Friederike Alm

The Politics of Us and Them – The Migration Politics Nexus

A Comparative-Historical
Analysis of Canada, France, and Germany

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Friederike Alm
The Politics of Us and Them – The Migration
Politics Nexus

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Für meine Eltern

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful for the support I received throughout researching and writing my PhD thesis in last five years. Here I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to those who supported and guided me through the process academically and emotionally (or provided much needed distraction when I needed a break).

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Prof. Dr. Jens Borchert of Goethe University and Prof. Dr. Elke Winter of the University of Ottawa. Jens provided invaluable support in initiating this research project, supervised the research and writing process with encouragement, patience, and critical attention to detail, and not least, gently reminded me not to take on too much on the side. He also encouraged and supported my teaching, including the design of my own syllabi in relation to the thesis subjects. Getting to teach on these subjects was among the most rewarding experiences of my PhD years. Elke was an equally encouraging supervisor, who, despite the supervision taking place across the big pond during a global pandemic, invited me to join collaborations and conferences, which broadened my academic horizons. Not least, she invited me to join a workshop in Harvard in the autumn of 2022, which was among the highlights of my PhD years.

My heartfelt gratitude goes out to all the experts in migration politics who took time out of their busy days to discuss Canadian, French, and / or German migration politics history with me. Your contributions to this project are vital and I am very grateful for each and every person who decided to participate. Thank you, merci beaucoup, vielen Dank.

Numerous colleagues helped me in the research process with insightful comments and guidance. The small group of migration politics PhD researchers which gathered to organize the migration politics colloquium 'Migrakolloq' met every month to provide encouragement, draft comments, and emotional support. Thank you for everything Alexandra Berger, Anna Goerg, and Marlene Neumann. To my colleague and friend Julia Dupont, thank you for your input on the project and your camaraderie. To my colleague Brigitte Holden, thank you for your kind support throughout the whole project. Professor Phil Triadafilopoulos, whom I first met while studying in Toronto in 2016, invited me to the University of Toronto for my research stay in 2021. His comparative work on Canada and Germany inspired this thesis, and he provided helpful guidance on the project. Thank you.

I would like to thank the Polytechnic Foundation of Frankfurt am Main for providing me with a PhD scholarship, which supported me financially and allowed me to make the acquaintance of a group of amazing young scholars in

encouraging me to ask questions and, saliently, to find answers. I am so grate-
ful to them for their support and their love.

List of Abbreviations

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland	*Alternative for Germany*
BAMF	Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge	*Federal Office for Migration and Refugees*
BVGF	Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz	*Federal Expellee and Refugee Law*
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation	
CCCC	Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship	
CESEDA	Code d'entrée et de séjourdes étrangers et des demandeurs d'asile	*Law on the entry and residence of foreigners and asylum seekers*
CHA	Comparative-Historical Analysis	
CJ	Critical Juncture	
DPs	Displaced Persons	
DM	Deutsche Mark	*German Mark*
EEC	European Economic Community	
EU	European Union	
FN	Front National	*National Front*
GDR	German Democratic Republic	
IMPIC	Immigration Policies in Comparison Index	
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index	
MP	Member of Parliament	
MPI	Multiculturalism Policy Index	
NIEAP	Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program	
ONAMO	Office National Algérien de la Main d'œuvre	*National Algerian Office of Manpower*
ONI	Office National de l'Immigration	*National Immigration Office*
PEGIDA	Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes	*Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident*
PM	Prime Minister	

PNPs	Provincial Nominee Programs	
RuStAG	Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeits-gesetz	*Law on Imperial and State Nationality*
TFWs	Temporary Foreign Workers	
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	

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I.   Foundations

We need immigrants, right? We need these new members of society who will enhance what we already are.
– Canadian Expert (CPS2, pos. 42)

We are an immigration country, clearly. But it's an immigration that's inherited, we didn't choose it.
– French Expert (FPS1, pos. 15)

We are making immigration policy. Since the beginning of the Federal Republic, we've been making immigration policy. We just don't call it immigration policy. (…) So, effectively, there's never been this categorical difference between us and Canada or the United States.
 – German Expert (GPS1, pos. 4)

1. Introduction: On the Comparative Politics of Migration

Canada, France, and Germany count among the ten most important immigration countries in the world today. In past efforts to typologize Canada, France, and Germany for comparative purposes in migration research, three models emerged which were held as distinct and paradigmatic 'ideal types' and often made their way from political research into public discourse, where they are referred to even today. Aptly put and simplified, Canada is the paradigmatic immigration country with a multicultural self-conception. Canada explicitly uses immigration for 'nation-building' and therefore views immigration as a constituent part of its emergence as a state. As Europe's oldest immigration country, France is also considered a paradigmatic case. It long used high immigration influx to bolster its population numbers (notably also to counter military inferiority in relation to other European states), paired with a republican self-conception and with quick ascent to the national community through citizenship acquisition. For a long time, Germany was assigned the uncomfortable position of an immigration country in denial, and outlier holding on to an ethnic and therefore exclusionary conception of nationhood. This thesis seeks to deconstruct and renew these portrayals.

In this thesis, I present a comparative-historical analysis (CHA) of Canada's, France's, and Germany's migration politics since the end of the Second World War in 1945. In all three countries, migration politics play a major role both historically and currently, which is why this analysis contributes to a necessary new perspective on these three cases and to the comparative politics of migration in the discipline of political science.

The salience of global migration and its myriad impacts on domestic politics is undisputed. Virtually every country on earth experiences migration processes and some iteration of their transformative societal effects (Steiner 2009: 3; Papademetrious 2011: 14). Migration processes, encompassing emigration, immigration, settlement, and integration, as well as questions of societal membership and citizenship, are complex and affect individuals, societies, and states in numerous ways. They evidently affect those individuals who migrate most personally. The choices migrants make and the challenges posed to them

during the migration process have a significant impact on their life-courses and individual well-being, as well as those of their dependents. For societies, a significant influx of migration often engenders more diversity. This changes societies' cultural and ethnic make-up and at times challenges long-standing conceptions of belonging. These processes often result in heated debates on self-conception/s and at times expose long-standing discriminatory attitudes and structures.

The interconnection of states and migration processes is charged with contradictions. While some researchers stress that international migration is the result of state-building and that states therefore both produce and shape the very processes of migration (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 53; Haas et al. 2019: 899), others assert that by undermining and challenging traditional notions of sovereignty, national identity, state membership, security and borders, international migration processes are essentially the beginning of the end of nation-states (Halfmann 2005: 129f.; Bauböck 2011: 344; Dauvergne 2016: 25). While these assertions appear at odds, both underline the centrality of states in migration processes, albeit from different perspectives. The former centers states' impacts on migration processes, the latter emphasizes migration processes' impacts on states. In short, "human migration in a world of sovereign nation-states is inescapably political" (Triadafilopoulos/Taylor 2021: 13).

In this thesis, I take my cue from migration research that centers the state and I focus both on how *states make and shape migration processes* and, conversely, how *migration processes make and shape states*. For this purpose, I use the shorthand *migration politics*, which I conceive as the ensemble of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics. I am particularly interested in the way these politics are interconnected in what I call the *immigration-citizenship-integration politics-nexus*.[1] I dedicate a significant part of this thesis to creating a sound conceptualization of immigration, integration, and citizenship politics, since this is the first study that presents a thorough analysis of the evolution of this nexus in different case-studies.

Today, Canada, France, and Germany are all Western pluralist democracies with a constitutional commitment to Human Rights and equal opportunities, welfare state provisions, as well as and high levels of immigration. Despite these commonalities, all three cases are held as distinctly different models of immigration countries, and their approaches to migration politics are often juxtaposed. This begs the question of why these countries approach migration politics differently and how their approaches have evolved and differed across time despite their evident similarities. The *comparativist approach* of this

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1   The focus of this analysis lies on immigration, excluding emigration for the purposes of this study.

thesis therefore includes a *within-case comparison across time*, seeking to understand within-case historical variance, and *across-case comparison* seeking to understand across-case differences and commonalities.

Researchers and experts on these cases will immediately object to some aspects of the characterizations of Canada, France, and Germany given above, particularly considering the developments of the last 30 years. Canada underwent a period of tightening of its naturalization procedures, particularly under the conservative governments from 2006–2015. France has maintained its ascribed model in naturalization. However, concomitant with an increasingly hostile public discourse towards immigrants, it has seen restrictions in immigration in the past 40 years, to a point where it at times even followed a zero-immigration objective. Germany, conversely, has undergone significant change in all areas of migration politics, such as the introduction of partial *ius soli*, the gradual institutionalization of integration politics and the liberalization of immigration policies. The previously assigned models therefore warrant reconsideration.

In light of this, researchers now widely hold that the typology approach, which was popular in migration research of the 1990s, is too static and deterministic for analytical purposes today and probably also when it was developed. Some researchers have therefore concluded that the typology and model approach is unhelpful and should be abandoned entirely for comparative migration studies, since the deduction of models distorts the historical complexity of each case, rendering the analysis reductive and methodologically unsound (Favell 2005: 48; Michalowski 2007: 13; Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008: 159; Winter 2014: 33; Schmidtke 2014: 78; Boucher/Gest 2018: 26). This begs the question of how we can effectively conceive of differences and commonalities between immigration countries in comparative migration research.

Central Research Argument
My central argument holds that, rather than static typologies, we need a new, more dynamic approach to conceive of the differences and commonalities between immigration countries. I argue that a comparison of these three cases that considers a) the historical dynamics of each country's migration politics trajectory, and b) the interconnection of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics as a nexus, will allow for a deeper understanding of the cases and, therefore, new perspectives on the historically grown differences amongst them. By allowing for a dynamic approach, I move away from static models but rather show how each country has developed in specific critical junctures

(periods of institutional flux, explained further below), moving through different migration politics nexus dynamics at different points in time. By conceptualizing migration politics as a nexus encompassing immigration, citizenship, and integration politics I allow for a thorough study of the cases that does not only focus on one aspect of migration politics and consequently overlooks other salient factors. In doing so, I present an analysis that strives to consider all facets of *the Politics of 'Us' and 'Them'* that have shaped migration politics in the three studied cases and can serve as a blueprint for further study in the comparative politics of migration.

Today, we have both the data and the virtue of hindsight to show that migration has remained a constant feature of human history, allowing us to normalize migration processes rather than viewing them as an 'anomaly' or a problem that needs to be solved.[2] The systematic control of immigration and emigration, as they connect to states, has also been a constant since the consolidation of nation-states as a global political ordering system. An estimated 90 percent of migrants gain access to their county of arrival legally (Papademetrious 2011: 17). It has therefore been widely accepted in research, but also gradually in public discourse, that migration politics will remain pertinent and an issue of quotidian politics of major immigration countries. Gradually, the "myth of temporariness", which used to pervade discussions on immigration, has been overcome (Cornelius/Hollifield/Martin 1993: 38). Saliently, we can also observe that many previous countries of emigration or countries that have historically avoided immigration are slowly transforming into immigration countries.

This means that it is time to move on from superficial pro and contra analyses of immigration, whether to approve of it, or whether to reject it, or how to avoid it (Fleras 2015: 13). Rather, thorough and balanced analyses of how long-standing immigration countries manage and shape migration politics today, and how they have done so in the past, will offer much-needed guidance to those newly emerging immigration countries on how to effectively deal with

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2   The problematization of migration has a long history in migration research, going back as far as the beginning of the last century, where migration was often framed as the result of crises and "overpopulation" (Ehmer 2005, 30). This initial analytical fallacy travelled and became integrated in popular analyses of immigration politics to this day. From states' perspective, this view of migration as a "problem that needs to be fixed" (Fleras 2015: 36; Castles 2016: 21; also: Glick Schiller 2010: 110) has therefore remained pertinent. The proposed solutions then range from strengthening border controls further or efforts to battle origin country poverty (Fleras 2015: 36). This latter 'solution' to the very popular 'battling-poverty-will-decrease-migration' idea appears misguided considering that research has shown that the richer a developing country gets, the more its share of emigrants increases (Fleras 2015: 33; Haas et al. 2019: 893). According to migration researchers, it is more useful to conceive of migration as "normal and routine process because of broader social transformations" (Fleras 2015: 36).

the challenges, the upsides, and the downsides that immigration inevitably brings. While researchers have stressed that postwar immigration in the West took on "unexpected" dimensions, both in numbers and in political and societal impact (Brubaker 1990: 383), we can now learn from and, more importantly, aim to *understand* the migration politics histories of Canada, France, and Germany so as not to encounter a period of frazzled political inertia once again. I am hopeful that this thesis will contribute to these valuable insights and a confident, informed approach to migration politics in the future.

1.1 Research Question/s

Building on my central argument outlined above, the work presented in this thesis is guided by the following research question:

> How can we conceive of the commonalities and differences in the historical development of Canada, France, and Germany's immigration, citizenship, and integration politics since 1945?

This central question leads to a subset of theoretical, methodological, and analytical questions in relation to the research design.

Conceptual questions:
1. What are the politics of immigration, citizenship, and integration?
2. How do we integrate the study of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics conceptually in one analytical tool that can be used in comparative migration research?

Methodological questions:
3. How can CHA be applied in this context and which methodological tools for a sound CHA can be used to develop this typology?

Empirical questions:
4. What are significant periods of change or potential 'critical junctures' in migration politics in Canada, France, and Germany?
5. How have these 'critical junctures' altered each case's migration politics nexus?
6. What differences and commonalities can be discerned from an analysis of the critical junctures in the cases' migration politics nexus?

In each part of this thesis, I present the answer to one or several specific sub-questions. In the following, I present three important caveats to my research question and analysis.

Caveat 1: On the Chosen Timeframe and the Use of Historical Time
1945 appears as the logical starting point for the analysis presented in this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it is widely considered as a turning point for the global order since it marked the beginning of the postwar era (re-)democratization process for the European countries in this study. Secondly, postwar democratic changes to migration politics that are worth including in this analysis occurred in both France and Canada almost immediately after the end of the Second World War, highlighting the pertinence of these issues for both countries as necessary political adaptations to the new global order. Germany's formal democratization process was arguably only completed with the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949. However, the occupied German territory saw a massive influx of refugees immediately following the end of the war.

Relatedly, as a first caveat, it is important to stress that I will use time historically, not chronologically. I will not present a year-by-year descriptive account of all the different policies and political events that shaped each country's migration politics. Rather, as is the norm in CHA projects, I will identify periods of significant change and closely analyze the developments during those periods. In fact, systematically discerning periods or moments of significant change is one of the analytical contributions I will present in this thesis. I am convinced that the contribution (and not least, elegance) of this analysis lies in its aptness and its ability to select the most pivotal and incisive moments of political change, rather than in its chronological detailedness.

Caveat 2: Limitations on Scope
With this thesis I offer a broad analysis of three highly complex political fields in three countries. For the sake of conciseness, I had to exclude certain topics from featuring dominantly in the analysis. For the European cases, I do not afford a central analytical position to or include an extensive discussion on the European Union (EU) for the development of French and German migration politics. This is because migration politics developments for the most part still take place at the nation-state level, particularly those regarding immigrant integration and citizenship politics. The roots of the respective historically grown migration politics nexus therefore do not lie with the EU. The EU obviously features in the analysis as it has increased in importance in immigration politics in the recent decades.

For Canada, the importance of Indigenous politics has increased in academic and public discourse in recent years. Settler colonialism and immigration are both constituent parts of Canada's nation-building, which is why a discussion of the interconnection between Indigenous politics and migration politics is pertinent. However, throughout the last 70 years, Canada's Indigenous population has not held any power to influence migration politics. In political science terms, this part of the population was not an actor in migration politics. Therefore, Indigenous politics do not feature prominently in the analysis. However, I included a question item on the interconnection between migration politics and Indigenous politics in the expert interviews I conducted. An excursus essay on my findings can be found in the appendix of this thesis (Appendix section III).

Lastly, I do not intend to cover every single aspect of every single political field in every single moment in time throughout the seventy years under study in every single country under analysis. It would be impossible for me to offer an exhaustive account of every single case with the parsimony required for a doctoral thesis. Therefore, this is not the aim of my analysis. I am striving to offer a concise analysis that builds on previous work and aims to extend and improve it.

Caveat 3: The Analysis of Migration Politics stricto sensu

In this thesis, I focus on migration politics *stricto sensu*. In recent years, particularly in light of increasing politicization of migration issues, concomitant with forced migration periods that saw an increase in refugee numbers, there has been a tendency to use migration as a "meta-narrative" (Foroutan 2019: 13). As German sociologist Naika Foroutan explains, this has meant that migration has developed into an "explanatory category" for all kinds of societal issues, which are then transferred to a wide variety of policy areas such as "security, health, education, politics, religion etc." (ibid.).[3] I agree with Foroutan on the emergence of this meta-narrative. Moreover, while it is true that some aspects of migration processes will inevitably touch on a lot of these policy areas in the long run, my focus is on the way migration politics shapes states and is shaped by states.

Another way that issues of migration politics have become muddled in discourse is on their use as a coding strategy for political campaigns, particularly

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3 Foroutan specifies how migration is attributed to societal issues like "educational gaps, criminality, welfare state provisions, housing shortages, gender inequality, antisemitism". She explains that this narrative connection then allows "German society to rearrange itself in front of the background of migration debates" (Foroutan 2019: 13).

those of the populist realm. However, very often when migration is used in far-right political discourse and campaigning, the issue is often not migration politics *stricto sensu*, but rather the meta-narrative described by Foroutan. Migration is used as a codification for xenophobia and racism in a way that muddies the waters for a sound analysis of genuine migration politics. I do not study the way migration politics and populism interact in this thesis, although this has emerged as a popular topic for political science. However, I will consider historical processes of the *politicization* of migration and how those might have affected migration politics in each country case.

1.2 Research Design

In this section, I explain the research strategy, units of analysis, and case selection of this thesis which I will further elaborate on in the connected chapters on methodology and state of the art later-on.

1.2.1 On Research Strategy: Comparative-Historical Analysis and the Identification of Critical Junctures

The methodological design and empirics of this project are based on the research approach of comparative-historical analysis (CHA). CHA has a long history in the social sciences generally, and in political science in particular. CHA is connected to the research field of historical sociology with its roots in Tocquevillian comparisons of French and U.S.-American societies and a Weberian "interpretative sociology", which strived for a comparative analysis of societies and politics in historical and cultural contexts (Birnbaum 2011: 1083).

Epistemologically, researchers in historical sociology, and its subspecialisation in political science, CHA, are not interested in formulating social or political 'laws of nature' or coming up with generalizable mono-causal inferences with strictly preconceived dependent and independent variables. Rather, their ontological perspective encompasses societies and states in their multicausal contexts, aiming to *understand* rather than *explain* why the studied units of analysis did or did *not* occur or develop in the way they did. This means that CHA allows the researchers to choose a small number of cases and then dive deeply into the research matter to conduct an expansive analysis for a deeper understanding of the question at hand. In contrast to quantitative and positivist

research designs, CHA does not develop explicit hypotheses that the researcher sets out to prove or falsify. Rather, CHA researchers acknowledge complex historical multicausality from the start. It is their aim to delve deeply into the historical processes and paths that have determined the political developments in their respective field of study. This epistemological interest of CHA research therefore aligns with my research question.

CHA is best understood as a research strategy, rather than a clear-cut method. Within this strategy, the application of several frameworks and methods is possible. The fundamental tool of CHA research is the in-depth study of secondary literature on the studied issues. A literature study is a key feature of any CHA analysis and is acknowledged as its own methodological contribution to the research design. In the case of this thesis, this meant that I read and reviewed literatures on all three countries, accustomed myself to the idiosyncrasies of migration research and the histories of each respective country. This constitutes a major feature of this thesis.

In a second step, I apply the framework of critical junctures to the insights gathered in the literature analysis. The notion of critical junctures represents an "analytic-temporal framework" in CHA (Thelen/Mahoney 2015: 21f.). Critical junctures are "phases of institutional flux (…) during which more dramatic change is possible. The causal logic behind such arguments [the identification of critical junctures, F. A.] emphasizes the lasting impact of choice made during those critical junctures" (Capoccia/Kelemen 2007: 341). By identifying possible critical junctures, I am able to understand in which periods in time paradigmatic change occurred (or did not occur) for each country case.

Lastly, I chose a less conventional approach within CHA, which is the method of expert interviews. Based on the examined literature, I conducted 43 semi-structured interviews in total, with experts from the fields of migration politics in each respective country. These interviews served two purposes: For one, through their expansive contextual and processual knowledge, the experts' accounts allowed me to verify my own preliminary analytical assessments on the possible critical junctures, or they alerted me to political intricacies I had missed in my study. Secondly, they provided me with important interpretative knowledge on the case/s. Many of the interviewees were migration researchers from the social sciences or humanities, another large part were former or current long-serving public servants from the field, a small number were specialist journalists or activists in the field with expansive knowledge. Most are very prominent members of the migration research or migration policy-making communities and helped my project immensely. Contrasting their insights and assessments on each country case helped clarify the comparative research results and bolstered my analytical contribution. The narrative and

interpretative open-endedness of the semi-structured interviews provided the optimal addition to my literature analysis and supported the identification of possible critical junctures. This shows how CHA as a research strategy allows for a multitude of approaches to be employed to answer a proposed research question.

Both the units of analysis and the case selection is strongly connected to the chosen research strategy of CHA: States are a central unit of analysis of most comparative-historical analyses. Researching a specific and impactful political field, such as economics, education, or welfare state systems, is also a classic CHA approach. The case-selection, in turn, builds on a small-n qualitative model with three Weberian 'ideal types'. Here again, CHA was the guiding post for strategically choosing the cases that offered most potential for deeper understanding of the studied units of analysis.

1.2.2 On Units of Analysis: States and Politics

Two units of analysis guide the research question of this project: *States* and migration *politics*. The first unit of analysis is relatively straightforward. *States* remain one of the most traditional and major macro-level units of analysis of political science. Comparativist approaches, particularly CHA, often work with states as the primary unit to analyze one or several political fields, developments, or phenomena (Birnbaum 2011: 1083). In comparative migration research, there is a distinction between research that focuses on states or "the national models or political opportunity structure approach" (Bloemraad 2013: 33) and research that focuses on particular migrant groups (ibid.). The difference lies in the explanatory potential accorded to the macro and micro-levels. For researchers that focus on states, like I do in this study, immigrants' "agency is secondary to the overwhelming constraints exerted by macro-level forces" (ibid.). Therefore, immigrants' experiences are not the focus of this research.[4]

Saliently, states themselves are not actors. Rather, they are an accumulation of political actors and institutions (in turn, led and guided by actors). However, in their entirety, those actors and institutions create, influence, and implement

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4 Of course, there are also studies that combine both perspectives. A lot of work has been done on what Bloemraad calls "quasi-experimental" designs, which look at the integration of 'similar' immigrant groups (like for instance, the Chinese diaspora) across different countries to work out how exactly the states' approach might have shaped the groups' experience of migration processes (Bloemraad 2013: 37).

a dynamic set of politics that they follow and that guide their actions into what can be then conceived of as the entirety of a state's politics.

The second unit of analysis, migration *politics*, requires some conceptual elaboration.[5] I chose politics on the grounds of its conceptual breadth, which better reflects the analytical scope of my research question and the research approach CHA than *policy* or *policy fields*. In political science, policies are "a system of political decisions and specific subfields", while politics is best conceived of as mechanisms or structures that lead to the outcome of policies (Badie/Berg-Schlosser/Morlino 2011: li). This thesis does not present a policy analysis in the classic sense of a "policy analysis (…) ", that "produce[s] expert and objective advice on the questions confronting government" (Colebatch 2011: 1893). Researchers using the method of policy analysis tend to reduce policies to their function and aim at a more functionalist understanding of policy content (ibid.). To distinguish this work from more functional policy analysis and because the analytical scope of the research question goes beyond the research approach of policy analysis, I chose *politics* as the second central unit of analysis.

The research aim of this thesis is to present the whole of the political fields of immigration, citizenship, and integration, rather than an approach that focuses only on the policy dimension. I am interested in political mechanisms and structures, as well as historical events that lead to the introduction of certain policies, but also how certain policies might have contributed to certain causal mechanisms. Policies remain one major factor in the analysis. However, using *politics* as the unit of analysis allows for this wider scope of analysis that incorporates historical, political, and discursive dimensions, briefly, the whole of the politics that lead to certain policies.

CHA allows for this broader approach because it does not require hypothesis building or mono-causal inferences as part of its research design, as the previous section showed. Rather, research done with a CHA approach often aims for a re-telling of the political history of a political field, which requires a more comprehensive perspective. Choosing politics, rather than policies, allows drawing this methodological distinction, since policy analysis operates with other methodical requirements than CHA.

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5 While the chapter on theory will contain a sound conceptualization of all three concepts, immigration, citizenship, and integration, as well as an elaboration of the nexus between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics, I provide my explanation for the decision to use 'politics', rather than policies, as the unit of analysis attached to the three core concepts in this section.

1.2.3 On the Case for my Cases: The Selection of Major Immigration Countries

There are three reasons to select Canada, France, and Germany as the cases for this study: Firstly, their paradigmatic positioning as immigration countries in previous research, secondly, the research approach of comparative-historical analysis, and lastly the pragmatic reason of already established field access and academic experience.

In previous research Canada, France, and Germany have each been assigned unique positions as paradigmatic immigration countries with distinct approaches to migration politics. The selection of the cases is therefore based on a 'similar cases – different outcomes' design. This means that they have similar political and economic characteristics but different migration politics. All three selected countries have long been immigration countries in the purely descriptive sense of the term, which is that they have predominantly experienced net immigration in the last 70 years. Also, they are comparable with regards to their regime type, their roughly comparable welfare state provisions, and their economic prosperity. However, the internal logic of the project's case selection stems from the cases' frequent juxtaposition with regards to their migration politics in academic literature – the above-described models serve as a starting point for Weberian different 'ideal types' (Bloemraad 2013: 40).

The second reason of this case selection is grounded in the project's research approach. Essentially, the constellation of these three cases leads to the underlying question that often guides small-n qualitative research designs in political science: If the selected cases are similar in many respects, how can we understand their diverging migration politics? This approach of understanding different political developments lies at the heart of most comparative-historical research designs. CHA often tackles broad political fields with a small-n qualitative design. Similar cases with diverging historical trajectories with regards to one political field are therefore ideal and support the proposed case selection.

Lastly, the case selection was also guided by pragmatic reasons. I have lived, studied, and conducted research in all three countries, I speak and write all three languages fluently and, through my previous studies, I have been privy to each country's history and political system. I am also well-versed in the academic and cultural idiosyncrasies that I need to be aware of to gain access for field research. This provided me with an advantageous head start for my research an equips me well to tackle the research question/s presented above.

In the following, I present an overview of each country's migration politics since the middle of the last century, to provide some contextual background to the reader.

Canada: The Multicultural Immigration Society
A mid 20th century shift can be observed in the Canadian migration politics trajectory: In the first half of the 20th century, the Canadian immigration system was characterized by a racialized understanding of Canada as a "white man's country" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 18). Before the middle of the century, immigration policies explicitly distinguished between desired and undesired immigrants along racial lines.[6] After 1945, Canada maintained this racially selective system, but established its own citizenship and naturalization regime independent from the British. The 1960s marked the paradigmatic turning point in Canadian immigration history, as race and religion were abandoned in immigrant selection in 1962. The introduction of a points-based system for skilled immigrants followed in 1967 and in 1971, PM Pierre Elliott Trudeau announced multiculturalism as Canada's official state doctrine. Today, Canada is widely considered the *paradigmatic "immigration society"* (ibid. 78), with an international image of being the 'poster boy' for a successful immigration country (Kymlicka 2004, Schultze 2008). Immigration forms an integral part of "Canada-building" (Fleras 2015: 78) and is understood to be one of the founding principles of Canadian national identity (ibid.).

France: The Egalitarian–Assimilatory Republic
France is Europe's oldest immigration country (Amiraux/Simon 2006: 194; Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 61). In the first half of the 20th century, immigration to France was shaped by a strong immigrant influx from its neighbouring countries (something Weil calls "*immigration du voisinage*", 2005: 14).[7] After the experience of the Second World War and as early as 1945, France introduced a low-threshold immigration system for workers and liberalized citizenship for its colonial populations (ibid.). Immigrant composition changed significantly in the second half of the century, marked by a distinct impact of France's colonial history (Bleich 2005). After a complete recruitment stop in 1974, France strongly restricted immigration until the early 2000s, even following a zero-immigration goal. In the 1980s, the far-right *Front National* (FN) gained footing and influenced the emergence of a deep political cleavage on migration

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6   Fleras describes this system with reference to Walker (1998) as a "racial pecking order" (2015: 84).
7   Incidentally, this is also reflected in numbers: In 1931, France's share of foreign residents was even higher than that of the United States (ibid.).

politics which persists until today. The selective recruitment of highly skilled immigrants was established in the 2000s. Today, France's largest immigrant groups come from former colonies and represent a postcolonial presence, which also explains why "attitudes towards minorities were shaped by centuries of national expansion and colonial experience" (Vuddamalay/Vasta 2006: 3). In stark contrast to Canada, academic discourse has long characterized France as the *"archetypical assimilatory society"* (Simon/Sala Pala 2010: 92, also: Brubaker 1990, Vuddamalay/Vasta 2006).

