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Content

Research Note

Book reviews

Metapolitics and Cultural Hegemony:
The Concept of the Elite in the Discourse
of the New Right *Institut für Staatspolitik*

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Abstract : Most research on right-wing populism focuses on the construction of 'the people'. Conversely, I ask how the other side of the populist conflict line – 'the elite' – is discursively constructed. To this end,, I examine the debates of the far-right *Institut für Staatspolitik* (IfS) using Robert Entman's framing analysis. Subsequently, I contextualize the results within the elite discourse of the German New Right. Summing up the results, the IfS states that starting from the student protests in the 1960s and 1970s the elite has become leftist or 'multiculturalist'. Through the elite's hegemony in the media, it exerts a pressure of conformity. While the IfS constructs the elite negatively, it is not anti-elite. By labeling its political enemies as elites, the IfS tries to speak in the name of 'the people'. At the same time, it is elitist argues even for a right-wing elite. In pointing out this paradoxical construction, it becomes clear that the framing of right-wing actors should not be confused with the actual reality. Notably, the IfS's discursive strategy reflects a metapolitical or hegemony theoretical approach that is paradigmatic for the New Right.

Keywords: New Right, Institut für Staatspolitik, Framing Analysis, Elite, Metapolitics, Hegemony

Introduction[2]

> Schließlich sollte man die Tricks […] dingfest machen, ihnen sehr drastische Namen geben, sie genau beschreiben, ihre Implikationen beschreiben und gewissermaßen versuchen, dadurch die Massen gegen diese Tricks zu impfen, denn schließlich will niemand ein Dummer sein […]. Und daß das Ganze auf […] einen gigantischen psychologischen Nepp herausläuft, das ist wohl durchaus zu zeigen (Adorno, 2019, 54)[3]

In his classical essay *The Populist Zeitgeist*, Cas Mudde (2004, p. 543) defines (right-wing) populism as an ideology "that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogene-

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1   Correspondence address: Simon.Clemens@gmx.eu
2   In the following, I translated longer German quotes in footnotes and individual expressions in brackets if necessary.
3   "After all, one should capture the tricks […], give them very drastic names, describe them exactly and try to inoculate the masses against these tricks, because nobody wants to be a fool […]. And that the whole thing runs out on […] a gigantic psychological swindle, that can probably be shown" [SC].

ous and antagonistic groups, 'the *pure* people' versus 'the *corrupt* elite' […]".[4] The definition was followed by discussions. While many scholars agreed with Muddde's approach (e.g. Decker, 2006; Rensmann, 2006; Müller, 2016), others criticized it as culturalization (Manow, 2019, p. 31) or essentialist (Mouffe, 2018, p. 62). To avoid content pre-configurations, I will understand populism as a discursive strategy that is not further defined by content and articulates a conflict between 'the people' and 'the elite' (Laclau, 2018, p. 156).[5] Since research about the German radical right usually concentrates on the theoretical and empirical construction of 'the people', I will instead focus on the construction of 'the elite'. Therefore, I ask how the elite is discursively constructed by the far-right thinktank *Institut für Staatspolitik* (IfS). In the following, I will present first the approach of framing analysis and argue why this method has been chosen. Second, I will introduce the *Institut für Staatspolitik* and the analyzed data. Afterward, I will present my results, i.e. the framing of the elite. Finally, I am going to classify and contextualize the results as well as discuss some implications.

Framing Analysis

While knowing that 'framing' often lacks a specific use, Entman (1993, p. 52) suggests to understand it as a selection of "some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation". Hence, his definition results in four functions: First, a frame defines a problem by determining costs and benefits. Second, it diagnoses the force that causes the problem. Third, a frame judges morally and, consequently, proposes remedies, i.e.: it offers and justifies "treatments for the problems and predicts their likely effects" (ibid.).

