capability, experience in terms of mediation and peace building and also post-conflict-reconstruction, supplying the much needed development partnerships, objectives and commitments on the continent as a development partner.

“A lot of peace and security arguments, policy documents have come because of the norm entrepreneurship role played by SA, especially at the AU level.”

Regionally SADC is too plagued by a lot of problems, so everything falls back to the more capable more powerful actors, in this case South Africa. And that means that it is SA's decision in which conflict zones it might intervene and in which not, bearing in mind its national interests. And that means that it got to balance its foreign policy identity on the one hand with its national interests on the other hand.

I: How does South Africa perceive the current existing international order, from Pretoria?

It sees the world order as completely unequal and hence it tries to tip and balance and provide alternatives to the hegemonic nature of the existing order. And the R2P debate has to be seen as part of this debate. On the hand side there is the notion of pluralism and solidarity and on the other hand side the fighting against structural power which you can see in the debate of R2P. So it sees the order as totally unequal but at the same it sees itself as one of the major players able to create some sort of bridge between the two unequal poles. Structural power and global power relations, the fault lines of global order come into play.

I: How does SA see BRICS and IBSA, what are the differences, what are the commonalities? Why at the moment does it prefer BRICS and in regard to South-South solidarity against the established powers, isn't it a little bit contradictory because Russia and China are part of the established powers, part of the established order, permanent members etc.?

E: *It's mainly about SA sitting together with big boys on the same table, but I would agree that it is interesting that they argue against the established order and by being within BRICS you are actually part of those power structures. In terms of worldviews, it believes that structural power is heavily tipped in favor of the Western and more established institutional powers and it sees itself of having a role to balance that more in favor of the South.*

I: How does SA see the West? As a homogenous block or with the experiences out of solidarity in the Apartheid past as more heterogeneous, how is the West perceived from Pretoria?

It depends on what is being contested. If it is about intervening in its affairs or in African affairs than it will block the West, if it is about economical things that SA is very much cherry picking.

“In terms of guarding sovereignty than it is almost blanket anti-West, almost antiimperialist approach. When it comes to the other elements of foreign policy than it cherry picks.”

I: How does SA sees the UN and the UN-AU relationship in terms of subsidiarity, burden sharing, reform of the UN etc.?

Based on the foreign policies and principles as articulated in the official documents I would say there is still a huge role for the UN to play especially because one of the elements that SA prioritize is Multilateralism. So, in this sense SA sees the UN as a key vehicle to achieve its objectives and Multilateralism. But at the same time there is heavy criticism that comes from the whole question of the unequal distribution of power, power relations. The issue of UN reform for SA links back to the whole notion of balancing out the unevenness and playing a bridge builder role.

I: There was this debate about the question of authority over the use of force, in terms of Art. 4(h) between the AU and the UN, in which the AU tried to get the authority down to the level of regional organizations but then finally accepted the single authority of the UNSC. Is this debate over?

E: *It has to be seen in the context of the wider debate on UN reform and I would say there is a stalemate, and it will go anywhere without the solving of the bigger issue. But still the UN is one of SA foremost vehicles to achieve its multilateral objectives.*

I: Does SA has another perspective on norms and principals like sovereignty, non-intervention and human rights? Shall we start with sovereignty, because here SA seems to flip-flop between different notions of sovereignty in regard to different circumstances?

E: *It sort of a contestation between “Sovereignty as responsibility” and a classic “Westphalian” understanding but if you look at the 2001 ICISS report it is very much this solidarity approach and what has been coined “R2P light” the 2005 WSOD is more in this pluralist approach. It is of course as well very much influenced by the experiences and especially the countries that*

gained their sovereignty from Colonialism very much hold on their sovereignty dearly. If they hold on the classic Westphalian notion then also because they are very apprehensive about any abuse and when they look at the constitution of global power in the arena they think that any alternative understanding might open up a potential for powerful states. And they find it hard to reconcile between R2P understanding and their apprehensions. And this all linked with the question of power distribution and international order. This is why they bring in the argument of human security, who is responsible for the actions and the question of international justice.

I: The next topic/notion is the prohibition on the use of force. SA in my eyes is quite reluctant especially in the implementation of R2P?

E: That is true, and SA sees R2P as a process and is very cautious as well as Brazil or India or others that only will use force calculated when all other means have exhausted and this on paper the approach that SA takes.

I: But isn't it the case as it is for India as well that these regional powers are willing to use force in their immediate neighborhood but when it comes to the question of using force abroad or an outside country is going to use force in their region then they get very reluctant towards the use of force?

E: Yes, but this also points to the past and the experience that they made. As in the case of SA which did a number of interventions e.g., in Lesotho shortly after the end of Apartheid and got its nose blooded. And thus, and by reflection it learned that this unilateral course, this unilateral approach is not the way to go in the future and prioritize multilateral approaches especially in the region. I don't even know whether I can SA credit with this because Nigeria had the same with the Libyan case what came up strongly was the whole idea of regional gatekeepers especially when it comes to international interventions and preventing foreign imposed regime change. The regional and the sub-regional organizations are being given a center place.

Libya and Mali raised the issue of foreign imposed regime change and raised anti-imperialist reflexes on the continent and this led to SA very heavy lobbying for the creation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). Some might say it's only a duplication of the AU Standby Force but that whole move was reactionary because the idea that France led the intervention into Mali left a very bad taste in the mouth of a number of AU member states, so the idea was immediately created and endorsed, and it was more reactionary than pragmatic.

If we agree that SA fits in what we define as middle power that middle powers have a responsibility of moving the debate away from the polarized version of us against them, North vs. South, the West vs. the Rest and that is where its capabilities and its strategies etc. will be more clearly brought out. And it is always important to move the debate away from the micro level – what is the meaning of sovereignty etc. I think this will only lead to a stalemate. We have to move the debate beyond the state and horizontally that means to bring in more actors and to acknowledge that this all about atrocity prevention and that needs to be done collectively. More engagement with civil society actors, more engagement in view of the security-development-nexus, more engagement with development practitioners.

And this whole middle power status as I already mentioned goes hand in hand with a strong preference on Multilateralism, especially on the regional and sub-regional level and that leads to the question of capacity building on these levels with feeds into the whole approach of internationally collective response and burden sharing. And as a middle power SA should end romanticizing its relations with the South and should stop seeing the Global North as the sole carrier of imperialist and hegemonic agendas.

The idea of Sovereignty as responsibility needs to be mainstreamed not only on the national level. SA should show more commitment towards R2P and start on implementing R2P in its foreign policy and until now it doesn't even have a R2P focal point, which is a bit surprising.

I: SA took a lot of effort on the transformation of the OAU into the AU and on the implementation of article 4 (h) into the founding document of the AU but it did not engage so much into the discussions in 2005 at WSOD. Would you agree? And about article 4 (h) some people say it is closer to the idea of HI than to Human Security and R2P. Could you elaborate a little bit on that?

E: *I would argue against the perception that article 4 (h) is closer to HI and more regime security centered than R2P because the language and the arguments that actually convinced and were put forward very convincingly by Mbeki and his team were through the lens of Human Security and the fact that SA was instrumental in the crafting of the APSA points to a paradigm informed by Human Security. It is only at the implementation level that we are starting now questioning the gravity of Human Security. What challenges is that a lot of the leaders who are trying to run away from accountability etc. end up falling to shielding their peers and trying to get away from justice for crimes committed so this is why the argument of Regime Security comes in. But on paper I would say it is one of the most interventionist peace and security regimes that exist and I would say it has very severe implications for Human security.*

And I would say that Mbeki's position on R2P was not only informed by Sovereignty as Responsibility and Human Security but also by the whole notion of prevention. And if you look at NEPAD, the APSA and the mandates of the PSC it is very Human Security centered. And the whole transformation from OAU to AU implied a fundamental shift from the old understanding of security and non-intervention to non-indifference, and non-indifference implies Human Security.

I: Thus, you would argue this peer shielding, the non-arrestment of al-Bashir, the low pressure on Mugabe etc. stems more from the Anti-Imperialism than from a shift back towards regime security?

E: *Yes, it comes from this anti-imperialist idea, to shield you peers and not allowing that they also become victims and they very provincial view of the ICC as only projecting Western interests in Africa and not looking on the broader picture of international justice. And there is a lack of political will to implement and ratify this justice mechanisms and institutions as the Kenyan case clearly show even for the African Court of Human Rights.*

I: Was the Kenyan election crisis an issue in SA and what Role did SA played?

E: *Gracia Marchel was very much involved. SA was only involved to an extent. If somebody asks me on SA's approach on R2P I would say you have to look at the wider peace and security*

approach that it presents which is like a mentioned a full spectrum approach. And this is also true for R2P where it is in favor of the full-scale approach of the 2001 ICISS report with all dimensions “prevent”, “react” and “rebuild”. This is my view of SA’s on paper approach to R2P. Kenyan case is a good case of prevention and pillar II of R2P.

I: Let’s come to the Libyan and Ivory Coast cases. Very tricky cases for South Africa, difficult to find a AU position, other regional organizations involved, Gaddafi violated Resolution 1970, but Gaddafi was the biggest sponsor of the AU and good arguments to vote for Resolution 1973 because of Gaddafi’s violation of 1970, threat to kill the people of Benghazi etc. But after voting for 1973 SA was very fast to criticize and condemn the operations against Gaddafi.

E: *Yes, but the main question people miss to ask is the sidelining of the AU. Was it self-inflicted? [...] I think the AU was a bit late to the party. The whole idea of solidarity with Africa fell victim in that case. The people that voted in favor of 1973 would probably argue that the text of the resolution was very much in line with SA’s position on R2P and human rights and they had to vote for it. There also might have been some sort of conversation between the US and the delegation of SA and between them and Pretoria which we don’t know. But I would say that the pretty soon realized they made a mistake in terms of the long-term implications, the way the implementation/NATO operation was carried out. Because even from a military perspective the wording was very carefully crafted, and it contained all the precautionary means. It was the mismatch between not knowing what shall we prioritize? African Solidarity, the moral imperative to protect civilians from mass atrocities. But the Libya case was special. One cannot take away the imprint of Gaddafi on that situation. The Gaddafi factor played a role. The complete sidelining of the AU that was obviously a fault of their own. We don’t know the amount of pressure that was placed on SA to vote in favor.*

I: Will the Libyan case have implications for the future of R2P because you said it was such a special case, especially for the AU und SA?

E: *It will have very serious implications in the regard that a next resolution would surely contain obligations on the responsibility to rebuild and it also rings to the preventive aspects of R2P, and of course more focus will be given to Pillar I and II.*

I: How did South Africa react towards RwP which actually addresses all those problems that occurred during the implementation of R2P in Libya?

E: *Yes, they did support and reacted very supportive to RwP as well as to the Chinese proposal of Responsible Protection, but unfortunately RwP died out obviously for wider domestic reasons. SA supported especially the procedural and prevention aspects of it. And I would argue that this whole process of debate post Libya, this norm contestation did not weaken the norm it made it stronger because actually the prevention part is the cardinal part of R2P and now we need to focus on this and on the regional implementation of R2P.*

I: In 2011 we had another case with Ivory Coast and in my eyes, SA did behave not so well. What would you say about why did SA behave in the way they did and why did they stick to old president against the overwhelming international majority in favor of the new elected president

and getting in trouble with the ECOWAS on the principle of Subsidiarity which they stressed so much in the Libyan case?

E: From the little that I know about that case SA was not seen as impartial, holding to one party of the conflict and there was a lot of confusion about what to do. And ECOWAS did react quite solid and the proposal with which they came up was prioritized which points to the fact of responsibility of regional and sub-regional organizations. The engagement of SA was influenced by its profile as the de facto peacemaker but the arguments around whether it is impartial and not knowing which path of action to take undermined its contribution in that case.

I: Can we expect contributions by SA in this norm debate or in the debate around the further implementation of R2P comparable with the Brazilian RWP proposal?

E: This of course heavily depends on political will and since SA not even got a focal point on R2P this is questionable. But the other point is that in my eyes one should not come up in the current situation with even more versions, counter versions of R2P but engage with what already has been offered, supplementary or complementary. The focus should not be on alternatives but on implementing in a more effective way and focusing more on the consensus.

But I don't see the political will to drive the agenda forward and IBSA and BRICS countries are facing economic hardship not withstanding a lot of other domestic issues. It needs the appointment of a focal point as number one priority and more engagement collectively by the government, civil society organizations, the universities and think tanks etc. to produce a strategy, document on SA's stance towards R2P. SA, like Nigeria, Kenya is a swing state, whatever happens here will have spillover effects to others, so its identity is its strength but at the same time its burden.