Germany: The de facto *Multicultural,* Self-Conscious *Country of Immigration*
In the triad between France and Canada, Germany presents an ambiguous case. The first half of the 20th century saw the introduction of policy measures dedicated to excluding unwanted immigrants, notably Jews and Poles from Eastern Europe. The terrors of the Nazi regime were based on the quest for an ethnically homogenous society (Triadafilopoulos 2012). Since the middle of the century, Germany has been ambiguous and "self-conscious" about its status as an immigration country (Schönwälder 2010). Economic and labour politics led to the immigration of many so-called 'guest workers' in the 1950s, 60s, and early 1970s, a policy which rested on the myopic idea that these immigrants would not settle in the long term but return to their home countries once they had completed their assignments. Despite a full stop to labour migration because of the oil crisis in 1973, Germany's liberal refugee policy, as well as the family reunion policy supported by the Basic Law, led to consistent immigration after 1973 (Joppke 1999). The decade-long contention by German political elites that Germany is 'not a country of immigration' (ibid., Triadifilopoulos 2012) changed significantly in the late 1990s. Today, researchers hold that Germany's status as an immigration country has been acknowledged (Foroutan 2019).[8] Nevertheless, the persistent reckoning process with its self-perception as an immigration country (or lack thereof) and the fact that it has become a "de-facto multicultural" society (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 2) has resulted in an inconsistent, patchwork style policy field, as immigrant integration policies differ significantly at the state and federal levels (Schönwälder 2010).

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8   There is some scholarly debate (Foroutan 2019, El-Mafaalani 2018) whether there has been a palpable discursive shift or just some lack of clarity as to whether Germany's status has changed. One thing to note is former interior minister Horst Seehofer's 2018 contention that "migration is the mother of all problems" (Roßmann 2018), which seems to contradict the claim of a palpable shift in Germany's self-conception.

1.3 Structure and Line of Approach

This thesis is divided into three segments, comprised of several chapters. In *Segment I*, I present a discussion of the theoretical, empirical, and methodological premises of this research. In *Segment II*, I present the comparative-historical analysis of migration politics in Canada, France, and Germany. In *Segment III*, I discuss the results of the comparative analysis and present the final typology of the cases.

Segment I: Foundations
Chapter 2 begins with the conceptual and theoretical foundation of this thesis. Here, I present a comprehensive theoretical account and conceptualization of this thesis' core concepts, immigration, citizenship, and integration politics. Each concept will be presented in depth, starting with an overview of its theoretical development, resuming with a section its connection to the state and finalizing each section with my own conceptualization of the term in contrast to competing or complementing previous conceptualizations. In addition to the core concepts' conceptualizations for my purposes, I also present the immigration-citizenship-integration politics-nexus as the conceptual tool for the later analysis. Chapter 3 proceeds on the project's methodology. This chapter includes a discussion on comparison in political science, a closer look at CHA, its history, and methods, and lastly at the method of expert interviews, with an in-depth account of the reason for using expert interviews in this project as well as a description of the way they are used in the later analysis. Finally, I conclude the first segment with chapter 4 on the state of the art, offering descriptive comparative accounts on the three cases and summarizing previous works in comparative migration research. Lastly, I give an account of key works on CHA research done on the three cases, and on how I seek to complement, expand, or object to their findings.

Segment II: Analysis
Segment II contains this project's substantive comparative-historical analysis. With the concepts and methodological tools developed in segment I, I discern three major periods of change for each of the three country cases, which will each be discussed comparatively in one respective chapter. In chapter 5, I begin the analysis of the developments in the Canadian, French, and German migration politics nexus in the postwar years, ending in the early 1950s. In this period, all three countries decided to allow immigration, albeit with starkly different priorities regarding the selection of immigrants for permanent settlement. Canada maintained a focus on European-only immigration, France

nominally opened immigration to everyone, and Germany only provided a framework for the permanent settlement of co-ethnic immigrants. In chapter 6, the analysis of the migration politics nexus comprises different periods in the mid- to late 20th century. Canada underwent a fundamental shift in the period between 1967 and 1982, when it established the points system for immigrant recruitment and implemented a state policy of multiculturalism. In France, migration politics changed significantly in the period between 1981 and 1989, when the far-right *Front National* emerged as a major actor in migration politics and contributed to the emergence of a deep political cleavage on migration politics. In Germany, the period between 1989 and 2000 is decisive. After unification, Germany abandoned the prioritization of co-ethnic immigrants and started to politically grapple the fact of a settled permanent immigrant population that had grown out of the 'guest worker' movement in the 1950s and 60s. In chapter 7, developments in the migration politics nexus in the new millennium are analyzed. In Canada, Stephen Harper premierships between 2006 and 2015 were a meaningful period for migration politics. In France, the influence of interior minister and later President Nicolas Sarkozy between 2002 and 2012 were pertinent. This includes an analysis of the large-scale riots in 2005 and their impact on French migration politics. In Germany, the analysis focuses on the developments between 2006 and 2020, with special attention to the events of 2015, when an unprecedented number of humanitarian immigrants arrived in Germany.

Segment III: Results
In chapters 8 and 9 I turn to the results of the analyses. In chapter 8, I first summarize the insights gained from the *within-case across time comparative analysis* and the identification of critical junctures. I then move on to an *across-case comparative analysis* of the migration politics nexus, ending with the identification of common in

2. Understanding Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration: Theories and Conceptualizations of Core Concepts

As the conceptual and theoretical basis for this thesis, this chapter fulfills three aims: Firstly, I provide the reader with a general understanding of this thesis' core concepts and the histories of their emergence. Secondly, I discuss theories on how each concept is connected to state politics; and thirdly, I conceptualize each core concept for the purposes of this thesis with justification as to why these conceptualizations emerged in opposition to differing understandings. I then proceed articulate the nexus between the immigration, citizenship, and integration politics for its use in this thesis.

To fulfill these aims, I divide the chapter into four sections. Sections one to three are dedicated to the respective core concepts, immigration, citizenship, and integration politics, *migration politics* for short. Each contains an overview of paradigmatic theories in the field, as well as a conceptualization for the purposes of my thesis. In the final section, I develop my perspective on the interconnectedness of the fields, the nexus between the three concepts and how this can be applied in the later analysis of this thesis.[9]

2.1 On Immigration Politics

In its essence, migration is a form of human mobility, with the important distinction in how to conceive of mobilities *within* and *across* state territories. Citizenship and migration researcher Rainer Bauböck summarizes the concept of migration and the significance of borders aptly:

Migration is a form of human mobility that involves crossing territorial borders and taking up residence in another municipality, region, or country. In the contemporary world, most

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9   A note on terminology: The subchapters of this chapter make explicit reference to theories of immigration, citizenship, or integration *politics*. As already explained in the introduction of this thesis, this serves to clarify that the unit of analysis of my research are politics and states particularly, as opposed to individuals' migratory trajectories. However, migration theories more broadly obviously form the basis of any theories or conceptualizations of immigration politics, which is why they serve as the starting point for this chapter. For further clarification, please refer to the Introduction.

such geographic entities are organised as jurisdictions with precisely defined political borders. (Bauböck 2006b: 17)

The distinction between mobility within and across borders is pertinent.[10] Saliently, I focus on the state politics of cross-border mobility, so *migration politics*. In this thesis and from a political science perspective, migration entails the (more or less) permanent movement of people across fixed state borders, conceptually excluding internal mobility. In my view and those of many other migration researchers, the existence of officially recognized borders and the enforcement of border controls produce the challenges of immigration politics (Zolberg 1989: 405; Zolberg 2006: 222; Strazzari 2017: 61).

Research on migration is multidisciplinary, encompassing almost all humanities and social sciences to account for the complexity of migratory processes (Steiner 2009: 3). In this subchapter, I focus on theories stemming from political science and sociology, concentrating on several unifying features of the relevant theories on migration from these disciplines which help us understand migration as a larger social process and its connection to states. Political scientist and migration researcher Aristide Zolberg emphasizes the salience of borders for our understanding of international migration, pointing out that "migratory pressures do not automatically result in massive migrations, because border control usually intervenes as a determinative factor. Independently of other conditions it is state actions with respect to these borders that determine whether migration will take place at all" (Zolberg 1989: 405).

I begin with the concept of migration to provide an understanding of how theories on immigration politics connect to the wider realm of theories of migration. I then delve deeper into theories on immigration and the state, providing an account of different perspectives on this interconnection. Lastly, I elaborate on how I conceptualize immigration politics for the purposes of this thesis.

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10 As Rainer Bauböck stresses in this quote, one qualifier for human movement as migration is the crossing of territorial boundaries, meaning borders. This is important because some mobility researchers have tried to downplay the role of borders for the conceptualization of migration, stressing that any human mobility should be conceived of as migration, not necessarily so distinct that it warrants its own theoretical approach. I disagree – borders ought to be considered the distinguishing element that transforms mere mobility into migration. In his book Migration Borders Freedom Harald Bauder elaborates on this argument, forcefully pointing out that "the focus must remain on migration across international borders, because this type of migration is linked to exclusion, disenfranchisement, and the death of people. (…) [T]he very concept of the migrant is a construct of international bordering practices in the first place." (Bauder 2017).

2.1.1 An Overview of Migration Theory

Somewhat tautologically, the most unifying characteristic of migration theories is the lack of a unifying framework. Stephen Castles warns of an attempt to formulate an overarching theory of migration, because this would "almost inevitably degenerate into banality and abstraction" (Castles 2016: 36f.). Therefore, it is helpful to understand migration theories as emerging from different *paradigms* or schools of thought (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 1567) that we can discern from the evolvement of migration studies.

I present three important schools of thought, which have been paradigmatic in shaping our contemporary understanding of migration processes: Economic & functionalist theories, historical-structural theories, and transnational theories.[11] These paradigms all have different perspectives on *why* migration happens, and *how*, and *what* its impacts are on receiving countries.

The Economic-Functionalist Paradigm

With the onset of the systematic study of why migration happens and how, first theories emerged that continue to have a strong influence on migration research and sometimes even popular discourse. The first theories that attempted to explain migration within a *functionalist* framework emerged as early as 1885, when geographer Ernst Georg Ravenstein published his "laws of migration", which were later followed up by other geographers' work connecting migration theory with 'gravity' models inspired by Newton's law of gravity (Zolberg 1989: 403). Theorists studying migration therefore started off with a distinctly economic and functionalist lens, by focusing on the effects of immigration on labour markets in countries of arrival. This constitutes one of the central approaches of migration research, also within political science (Green 2011: 1149). The most popular theory, known even beyond of the academic study of migration, is the functionalist *push-pull theory*, the core tenet of which Fleras summarizes aptly:

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11 These paradigms were not discerned by me in the first place. A similar, more exhaustive account among these lines can be found in Castles et al. 2015. The main difference lies in the distinction that Castles et al. make: They separate two paradigms (functionalist and historical-structuralist) and do not view transnational theories as their own paradigm but rather a shift in perspective to the agency of immigrants. In my division, transnationalism features as its own paradigm, not only because it has often been described as such (i. a. Fleras 2015), but also because I consider this distinction helpful for the reader to gain an overview of migration theory.

[P]eople are *pushed* out from their homeland because of political oppression, ethnic conflicts, demographic pressure, environmental despoliation, and economic stagnation. They are also *pulled* into another country to take advantage of opportunities, freedom, security, and excitement. (Fleras 2015:4)

As Fleras' quote demonstrates, the idea that migrants are pushed out and drawn in by certain factors appears common-sensical (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 25). Their striking simplicity is precisely what makes different iterations of push-pull theory so popular that they are regularly used in political discourse to justify the introduction of different migration policies. However, push-pull theory has come under criticism precisely because it does not provide any answers beyond the simple question of why people move and (maybe) where. Criticism of push-pull theory is widespread, mainly focusing on its explanatory limitations (for instance, it is not able to explain why many countries see the simultaneous occurrence of immigration and emigration) and their determinism (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 29). Nevertheless, their popularity gave birth to the ideas that economic improvement in countries of origin would hamper migratory movements or that deterrence policies by countries of arrival would provide a means for diminishing the attraction of certain destinations. This demonstrates the implicit normative impetus of the push-pull theory of migration as something that ought to be prevented.[12] The strength of functional-economic theories lies in their perspective on broad-scale causal effects of migratory processes. This strength is undermined by an overly deterministic perception of migration, which has limited explanatory potential for the myriad of different complexities associated with them.

The Historical-Structural Paradigm

The 1970s and 80s saw the emergence of a paradigm that positioned itself in contradiction to the functionalist theories that preceded it. A shift occurred in

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12 Both of these ideas (which have very often been translated into policy) have been debunked in research: Research shows that emigration movement, particularly from the global south to the global north, increases once a country becomes more economically prosperous: "Middle-income countries tend to the most migratory and international migrants predominantly come from the relatively better-off sections of the origin populations" (Haas et al. 2019: 893). The poorest of the poor countries do not migrate at all or if they do, they tend to limit themselves to neighbouring countries (ibid.). Crawley and Hagen-Zanker (2019) have found that deterrence policies often do not have any effect on migrants' decisions on where to go – rather, the decision on where migrants go largely depends on pre-existing migrant networks or the overall economic environment of the region. In fact, Haas et al. point out that nine out of ten African immigrants move to Europe "within the law". They attribute the portrayal of out-of-control migration largely to "media images and political rhetoric that inflate the relative magnitude of unauthorized migration". (Haas et al. 2019: 907).

which theorists started to "interpret migration as one of the many manifesta-tions of capitalist penetration", a side effect of the global exploitation of the working class and a result of the "unequal terms of trade between developed and underdeveloped countries" (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 32). From this per-spective, migration is seen as the result of a "highly unequal access to re-sources", a cheap way for "mobilizing labour for capital, which primarily serves to boost profits and deprives origin areas of valuable labour and skill" (ibid.).[13]

The historical-structural paradigm focuses on historically grown structural inequalities and sees them as the main driver for migration processes (Zolberg 1989: 406). In this view, migrants are powerless victims of a global system of economic exploitation, best illustrated by the slave trade or other forms of in-dentured labour that happened during colonization, finding its more contem-porary models in the guest worker systems of Western Europe or the Kafala systems in the Middle East. The strength of the historical-structural perspective lies in its contribution of an important structural explanation to theories of mi-gratory processes. However, in their overemphasis on economic exploitation, theorists from this paradigm sometimes lack acknowledgment of migrants' agency and tend to ignore migration success stories. As Castles et al. aptly summarize: "It would be as unrealistic to depict all migrants as passive victims of capitalism as it would be to depict them as entirely rational and free actors who constantly make cost-benefit calculations" (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 36).

The Transnational Paradigm
With its roots in anthropology, theories within the transnational paradigm are characterized by an interest in "how people [who have migrated, F. A.] stay connected and often form a cohesive community across state borders" (Hon-dagneu-Sotelo 2003: 27). Broadly speaking, transnational perspectives on mi-gration started at the micro-level with a focus on migrants, their trajectories, and their agency within the processes of global migration. More recently, the contributions of the transnational paradigm have influenced theories of migra-tion in sociology and political science, expanding beyond the micro-level to theories that try to explain migratory processes beyond borders and nation-states. Pertinently, transnational theories provide an important segue to theo-ries about migrants (rather than migration), shifting the focus away from struc-tural components towards the agency of individuals or groups in shaping mi-gratory movements. One of the most prominent researchers within this field is

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13 Two of the biggest theoretical approaches within this paradigm are dependency theory and world systems theory.

Nina Glick Schiller, who argues for a "global perspective" on migration and the role of migrants as political actors in their own rights in global migratory processes:

A global perspective on migration (…) highlights the varied roles that transmigrants have been playing in the relationship to the neo-liberal restructuring and rescaling of localities. Migrants can be 'scale makers' who reshape places as they integrate them within transnational social fields of familial, commercial, religious, political, and organisational relationships. (Glick Schiller 2010: 126)

Along with this core argument of transnational theories comes a broader epistemological critique of previous migration research by this paradigm. Glick Schiller, among others (i. a. Fleras 2015) argue that migration research tends to focus too narrowly on receiving countries and nation-states as units of analysis, problematizing migration to the point where research contains a "sedentary bias" (Fleras 2015, viii) and is heavily influenced by "methodological nationalism" (Glick Schiller 2010: 129; also: Gutiérrez/Hondagneu-Sotelo 2008: 504).

The strength of theories within the transnational paradigm lies in their focus on migrants as political actors and the impact they might have on migratory processes, a perspective that is largely absent form both economic-functional and the historical-structural paradigms. However, this paradigm's weakness lies in its overemphasis of migrants' agency, at times running the risk of throwing away the baby with the bath water in their insistence on the irrelevance or outdatedness of states for migratory processes. It is true that states' or economic perspectives should not dominate in migration research, but it might be a normative overcorrection to discard state-focused research altogether by branding it as anachronistic and 'nationalist'. As Castles et al. stress: "An examination of historical and contemporary migrations shows that sending and receiving states continue to play a major role in in initiating and shaping movements." (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 51). This interconnection of migration and the state will be the focus of the next subchapter.

2.1.2 Theories on Immigration and the State

The territorial state (…) has a basic and distinctive interest in being able to control the flow of persons across its borders – in being able to compel, induce, discourage, or forbid the entry or exit of particular categories of persons. (Brubaker 2009: 25)

For much of human history "the obstacles to individual movement were (…) *social* and *logistic*, rather than legal" (Boucher/Gest 2018: 1). In a major reversal of this long-held tendency, the obstacles have become predominantly legal since the middle of the 19th century in the wake of increased nation-building. States remain the main entities that guide migration movement: They increase immigration controls to curb immigration altogether or encourage what they conceive of as the right kind of migration while keeping out those they deem to be undesirable (Zolberg 1989: 405).

As Rainer Bauböck explains, state borders hold two separate and distinct political functions: "the demarcation of territorial jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the political control of flows, on the other hand." (Bauböck 2011: 346). The construction of states saw the construction of borders which therefore led to the emergence of immigration as a political process (Wimmer 2008: 69). Immigration as a political phenomenon is therefore closely tied to the emergence of nation-states and the concomitant quest to systematically control population movement across borders. In fact, researchers argue that we cannot understand the emergence of migration politics in states without looking at the necessity for states to defend themselves in wars – the control of immigration and emigration were necessary for the recruitment of soldiers (Zolberg 2006: 222).

Initially, the regulation of population movement by nation-states mainly focused on controlling emigration. However, this shifted at the end of the 19th century. While emigration and the state, so the politics of controlling citizens leaving the country and those who have left, is an enduringly important topic, this subchapter focuses on theories of immigration and the state, that is the control of foreigners entering the country to settle (more or less) permanently, excluding emigration for the purposes of this thesis.

The interplay between immigration and the state has been the subject of much debate, mostly in historical sociology and political science. Despite their strong roots in political science, most researchers working on theories on immigration and the state, like the broader field of migration theory, still consider it an emergent field with an overall lack of coherent theoretical framework (Freeman 1994; Freeman 2005: 111; Ellermann 2021: 4). The reason for this lack of coherence might lie in the dispersion of immigration theory among different subsections of political science. Here I agree with Ellermann's contention that immigration itself should be considered and "intermestic" policy field, which means that it sits "at the intersection of domestic politics and international relations". Aptly put, "immigration policy made in one country often has far-reaching social and economic implications for others" (Ellermann 2021: 59). However, zooming in on the domestic dimension of immigration politics,

theories often try to approach two questions: Firstly, how immigration impacts the state and secondly, how state impacts immigration. This division guides this subchapter.

Immigration's Impact on the State

Immigration affects border control and therefore state sovereignty. Sovereignty remains a central component of statehood in the Weberian sense. Immigration might challenge or undermine state sovereignty in several ways, such as "the inability of states to control the flow of illegal immigrants across their borders" and "the capacity of states to rule migrations through regional agreements and international rules" (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 1568; see also: Halfmann 2005: 129f.). An example of this challenge can be found in the 2015 events in Germany, when an unprecedented number of asylum seekers arrived in Germany.

Yasemin Soysal, who contributed seminal work with her 1994 book on "Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe" argues that immigration decouples states from "the locus of legitimacy, which has shifted to the global level (…). [N]ation-states remain the primary agent of public functions, but the nature and the parameters of these functions are increasingly determined at the global level" (Soysal 1994: 144). However, another way to view the impact of immigration on state sovereignty may be that it is reinforced through the strengthening of border controls. To date, states continue to be the major entity for managing immigration, which counters Soysal's central contention of rising postnationalism. Nevertheless, it is true that immigration leads states to reflect on and reconfigure the structures that guide immigration.

The politicization of immigration has impacted many polities since at least the 1990s (Ellermann 2021: 53). Immigration and interrelated topics such as citizenship, integration, and national identity, have emerged as a new "political cleavage", following Lipset and Rokkan's classic political cleavages (Lipset/Rokkan 1976), as the "electoral impact" of immigration politics increased throughout the latter half of the 20th century (Cornelius/Hollifield/Martin 1993: 6).

Lastly, the permanent settlement of immigrants affects states' notions of belonging, taking form in the way immigrants can become members of society through naturalization, and different variations of immigrant integration. These aspects will be discussed further below in the subchapters of citizenship and immigration.

The State's Impact on Immigration

Due to immigration's challenge to state sovereignty, immigration policies are primarily implemented for "the control of entry to a state's territory" (Green 2011: 1146). However, this systematic control of entry and stay varies widely between polities. This includes principles for the selection of immigrants for short or long-term residency, as well as the statuses immigrants hold after immigration.

The "liberal paradox" (Hollifield 1992) points to the distinction between states' impact on immigration by virtue of their regime type. Liberal democracies are constrained in their efforts to curb and control immigration movements due to several factors. For one, liberal democracies' commitment to human rights inhibits their ability to prevent certain kinds of migration, such as that of dependents or of asylum seekers (Green 2011: 1148). Within liberal democratic regimes, immigrants cannot be deprived of certain democratic rights, even if they do not have a regular membership status in the immigrant country (Hollifield 2008: 222; Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 1568; Hollifield/ Martin/Orrenius 2014: 3; Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 53).[14] By virtue of their regime type, autocracies can influence immigration control (and exploit immigrants) more rigorously than liberal democratic regimes.

In their 1994 book "Controlling Immigration", researchers Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield propose two interrelated hypotheses to explain states' immigration politics on the basis of their comparative study of immigration policies: The convergence hypothesis and the gap hypothesis (1994: 3). The convergence hypothesis holds that the latter half of the 20th century has seen the increasing convergence of immigration policy, particularly in liberal democracies of the Global North. This trend to convergence shows that, generally, migration policies are mostly similar in most democratic and industrial states (Dauvergne 2016: 2; Hollifield/Martin/Orrenius 2014: 3). After the collapse of 'whites-only' immigration legislation and ethnically exclusionary policies following the end of World War II, all major immigration states in the Global North roughly follow the same liberalizing policy paths with regards to immigration, supported by their commitment to human rights and other supranational structures, like EU legislation (Boucher/Gest 2018: 154). Global human rights norms are often cited as the reason for this convergence development, which is connected to similar theorists as those who argue that nation-state politics have less relevance than they used to (e. g. Soysal 1994, see also: Meyers 2002, Dauvergne 2016, Ellermann 2021). While the convergence

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14 This is a broad and normative generalization which does not always hold, considering the brutal treatment of Mexican immigrants at the U. S. border or immigrants' treatment at EU borders.

hypothesis succeeds in superseding the confines of specific state specificities, it also runs into several counterarguments, most importantly: How can we understand country-specific idiosyncrasies in immigration policy?

The gap hypothesis holds that there is a gap between the intent of the policies that state implement to control immigration and actual policy outcomes (Cornelius/Hollifield/Martin 1994: 3; Hollifield/Martin/Orrenius 2014: 3). Haas et al. add to this hypothesis by providing a helpful distinction between the effects of immigration policies and their effectiveness. Effects can be different from effectiveness, because the actual outcome of immigration policies, their effects, may differ significantly from the intended "policy objectives", so their effectiveness (Haas et al. 2019: 901f.).

Ideational or narrative approaches to explaining the state's impact on immigration tend to focus on the historically grown emergence of immigration control paradigms in different countries (paradigmatically: Brubaker 1990, with his distinction between ethnic and civic states; also: Favell 2001 with his account on 'philosophies of integration'). Within the specific resultant policy framework, we are able "to trace over time the evolution of politics and policies (…). [It] imposes a language, epistemology and theoretical scheme on the on-going treatment and debate of policy problems" (Favell 2001: 26). These theories can explain why, for example, Germany was historically restrictive in offering membership status to all immigrants except those who arrived through the co-ethnic migration policy of resettlers (*Aussiedler* and *Spätaussiedler)*. Another example is immigration policy in Israel, which primarily serves nation-state building purposes by facilitating the immigration of Jews through the Israeli birthright policy (Bauböck 2006b: 18).[15] As Ellermann summarizes aptly: "immigration narratives shape the politics of immigration through their power of framing national identity in its relationship to immigration" (Ellermann 2021: 25). Theories that emphasize the importance of historically grown narratives in explaining immigration politics frameworks are criticized on two grounds: their deterministic tendency, meaning that proponents might overestimate the historical narrative of the respective countries[16], as well as an

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15   Rainer Bauböck is understandably puzzled by the persistence of co-ethnic immigration policies in many states. He refers to this policy development as a "normative puzzle", considering that those who make use of those co-ethnic immigration policies often do not even fulfill the most basic integration demands such as language ability. Bauböck claims that this particular type of immigration policy ought to be studied in combination with research on nationalism and nation-building, which I agree with. (Bauböck 2006b: 18; Bauböck 2017).

16   Prominently here is Brubaker's 1990 study on Germany and France, whose central contention on the dichotomy these countries represent would have been entirely unable to explain Germany's dramatic policy shift in the early 2000s towards a more liberal and inclusive policy framework for immigration, citizenship, and integration.

overemphasis on historical differences between countries which may lead to 'exceptionalizing' their status and make us unable to recognize emerging commonalities and convergence.

2.2.3 Conceptualizing Immigration Politics

This subchapter has given an overview of prominent migration theories and research that seek to understand the connection between immigration and the state. Several theoretical paradigms have emerged to explain immigration, such as the functionalist paradigm, the historical-structural paradigm, and the transnational paradigm.

In this thesis, I focus on the connection between the state and immigration, which I call immigration politics. I conceptualize immigration politics as *the totality of political decisions concerning immigration which result from the emergence of paradigms, significant policy shifts (or the lack thereof despite an impetus to change), and socio-political events (like recessions, protests, political campaigns, major refugee numbers etc.)* that have a significant bearing on immigration processes in the respective country cases during the periods under study. The development of immigration politics paradigms includes state measures that are developed in reaction to immigration, to manage, increase, or stop migration altogether and the internal logics that guide states' ideas in that respect. Significant political shifts include changes and amendments made to existent policies as well as the introduction of entirely new legislation, the introduction or abolishment of state institutions dealing with immigration.

The analysis of the interconnection between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics is the salient contribution of this thesis. The way in which this interconnection is conceptualized is therefore central to the analysis. Changes in immigration politics can have a significant bearing on citizenship and integration politics. Depending on the political decision-making of who to let in and who to keep away from permanent settlement, measures on citizenship acquisition and integration adjust, sometimes in the long-term. This will be further discussed in chapter section 2.4.

2.2 On Citizenship Politics

[T]here is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, [yet] none more variable in history or contested in theory. (Shklar 1991)

Citizenship has the longest history of academic study of the three core concepts discussed in this chapter and it has 'travelled' extensively within the social sciences. In its most basic understanding, citizenship is a form of membership status in a political community. This basic definition does not tell what this membership entails, who gets to attain membership, which rights and duties the membership comes along with, and what exactly constitutes a 'political community' (Joppke 2013: 1). Researchers studying citizenship often start their work by underlining the inherent complexity, malleability, and contestability of citizenship, making clear how "slippery" and "polysemic" the concept really is before daring to make any substantial claims about it (Lister 1997a: 28f.; Kivisto/Faist 2007: 2). As the quote by Judith Shklar above demonstrates, the study of citizenship leads to a high degree of discordance regarding its meaning among researchers, ranging from citizenship as an emancipatory tool and inclusion to citizenship as the ultimate tool for disenfranchisement and exclusion.[17]

Two caveats shape the structure of this subchapter: First, I acknowledge the long and complex history of citizenship as a concept in the social sciences and beyond. Like theories of migration, this makes the attempt to present an exhaustive account of all citizenship theories futile. I therefore focus on the salient aspects of the theoretical discussions of citizenship and migration. This leads me to my second caveat. Unlike migration, which can be studied independent from states, the study of citizenship in political science is inherently connected to states (Brubaker 2009: 75). Hence, I distinguish between theories on citizenship and theories on citizenship, immigration, and the state, as theories on citizenship are automatically theories on citizenship and the state. The second qualification allows me to zoom in closer on this specific interaction.

I start this subchapter by giving a short overview of the historical development (*Ideengeschichte*) of the citizenship concept. This will also include a discussion of the different dimensions of citizenship as they have been outlined by previous researchers. In the second section, I discuss the theoretical interconnection/s between citizenship and immigration. Finally, I conceptualize citizenship politics for the purpose of this thesis.

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17 For paradigmatic discussions on this, see Miller 2000 and Shachar 2009.

2.2.1 An Overview of Citizenship Theory

Citizenship's Conceptual Origins and Theoretical Trajectory
The idea of citizenship as a form of membership status goes back to old Athenian society. A citizen was first defined by Aristotle as "one who both rules and is ruled", pointing to citizenship's early association with conceptions of democracy and democratic theory (Joppke 2013: 6). This status was not equal or democratic in the modern sense. Rather, this "highly exclusive" position was restricted to men who were heads of households, disenfranchising most of society (ibid.)

Throughout the centuries following the Athenian "birthplace" (ibid.) of citizenship, feudal statuses took over and the citizenry took on very varied forms. Karl Marx dismissed citizenship as a "passive instrument of class rule" (Joppke 2013: 9). It was only with increasing democratization of societies and the establishment of formal statehood throughout the 19th and 20th century that citizenship came back in its form of a rights- and membership-based notion within a nation-state, initially perceived as independent from questions of democratic inclusion or migration (Halfmann 2005: 134). Consequently, citizenship was largely synonymous with nationality, a formal legal status.