However, a frame not necessarily includes all functions (it may include more or none of them). Moreover, empirical results and operationalizations show that the paradigm addressed by Entman is highly fragmented (Scheufele, 1999, p. 118). Nevertheless, most papers focus on the quantitative analysis of different frames (e.g. Van Gorp, 2005; Hong, 2013; Berbers et al., 2016). In contrast, I will use the approach qualitatively to explore the notion 'elite'. The four functions provide a good starting point for a first understanding.[6] Because of the exploratory nature of my work, I cannot treat frames as dependent variables, which would mean investigating "the role of various factors in influencing the creation or modification of frames" (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107). Individual frames, i.e. "information-processing schemata" (Entman, 1991, p. 7), cannot be central to the general question of my paper as well. Hence, I will focus on *media frames* as *independent variables*. Based on the four functions above: "problem definition, causal

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4   I like to thank Bastian Kenn, Alina Sabransky, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful remarks.
5   Articulation means *"any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice"* (Laclau/Mouffe, 2001, p. 105).
6   The "members of the audience do not autonomously form and maintain the orientations they use to process information. Their partisan and ideological loyalties arise from socialization", which is mainly shaped by a group of people "most of whom use the media" (Entman, 1989, p. 366). Therefore, when one first explores an unknown area, it is advisable to start from a media-centered point.

Civil Rights and Political Realignment:
The Presidency of John F. Kennedy

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Abstract: During his presidency, John F. Kennedy emerged as a powerful force for change in the area of equal rights for the nation's black population. In addition to the major civil rights legislation that he proposed and that Congress ultimately enacted, Kennedy served as the nation's teacher, trying to awaken in citizens a sense of understanding and fair-mindedness. He referred publicly to civil rights as a "national crisis of great dimensions," and then worked hard in trying to resolve that crisis in a positive and peaceful way. However, the civil rights activities of both John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson contributed immeasurably to a powerful and enduring political realignment in the United States. Millions of Democrats, located heavily in the south, were highly disaffected by Kennedy's and Johnson's activism in civil rights. Many moved out of the Democratic Party and then into the Republican Party after flirting in 1968 with the short-lived and overtly racist American Independent Party. Today, more than fifty years later, the south remains strongly Republican.

Keywords: Civil rights, John F. Kennedy presidency, Southern United States, Republican Party

Introduction

As a member of the United States Congress for fourteen years, John F. Kennedy advanced a "nuanced strategy on civil rights" that aimed to end the more odious abuses of racial segregation while still appeasing the more traditional southern voters.[2] However, shortly after taking the oath of office as President of the United States on January 20, 1961, Kennedy demonstrated a noticeably more active interest in civil rights progress. When, for example, he noticed that *all* of the Coast Guard cadets marching in his inaugural parade were white, Kennedy quickly issued an order to the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard Academy, directing him to begin recruiting and enrolling black students without delay.[3] This, then, was one of Kennedy's first

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1   Correspondence: r.gilbert@northeastern.edu
2   Christopher Sanford, Harold and Jack: The Remarkable Friendship of Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy, Amherst, New York, Prometheus Books, 2014, p. 51.
3   Kenneth P. O'Donnell and David F. Powers, *Johnny,* We Hardley Knew Ye, Boston: Little Brown, 1970, p. 248.

official acts as a new president. Soon he saw both black students and black faculty members recruited for the first time since the academy's founding in 1876.

Kennedy's interest in non-discrimination was almost certainly heightened by the fact that as an Irish-American school boy, he had been the victim of "ethnic, social and religious prejudice."[4] Later, his Irish heritage offended some of the power brokers and voters with whom he came into contact and anti-Catholic sentiment was a significant problem for him in winning the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination and then the general election that followed.[5] As an example, Protestant evangelicals in September, 1960 issued a public denunciation of the Catholic candidate's fitness for office.[6] Kenneth W. Thompson has pointed out that, in the face of this attack, many observers predicted that Kennedy was doomed to defeat.[7] Therefore, he had to respond vigorously in order to demonstrate to concerned Democratic Party leaders that " his youth and Roman Catholicism had *not* ruined the party's chances in the Fall election…."[8]