**Interview with Ambassador Jan Mutton, Senior Fellow at the Department for Politics,
University of Pretoria**

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Büro des Interviewpartners
Datum des Interviews: 13.09.2016, vormittags
Dauer des Interviews: 01:15h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What from your perspective are the most decisive and influential factors that SA's foreign policy in terms of identity, culture, commonly shared world views?

E: "The most obvious background is liberation movement. When they came back in 1994 from exile, the ANC, after its negotiations with the government [...] were in a mood of liberation movement, and they still are kind of in a mode of liberation movement, 22 years later, after the elections in 1994. And which is a little bit of a dilemma and a challenge, how to get out of the mood of liberation movement and go into a proper political party with responsibilities of management of the country, whether you are the ruling party in government or in opposition. But certainly, still the general background of South Africa's foreign policy is a liberation movement spirit. [...] Of course, Africa has always been very important and is a priority. Africa and within Africa certainly the SADC region, so South Africa's foreign policy is very much focused on the SADC region and also on Africa."

Concerning Africa, it is about getting Africa as a continent better organized for SA's interest (invest, export etc.) but also because there is a feeling of a responsibility for the continent. SA wants to be proud of Africa in the world. Africa has always been behind SA's foreign policy. Everything else has been changed a little bit since 1994. They had to write a new foreign policy because the old foreign policy of the Apartheid government was totally different due to the hostile neighborhood, a lot of boycotts, no diplomatic relations etc. So, it was mainly a new foreign policy after the end of the Cold War directed to find a place for SA in the international system. This new foreign policy was very sensitive to the outer expectations because don't forget the world's expectations were extremely high. Everybody expected SA to play the role of a high value asset for world politics because of a widely supported liberation movement took over a country, the last decolonized country. So many antiapartheid movements had been fighting for SA, in Africa, around the world, the Frontline States.

It was not an easy time to come into world politics. It was the time of the beginning of globalization, the genocide of Rwanda, the end of the Cold War. Breakup of the Soviet Union and socialist countries.

Mandela: HR are the cornerstones of our foreign policy. The first four years was really we have to tell the world what human rights are. It was a very pro-active foreign policy for human rights.

“It was a very proactive foreign policy in the beginning about human rights. Nelson Mandela would stand up in the OAU and tell people that sovereignty is no reason for allowing violations of human rights or he would ask at a Commonwealth conference for the boycott of Nigeria. He took a unilateral decision to go with the SA army into Lesotho to stop a coup. [...] But soon they realized that was not the right thing to do.”

Then you see a gradual change and if you look at policy documents of the late nineties it softened a lot, it was not so radical, proactive albeit still committed to human rights. It is now no more about integrating in the world scene, it is more about playing a role in establishing the new world scene and playing a role in the Global South, in the BRICS but Africa remains the first priority as a reflection of national interests.

I: You already elaborated on the question of what kind of an actor SA would like to be or what role would it like to play. In that context I'm interested in the notion of being a liberation movement, because the first thing Faith Mabera mentioned was Anti-Imperialism, so has this mood of being a liberation movement become stronger with Zuma or with the younger generation or is it just rhetoric to keep the ANC members in line?

E: “There is a serious sentiment of Anti-Western, Anti-Imperialist something that was absolutely not there in 1994. So actually, you see more the younger generation that is becoming, not more aggressive, but more self-assertive.”

The older generation has lived in exile, was ready to interact with the West but maybe the younger generation finds it necessary to assert itself better. Probably like immigrants in European countries where the second generation is more revolutionary than the first one. And maybe because SA is looking for its identity to be anti-something helps you to define yourself and your identity. And for many reasons this anti is being anti West.

In that identity making you have to stop someday and cannot go on and just be revolutionary for being revolutionary. One has to find out what is it that I am, what do I stand for and not only anti. And at the same time there is a superiority complex of only the greatest is good enough for SA. But I don't see the future of SA with countries like Russia or China or even India and Brazil but more with likeminded countries such as Indonesia, Chile, Mexico, Vietnam etc.

I: How does SA see BRICS and IBSA and what are they stand for? Is it an alternative for the Western (dominated) institutions? And isn't it actually better to interact with IBSA, because these countries are more likeminded and you bring in the civil society, what you can't with China and Russia?

E: *IBSA really disappeared into BRICS. We don't hear about IBSA anymore. There is a number of advantages with BRICS, but it's mainly about SA sitting together with big boys on the same*

table, superiority complex. But they don't know how to find identity within BRICS. There is also a bit of a victim complex, and they see the building of relationship with other countries too much as joining a group of other victimized countries. SA is a strange mix of a lot of things because it came so late into being. It is a superiority complex because they are so proud of the liberation movement of the peaceful transition and its first president really an icon. But at the same time, they have this victim complex, and they believe that everyone else is victim as well or try to join groups of countries that are also victims. They always have the feeling they have to stand up against something and they countries as Russia and China as countries that also has to stand up. They don't realize that countries like Brazil are longer independent that even Belgium or that China perceives itself as the center of the world or Russia and they see BRICS as a group of victimized countries which is not true.

I: How does SA from Pretoria perceives the current existing international order?

E: They see themselves as a transformer to lead the transformation of the existing international order and institutions. The current order serves the interest of the West and is unjust and they are excluded of the decision making. But Russia and China are in the decision making as well and will not give it up, mainly in the UNSC but that SA doesn't see.

I: How does SA see the West? As a homogenous block or with the experiences out of solidarity in the Apartheid past as more heterogeneous, how is the West perceived from Pretoria?

"As politically evil but I don't think they consider Europe in the same league as the US. [...] But they will be maybe in the end be more specifically critical of Europe than the of US because they need US more, they think."

I: How does SA sees the UN?

It's mainly about transformation of the UNSC, resolutions in the UNGA and the permanent seat or two for Africa but beside UN it is not so important, unless it is transformed. Because they are so fixated with the transformation, I don't know whether they really use the existing means within these organizations well enough in order to obtain results for SA, Africa and the Global South. And you can find this as well in the domestic affairs of SA.

There is a tendency of ask for new thing, new institutions but I doubt that they already used or exhausted the existing institution and funds etc. In SA we read these days so much about the burning of schools, libraries, university building, if there is an issue that doesn't work as they expect they have a tendency to destroy rather than reform it.

I: Does SA has another perspective on norms and principals like sovereignty, non-intervention, and human rights, what is their position on State Security vs. Human Security?

E: I think that SA has a lot if not many aspects of R2P already within its foreign policy. There are so many elements in SA that they could have a very good and valid protection policy. Within IBSA, within BRICS probably SA has the best protection policy.

I: But some people argue that their position towards human rights is in regress, because Nelson Mandela said there is no sovereignty that can shield you when you violate human rights and

hasn't that changed a lot since then? Is it still this Francis Deng understanding of sovereignty as responsibility or is it now again a more Westphalian understanding or still close to our European understanding?

E: Its more than Mandela, actually Thabo Mbeki has been the most important one in terms of sovereignty [...] With Mbeki came African Renaissance and actually African Renaissance is about sovereignty.

Mbeki was clear about you can only have African Renaissance when there is peace and absence of violence and no violation of human rights because it means instability. It actually came after the unilateral peace brokering attempt by Mandela in DRC in 1997 which failed. But they learned that there where so many interests, US, British, French, Belgium etc. doing their things in their interests that they actually learned we cannot go on like this, we as Africans must be able to take care of our own things by ourselves. We cannot leave it to the French, the American or the British. From that background came African Renaissance and then the sovereignty issue and the pushing for article 4 (h) and the Ezulwini Consensus.

We have as well a change of personality which influences foreign politics. Let's face it, Nelson Mandela could do anything and get away with it. Then came Mbeki and he was very well respected internationally, even the HIV-story tarnished this in the aftermath. These both could go everywhere and say, hey here are my theories, but at the moment there are no internationally recognized figures in SA's foreign policy and there is not much of thinking, there are no theories.

The most obvious thing at the moment is the pro BRICS-Anti-Western one. But the other important topics are not out, they are still there, but not so dominant at the moment. A major thing still is not to hurt Africa. Mandela would have always decided for sovereignty, Mbeki would probably have thought a little longer but then would have gone for sovereignty but now it is, if Africa doesn't want it, we will not do it, as with al-Bashir, Burundi.

I: What is the position of SA on the prohibition on the use of force and military force as a means of foreign policy? Does this attitude differ depending on whether it is African military or Western military?

E: Last resort and certainly not in the region again, I don't see it within SADC in the future. They went into DRC but under the UN flag and you really have to read their interventions at the UN, they believe that that is maybe the future of peace interventions in Africa, going in with the UN militarily, robust as in the Eastern DRC in terms of POC, peacekeeping, prevention.

I: You already said that human rights are high on SA's agenda on the other hand you have those contradictions as in the al-Bashir case or with Zimbabwe. If it comes to a conflict with different interests and principles of SA's political culture, which one will prevail?

E: Human rights is an interesting issue in SA. They feel that human rights as they are applied by the West, US and Europe, are not enough Global South minded.

While in the West is about civic rights, elections, free speech etc., in the Global South it is about development, economical rights, social rights and I understand that. There is the policy of Ubuntu that goes with that etc. But then, how to defend these rights? They believe that the UNSC

is not the right place to discuss human rights because only seldom human rights they are a threat to peace and security, and this is not the right place to discuss this issue because it is US dominated. But actually it is not getting real better in the Human Rights Council.

Certainly, human rights is very high on the agenda in SA, it is the constitution, there is the bill of rights in the constitution, there are the media, there are the rights movements, we are stopping the (anti-gay) pastor from US. There are a lot of human rights sensibility and things going on in SA that maybe is not going on in China. I don't think human rights is a daily subject in China or in Russia or even in Brazil or India, they have other issues at the moment to deal with. Even with all that poverty you have to deal with human rights is still very much on the mind, but they will not really come out for it internationally.

It is very much aware of the need for human rights in the line of Mbeki, that Africa cannot prosper without human rights, but there is a lack of direction for the moment to give it its own SA brand. But even if they are not in favor of the European or US understanding and have a different view, okay but the go for it, do it, put it on the table. I think human rights is not out of foreign politics, it is part of their foreign policy and of that country. They are not defending it internationally, while the other countries I mentioned don't even have it and that is a difference, I think

Still, it is very much a democratic country and Human Security focused. Regime Security is coming in, but we have very good judiciary institutions to control it and HS is still very strong in their foreign policy I would say.

I: Concerning 2005, was the South African position supportive and helped to find consensus but did not really engage in the conceptional discussions around R2P and why?

E: Supportive because it was an idea they could not be against. SA pushed a number of countries not to go against R2P.

I: Has Kenya and the election crisis of 2007/08 been a topic in South Africa and has South Africa been engaged?

E: Single persons have been involved but certainly it has not been really an issue in SA. There is another case I have to mention, which is the al-Bashir case. I don't think we can take the al-Bashir case as a parameter for their approach. Basically, they believe that Bashir is wrong, and this is unacceptable. SA and Mbeki were part of the UNSC when the resolutions were passed and don't forget SA were under the first countries to recognize the ICC and even put it into national law. What went wrong was it took an African color and was about possessions of power between countries. But Mugabe was chair of the AU, and they would not go against one of the old heroes of liberation on the continent. And before they refused to invite Bashir to the inauguration of Zuma and let him know that he was not welcome. So, it got more to do with the AU meeting and Mugabe than with Bashir.

I: Let's come to the Libyan and Ivory Coast cases. Very tricky cases for SA, difficult to find an AU position, other regional organizations involved, Gaddafi the biggest sponsor of the AU but as well good arguments to vote for Res. 1973 because of Gaddafi's violation of 1970, threat to kill the people of Benghazi etc. But after voting for 1973 SA was very fast to criticize and condemn the operations against Gaddafi.

E: Gaddafi was not only the biggest sponsor of the AU but as well of the ANC at some time. But the whole case is a juxtaposition of its foreign policy on that whole issue. They really believed in 1970 and 1973 but when it became an African context than you have a problem, and we still have the same thing now. They believe in the ICC and that Darfur is wrong but to practically go for it in the African context is simply another difficult thing. Don't forget that the experience of 1994 weighted heavily on them. When Rwanda happened, Mandela was inaugurated and the feeling that maybe it was too much attention on the liberation of SA and too less on the genocide in Rwanda. They voted honestly for 1973 but they were ashamed to admit it afterwards. A dilemma between what you believe and what you pretend to be.

But why didn't they and the AU react earlier against the developments in Libya and Gaddafi?

I: Why did SA had so many problems with the case in the Ivory Coast?

E: France! And also, the leader, you don't really put a president out.