Social scientists associate the (re)naissance of the scientific discussion on citizenship to English sociologist T. H. Marshall's essays on citizenship from 1950. In his seminal essay, called "Citizenship and Social Class", Marshall positions citizenship as a "federative concept" in political science, claiming citizenship as a possible equalizer for overcoming inequalities in English society (Marshall 1950; Déloye 2011: 238). Marshall's contribution added an important differentiation to the many functions of citizenship.[18] According to Marshall, citizenship is the antidote to social class struggles:

Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievements can be measured and towards which aspirations can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed. Social class, on the other hand, is a system of inequality. And it too, like citizenship, can be based on a set of ideals, beliefs, and values.

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18 The normative dimension of citizenship was also indirectly formulated in Hannah Arendt's *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1950) and her swift credo that one should always have "the right to have rights" (*Das Recht, Rechte zu haben*).

It is therefore reasonable to expect that the impact of citizenship on social class should take the form of a conflict between opposing principles. (Marshall [1950] 1994: 175)

As this quote demonstrates, citizenship can counteract mechanisms of inequality because it bestows equal rights on citizens that give them the ability to rights-based emancipation from inequality. By linking citizenship to rights and participation, Marshall implicitly connects citizenship to democratic forms of statehood. In his essay, Marshall continues to distinguish between three "elements" of citizenship, the civil, the political and the social (Marshall [1950] 1994: 173), each consisting of a plethora of democratic rights (and duties) bestowed through citizenship. Herein lies the main contribution of Marshall's discussion of citizenship – its inherent connection to liberal democracy. Marshall's shortcomings have been discussed at length, particularly in light of his myopic outlook that perceives society consisting mainly of white heterosexual men, excluding the discussion on the rights of women and racialized people (Déloye 2011: 241). One of the most important insights from critics that challenge his contribution is the fact that he "failed to acknowledge the link between the increasing internal inclusiveness of citizenship and the reinforcement of the nation's borders" (Winter 2011: 37). Elke Winter stresses that Marshall's assessment needs to be complimented by such an analysis because "the extension of modern citizenship develops in close relationship with the external closure of the political community along ethnic and national lines" (ibid.). In short, Marshall's discussion of citizenship did not extend to the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens.

Marshall's theoretical shortcomings were followed up by new theoretical contributions to the field of citizenship studies that examined this tension more extensively: The first theoretical examinations of citizenship as a membership status connected to migration emerged in the 1990s with Rogers Brubaker's study of citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Rogers Brubaker's central claim centers states' trajectories of conceptions of nationhood and self-understanding that understood historically and through path-dependency, determine states' current citizenship and migration politics. A second important contribution of Rogers Brubaker's analysis is his perspective on citizenship as a dialectic instrument of inclusion and exclusion in nation-states (Brubaker 1990). From this perspective, theorists began to argue that citizenship is "a lot like the feudal status in the medieval world" (Carens 1992: 26), and that this understanding of citizenship policy as membership policy mean that it is essentially a "instrument of social closure" (Brubaker 2009: 23). Citizenship's inherent inclusion–exclusion dynamic will be considered in more length in the later part of this chapter. Before, the following section explains

citizenship's different dimensions as they have been outlined by researchers more recently, evolving from Marshall.

Dimensions of Citizenship

Current discussions of citizenship often build on the differentiation of citizenship's elements first introduced by T. H. Marshall by distinguishing between different *dimensions* of citizenship to facilitate a more exact discussion of its different iterations, which are those of "legal status, rights, (political) participation, and a sense of belonging" (Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008: 155–56). There are other dimensions outlined by other researchers, but they often overlap with the distinction offered by Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul:

The *legal-status dimension* most clearly overlaps with the status of nationality. While legal status is the most clear-cut dimension, it is also a salient addition by these researchers. By adding the dimension of legal status, researchers make explicit that citizenship is often not a given and has historically held disenfranchising potential for many discriminated and marginalized members of society.[19] For instance, for a long time women were excluded from full citizenship, i. e. from its political dimension (prohibited from participating in elections) but also implicitly from the legal status. Until the 1950s, many states took citizenship away from women who married a national of a different country. Additionally, many members of society might be long-term residents but do not hold official citizenship status. Conversely, some of these residents might still hold several rights to welfare state provisions or certain aspects of political participation, so aspects of social citizenship, without holding an official membership status. This in-between status has been called *'denizenship'* by migration researcher Tomas Hammar (1990).

The *rights-dimension* of citizenship opens the floor to a lot of discussions. In the German Basic Law, for instance, there is a distinction between so-called *Jedermannsrechte* ('every man's rights'), which are rights that apply to any person that is physically on the territory of the German state (these include freedom of speech for instance), but there are also a number of rights that only apply to German citizens (including the right to association for instance). This shows the great variability within this dimension depending on the political order.[20]

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19 Being a national but not a citizen/ women's citizenship, enslaved people, people with disabilities etc.

20 Rainer Bauböck calls the variability within this element "patterns of partial inclusion". He calls the tendency of European countries to allow municipal voting rights for EU-foreigners a sort of "residential citizenship disconnected from nation-state membership". He also adds several examples to demonstrate the variability: "In the US, an alien franchise was very

The *political participation-dimension* of citizenship is first and foremost connected to the possibility of voting in elections and running for elections. Both are not possible for non-citizens in most societies. However, there are certain caveats. In Germany and other European countries, EU-citizens can vote at the municipal level after a certain period of residence for instance. Conversely, some members of society who may hold the legal status of citizen may not be allowed to vote or run for elections. In most states, this includes people under the age of 18, some people with disabilities, or criminal convicts (Kymlicka/Donaldson 2017).

The *belonging-dimension* of citizenship is the most elusive but also in many respects the most salient aspect of the four. Other researchers have called this the 'identity dimension' of citizenship (Déloye 2011: 240). Bloemraad, Kortweg and Yurdakul summarize the complexity of this dimension:

> [This dimension] spans literatures ranging from philosophies of republican citizenship and communitarianism to the study of nation-building. Notions of belonging inherently have exclusionary tendencies; some must fall outside the community in order for a 'we' to exist (…). Such exclusions are often justified by the need for social cohesion, leading to the question of what sort of social cohesion is required for contemporary societies. (Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008: 156)

Feelings of belonging and identity are hard to measure, and it is evidently possible for someone to feel like they belong even though they might not hold political rights or official legal status in a country, or, conversely, for someone to hold all political rights and legal status without feeling like they belong. It is also possible for someone who is a citizen to feel like they belong, but they are not perceived to belong by other citizens. The subjectivity of this dimension makes it hard for social scientists to pin down and operationalize. In this work, I consider the content of this dimension twofold: For one, the analysis of the conditions for accessing legal membership is one way to evaluate the implicit messages of belonging inherent to nation-state citizenship. Secondly, this dimension is related to the concept of integration and the types of implicit messages of belonging or non-belonging that have been sent to non-citizens who may or may not hold legal citizenship status in the future. A deeper discussion of this dimension will feature in the subchapter on the politics of integration.

The discussion of the different dimensions of citizenship lay bare the numerous intricacies of inclusion and exclusion that are at the core of citizenship

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widespread at the state level until World War I. Today, non-citizens cannot vote in the US, in Canada, and Australian, but they do enjoy active voting rights even in national elections in New Zealand. Several Latin American countries also do not require national citizenship for the vote." (Bauböck 2006b: 24).

as a political membership concept (see also: Alm 2018). This tension will be discussed in the next section on dynamics of inclusion and exclusion.

The 'Dialectics' of Citizenship: Tensions between Inclusion and Exclusion

The greater or lesser ability of certain groups to act as citizens and the degree to which they enjoy both formal and substantive rights as citizens depends on where they stand on a continuum of inclusion and exclusion which, at the extremes, represent the two sides of citizenship's coin. (Lister 1997a: 36)

Ruth Lister's quote stems from feminist research on citizenship, which contributed to the analysis of the exclusion of women from the citizenry and to the activism that was waged to access fully-fledged political agency as citizens in society (Lister 1997b: 7). The feminist movement, like the U.S. Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, movements for the rights of people with disabilities, queer rights, etc., demonstrate the dynamic of the exclusionary potential citizenship holds "from within" (ibid.). This can be distinguished from the exclusionary potential citizenship holds towards those "who are excluded from without" (ibid.). Much of the theoretical literature that follows this distinction then sets out to assess how inclusion and exclusion are in tension with one another or how they are justified (Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008: 155). For liberal democracies, Peter Kivisto and Thomas Faist (2007: 15) stress that the former dynamic tends to be a discussion of the past, whereas the latter, the question of inclusion of people "from without" is what preoccupies theorists currently, since "barriers to citizenship predicated on class, race, and gender have been progressively dismantled" (ibid.: 47). This is a somewhat optimistic assumption, since the question of inclusion from within is not resolved in many societies (Bauböck 2006a, 2006b: 16; Ní Mhurchú 2014: 35; Kymlicka/Donaldson 2017: 2). Countering exclusion from within the state is far from being 'solved' or outdated. It still constitutes a considerable aspect of several social fights, which will be expanded upon in the next section.

The inclusion-exclusion dynamic from within and without the state becomes even more difficult to disentangle in matters of immigration. For our purposes, it is necessary to consider both parts of the dynamic from the approach that states choose to grant inclusion from within and without to immigrants. Roughly speaking, inclusion-exclusion from without is a matter of immigration politics, whereas inclusion-exclusion from within is a matter of

integration politics, although both dimensions can interact at specific points in time.[21]

2.2.2 Theories on Citizenship and the State

As the overview on the conceptual history of citizenship has shown, citizenship policy largely developed independent from immigration policy. Citizenship only entered the realm of migration politics once it became a necessary "tool" to distinguish amongst nationals and non-nationals (Boucher/Gest 2018: 57). The process of making use of citizenship for immigration politics is highly relevant for political science researchers and theorists and, as I will show later-on in the section on the interconnectedness of the three concepts discussed, it is highly case-contingent. In this subchapter, I focus on the way that citizenship has been discussed theoretically in relation to firstly the state and secondly to processes of immigration. I begin the chapter by explaining the difference between citizenship, nationality, and demos and discuss different ways to attain citizenship today. The latter will allow us to zoom in closer on theories on the interconnection between citizenship, the state, and immigration.

Distinguishing between Citizenship, Nationality, and the Demos
Citizenship and nationality are often used interchangeably, particularly when it comes to international law (Bauböck 2006b: 17). However, if we consider citizenship's different dimensions, this synonymity is inaccurate. People may consider themselves to be a national of a nation without its own state, like the Québécois in Canada, who view themselves as a nation but are part of a multinational state, or the Kurds who have autonomous territories in several states, but no own independent state.[22] Moreover, the normative democratic connotation of citizenship rights leads Bauböck to conclude that these

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21 Long-term residency does not automatically lead to full membership for all immigrant groups, in fact, some states have actively tried to counteract this mechanism for those they deem undesirable members. Brubaker (2009) formulates this tension aptly in his essay on "Citizenship as Social Closure": [F]ormal closure against legal noncitizens may overlap in practice with informal closure against ethnocultural nonnationals" (Brubaker 2009: 30).

22 Newer contributions to citizenship research also link the emergence of state-citizenship to colonialism. In this view, the modern conception of state-centered citizenship was a necessary tool for "stratify[ing] the movement and rights of people across empires". Both in colonial and settler-colonial states, citizenship was often used to distinguish between citizens and colonial 'subjects', as was the case of the Muslim Algerian population in French Algeria. Researchers Boucher and Gest point out that "against the view that borders are a product of the nation-state – as a political project separate from or counter to European colonialism- borders and immigration law are better understood as formed by and central to the function of colonial and imperial projects"(Mayblin and Turner 2021, 71).

conceptualizations of citizenship "do not easily apply to regimes that lack appropriate institutions of popular government and can be characterized as non-self-governing. In other words, authoritarian states rule over their nationals, but these nationals can be called citizen only in a very limited sense" (ibid.).

This "narrower" (ibid.) version of citizenship is also explained by Heike Hagedorn, who references the German distinction between *Staatsbürgerschaft* and *Staatsangehörigkeit*. She explains that one is fully capable of being a national *(Staatsangehöriger)* without being a citizen (*Staatsbürgerin*): This applies, for instance, to people below the age of 18, some people with disabilities, or sometimes also criminal convicts which hold nationality, but they do not have access to all the rights that are promised by full citizenship, particularly that of political participation. As Hagedorn points out, this was the case for women in Germany and France, where women were not full citizens in the rights-based definition of the term until 1919 and 1946 respectively (Hagedorn 2001, 24). In the next section, I will show the different legal principles that states follow to give people the ability to attain state-citizenship.

Ius Soli, Ius Sanguinis, and Ius Domicili

Ius soli, ius sanguinis, and *ius domicili* refer to legal principles of citizenship attainment within a state, which in turn "refers to the mechanism based on which individuals acquire formal citizenship and become formal members of the polity" (Bauder 2017: 77). There are five ways or "principles" that determine how a person can attain formal state citizenship: "(a) by blood or genealogy; (b) by soil or territory; (c) by ideology; (d) by colonialism, or (e) by residency" (Fleras 2015: 389; Bauder 2017: 77). Three of those are particularly relevant today and have a long history in citizenship and nationality law: *Ius sanguinis* (attainment by genealogy), *ius soli* (attainment for being born on the territory of a state), and *ius domicili* (attainment by duration of residence*).

Ius soli and *ius sanguinis* are the oldest two principles and were often viewed as dichotomous in the literature: Settler states like the United States and Canada afford citizenship by being born in the territory, as opposed to states with strong ethno-national self-understandings, such as Germany or Denmark, which tend to mainly afford citizenship by genealogy. However, this dichotomy does not hold today. While a preference for one of the two principles prevails in many countries, most states grant citizenship by a combination of the three principles cited above (Kraler 2006: 44; Boucher/Gest 2018: 123; Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 290). *Ius soli* is often considered as the more progressive principle than *ius sanguinis*, because it does not exclude based on genealogy like *ius sanguinis* does. The latter principle is associated with ethno-national conceptions of belonging and nationhood, which are highly selective

and exclusive in who gets to attain membership in the political community. However, the historical origins of *ius sanguinis* show that it was once perceived as the more progressive principle, because it detached people's citizenship from a feudal conception of belonging to the territory of the nobility (Kraler 2006: 45).[23] Albert Kraler convincingly shows that using *ius sanguinis* as an indicator of ethnic conceptions of nationhood is therefore reductive (ibid.).

Ius domicili is the only principle that does not apply upon birth, but upon the completion of a period of residence. It is therefore the only principle that allows people to choose citizenship through a process commonly referred to as *naturalization*, which is "a rite of passage that lawfully transforms foreigners into full citizens" (Winter 2018: 231). Temporal requirements for residence vary widely across countries and are subject to dynamic changes across time (Kraler 2006: 46). There is general agreement that the shorter the temporal period required, the more liberal the access to naturalization by the country. In many countries, the period required to undergo naturalization can be reduced by monetary investments or by other factors, such as immigrant status upon arrival or previous colonial ties to the sending country.[24]

Ius domicili is of relevance to immigrants of the first generation, while *ius soli* and *sanguinis* are more relevant to their children of the second and third generation. According to Bauder, we can perceive of the combination of the principles in country-specific practices as "strategic objectives to include or exclude population groups" (Bauder 2008: 320). In other words, the way that these principles are applied in different country cases and how they have changed over time can act as one indicator about the country cases' mode of inclusion and exclusion for immigrants or otherwise marginalized groups (with the caveats described above).[25] In the following section, I will expand on the way that citizenship in the state has an impact on immigration and vice versa.

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23 Kraler explains the progressive origins of ius sanguinis thusly: "The multinational Habsburg Empire (…) adopted ius sanguinis as early as 1811. At that time, it was considered 'modern' and a break with the feudal ius soli tradition that made a subject of anyone born within the overlord's dominion. Ius sanguinis was retained as the guiding principle of citizenship legislation in virtually all successor states after the break-up of the empire (…). It is not difficult to see, then that the application of a formal principle alone is a rather weak indicator of an 'ethnic' conception of nationhood". (Kraler 2006: 52).

24 Another principle which has gained importance in recent years is ius scholae, the practice of reducing or expunging ius domicili requirements on the basis that the person was educated in the country or received education in the receiving country's system. Iterations of this can be found in France, where there is a reduction in ius domicili if someone was educated in the French system, even abroad.

25 Just as there are principles to attain citizenship, there are also different ways to lose citizenship, through "voluntary renunciation, automatic expiration or involuntary withdrawal"

Citizenship, the State, and Immigration

Citizenship, or its lack, is often felt most sharply by those who move across borders, as individuals and families run a gauntlet of passports, visas, technological scans, and officials tasked with enforcing borders. Crossing borders and staying on the other side also raises questions about migrants' relations to the state where they reside and the states they left, and even to the states where their parents or grandparents were born, or their spouse holds nationality. (Shachar et al. 2017: 3)

The interplay of citizenship, the state, and immigration can be divided into two questions that roughly mirror the ones outlined in subchapter 2.1 on immigration: How does immigration impact state-citizenship? How does state-citizenship impact immigration, and more specifically, immigrants?

Generally, processes of immigration expand the role of state-citizenship and naturalization policy, citizenship regimes as I will call them as a shorthand and give them the role of an entry point to membership and permanent settlement in the country of arrival. Therefore, immigration's main effect on citizenship regimes is citizenship's role in the settlement process for immigrants after their entry. Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos identifies citizenship regimes as the central arena for the "migration–membership" dilemma, that a lot of states face. While labour immigrants in are desired for augmenting the work force, sooner or later the question of their membership in the political community will arise (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 1). Bauböck refers to state-citizenship regimes as a "control device" in that it affects non-nationals and nationals on their arrival in the country, and as a "sorting device" for immigrants or a "second gate" that they have to pass through after their immigration (Bauböck 2006b: 18).

Immigration can also impact state-citizenship in how a state may design their naturalization rules in response to increasing or decreasing immigration. These mechanisms, however, are highly variegated and case-contingent. Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil propose three hypotheses that connect changes in citizenship policy to country-specific migration histories (Hansen/Weil 2001, Kraler 2006: 51f.). They claim that countries tend to tighten their citizenship regulations in times of heightened migration, liberalizing them again when the immigrant population has undergone a sustained period of settlement. The politicization of migration issues also has effects the tightening of naturalization rules (ibid.). Rogers Brubaker's seminal contribution on the dichotomy of ethno-national and civic-republican citizenship seems to confirm the first

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(Bauböck 2006b, 21). While these are not central to this thesis' analysis, they are being studied extensively. For a succinct overview of these processes, refer to Fargues et al. 2020.

part of their claim, considering that Germany stood steadfast in its conviction of maintaining its 'no-immigration-country' narrative until the 2000s. There is another development which confirms Hansen and Weil's hypotheses: Since the 1950s, the central idea that one person ought to only hold one nationality has been upended by a proliferation of more liberal citizenship regulations that allow people to hold dual or multiple citizenships. The previous belief was fueled by the idea that allowing multiple citizenships would undermine state sovereignty and an individual's solidarity to their nation-state in case of war. Today, it is considered a progressive sign if a country allows dual or multiple citizenships, and it is often causally linked to a substantial immigrant community (Kivisto/Faist 2007: 103). As Peter Kivisto and Thomas Faist explain, "dual citizenship does not challenge the nation-state per se, but rather calls into question any one state's right to claim a monopoly on the membership of its citizenry" (ibid.).

One final way in which immigration can impact citizenship regimes is in the diversification or "civic stratification" of immigrants after their arrival (Kraler 2006: 38). To maintain an exclusive conception of citizenship, many countries will introduce 'in-between' statuses for immigrants to afford them part of the rights that citizenship includes, except for political participation. These statuses have been called "denizenship" in Thomas Hammar's seminal contribution to the field (1990), where he claims that Turkish immigrants in Germany possess everything akin to citizenship except the formal juridical and political participation dimension. Adding to this, in her seminal work on the "Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe" (1994), Yasemin Soysal claims that immigration in the post-World War II era has led to a "reconfiguration of citizenship from a more particularistic [conception] based on nationhood to a more universalistic [conception] based on personhood" (1994: 137). This reconfiguration has led to statuses of "postnational membership", which emerged concomitantly with human rights norms and enabled "migrants to make claims against the state which they might not be able to make through domestic politics" (Boucher/Gest 2018, 154).

The impact of state-citizenship on immigration are highly variegated and case-contingent. There is agreement that "citizenship policy may be an instrument of immigration policy" (Kraler 2006: 54). Considering this, it is noteworthy that many of the democracies that have received substantial numbers of immigrants and that conceive of immigration as nation-building, such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, often have comparatively liberal citizenship regimes. State-citizenship also plays a central role for immigration in France, where it has historically been used as a swift incorporation device for immigrants. Albert Kraler distinguishes two "opposing views" on citizenship by

states with regards to immigration: "one that sees citizenship as a means to integrate newcomers more fully into the national community, and therefore welcomes the timely acquisition of citizenship, and a second, which sees citizenship as a 'prize', a reward and honour granted by the state on its own terms and by discretion" (Kraler 2006, 47). I hold that states usually go through different stages of these two views, depending on the historical context.

When it comes to the impact of citizenship on immigrants, there is a host of theoretical and empirical contributions. In his important theoretical contribution "Multicultural Citizenship" (1994), Will Kymlicka claims that to maintain a liberal democratic order, democracies should introduce the notion of multicultural citizenship to their citizenship regimes. He divides this imagined citizenship regime up into three groups, immigrants, Indigenous people, and sub-nationals – ostensibly designed after the Canadian experience. For Kymlicka, multicultural citizenship entails several policies that should be implemented for each of these groups. He does not, however, discuss the citizenship in multicultural citizenship extensively. With regards to the immigrant group, it remains unclear whether those who are beneficiaries of his proposed multicultural policies must be citizens. I therefore classify Kymlicka's work as a contribution to integration theories, rather than citizenship theories, since it refers to the rights-dimension of citizenship, excluding discussions on naturalization or political participation. His theoretical contribution is a good example of the theoretical overlap between immigration, citizenship, and integration, discussed later-on in this chapter.

Empirically, the attainment of citizenship status for immigrants seems to have little to no effect on their socio-economic integration (Diehl/Blohm 2008: 438). However, this causal link may be misguided in the first place: Many countries now place extensive demands that immigrants must fulfill prior to their naturalization, including language and socio-economic requirements – this is why immigrants who naturalize may already have completed these socio-economic demands, while citizenship attainment takes on the role of the final step to the juridical-formal, belonging, and political participation dimensions of citizenship. As Brubaker aptly puts it: "[I]f citizenship status is not a decisive determinant of immigrants' life changes, it remains a crucial determinant of their place in the polity, and, more broadly, of the general character of politics in the countries of postwar immigration" (Brubaker 1990: 385). He also stresses another salient point of the role of citizenship for immigrants and the polities they reside in: "The fact that the exclusion (…) of immigrants from formal citizenship is tantamount to the disenfranchisement of a signification fraction of the population (…) and that the interests of disenfranchised groups do not count for much in the political process" (ibid.). He closes with a claim

that is decisive for my work as well: "The substantial cross-national variation in the civic incorporation of postwar immigrants thus deserves more attention than it has to date received" (Brubaker 1990: 385).

2.2.3 Conceptualizing Citizenship Politics

In this chapter I explained the theoretical origins of citizenship in political science and political sociology and discussed the connection between citizenship and immigration to states. This included a discussion of T. H. Marshall's foundational definition of citizenship as a privileged membership form beyond a merely juridical status. The juridical status of holding citizenship can also be captured by the term nationality. Nationality does not cover the political, rights, and belonging dimension of citizenship. I also explained the dialectic of citizenship, which means that it serves to both include and exclude people from different dimensions of citizenship.

To discuss the connection between citizenship and immigration in states, I explained the different principles that guide citizenship attainment, *ius soli, ius sanguinis*, and *ius domicili*, and I explained the rise and implication of being able to hold dual or multiple citizenships. Lastly, I discussed the many ways in which citizenship and immigration are connected. States have citizenship regimes, which encompass all the different ways in which citizenship can be attained (or withdrawn).

Dieter Gosewinkel offers a succinct definition which summarises the different iterations of citizenship discussed in this chapter and is pertinent for the work presented in this thesis. He writes:

In essence and origin, citizenship is a legally formed status of membership whose genesis and practical impact have been objects of political struggles. Given the double boundary that citizenship draws, these struggles are fought out both inside states and with regard to demarcation vis-à-vis others. Struggles about citizenship are therefore struggles about belonging. (Gosewinkel 2022: 4)

Gosewinkel's definition points to the complexity of citizenship and the way it is connected to the other two concepts discussed in this thesis, immigration, and integration. In this thesis, I focus on the connection citizenship and immigration to states, which I call citizenship politics. I conceptualize citizenship politics as *the totality of political decisions concerning citizenship for immigrants, significant policy shifts concerning naturalization or citizenship for the second and third generations (or the lack thereof despite an impetus to change), and socio-political events (like discussions about changing*

citizenship regimes for immigrants, political campaigns in relation to citizenship and naturalization). Significant political shifts include changes and amendments made to existent policies as well as the introduction of entirely new legislation regarding citizenship and naturalization, the introduction or abolishment of state institutions dealing with citizenship, or meso-level political influences on citizenship that might be discretionary but have a major bearing on naturalization numbers or immigration movements.

Lastly, several researchers have stressed that citizenship is not only connected to immigration but can constitute a "central mechanism in states' integration policies" (Joppke 2011: 159; Kraler 2006; 42), or as Winter points out, naturalization can be conceived as "the ultimate institutional expression of national boundaries" (Winter 2018: 231). These insights further demonstrate the meaning of the different dimensions of citizenship stretching beyond a mere legal status to questions of participation, rights, and belonging. This will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

2.3 On Integration Politics

The sustained arrival of immigrants for temporary or permanent settlement has numerous consequences for the receiving society (Somerville 2016: 26). While immigration does not threaten social cohesion as a default, it does present a challenge to or stand in tension with social cohesion (Jordan 2021: 3). This tension can be met in different ways from the perspective of states. In this sense, integration[26] denotes processes that minorities in pluralist and diverse

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26 For conceptual clarity: In political science 'integration theories' can also refer to theories on regional political integration of states into supranational constructions such as the European Union. Despite this homonymity, this subchapter deals with integration as applied to theories of immigrant and minority incorporation into receiving societies. There are many other terms that researchers use to denote processes of establishing social cohesion in pluralist and diverse societies, particularly regarding immigrants. These include "assimilation, absorption, acculturation, accommodation, incorporation" or "inclusion" (Favell 2005: 42; Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008: 163). All of these have in common that they denote the "narrowing of differences between immigrants and the native-born population in certain aspects of social life" (Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008: 163). Some terms are more descriptive and some are more ascriptive regarding the form these processes take. For the purpose of this thesis, I have decided to use the term 'integration' to refer to this process, because it is a widely used and well-established term, and it is also popularly used to denote state agencies in charge of managing the relationship between immigrants and the receiving country (Favell 2005: 41).

societies undergo to gain relative socio-economic equity with the majority population. This can include the attainment of skills that allow for cultural and societal immersion (such as proficiency in the country's language/s), but also their ascent into the country's community by citizenship status or through an altered self-conception of the country. These processes, in turn, can be supported (or not) by states.

To be sure, integration is but one of the approaches states can use for dealing with internal differences that challenge social cohesion. Researchers John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary pithily point out the division between "methods to eliminate difference" (which include genocide or partition), and "methods to manage difference" (which include territorial autonomy, such as federalization, but also systems like apartheid, or integration) (McGarry/O'Leary 1993: 4). Efforts to manage difference equitably are mostly employed by liberal democratic states, because they have a normative impetus to do so, and integration measures fall into this category. Like the concept of citizenship, processes of integration are therefore inherently connected to states (Favell 2022: 2) as one of the many forms that states have historically used to deal with ethnic diversity, cultural difference, and minority groups.

It is useful to think of states' measures for the integration of immigrant populations as an approach to maintain and foster social cohesion. In the abstract, social cohesion denotes

a (desirable) characteristic of a social entity (such as a community or society) (…). [It] is typically seen as a multidimension construct consisting of phenomena on the micro (e. g. individual attitudes and orientations), meso (features of communities and groups), and macro (features of societal institutions) level. (Schiefer/Van der Noll 2017: 583)

In this chapter, I look at the history of integration theories pertaining to immigrant populations, taking social cohesion theory into account. I begin with a brief overview of the historical origins of social cohesion and integration theories and then move on to the evolvement of immigration integration theory in relation to states. In the final step, I conceptualize integration politics for the purposes of this thesis.

2.3.1 An Overview of Social Cohesion and Integration Theories

Social scientists have been preoccupied with questions concerning the establishment and maintenance of social cohesion for a very long time. As Christian Joppke puts it: "what integrates society, and why there is order and not chaos,

has been one of the main questions of political theory since Hobbes, and of social theory since Durkheim" (Joppke 2011: 158). In their extensive review of social science literature about social cohesion, researchers David Schiefer and Johanna van der Noll underline that at its root, questions on social cohesion are concerned with "what constitutes social order in a society and why it can be maintained even in time of social changes" (Schiefer/Van der Noll 2017: 583). They helpfully delineate between different periods of the theoretical history of social cohesion, which are strongly connected to the societal context of their development, namely between British, French, and German thinkers.