In mid-September, Kennedy delivered an address in Texas to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association during which he asserted that "I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute – where no Catholic prelate would tell the President (should he be Catholic) how to act…."[9] Kennedy's victory margin over Republican Richard Nixon was only 119,000 popular votes (out of the 68.4 million votes cast), with surveys suggesting strongly that the factor of religion had played a clear role in narrowing the gap between the two major party nominees.[10]

As a new Chief Executive, Kennedy tried to exert quick but subtle influence over racial attitudes by the way he interacted *personally* with African Americans and responded *personally* toward the issue of racism. He danced with black women at the 1961 inaugural balls and invited more black guests to the White House than any president before him, socializing with them comfortably and with charm. Also, although Kennedy had considered appointing Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas to the position of Secretary of State, he ultimately rejected the idea because Fulbright had taken a "a segregationist stance in his Arkansas constituency."[11] Then, early in his term, the new President told the press that he "personally approved" of his brother's resignation from a segregated club in Washington, D.C.[12] His overt inclusiveness, then, helped foster stronger racial acceptance in *some* quarters of American society and, in effect, "represented a genuine paradigm shift in American racial politics."[13]

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4   Nigel Hamilton, JFK: Reckless Youth, New York: Random House, 1992, p. 206.
5   Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960, New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961, pp. 354-355.
6   Nancy Gibbs and Michael Duffy, The President's Club, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012, p. 255.
7   Kenneth W. Thompson, The President and the Public Philosophy, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981, p. 214.
8   Thomas E. Patterson, The Vanishing Voter, New York: Vintage Books, 2003, p. 116.
9   White, The Making of the President 1960, 1961, p. 391.
10   Gerald Blain and Lisa McCubbin, The Kennedy Detail, New York: Gallery Books, 2010, p. 33.
11   O'Donnell and Powers, Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye, 1970, p. 236.
12   Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963, p. 358.
13   Nick Bryant, The Bystander: John F. Kennedy and the Struggle for Black Equality, New York: Basic Books, 2006, p. 464.

Metaphors in Daesh Propaganda:
A Spark Lit in Iraq to Burn the Whole Globe

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Abstract: Within massive publications on Daesh propaganda, the function and utility of metaphors is underexplored. The selection of metaphors is an act of meaning creation and they reflect a shared cognitive universe among in-groups. The qualitative study at hand analyzes official media output of Daesh in four 1-week periods, each starting after a landmark event with approximately one year intervals between them (2014-2017). The selected periods can be described as times of "glory", "victory", "loss" and "collapse", respectively, for Daesh. Through analysis of 31 propaganda items in English and Arabic, 778 metaphors have been coded to provide insight about the cognitive universe shaped and shared by Daesh media. The results support our hypothesis that Daesh shows skill in adjusting selection of metaphors, verbal or visual, in support of seasonal communication priorities. Moreover, the metaphors listed in the article have potential to become an important tool for professionals formulating counter-narratives, providing them a catalogue of source domains to draw on to counter Daesh messages together with their cognitive roots.

Keywords: Metaphor, cognitive schemata, Daesh, propaganda, Islamic State

Introduction

At four critical junctures between 2014 and 2017, Daesh[2] experienced "glory", "victory", "loss" and finally "collapse" in chronological order. Glory came on 29 June 2014, the first of the holy month Ramadan, when the organization proclaimed its self-styled "caliphate." (Fishman, 2016) Epic depiction of military successes and marketing of this idea of the "caliphate" were part of its agitation and integration propaganda (Ellul, 1965). Daesh media outlets repeated the message enough times that in August 2015 over 700 propaganda items were produced by the centralized media network of Daesh (Diwan al Markaz al-I'lami) (Milton, 2016). Thanks to this productive

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media network, Daesh was able to recruit more than 42.000 foreign terrorist fighters from more than 120 countries between 2011 and 2016 (Barrett, 2017).