But SA was burned in the IC before these things happened. And they goofed more in the run-up to the crisis than in the crisis. SA was already out of the equation when 1975 was drafted. And they argued that France manipulated or used to the UN for its own interest, which is partly because they look at many things through the glasses of colonialism.

I: How did SA react towards the RwP proposal by Brazil?

E: They approved for sure but it didn't provoke any constructive engagement in the sense of let's use that thing to engage beside interventions at the UN when the proposal came out.

I: Can we expect contributions by SA in this norm debate or in the debate around the further implementation of R2P comparable with the Brazilian RwP proposal?

E: "No, I don't see that for the moment that we [SA] are coming up with any new idea, in no field. A proactive foreign policy turned into a reactive foreign policy; a principled foreign policy turned into an interest foreign policy. No, we are going maybe into a no-foreign-policy."

They manage their relations but no proactive for the moment. But everything is there to be a very valuable player in IR but they have to make use of it. For example, they are very much engaged in peace negotiations and active peacekeeping in the DRC from Mandela until today, very active, pro-active under Mbeki. A lot of elements in the way of R2P, but uncoordinated and the dynamics of the moment don't allow for it. The foundation of SA's politic to play a meaningful role in foreign politics and for HR and R2P are good but the dynamics are not good at the moment, and we are missing personalities. A lot of think tanks, universities, NGO's etc. The potential is there.

**Interview with Professor Dire Tladi, International Law Faculty, University of Pretoria,
Legal Adviser to the Delegation of South Africa at the UN 2009 – 2013**

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
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I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: I'm interested in the stance of SA on certain norms and principles which underlie the concept of R2P and are very important in IR and not only for R2P such as sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force. And of course (since he was the Legal Adviser) I'm interested in why did SA vote on 1970 and 1973 in the way it did vote?

E: *In terms of the prohibition on the use of force and sovereignty SA's position is what you will find in certain NAM declarations. So there need to be restrictions on the use of force; the sovereignty principle is important for NAM countries, because if you are not the powerful, it is more likely that your sovereignty might be affected by those who are more powerful. The concept of sovereignty is mainly to protect the less powerful. But SA's position is as well that we cannot allow atrocities to happen. There has been an evolution in international law and policy and at times it is necessary to take action. But(!) – and that is also a very important strand within SA's foreign policy – it has to be done in the context of Multilateralism and with proper respect for Multilateralism.*

R2P is supposed to operate in the context of existing law as stated by the WSOD, in the context of the prohibition on the use of force. R2P stays in the existing framework, when can force be used under what circumstances and by whom (UNSC, AU article 4(h) mandate)? And via the UNSC one can use force to maintain or restore peace and security, which nowadays includes the protection of populations and civilians. And in that context SA voted "yes" on the Libya resolution, the 1970 and 1973 resolutions. And the resolution 1973 speaks about the respect for the sovereignty of Libya but at the same time that UNSC will not allow mass atrocities on the civilian population which leads to UNSC action. So, there was really no question of not voting for the resolution. And afterwards SA did not criticize the resolution, it never criticized the resolution. What it did was, it criticized the implementation of the resolution. Here is the resolution we voted for, and this is what happened and between both is a disjuncture. You can find that in the explanation of the South African vote. So, there was no regret as commonly believed in voting for the resolution. There was a regret for the manner in which the resolution was implemented.

My personal opinion and not the official position of the government in discussion with people that argue: “You must have known that the resolution was going to be abused. And I guess the answer to this is: I think so, but this is me thinking. And that is why you have an explanation of vote that sort of say: be careful about how you are doing this. But at the same time, you can’t vote against the resolution or abstain. Because if you would abstain, because you think the resolution might be abused, then you can vote against all resolution, because all of them can potentially be abused.”

If the text is fine, then it becomes very difficult not to vote for the resolution. That is in a nutshell, why.

There was no misunderstanding. We did know, what all necessary means meant, but the use of force deviated from that. The authorization of force said, there will be a no-fly zone and the second objective was the protection of civilians. We interpreted it that way and I still interpret it the way that, when Gaddafi-forces actively attacking civilian population than you can use force to prevent it.

It was not the first time that the council had adopted a protection of civilian’s mandate in a resolution and it has never been that you can take pro-active force. In fact, in subsequent resolutions I think starting in 2014 with the DRC, MONUSCO, where there was a particular arm of the operation that was given an offensive, it was specifically spelled out, right.

There was never a question of misunderstanding, but this is what it means, and if it had been done correctly than we would be all happy. And of course, the government expected that there might be a chance for the AU delegation and negotiations but that wasn’t happen after the bombs fall beyond the mandate.

I: What I’m as well interested is the position of SA on human rights and its sometimes-contradictory stance on that issue and the conflict between maybe values and interests, African solidarity vs. the obligations as a member of the ICC etc.?

E: *The SA position is based on respect for Human Rights but at the same time there is an understanding that it might not help the Human Security if you engage or adopt certain decisions which itself will have no impact but all that they do is to flare up anti-human-rights sentiments. It’s not a lack of support for the (HR) agenda but it’s a pragmatic approach to achieve certain things rather than stick rigidly to the moral principle. Stopping that anti-gay/lesbian pastor from entering SA means more to me in regard to the respect of human rights a practical impact than a distinct vote on a certain resolution in the Human Rights Council.*

Certain states have a much louder voice, say things, put a highlight on a resolution that you didn’t vote for that produced news headlines. I could give you countless examples from my time at the UN when SA supported certain pro HR measures, when these very states opposed them and it didn’t make the headline. Those were kinds of a double standard, right. Let’s take the example of Western Sahara, where we almost single handedly pushed to try to get a human rights mandate for the UN mission and received no support. And no one does anything about it. About the human rights abuses in Gaza for example. Those abuse are perpetrated by states which are

defended by the very same states that push the agenda of “oh, you didn’t vote for or abstained from this or that HR resolution”. For us it is about what you can actually achieve by your action.

I: In regard to the question of how to prevent another Rwanda from happen, would you say that Art. 4(h) is the answer and is in line with SA’s position and policy?

E: *I argue to my students that I don’t know what R2P (2005 WSOD) really adds.*

“The proper application of provisions like Chapter VII of the UN Charta and Art. 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, that is the real response or the proper application of those is the real way in which you can make sure that you prevent Rwanda from happening again.”

R2P adds something as a responsibility but what does that mean. It is no right, no law. R2P is no obligation to act even if we would acknowledge that there is a responsibility, which is not, and due to that we have to accept that the UNSC will only act by discretion. A failure to act is not a violation of something, beside the responsibility. And in regard to circumnavigate the UNSC if it is blocked by veto, the UNGA already adopted the Uniting for Peace resolution once and they simply have to continue using it. The legality of that has been targeted but it has been used, so...and the legality has been affirmed by the International Court of Justice, that that resolution is perfectly legal.

I: Can you elaborate a little bit on SA’s position towards the ICC, because the discussions around the non-arrestment of al-Bashir etc.

E: *There are two issues, legal and political issues. And the legal position of the government was, you have a conflict of obligations in international law. So, whatever the Rome statute says, under customary law you have to respect the immunity of Sudanese head of state as well. That is a fact, and it is a duty between the government of Sudan and SA and there is no treaty regime that can come in, that can just stop, because Sudan is not a party to that treaty regime. So, you can’t create obligations to a state via a treaty, of which this state is not part of.*

And article 98 of the Rome Statute recognizes this conflict. It wants you to cooperate with the ICC, but if that cooperation violates other law or your obligations to another state and immunities than the court shouldn’t ask you to cooperate. People that have never read any case of the ICC talking about these cases. And within the ICC pre-trial chambers there are different opinions about what that provision means. So clearly there is an unresolved conflict.

As a political issue, if you accept that there is that obligation and no conflict, then you have the duty to arrest. “The question becomes, whether or not South Africa should be prevented from playing the role that it plays on the continent in terms of peace keeping, in terms of finding solutions to our problems because of that obligation. So, we are in contact with all kinds of not so good people, and sometimes we need to be in contact with them to drive peace home. Are we saying for example that we can’t host the peace conference in South Africa, which is designed to end the suffering of people?”

Our foreign minister stated, if we have to choose between those (contested) obligations of the Rome Statute and our obligations to play our role in securing peace in the interest of the African continent, we will choose the latter because they serve us more. The case is now at the

Constitutional Court after the High Court and the Appeal Court ruled there is an obligation to arrest, but that would mean in the end that we would have to decide whether to arrest or leave the ICC, if the ICC insist, due to our other more important obligations by a political standpoint.

Interview with Professor Siphamandla Zondi, Head of the Department of Political Sciences (University of Pretoria) and Executive Director of the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), Pretoria

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
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I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What are, from your point of view, the most influential and decisive factors that influence or shape South Africa's foreign policy in terms of identity, commonly shared world views, ideas etc.?

E: *All foreign policies are functions of national identities. The majority of national identities are fractured identities. Except for some old European modern nation states, the majority of states have only come lately into being under difficult circumstances, in turbulences, formed by the outside, by imperialism, colonialism, not by the people.*

"All of them are fractured, fragile, inherently fragile states. Second, they are also contested states. Thirdly, they are supposed to be a nation state, but they tend to be nation's states."

The adding of a variety of communities of which the Europeans believed that they might function together as a nation state as in Europe. The Europeans worked really hard to establish the Westphalian system, but it is actually more an idea than reality, more an imagination, so it is still work in progress. But this gives the majority of Global South countries a very fragile basis to establish their national development, their national programs, to develop their national identities etc.

The transition entities into functioning nation states under good circumstances might take 80 to 100 years or a bit more. From that fragile basis and under these circumstances there are examples in the global South, Haiti for example, where it already takes longer, and it may take 300 years or even more for the transition period. SA is part of that game. You had a state, a settler state, mirroring the European states with a settler nation, and now after transition, you have a state but no nation, which is a problem.

From Smuts to de Klerk, SA had a foreign policy, where it was mainly meant to serve the national interest of the nation, which meant the white minority only. Since 1994 have a rather clumsy process of trying to build a nation.

This all creates a condition for a foreign policy that is full of contradictions, because it is managing a contradiction on which it is based anyway.

“Rainbow Nation” was termed to find a way for all those different nations to co-exist. The white and the black, the rich and the poor, the homelands continue to exist in identity to this day. These identities and nations continue to converge and diverge at the same time. A constant process of making and unmaking of South Africa. Many things in one thing, at the same time. That is why the ANC expects itself to bring all this diversity into government. Also, the ANC is not one thing, is the left, the right, the middle. Liberals, communists, conservatives all in one movement. It is constantly managing contradictions. And that means for foreign policy, that it is constantly a function of these contradictions and management processes.

And that leads me to the five obvious features of South African foreign policy.

One is the Pan-African orientation. Mandela: Africa is our destiny and top of our priority. African agenda, renaissance, South Africa as a gateway to Africa, African peace diplomacy, SA is one of the voices of Africa.

The second one is solidarity. To bring Africa together, to strengthen Africa, the importance of G77, NAM, Global South multilateralism. This solidarity is deeply neglected in the IR literature because it is an experience of the South, and the IR literature tends to focus on the experiences of the Global North. One important element is solidarity with other struggles for sovereignty, struggles against oppression, identify with the Western Sahara, Palestine etc.

The third is fate in the international system but the wish to change it. SA is in the UN fully enthusiastic but also to rebel. Fate in the institutions, the UN but wish to change and reform the institution at the same time. That comes with a belief in multilateralism as the only way to change things.

The fifth is managing relations with the North but always under protest. Mandela always said that the North is very important for us albeit we have issues with it. ANC 1994: the relations with the Global North are driven by economic interest, the relations with the Global South are driven by solidarity, development, by geopolitical position in the world.

The constant balancing of values and interests put SA on a collision course with the activists of human rights, because for them, human rights trump all other values such as justice, equality, development. But for SA and many countries in the Global South human rights is an important value, but all the other values are as much important. None of them is more important, they are of equal importance. Mandela said human rights are the guiding light, but he also said justice will be the cornerstone and he mentioned a lot more guiding principle, not just one.

That also influenced SA's voting at the UN, where SA voted in 99 percent with the West but is criticized for three or four votes, in which it did not vote with the West. And because SA is not prioritizing, is trying to bring all the different SA identities to the table – value driven, interest driven, human rights driven, pan-Africanist driven – that leads in the words of Laurie Nathan to the consistency of inconsistencies of South Africa's foreign policy behavior.

I: What roles is SA playing, wants it to achieve, to fulfil on the global stage?