In British Liberalism of the 17th century societal processes were perceived "as the simple sum of individual actions (…). Social cohesion and order emerge automatically from the natural harmony of individual interests" (Schiefer/Van der Noll 2017: 583). French thinkers rebuked this thinking and promoted the idea of "society as an integrated system with shared principles and values." In this line of thinking, "social cohesion is not a by-product of individual behaviour but rather based on solidarity, shared loyalties, cooperation and mutual action" (ibid.). Another approach, "romantic conservatism", emerged in late 18th century Germany. Here, "cohesive societies are durable social hierarchies that are bound together by cultural tradition and by deference of the individual to the social order". Society as a collective of individuals are "merged in an organic entity, bound together by the same language, culture and traditions" (ibid.).

Strikingly, these schools of thought were highly influential in their respective societies, as is reflected throughout history, for instance in the well-known quote by conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher "there is no society, there are individual men and women" or the strong emergence of a union movement in France and a propensity for large social protests rooted in mutual solidarity. Therefore, what emerges from these different early approaches to conceptualizing social cohesion is a fundamental desire to fostering and maintain social cohesion, but starkly different views on how it ought to be attained.

In the early days of this thinking, these different perspectives did not emerge in relation to questions on immigration so much as different cultural groups and regional differences, as well as questions pertaining to poverty level and related social fragmentation (Somerville 2016: 29). Therefore, in its evolution throughout the 20th century, approaches to social cohesion were often coined by partisan ideologies, with distinctions between "liberal, republican, or social democratic" as well as "nationalist" views on social cohesion, which were often at odds with one another:

From a social-democratic view, equality and solidarity might be emphasized as an essential ingredient for social cohesion whereas from a nationalist view the shared national history and traditional values might be emphasized. Liberal views, in turn, might stress the importance of equality in terms of individual opportunities. (Schiefer/Van der Noll 2017: 583)

Throughout the 20th century, perspectives on social cohesion evolved according to these distinctions and left their mark on different country contexts (Somerville 2016: 29). As Will Somerville outlines, this also explains why the notion of immigrant integration is so highly contingent on the evolvement of thinking about social cohesion in a specific country context (ibid.). This is a pertinent insight for the analysis of the three country cases in this research project, because an awareness of the roots and evolvement of the conceptualization of social cohesion, and different perspectives thereof within-case, need to be considered. It has the explanatory potential both for partisan differences within-case, as well as constant features that coin each case's historical trajectory.

By the early to mid 20th century, questions of social cohesion were formulated more around cultural differences and the impact of immigration, and with it came the conceptualization of social cohesion through integration. The latter would eventually become the "default concept in forward-looking thinking about the consequences of migration and the diversification of society" (Favell 2022: 2). From this perspective, "social cohesion is present when individuals and groups with different cultures, values, beliefs, life styles, and socio-economic resources have equal access to all domains of societal life and live together without conflict" (Schiefer/Van der Noll 2017: 584).

In the context of immigration, different theoretical schools emerged on integration throughout 20th century. The earliest link between the two concepts is attributed to the U. S.-American Chicago School with their assimilation approach (Roeder 2020: 5), while the British and Canadian schools of thought on multiculturalism emerged in the mid- to late 20th century. Both schools of thought have in common that they focus on the integration of cultural and / or religious minority groups (as opposed to, for instance, social disintegration due economic stratification), which have formed either because of immigration or due to other historical aspects of societal diversification. For the theorists of the assimilationist approach, the onus of integration through assimilation rests on ethnic, cultural, religious minorities who may be supported by the state in this process. From this perspective, the institutions of the state are a 'neutral' vehicle to facilitate integration through assimilation. Assimilation can therefore take place in a school system that promotes the perspectives of the majority population. Normatively, assimilation theorists desire the maintenance of a culturally homogenous society for the sake of social and political stability.

For multicultural theorists, the onus for integration is on the state to facilitate the maintenance of cultural diversity through the promotion of minority group rights. Normatively, multicultural theorists view the support and maintenance of cultural plurality as a matter of democratic justice towards minority groups.[27] From this perspective, the state and its institutions are not 'neutral', but rather implicitly or explicitly promote the authority of the dominant part of the population. According to multicultural theorists, social cohesion should be achieved through the maintenance of cultural difference as a question of justice in democracies: societal exclusion of minority groups goes against human rights doctrines and the subsequent normative aspirations of liberal democracies (e. g. Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995).

While both of these approaches are consistently referenced in the literature on integration, it is evident that empirically, most countries do not employ measures or strategies that strictly align with only one of the different approaches, but rather a mixture of approaches that range from the pragmatic (facilitation of language attainment, immersion into education for immigrant children, measures for the swift integration into the labour market) to the more normatively charged (integration 'contracts' or integration tests for citizenship attainment). Evaluating the totality of these measures even in one country case often offers a hodgepodge of different normative approaches that reflect the range of the perceptions of the immigrant population, their ascribed needs and obligations.

The diffusion of the integration concept amongst different schools of thought has led some to argue that it should not be limited to questions concerning the integration of immigrant populations but expanded to notions of social cohesion more generally. This would effectively mean returning to the initial approaches to social cohesion that were outlined at the beginning of this subchapter by conceiving of integration as "a highly complex process that pertains to all subsegments of society" (Roeder 2020: 5; Pickel et al. 2020: 2). Another view, referenced in Steven Vertovec's invocation of the concept "superdiversity" (2007) holds that due to globalization, most societies today experience high levels of diversity of which immigration is just one driver, in an

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27 In writing about the distinction between the German and French cases, Brubaker summarizes the French approach thusly: "It is one thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian, and quite another to want to make all Utopiphones citizens of Utopia. Crudely put, the former represents the French, the latter the German model of nationhood." (Brubaker 1990: 390). Notably, the assimilation versus multiculturalism dichotomy also falls along political theory discussions that posit republicanism versus liberalism or communitarianism (Kastoryano 2011: 1629f.). It is no coincidence, therefore, that the France has a history of a republican-assimilationist model to integration, whereas Canada is seen as a liberal-multicultural model.

effort to rethink the integration term entirely (Roeder 2020: 5). Stemming from the transnational school of thought, which has also influenced immigration theory as outlined above, these thinkers propose a conceptualization of diversity beyond the nation-state, a process which has only been accelerated by immigration movements (ibid.).

Despite these different interjections, it is premature at best to abandon the integration concept or disregard its inherent connection to immigration in many countries. Rather, a critical evaluation of its use "particularly regarding social inequality and power structures of different actors" appears as the more pragmatic treatment of the term (ibid.). When considering different approaches to immigrant integration, it is therefore helpful to think about the fundamental question of "who ought to be integrated into what by whom" (Hylland 2015: 16), and, most importantly, how. In the next section, we delve deeper on the interconnection between immigrant integration politics and the state's role in it.

2.3.2 Theories on Immigrant Integration and the State

[N]o generation starts with a blank slate. Each adapts and builds on an existing base. Thus, understanding the evolution of immigrant integration requires the mindset of an archeologist. (Banting 2014: 70)

If we conceive of consistent immigration as one feature that might constitute social change, it is evident that states have historically had some interest in managing and guiding this change in order to avert social disintegration, or as Joppke puts it aptly "the main political need (…) generated by immigration is a need for integration" (Joppke 2011: 158). Therefore, state approaches to counter this possible disintegration are popularly referred to as integration measures, one of the most central concepts in migration research today (Roeder 2020, 9). No matter the various normative underpinning of their integration approach, states implement a vast number of measures to facilitate integration, covering a plethora of policy areas, which are prone to constant change, as Keith Banting explains:

[T]he full incorporation regime encompasses a wide range of programs, including immigration rules governing admission and residency, settlement programs, diversity policies, anti-discrimination provisions, labour market regulations, the education and health care systems, and regulations governing naturalization. (Banting 2014: 69)

Banting's outline of an "incorporation regime" is comprehensive and already points to the interconnection of integration measures with immigration and

citizenship politics. Banting also stresses that policies introduced in one area might not correspond to policies implemented in another area, generally leading to "the lack of an integrated design (…). They [integration policies] change at different speeds in response to different pressures, but, in combination, they matter" (ibid.). This demonstrates the malleability and diffusion of integration measures even within one state, leading to the fact that integration measures are sometimes not necessarily 'integrated' amongst themselves, but rather best conceived of as a plethora of different approaches within one state (Roeder 2020: 2). For instance, integration measures can be employed differently at the state, federal, or reginal levels, or they can be stratified amongst different immigrant groups with varying offers or demands placed labour immigrants, as opposed to education immigrants, or asylum seekers (ibid.). Not only this, the implementation of integration measures also presupposes that the state in question conceives of the arrival of immigrant communities as a permanent feature, rather than one for temporary labour immigration.

The complexity of the integration politics in only one state applied to different immigrant groups (and therefore, also how integration politics are connected to immigration politics) can be illustrated by a quick example from the German case: From the 1950s to the 1980s, there was a distinct absence of any state-mandated integration measures for so-called 'guest workers', whereas integration measures for the labour market, in education and even in the form of preferential treatment in housing were a given for co-ethnic immigrants, so-called resettlers (*Aussiedler*) at the same time. From the perspective of the German state, one group was meant to settle long-term, the other was not.

For the purposes of this thesis, it is helpful to distinguish between short-term immigrant integration measures that aim at the swift settlement process of newly arrived immigrants, and long-term immigrant integration approaches that circumscribe the role that settled immigrants are assigned within a state. While the former is easily traced, the latter is more malleable and interconnected with the citizenship dimension of belonging described above, as well as general conceptions of country's self-conception or national identity.

In connection to this, the success of integration measures implemented by states depend in large part also on the preconceived notions about immigrants that are held by the receiving society, or, in turn, those notions can influence the extent of the integration measures offered by states (Somerville 2016: 27; Roeder 2020: 8). As Somerville explains "integration policies and measures may be deployed to the perceived dilution of distinctive national identities" (ibid.).

2.3.3 Conceptualizing Integration Politics

Historian Jochen Oltmer suggests a helpful caveat for thinking about and studying processes of immigrant integration. He notes:

> In the historical reality of life, integration was neither for immigrants nor for the majority population a global event of adaptation to a society. Rather, integration means the long-term negotiation of economic, political, religious, or legal participation, characterized by cooperation and conflict. It is perceived and experienced differently by individuals, groups, or organizations in both the immigrant and the majority population in their various stages. (Oltmer 2017: 39)

As the preceding theoretical discussion of social cohesion and immigrant integration has shown, there is an inherent malleability to the term integration. To facilitate the study of immigrant integration politics in this thesis, I therefore take a two-step approach. Firstly, I conceptualize integration politics as measures to facilitate the settlement of immigrants in the form of language classes, education, and labour market support. This is the more straight-forward part of the conceptualization, and it indicates whether there is an overall acknowledgment for the necessity of immigrant integration. It is important to show whether these measures are stratified amongst immigrant groups (e. g. co-ethnics versus labour immigrants), because this can indicate which immigrants are desired for long-term settlement.

In a second step, the different normative approaches which have coined state approaches to immigrant integration throughout the last 70 years are also important for understanding the states' underlying 'philosophies' in immigrant integration (Favell 2001). Perspectives on a country-specific form of dealing with cultural diversity arising through immigration, a country's self-conception as an immigration country (or the type of immigration country it intends to be) and shifting constellations of national identity connected to immigration therefore feature in the analysis.

To conceptualize integration politics, I therefore take a two-step, state-based and pragmatic perspective. I first conceptualize *integration politics as the totality of political decisions concerning the facilitation of settlement, such as education, language attainment, labour market integration, or support for housing. I consider significant policy shifts concerning immigrant integration (or the lack thereof despite an impetus to change).* Significant political shifts include changes and amendments made to existent policies as well as the introduction of entirely new legislation regarding integration, the introduction or abolishment of state institutions dealing with integration, or meso-level political influences on integration. The absence of immigrant integration measures

is also telling because it implies a state's unwillingness to recognize long-term immigration or that the state relies on other mechanisms, such as citizenship attainment, for integration. Additionally, it is pertinent whether measures are only in place for one immigrant group but not for another.

To account for the second step on immigrant integration's connection to a country's self-conception and national identity, *I also consider major socio-political events (like prominent discussion problematizing or politicizing immigrant integration, political campaigns, or activism in relation to immigrant integration, or riots by the immigrant population, or riots and attacks against the immigrant population),* because of the their significance for the receiving societies' perception of the immigrant population.

2.4 The Nexus between Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics

In this research project, I focus on the interconnection and interactions between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics for within-state and across-state comparison across time. In this subchapter, I conceptualize this nexus for the later analysis in segment II of the thesis. To begin, I offer a short summary of the insights presented in the previous subchapters on immigration, citizenship, and integration politics. I then conceptualize the nexus of these three concepts and explain how I use the nexus as a tool in the subsequent comparative-historical analysis of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics in Canada, France, and Germany.

In the previous parts of this chapter, I explained the conceptual origins, theoretical discussions and my own of conceptualising immigration, citizenship, and integration politics. For immigration politics, I showed that the notion of immigration (as opposed to migration and human mobility) is closely tied to the emergence of nation-states and the necessity to protect borders for the maintenance of sovereignty. The emergence of systematic state strategies for immigrant selection for economic and / or state-building purposes dates back the late 19th century. Focusing on the post-World War II world order, I showed how different theoretical paradigms have emerged to account for the way immigration takes place, both from state and from immigrants' perspectives. I then conceptualized immigration politics *as the totality of political decisions concerning immigration which result from the emergence of paradigms, significant policy shifts (or the lack thereof despite an impetus to change), and socio-political events (like recessions, protests, political campaigns, major*

refugee numbers etc.) and that have a significant bearing on immigration processes in the respective country cases.

On citizenship politics, I explained the emergence of the concept as initially independent from thinking about state membership for immigrants. In social science, thinking about citizenship in connection to immigration gained popularity in the last thirty years. For analysis, the concept is often divided into several dimensions, the legal, political, rights, and belonging dimensions of citizenship. The focus in this research is mainly on the way states allow for citizenship acquisition of the second or third immigrant generations or the naturalization of the first immigrant generation, guided by principles such as *ius soli, ius sanguinis,* or *ius domicili*. Citizenship is inherently connected to states and the way a state defines its citizenship laws could be seen as a operationalization of its membership citizenship dimension. I therefore mainly focus on the legal and political dimensions of citizenship, although citizenship can also be conceived as a reflection of who belongs and who does not. I then conceptualized citizenship politics as *the totality of political decisions concerning citizenship, significant policy shifts concerning citizenship and naturalization (or the lack thereof despite an impetus to change), and socio-political events (like discussions about changing citizenship regimes or political campaigns in relation to citizenship and naturalization).* I specifically look at citizenship politics that are supposed to shape immigration and integration politics, the interconnection at the heart of this analysis. Significant political shifts include changes and amendments made to existent policies as well as the introduction of entirely new legislation regarding citizenship and naturalization, the introduction or abolishment of state institutions dealing with citizenship, or meso-level political influences on citizenship that might be discretionary but have a major bearing on naturalization numbers or immigration movements.

On integration politics, I explained the interconnection of theories on immigrant integration with previous schools of thought that were concerned with social cohesion. The approaches to how immigrant integration should occur can vary widely, not least to different ideological approaches. In relation to this, I explained that I take a two-step approach to the conceptualization of integration politics: The analysis of settlement politics as well as the interconnected normative immigrant integration approach implied by the role of immigration in a country's self-conception. I conceptualized integration politics as *the totality of political decisions concerning settlement, such as labour market integration, housing, language acquisition etc., so significant policy shifts concerning immigrant integration (or the lack thereof despite an impetus to change).* Significant political shifts include changes and amendments made to existent policies as well as the introduction of entirely new legislation

regarding integration, the introduction or abolishment of state institutions dealing with integration, or meso-level political influences on integration. To account for the self-conception dimension and its connection to immigrant integration, I also include *socio-political events in relation to integration (like prominent discussion problematizing or politicizing immigrant integration, political campaigns, or activism in relation to immigrant integration, or riots by the immigrant population, or riots and attacks against the immigrant population)* in my conceptualization. Using these conceptualizations as the starting point, I move on to conceptualize the nexus between the three.

2.4.1 Conceptualizing the Nexus between Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics

What is the Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics Nexus?
'Nexus' is a term denotes an interactive, causal connection between different issues or phenomena. By claiming that immigration, citizenship, and integration politics can be studied as a nexus, I therefore posit that all three concepts and their related political fields are inherently connected and stand in a synergic, interactive relationship with one another. For a long time, migration research was relatively fragmented in its approach to these three issues. Researchers would often focus on one of the three areas without necessarily considering another. This is not wrong *per se*, as there are issues in connection to all three concepts that warrant detailed attention and need to be studied deeply and independently. But it might also lead researchers to miss out on the interconnection between the three, particularly in nation-states (Kraler 2006: 38; Fleras 2015: 422; Boucher/Gest 2018).

In this thesis, I follow calls from migration researchers to draw an explicit analytical connection between the three political fields (Castles 2012; Boucher/Gest 2018). By virtue of their processual character, immigration and integration politics are particularly closely interwoven. The role that citizenship and its acquisition take can have an influence on who chooses or gets to immigrate in the first place, and when they become fully-fledged members of the receiving society. Not only this, states try to influence immigration processes by changing citizenship policies, or they hamper with settlement processes by providing support to one immigrant category but not another. They also select immigrants on account of their perceived ability to integrate, meaning that immigration politics have a bearing on integration politics. Lastly, integration and citizenship acquisition are held to be part of the same trajectory. This shows that the possibilities for interconnection are manifold.

Why is it helpful to conceive of the Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics Nexus?

Alexandra Dobrowolsky outlines the interconnection between immigration, citizenship, and integration for the Canadian context aptly, using the term multiculturalism which denotes the official Canadian approach to immigrant integration:

Immigration and multiculturalism are revealing indicators of the contours of citizenship. Beyond the official requirements of a country's immigration policies, and its formal recognition of multiculturalism, or lack thereof, both serve to convey what newcomers can expect, and how they will be received, in terms of rights, responsibilities, and belonging. (Dobrowolsky 2018: 187)

This quote shows how an analysis of the nexus contributes to our understanding of historical dynamics of migration politics. The nexus is revelatory of the dynamics in migration politics in two ways: Through its conceptual breadth and its conceptual clarity. For one, I can develop a broad understanding of how the three political fields are interconnected. Too often, particularly in research on policies, we only look at one area, eschewing developments in another, although as my analysis will show, sometimes developments in one area lead to effects in another, and sometimes a state chooses to manage one area through making adjustments in another. The conceptual breadth of the nexus is a novelty that explicitly tries to discern the way in which these three political fields stand in a synergic connection to one another.

The other aspect is conceptual clarity. Often, as the chapter on the state of the art will show, researchers claim that they are studying immigration, when what they are doing is also using integration or citizenship concepts in their analysis. Conversely, some claim that they are studying citizenship when they are really looking at integration. Similarly, there have been studies related to the interconnection of citizenship and immigration, or integration and citizenship, but so far, no study has explicitly connected the three (Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008; Hollifield/Martin/Orrenius 2014: 9; 154; Bauder 2017: 4). Therefore, the overlap between the three political fields has sometimes complicated the conceptual clarity with which migration research has approached different subjects (Favell 2005: 42; Hollifield 2008: 212, 224). It is clear, however, that the interconnection between the three can take place on many different levels of social and political order. In this study I take a political science perspective on the issues by focusing on the ways these three are interconnected in the state as the unit of analysis.

2.4.2 The Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Nexus as an Analytical Tool in Comparative-Historical Research

Two analytical tools feature in the research design for the analysis of the secondary literature and empirical materials in this thesis: The identification of possible critical junctures, described in the Methodology chapter as historical periods of pivotal political change, and the nexus between immigration, integration, and citizenship politics. After identifying periods that might constitute a critical juncture for each case, I move on to gain an understanding of the (changing) constitution of the nexus during the period of analysis.

Rather than a preconceived comprehensive theory, my approach to studying the nexus in the three countries over time is more inductive in its approach. I seek to find out how the nexus is (re-)constituted at different points in time. This is why the nexus will be at the center of the analysis and feature as a major part of the analytical results outlined at the end of the thesis. In my analysis of the nexus, I pay particular attention to the way in which politics in one area influence policies in another, or the way in which politics for one area are supposed to shape developments in another.

Lastly, I am guided by the assumption that the nexus between immigration, citizenship, and integration is particularly pertinent in immigration countries that have a liberal democratic regime type and therefore allows us to draw distinctions between the migration politics between various liberal democratic countries. In many immigration countries that have a different, often autocratic regime type, these political fields are decoupled from one another, or frankly nothing but immigration exists. For instance, in the Kafala Immigration system, popular in the Gulf States, the system does not feature any integration of the immigrants, nor their acquisition of citizenship. In this system, immigrants are recruited purely for their contribution to the workforce. There is no normative impetus that would lead to the idea that immigrants arrive for long-term settlement and arrival in the society (Boucher/Gest 2018: 115). Consequently, countries with the highest numbers of immigrants are also the ones who do not naturalize at all (ibid.). This caveat might limit the applicability of the nexus in the study of other cases, but it may also help us understand the comprehensiveness of the migration regimes in different countries. In the next chapter, I explain the methodology of this research project.

3. Methodology: On Comparison, Comparative-Historical Analysis and Expert Interviews

In a 2005 article on "Political Science and Comparative Immigration Politics", eminent political scientist and migration researcher Gary Freeman laments that immigration research has mostly been "ignored by the best minds in political science" (Freeman 2005: 117). Conversely, migration researchers from other disciplines have tended to disregard migration's "political dimensions", despite its obvious implications of state regulation on the field (ibid.: 112). The historical marginalization and "poor reputation" of migration research within political science (also partially due to a lack of large-scale data) have been to the detriment of the quality of research and ultimately our collective knowledge of the field (Freeman 2005: 115). Freeman's comment on the status of migration research was written with the U. S. context in mind. Today, with the increasing political importance of the field, the status of migration research within political science is contextual: While the Anglo-American research cultures have worked to institutionalize migration research within the discipline, continental European migration research has by and large continued in the vein that Freeman described.

To comparativists from other research areas, Freeman's intervention may appear surprising. At first glance, the conceptual and analytical tools that comparative political science offers seem well-suited for contributions to migration research (Bloemraad 2013; Alm 2021). Especially considering the heightened public attention this field has received in the last 15 years, the political dimensions of migration research should finally be welcomed to the proverbial centre stage of comparative political science. This research project attempts just that: Countering the historical marginalization of the field, particularly within the context of German political science, I aim to contribute to a "new conceptual toolkit" (Fleras 2015: 28) for comparative migration research within political science. I also follow Freeman's imploration that "the most pressing need in political science is for the mainstream of the profession to bring its own conceptual and theoretical apparatus to bear on a topic left too long to its sister disciplines" (Freeman 2005: 112).

This thesis presents a comparative political science project with a comparativist approach on the subject of migration politics. The aim of this chapter on the research approach and methodology of this thesis is three-fold. In a first step, I situate the comparativist approach in political science and delineate it to other forms of research paradigms. In this subchapter, I explain why we

compare and how, and give an insight into the use and limitations of case-based research: How do we select cases on the grounds of the strategies which are available for comparison?

In a second step, I explain the impact the comparative approach has had on migration research, which helps situate my research approach in this broader context and connect my project to the methodological "apparatus" (ibid.) of comparative political science. This subchapter will be connected to the State of the Art, but with a distinctly methodological focus on the research.

In a third step, I zoom in on the methodological approach for this thesis: I further explain the approach of comparative-historical analysis and the method of expert interviews. This project uses methods pluralism, meaning different methods for its qualitative research design, to attain empirical insights to answer the proposed research questions. For this purpose, I conducted 43 expert interviews, 12–15 for each country case. In this subchapter, I present the process of sampling the interviewees and an explanation of the operationalization of the interviews based on previous comparative-historical research. This last part of the chapter also gives an insight into the interview processes themselves, including an account of the success and pitfalls of expert interviews. In the concluding part of this chapter, I synthesize the insights gained throughout and explicate how they contribute to my overall research project.

3.1 Research Approach: On Comparison in Political Science and Migration Research

Comparison is compelling because it reminds us that social phenomena are not fixed or 'natural'. Through comparison, we can de-center what is taken for granted in a particular time or place after we learn that something was not always so, or that it is different elsewhere, or for other people. A well-chosen comparative study can challenge conventional wisdom or show how existing academic theories might be wrong. (Bloemraad 2013: 29)

3.1.1 Why we compare: On Comparative Logics and Epistemic Tensions

Comparison is compelling and it should be considered the baseline *modus operandi* for all social sciences, be it for the empirical comparison of cases or theory comparison (Borchert/Lessenich 2012b: 21; Bloemraad 2013: 29).

People who have studied societies throughout history have used comparison as a starting point for understanding and concluding how systems, institutions, societal relations, and political developments in different societies function (Hartmann 1995: 14). In short, comparison has been a predominant route for researchers to cope with a "messy, noisy world" (Schmitter 2008).

As the social sciences have progressed and delineated themselves amongst one another, different paradigms and opposing epistemic logics have emerged on the way comparison is conducted. As Jens Borchert and Stephan Lessenich explain, there was never any doubt about the saliency of comparison in social science, but the question of how to compare led to considerable debate going back to a fundamental conflict in epistemic interest (*Erkenntnisinteresse*) (Borchert 1995: 83f.; Borchert/Lessenich 2012a:10). Referencing Hintze (1922), Borchert and Lessenich explain that this difference boils down to one essential guiding decision when one seeks to compare: One either compares to seek generalization, or one compares to sharpen and deepen one's understanding of the unique factors that differentiate the units in comparison (ibid.). Despite this fundamental epistemic difference, all comparison serves to fulfill comparative political science's mandate to explain how societies work (*Erklärungsauftrag der Disziplin*), as Jürgen Hartmann stresses (1995: 17).

This epistemic tension warrants closer attention nonetheless, particularly as it helps understand the different research designs that are constructed depending on the questions that are asked in a comparative research project. Donatella Della Porta (Della Porta 2008: 200) distinguishes between "variable-oriented" and "case-oriented" research, a contrast based on the opposing research traditions of Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, who are widely considered the founding members of modern social science. These two traditions or "logics" (ibid.: 203) are also often contrasted with the terms *erklären vs. verstehen* (explaining vs. understanding). Durkheim's explaining logic, as Della Porta describes, aims at *generalization* and the "search for trans-historical permanent causes" (ibid.). To reach this goal of large, general, and overarching explanations for the social world, those working in Durkheim's tradition rely on quantitative statistical methods, often building on large-n research designs to increase the validity of their research results. As will be the subject later in this subchapter, time does not play a historical role in this tradition, but it is rather used 'ahistorically' to increase the number of cases (e. g. by using the same case but at different points in time to increase the 'n'). Critics of this research strategy often point out that its researchers try to apply the same "mechanistic" standards to the research unit of society as they would to e. g. physical phenomena, and thereby fail to take into account the "historical, cultural, and

geographical" contingencies that determine societal processes and constellations (Hartmann 1995: 27).

The *verstehen* approach, building on a Weberian tradition, aims to understand the *complexity* of a small number of cases by searching "for limited generalizations about historical divergence and concrete knowledge about specific processes" (Della Porta 2008: 203). Research in this tradition is generally "qualitative, historical comparison based on a case strategy" that includes a relatively small number of cases (ibid.). To fulfill this epistemic aim, Weber argued for the construction of theoretical *ideal types* (Borchert/Lessenich 2012a: 10). As Della Porta explains: "These are abstract models, with an internal logic, against which real complex cases can be measured. An ideal type (…) is no 'hypothesis' but it offers guidance of hypotheses. It is not a description of the reality, but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression through such a description." (Della Porta 2008: 206).

As this shows, the tension between the two kinds of approaches should not be understood from a perspective that evaluates which approach yields 'better' insights (although, unfortunately, claims of scientific superiority of quantitative large-n research remain pervasive).[28] Rather, a research project's logic emerges depending on the research question one asks. As Borchert and Lessenich stress, the approaches should not be continuously feuding, but rather be understood (and implemented) as complementing each other. This is pointedly summarized by them:

Regardless of whether the research interest is primarily focused on the particularities of the individual case or on the commonalities of an entire group of cases: In each case, the particularities of the individual case result from the specific constellation of features or manifestations of a feature that emerge in relation to other cases. And the social meaning and

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28 In an effort to synthesize the approaches, Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba provided a programmatic intervention in their classic "Designing Social Inquiry" (1994). They argue that both approaches should operate under the single logic of providing causal inferences and they are semantically heavily guided by the quantitative variable-based approach. This proposal was received with both enthusiasm and criticism, since it left a rather narrow window of which kinds research ought to be considered properly scientific (Della Porta 2008: 202). In an essay on historical institutionalism, Steinmo explains the institutional origins of this sense of quantitative superiority. According to him, political science departments in the U.S. in the 1960s and 70s were under pressure to adapt to hard science norms due to funding issues, which led to either "atheoretical micro-analyses of political behavior" and or non-empirical "theorizing of Marxism, functionalism, systems theory and rational choice". This development was not as stark in Europe, where social scientists "had fewer incentives to model themselves on the hard sciences" (Steinmo 2008: 122). Hartmann also laments that a focus on quantitative methods might be to the detriment of the quality of research and result in a sort of navel-gazing social sciences: "A political science that uses more energy and innovation for methods of arithmetic runs the risk of becoming more concerned with itself than with its object" (Hartmann 1995: 29f.).

relevance of a feature shared by a group of cases can only be understood in the contextualizing reconstruction of its interaction with other elements of a social context. (Borchert/Lessenich 2012a:14)

It is therefore helpful to distinguish the "comparative method" as one of the comparative strategies that a comparative researcher could choose to employ (Della Porta 2008: 201). The comparative method, which is the one this thesis is based on, builds on the aforementioned selection of a small number of cases (in this research the migration politics of three countries, Germany, France, and Canada) to provide an intertemporal analysis of these cases to *understand* them comparatively in their depth and complexity. To further show how cases are selected and which strategies there are to compare them, the next section provides a deeper insight into case-oriented research.