Like any insurgent group, Daesh depended on the magnifying effect of media activities for recruitment. It accomplished this in a relatively easy way when it constantly gained new territories in line with its slogan of "stay and expand" ("baqiyya wa tatamaddad").[3] However, starting from March 2015, Daesh began to be expelled from its so-called liberated territories, making the task of maintaining this always-winning caliphate image an extremely daunting challenge. The organization was in constant retreat, and this hurt the commonly shared notion among its adherents that success was a sign of being righteous. Above all, to offset this continuous trend of losses on the battlefield (McCants, Why Did ISIS Attack Paris?, 2016), Daesh conducted the notorious Paris attacks on 13 November 2015, which gave a momentary sensation of victory, encouraged initial perceptions of a militarily able group, and showed a shift in strategy from a territorial terrorist organization towards one with increased reach that can attack western targets (Schmitt & Kickpatrick, 2015).

Loss continued, nevertheless, even after the Paris attacks. On 16 October 2016, Daesh lost control of Dabiq, a small town in northern Syria which is extensively mentioned in Daesh propaganda, and which forms an important element of eschatology for recruitment (Petit, 2015). According to this eschatology[4], the last hour will not come until the best of Muslims confront the Romans in al-A'maq[5] or in Dabiq[6]. Daesh asserts to represent those best of Muslims.

Finally, on 17 October 2017 came the collapse. Daesh lost almost total control of Raqqa - its so-called capital- to US-backed militias (Wilson Center, 2019). This effectively meant the end of this self-styled proto state.

Each of these defining moments created a unique challenge for Daesh leadership and media regarding meaning construction. They had to provide their fighters and adherents persuasive alternative reading of the military developments on the ground that would reduce complexity for them, close the door on questioning organization's righteousness, keep alive the sensation of being on the winning side, maintain their loyalty, and inspire their further commitment and sacrifice.

In the last decade, there has been extensive academic interest in Daesh strategic communication and propaganda. Yet, one shortcoming of the extant research has been primarily them deriving inference based on two flagship magazines of the organization in English, namely Dabiq and Rumiyah (Ingram, 2018; Christien, 2016; Kling, Stock, Ilhan, & Henkel, 2018; Lakomy, 2019; Delemarre, 2017; Andersen & Sandberg, 2018; Ingram, 2017). Zelin's

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3   This is in fact the slogan on the cover of Dabiq's fifth issue. The article with the same name was written to inform its readers of new pledges on 11 November 2014 from militants in Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Sinai and Saudi Arabia to ISIL. The article, towards end, discusses the source for the slogan and what it meant for the organization (Al-Tamimi, 2017).

4   The referred eschatology foresees Muslims after defeating Romans and their 80 allies will advance to Constantinople (Istanbul). Roman Empire that held Constantinople in the 7th century, the time this eschatology was uttered by the prophet, is normally used for non-Muslim West in Daesh propaganda (McCants, 2014).

5   This is the name of one of the Daesh media organizations that delivers news about Daesh accomplishments.

6   This is the name of the first English journal of Deash. At a time close to loss of Dabiq, the organization changed the name of the journal to Rumiyah, Arabic name for Rome, a further reference to the hadith prophecying this future event. For the whole text of the hadith please consult Muslim, *Sahih Muslim, The Book Pertaining to the Turmoil and Portents of the Last Hour (Kitab Al-Fitan wa Ashrat As-Sa`ah)* (Muslim, n.d.).

Expression of political views by school teachers: Teachers' and parents' perspectives and mindsets regarding the real and the ideal

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Abstract: The current study examines the perspectives and mindsets of Israeli teachers and parents pertaining to political participation and expression of political opinions by Israeli teachers. For that purpose, qualitative methodology was applied. The main findings showed that about one fifth of the teachers and less than a third of the parents could not even name a relevant restriction concerning political participation and expression of teachers. On the other hand, a vast majority of the teachers can indeed recognize the differences between political education and party education.