E: *SA got huge ambitions well above its abilities. SA is often not aware of its limitations and also not doing enough to build these capacities. At the same time, it is making a lot of unforced errors at the domestic front. The excessive use of politically motivated appointments in the diplomatic corps, cadre politics, is going to harm SA's ambitions. It is very hard to catch these co-existing strands with traditional Western IR. SA is many things, guiding principles at the same time.*

I: *How does South Africa perceive the current existing international order?*

E: *It wants to change the global governance system but has fate in the system as well. That means, that SA is not as antiimperialist, as its rhetoric sometimes suggests. The Antiimperialism has to coexist with the Liberalism, with the Pan-Africanism.*

I: *What do you think about the relationship between IBSA and BRICS for SA's foreign policy?*

E: *It depends on what you put in the center of your analysis, democracy, reform of world power, economics. IBSA is important for dimensions BRICS can't deliver. But for reforming the international order, economics, then it is BRICS. For South-South than again it is IBSA because BRICS is ideological South, but Russia is not South, it is not North either. China is economically not South anymore, but ideologically South. SA and India have a huge responsibility, because they stepped on the brake pedal concerning IBSA and put all their eggs in the BRICS basket, which is a problem, we need IBSA. IBSA is about practical cooperation; BRICS is about relations with the North. NATO is about dominance, war and military. IBSA wants to be an alternative.*

I: *R2P is not law, is a concept in my eyes. How does SA understand sovereignty, prohibition on the use of force, protecting human beings from mass atrocities?*

E: *Peace is a very important theme in the context of violence. The Liberation Movements associated themselves with the so-called world peace movement. Fighting for liberation will lead to liberation and world peace. For this you protest, dialogue but you cannot bring peace through violence, something you can still find in the ANC ideology from their international relations since the 1960s. Now this idea is kept in the name of peace diplomacy. Against militarization, nuclear weapons etc. When SA did send troops to Lesotho to safeguard the government against a military coup, it really regretted that action for next 15 years. The ANC was and is part of this World Peace Movement and this was for people like Mandela or Mbeki not guiding any action but a framework in which they thought and acted.*

Central to R2P is intervention even by military means to prevent the killing, the violence against civilians. R2P is not only about military intervention, is about all other peaceful forms of intervention and forceful as the last resort. Nigeria is in my eyes the only country on this continent who is a little more in favor of military interventions, possibly the country was for so long under military rule. R2P institutionalized the idea of legal intervention (by many forms) into sovereign states. For the AU, which believes in R2P, peacekeeping is the only acceptable form of intervention by military means, not the Libyan style operations. Not preemptive wars like in Iraq or regime change as in Libya. That makes the idea of military R2P very difficult to accept for AU countries. At the moment is some kind of paralysis because the idea is understood so differently. See for instance the Brazilian approach and the concepts differ. A lot more work needs to be done to find consensus over the implementation, which is always very difficult, globally. The

concept for implementation behind the term is not agreed. That comes from different paradigms which are informed by historical experiences. For instance, Germany and its experiences with war on its territory vs. USA, which never had a war beside the civil war between North and South on its soil.

I: Germany abstained, but SA with Gabon voted in favor of the resolution 1973...

E: ...because, the reasoning was, let us support this resolution to give us diplomatic options via the war mongers France, UK and US. Let us make this resolution work to prevent worth developments, but it never had a chance to work. SA believed that they must try to make this resolution work, because they had fought to get all those provisions – negotiations, AU-roadmap etc. – into the resolution. Big miscalculation by SA. They operated in an ideal world where principles, ideas and rules are respected, but the powerful are able to sweep aside these principles and rules, when it is in their interest. But it was also miscalculation by the West, for the consensus on R2P. R2P will not be implemented thereafter. Many countries will refuse to implement R2P on any case in the near future.

I: But R2P as a concept is not so far from the Article 4(h)?

E: “R2P as a concept is a very wise concept. But how it has been applied, because of the paradigm that is dominant, has actually discredited the wise principle.”

Also a failure of the UN under Ban ki-Moon to take an independent stand on principles and rules. Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cote d'Ivoire all that reinforced the thinking that R2P is only a cover.

“Three ideas out of the NATO block – preemptive war, regime change and humanitarian militarism – undermine R2P, who shall be a much wiser, more enlightened, more global and inclusive concept.”

R2P was very important for the paradigm of peace, for the development of consensus on international norms and prevention but it needs a strong UN that can forge a real consensus on these principles, which will take a long time. Now it is more difficult for dictators to commit atrocities.

I: Could you explain the behavior of SA in the case of Ivory Coast and the neglect of subsidiarity?

E: SA was a mediator in IC on invitation by ECOWAS as a non-regional player in 2006/07, I think. France put pressure on ECOWAS to end SAs negotiation, because SA does not belong to the region. The French foreign minister said, SA does not understand Western Africa.

SA was not involved in IC directly in 2010/11. ECOWAS was actually not united on IC and the questions after the election either. All the countries in ECOWAS had in a way invested in one of the parties or a particular outcome, there was no consensus in ECOWAS. Odinga und Mbeki had been sent by AU with agreement of ECOWAS, where Ghana was very heavy pushing for a negotiated solution. It was a very complex situation, more than it looked from the outside.

Subsidiarity principle is conditional upon the region, being united or fractured.

I: You already touched on that question, but to make sure: Could you elaborate on SA's position on the Brazilian RwP proposal?

E: *The RwP thing is kind of dead, because the Brazilians acted as an individual state, not together with the Global South and other countries, and I believe this is, because they wanted to have a concept which is THEIRS.*

I: Will SA come up with comparable own proposals such as the RwP?

E: "South Africa was one of the countries that really believed in R2P. Because remember, it is an African idea, proposed by an African diplomat."

But Africa will not support ideas that take away from an African idea, as the Brazilians and Chinese did with RwP and RP. The idea is to build a consensus that is safe against abuse of R2P. Africa believes in building a global consensus, which will be a long and huge process to re-establish the consensus via the UN.

"You can see it also in the AU, the last summit, before the summit in Ruanda, R2P thinking is deeply embedded in there."

If the UN starts to revive the R2P in the UN and defends it, it will be a huge process, but it will re-establish the consensus on R2P.

I: My very last question: is there anything you would like to add or that comes to your mind in regard to my research interest?

E: *A problem of the Eurocentric thinking is the lack of humility and empathy. Our experience is valid everywhere.*

Interview with Professor Deon Geldenhuys, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Büro des Interviewpartners
Datum des Interviews: 15.09.2016, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:50h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What are, from your point of view, the most decisive factors that influence or shape South Africa's foreign policy in terms of identity, commonly shared world views, ideas etc.?

E: *I think it's a combination of soft and hard power factors. Hard power factors are obvious: big country, 55 million people, its economy is highly advanced in the African context, military relatively effective in the African context again. The hard power resources put an obligation on SA in the minds of the foreign policy maker to assume a leadership role, at least in Africa or even beyond.*

Then you have the soft power, intangible factors: a democracy that went through a miraculous rebirth in 1994, SA as a model of peaceful conflict resolution and a subsequent reconciliation. Those factors too play into this idea that SA is determined for political greatness or leadership. Many of these aspects I think could be confirmed by foreign policy statements, that supports these notions. SA as a leading African state in the world that speaks for the other African countries. Here it becomes controversial, because not all the other African states buy into this idea, especially not the big ones, such as Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia.

International expectations of South Africa by international actors, states etc. The expectations on the outside are high. We are a country that is ready to assume a prominent role at the international high table, not the African high table but the global high table.

I wrote an article on "The weak domestic base of SA's good global citizenship". But, especially under Mandela, there was this feeling of being called upon being a good global citizen not because of hard power facts but due to the moral dimension. Mandela's legacy entitles SA to be a good global citizen, like Sweden, Australia etc.

I: How does South Africa perceive the current international order in terms of just/unjust, Western dominance in the eyes of the people in power in Pretoria?

E: *There is ambiguity. A strong antiimperialist impulse as part of the DNA of the ANC since the years of the antiapartheid struggle, strong communist tradition, Western bashing (Nordic countries, the good guys, excluded) versus a pragmatic approach of we need the West, Africa needs the West. Apartheid identity understanding: a Western outpost in Africa. Now: a strong association with the Global South and an African and Global South identity*

I: What were the reasons for SA to prefer BRICS over IBSA? IBSA is the more natural club, but SA choose BRICS, for what reason? Just the China factor?

E: *It IBSA has been downplayed, but I don't know the reasons. But the attractiveness of being in the company of two veto powers speaks to the SA self-understanding and put it in another league, league of the heavy weights. They try to bring BRICS to the grassroot level, for instance this university is part of a cooperation of five university of the BRICS in a variety of fields, research etc. BRICS is becoming visible in SA, the BRICS bank etc. IBSA never achieved this.*

I: How does South Africa approaches the UN? Is it mostly for permanent membership in the UNSC or to represent Africa?

E: *Officially and by the public statements it is permanent membership of the UNSC, bringing Africa to the high table, we want to reform the international order, beginning with the UN and we have a role to play as an African power. BRICS might add a muscle in this context.*

I: What is South Africa's understanding of sovereignty, the prohibition on the use of force, non-intervention in regard to R2P, the AU, the UNSC?

E: *Under Mbeki, who had a very strong antiimperialist streak, despite his British education, exile etc., SA pushed very much for his African agenda and African solutions for African problems. But even with the political will to find African solutions for African problems and to put boots on the ground, very often the capacities were not available/lacking. Huge gap between ambitions and capacities. See the Malian example, where Africa (AU and ECOWAS) were lacking the capacities to stop the jihadists and we had to call the French. We want to keep the West out of Africa, but when we are in trouble, whom do we look at? Maybe in the future we will turn to the Chinese or the Russians?*

Under Mandela and Mbeki SA took at least in statements the very strong position, that sovereignty is not a license to kill or shield rulers to commit atrocities.

In the case of al-Bashir, African solidarity trumped African morality. South Africa was very much supporting the ICC, but now it seems as if the side with African reservations about the court and whether Africans should remain within the Rome statute or should Africa establish its own equivalent. Many African states are not comfortable with the ICC, but there is not much debate about the court or foreign policy, except there is a case such as with al-Bashir. In this country we are so much absorbed with the internal problems.

I: Would you say that there is some kind of regress from Mandela over Mbeki to Zuma in terms of foreign policy engagement?

E: *Mbeki was the foreign president; he was traveling abroad forever. He was just making a short “Blitzbesuch” to South Africa and then he was off again. But Zuma surprised me. I think he is traveling as much as Mbeki, if not more. Maybe he wants to get away from all the domestic troubles, but he established a quiet high international profile for himself.*

I: Under Zuma South Africa had been elected to the UNSC in 2011. They were pretty much faced with the Libyan case as well as with the Ivory Coast crises. The AU couldn't find a common position, SA voted in favor of Resolution 1973, together with Gabon and Nigeria. But soon after, SA started to harshly criticize the intervention.

E: *This is one of the rare cases where SA sided with the West and then felt buyer's remorse, but the critics said, what else did you expect the West would do. This is exactly what everybody expected, so why did you vote in favor of that very resolution. I don't know, why SA voted with the West.*

I: Coming to the Ivory Coast case. What motivated SA to its political steps? Regime Security, Anti-Nigerian sentiments, Anti-French sentiments?

E: *France in my eyes is not a topic in SA. It holds its footprint in its former colonies, in Western Africa, but it is hardly a topic here in SA. One thing I forgot about Gaddafi. When he was in power, he advertised a prize on human rights and it was awarded firstly to Nelson Mandela, who took it, when he was president. Mandela was criticized by Western media for sympathizing with Castro and Gaddafi. Mandela was furious that anyone from outside, especially from the West was criticizing him and could have the cheek to dictate, who SAs friends maybe. We are a sovereign country, and we support those that supported us during the struggle. We remain loyal to our old friends.*

I: Does generation play a role, and will we see a change with a new generation taking over? Does the younger generation have a different world view?

E: *The exiles vs. the ones who remained is a topic in the older generation. With the exiles getting the top job, are the real decision makers because they have sacrificed far more than those who were not on Robben Island or in exile. Whether the next generation, the so called “born frees”, will mean less Africanist or less Anti-West, I don't know. From the universities, there is this process of decolonization of knowledge. It is a movement that wants to de-westernize the curriculum. The soft version wants to add African thinkers to the existing canon, which is fine. The pure version says that is not enough. The radical version wants to replace the existing canon. The radical streak is fed by the legacy of Apartheid, the reality of unemployment and inequality. And it is not only people that would side with the Economic Freedom fighters. There is a readiness under many students to jump on the bandwagon, of bashing the West, we must go the African way. There is “culture” of setting things alight, the auditorium of this university burned, schools, libraries around the country burned, this whole development is going deeper and transforms the society. My fear is, that there might be a development of mainstream thinking we have to destroy first before we can rebuild.*

The Anti-Western sentiment, that was around since 1994, was kept reasonably in check by Mandla. Under Mbeki that changed but now it seems like there is a grassroots resistance against

the West and we are in very uncertain times politically. We are still searching for an identity, especially domestically. Zuma has a political culture which is very traditional. He is the chief, he is number one, he eats first etc. He understands himself not as a servant of the state but the state to be at his disposal. Since Zuma survived politically for so long, there must be a strand in the political culture of the ruling party that thinks, this is the way (like Zuma) a country should be ruled. It is not a problem to be a Zulu traditionalist like Zuma is, but you can't rule a whole, big, diverse country like this.