3.1.2 How we compare: On the Selection of Cases and Comparative Strategies

Good cases are not the most typical, but the most telling. (Della Porta 2008: 216)

In a comparative project that is based on three distinct cases, it seems evident that there should be a methodological section on how cases ought to be selected and how they can be compared in theory. The selection of the three cases, as explicated in the Introduction to this thesis, did not occur at random, but due to in-depth examination of the case's prior scientific classification/s. In his text "What is a Case, and What is a Case Study?" author Hervé Dumez references Herreid (1997) to give a very simplistic definition of a case: "Cases are stories with a message" (Dumez 2015: 46). In a second step, the researcher needs to ask herself: "What is my case a case of?" (ibid.). While this question should be asked at the very beginning of the research, Dumez concedes that the answer to this question will probably only be clear at the very end of the research project. In the beginning,

the theoretical framework is an orienting theory. It is only at the end of his research that the final theoretical answer will appear to the researcher (…). What it is a case of will coalesce gradually, sometimes catalytically, and the final realization of the case's nature may be the most important part of the interaction between ideas and evidence. (Dumez 2015: 49f.)

What Dumez alludes to here is the process of analysis which will clarify what the cases one has selected are really a case of. In choosing these cases, I already made several pre-emptive decisions about the strategy of analysis following

the classic methods proposed by John S. Mill: The method of difference and the method of agreement. In concordance with Mill's methods of comparison, Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1970) differentiate between research that follows either a most-similar or most-different-systems design.

By choosing systems that are most similar (in the case of countries this could be regarding their economic and political systems, their size, their geographic location, their wealth, their culture, etc.), this helps to keep those factors constant to zoom in closer for understanding why those cases developed differently despite their similarities. This strategy follows the "ceteris et paribus rule – that is, it reduces the number of 'disturbing' variables to be kept under control" (Della Porta 2008: 214). Following Mill's method of difference, this approach usually focuses on a small number of cases and "usually points at similarities and differences through dense *narratives*, with a large number of characteristics being taken into account" (ibid.: 204, italics in the original). This strategy is sometimes criticized for 'choosing on the dependent variable', however, as Della Porta explains, this is something that researchers with small-n approaches often do. They "intentionally select cases that differ relatively little (…) focusing in particular on positive cases, that is cases where a phenomenon (…) is present" (Della Porta 2008: 212). The charm of this approach also lies in its careful attention to "the identification of causal mechanisms", something that quantitative research often cannot provide beyond establishing correlation (Bloemraad 2013: 29).

For a most–different–systems design, the logic is inverse (Hartmann 1995: 31). The foundational question here is why several cases developed similarly despite their major differences (again for countries this would be economic and political systems, size, wealth, geographic location, culture, etc.), although it is used "most often on a lower level than the systemic one". This method is often used to check "if a correlation holds true no matter which country" (Della Porta 2008: 215) and aims to develop overarching generalizations.

This research project follows Mill's indirect method of difference as it employs a most–similar–systems small-n research design. All three of the selected countries were categorized as having very different, almost juxtaposed approaches to their migration politics, despite their systemic, political, economic, and demographic similarities, which makes their selection both compelling and promising for scientific insight. In the next section, I will further explain how comparison has been used in migration research, to connect the political science paradigms to the interdisciplinary field of migration research.

3.1.3 'Bringing the State back in': On the State as a Unit of Analysis in Migration Research

As I established in the introduction to this chapter, migration research is a broad, interdisciplinary field. This could be considered both a strength and a weakness of this area, as it results in a theoretical and methodological eclecticism, which may allow "closer proximity to the social problems of migration" (Halfmann 2005: 129). However, it may also result in a lack of "unitary theoretical and methodological standards and risks applying contradictory and often outdated concepts" (ibid.). Additionally, the interdisciplinary character of the field has led to a tendency to its being marginalized within the disciplines where it is studied, as Freeman's argument from the introduction of this chapter shows. Stephen Castles also bemoans the "compartmentalization" and the fragmented character of the migration research landscape, which according to him results in "a failure to understand the historical character of migration, false assumptions of one-way causality, and an inability to understand the overall dynamics of migratory processes and their embeddedness in processes of societal change" (Castles 2016, 23f.).

For political science, this has meant that researchers have "devoted relatively little attention" to the impact of state structures on migration processes (Freeman 2005: 122). At the same time, it is noteworthy that as a social science subject, migration researchers have made extensive use of comparative methods, to the point where Irene Bloemraad notes that comparison should be considered inherent to migration research (Bloemraad 2013: 28).

Applying a comparativist approach that centers states as its unit of analysis to a subject of migration studies has however been met with some criticism from the field. Proponents of the transnational paradigm in migration studies have regularly stressed how migration itself challenges the boundaries of states, rendering their study almost superfluous since migration explicitly takes place across borders and should therefore not be studied from a state-based perspective. This idea is connected to the critique by transnationalist researchers Nina Glick Schiller and Andreas Wimmer (2002) of "methodological nationalism" in migration research. Methodological nationalism, according to these researchers, has led to an over-emphasis on the nation-state as a unit of analysis and has blinded "researchers to certain questions and phenomena, often reifying national political projects in the process" (Bloemraad 2013: 35). Instead, researchers from this paradigm argue to move beyond the nation-state as a spatial unit of analysis and instead re-envision the places where migration takes place as "transnational spaces" and "multi-sited 'imagined communities' whose boundaries stretch across the borders of two or more nation-states"

(Gutiérrez/Hondagneu-Sotelo 2008: 504). Studying states as actors in migration studies could therefore be considered almost outdated for researchers seeking new insights in the field. This is made explicit in a comment by Halfmann in his essay on the challenges that migration studies pose for political sociology. He argues that attempts by states to control and manage migration could almost be considered a "futile endeavor to uphold control in areas whose primary mechanisms of inclusion do not follow national or territorial criteria" (Halfmann 2005: 138), which in turn poses a dilemma for migration studies: "As long as political sociology concentrates its efforts on the nation-state and the relationship between the state and civil society, it will have to live with the slow disappearance of its subject matter" (Halfmann 2005: 141).

The points of critique brought forward by researchers within the transnational paradigm are indeed valid and warrant further attention. I have argued elsewhere that the transnational paradigm has made many important conceptual contributions to the field of migration studies, which have deepened our understanding of migration processes (Alm 2018). It is certainly true that questions of belonging and membership for migrants normatively challenge the foundational ideas of nation-state sovereignty and the make-up of civil society in membership, and they put in question ideas of political participation and political rights (Halfmann 2005: 129, 146). It is also true, as Bloemraad notes, that an over-emphasis on states might blind us to the spatial differences for immigrants' lives within them: "immigrants' lives are very different in Berlin compared to a small town in Bavaria" (Bloemraad 2013: 34f.). It would however be misleading to conclude that states, therefore, do not matter in migration studies. This idea might be more of a normative desire by some migration researchers than an empirical reality for those migrating. On the contrary – I hold that while immigrant communities and diasporas may have become increasingly transnationalized, those making the rules for migration, who gets to come, who gets to stay, who has to leave, who becomes a member and how, are exclusively made by states. This certainly creates a tension, but it also reemphasizes the importance of states and their politics for migration. As Freeman carefully notes on the debate of whether states are important units of analysis in migration research:

To the extent that states have been central to immigration studies, they have played in a debate over the continuing viability of sovereign nation-states in an era of intensifying globalization. This argument between proponents of globalization and skeptics who claim that state sovereignty persists has been entertaining, but may be distancing us from the more specific exploration of varieties of state structures and their linkages to variants of immigration policy. (Freeman 2005: 122)

This is echoed by Augie Fleras, who also points out that the state is "unlikely to disappear as an organizing principle or lose its influence or legitimacy" (Fleras 2015: 367). The question therefore ought not to be whether states should play a role or not, but rather for which purposes they are analysed in migration studies. In this research project, the purpose is to discern the historical trajectory of each country case's migration politics in doing so, understand how the political fields of immigration, citizenship, and integration are connected for each country cases. The logic of this research project therefore explicitly places these cases' politics as the primary unit of research in the middle of its research aim. This is significant because it does not mean that my project disregards the insights from transnational research. On the contrary, as the theoretical part of this thesis shows, I explicitly take their insights and unique conceptual vocabulary into account, since I believe that it significantly enriches our understanding of migration processes. Nevertheless, the research approach chosen for this project is particularly suited for the study of big state structures and their development over time. It allows for multicausality (as "how"-questions usually do) and does not aim to understand specific immigrant groups or the impact of immigration on just one city or immigration routes or only one area of immigration. It is rather the aim to develop a large overarching conceptual contribution to how these countries' historical development in migration politics ought to be understood for further research. Bloemraad's seminal essay on comparative research designs for migration studies put this aptly: "The goal is to examine how structures, cultures, processes, norms, or institutions affect outcomes through the combination and intersection of causal mechanisms." (Bloemraad 2013, 28). To show how exactly this approach is applied in this project, the next section gives an insight into the field of the specific approach chosen for this thesis, which is comparative-historical analysis.

3.2 Comparative-Historical Analysis: Situating this Project within the Research Paradigm

In this subchapter, I explain the approach of comparative-historical analysis (CHA), I expand on the salience of time for this research approach, and lastly, I elaborate how this research approach is applied in this research project with the framework of critical junctures.

3.2.1 What is Comparative-Historical Analysis?

Comparative-historical analysis (CHA) is a subfield of historical sociology which looks back on a long and rich tradition of scholarly research (Lange 2013: 22). Often used in the context of political science research, CHA is held to "bridge the gap between sociology and political science" (ibid.: 34), with many of the founding figures of the social sciences using the approach of CHA to contribute to political analyses of the social world. These include the works of Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Max Weber (ibid: 22f.). The founders of this tradition also set the precedent for the major themes and phenomena that are studied in CHA research, which usually comprise large-scale and macro-level "social change and development", tackling large processes such as how states are formed, how the economy works, how regimes change, war and peace, the origins and maintenance of inequality, among many other phenomena, predominantly in Europe (ibid.: 33f.). The newer generation includes researchers Theda Skocpol, Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly, Margaret Somers and many more. This generation brought new subjects to CHA research, such as social movements and democratization processes, and broadened the geographic scope of beyond Europe and the Global North, while also contributing important methodological considerations on CHA to its framework, which will be discussed below.

As I explained in section 3.1 of this chapter for small-n comparative research, CHA distinguishes itself from quantitative analyses ostensibly by its epistemological interest (*Erkenntnisinteresse*). As Borchert (1995: 85f.) puts it, while quantitative approaches keep the number of variables limited to examine many cases, the comparativist approach restricts its cases to conduct a more expansive analysis. In this approach, the researcher does not set out to prove or disprove hypotheses but rather aspires to reach her findings through an "inductive application of the theories, typologies, and categories" discussed in the project's theoretical framework (Borchert 1995). It is therefore helpful to conceive of CHA less as a method and more as a *research strategy* that aims to discern historical mechanisms in its causal analysis and in doing so answer "how"-guided research questions (Borchert/Lessenich 2012b: 30).

Kathleen Thelen and James Mahoney succinctly describe CHA as a "problem-driven" research approach, meaning that researchers within this tradition "gravitate towards empirical puzzles anchored in particular times and places" (Thelen/Mahoney 2015: 13). The three key components of CHA according to these two researchers are "its focus on large-scale and often complex outcomes of enduring importance; its emphasis on empirically grounded, deep case-based research; and its attention to process and the temporal dimension of

politics" (ibid.: 3). CHA's strengths therefore lie in its relative openness and possibility to engage deeply with multicausal historical mechanisms to de- or reconstruct a historical narrative. It privileges a deep engagement with the particular history and complex specificities of each chosen case, all the while maintaining a careful relationship with theories, concepts, and categories to enhance our understanding of them (Steinmo 2008: 135; Borchert/Lessenich 2012a: 14; Bloemraad 2013: 31). This is true of all scholars within this comparativist tradition, including researchers who situate themselves in historical sociology (the broad umbrella of comparativist approaches) or historical institutionalism (which includes those who emphasise the part that institutions play in historical processes) (Morawska 2005: 223; Steinmo 2008: 123).

The enduring charm of CHA is its detachment from contemporary political science research that is "characterized by a feverish concern with data collection and theory testing" (Thelen/Mahoney 2015: 4). CHA opposes this approach by resolutely trying to generate theory and by not shying away from historical complexity and multicausality. In doing so, CHA contributes to our causal understanding of the origins of societal constellations in the present through this deep historical work and also "produces conceptual innovations of broad applicability" (ibid.: 14). The particular appeal of CHA also lies in its methodological plurality, the relative openness of its research aim, and the possibility to comprehensively understand why the studied cases historically evolved the way that they did.

Since CHA has a "macroscopic orientation", the cases studied in this research realm are usually nation-states, but they can also include "political movements, subnational territories, empires, and in a few cases, even whole civilisations and world systems" (Thelen/Mahoney 2015: 5). In their seminal work on different approaches to comparative history, Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers (1980: 175) distinguish between three different types of CHA, namely the "parallel demonstration of theory", the "contrast of context", and "macro-causal analysis". Each of these types of CHA has its strengths and shortcomings. Since the research presented in this thesis does not set out to prove a certain theory, my approach for the CHA of Canada, France and Germany combines both the "contrast of context" and aims at analyzing these contexts for their macro-causal differences and commonalities. By looking at the cases, contrasting them, and comparing them, I seek to reach, in the words of Skocpol and Somers (ibid.: 188) "bounded generalizations". While these might not be extended beyond the studied cases, their creation allows for further study in future research of this field.

In short, CHA ought to be understood as a research approach that builds on a Weberian small-n design with a multicausal long-term perspective on the

research matter. This explains why researchers that subscribe to this approach usually do not set out to test causal inferences with dependent or independent variables but take a more narrative look at their object of study (Mahoney/Thelen 2015; see also: Skocpol/Somers 1980; Pierson 2004). It also allows for several methods to collect empirical data for the analysis.

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, there is a strong case to be made for contrast-focused CHA. Most salient for this thesis is CHA's potential to make new conceptual contributions through complex "narratives of processes" (Della Porta 2008: 207). This means that this is a hypothesis-free, inductive study of cases, rather than a focus on pre-conceived causal relationships. With no intent to form overall generalizations, the CHA approach allows the researcher to come to new conclusions and to generate new conceptual contributions.

3.2.2 Time in Comparative-Historical Analysis: Taking History Seriously

Numerous social scientists have written extensively on the different uses of time in research (i. a. Pierson 2004, Lange 2013, Cohen 2018). In his seminal work "Politics in Time", Pierson (2004: 5) expresses his dismay at the turn in social sciences to merely treat "history as a site for generating more cases" (ibid.). He makes a passionate argument for a renewed attention to the "temporal dimensions of social processes" (ibid.: 10), which he considers being pivotal for our understanding of their origins and outcomes. As previously outlined, a Durkheimian approach generally uses time a-historically. Time is a device to accumulate more data to increase its external validity (Mahoney/Thelen 2015: 27). Broadly speaking, the historical dimension of a causal relationship is either only featured as an "illustration" (Pierson 2004), or not featured at all in its explanation (ibid., Della Porta 2008). In contrast, in the Weberian approach, time is generally perceived as a historical reality that contributes to the understanding of the case/s at hand. Rather than using time to accumulate more data, a case's or several cases' history is considered as the central object of study (and route to understanding) for researchers of this realm. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2015: 27) argue that this approach, made concrete in the approach of CHA, offers a large degree of internal validity, which means that the two approaches can "build on each other's findings in productive ways" (ibid.).

CHA takes history seriously (Steinmo 2008: 128). What differentiates CHA research from classic historiography, in which events are uncovered and recounted as they happened chronologically, is its treatment of historical time. The most important feature of CHA is the assumption that the past is essential for understanding the present. History is at the root for making causal claims about the present, and the value of CHA research lies in uncovering the causal relationships produced by the past (Hartmann 1995: 17f.). For this scientific endeavour, multicausality and context complexity are presupposed for understanding the large-scale phenomena under study. In fact, "CHA researchers believe that there is no alternative to analyzing the effects of causes in light of the context in which they occur", because "(…) abstracting a case from its context in the interest of parsimony can lead to deeply misleading results" (Thelen/Mahoney 2015: 8). In short, CHA researchers want to understand "genuine otherness among otherwise similar and therefore comparable societies" (Streeck 2015: 272) through tracing the origins of this otherness in its historical context. To do this, CHA researchers usually do not engage in historiographic work, but rather use historical accounts that already exist to build their arguments.

There are several ways in which CHA researchers can approach the rich historical materials that they seek to study. Well-known concepts within these approaches are process tracing, the uncovering of path dependencies, or critical junctures. For this research project, I use the analytical framework of critical junctures to conduct my analysis and build my arguments. The concept of critical junctures is "central to research on the crises, sequence, and timing of development, (…) continuity, and change" (Berins Collier/Collier 1991, 28). I will explain why and how this perspective is applied in the next section.

3.2.3 The Application of Comparative-Historical Analysis in this Research Project: Critical Junctures

What are Critical Junctures?
As part of the methodological paradigm of CHA, critical junctures have been part of a canon of research methods employed in comparative social science for more than half a century. While the terminological innovation goes back to researchers Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), the conceptual origins can be found in Max Weber's "idea of historical 'switchmen'" (Collier/Munck 2021:1).

David Collier offers a succinct "working definition" of critical junctures, which identifies the main qualifier for a historical event to be analysed as a critical juncture:

A critical juncture is (1) a *concentrated, macro episode of innovation* that (2) generates *an enduring legacy*. Two points should immediately be addressed. First, the fundamental requirement posited by this definition is that for an episode of innovation to be a critical juncture, it must generate an enduring legacy. *No legacy, no critical juncture.* In a spirit of healthy skepticism, scholars should recognize that the negative finding that a given episode of innovation is not a critical juncture is just as valuable as the positive finding that it is one. (Collier 2021:34; italics in the original).

At their core, critical junctures are moments of historical flux in which greater political change than usual is possible (Capoccia/Kelemen 2007: 341). Usually offset by a pivotal event, a political cleavage, or a "shock" which could be (but does not have to be) a crisis, they mark "major transitions" in the political handling of one or many major societal issues.

As David Collier helpfully puts it, there is both simplicity and complexity to the identification of critical junctures. It is self-evident that periods of major political transitions exist. There are a wide variety of words to describe these moments, such as "turning points, pivotal episode, choice point" or the well-known "watershed" (Collier 2021: 33). The complexity of working with the critical juncture framework is not necessarily the identification of a critical juncture, but rather the establishment of a solid causal claim through empirical evidence that shows the "enduring legacy" that the critical juncture is supposed to have produced (ibid.). Not every crisis or watershed moment necessarily sparks a critical juncture As Collier stresses above, every critical juncture must produce an enduring legacy (Berins Collier/Collier 1991: 29; Collier/Munck 2017: 6). It is the contingency of critical junctures, the multitude of possible outcomes, which make them fascinating subjects of study and helpful tools for CHA researchers (Capoccia/Kelemen 2007: 343).

How to identify and analyse a Critical Juncture
Hillel Soifer highlights that the concept of critical junctures emerged to help scholars distinguish different forms of 'turning points' in politics. It offers researchers the analytical vocabulary to explain how this period is "distinct from those that precede and follow it" (Soifer 2012:1592). As such, most researchers use critical junctures as part of comparative research designs involving a small number of cases to identify "similar historical processes in different units (for example countries, parties, interest groups), that involve critical junctures in

which the same actors act in a similar strategic environment and face similar challenges." (Capoccia/Kelemen 2007: 359)

To identify a critical juncture, it is important not to conflate the "shock" or crisis with which a critical juncture is triggered with the juncture itself (Collier/Munck 2017: 5). For instance, in the case of this thesis, the end of the Second World War itself is not a critical juncture, it is the shock that triggered a critical juncture, which, as the subsequent chapters show, can vary across cases. A critical juncture varies temporally, it can be swift or occur over several years, like Berins Collier and Collier argue (Berins Collier/Collier 1991: 32). Capoccia and Kelemen add a qualifier to this assertion: In their view, a critical juncture ought to be short "relative to the duration of the path-dependent process that it initiates". For instance, "treating an entire decade as a critical juncture with respect to an outcome observed a century later might be sensible. But it would not be sensible to consider a decade-long period a critical juncture with respect to an outcome observed only one year later" (Capoccia/Kelemen 2007: 350f.).

To work with critical junctures as an analytical tool, Collier and Munck (2017) and Collier (2021: 38) offer a five-step template, containing "a temporal chain, and also a causal chain". In this framework, a critical juncture begins with its *antecedent conditions*, which are comprised of different drivers or features of the economy, society, politics, and the state. Once *a cleavage or a shock* occurs, which are those kinds of "conflicts and crises that trigger the critical juncture", the actual *critical juncture* begins, which is an "episode of political and/or institutional innovation". The critical juncture is then followed by its aftermath, in which the *legacy* of the critical juncture is produced (Collier 2021:38). Once a possible critical juncture has been identified, the most useful approach for its analysis lies in "counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing" (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 343).

In this thesis, the concept of critical junctures will be used to identify periods that could possibly qualify as a critical juncture in each country respectively with regards to their treatment of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics. As the analysis will show, I identify a number of possible critical junctures for each country case and reconstruct the causal mechanisms of their enduring legacy using secondary literature analysis and empirical evidence drawn from the conducted expert interviews. After my analysis, I will conclude whether the analysed period qualifies as a critical juncture. Using critical junctures in this thesis offers both a pragmatic approach and novel analytical insight. Pragmatically, it helps divide up the decades of analysis into periods of significance for analysis. Analytically, I can trace how and why different periods of change occurred, whether they qualify as critical junctures and, in a last

step, compare the different country cases. In the ultimate part of this chapter, I explain the use of secondary literature analysis and expert interviews in the later analysis.

3.3 Empirical Analysis: Secondary Literature Analysis and Expert Interviews

The analytical approach of this thesis builds on the methods traditions proposed by previous comparative-historical analyses. In this chapter, I explain the twofold approach I have chosen for this thesis: Secondary literature analysis and expert interviews. The secondary analysis lies the foundation for the second method used for this thesis, which are expert interviews. This is a more unusual approach within comparative-historical analysis, but a common method employed for case studies and interpretative studies. In the subsection on the interviews, I explain my decision to conduct expert interviews and the ways in which the secondary literature analysis played apart both in the construction of the interview guide as well as the selection of the experts that I interviewed.

3.3.1 Secondary Literature Analysis

While the explicit inclusion of secondary literature in the analysis might be surprising to those stemming from more quantitative, Durkheimian research traditions, it is a common approach within CHA. As Borchert pointedly explains, the use of previous academic literature for the analysis of a complex set of cases within a large time frame is not merely a practical, but also a necessary decision to enable the feasibility of a research project (Borchert 1995: 91f.). Borchert pithily remarks that researchers conducting a secondary literature analysis have sometimes have to tackle with the reproach of conducting "unscientific" or "*horribile dictu* – journalistic" as opposed to 'real' research (ibid.). He counters this assertion, pointing out that a primary analysis of several large cases across a long period is "de facto not feasible". Also, I would add that this approach recognizes those who have already done the primary research rather than insisting on redoing primary research for the sake of it (Borchert 1995: 91f., also referencing Skocpol 1984: 382). Therefore, secondary literature analysis goes beyond a mere assessment of the state of the art, building the foundation of previous empirical work.

3.3.2 Expert Interviews: On the Use of Narrative Accounts for this Research Project

This subchapter explains the process of organizing, conducting, and analysing expert interviews. For this purpose, the subchapter is divided into three sub-sections. In section one I explain my decision to use expert interviews as narrative accounts for my project, I define expert interviews to delineate this approach from other kinds of qualitative interviews and I expand on the kind of data that can be discerned from this approach. In the second section, I explain the operationalization and general structure of the semi-structured, qualitative expert interviews according to the project's research question/s. I also explain which kind of experts were chosen for the project. In the third section, I report on my experience of the expert interview process, starting with the pre-test and with my general observations throughout the interviews in all three country cases, which were very varied and warrant their own little excursion. I conclude by giving an insight into how the interviews were transcribed and made ready for analysis with the use of the computer programs F4 (for transcription) and MAXQDA (for interview data coding). One important source for the construction of my interviews was Robert Kaiser's introduction to qualitative expert interviews (2014). This book guided me through the process of interview construction and the practical application of expert interviews.

Why Expert Interviews?
Three reasons convinced me to employ expert interviews as a mode of empirical data collection for this project. The first pertains to their general application within political science. Here expert interviews have gained significance either as low-stakes sources for political consulting or as qualitative sources for in-depth explanations of complex political processes in case studies. The second application is the most relevant to this study. Generally, as Kaiser (2014: 4) holds, expert interviews are well-suited for case-based research in political science. They are often employed in projects that seek a deeper *understanding* of the mechanisms behind political processes rather than the generalizations of research results. Political Sociology is held as one of the sub-disciplines where expert interviews are most often used (ibid.). Expert interviews are also used in instances where the researcher is looking for data that is not available in statistics or documents (ibid: 31).

The second reason for the use of expert interviews in this project is the kinds of narrative data that can be derived from them to answer my research question/s. The research question/s that guide this project seek an understanding that borders on narrative accounts of the historical trajectories, self-

conceptions, perceptions of 'national' identity, and interdependencies of political fields. The way that experts that were chosen for this project narrate each country's political development over the last 70 years therefore offers a deeper interpretation of the political developments and the concomitant self-conception and interdependencies. As I will explain further-on, the different kinds of knowledge that expert interviews present are particularly well-suited and the logical choice for this research project. The reconstruction and interpretation of the pivotal moments of change for each country case by an expert are particularly valuable as well (ibid.). This point will also become even more evident once I explicate the operationalization of the research question in the interview guidelines.

The third reason for the selection of expert interviews as one of the data sources is pragmatic. As Kaiser (ibid.) explains, expert interviews serve to broaden the scope of the possible insight that is gained from research. Within a research project, their role can either be supporting or central to asking the research question/s. In the case of this research, they are both, in that I seek new knowledge as well as 'reassuring knowledge' from the interviews that allows me to catch mistakes in my previous interpretation of the cases' trajectories (ibid.: 32). Among the persons selected as experts for interviews are several prominent academics in the field of migration research in the respective country cases. Their knowledge is also readily available in their publications. However, interviews with this specific group (the composition of the interviewees will be explained further on) served as reassurance on my understanding of each country case. Considering the depth and breadth of my research, it is unrealistic for me to grasp the whole of the academic literature available on each case for the whole timeframe. The experts' *context knowledge* (explained further below) therefore serves as an important reassurance of my research findings. I also use the academics' context knowledge insights as empirical sources for the historical accounts of each country case.

Expert interviews – Delineated and Defined
Kaiser delineates between three different kinds of qualitative interviews for political scientists: the ethnographic interview, the narrative interview, and the expert interview (ibid.: 3). They can be distinguished first and foremost by their epistemological interest: ethnographic interviews seek to discern attitudes of the interviewees; narrative interviews look at biographical developments and expert interviews seek general information. Ethnographic and narrative interviews tend to be quite open in their structure, whereas expert interviews, despite a high grade of flexibility, do have a structure to them to enable easy across-interviewee comparison (ibid.).

Qualitative expert interviews are then defined as: "a systematic and theory-guided method of data collection in the form of interviews with persons who dispose of exclusive knowledge on modes of political negotiation and decision making or strategies, instruments and implications of politics" (ibid.: 6). There are three different kinds of expert interviews that the researcher can employ. They either use the expert interview *exploratively*, collecting information on an undertheorized topic or for further deepening their later analysis. Researchers using a *semi-structured* expert interview, conversely, are in search of hard facts and data that they could not find elsewhere. The data derived from this type of expert interview serves to answer a very precise, already determined research question. Lastly, with a *plausibility* interview, the researcher seeks to find out which parts of their research could be implemented in policy and be of use to policymakers generally.

In this project, the approach falls between the explorative and the semi-guided expert interview, as the interview itself contains narrative elements since it pertains to historical developments and interpretative accounts of the country's self-conception. There is an element here which is, therefore, less functional, and more focused on the way the experts of each country case talk about the case and the commonalities (and differences) in interpreting the cases' historical trajectory. As the following sections of this chapter will clarify, the selection of the experts for this project was explicitly diverse and varied to allow for a variance of perspective and ideas.

Theoretical Perspectives on Knowledge Production in Expert Interviews
As previously clarified, expert interviews are particularly well-suited for qualitative case studies that seek to understand causal mechanisms. They do this by enriching them with contextual, processual, and interpretative knowledge by (political) actors considered relevant for the case (Kaiser 2014: 5). *Context knowledge* is often a repetition of already available knowledge, but it helps reassure the researcher that her previously established claims are sound. *Process knowledge* is often given by people who were involved in the decision-making processes or who bore witness to the internal political dynamics during certain periods. *Interpretative knowledge* allows the interviewees to offer their insight into how a particular development or interplay should be perceived (ibid.).

Before operationalizing the research questions and conducting the interviews, the researcher must reflect on the kinds of knowledge she seeks from their interview partners (ibid. 129). Kaiser recommends that all types of knowledge be connected within the interview (ibid.). The challenge for the researcher then lies in asking the right kind of questions that make the

interviewee depart from generally available knowledge to reveal other types of knowledge during their conversation. In the case of my research, all three kinds of knowledge are relevant: Context knowledge, although possibly offering no novel information about the cases, serves to reassure me that my prior assumptions about the cases are correct and that I am on the figurative right path. Process knowledge is valuable because it is revelatory of the mechanisms behind decision-making in each country case and also enriches my knowledge about the institutional habits that shape these political fields in the respective countries. Interpretative knowledge appears to be the most valuable and novel knowledge I attain through the interviews. With questions aiming to discern experts' interpretation of each country's trajectory, I am able to deduce both the political vocabulary associated with the political fields and the self-conception associated with each country case.