Keywords: political socialization; democracy education; political limitations on teaching staff; teachers' training

Theoretical background

Freedom of speech is considered an important, fundamental right in Israel, allowing a broad scope of personal expression and individual autonomy in society, and is one of the foundations of democracy. However, it is not an absolute right and it often clashes with other rights. For example, the Supreme Court have often debated the balance between public servants' freedom of speech and their obligations**,** and their rulings have determined that they should keep a neutral and objective façade, free of any defined political position or standpoint in the eyes of the general public, and particularly in the eyes of the public they serve and have contact with (Disciplinary Appeal – Civil Service 5/86: Gideon Spiro versus Civil Service Commissionaire).

Ministry of Education political directives

The directives to teachers seek to apply uniform codes and norms, without discriminating between civil servant and non-civil servant teachers, based on the belief that they should all be

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treated equally. It has been determined as they are in charge of students, teachers should publicly appear to be as impartial, neutral and objective as possible even in private exchanges. They must exhibit tolerance and restraint, and refrain from favoring or encouraging one political view over another. Failing to comply with these directives may lead to legal action (Local Authorities Law [discipline], 1978).

The question of teachers' political freedom of speech was first debated in the early 1950s through a petition filed by Dr. Israel (Scheib) Eldad against Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion's decision to prevent his employment as a teacher. The directive against his employment was based on the accusation that Eldad had been preaching the use of arms against the IDF and the government of Israel. Eldad, formerly one of the leaders of the Lehi underground movement, claimed in his petition that the real motive for the defense minister's refusal to approve his employment was political, based on the fear that he might bring up the young generation to take political stands opposed to those of the government. Among other things, he based his claim on what Ben-Gurion had said about him to poet Uri Zvi Greenberg: "Precisely because he is a good teacher, he inserts his politics into grammar lessons as well" (Kedar, 2004). The court accepted the petition and ordered his reinstatement, based on procedural and administrative reasoning. However, at the beginning of his ruling, Judge Shneur Zalman Heshin (Supreme Court Ruling 144/50, p. 404) expressed his wish that:

> The day will soon come when the Knesset will enact a law strictly forbidding teachers, educators and all those engaged in education, from dealing, whether openly or secretly, inside or outside school, with politics, or with anything that reeks of it. Our children's education is sacred, and no foreign sacrifices should be made on its altar.

In light of these words the Knesset added section 19 to the State Education Law in 1953, two years after the conclusion of the Eldad affair, stating that: "A teacher, or any other educational institution employee, shall not conduct propaganda in favor of a political party or any other political organization among the educational institution's students."

In 1955, the court gave this section a broad interpretation, ruling against teachers' political activities, even when conducted not in front of their students (SCR 76/55). This broad interpretation was later rejected by another court ruling, which allowed teachers' political activities even on school premises, but not in front of their students. This interpretation would obviously allow political activities outside school hours as well (Tel-Aviv [Jerusalem] 10451/01).

Valid directives specified in the Director General's Circular from 2009 (8[a]) mostly deal with the tension between the civil right to free speech and the wish to protect students from propaganda. It barely has any concrete reference to the pedagogical and substantive aspects of political education, but rather mainly involves delineating the areas between teachers' legitimate political activities as citizens and their educational activities as teachers. This way the directives subordinate the teachers to rules and legal precedents applicable to all civil servants. The Circular includes a list of prohibitions applying to teachers at all levels.