Interview with Anthony Bizos, Department of Political Sciences (University of Pretoria)

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Büro des Interviewpartners
Datum des Interviews: 21.09.2016, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 01:06 h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What are, from your point of view, the most influential and decisive factors that influence or shape South Africa's foreign policy in terms of identity, commonly shared world views, ideas etc.?

E: *From my experience in terms of identity there are so many inconsistencies, structural limitations and different identities, diversity, and domestic challenges. The Rainbow Nation and Brand South Africa kept together by the personality of Mandela are no longer existent. The reconciliation swept over the scars of apartheid past without creating a new identity.*

“We began as a sick society and, for a period of time, we were able to brush over that, as the result of one individual's moral compass and ideas, but those have come back to manifest and certainly to haunt us. And this now begins to play out also within the foreign policy field.”

And erroneously we still write our foreign policy documents on this false premises of multiethnic, diverse but multicultural society with a common identity, as in the 2011 Ubuntu document.

I: Do you think the driven factors of SA's foreign policy culture can be found in the ruling ANC? In the party, in the presidents or both?

E: *In a traditional way one can try to analyze foreign policy via the three presidencies, or four with Motlanthe keeping the seat warm for Zuma. Leadership personality and priorities is important, but one also must look into the ANC and bureaucratic foreign policy and domestic contestation.*

Concerning Constructivism, social context is important in order to understand material conditions. The public sphere is not very visible in the foreign policy field. Mbeki put an immediate stop on any form of national dialogue about (foreign) policy with the society. He was known for his desire to surround himself with yes-people. Zuma was immediately securitizing anything out of the society that threatened the status quo. And president Mandela made it very clear from the beginning that there is only a very limited role for the civil society. Mainly because

of the nature as a liberation movement and for the ANC and Mandela, the people had spoken and given the responsibility and voice to the ANC do act for them.

I: What roles does SA wants to play on the global stage and what kind of an actor does it wants to be in international affairs?

E: *We are also shrinking in term of engagement in international politics, in African politics, withdrawing from international affairs and throwing its weight to a limited number of certain players, especially BRICS. SA is pushing above its weight in BRICS materially but ideologically and morally it fits in BRICS.*

I: How does South Africa perceive the current existing international order?

E: *As double standards, serving the interests of a few, selectivity, structural inequalities, and the need of reform of the UN and other institutions.*

I: Did the perception of the West changed due to the change of generation, younger people with other experience than the exiles. And is there a tendency to blame European states for the failures of the West, because SA doesn't want to bother the US?

E: *The West is not homogenous, but I think the West is simply disappointed in SA. SA as the symbol of liberalism, transparency, good governance, and human rights.*

The leaders from exile had been socialized very specifically, depending on Northern countries, socialist countries etc. But the voices of the mass democratic movement that had happened here kind of opposed some values and principles of the exiles, were on different trajectories. The exiles brought a difficult legacy, had to do bad deals with dodgy people, deals with the devil, the enemy, illicit action, involvement in drug and small arms trafficking etc. Thus, the brought a propensity for corruption, for collusion, for non-decerning when it came to make friends and allies. The alienated exiles kept the reins of power without having a common SA identity.

I: I understand R2P as container concept of important, sometimes contradictory, norms and principles of the UN Charta and international law. Are there differences in the understanding of these norms and principles between the West and SA?

E: *Here again you see the inconsistencies of SA, because if you take the case of not allowing the anti- gay pastor from the US to entry SA for human rights reasons two weeks after you voted against a UN Human Rights Council resolution, that wanted to protect the rights of sexual minorities and gay people, I mean that is absolutely ridiculous. I'm not buying in that whole romantic argument that R2P comes from African soil and sovereignty as responsibility etc. I think this is total junk and I proved this by a compelling process tracing on the AU. And the only norm the AU localized in their Constitutive Act in the late 1990s was the norm of Humanitarian Intervention and not R2P. There was no ICISS at that time and F. Deng is not representative for Africa. Most of the stuff he did, he did in the US or abroad and the same is true with Kofi Annan. The AU incorporated that weak Humanitarian Intervention norm under article 4(h). SA and the AU did support R2P at the World Summit under the condition of UN reform as lined out in the Ezulwini Consensus. SA did lobby for R2P, but it was never a custodian of R2P or the beacon of R2P, I think that is nonsense.*

“As far as R2P is now concerned in South Africa’s foreign policy, R2P is dead. It is not even an issue of the crisis of relevance.”

I: Would you agree that the difference between Art. 4(h) and Humanitarian Intervention is at least, that Art. 4(h) in rhetoric states a shift from a state security approach towards a human security approach?

E: *I don’t think so, it is still very much based on regime security. It speaks to collective security, multilateral approach rather than unilateral intervention. But it is still about regime security, state centered. But it wants to prevent power politics by single powerful states on the continent. But it is not different from what NATO did in Kosovo, it is not about R2P, it is Humanitarian intervention by Africans in Africa.*

I: What do you think on South Africa’s position in the Libyan case?

E: *In my understanding, concerning resolution 1973, there was a certain level of individual mistakes and incompetence. They misunderstood because of individual unpreparedness. 1973 should be put in the context of individual mistakes and unpreparedness, because DIRCO cadre deployment is not giving us the best of the best in the diplomatic corps and the foreign bureaucracy which leads to inconsistencies and lack of resources at a certain level. And that is complicating the situation for the experienced diplomats, because they need support, resources, background checks and expertise to do their job. They do certain things very well, fantastic in Burundi but only when there is competence, resources, and support. In the Burundian case, Parliament was informed, involved, and mandated the use of African Renaissance fund resources which helped to find lasting solutions. In the Libyan case, Parliament was not involved, no discussion took place, no other stakeholders were given a chance to participate.*

I: AU always argued for the principle of subsidiarity in the Libyan case but kind of neglected it in the case of Ivory Coast, or at least tried to overrule ECOWAS.

E: *Interestingly it was for sure the engagement and leading role of the Arab League and its role that allowed for Libya. Thus, subsidiarity is an important feature in regard to R2P. SA absolute played double standard. This was a Western African case, SA stepped very much on the tooth of Nigeria.*

I: What did SA took out of their experiences in IC and Libya concerning future resolutions on R2P or POC mandates?

E: *In my eyes what came out on the intervention dimension of R2P was, that President Zuma announced the creation of African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). As a statement of the lack of AU resources to react militarily. And SA spoke very strongly after Libya for a more interventionist stance for direct military intervention of the AU or a coalition of the willing. And that played out in 2013 when SA played decisive role in the DRC and a more interventionist, well planned, well prepared, well organized, well executed mission for eliminating the M23 rebels. Libya and IC were fantastic for initiating the creation of intervention capacities of the AU and bringing forward a more interventionist stance of SA.*

Our defence force is now bankrupt, we don't have the capacities to intervene anymore, our equipment is a result of the corruption scandal arms deal.

Interview with Dr. Yolanda Spies, former diplomat, Senior Lecturer (University of Pretoria) and Senior Research Associate, Faculty of Humanities (University of Johannesburg)

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Wohnhaus der Interviewpartnerin, Pretoria
Datum des Interviews: 22.09.2016, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 01:06 h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What are, from your point of view, the most influential and decisive factors that influence or shape South Africa's foreign policy in terms of identity, commonly shared world views, ideas etc.?

E: 1) South Africa is a country still in transition, domestic problems, problems with societal cohesion, economic inequality. 2) The baggage from the Cold War and the East-West divide. Apartheid as understanding itself as white post-colonial but racist and now the second black post-apartheid, post-colonial system. 3) The ANC as a proud liberation movement in power since 1994, norms and values in the Freedom Charta. ANC as an alliance between communist, anti-colonial, liberal, conservative, nationalist elements and not the only black movement against apartheid. ANC identity for a long time "fight against apartheid" but this is no longer enough. The young (black) generation saying we would have fight against apartheid, but we were born after apartheid. We fight against corruption and economic inequality. There is a huge identity crisis in this country, in society, in the political parties.

We only had a coherent foreign policy under Mbeki, who was inspired, forward looking and had a plan and a vision.

"When it comes to foreign policy, he (Mbeki) was the most forward looking, inspired and intelligent leader we've had, since Jan Smuts."

Nelson Mandela is still the iconic father figure of new South Africa but in his shadow, Mbeki already planned a foreign policy strategy with African Renaissance, NEPAD etc. He conceptualized IBSA a G7 of the South as a counterbalance against the G7. Under Mbeki SA pushed way above its weight actively. It was anti Global North but using the existing global arena. Not rejecting the West as the first-generation liberation movement leaders such as Robert Mugabe, being more pragmatic. Trying to use the existing order, adapt to it and use it to fight for acceptance and more participation.

After 2007 Mbeki remained president, but Zuma became ANC leader. Zuma was then actually the more important one, because the ANC controls the government. And a few months later the ANC ordered Mbeki to refuse. Zuma continued with the African agenda formally, but Mbeki overplayed his hand and Zuma feared to lose domestic support with following that Mbeki foreign policy. Zuma first and almost tried to foster his domestic support base. Under Mbeki society and their opinion on foreign policy was very much sidelined. Zuma ordered the foreign minister and the new named DIRCO to start a public diplomacy and foreign policy roadshow in SA, directed on SA. Mbeki only wanted academic advice when he asked for it. Zuma invited think tanks and academia into DIRCO and the presidency nearly weakly and was briefed on every foreign policy topic. But with the financial crisis and the World Cup 2010, and then with corruption and growing domestic problems, this ended quite soon.

Zuma is a nice person, but he is not a leader of the 21st century, he is first and almost a Zulu chief.

We voted for the Libya intervention, because we were not prepared, we didn't wanted to be seen again on the side of the human rights abusers, the AU had a fractured position, the AL and the other African countries supported the intervention, and this is why we voted for the intervention.

With the regime change agenda and the exceeding of the mandate by NATO the SA position changed. It was a tactical decision, and we had no leadership. The Libyan case is responsible for the low point of R2P.

IBSA was dwarfed when SA became member of BRICS.

I: What do you think on the IBSA and BRICS perspectives of SA?

BRICS actually is ill conceived, and the only reason SA was invited is because it was perceived as the gateway to Africa for strategic reasons (land, resources, vote in the UN).

Gaddafi was perceived as mad, capable of committing mass murder, there was the legitimacy of the UNSC, Russia abstaining, AL vote, it seemed like a clearcut case. Europeans were naïve because when you remove somebody in Africa or MENA, there are no substitute institutions, there is only chaos, for which the Europeans were not prepared. The intervention seemed simple but it wasn't.

I: What do you think SA wanted to achieve in the Ivory Coast and why did act the way it did?

France is totally ruthless when it comes to Africa. They are the colonial masters and very good in handle the African states in a way that serve their interests. The invasion in the Ivory Coast was a trick by France to restore stability in their West African backyard and in their interest. After Mbeki as mediator of the AU failed and a humanitarian disaster was imminent, the French were campaigning at the UNSC for an intervention, talked to the Nigerians and convinced them. Zuma at that time went to Paris with one of his fiancées and when he came back, SA voted for the French resolution and intervention.

I: Would you agree that under Zuma South Africa had no longer a principled, ideologically funded position on human rights, intervention etc.?

There is no principle, pragmatic, depending on the advisers, what is in his interest.

South Africa's post 1994 foreign policy has had this incredible tension between our constitution, support for human rights – very liberal constitution by global standard – and our ideological support for historical friends and for anybody who opposes the former colonial rulers and the US. In every case it seemed as though there was more weight been given to our historical support for comrades.”

At certain points for a while under Zuma it seemed as if we were listening to South Africans and their position on human rights etc., because we were held accountable not only by the rest of the world but by our citizens. But that disappeared. And there was no mainstreaming of R2P in our foreign policy, our armed forces, no focal point, zero...

I: Concerning article 4(h), there is a wide variety of opinions on this article and what it means? What is your opinion on article 4(h)? Is it about Human Security or State Security, R2P or Humanitarian Intervention?

E: The reality in Africa is that state security, and even more than that, regime security is prioritized.