Theoretical Considerations on Representativity and the Selection of Interview Partners

From a theoretical perspective, many actors qualify as possible experts for expert interviews in political science. As the previous section showed, the expert selection should therefore also be made on the grounds of what kind of knowledge a researcher seeks. When choosing experts to interview, Kaiser makes one important point that is worth quoting in full, which is that

qualitative expert interviews do not aim at producing generalizable results beyond the case that is being examined. Rather, they seek to gain a deeper understanding of the case based on systematic analysis. This difference is pertinent and has a direct influence on the process of selecting suitable experts. Because we are not looking for generalizable results, we do not have to strive for representativity or interview all relevant experts. Rather, we can select experts purely based on the research content they could provide. The composition of experts is a central part of the research design and needs to be justified. (Kaiser 2014: 72)

Kaiser also writes that journalists or other qualified specialists should not be dismissed from the realm of experts, because their broader perspectives might sometimes be deeper than even those of actors directly involved in decision-making processes (ibid.: 39). Therefore, the choice of attributing expert status to an interview partner falls to the researcher and warrants further explanation within the research project (ibid.). However, Kaiser recommends looking for possible interview partners at the so-called "middle-hierarchy level" (*mittlere Hierarchiebene*, ibid. 130). He holds that actors at this level have often been in the field for a longer period and are therefore better able to evaluate periods of change. It makes more sense, therefore, to interview public servants who have been directors of relevant units for a longer period rather than a minister.

Since I wanted to keep the scope of my project large and gain several insights from different kinds of experts in the political fields under research, I identified three different groups as possible interview partners for my project: Academics, public servants, and practitioners in the field. Altogether, I interviewed 43 people, composed of 23 academics, 15 public servants, and five practitioners. I further elaborate on the composition of each group for each country case in the following section, where I delve deeper into my experiences in sampling for each country case and the challenges that I faced in this process. In that subsection, I will also give an insight into the demographic composition. From a theoretical perspective, the choice to interview three different kinds of experts was logical, because I assumed that each group would have different stories to tell and therefore different insights to contribute.

From the academics I wanted to gain the aforementioned reassurance on my historical research assumptions – however, particularly in the cases of France and Canada, academics were often also involved in political decision-making at one point in their careers, either as invited experts on government commissions or because they had decided to switch careers into academia later-on in life. Vice versa, several public servants I interviewed had spent some time in academia, until at least the Ph.D. level, which proved them to be excellent interview partners. Interviews with academics were therefore particularly helpful because I was also able to stay on top of the current research topics investigated in the field in each country case and I could gain insight into the academic networks in each country.

The decision to speak with public servants stemmed from my interest in the mechanisms behind political decision-making and I hoped to gain insights into the internal reaction to big and decisive events in the history of each country's trajectory, so their *process knowledge*. Additionally, I was convinced that public servants who had served in the field for a very long time had an 'institutional memory' of the change that had occurred in each system that would be helpful. Lastly, I wanted to find out whether there was an institutional vocabulary or logic to migration politics decision-making in the respective public services. Because of my sampling, I was able to interview people who had been in the room when Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that he wanted Canada to take in 40,000 refugees. I also interviewed people who were part of naturalization campaigns in the German case, or people who had been part of the inter-ministerial task forces right after the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees in the summer of 2015. Their perspective on these events and the way that they impacted institutional change was incredibly valuable. I also included voices from the local, regional, and federal levels as best as possible.

Lastly, the broader group of practitioners was a way for me to include more voices outside of public service and academia, but of people who were nevertheless part of the expert group on migration politics. These included journalists, people from independent think tanks, or people who had otherwise been in the field as advisors, activists, or authors. It was also a way for me to include more diverse voices because both academia and public service tend to be white and middle-class spaces that do not necessarily include immigrant voices, as my sampling will show. This tendency was intensified by my decision to interview people who had been in the field for a longer period.

Before starting my data collection, a question I was often asked at conferences or workshops was why I was not explicitly interviewing immigrants for my project, or why that group was not considered an expert group. I concede that this might strike one as odd in a research project on migration politics. However, my research interest lies not in the specific experiences of immigrants in each country, but rather in the trajectory of each country's migration politics. Decisions for this trajectory were usually exclusively made by people who were not immigrants themselves, as is often still the case. Therefore, I would not be able to understand the internal reasoning behind the decision-making, and the interpretation of how those decisions were impacted by self-conceptions or vice versa, by interviewing immigrants themselves. Considering the growing diversity of stakeholders, decisionmakers and academics in the field, I used the practitioners' group to include those voices, which is also why I did not adhere to my rule to only interview people who had been in the field for a long time for this group of people. Interviewing them was particularly helpful for gaining *interpretative knowledge* on the cases' trajectories. However, interpretative knowledge was to be gained from all three of these groups, and I can retrospectively confirm that this was the case.

Constructing Expert Interviews: Operationalization, Pre-testing, and Ethical Considerations

The first task in constructing an expert interview is to transform the project's guiding research question/s into less academic, more to-the-point question items. According to Kaiser, this is the most challenging step in the research process and therefore takes some time and effort, since this process of operationalization is foundational for the later interviews since it is the complex construction of an "instrument" for data collection (Kaiser 2014: 53). In the case of my research, the process of coming up with a comprehensive interview involved five steps. This multi-step process took about two to three months (April to June 2020). Altogether, the process of conceptualization until the first

post-pre-test interview took from April to September 2020, fulfilling Kaiser's time prediction of six months preparation time.

Steps 1 and 2 – Theoretical Reflection and initial Operationalization

In a first step, I reflected on and clarified the reasons for this method and the general overarching research aim that the interviews were meant to fulfill (out-lined above). This was done in tandem with my supervisor. The second step was more hands-on. After diving deep into the historical literature on the country cases, I accumulated enough knowledge on the Canadian case to construct this interview guide first. I divided my research questions into different topical blocks, which I then subdivided into different sets of "guiding questions" (*Leitfragen*, Kaiser 2014: 5). The big thematic blocks I came up with were the country's historical trajectory, self-conception, the immigration-integration-citizenship nexus (at the time still called synergy between immigration, integration, and citizenship), a comparative dimension, and an actor-specific question (depending on the interviewee).

Before I divided these into further subsets of specific questions, I reflected on the structure of the interview and the different question types that could be asked, keeping in mind the necessary flexibility I would have to maintain to adapt to the interviewee, their available timeframe, and the specific expert knowledge they could provide me with. I proceeded to deduct specific subsets of questions from my initial operationalization, which led to steps 3 and 4 of the process.

Steps 3 and 4 – Specific Interview Questions and Pre-Testing

After coming up with the thematic blocks and reflecting on the types of questions I wanted to ask, I also had to work out what time frame I was anticipating for the interviews. According to Kaiser, a good expert interview should take about 1.5 to 2 hours. After trying out different types of questions and discussing them in Ph.D. colloquia and with my supervisor, I deducted a final set of around 20 questions per case (the interviews for all three cases are attached in the appendix). While the questions on the historical trajectory differed depending on the case, questions regarding self-conception, the nexus, and the comparative dimension could usually be translated almost completely for the other cases. I made sure to come up with a very broad introductory question for each case to 'get the interviewee talking'. The interview process was held open, and sometimes we spoke at length on once issue, while maybe leaving out another. I made sure that each category appeared in each interview, sometimes emphasizing one issue depending on the expert's particular knowledge (e. g. if they

were experts on a certain period or historical event, or if they had been present for moments of salient political change). The following interview guide should therefore be conceived as such, a guide, rather than a comprehensive questionnaire.

Table 3.1: Outline of the Expert Interview, Canadian Case

INTRODUCTORY QUESTION:
Since the middle of the century, Canada has become one of the paradigmatic immigration societies in the world. Internationally, it even enjoys a reputation as a "poster boy" of multiculturalism. In academic discourse, immigration is seen as part of the Canadian nation-building process. What is your point of view on this development?

Questions on the HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY:
Before 1945, Canada was considered the a 'white-man's country'. What were the political motivations for changing this image afterwards? Do you think Canadians were okay with this change at the time?

The 1967 points system appears to be a paradigm shift in the Canadian immigration system and soon after, Canadian multiculturalism was introduced in 1971. What is your perspective on those years?

In 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms [part of the Canadian Constitution] was incorporated into law, which is considered pivotal in Canadian political history. What has changed in Canada's image of itself when it comes to immigrant diversity?

In 2015, Trudeau was elected. What differences are there between the Harper government and Trudeau regarding immigration, citizenship, and integration politics?

Questions on SELF-CONCEPTION:
In your opinion, how do new immigrants perceive their status of belonging to Canada? How is this different from the last century? What sense of belonging do immigrant integration measures in Canada give new Canadians? In your opinion, has this objective been achieved?

Questions on the SYNERGY OF IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND INTEGRATION:
How would you describe the interweaving of citizenship? It is often assumed that citizenship has some sort of hinge function in the immigration and integration process. In this context, how would you position the role of citizenship in relation to multiculturalism and immigration?

Questions on the INTERNATIONAL IMAGE:
How would you describe Canada's international image in terms of immigration, citizenship and integration? Do you think immigrants to Canada would adapt to Canada's international image? How would their vision of Canada be different? Does it depend on the immigrant group? What image do you think Canadian politicians would like to give of immigration, citizenship, and integration in Canada??

Questions on the COMPARATIVE DIMENSION:
How do you assess the development of Canada compared to other countries? How do you think Canadians see continental Europe in terms of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics? Are there any countries that Canada looks to for inspiration?

Questions for ACADEMICS:
What is your experience of this research culture and tradition on migration politics in Canada?

CONCLUDING QUESTION:
Who do you think belongs to Canada from a Canadian perspective? From your perspective, are there some people I should talk to for this project?

As this shows, the first section was dedicated to the historical trajectory. After reading up on the pivotal moments of change in Canadian migration politics since 1945, I decided to ask several structuring questions to take the interviewee through the trajectory and find out blind spots that I had missed. In the second part of the interview, I delved deeper into the self-conception and interpretative knowledge on the immigration-citizenship-integration politics-nexus. The final part of the interview included concrete questions on the comparative dimension. A final question on belonging was meant to open the floor for broad claims and interpretations. Lastly, I included one question item specific to the interview group.

Having come up with this initial interview structure, the next important step for conducting the interviews is a pre-test. The pre-test for this interview was conducted in July 2020 with an academic with expert knowledge on the Canadian case, who was contacted via e-mail. The interview was conducted over the phone with a digital recording device on hand because the expert felt most comfortable in that setting. This was of course a challenge because no eye contact could be established, and I had to rely entirely on my voice to guide the interviewee through the interview. The interview took just under two hours and went well. Based on this experience, I felt that I hardly had to make any

changes to the interview guide and proceeded to contact possible interviewees for the period of autumn 2020. Retrospectively, I am convinced that this pretest was essential for conducting the later interviews because it presented a low-stakes situation which allowed me to build the necessary confidence in my interview guide and my interviewing skills for later interviews.

Step 5 – Ethical Considerations
Like with all other kinds of qualitative research interviews, the researcher must abide by several ethical rules to conduct expert interviews. These include the protection of personal data, getting the interviewee's informed consent for the interview (which they can withdraw at any later point), and confidentiality regarding certain parts of the interviews that might be considered confidential (like off-mic comments) (Kaiser 2014: 49). Anonymity is a tricky question for expert interviews. In a way, laying open the identity of the interviewees demonstrates the range of experts that were consulted and significantly enhances the research results' outward validity. Some researchers do not offer anonymity for expert interviews, because they consider the content of the interviews to be largely impersonal. However, especially in the case of a politically controversial subject such as migration politics, I considered that many interviewees might speak more freely if their identities were kept anonymous. Also, in many cases, public servants and activists or practitioners might share insightful information with me anonymously that they would otherwise not expose. I therefore decided to offer anonymity as a default. To make sure that the internal validity of the research was maintained, I shared the names and functions of my interview partners with my first and second supervisors (on strictly confidential grounds), who as experts themselves were able to determine whether my expert selection was sound. This strengthened the internal validity of the expert selection.

I always began my interviews with a non-recorded section in which I explained the purpose of the interview and the use of the data, also offering to send the anonymized transcript to the interviewee if they wished so. After recording, I anonymized the interviews so that the interviewee's identity could not be deduced (eliminating city names, specific job post titles or other personal information). I also did not transcribe interview sections that were explicitly 'off-mic' and therefore extra confidential. Additionally, I created a "document of informed consent" in all three languages to be signed by every interviewee.

Conducting Expert Interviews: Sampling, Interview Observations, Transcription, and Coding

In this section, I will describe my expert sampling process, experiences gained from the actual interview processes and, in the last section, how the interviews which software tools were used to transcribe and code the interviews.

As Kaiser explains, one integral part of including expert interviews as a method of data collection includes the disclosure on how experts interview partners were acquired, including the difficulties in the process of sampling the interview partners, which this section will cover (Kaiser 2014: 72). Connecting to the above section on theoretical considerations of expert selection, this section will also summarize my interview partners' composition on some demographic grounds and with regards to their backgrounds.

I can confirm Kaiser's (2014: 134) claim that the process of choosing and contacting experts requires time, patience, perseverance, and, sometimes, a certain level of diplomacy as well as detective work. The first potential interviewees I contacted were experts for the German case. Knowing the research field, I already knew which academics I would like to contact. I also knew which institutions I would like to speak to at the federal and *land* level, including the ministry of interior, the ministry of labour, the BAMF (federal office for migration and refugees), the office of the state representative for migrants and refugees and persons from land-level ministries of integration. I acquired interview partners for all these government agencies. I also had acquired some previous contacts through contacts at conferences and workshops, which I was able to tap into.

I contacted the German experts both by e-mail and by postal mail, which was recommended by Kaiser (2014: 78). I included my interview request, an academic CV, and a short overview of the interview contents. The postal mail was sent from the professorship's university office. I had to be sensitive to the fact that in German bureaucratic culture, official names and documentation matters. This approach proved to be quite successful, and I acquired several interview partners from the academic and public servant groups swiftly. I was also aware that the group of academics would include an interdisciplinary mix of people since migration politics is researched in all kinds of disciplines. For the Canadian interviews, I contacted potential interviewees mostly by e-mail from my university e-mail account, which sufficed. However, through previously established contacts, I was able to include in my messages that I had not chosen these experts at random but rather because they had been recommended to me. This also often proved to be a helpful tool in acquiring interview partners. Before contacting an interview partner, I tried to discern from available

online information how long they had been in the field. At the end of each interview, I asked the interview partner who they think I should speak to based on our conversation. It was also pertinent to me when a person was mentioned several times by several other interviewees as someone I should talk to. Some ministries, like the Ministry of the Interior in the German case, were guarded and declined a request to be interviewed several times. It was only through contacts with other experts that I was able to obtain an interview partner and it took careful requests on my part to be put in touch with these interview partners. In the case of the French interview partners, contact acquisition was quite tough. I was able to start off with some previously established contacts, but in the case of some interviewees I had to resort to more creative contact options (e. g. Twitter). I was often stood up for arranged interviews, and I often had to be persistent, in one case staying in touch with someone for well over a year until they conceded to finally being interviewed.

Generally, I observed that time and patience were key in contacting interviewees. This, as well as attention to the people who were mentioned to me by other interviewees as validation and reassurance that I had tapped into the right group of people. The following table summarizes the composition of the expert interviewees in an anonymized fashion.[29] In addition to gender and approximate age, I also include whether the interviewed person has their own migration experience, which I characterize as either having immigrated to the respective country yourself or the parents' generation having immigrated, therefore coining your lived experience.

Table 3.2: Overview of Expert Interviews, Canadian Case

Code	Extra Information	Duration
CAC1	Academic in Political Science, male, 75 years old (y. o.), no migration experience	2 h
CAC2	Academic in Geography, male, 55 y. o., migration experience	1 h
CAC3	Academic in Political Science, male, 55 y. o., migration experience	1.5 h
CAC4	Academic in Political Science, male, 70 y. o., migration experience	2 h
CAC5	Academic in Political Science, female, 55 y. o., migration experience	1.5 h

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29 To maintain anonymity, ages are approximate. For simplicity, interview duration is also approximate.

CAC6	Academic in Sociology, female, 55 y. o., n./a.	1 h
CAC7	Academic in Political Science, female, 40 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
CAC8	Academic in Sociology, female, 70 y. o., migration experience	1.5 h
CAC9	Academic in Sociology, male, 55 y. o., migration experience	1.5 h
CAC10	Academic in Sociology, male, 55 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
CPS1	Public Servant in Foreign Service, male, 70 y. o., no migration experience	1 h
CPS2	Public Servant in Foreign Service and Federal Level, male, 55 y. o., migration experience	2 h
CPS3	Public Servant in Foreign Service and Federal Level, male, 60 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
CPS4	Public Servant at Municipal Level, female, 55 y. o., migration experience	1 h
CPS5	Public Servant at Federal Level, male, 50 y. o., migration experience	1.5 h
CPS6	Public Servant in Foreign Service and at Federal Level, male, 80 y. o., no migration experience	2 h
CP1	Practitioner organizing between Academia and State Politics, male, 70 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
CP2	Practitioner in Journalism, male, 50 y. o., migration experience	2 h
Extra Talks	2, with academics	2 h
Follow-ups	2, with public servants	2 h

Altogether I held 18 interviews for the Canadian case, and an additional four informal conversations which I also transcribed. Most experts were male (13/18) and half had migration experience (9/18). The approximate average age of the Canadian interviewees is 60 years. Interview acquisition went very smoothly in the Canadian case, with people mostly open to meeting planned or spontaneously, and some wanting to meet up a few times due to their interest in the project. The length of the interviews is also telling. Most interviewees were open to my questions and took a lot of time in answering the questions, providing very helpful insights.

Table 3.3: Overview of Expert Interviews, French Case

Code	Extra Information	Duration
FAC1	Academic in History, male, 65 y. o., no migration experience	2 h
FAC2	Academic in Political Science, female, 55 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
FAC3	Academic in History, male, 65 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
FAC4	Academic in Sociology, male, 45 y. o., no migration experience	45 mins
FAC5	Academic in History, male, 60 y. o., no migration experience	15 mins
FAC6	Academic in Sociology, male, 55 y. o., no migration experience	1 h
FAC7	Academic in Sociology, male, 60 y. o., no migration experience	1 h
FPS1	Public Servant in French Ministry, male, 40 y. o., no migration experience	1 h
FPS2	Public Servant in French Ministry, male, 35 y. o., migration experience	1 h
FP1	Expert Practitioner from the OECD, female, 35 y. o., migration experience	1 h
FP2	Former high-ranking French government official and active politician, male, 65 y. o., migration background	1 h

Overall, I interviewed eleven experts for the French case. Most were male (9/11), three had migration experience, and the approximate average age of the interviewees was 52. The number of expert interviews and their average length contrasts with the German and Canadian cases. I experienced difficulties in setting up interviews with French experts, which was both due to pandemic circumstances and to an overall difficulty in responsiveness and reliability for French interview partners. Overall, this shows how the collection of empirical material in the French case was a cumbersome experience in comparison to the German and Canadian cases, but I learned a lot about persistence and confidence as a qualitative researcher. It also resulted in a slightly lower number of interviews, which I had to accept due to pragmatic reasons.

Table 3.4: Overview of Expert Interviews, German Case

Code	Extra Information	Duration
GAC1	Academic in Political Science, male, 55 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
GAC2	Academic in Political Science, male, 55 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
GAC3	Academic in Political Science, male, 80 y. o., migration experience	1.5 h
GAC4	Academic in History, male, 60 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
GAC 5	Academic in Sociology and Political Science, male, 55 y. o., migration experience	1 h
GAC6	Academic in Pedagogy, female, 55 y. o., migration experience	1.5 h
GPS1	Public Servant at the Laender Level, male, 65 y. o., no migration experience	2 h
GPS2	Public Servant at the Federal Level in Government Agency, male, 55 y. o., no migration experience	1.5 h
GPS3	Public Servant at the Federal Level, male, 65 y. o., no migration experience	2 h
GPS4	Public Servant at the Local Level, male, 60 y. o, no migration experience	1 h
GPS5	Public Servant at the Federal Level in Ministry, male, 50 y. o., no migration experience	1 h
GPS6	Public Servant at the Federal Level in Ministry, male, 50 y. o., no migration experience	1 h
GPS 7	Public Servant at the Federal Level in Ministry, female, 55 y. o., no migration experience	1 h
GP1	Author and Activist, male, 25 y. o., migration experience	1 h

I interviewed 14 people for the German case. Most were male (12/14) and four had migration experience. The approximate average age of the interviewees in the German case was 56. Interview acquisition went smoothly in the German case.

Experiences and Challenges during the Expert Interviews
Holding qualitative interviews during the COVID-19 pandemic meant that I had to be flexible regarding the format of interviewing experts. My first

interviews after the pre-test were held in September and October 2020 during a period in which pandemic restrictions allowed for interviews (in person, with a mask) and interviews outside. The bulk of the interviews for the German and Canadian cases, which were held in early 2021 (January to May), were all conducted online and sometimes, by request, by telephone call. Later in 2021, I was able to meet people in person again, this time during my research stay in Canada. In the case of the French interviews, half were held online and the other half in person during several research trips to France in 2022.

In most cases, the interview process was insightful and went well. I was prepared for most of the challenges I encountered. Kaiser (2014: 78f.) warns of several interaction effects that could occur during expert interviews. Of these, I encountered two: The *iceberg effect*, which meant that some interviewees were a little stand-offish and skeptical about the interview situation. This required a level of flexibility and diplomacy on my part. I solved this interaction effect first by assuring them of my "co-expert-status" (ibid.: 55). Through explaining my project again at the beginning of the interview and adding my own knowledge during the conversation, I could assure the interviewees that I was knowledgeable on the field despite my age. Often, this would work, and the interviewee would open up more once they had realized that I was not entirely new to the field.

The second interaction effect that I encountered rather frequently was the *paternalism-effect* (ibid.: 78). This means that the interviewee overexplains or talks down to the interviewer due to a real or perceived difference in hierarchy and knowledge between interviewee and interviewer. This interaction usually worked to my advantage and did not have any negative effects on the research. I would usually acknowledge the interviewee's long professional experience in the field, and I would have to make sure to intervene when the interviewee would monologize. That said, there were two or three interviews in which the interviewees were not responsive to my efforts in intervening to guide them back to the interview.

Having held interviews online, in person, and on the phone, I would have to concede that interviews in person were often the most pleasant and straightforward conversations, closely followed by interviews on Zoom. Interviews on Zoom gave the interviewee and me several advantages, such as the fact that I was able to interview people all over Canada, France, and Germany from my desk in Germany. Because the contents of the interview were not deeply personal, I would consider online interviews a sufficient replacement for expert interviews in person, especially during the pandemic and when experts from several country cases are consulted. That said, interviews on the phone were the least pleasant for me because I had difficulty guiding the conversation

without being able to maintain a rapport through eye contact, nodding, and other forms of active listening.

Overall, I was convinced by my choice of data collection both from the perspective of the valuable contribution it made to my research and the experience I gained as a qualitative researcher. I could notice my level of ease and professionalism increasing throughout the process and I would find myself in interviews where I could gauge early on how to steer the conversation to guarantee a positive outcome. In the case of several Canadian experts, I met them again for an informal exchange after our interviews during my research stay in Canada, often having pleasant conversations regarding my project and other things connected to the work.

Post-Interview Process – Protocols, Transcription, and Coding
I followed Kaiser's advice and wrote protocols for each interview, noting down things that were special about the interview, challenges that had occurred during the interview process, and other information such as timespan of the interview, date, and place, position, age, and contact information of the interviewee, etc. According to Kaiser (2014: 33), keeping records of the interviews also not only allows for this information to be saved but also enables the researcher to write down irritations or questionable moments, which need to be considered in later reflections on the results of the respective interview. This turned out to be a valuable source for this chapter later because I could discern the above-mentioned difficulties I encountered most from these protocols. This also included the step of anonymizing the interviews and giving each interviewee their name code that is used throughout this thesis when people are quoted. The logic behind the interview name codes is this: C, F, or G for the country, and then AC, PS, or P for an academic, public servant, or practitioner, followed by the order in which the people were interviewed. GPS4 would therefore be the fourth German public servant I had interviewed. I would periodically transfer the information of the handwritten protocols into a password-protected excel-sheet to maintain an overview of the experts and the important data points for later analysis.

All interviews were recorded on a digital recording device and then transcribed.[30] I transcribed the interviews without including filler words or long

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30 There were two software programs that I used for transcription and analysis. For transcription, I used f4 as a transcription program. To auto-transcribe the audio files I used the in-built f4 auto-transcription service (for German) or the Wreilly online auto-transcription service (for English). While these programs helped a little, a lot had to be done after the auto-transcription to correct and sharpen the interview transcript. I was able to acquire transcription funding for the French interviews.

pauses, concentrating mainly on the content. As described above, I would anonymise them by hand during or after the interview transcription process. After transcription, I uploaded the interviews into MAXQDA, where I developed codes to prepare the interviews for later analysis. Considering the size of the corpus (around 650 pages), the use of MAXQDA allowed me to establish an order in the contents of the interviews and to exclude information that I deemed unnecessary for the later analysis.

3.4 Interim Conclusion: CHA, Critical Junctures, and Expert Interviews

In this chapter I covered the methodological approach for this project's research design by explaining the theoretical and pragmatic considerations behind it. I began by explaining the theoretical considerations for comparison within political science, highlighting two contrasting epistemological approaches within the science and positioning this project within the Weberian approach of using small-n comparative projects to *understand* an issue in its complexity. I proceeded to explain comparative-historical analysis as a research approach. Conceiving of CHA as an approach rather than a clear-cut method is essential. There are several methods that can be used within a CHA project. However, a CHA project will usually include secondary literature analysis, to allow the researcher to understand the breadth and depth of the subject at hand. I also explained that CHA is most suited for small-n case comparisons on the big subjects in social science, such as state construction, wars, democratization processes or the emergence of party systems. All three countries studied in this project are amongst the ten most important immigration countries worldwide today. This leads me to argue that migration politics have historically played and continue to play a major role worth exploring in a CHA.

Within the CHA 'toolbox', I apply the framework of critical junctures to discern the periods that warrant closer analysis. I seek to determine critical junctures in the migration politics of each country, conceived of as the interplay between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics. I also explained the methods used in this project, namely secondary literature analysis and expert interviews. I dedicated substantial sections to expert interviews to demonstrate the complexity of preparing, conducting, and evaluating expert interviews.

To summarize, this work presented in this thesis can be characterized as a qualitative, Weberian, small-n, comparative-historical research project using

secondary literature analysis and the collection of novel empirical data in in-depth expert interviews. This design allows for an inductive, interpretative, flexible approach to a substantive corpus of knowledge upon which the answers to the project's research question/s will be based. Central to this methodology is the acknowledgment that historical time plays a pivotal role in answering the proposed research questions.

4. State of the Art: Contributions and Gaps in Comparative Migration Research on Canada, France, and Germany

Questions of migration and statehood are historically intertwined: Territorial boundaries and states' interest in controlling movement across and regulating settlement within those territorial boundaries produced a tension which resulted in the increasing desire by states to administer territorial borders since the late 19th century. As Stephen Castles et al. highlight, "the defining feature of the age of migration", starting in the middle of the 20th century, is the way in which immigration is tied up with questions of state sovereignty (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 5). The pertinence of studying immigration countries derives from this development. Hence, my primary focus in this chapter on the state of the art is comparative research that has been conducted on migration politics analytically focusing on the nation-state dimension.

This project builds on a significant body of research on the country cases and their respective politics of immigration, citizenship, and integration; and the analysis of the existent research forms a major foundation of this thesis. In this chapter on the state of the art, I present a synthesis on the major data points and analytical insights that can be gained from cross-country data and academic literature, as well as a discussion on previous comparative-historical works which have inspired and guided this project. With the insights provided in this chapter, I intend to set the stage for the subsequent analysis in the following chapters.

This chapter therefore serves three distinct purposes: Firstly, it provides a succinct overview of global migration history and data to provide the reader with the necessary contextual information on the later analysis. This step includes an overview of statistical data on global immigration movements, highlighting the three cases as a reference point within the data. Secondly, this chapter contains an account of comparative research on immigration, citizenship, and integration politics. Thirdly, in the final part of this chapter I establish the contributions and shortcomings of the current state of the art. Here, I highlight the foundational contributions that have already been made to the field, all the while pointing out the research gaps that I would like close with this project.

Some scholars have taken the comparative-historical approach of my research design. None have analyzed the same case constellation as I intend to.

Their approaches nonetheless guide my research and the empirical material consulted. To provide a clear segue on how I intend to link my research to previous contributions, I divide this final subchapter into five sections: previous contributions and shortcomings of the literatures regarding the country case-literature and migration, contributions and shortcomings of the literatures pertaining to the scope and the temporal dimension of their analysis, and lastly the explanatory potential offered by previous contributions.