The Ministry of Education's Director General's Circulars up to 2014 explicitly stated political prohibitions applicable to teachers. Among these prohibitions, all teachers regardless of rank or status, are prohibited from publicly criticizing the Knesset and its committees, including its decisions and legislations, as well as the government and its ministries, including government policy, public bodies or senior public figures. This rule also applies to teachers as private individuals, when they express their opinions in written or on electronic media, in press conferences,

Economic evaluations and political support: Repeated micro-analyses in the Netherlands, 2008-2020

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Abstract: How important is the evaluation of people's personal economic situation and the economic situation of the country in which they live in explaining differences in political support? And how stable are the effects over time and between different groups? This chapter addresses these questions using analyses of data drawn from fifty surveys carried out for the Dutch 'Citizens' Outlooks Barometer' (COB) over the period 2008-2020, from before the financial crisis until the start of de coronavirus crisis. It transpires that (macroeconomic) 'sociotropic' considerations are more important than (personal financial) 'egotropic' aspects over the entire period and for both higher and lower-educated segments of the population. Evaluations of the present situation appear to be more important than expectations. Some evidence is found that negative evaluations have a bigger impact than positive evaluations. Suggestions are put forward for further research to explain fluctuations in the importance of financial and economic evaluations in explaining differences in political support.

Keywords: political support, The Netherlands 2008-2020, personal economic situation, 'egotropic', 'sociotropic'

Introduction

A note on methodology

This article uses traditional quantitative techniques (especially regression analyses) to look at public opinion in more detail. We stay close to the data and look for diversity. Instead of using advanced multilevel techniques to uncover regularities in composite data, we repeat analyses for fifty surveys in a time series to get more insight into stability and to discover patterns. For quantitative researchers, this article can be a useful exercise to become or remain aware of the coincidence or temporality of findings in single surveys. For qualitative researchers, I hope this

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article stimulates thinking about possibilities to link their investigations to representative population survey research.

This research is part of a broader explorative and interpretive approach of public opinion (cf. Schuman 2008; see Data and indicators Section). Because of limited space and language barriers, I will not include analyses of qualitative data in this chapter, but I will refer to it to justify interpretations and with suggestions for further research.

Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic support for politics

The attention given to economic interests and developments varies when it comes to explaining political preferences and attitudes. While they were once the obvious basis for understanding mass political attitudes and behaviour, in recent decades non-material cultural factors have received more attention, in particular in discussions about globalisation and populism (Guriev & Papaioannou 2020). More recently, we have seen a number of promising initiatives aimed at combining economic and cultural factors, with a lot of attention also being paid to combinations of factual circumstances in people's perceptions, to social interactions and the different contexts in which individual judgments occur, or to the developments at the micro, meso and macrolevel. This chapter does not have the pretension of making a direct contribution to these innovative and integrative approaches; its ambitions are more limited. The focus is exclusively on the micro-level of relationships between individual attitudes, in a bid to ascertain to what extent stable patterns can be discerned in a turbulent time. More specifically, the question is to what extent known differences from previous research literature on the political impact of perceptions of the personal and national economic situation can still be found in the Netherlands in the period 2008-2020, and how much change there has been over this period. Given the changes in of circumstances – the global financial crisis, turning into an economic crisis and the euro crisis, the emergence of major non-primary economic challenges such as a large influx of refugees and the climate issue and, not least, at the very end of the period of the coronavirus pandemic – economic considerations are unlikely to play a constant role. I will not comment on the changed circumstances as such, but will look only at the relationships between individual characteristics at different times. The findings will update our knowledge of the importance of economic factors in shaping political support. It is scientifically relevant to know whether known regularities from older research still hold true and whether they always hold. In addition to the relationship between perceptions of the personal and national situation, we also look at the relationship between retrospective and prospective views, at the possible asymmetry of effects of positive and negative evaluations, and at differences in political sophistication.

Earlier research and expectations

For a long time, economic and financial factors have received attention as explanations for party choice and differences in political support and trust (Nannestad & Paldam 1994, Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000, Stegmaier et al. 2017, Van der Meer 2018). These studies focus both on macrofigures for economic growth and unemployment to explain national developments and differences between countries, and economic conditions, valuations and perspectives of citizens to