There are many reasons for that. And when a regime comes under critique than the ideological script of imperialism and colonialism is being started. Regime security is what most African leaders are interested in. Also, what comes in is the African respect for the elders. Parts of African culture fights with African democracy. The AU, as SA, has a wonderful written constitution, but it does not reflect African values and opinions. African presidents only seldom retire, there is no mechanism.

I: From the outside it is hard to comprehend to contradictory position of SA on human rights and the voting in the UN...

E: Africa is a bit crazy, but I'm a proud African. You have to take Africa seriously; it is the future. We need strong institutions to be resilient against the flux in history and mankind. We don't have all the institutions yet. But we have a strong Judiciary. On the other hand, we are lacking continuity in our institutional progress, since in some parts our institutional capacities have been in regress, in other parts are developing.

But regarding R2P my opinion is very negative. I don't think we ever had a foreign policy on R2P.

I think we must and can make the world, the world we want. Everything is about evolution and change, and we shouldn't be scared of change. The world will be different.

Interview with Dr. Mzukisi Qobo, Associate Professor, Pan African Institute, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, now Head of Wits School of Governance, University of Witwatersrand

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: News Café Hatfield, Pretoria
Datum des Interviews: 22.09.2016, vormittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:55 h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What are, from your point of view, the most influential and decisive factors that influence or shape South Africa's foreign policy in terms of identity, commonly shared world views, ideas etc.?

E: *I think there are three strands: the Africanist strand, close alliances with other African liberation movements and integration in African politics. The second strand has to do with the ANC's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement. That deepened the ANC's relations with the development countries. The third is the internationalist identity. That influenced the world view of the ANC.*

Then you have four pillars, the MK, the struggle itself, the mass movement and the international mobilization. Currently, with the ANC in power the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial strand is very strong. The relations with China and Russia in BRICS are a new phenomenon. The strong anti-imperialist and pro BRICS stance at the moment is not so much due to the ideology of the struggle. It got more to do with politics of factionalism, corruption and unprincipled pragmatism within the ANC. The primacy in SA's foreign policy is Africa, and SA representing Africa's interest in global governance mechanisms and institutions. Another primacy is diversifying trade relations away from the West, to encompass other parts of the world and especially development countries but keep the relations with the West, which is perfectly understandable in a changing global order.

I: How does South Africa perceive the existing international order?

E: *On the one hand there is the recognition of the change from a Western dominated to a more multipolar world. On the other hand, there is also recognition of the persistence of global inequality, inequities and historical injustice and the marginalization of development countries and African countries, especially. SA tries to deal with that via Multilateralism, multilateral institutions and to contest the inequities.*

There is also the parochial engagement with China and Russia. But in my eyes the world is no longer so much binary as in the Cold War. It is much more fluid and dynamic and complex. But you also have this narrow ideological approach that sticks to G77 or NAM and is dismissive on OECD for ideological reasons, albeit that makes no real sense. This can be explained by the erosion of technical and institutional capacities. If you look at DIRCO for instance... Over the past ten years, there has been a dramatic shift in our foreign service. Especially in the heads of foreign missions from thirty percent political appointees and seventy percent career diplomats. Now the split is eighty to twenty, but with eighty percent political appointees and twenty percent career diplomats. And that influences DIRCO and strengthens this kind of narrow ideological approaches coming from the ANC.

There has been a sharp regress, especially from Mbeki to Zuma in that regard. Under Mbeki DIRCO also was not a solid institution, lacking capacities but you had a president who was engaged, albeit the minister was only in the shadow of the president. Zuma is lacking the gravitas that Mandela had, and the foreign policy knowledge and technocratic intelligence of Mbeki.

I: Does that influence the role of SA in international politics? The international expectations are huge towards South Africa

E: I think it has changed, maybe less dramatical. And there are no more so high expectations in Africa and the world. The expectations have readjusted to the domestic realities, albeit SA was ahead of its peers in Africa and in regard to other developing countries. But the available resources and the quality of its leaders has waned. But not a pivotal state in world politics. The potential to recover the lost ground is still there but it has declined.

I: What do you think is South Africa's approach to the West? Still the bridgebuilding approach? Does it see the West as block, or does it differ?

E: I would see it has a narrow view, but it treats the West pragmatically in its foreign policy. There is no positive sentiment, but relationships that need to be serviced. The relations with the EU, bilateral relations etc. are needed by SA. But its priorities and emotions are with the emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India and developing countries.

I: Could you elaborate a little bit on the BRICS perception in South Africa and the relationship towards IBSA?

E: There is a misfit towards Russia and China vis-à-vis SA's natural partners India and Brazil. From a commercial point you cannot ignore China. But I think there is a great deal of understanding what role China is playing in the world and what its foreign policy priorities really are. But we are lacking knowledge and technical expertise on China in the trade department, but also to a lesser extent in DIRCO. The driver in our policy towards China is narrow political and there is naivety as well. China is projecting itself as an alternative to the US.

With Russia it is mainly the nuclear deal and the president's interest in that deal. There is no ideological convergence between United Russia and the ANC, totally divergent, couched in that anti-western, anti-imperial role Russia is always presenting itself.

But overstretched capacities and lack of expertise and knowledge is the key problem.

I: Concerning the lack of knowledge: was the voting behavior on resolution 1973 due to a lack of knowledge and capacity? Did they understand right and then changed their position, because they felt betrayed? What do you think?

E: *I think they understood and at the UN SA got good personal, good institutional memory, good advisers. SA lost faith in the resolution and the case. Voting is not easy at the UNSC, but they knew and understood. SA expected and felt the backlash and wanted to save its face.*

In the case of the Ivory Coast, there was also anti-French rhetoric, which is part of the anti-Western paradigm. I never quite understood why SA aligned with Gbagbo. But often the explanation is an isolation between the bureaucracy and the ministry, running its own show, not working together. The ministry and the presidency depend on their advisers. There are very good advisers, but there are a lot of quite bad advisers with a lack of expertise on what they shall advise. A lot of people living in a bubble disconnected from the bureaucracy. Those details have an impact on our foreign policy posture and performance and explain why it is so hard to explain some totally irrational decisions in our foreign policy.

It is a lot of ad-hoc foreign policy. You no longer have a principled foreign policy. And that is also across other foreign policy fields, sometimes against our constitution, because of bilateral relations between the president and another person.

I: Does that also apply, this unprincipled approach, to R2P and norms and principles of international politics?

E: *I don't even think that we have a principled stance on human rights at the moment. We don't want to be embarrassed, as in the case of the US anti-gay pastor trying to come to our country.*

The Dalai Lama was not given visa to SA for the only reason of pleasing China. We hate the fact that the West is making noise about al-Bashir, albeit we are a member of the ICC and the Rome Statute. That goes back to other whimsical decisions, to please Mugabe, to please other African states and allies and the AU in the al-Bashir case. And we could demonstrate our will to resist Western demands and give middle finger to the imperialist West. There is no commitment to normative reference points in SA's foreign policy at the moment. Other states also derogate from principles but at least they know the principle. There is always a compromise between norms and principles and action.

Interview A: Interview with a member of South Africa's Permanent Mission to the United Nations in 2011/2012

Art des Interviews:	Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews:	Garten des Pebble Fountain Guesthouse, Pretoria
Datum des Interviews:	23.09.2016, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews:	01:00 h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

kursiv: zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: Could you elaborate a little bit on the position of South Africa on UNSC resolution 1973 and why that position changed to criticism so fast?

E: *We voted in favor; we believed in the concept and the resolution. The criticism came with the implementation and the problems with no one reporting back to the UNSC or being accountable. When you look at other missions, for instance KFOR, the report at least once a month back to the UNSC. We asked for reports in the Libyan case because it is council practice. We asked several times but received no answer. The implementation of the mandate was not to establish the No-fly-Zone but to remove Gaddafi from power.*

I: But why came the change in the position so quickly? Wouldn't it been better to abstain?

E: *I don't think even in retrospective we would change our vote/position. There was actually more pressure to abstain, from the BRICS countries.*

As an elected member you have three phases when you vote. 1) You have your position. 2) You redraft your position. And then you decide on what you are pushing for. There were two resolutions on the table at that time. And don't forget the Libyan UN ambassador Shalgham defected from the Gaddafi regime and miraculous France presented resolution 1970 with a two-week trigger. This, in hindsight, was probably the biggest mistake. We did question it, but we didn't pushed hard enough. Lebanon tabled the resolution, but we all knew it was France behind that resolution, which was in blue, what means ready for decision. Russia said no, you can't have a No-fly zone without a ceasefire-agreement and tabled a second resolution, calling for a ceasefire. The negotiations started and the ceasefire went into resolution 1973, we pushed for a language concerning the No-fly zone similar to the Bosnian No-fly zone in the 1990s. Then the AU came in, which were trying to engage with the rebels and then Gaddafi again. So we pushed for the implementation of the political process and the AU into the resolution. The only point sticking out the next day was "all necessary means", but then France said we stop the negotiations here and call for a vote without further negotiations about "all necessary means".

In the third phase it becomes very difficult whether you vote for a resolution or not. You have to take into account your regional position, the amendments you proposed and whether the resolution is enough in line with your position to vote for it. No one is ever entirely happy with a resolution. It is like in church with a god sermon. Everyone feels a bit offended, than it was a good sermon. It is always a compromise. Purpose, language, consequences. It is very difficult to abstain, when a lot of your proposals and language went in a text. "All necessary means" was understood as no boots on the ground. The implementation was violating the understanding and the spirit. We were suspicious from the beginning, but still, it is hard not to say yes, when a lot of your input did find its way in the resolution. The AU high-level committee in Mauretania asked the UNSC for a delay in the start of the bombing, to have a chance to get into Libya, do the fact finding and talk to Gaddafi and the rebels. They were told by France, no, we are starting the bombing. That was quiet offensive. There it became clear, that no political solution was sought by some countries. Certainly, I don't think South Africa will ever agree again to the phrase "all necessary means".

I: What do you think will be the outcome of the Libya case? Is it the dead of R2P? Will new resolutions only be possible drafted in regard to the Brazilian RwP?

E: We started after, stressing the importance of the rule of international law. We initiated under our presidency a dialog about the rule of international law and the responsibilities of international organizations, incl. the UNSC, to comply with international law when implementing mandates. The Brazilians named it, RwP. R2P incapsulates the principles and responsibilities of the UN Charta and towards our citizens. You need to oversee your decisions and make sure that they are in line with the mandate and international law. We remain a strong supporter of R2P. Last year we hosted two workshops in SA with the Global Center on R2P. We see R2P in context with the Constitutive Act, the Peer Review Mechanism, the security and development nexus and so on.

The primacy of the African continent is in our own self-interest. SA will not be stable without a stable neighborhood and continent. Africa is almost voiceless when it comes to question of peace and security, while the UNSC is very quick in taking decisions on Africa, without listening to Africa or give it a voice. R2P is damaged but it is maturing at the moment. We link R2P with a reform of the UNSC and the P5 don't like it. And they don't like it either, when we use cases, such as Libya to question the legitimacy of the UNSC without reform.

I: Norms and principles are not static. R2P is about norms and principles and their change in regard to Human Security, a different understanding of sovereignty etc. SA pushed for a lot of those norms and principles which are in the South African constitution. Is there a regress under Zuma's presidency? Is there still a principled foreign policy under Zuma?

E: Every state got to navigate the balance between ideals and reality. The expectations are huge inside and outside. Especially the domestic expectations are very, very strong. SA's identity is so different in the domestic, African, and Western perspective. Foreign policy is under critique of not being aimed enough on our domestic needs. We promote the continent too much, and SA too less. Mbeki was very intelligent, very ambitious as a person and he received a lot of critique by other African leaders. According to a study, out of IBSA, SA is voting the most opposite to the

US of those three countries. The West and especially the former colonial powers sometimes still behave like colonial masters. I've been personally told by a British diplomat not to read the documents, but to do what they say. We are a sovereign independent nation since about a hundred years. And we've been told by our former colonial power what to do.

Concerning the balance of the principles in foreign policy it is always a compromise. Concerning the al-Bashir case the bottom line is, we told Bashir several time, he couldn't come on a bilateral basis. But no African state would prevent a head of another African state from attending an AU-summit. We would be crazy to do this as South Africa. And there is international law and guarantee for participants to participate in international conferences, a protection clause even in the Rome Statute of the ICC. Bashir went to Nigeria on a bilateral visit – not shielded by the ICC – and that wasn't a big deal. He went to other countries as well, but domestically interest, civil society and Western expectations are different, when it comes to SA.