4.1 An Overview of Migration History and Politics

4.1.1 Historical Phases of Global Migration Movements

Human migration is a truly global phenomenon. Not only does it involve every country on earth, but it also connects with a wide range of diverse issues (…). Because migration is interwoven into so many places and issues, it is enormously complex. This complexity often catches people off guard who at first glance think it is fairly straightforward. Scratch the surface, however, and it quickly becomes clear that it is not simple to 'help refugees' or 'get rid of illegal immigrants' or 'become a citizen'. (Steiner 2009:3)

Global Migration before the Second World War
Researchers Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark Miller (2015) point out that the movement of people underwent its first significant shift in the 16th century, concomitant with the start of European colonization. With this development, people moved long distances across continents to settle elsewhere in a way that was also documented for researchers (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 5). However, the scale of movement during this era was negligible to what came after, in what is commonly referred to as the "first age of mass migration" (Castles 2016: 22).[31]

This next significant shift in global migration movement was heralded by the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, which led to increasing urbanization and simultaneous population movements, both within borders and across them. This era saw the mass migrations of Europeans to the Americas from the middle of the 19th century roughly until the First World War (Castles, Haas, and Miller 2015, 5). Significantly, this was also the period when first

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31 Lucy Mayblin and Joe Turner (2021) point out that the control of movement was also central to colonial projects: "Empires were racial projects, and this was exemplified in the control of movement. This includes slavery and the management of indigenous peoples, which was primarily organized around movement. Who could move where, for what purpose and under what conditions was central to the organization of colonial rule and imperialism." (2021: 67)

"systematic attempts" were made to regulate and manage migration (Boucher/Gest 2018: 39).

This era could therefore be considered the beginning of the history of immigration politics, that is attempts by states to select immigrants and regulate migration movements. In settler-colonial states such as Canada, the United States, or Australia, this often manifested in exclusionary policies, designed to keep those who were unwanted out. The unwanted included people who were too old, too sick, or not from (Northern) Europe. Prior to the introduction of these restrictions, in most immigration states in North and South America, "labour was actively recruited without regulations" (Boucher/Gest 2018: 41) – no attempt was made to regulate this migration, because it predominantly came from Europe (ibid.).

The U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 is the first piece of legislation that systematically excluded the immigration for a specific group of people on racist grounds (ibid.: 42). Other settler-colonial states followed with legislation that would exclude non-white migrants from settling. This was often made quite explicit, e. g. by the "White Australia policy", an Immigration Restriction Act introduced in 1901, which made it almost impossible for non-Europeans to settle in Australia (Boucher/Gest 2018: 48). Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos notes the pervasiveness of this "scientifically sanctioned belief in the superiority of the 'white races' of northwestern Europe over other peoples" as the most significant driver behind immigration policy at the time (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 21). The *blanqueamento* (Hispanic countries) or *branqueamento* (Brazil) movements emerged as explicit social policies in the late 19th century in countries like Brazil and Cuba and aimed at literally 'whitening' the population by subsidizing immigration from Europe.[32]

Efforts to systematically manage and gain control of migration movements can also be observed in Europe of the late 19th and early 20th century. France experienced a high level of migration and encouraged migration due to its demographic *faiblesse* in comparison to Germany since the 1870s. In Germany, the Jewish political emancipation led to an increase in Jewish migration from Eastern Europe throughout the 19th century, eventually leading to significant efforts to manage this influx by the Prussian government by the late 19th century.

Due to the devastation of the First World War and the global economic recession following it, European emigration dwindled between the two World Wars. Immigration numbers during WWII were comprehensibly low, however the Nazi regime implemented several forced migration movements to increase

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32 Successfully, the Brazilian government subsidized the immigration of one million from Europe between 1890 and 1914.

its labour force with indentured workers from eastern and western Europe. By the end of the War this force grew to twelve million, accounting for 20 percent of the total German labour force.

Post-World War II Global Migration Movements
The end of the Second World War led to another paradigmatic shift in the global history of migration and the onset of what Stephen Castles and his colleagues call "the age of migration" (Castles 2016: 22). This period saw the onset of the systematic recruitment of foreign workers, often dubbed 'guestworkers', in much of Western Europe, often from states that were economically or politically ailing, firstly from the European South, later also from former colonies or protectorates (depending on the receiving country), Turkey and Yugoslavia.

This period therefore resulted in the growing diversification of immigration to the Global North and a reversal of immigration diversity in the Global South. This diversification of immigrant origins in the Global North had several reasons: A transformation of European countries of emigration to countries of immigration, the end of colonization, the draw of well-educated immigrants to the more prosperous Global North due to economic globalization, and the successive abolishment of racist immigration policies (Haas et al. 2019: 889).

Characteristics of Contemporary Migration Movements
Today, around 280 million people are classified as 'on the move', roughly amounting to three to four percent of the world's total population. Fleras makes the somewhat contentious point that migration could therefore be considered as an outlier phenomenon: "That over 97 percent of the world's inhabitants remain in their country of birth point to humans as a relatively sedentary lot" (Fleras 2015: 4).[33] This table from the *World Migration Report 2022*, published by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), illustrates the variation in global migration numbers since 1970:

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33 "According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the world total stock of international migrants (defined as people living outside their country of birth for at least a year) grew from about 100 million in 1960 to 155 million in 2000 and then to 214 million in 2010. This sounds a lot, but is just 3.1 per cent of the world's 7 billion people." (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 7).

Table 4.1: Global Migration in total and in percentage of the world population since 1970

Year	Number of international migrants	Migrants as a percentage of the world's population
1970	84,460,100	2.3
1975	90,368,000	2.2
1980	101,983,100	2.3
1985	113,206,700	2.3
1990	152,986,150	2.9
1995	161,290,000	2.8
2000	173,230,600	2.8
2005	191,446,800	2.9
2010	220,983,200	3.2
2015	247,958,600	3.4
2020	280,598,100	3.6

Source: own table, based on IOM (2021: 4)[34]

Saliently, the overall global population increase means that global migration has still accelerated in total numbers. To explain the increased politicization of migration, de Haas et al. point out that in addition to the numerical acceleration of migration by 1.3 percent, "post-WWII migration shifts have been predominantly directional" (Haas et al. 2019: 889). Due to the aftermath of decolonization and accelerating economic globalization, the direction of migration, "both recruitment-based and spontaneous", has shifted significantly to the Global North (ibid.), calling on those industrialized 'receiving' countries to 'step up their game' in managing migration.[35] As human mobility remains a historical constant, the politics to manage mobility are a relatively new phenomenon. Niklaus Steiner summarizes this point aptly: "What is unique about migration today is the juxtaposition of two truths: the ability of people to move and the ability of governments to control this movement" (Steiner 2009: 3). Stephen Castles et al. frame this juxtaposition as the "defining feature" of the current "age of migration", even invoking migration as a fundamental

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34 The IOM notes on these data: "The number of entities (such as states, territories, and administrative regions) for which data was made available in the UN DESA International Migrant Stock 2020 was 232. In 1970, the number of entities was 135." (IOM 2021: 4)

35 Boucher and Gest rightfully point out that even this perspective might be misleading. Recent numbers show that "immigration into non-OECD states accounts for around 48 percent of existing global migration (…). (…) [T]he fastest rate of international immigration is in the Global South. (Boucher and Gest 2018: 23).

challenge to the "sovereignty of states" (Castles/Haas/Miller 2015: 5). In a less urgent manner, Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (2006) note that the way Western democracies have dealt with ethnocultural diversity has shifted significantly in recent decades: As the composition of immigrants has become more diverse, questions have arisen of how to deal with this new ethnocultural diversity resulting from immigration[36] in policy beyond the idea of just suppressing and assimilating it (Kymlicka 1996: 193; Banting/Kymlicka 2006: 1). Considering the structural dependence of most industrialized countries on immigrant labour, immigration, citizenship, and integration politics will inevitably continue to constitute major policy areas for most democratic states (Bauder 2008: 316). Two features therefore define immigration to industrial states in the late 20th and early 21st century: Novel approaches by states to manage immigration and ensuing questions of membership as well as the (connected) diversification of immigrants' origins. This is also true of the three countries studied in this project, as the next section will show in more detail.

4.1.2 Statistical Data on Migration Politics in Canada, France, and Germany

To provide a comparative perspective of the overall case-specific data on migration movements, I present several key tables and graphs in this subsection. Today, Canada, France, and Germany are among the ten most important receiving states globally with regard to their total migrant population (defined as people who have changed their country of residence with a foreign passport), with Germany, significantly, in second place at 15.8 million migrants in 2021 (up from 5.9 million in 1990):

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36 It ought to be pointed out that ethnocultural diversity in any country is hardly ever merely the result of immigration, as some more cursory analyses of ethnocultural diversity sometimes contend. On the contrary, the majority of states worldwide experience a form of ethnocultural diversity by virtue of their historical implication in the slave trade (i. a. the Cape Malay in South Africa, Black Brazilians in Brazil, African Americans the United States), colonial ties (many African states have white minorities whose origins are tied to the colonial era), or small subnational ethnic groups (like the Russians in Latvia, the Uyghurs in China, the Sorbs in Germany, the Roma all over Europe). These few examples demonstrate that questions of accommodating ethnocultural diversity must never be reduced to immigration alone and that the conflation of immigration as the sole reason of the heterogenization of societies is often somewhat misguided.

Chart 4.1: Percentage of Migrants in largest Immigration Countries

France stands at 8.5 million, closely followed by Canada with 8 million (ibid.; Migration Data Portal 2022). The following chart illustrates the total migrant population in millions in a timeline from 1960–2015 (unfortunately excluding Germany until 1990):

Chart 4.2: Total number of Migrants in Canada, France, and Germany since 1960

As we can see here, Germany has by far the highest total migrant population out of the three cases. We can also observe a steady overall increase in total immigrant population in every country. Germany has the largest total population of the three countries.[37] The picture therefore changes somewhat when we look at the migration population as a percentage of the overall population. Here, Canada clearly emerges as the country with the highest percentage of immigrants in relation to their total population (see Chart 4.3).

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37 Canada 2021: 37 million; France 2019: 67 million; Germany 2019: 83,1 million.

Chart 4.3: Percentage of migrants as part of the total population in Canada, France, and Germany since 1960

Source: Own chart, data from World Bank (2022) and IOM (2021)

Notably, the percentages have increased significantly for the German case, with Germany reaching 18.8 percent migrants as percentage of the total population in 2021 (IOM 2021), behind Canada with 21.3 percent, followed by France at 13.1 percent. What we must highlight considering these numbers is a general tendency of Canada and France to naturalize immigrants faster than Germany, which may account for some of the difference between the German and the French case. Considering the migration flow, so the number of people annually entering as migrants, with data available from 2011 to 2021, this dimension becomes even more salient:

Number of naturalisations in Canada, France, and Germany, 2012-2021

Source: Own chart, data from World Bank (2022) and IOM (2021), numbers in
         hundred thousand

All these data points are important and once again underline the necessity for studying these three cases together, not least due to their on-going importance as immigration countries receiving diverse immigrants from all over the world. I will fill these descriptive data with analytical meaning in the analysis later-on.

4.2 Comparative Analyses of Migration Politics

4.2.1 Typologies, Categorizations and Indices of the Country Cases based on their Migration Politics

Typologies based on Non-Historical Data
As I already mentioned in the Introduction, efforts to typologize countries on the grounds of their migration politics became popular in the migration research of the 1990s. This section provides further insights from the state of the

art of categorizing country cases on the grounds of their migration politics, often on a large-n scale. I will present these categorizations, typologies, and indexes with a specific focus on how they classify Canada, France, and Germany in their respective studies.

One of the most prominent scholars of the field, Gary Freeman, provided a fundamental distinction between 'old' and 'new' immigration countries in 1995 (Freeman 1995: 881f.), roughly drawing a line between settler states, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia and Western European countries, which he considers new countries of immigration. He is particularly interested in convergence and divergence within the "liberal democratic model" of immigration states, which is why he then further distinguishes between three different "subsets" among countries in North America and Europe:

> The English-speaking settler societies – Australia, *Canada*, New Zealand, and the United States – are the most important traditional immigration countries. Migration was critical to their founding and national development. A second group is made up of those Western European states – most importantly, *Germany, France*, Britain, Switzerland, the Netherlands Sweden, and Belgium – that mounted temporary labour programs after World War II and accepted inflows from southern Europe, nearby labor surplus states, and colonial or ex-colonial territories. Finally, there are a number of European states – Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece – that have only recently gone from being countries of emigration to experiencing pressures from migrants, legal and illegal, and asylum seekers. (Freeman 1995: 882; italics by F. A.)

Freeman claims that these groups have "significantly divergent immigration politics as a result of their peculiar immigration histories" in addition to the scale of institutionalization of migration politics (ibid). Canada is placed with the 'old' settler state immigration countries, whereas Germany and France are put in the same category of 'new' labour-recruiting states. Freeman's typology continues to impact thinking about different immigration countries in migration studies until today, often cited and referenced without further critical discussion until recently (see for instance Fleras 2015: 5). Critics have argued that his distinction, particularly between 'old' and 'new' countries of immigration, might be overdrawn, as it simplifies the historical evolution of these states and serves to portray European countries as a monolith and "newcomers" to immigration, when they have not necessarily been that.[38]

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38 In fact, Antje Ellermann calls this distinction an "ideational construct" in her work: "As a political narrative, the importance of remaining a 'country of non-immigration' defined the contours of immigration politics for many years. This narrative distanced guest worker statehood from 'classic countries of immigration' and ensured that rather than debates over the composition of immigrants, the most pressing political question was whether or not to allow immigrant settlement." (Ellermann 2021: 29f.).

A more recent and the most comprehensive typology of 30 to 50 immigration countries[39] comes from researchers Anna Boucher and Justin Gest (2019). Their book *Crossroads: Comparative Immigration Regimes in a World of Demographic Change* is based on OECD data from those 50 countries from 2013, covering a vast range of indicators. Their central argument holds that migration studies have so far been unequipped to effectively categorize immigration regimes in an informed manner on a large scale due to a lack of available data and sound operationalizations of salient indicators. They therefore propose a new typology including two so far underexplored factors, which clearly distinguish Boucher and Gest's typology from previous works: In their expansive approach, they cover countries from the Global South which have, until recently, received less to no attention in typologies from migration researchers. Also, they seek to counter approaches which treat immigration, integration, and naturalization as distinct political arenas, a habit within migration studies which they claim produces "partial renderings of immigration regimes" (Boucher/Gest 2018: 178). Much like I argue in this thesis, they propose that integration and naturalization should be featured in any categorization of immigration regimes, since "naturalization represents a critical factor in state calculations about admission"[40] (ibid.). They are convinced that a "consideration of the interrelationship between these various stages of the migration experience is underexplored", although they are clearly intertwined in what some researchers have called "an immigration-integration 'nexus'" (ibid.: 12).

Their quantitative analysis[41], based on a complex algorithm, results in seven different types of immigration regimes among the 30 analysed countries, which include Canada, France, and Germany in three different categories: Neoliberal Regimes (incl. Canada), Humanitarian Regimes, Intra-Union Regimes (Germany), Extra-Union Regimes (France), Constrained Regimes, Kafala Regimes, and Quasi-Kafala Regimes (ibid: 141f.):

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39 Depending on the available data.

40 They continue in the vein of my argument on the immigration, citizenship, and integration nexus. The prospects for naturalization inform the distribution of visa types, the quotas imposed, and the selection of applicants to fill them. In short, when membership (and all the entitlements that come with it) is likely, states can be expected to select more carefully" (Boucher/Gest 2018:178).

41 To develop their "taxonomy of thirty immigration regimes", Boucher and Gest base their analysis on three broad indicators: the "visa mix" (made up of the kinds of "flows" which are accepted into the country, divided between total, economic, family, humanitarian, free movement and other flows), the "temporary ratio" (percentage of temporary labour migrants among the total flow in a given year) , and the "naturalization rate" (ibid.: 136f.).

(1) **Neoliberal Regimes** (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) – many of which began as settler states – feature high levels of temporary migration, a strong labor admissions focus, and elevated naturalization rates.
(2) **Humanitarian Regimes** (Finland, Sweden, and the United States) most reflect the legacy and influence of historic settler state models in North America and Oceania, which sustained significant flows under diverse visa types, with high rates of naturalization – even though only the United States is actually one of these historic settler states.
 (3) **Extra-Union Regimes** (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) are characterized by moderate levels of free movement inside the European Union, a moderately diverse admissions program, and low levels of naturalization.
 (4) **Intra-Union Regimes** (Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland) have elevated levels of free movement from member states of supranational unions (e. g. the European Union), limiting flows under other visa types and suppressing demand for citizenship.
(5) **Kafala Regimes** (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia) are characterized by exceptionally high migrant flows, and an exclusive focus on temporary labor admissions with few outlets to citizenship.
(6) **Quasi-Kafala Regimes** (China, Russia, and Singapore) follow the economic efficiency of Kafala Regimes but with significantly lower migrant flow levels.
(7) **Constrained Regimes** (Brazil, Japan, Mexico, and South Korea) feature lower flow levels, less economically focused admissions, and – with the exception of Brazil – low naturalization rates. (Boucher/Gest 2018: 4f.)

According to the authors, neoliberal regimes like Canada have since recently focused on short-term immigration based on labour-market needs. Among this category are Australia, New Zealand, and Britain. Boucher and Gest claim that this finding presents "a major departure from their former status as settler sates premised on permanent settlement" (ibid:142).[42] However, Boucher and Gest stress that Canada itself presents "an outlier" within this type:

Canada has by far the world's highest naturalization rate (…), a number that is distinguished even among other former settler states that have historically promoted citizenship acquisition. Different from other neoliberal regimes, Canada also features an elevated share of humanitarian migrants. No other regime truly comes close to mimicking Canada's balance – its focus on selecting labor migrants, the compassion it has shown for admitting humanitarian migrants, and its propensity to naturalize large shares of its migrant stock. (Boucher/Gest 2018, 142f.)

Boucher and Gest assign Canada a kind of special status within this group, implicitly praising the Canadian regime for not fully giving in to the neoliberal approach that renders them only second to Kafala and quasi-Kafala regimes in

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42   To be sure, Britain never had a settler country status, but Boucher and Gest seem to hint at an implicit connection to the other countries due to former colonial and present on-going commonwealth ties.

their "interest of maximizing their economic contribution and minimizing the risk of their financial dependence of state resources" (ibid.: 142).

France is placed in the category of "Extra-Union Regimes" (also featuring Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Here, the immigration intake is strongly connected for former colonial ties, with less influx of European Union immigrants than in "Intra-Union Regimes". Apart from this, these regimes are characterized by low temporary labour migration (all below 13 percent), and relatively moderate naturalization rates (except, the authors note, in France and Portugal, where naturalization is historically high) (ibid. 146-147).

The authors consider Germany to be an "Intra-Union Regime" (including Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland). These states experience most of their migration from the European Union (in the German case, about 65 percent of migrants are European citizens). Historically and until today, these states have "suppressed" naturalization (ibid.: 4f.).

Interestingly, both Canada and France do not seem to neatly fit into the categories that Boucher and Gest developed, particularly with regards to their approaches to naturalization. The German categorization appears accurate. It might be noteworthy that Germany presents by far the biggest country within this category population-wise, which possibly points to its role as a major player within this approach that other countries have used as a blueprint.

What is remarkable about Boucher and Gest's large-scale taxonomy is the fact that it breaks with some long-held premises in migration studies. The United States, for instance, are included in the category of Humanitarian Regimes, which surprisingly "most reflect the legacy and influence of historic settler state models", even though the U.S. shares this category with Finland and Sweden (ibid.). Most of the democracies and all of the countries from the Global North (except Japan) studied in their project are included in the Neoliberal, Humanitarian, Intra- or Extra-Union categories. Most non-democracies and all countries from the Global South are part of the Kalafa, Quasi-Kafala, and Constrained categories.[43] One major contribution of their work, apart from the above-mentioned additional aspect taken into consideration, is their suggestion that the "unifying logic" amongst all the states studied in their research is best summarized as the "market model". They claim that, globally, immigration regimes are dominated by this model "that manages immigrants as consumable resources" (Boucher/Gest 2018: 180). This model "demonstrates states' countervailing acknowledgment of human capital needs (…) effectively

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43   One evident criticism for Boucher and Gest's work is the use of normatively loaded terms for their categorizations (neoliberal, humanitarian, constrained), mixed with relatively neutral terms like intra- and extra-union. This makes implicit judgement calls on the states categorized within the taxonomy.

sanitizing globalization from its purported ills but exploiting the economic benefits of human movement" (ibid.: 156).

This analysis adds a new and almost opposing dimension to Freeman's Liberal Democracy model of the mid-1990s. Whatever convergence has taken place in the migration regimes of the last 25 to 30 years can be explained not by liberal democratic normative values, but rather by a unifying quest to meet economic needs while concomitantly ramping up efforts to reduce the purportedly negative impact of increasing immigration numbers.

Indexes

There are several highly developed indexes within the realm of migration politics that seek to categorize countries based on different aspects of their immigration, integration, and / or citizenship politics. The predominant focus is usually on integration measures, but some indexes are quite comprehensive, nonetheless. I would like to present three selected indexes here, which all feature Canada, France, and Germany in their ranking: The Multiculturalism Policy Index, The Migrant Integration Policy Index, and the Immigration Control Policy Index.

The Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI) measures multicultural policies in 21 democracies in ten-year intervals since 1980.[44] Three different categories are explored in this index: national minorities, immigrant minorities, and indigenous populations. For the immigrant group index, eight policy areas are explored:

1. constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism; 2. the adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum; 3. the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing; 4. exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation etc; 5. allowing dual citizenship; 6. the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities; 7. the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; 8. affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups. (Multiculturalism Policy Index 2022)

Each country can score 0 to 8 points in the index with 0.5 steps for policies that are half-fulfilled. The highest-scoring country throughout the forty years is Australia with a score of 8 since 1990. Canada[45] follows Australia closely with a score of 7 in 2020, classed 0.5 points down since 2010, because Quebec has introduced certain instances of banning the niqab from public life. France[46]

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44 Developed by researchers Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka of Queen's University in Canada. This project started in 2005 and it is an input-based index.
45 Canada's scores are 1980: 5.5; 1990: 6.5; 2000: 7.5; 2010: 7.5; 2020: 7.
46 France's scores are 1980: 1; 1990: 2; 2000: 2; 2010: 2; 2020: 1.5.

is among the lowest-ranking countries in the MPI[47], with a score of 1.5 in 2020, down from 2 in 2010. They have continuously received 1 point for allowing dual citizenship and were recently downgraded 0.5 points for policy area 6, because of public funding restrictions and uncertainty for immigrant organisations. Germany scores 3 in 2020, up from 2.5 in 2010, with a 0.5-point improvement due to the rise of the possibility of dual citizenship in Germany.[48] This table presents the overall findings of the MPI for Immigrant Minorities:

Table 4.2: Total MPI scores out of eight by country and year, 1980–2020

Country	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
Australia	5.5	8	8	8	8
Austria	0	0	1	1.5	1.5
Belgium	1	1.5	3.3	5.5	5.5
Canada	*5*	*6.5*	*7.5*	*7.5*	*7*
Denmark	0	0	0	0	1
Finland	0	0	1.5	6	7
France	*1*	*2*	*2*	*2*	*1.5*
Germany	*0*	*0.5*	*2*	*2.5*	*3*
Greece	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.5	2.5
Ireland	1	1	1.5	4	4.5
Italy	0	0	1.5	1.5	1.5
Japan	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	2.5	3	4	2	1
New Zealand	2.5	5	5	6	6.5
Norway	0	0	0	3.5	4
Portugal	0	1	3	3.5	3.5
Spain	0	1	1	3.5	3
Sweden	3	3.5	5	7	7
Switzerland	0	0	1	1	1
U. K.	2.5	5	5	5.5	6
U. S.	3.5	3	3	3	3.5
Average	**1.3**	**1.9**	**2.7**	**3.6**	**2.8**

Source: Own table, based on graph from Multiculturalism Policy Index (2022)

While the MPI presents a helpful tool that allows comparison across time, it only focuses on settlement and integration policies in favour of immigrant minorities. Therefore, this index does not give any insight on the immigration or

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47 Together with Japan (0), Denmark (1), and Switzerland (1).
48 Germany's scores are 1980: 0; 1990: 0.5, 2000: 2; 2010: 2.5; 2020: 3.

naturalization policies implemented by the evaluated countries, which takes away from the comprehensiveness of the index.[49]

The undoubtedly largest and most-referenced index is the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Funded by the European Union, this project started in 2004 and has been updated four times since. The most recent 2020 edition evaluates integration policy measures on all six continents, in 56 countries, and across eight policy areas: Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunification, Education, Political Participation, Permanent Residence, Access to Nationality, Anti-Discrimination, and Health. Each policy area is divided into a set of indicators for which countries can receive 0 to 100 points. The average among the points afforded for policy indicator is then the overall score for each policy area, resulting in a final score between 0 and 100. The MIPEX team has then categorized the scores among four categories: Comprehensive Integration, Equality on Paper, Temporary Integration, and Integration Denied. Canada (scoring 80/100) is included fourth in the Top Five of the overall scoring, following the highest-scoring Sweden (86/100), Finland (85/100), and Portugal (81/100), followed by New Zealand (77/100) as those countries with the most comprehensive integration measures. As the MIPEX team writes: "policies in these countries encourage the public to see immigrants as their equals, neighbours, and potential citizens" (MIPEX 2020). Germany (58/100) and France (56/100) score very closely to each other and are placed in the category "Temporary Integration – halfway favourable". This means that "policies in these countries are less advanced than in the Top Ten". They "do encourage the public to see immigrants as their equals and neighbours, but also as foreigners rather than potential citizens" (ibid.).

This graph illustrates the overall positioning of all the top 20 of the 56 countries evaluated in the index, which include Canada in 4th, Germany in 14th, and France in 18th place.

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49 The theoretical premise for this index is its creator Will Kymlicka's theory of Multicultural Citizenship (1995). I have written extensively on Multicultural Citizenship in my Master's Thesis (Alm 2018) to demonstrate some of the concept's shortcomings. One of the main points of critique apart from the limited perspective the index offers on immigration, and citizenship, is Kymlicka's evident use of Canada as a blueprint for the desirable multiculturalism policies he develops, confirmed by the fact that Canada continuously scores very highly on the index.

Table 4.3: Scores of the Top 20 countries evaluated in the MIPEX, 2020

Country	Approach to integration	Score	Change since 2014
Sweden	Comprehensive (Top 10)	88	-1
Finland	Comprehensive (Top 10)	85	+3
Portugal	Comprehensive (Top 10)	81	+3
Canada	*Comprehensive (Top 10)*	*80*	*+2*
New Zealand	Comprehensive (Top 10)	77	=
USA	Comprehensive (Top 10)	73	-2
Belgium	Comprehensive (Top 10)	69	=
Norway	Comprehensive (Top 10)	69	-3
Australia	Comprehensive (Top 10)	65	-4
Brazil	Comprehensive (Top 10)	64	+12
Luxembourg	Comprehensive	64	+10
Ireland	Comprehensive	64	+5
Spain	Comprehensive	60	+3
Germany	*Temporary*	*58*	*+1*
Argentina	Equality on Paper	58	-4
Italy	Temporary	58	-1
Netherlands	Temporary	57	=
France	*Temporary*	*56*	*+3*
United Kingdom	Temporary	56	-1
Korea	Comprehensive	56	-2

Source: Own table, based on graph from MIPEX (2020)

Due to the changes this index has undergone regarding the scope of the countries studied and the shift in indicators observed, a clear development over time for all three of the countries studied is not possible except for the period between 2014 and 2019 (when the data for the MIPEX 2015 and 2020 were collected respectively). Overall, all countries evaluated in the MIPEX moved up two points in this period. Canada climbed up two points to be included in the Top Ten, France climbed up three points, and Germany climbed up two points during that period.

Lastly, the Immigration Policy Control Index (IMPIC) was developed by researcher Marc Helbling and his colleagues to measure the restrictiveness of immigration policies among 33 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010 on a 0 to 1.0 scale, with 1.0 reflecting the most restrictive immigration policies (Helbling et al. 2017). Based on their data, we can observe how Canada, France, and Germany have tightened or loosened their immigration policies

across time. The following chart illustrates this development for Canada, France, and Germany:

Chart 4.5: Development of IMPIC score in Canada, France, and Germany, 1980-2010

Source: Own chart, based on graph based on Helbling et al. (2017)

The creators of this index include different forms of immigration in their index (labour, family, humanitarian, and co-ethnic migration) and define immigration policies as government statements regarding what the government intends to do with regard to immigrants (Helbling et al. 2017: 82). Surprisingly, all three countries started off with less restrictive policies in the 1980s, increasingly restricting their policies towards 2010, when they converge once more at 0.7 points. The aggregation of four different forms of immigration might be at the root of these results. While the convergence is interesting, the IMPIC explains relatively little about the actual developments in migration politics in these three countries during this period.

4.2.2 Research in Comparative-Historical Analysis on Migration Politics

Several noteworthy historical-comparative analyses within the field of migration studies guide this doctoral project as starting points and role models. The following section does not provide an exhaustive account of all the different research that has been conducted in comparative-historical analysis on immigration states. Rather, I present the following works under the conditions that they worked with a comparative-historical approach to the subject matter, they studied at least one of the countries that I studied for this project, and they covered at least one of the political fields that I am interested in.[50] Some, but not all, chose to develop a typology or models on the grounds of their study. The studies I present are *Citizenship and Nationhood* (1990) by Rogers Brubaker, *Limits of Nationhood* (1994) by Yasemin Soysal, *Immigration and the Nation-State* by Christian Joppke (1999), *Becoming Multicultural* by Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, and *The Comparative Politics of Immigration* by Antje Ellermann (2021).

I have ordered these contributions chronologically in the following section. This is both for structural clarity and because these works are also in dialogue with one another, which helps place my study in the continuity of their central arguments. While I already highlight some of the criticism that has been formulated in response to these works, I will include final evaluations of these contributions in the conclusionary section of this chapter. There, I present an overall estimation of the gaps and contributions in previous studies, outline the shortcomings of these works, and illustrate how I will expand on or reconfigure their findings.