We often get criticized for our Zimbabwe and Myanmar voting in the Human Rights Council in our first term at the UNSC. We voted three times against the Western expectations, and I think we had reasons and proof for our decisions. You can't be part of the punishment while you are leading mediation efforts at the same time, as we did in Zimbabwe at that time. Mediators must be impartial and cannot vote for sanctions plus five million people from Zimbabwe in the country. So we get settled with expectations that are not realistic. There has been a move between the presidents but the domestic situation also changed a lot. Our principles and the parameter have not changed, but as well we are still terrible in our communication on our foreign policy. Under Zuma the foreign minister is in a very strong minister within the foreign cabinet

I: Up to now there is no focal point and no real foreign policy strategy on R2P. do you see that to come?

E: You are right on bot points. We don't have one, because we got several institutions on peace keeping and mediation, and R2P for us has to be seen and followed in that context. We can do better on R2P but we are very active in what we believe is most important, meaning peace keeping and mediation up to highest level. We never really felt a need to have a structure on R2P which permeates through all our other efforts. And to some extent we are lacking resources, we are very stretched in our foreign policy efforts. Under the current economic circumstances, it is not very likely that we will have more capacities. Somalia and the DRC were bigger triggers for the establishment of ACIRC than Libya. The AU PSC had a special meeting on Libya this year. Libya had made the continent even more vulnerable for violence, with all that weapons stockpiled by Gaddafi no floating into Sahel and to Boko Haram. We see a rise in the terrorist groups, not only in the North of the continent.

I: I'm interested in the positioning of SA towards the resolution 1975 on the Ivory Coast, about which I have been told so many different explanations?

E: Ivory coast started in October 2010. The constitutional court and the UN envoy had different opinion on the voting results. France pressed for a certain outcome and was successful, whether or not the result was correct or not. Ivory coast is a good example of our bad communication for our decisions in the UNSC. We looked at the result and it was close. So, for us it was decisive that one had to do something with the other 50 percent of country that didn't vote for Ouattara.

That informed our decision as well as Gbagbos sacking of the AU mediators. And it was very, very short after we came in the UNSC. The first two, three months were unimaginable for us, very tough. Not only for us, for all the delegations in the council. Funny mistakes happened, ambassadors reading statements of other delegations, because of being tired and unaware etc. In one coffee break three important international events took place. Very hectic, others with less experience and resources were really in a difficult situation. There was never a recount in the IC, but France and part of the UN wanted Ouattara, and Gbagbo go.

I: Article 4(h) contains a lot of interventionist stance, human security perspective and approach. Would you say that it was driven by the mood of that time and that it changed a bit since then in regard to a wider African stance on R2P and Human Security? Is this just because of foreign interventions or also a kind of regress from Human Security to Regime Security?

E: *Yes, it was driven by that time. One shouldn't underestimate the relationship between Obasanjo and Mbeki at that time. They really were in the forefront, the drivers behind the Constitutive Act. At the same time, for instance France was lobbying actively for Ping as president of the AU. We would never actively interfere in the election of the EU president, but France is doing it in the African case. It is just ridiculous and a lack of respect.*

I'm very confident in our structures and democracy. I'm on the optimistic side. We can handle a change in government.

Written replies to questions:

Respondent: Professor Sandy Africa, Department of Political Sciences, Director at the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of Pretoria

Date: 19th December 2016

I=Interviewer

E=Experte

I: What – from your experience and your point of view – are the most influential, decisive factors that shape South Africa's foreign policy identity in terms of experiences in the past, collectively shared ideas, worldviews etc.?

E: SAs post-1994 foreign policy identity shaped by several realities:

- it's historical ties (diplomatic, trade and economic) with several countries in the West
- the ties that its liberation legacy have bequeathed in ideational terms (the internationalism with communist countries like Cuba, China, former Communist countries like Russia and the non-aligned world generally as embodied by the non-aligned movement); and
- post-1994 expectations that SA would play a leading role on the African continent. South Africa has been at the forefront of promoting a Pan-Africanist agenda.

All of these factors contain within them contradictions, since the world that SA confronts is changing. Moreover, South Africa's political identity is itself changing as different political and economic interest groups realign.

I: SAs role in international politics is constantly evolving. How does SA see itself and what kind of an actor in international relations is SA/which role does it play which role would it like to play/should it play?

E: South Africa sees itself as an emerging power whose comparative advantage is its soft power. It does not see itself as having the capacity (not the political will) to project itself as a 'military giant', though being able to project a credible deterrent capacity remains important. This is why, whenever there are conflicts, South Africa's approach is to emphasise diplomatic initiatives as a response, rather than military solutions.

I: How does SA perceive the current/existing international order?

E: SA sees the existing international order as multipolar and rapidly changing. It is therefore critical about the anachronistic collective security architecture of the United Nations and has been pushing for reform, including of the UN Security Council.

I: How does SA see “the West”?

E: SA sees countries in “the West” through realistic lenses and enjoys strong relations with many western democracies. Whilst it is pursuing other relationships it is careful not to alienate its western partners. At the same time, many South Africans, self identify as being part of the West, as evidenced by the pervasive cultural influence of the Western hemisphere. In recent times there has been a countermovement of Africanist thinking as evidenced by social and political movements espousing ‘decolonisation’.

I: How does SA see BRICS and IBSA?

E: SA sees these blocs are representative of the emerging geopolitical global reality, and probably as a channel for promoting its agenda for change within formal global institutions like the UN. At the same time, in the existent leadership there is a strong affinity to what these states represent, in ideational terms (notwithstanding the fact that there are changes unfolding in their polities all the time).

I: How does SA see the United Nations and its own role within this institution?

E: SAs concerns about the UNSC are well recorded. Apart from that it sees the agenda of human security as unifying and has been a norm advocate on a number of fronts.

I: How does SA understand fundamental international norms and principles such as: sovereignty/equality of states, prohibition on the use of force, -non-interference (where does it start/threshold)?

E: SA has a rather principled stance on the question of interference in the domestic affairs of other states and expects them to have the same approach. This was strongly expressed by the Minister for International Relations, Minister Maite Nkoane-Mashabane, who criticized Botswana for speaking out on SA’s decision to withdraw from the ICC. She remarked that there are ‘countries that have the death penalty’ (a veiled reference to Botswana) which SA abhors, but which it does not criticise such countries for upholding.

-non-intervention (vs. sovereignty, human rights, Zimbabwe)

If ‘intervention’ is understood as ‘military intervention’, SA eschews this as an approach to conflict resolution; even other non-military forms of intervention are carefully evaluated. SAs favoured position and approach is promoting dialogue.

-human rights (which human rights, civic rights or economical rights, development rights)

-prevention of mass atrocities via prevention, assistance and in extreme cases via force

-human security vs. state security (Art. 4(h) of AU rhetoric vs. reality in 2016)

See my article co-authored with Rentia Pretorius on Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

I: How would you describe SA's position towards the application of R2P in 2011 (while holding a seat at the UNSC) in the cases of Libya and Ivory Coast and the debate after? What were the reasons / factors/ arguments that shaped SAs position/response?

See my article with Rentia Pretorius on R2P.

I: Why did SA decide against the decision of the AU-PSC to apply Art. 4(h) in the case of Burundi?

E: Not sure. Didn't follow this closely.

Zusätzliche Interviews durchgeführt in Hamburg 2014, am Rande eines R2P-Workshops

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------|
| 1) Jaganathan, Madhan Mohan | 07.11.2014 |
| 2) Pawnday, Savita | 07.11.2014 |
| 3) Soulé-Kohndou, Folashadé | 07.11.2014 |

Interview with Madhan Mohan Jaganathan, Assistan Professor Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Institut für Theologie und Frieden Hamburg
Datum des Interviews: 07.11.2014, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:49h

Abkürzungen

I=Interviewer E=Experte

Kursiv = zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: What kind of an actor is India in international relations in your eyes? What role does it aspire?

E: India is not a unitary rational actor. *India is a middle power, but to me it is not an emerging power, because it is lacking the capabilities and it still got a long way to go, domestically, socially.*

India has always aspired to be a global leader. But there has always been that mismatch between aspiration and capability. India's growth ought to be much more inclusive to become really an emerging power.

I: How much does the former role of leader of the NAM still plays a role in current foreign policy?

E: *It's more a residual role, but it is too early to say it's just pragmatic.*

I: Democracy survived for such a long time in India in this problematic environment. Do you think India's foreign policy is focused on the region, at regional development. Will India be forced to invest most of its resources in the region and will this restrain its focus beyond or is it just restrained because it is a poor middle power, lacking resources and allies anyway?

E: *I think there has been a shift after 1988/89 the intervention in the Maldives. India hasn't intervened since. The trend is to grasp the globe and abandon the region.*

India did not interfere again in the Sri Lankan civil war, despite its huge Tamil population in Tamil Nadu. It seems like with coalition governments there is much less or no intervention taking place. And in addition, India has a much more calibrated approach towards its own backyard nowadays. And also focusing on non-reciprocity towards the neighborhood.

The Sri Lankan intervention in 1987 was a turning point. It was so much of a fiasco. The Sri Lankan episode really became like a Vietnam-syndrome for the US. After that – except for the intervention in Maldives – that was a watershed. Probably the change from intervention to non-intervention [in the neighborhood].

The memories of Sri Lanka, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi still is present.

I: Are we talking about the same thing when we talk about sovereignty, human rights (first, second, third generation). Is there a difference between the Global South and the Global North/West in understanding all these terms, are there problems, misunderstandings?

There are differences in terminology, threshold level, tipping point.

India gives the benefit of doubt to the sovereign state to a very, very high degree.

Which has to do with its history, with its culture, with its worldview. But there are many strands of thinking in India, not only the romanticized ones. I'm not ruling out for instance non-intervention or Ahimsa but there is a much bigger plurality in Indian political culture. India is not a single entity, it is too diverse, too different, too multiple, much more voices.

We mean different things, but also the Global South is very different in itself. R2P is useful to a certain degree/extent. R2P still privileges the sovereign state. Atrocities need to be very high to trigger international involvement under pillar III. Human rights violation still happens.

I: You just said R2P privileges the sovereign state. But I just hope that R2P coming from Human Security at least transport a little bit of this idea of putting the human being in the center of thinking about security.

E: *It is a good beginning, but it is not sufficient to make a practical difference. It will not change situation of human rights violation as long as they do not tip a certain threshold.*

I: From your perspective, what is the main reason that India did not contribute much to the R2P debate yet?

R2P was not high on the priority in India. Not in the foreign policy establishment, not even in academics. From left leaning academics there has been critique but no substantial contribution. India was very cautious and calibrated on R2P. For India the framework to handle R2P is through the framework of the sovereign state.

I: Are there still memories of the negative reactions of the international community towards the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971? Does that still come into play with the Indian attitude on R2P?

In terms of academic judgements and memories Bangladesh is a good example and still remembered. India's stance on R2P is influenced by very obvious factors. [...] You have the domestic factor, you have personality-based factors, and you have the sovereignty factor. The default preference is sovereignty. If there are domestic factors that overwhelm then you have scope for change. For instance, at the World summit, if you have powerful individual leaders which could exert decisive influence.

India's perspective on R2P says a lot about India as a whole as well.

India still privileges order over justice.

As long as India is giving its fair share, or exception such as in the nuclear realm, India accepts injustice at the UN and in international politics, otherwise it will protest if its interests are concerned.

I: How does India see the West and what role does BRICS play for India? A tool to show the West we are not happy with the existing institutions and if there is no reform, we will build our own institutions?

I don't think the reason for BRICS is sending a message to the West, at least not for India. India may not trust the West, but it is much more friendly to the West, more open to the West and receptive, under the UPA government and even under this Modi government. They want to do business with the West, engage with the West. The older generation was much more skeptical about the West, the new generation is much more open. JNU is more left of the Center and more skeptical but by and large India is more open to the West than at any other time in history.

I: From your perspective, how many people are really influential in the formation of India's foreign policy and what does that mean for Indian foreign policy?

Technically speaking it is a very minuscule section, but you have to be aware to not annoy people. Foreign Policy is almost a non-issue except for some instances. If it becomes an electoral issue or an issue for a majority then things are different.

Indian foreign policy is still centralized. Lack of representation is an everyday problem in India.

Interview with Savita Pawnday, Director of Programs (now Executive Director) Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Institut für Theologie und Frieden Hamburg
Datum des Interviews: 07.11.2014, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:53h

I=Interviewer E=Experte

Kursiv = zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: How would you describe R2P (norm, evolving norm, concept, a dead idea after Libya 2011) and its development nearly ten years after its recognition at the World Summit 2005?

E: [...] To me it is a standard of behavior, it is a political norm. *It is about a commitment that states signed. They committed themselves to a certain behavior. The term “norm” might imply for some people that there is legality that comes with the norm, but this is not how I see it. It is not a legal norm, and I don’t think that there is ambition within the R2P community to go down the legality-route. There are many legal obligations which already exist – International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Declaration, Genocide Convention etc. – it is a political trigger. Once you invoke R2P in relation to a particular situation that means that the situation is not politics as usual, this is something different. Definitely a norm, and definitely not dead.*

I: What are the main obstacles that you see concerning the implementation of R2P, especially on the national and the regional level?

E: In human rights and especially in the West there is such an allergy to talk about development. “Don’t bring development into human rights.” And for the South it is like, the moment you talk about human rights in connection with development, it becomes about conditionalities.

But these things are related, you can’t break them apart. Political these discussions become about development or human rights, but they belong together. For instance, the higher the inequality in a society, the higher the risk of mass atrocities. Despite and through Libya there is a lot more clarity and consensus now and a lot more attention on how to effectively prevent.

The biggest obstacle is implementation and that all starts from prevention.

I: What role do you see for the Global South in this Process, especially in the UN?

E: *I studied political transition processes in former socialist countries. For instance, in Russia, the male populations life expectancy dropped from 70 to 45 within five years after the fall of the SU. So now they had all the civil and political rights, but they lacked jobs, social nets, income etc., everything collapsed. Only the civil and political rights are not enough.*

But within the UN this is often discussed in a highly politicised way, depending on which camp you belong to. Even though the emerging powers are the future, they will not dominate. It will be a much more multipolar future.

I: Which countries belong to the Global South?

E: *Russia certainly not, imperial mindset, former colonial white power. Even China, more south than Russia, but not really the “Global South”, which is part of the explanation why BRICS never really functioned well.*

India, Brazil, and South Africa, they are large democracies, they manage huge differences. These are countries you can learn a lot from. They are not perfect in any way, but they have been able to manage a lot of diversity.

Their aspirations are similar, they want to sit at the UNSC, they want to lead, a leading role in the future multipolar system.

I: How would explain the differences between IBSA and BRICS and what the members want to achieve with each format?

E: *BRICS is more concrete, projects, the bank etc. South Africa huge internal problems, Brazil going through an extreme difficult economic crisis, India the most stable country of IBSA. BRICS is much more a reality. BRICS has more internal issues, like with India and China.*

Russia is a tried and trusted friend, that is what you will hear from everyone in India. And I grew up with “Russia is your friend and America is your enemy”, but with America, with the US slowly the relationship is getting better.

IBSA makes more sense, but BRICS is the reality.

I: IBSA and BRICS as a result of the dissatisfaction of emerging countries regarding reform of existing institutions and their representation?

E: *Exactly, 100 percent.*

I: What do you think about the Libya-controversy? Did it reinforce the fears that countries in the South had been afraid of concerning R2P?

E: South Africa voted for resolution 1973 and had an immense amount of byers remorse after that.

Absolutely no reporting back to the UNSC while the operation took place. In the end the resolution said “all necessary means” but that doesn’t mean/shouldn’t mean you never ever report back to the UNSC. The bigger problem/issue was, there was absolutely no accountability for what happened and no rebuilding after the operation. But the new Libyan government didn’t

want more interfering from the UN. So, you had both arguments, from the South complaining about no rebuilding and from the West arguing the government didn't want it. [35:40 min] So here was the argument the other way round, because here the South asked for "intervention" and the West did argue against.

Things appear much clearer in hindsight. But in that special moment it seemed to be clear that Gaddafi was going to kill the people in Bengasi, there was no other choice after resolution 1970 failed.

Just because R2P failed, the idea is not dead.

RwP interesting bridge over the destructive discussions and arguing after Libya. Discussion became operational afterwards, more constructive.

RwP was a gift to the R2P community. I personally and we institutionally totally agree with RwP. It demands more accountability by and from the UNSC and that is exactly what we need.

I: Brazil did a conceptual contribution with RwP. Do you expect more willingness and capacity for shaping normative discussions and debate by India, Brazil, and South Africa?

E: It mainly depends on what happens nationally. See the case with Brazil and Patriota, a brilliant Foreign Minister, who had a personal interest.

South Africa is in an interesting place. [...] Now they are in this 20-years-after-independence phase and grappling with so many domestic issues.

Sort of a disorganization in the SA Foreign Ministry, lacking resources and staff in their embassies.

With India, they are cautious and hedging their bets. Ambassador in 2005 was very destructive, then came Hardeep Singh Puri who likes to engage with everything, but it took some time. By the time when Puri left and over him, we came into contact with Indian Foreign Ministry and the Officials that deal with UN affairs, and we jointly organized a policy forum on R2P and that was the first step. But before it was impossible.

We had a bilateral with the Foreign Minister and he said, we support R2P of course. What we have a problem with, is implementation. Then you can begin a conversation.

There is a growing willingness to engage with these three countries, even in SA where they have all these issues with the ICC and leaving.

But for India, they are lacking the personal resources even at their UN delegation and they have to deal with 500 priorities and R2P comes not first.

I: Is there more room to maneuver due to the lack in capacity? Nirupam Sen had a very hostile attitude towards R2P. Because he was a member of the Left Front, Marxist...

E: Leftist views are typical for most of the foreign policy elite, foreign office personnel and older ambassadors. Puri and other more right, new ideas, new, younger generation nowadays with a different attitude.

The priority of the issue for the capital is also is important for the maneuver room.

**Interview with Dr. Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou, Center for International Studies (CERI)
Sciences Po, Paris**

Art des Interviews: Einzelinterview
Ort des Interviews: Institut für Theologie und Frieden Hamburg
Datum des Interviews: 07.11.2014, nachmittags
Dauer des Interviews: 00:41h

Abkürzungen

I=Interviewer E=Experte

Kursiv = zusammenfassende, inhaltlich korrekte, aber nicht wortgetreue Wiedergabe des Gesagten

I: How would you describe the foreign policy cultures of the IBSA countries in regard to R2P and their underlying worldviews, historical experiences, ideas, foreign policy traditions, attitudes etc.?

E: *IBSA countries nowadays have much more in common than in the cold war period. India was very clear and assertive in its foreign policy during that time, one of the leaders of the NAM, looking for autonomy, trying to align the Global South behind India. And albeit the NAM lost a bit importance, you can still find this today in their foreign policy. A country with its own voice, own choices and not following the vote of former colonial powers.*

Brazil and South Africa shifted a lot more since the end of cold war and apartheid. Especially Brazil had a lot of varieties in its foreign policy, as for instance under President Vargas, where it was more left, communist, seeking autonomy vis-à-vis the US, having had military coups and so on.

India's foreign policy was much more linear than that of SA or Brazil, but now they are all regional powers, subregional powers (India) stable democracies.

South Africa and Brazil have dismantled their nuclear programs. South Africa invests much less in hard power, because of the historical pattern, where its army, the SANDF, was very much invading in the southern African region. So, they want to be seen as a peaceful country.

In terms of identity and aspiration, they have the same interests. Become regional leaders and important powers beyond their region. They want to become leading voices of the South.

They are middle powers. They need multilateralism [...] because on their own – it's not like the US – they won't be taken into account.

Reform of Multilateralism and the UN, because they consider themselves as representing the Global South. Coalition building in certain forums is one strategy for the IBSA countries.

I: Would you agree that India, due to its internal issues, in its foreign policy is more cautious, more reluctant, contains less liberal values, talking less about human rights in international politics than South Africa or Brazil?

E: *India is promoting human rights in its diplomacy in a different way, but it is not qualifying human rights, instead it recognizes the universality of HR.*

India is promoting HR but not prescribing HR.

South Africa was prescribing [human rights] in the beginning with Nelson Mandela. And this is not in the foreign policy culture of African countries.

Highly inequalities in wealth in societies in SA, Brazil, and India. Big difference to traditional middle powers such as Germany for instances. As a result, they provide less development aid to other countries because they have to address the inequalities in their own countries first.

I: What differences and commonalities do you see in regard to NGOs and epistemic communities due to differences in society and political system/culture?

E: *The epistemic communities are very active and have an impact on foreign policy. In India the think tanks are more related to the government.*

I: What role do the parliaments play in the formation of foreign policy, or is it more the presidency and a small number of people, that is involved?

It is mostly the presidency and the executive branch than the legislative/parliamentarians. In SA especially a strong role of all presidents in the decision-making process.

After apartheid it was Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. [...] Thabo Mbeki used to be in charge of the foreign policy in the ANC in the apartheid era, when the ANC was considered by some as a clandestine terrorist organization. He studied International Relations at Essex, he is a foreign policy guy, he writes his own speeches. And he had a foreign minister, but people said he was his own foreign minister.

Personalities matter a lot. He was very active in all these initiatives such as NEPAD, African Unity through the AU, IBSA, formation of G20 etc.

Mbeki was responsible for international relations and foreign policy in the ANC and that is part of the explanation why he was reluctant to criticize Robert Mugabe, because he supported the anti-apartheid struggle.

There is a strong desire in the Indian diaspora in the US to have stronger ties with the US and leave all this non-alignment behind.

I: How do IBSA countries see “the West”? What contributions, ideas can we expect from Southern countries such as the IBSA in regard to R2P?

E: *They are not anti-Western, instead trying to bridge as middle powers.* [26:30 min]

The problems come when Western countries try to prescribe and ask normative questions about Southern states behavior. Southern states are trying to assert themselves while working with Western powers and reform the Western dominated institutions, especially the UNSC. And that comes into play with R2P. Maybe in the beginning there was norm contestations as well, but it developed a lot, especially Brazil.

Most of the people in the SA government where part of the anti-apartheid struggle and they did not forget, that for instance France and other Western states voted against the embargo on the apartheid regime in the UNSC.

The strongest country in Africa is France, especially in francophone Africa. GIBSA is a possible future cooperation.

Fragebogen

Leitfaden strukturiertes Experteninterview²

Central Question	Expected Content / Aspects	Requests / Notes / Comments
1. What – from your experience and your point of view – are the most influential, decisive factors in terms of historical-cultural experience, geography, collectively shared ideas, norms, rules, worldviews, and others that shape India's / South Africa's foreign policy identity?		
2. India's / South Africa's role in international politics is constantly evolving. How does India / South Africa see itself? What kind of an actor in international relations is India / South Africa and which role does it play, which role would it like to play / should it play and what are the guidelines / guiding principles of its current foreign policy?		
3a. How does India / South Africa perceive the current/existing international order?		
3b. How does India / South Africa see “the West”?		
3c. How does India / South Africa see BRICS and IBSA?		
3d. How does India / South Africa see the United Nations and its own role within this institution?		

² Der Leitfaden war die Grundlage für jedes in Indien und Südafrika geführte Interview. Dabei unterschieden sich die erwarteten Antworten, Themen und Aspekte länderspezifisch ebenso, wie die vorbereiteten Nachfragen. Je nach Situation und Interview kam es vor, dass in manchen Gesprächen einzelne Fragen nicht thematisiert bzw. übersprungen wurden. In einigen wenigen Fällen kam der Leitfaden gar nicht bzw. nur indirekt zur Anwendung.

<p>4. How does India / South Africa see or understand fundamental international norms and principles such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - sovereignty/equality of states - prohibition on the use of force - non-interference (where does it start/threshold) - non-intervention - human rights (which human rights) - prevention of mass atrocities via prevention, assistance and in extreme cases via force 		
<p>5. What does R2P stands for in your understanding?</p>		
<p>6. How would you describe India's / South Africa's attitude and position on R2P at the World Summit 2005 including its prehistory (Ruanda, Kosovo, ICISS Report etc.) and what were the decisive factors that shaped the position/(non)response?</p>		
<p>7. How would you describe India's / South Africa's position towards the international and regional reaction and assistance to and interference in the crisis in Kenya after the 2007/2008 presidential election to prevent mass atrocities in the name of R2P?</p>		
<p>8. How would you describe the position towards R2P after the concept had been established in 2005? Did the position changed in 2009 towards the Report on implementing the R2P by the UN Secretary General and in the following debates in the UN General Assembly and what were the decisive factors that shaped the position/response?</p>		

9. How would you describe the position towards R2P and its application in 2011 (while holding a seat at the UNSC) in the cases of Libya and Ivory Coast and the debate after and what were the reasons / factors /arguments that shaped the position/response?		
10. How did India / South Africa respond to the Brazilian initiative / proposal of a “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP) initiative and why (which reasons, what factors shaped this response)?		
11. What future contributions / proposals / inputs might be expected by India / South Africa in this ongoing norm evolution, concept evolving, R2P implementation process, and in the ongoing debate on R2P on the national, regional, and global level? How does India / South Africa see the future development and implementation of R2P?		
Is there anything left you would like to add, something important we didn’t discuss or something you would like to ask me?		