Rogers Brubaker provides one of the most valuable and well-known contributions to citizenship research in his book *Citizenship and Nationhood* (1990) in which he draws a connection between Germany and France's respective understandings of nationhood and their citizenship politics. In Brubaker's central argument, he holds that each country's contemporary immigration and citizenship politics ought to be understood by virtue of their respective "traditions of nationhood", dating back to the introduction of citizenship attribution in the 19th century "revolutionary era" and early 20th century, with the 1889 modification of the Nationality Code (*Code de la Nationalité)* in France and the 1913 Nationality Act (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz – RuStaG)* in Germany: "It is these rules, expansive in France, restrictive in Germany – that govern citizenship status and chances of today's immigrants" (Brubaker

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50 I did not include anthologies in this evaluation.

1990: 394). Through the comparative-historical study of both cases since this period, Germany is attributed the ideology of "ethnic nationalism", which explains its restrictive citizenship regime at the time. In contrast, France exhibits a "civic nationalism", which explains its more open, but assimilatory citizenship regime towards immigrants (ibid.).

Rogers Brubaker's seminal contribution was important because it explicitly linked citizenship and immigration, a perspective that had found little attention in previous research on citizenship (cf. Chapter 2). By drawing this explicit connection, he laid the foundation for the analysis of immigration and citizenship's explicit connection to nationhood and national self-conception. His research also provided the groundwork for the model perspective of the 1990s, which often followed his categorization of the two big immigration countries. Brubaker's work drew a lot of criticism regarding the value of its conceptual contribution and its empirical validity. On the conceptual level, some critics argued that his analytical results imply a historical determinism, which would render any political change in each country's respective path highly unlikely. However, the end of the 1990s saw a complete overhaul of Germany's citizenship politics, which contradicted Brubaker's central contention somewhat. On the empirical dimension, one of the central counter-arguments against Brubaker's analysis relates to his overestimation of traditions of nationhood (Hagedorn 2001: 219).[51]

Yasemin Soysal's 1994 book *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* provides one of the most comprehensive studies of what Soysal calls "incorporation regimes" (Soysal 1994: 30f.) in six European countries, Germany, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, from 1950–1990 (ibid.). She considers the institutional structures of these six immigration countries as decisive for understanding the way in which immigrant guest-workers, who are the focus of Soysal's study, are integrated into state structures (ibid.: 30f.). By using expert interviews and historical analysis of policies, Soysal presents a typology of three different "membership models", the corporatist (Sweden, Netherlands, *Germany*), the liberal (Britain, Switzerland), and the statist (France, *Germany*) model of immigrant incorporation (ibid.: 12). Within this typology, she assigns France the paradigmatic role of the statist model, meaning that France does not consider immigrant groups collectively, but rather aims to provide for immigrant needs through

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51 In fact, in her comprehensive 2001 dissertation *Who can become a member? A Comparison of Naturalization in Germany and France* (Wer darf Mitglied werden? Einbürgerung in Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich) Heike Hagedorn offers a rebuke to Brubaker's central arguments by providing extensive empirical evidence that Brubaker's initial interpretation of the 1889 and 1913 laws are no accurate, with both laws containing liberal and restrictive aspects in equal measure (Hagedorn 2001:105).

welfare state provisions available to the general population. Saliently, this means that "incorporation acquires a very state-centric meaning; it assumes uniformly equal individuals vis-à-vis the state", which means that this "assumption disallows specialized action or intermediary structures on behalf of migrant groups" (Soysal 1994: 58). Soysal classifies Germany as mixed case of a corporatist and statist model (Soysal 1994: 37). On the federal level, Germany refrains from acknowledging the needs of specific ethnic groups. Yet, Soysal observes such an acknowledgement on the local levels, where patterns of organisation around "migrants as collectives" have emerged (ibid.: 61f.). The overall conclusion of Soysal's work points to a tension between the enduring relevance of the nation-state and the emergence of a "postnational model" of migrant membership and incorporation. While Soysal stresses the importance of nation-states as actors and does not necessarily question their impact and importance, she argues that migrant membership in Western European states functions according to different rules beyond questions of sovereignty and territory:

As I see it, the incorporation of guest workers is no mere expansion of the scope of national citizenship, nor is it an irregularity. Rather, it reveals a profound transformation in the institutions of citizenship, both in its internal logic and the way it is legitimated. To locate these changes, we need to go beyond the nation-state. (ibid.: 139)

With her overall result and her prediction of a postnational model of nationhood, Soysal explicitly aims to intervene in an academic discourse that had previously emphasised (and according to her, overdrawn) country-based differences as explanatory factors in the different treatment of immigrants. Her results therefore almost point to a bind: While her analyses yield different types of immigrant incorporation, her final concluding argument calls for an analytical move beyond the nation-state for a deeper understanding of dynamics of immigrant incorporation and membership. Soysal's comprehensive study succeeds in merging the question of immigrant integration and citizenship and differentiating between Germany and France in a way that Brubaker's work does not. Rather than pigeonholing Germany as a perpetual ethnic state, Soysal shows that modes of incorporation function differently according to the administrative level, revealing an overall acknowledgment of increasing diversity even at the time of her study in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For France, Soysal confirms the enduring French aversion to administratively distinguish between different minority experiences and affording support according to those differences.

In *Immigration and the Nation State* (1999) Christian Joppke provides an analysis of the postwar immigration politics in the United States, Germany and

the United Kingdom and their impact on sovereignty and citizenship, three cases which "represent distinct types of nationhood" (Joppke 1999: 8). He analyzes of the interconnection between immigration, state sovereignty, and citizenship, the latter two being "two generic principles of the modern nation-sate that are challenged by immigration" (ibid.). The modern nation-state is caught up in this challenge, at once being "constitutive" of global migration movements and challenged by it (ibid.: 1). This focus is also reflected in his critiques of Brubaker and Soysal, on whose works he explicitly builds and whose arguments he considers to be "vestigial" (Brubaker) and "spurious" (Soysal) (ibid.: 3f., 271, 273f.). According to Joppke, it is not the understanding of nationhood which determines citizenship policy, like Brubaker opines, but rather that immigration and immigrant integration pose substantial challenges to the nation-state and therefore nationhood in general: "immigration is as much conditioned as it is involved in redefining nationhood" (ibid.: 4). Soysal, in turn, makes the erroneous assumption that human rights norms push nation-states towards postnational membership, when, in fact "postwar migrations have driven a wedge between the principle of human-rights protection and a second constitutive principle of nation-sates, popular sovereignty" (ibid.).

In his in-depth analysis of the three cases, Joppke classifies Germany as an "incomplete nation-state" until unification in 1990. Prior to this, the division of Germany made it necessary for the Western part to define "itself as the homeland of all Germans who were unfree to determine their own fate", a principle that was written into the preamble to the Basic Law. Due to this, "Germany could tolerate immigrants only as 'guestworkers', who were expected to stay out of the nation's own unfinished business" (ibid.: 261). Joppke describes the process that was set in motion post-unification thusly:

After unification and the demise of communism, the dual approach of excluding guestworkers and including ethnic Germans has lost it rationale. Accordingly, less than a decade after this historical caesurae, ethnic-priority immigration has been phased out, guestworkers and their offspring are encouraged to enter the citizenry, and the ritual formula that Germany 'is not a country of immigration' has receded from political discourse. (ibid.)

Concluding with this line of argument that positions 1990 as a centrifugal historical moment, Joppke once again reiterates the resultant faultiness of Brubaker's arguments made almost a decade prior. He also challenges Soysal's ideas once more, stressing that "in Germany, there is no political actor today, the immigrants included (…) who does not consider the permanent exclusion of second- and third-generation foreigners from the citizenry as a serious deficit" (ibid.: 274). Consequently, nobody considers the exclusion of immigrants from nation-state membership as a kind of postnational proliferation of global

human rights regimes, but rather as a problem that needs to be fixed in the short run: "non-citizen membership is not celebrated, it is detested" (ibid.).

In his overall conclusion, Joppke shows how all three studied cases have succeed in managing, expanding or curtailing immigration according to their shifting self-conceptions across the postwar period. He argues that his findings demonstrate the resiliency of nation-states "in the face of immigration". Considering this, this "resilient sovereignty and citizenship sets a counterpoint to popular diagnoses, more often journalistic than scholarly, that the nation-state is in decline" (ibid.: 263).

With his 2012 study *Becoming Multicultural*, Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos also presents a substantial contribution to comparative-historical migration studies. The author explores the immigration and membership politics of Canada and Germany comparatively from late 19th century until the beginning of the new millennium. His central aim is to explore the "migration-membership dilemma" (ibid.: 1) that most liberal democratic states face in the post-World War Two era.[52] He calls his approach a "configurative macro-analysis" and uses newspaper articles, policy analyses, political speeches, and party manifestos as the foundation for his comprehensive study (ibid.: 5). Contrary to Brubaker and Soysal, Triadafilopoulos does not construct different models or types of immigration countries based on his analysis. Rather, he argues that global human rights norms contributed to further convergence among these two countries towards the second half of the 20th century:

> As self-declared liberal democracies, Canada and Germany found that their postwar commitments to human rights sat uneasily with their established immigration and citizenship policies (…). I argue that the similar transformation of membership policies in Canada and Germany was ultimately due to the preceding and profound underlying transformation of the normative context within which liberal states operated. (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 4).

In doing so, Triadafilopoulos implicitly follows Yasemin Soysal's central contentions outlined above. While his comprehensive and in-depth study reveals a host of variations and differences between the two countries[53], he concludes by calling to move away from a static pigeonholing of the cases as inherently opposed, as they were widely held in the academic literature. His results

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52 Triadafilopoulos explains the migration-membership dilemma thusly: "On the one hand, admitting migrants may help meet labour market requirements and serve related economic purposes or advance other ideological or political interests, as the acceptance of refugees often does. At the same time, the satisfaction of these objectives often provokes sharply negative reactions from actors with conflicting material interests and from those with a different set of normative priorities, such as the protection of national identity." (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 1).

53 Antje Ellermann categorizes Triadafilopoulos' study as a "variation-within-convergence" approach (Ellermann 2021: 14).

therefore starkly oppose Brubaker's path-dependent analysis, maintaining that "while both states were subject to comparable pressures (…), their unique histories, conceptions of national identity, and political institutional configurations shaped the politics of membership in distinctive ways" (ibid.: 12).

Antje Ellermann adds the most recent contribution to the comparative-historical study of immigration countries with her work on *The Comparative Politics of Immigration* (2021). Hers is a study of "the politics of the immigration policymaking" (2021: 2) in four countries over 70 years, 1950–2020: Canada, the United States, Germany, and Switzerland. Drawing on previous academic literature and selected archival data, Ellermann uses process tracing to establish the development of immigration policy along three causal mechanisms: popular, interest group, and diplomatic insulation (ibid.: 41). Ellermann is not interested in providing a typology of the different cases, rather, her central aim is the development of a "theoretical framework for the comparative study of the politics of immigration policy making in liberal democracies" in addition to "a nuanced understanding of the political dynamics that have shaped policy development in these four countries" (Ellermann 2021: 2) Despite this, she positions Switzerland on one end of the "extreme". Germany and the United States are positioned in the middle, whereas Canada presents the other side of the "extreme" (ibid.: 31). By this she means that Switzerland presents the most politicised politics of immigration policy making, whereas in the Canadian case, immigration policy is par for the course of quotidian policy making. Here, the public hardly ever challenges or questions as it "distinguishes itself by the absence of an anti-immigration policy platform at the federal level" (ibid.). In her final argument, Ellermann holds that her study shows the increase of politicization of immigration policymaking in all cases except for Canada.

4.3 Interim Conclusion: Contributions and Gaps in the Literature

Several contributions were presented in this chapter, both from research with a similar methodology as the one used in my project, and from research that operates in a completely different vein. Rather than criticizing the research projects separately, I am offering an overview of the different contributions and shortcomings within the literature structured among five sections: three sections dedicated to each of the country cases respectively, one section

dedicated to questions of *scope & historical depth*, and the final one dedicated to *explanatory potential*.

Canada – Consistency with a Catch?

In the research outlined in this chapter, Canada presents a relatively consistent type. This is in line with the widespread model it has been commonly assigned as the prototypical immigration country, with high and consistent immigration for the sake of Canadian nation-building, swift access to naturalization for immigrants, and an open-minded multicultural outlook on immigrant inclusion. This perspective is supported by the data provided in the MPI and the MIPEX. Even in Boucher and Gest's taxonomy, where Canada is placed in the less flattering category of 'Neoliberal Regimes', the authors claim that Canada is a humanitarian outlier among the other countries placed in the group. Canada's trajectory therefore appears clear-cut and to confirm long-held notions of it being a progressive country for migration politics.

However, three points are omitted by this perspective, which is why a deeper analysis in the vein that I am proposing might offer a more differentiated perspective on the Canadian trajectory: The reasons for the restrictive turn in Canadian migration politics during the conservative government under Stephen Harper in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing securitization of immigration movement, including the accelerated trend to economic expediency immigrant selection, the fraught history with Québec and its influence on its migration politics trajectory (and the history of multiculturalism), and lastly, the (lack of) reckoning with Canada's settler colonial past and its influence on its migration politics trajectory, which fall out of line with the usual development of the Canadian case.

It follows, then, that I am aiming to both develop an alternative narrative of the origins of the Canadian model, which diverges from the account offered by Triadafilopoulos' work in which he attributes Canada's development mainly to human rights paradigm shifts. I believe that a deeper look at Canada's immigration, citizenship, and integration politics after 1945 present a somewhat different perspective which might be partially coined by a distinct focus on Canada's economic interest in immigrant selection and partially influenced by efforts to instrumentalize migration politics for overcoming secession desires by Québec. In the analysis in the subsequent chapters, I will highlight these prior omissions with my comparative-historical approach which will allow for a more dynamic and differentiated perspective on the Canadian trajectory.

France – Stagnation or Decline?

France presents a less consistent case than Canada when the research presented in this chapter is considered. Usually thought of as a paradigmatic European immigration country, it appears to have steadily lost its global significance with regards to migration politics at the end of the last and into the new century. This is mainly connected to the fact that France has steered away from renewing its immigration, integration, and citizenship system in any profound way, which in turn means that it has remained within the realm of its previously conceived principles. Nothing new is added to this by Boucher and Gest's most recent typology, which places France with other southern European states and does not give much away about current developments.

Nevertheless, some points from the research are worth highlighting. France consistently holds the last spot out of the three cases in the indices presented. There seems to have been a downward trend in both inclusiveness and openness towards renewal according to the literatures, overturning the more progressive role it was assigned by Brubaker in the early 1990s. This means that despite France having one of the more inclusive citizenship regimes in the world, immigration to France and immigrant integration has steadily become more difficult. Two issues will feature in my analysis which have hitherto not been given as much attention by the research:

Firstly, I will show how France's colonial past has a strong bearing on the constellation of its current migration politics and discourse, which is an issue that has found little attention in the literatures described and does not feature as an indicator in any of the indexes. Secondly, and also paradoxically, France has maintained its republican stance that underlines much of France's migration politics and discourse concomitantly to it becoming one of the countries with the strongest and most dogmatic right-wing parties, which has succeeded in persistently framing immigration as a source for insecurity and fear for its voter base.

It follows that a thorough investigation of France's history is called for, particularly regarding the paradoxes of the French case in light with its immigrant population, which, until today, is in the majority made up of people arriving from former colonies and protectorates. What led to the shift of France being one of Europe's most important immigration countries to it teetering behind the other two paradigmatic cases in almost all respects? Which critical junctures led to France having arguably the strongest right-wing anti-immigrant agenda amongst the three, despite its historical reputation for universalism and inclusiveness towards immigrants? My analysis in the next few chapters will shed light on these issues.

Germany – Turning itself on its Head?

Out of the three countries studied in this project, Germany may present the most surprising case, having undergone the most significant changes in its approaches to migration politics in the last 75 years. Formerly assigned the role of an exclusionary ethno-nationalist state, as argued by Brubaker, Germany began overhauling its migration politics in the 1990s, pushed by several developments, including its unification, the establishment of a large immigrant community in the country, and a profound shift in perspective on the way it ought to deal with increasing immigrant diversity. For better or worse, Germany came to realize that it will need consistent immigration in the long-term for the maintenance of its economic stability. A foreboding of this development can already be observed in the results of Soysal's and Joppke's work from the 1990s (albeit grounded in different explanations), but is revealed even more clearly by Triadafilopoulos in 2012, with his recognition of the steady convergence between Canada's and Germany's approaches despite their vastly different historical trajectories. The German development can also be observed in the different indexes presented above, with Germany consistently achieving higher scores throughout the years.

Food for thought is provided by the fact that very little research exists to explain a development that points to an almost reversal of the German approach in the last 30 years. What caused this shift and how did it occur? How can we explain the differential treatment of different immigrant groups which at times persist until today?

I will try to offer answers to these changes of the last 30 years in my analysis. This is not to say that the decades preceding the 1990s are of no significance. In fact, I am convinced that they laid the ground for the later developments in significant ways, including the development of a de-facto integration regime for resettlers (*Spätaussiedler)* and an increasing awareness by German policy-makers well before the 1990s that sound migration politics were necessary and here to stay. To ask the question more pointedly: Is it true that the German role reversal only took place in the 1990s or can previous developments also account for it and if so, in what way?

Scope & Historical Depth

The research I will present in this thesis distinguishes itself by both its scope and its historical depth in comparison to the previous works presented in this chapter's section on comparative-historical analyses within migration research. The aspect of scope is one of the major contributions, which I have also

outlined in the chapter on concepts and theories. None of the works presented in the comparative-historical section look at immigration, integration, and citizenship politics as a comprehensive and interactive nexus. Some consider two of the aspects (like Brubaker 1990), some say they consider all three (like Joppke 1998 and Triadafilopoulos 2012) but remain narrower in their analytical approaches, some are strictly concerned with one particular aspect like integration (Soyal 1994) or immigration policy (Ellermann 2022). Nonetheless, all these analyses offer valuable starting points for my analysis which will provide a decidedly comprehensive view of all three political fields.

I will not sacrifice conciseness for the sake of comprehensiveness, however. Rather, like Boucher and Gest (2018) have argued, I look to contribute an analysis that takes all these aspects into account but using a different approach to Boucher and Gest's expansive quantitative analysis, which offers only limited accounts of historical variance and a different comparative aspiration in comparison to this project. By using the immigration, citizenship, and integration politics-nexus as an explicit analytical tool and looking at potential critical junctures in a small number of country cases, I seek an original approach to the analysis of migration politics which follows the state-of-the-art demands on current research. Like Joppke, I have chosen three "meaningful" cases that have generally been used as juxtapositions in the literature, following his view that this selection counters previous tendencies in migration research, "which is either single-case oriented and thus too narrow in scope or swallowing country-specific detail by considering too many cases" (Joppke 1999: 8).

The issue of scope also extends to the historical period chosen for this project. By using a relatively large timeframe, I am interested in how these three cases developed throughout the pivotal moment of the end of the second world war. Brubaker's analysis started in the late 19th century and finished in the 1990s, largely forsaking the period of Nazi rule. Soysal analysed a comparatively brief period of about 25 years from 1965 to 1990 (with a more extensive case selection), Joppke analysed roughly 50 years (1945-1995), Triadafilopoulos followed Brubaker's timeframe (adding the 1990s and early 2000s), and Ellermann analyzed 70 years, excluding the period immediately after the Second World War. Evidently, all these timeframe choices have their own sound analytical justifications. However, following my method of identifying potential critical junctures, I am able to cover a long timeframe by zooming into particular periods that shaped these country cases' migration politics.

It follows, then, that the scope and historical depth chosen for this project are original and add new insights to the ones provided by previous research. Previous works and their insights will feature heavily in the analysis, precisely

because their contributions were so valuable and helpful in establishing my project.

Explanatory Potential

The immense analytical value of the works presented in this chapter is undisputed. However, I disagree with some of the presented explanations and causal conclusions. Also, I am convinced that my original case selection will offer new insights that have hitherto not been explored explicitly and might lead to additional insights to reshape the current understandings that dominate the field.

As was mentioned above, Brubaker's incisive analysis was initially met with praise and later with an extensive amount of criticism, particularly due to his pigeonholing of the two country cases France and Germany as a dichotomous pair, a perspective which did not hold even throughout the 1990s and even less so today.[54] Nevertheless, two of Brubaker's major achievements in his comparative-historical analysis are worth highlighting in connection to my work offered here. Firstly, he catapulted citizenship and its interconnection to immigration politics into the field of comparative-historical analysis, and he was successful in invigorating academic interest in this interconnection and the symbolic potential of citizenship politics for sociology, history, and political science. Secondly, while his dichotomous categorization of the two cases may have been overdrawn[55], he did attribute significant potential for understanding citizenship politics (and by extension, immigration politics) through the lens of country-based self-conceptions. The concept of a country's 'self-conception' is very difficult to research. By no means does it imply that everybody who lives in this country has the same static understanding or perspective of a political field as everybody else. Rather, I argue in line with Brubaker, there are underlying narratives that guide decision-makers and researchers in their perspective on these countries, leading to a sort of epistemological framework for migration politics. It is therefore helpful to acknowledge these self-conceptive narratives, even while being aware of their inconsistencies.

Soysal and Triadafilopulos produce similar explanatory perspectives. From their view, human rights doctrines and further globalization have led and continue to inevitably lead to "postnational membership" (Soysal 1994) and more policy convergence even among country cases that were previously considered on complete opposites of the spectrum (Triadafilopoulos 2012). However, I

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54 Others, such as Hagedorn (2001), have written whole papers and theses to take apart some of the misconceptions and misunderstandings in Brubaker's work. I am therefore 'late to the party' and will refrain from rehashing her original criticism extensively.

55 As he himself has conceded, see Brubaker 2009.

hesitate to agree with Soysal's argument that the development of participatory channels for guest worker migrants in the 1970s and 1980s amount to a model of "postnational membership". While she focuses on and clearly distinguishes between different states, her overall conclusion rests on the idea that states' modes of belonging are becoming de-territorialized and denationalized because of human rights and "entitlements legitimized on the basis of personhood" (Soysal 1994: 3). What Soysal, merely a few years after Brubaker, gets right though, is the detachment of the German approach to integration measures from a narrative of ethno-nationalism by pointing out the myriad of policy interventions that have taken place on a local or municipal level.

In a similar vein to Soysal, Triadafilopoulos argues that Canada's and Germany's development, particularly in the second half of the 20th century, can be attributed to "their interest in developing progressive identities in pursuit of their foreign policy and domestic political interests", which "made it extremely difficult for them to maintain (…) the restrictive policies they had developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 158). His argument clearly points to increasing convergence. However, I wonder whether in an effort to emphasize the commonalities between the two cases, the differences might be underestimated in their explanatory potential, particularly those differences that prevail until today, almost 20 years after Triadafilopoulos' analytical timeframe ends (Bauder 2014: 10f.). Nevertheless, Triadafilopoulos is right in drawing attention to the explanatory potential of comparing Germany and Canada, countries which had until that point been used as juxtaposed cases with supposedly little resemblance. His concession that his decision to compare the two "might strike readers as puzzling" points to the novelty of this approach (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 2). Several new contributions have been added to the comparison of Canadian and German migration politics since Triadafilopoulos' work (Bauder 2014; Winter 2014). Nevertheless, his extensive political science analysis and findings remain the fundamental inspiration for the case selection and mode of analysis of my research project.

Joppke (1999) and Ellermann's (2021) work is on the opposite end of the explanatory realm. Both are concerned with the centrality of the state in guiding immigration politics (Joppke) or policies (Ellermann). Joppke's historical analysis yields results that demonstrate a reinforcement of the importance of sovereignty and nationhood in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in immigration matters. His work is broad and comprehensive, offering a study of the role of the nation-state with regards to migration, which he views as pivotal. Ellermann's approach is less broad-brush than Joppke's and more concerned with the minute causal mechanisms that determine the specific

policy approaches by the four countries she studies. Hers is a disciplined process tracing of policy development. She remains within the realm of policy analysis, providing comparative conceptual tools for this specific area – notably, she does not go beyond immigration policy in her work.

In my work, my aspiration is three-fold: To provide a new narrative of the migration politics history of each case, to provide new comparative insights through this narrative, and to provide a new conceptual tool in the form of the nexus between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics. In the next chapters, I present the analyses of the country cases starting in 1945.

II: Analysis: The Historical Trajectories of Politics of 'Us' and 'Them' in Canada, France, and Germany

The following chapters contain the results of the research I conducted on and in Canada, France, and Germany from 2018 to 2022. In each country, the nexus of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics has changed significantly throughout the last 75 years. Here I offer to my readers the insights of my analysis into these politics to deepen our collective understanding of each country's historical trajectory considering the possible critical junctures that occurred at the nexus of their immigration, integration, and citizenship politics. To reiterate: As elaborated in Chapter 2 (section 2.4), this nexus is the primary analytical focus of this analysis and constitutes the central contribution of my research. In studying the interconnection between immigration, integration, and citizenship politics as I have conceptualized it, I intend to show how the historical dynamics of the nexus represent an on-going negotiation of belonging and membership in each country, at times covertly and subtly, at other times expressly.

The analytical task for this part of the thesis is threefold: Firstly, I explain why the period I have chosen to analyse may constitute a critical juncture. Secondly, I tell the story of how the politics of immigration, citizenship, and integration interacted prior, during, and after the possible critical juncture to show the change that occurred during that time. Lastly, I summarize the findings of the analysis of the intra-case developments. I maintain a across-case analytical perspective throughout, which will be centered further in the ultimate part of this thesis.

In Chapter 3, I have described the tools and frameworks that comparative-historical researchers use to analyse time in politics (section 3.2). This comprises a description of the critical junctures framework which lies at the centre of my own analysis. To briefly reiterate: A critical juncture is "a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (…) and which is hypothesised to produce distinct legacies" (Berins Collier/Collier 1991: 29). This period of change is triggered by a political cleavage or crisis. It is important not to conflate the "shock" or crisis with the juncture itself (Collier/Munck 2017: 5). For instance, the end of the Second World War is not a critical juncture, it is the shock that triggered a critical juncture, which, as the subsequent chapters show, can vary across cases.

A juncture, in turn, can be relatively short or occur over several years (Berins Collier/Collier 1991: 32). Following Collier and Munck (2017: 3), the framework of a critical juncture is divided into five parts: antecedent

conditions, the crisis or shock (which I will also refer to as a 'turning point'), the juncture itself, the mechanisms of production (so the ways in which change occurs during the juncture) and its legacy. In the subsequent chapters, this approach will frame my analysis.

In line with this framework, to set the stage for my analysis, and provide the antecedent historical context, I begin each subchapter in chapter 5 on the postwar period with a summary of each country's pre-1945 migration politics history. This chapter then contains an analysis of periods that may qualify as critical junctures following the period after the end of World War II, which set the tone and course for the decades following. In Canada, the war years led to a period in which belonging was renegotiated through citizenship, establishing an inclusive perspective on what it takes to become and be a Canadian in its first citizenship law. In France, the end of the Vichy regime and Nazi occupation were followed by the very swift re-establishment of its migration politics comparable to the pre-war approach. Very quickly, French migration politics became entangled with French colonial politics. The newly founded German Federal Republic adopted a Basic Law with exclusive membership ideas, setting the tone for the following decades of it not being a country of immigration, with the exception for co-ethnic immigration.

Chapter 6 traces possible critical junctures of the mid to late 20th century for each country case. In Canada, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were a period in which incremental change slowly but surely led to a watershed with an institutional overhaul of Canadian migration politics, including the introduction of the points system for labour immigration and the constitutional commitment to multiculturalism. I show why the legacy of this change endures until today. In France, the developments of the 1980s temporally overlap a little with the Canadian case. It was in this period that France repeatedly tried to (and repeatedly failed) to gain control of immigration. It was also at this time that immigration diversified and became significantly politicized, not least because of on-going decolonization and resultant diversification of immigration. In Germany, this overhaul occurred a decade later. I show how the 1990s constituted a pivotal period for migration politics, which led to fundamental change in the German approach to migration, with an enduring legacy into the 21st century.

Chapter 7 guides us through the developments of the 21st century. In Canada, the 2006 election of a conservative government led to a challenging period of change that undermined the Canadian migration politics paradigm and that left legacies even after the return to liberal rule. In France, the consolidation of a cleavage between the extreme-right and the rest on immigration endured, despite efforts by interior minister and later President Nicolas Sarkozy to revert this development between 2003 and 2012. In Germany, the legacy of the 1990s

endured well into the 2000s in migration politics that propelled its transformation into the second most important global immigration countries today. 2015, a year in which almost a million refugees arrived in Germany, and which is widely discussed as a turning point in German migration politics, receives a more critical reading in this chapter.

I present this rough division of the timeline and the identification of significant periods of change as my first analytical contribution to this work, based on the interviews I conducted with the experts and my own secondary literature analysis. Rather than writing three chapters that deal with the trajectory of each country respectively, I approach the analysis by presenting three different chapters with three different time periods, offering the country analyses alongside one another within the respective chapters. The periods covered for each country do not overlap precisely – rather, they took place within the same decades. This approach allows for elements of simultaneity and comparison, speaking to the comparative-historical aims of this thesis, which I reflect on further in the interim conclusion to each chapter.

A note on structure and form: While the chapters are ordered in a rough chronology, the country analyses are ordered according to alphabetical order, how they also appear in the title: Canada, France, and Germany. Expert citations are both used to support my analysis by providing interpretative accounts on the causality of the historical developments. All experts are cited in English, translated from their original French or German when necessary.

The following analysis intends to deepen our understanding and widen our perspective on the nexus of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics. As the following fifth chapter will show, this interconnection is salient and goes back even further than 1945, as states have historically used different political measures to the same goal of managing the Politics of 'Us' and 'Them'.

5. Manifesting Unity, Belonging, and Exclusion: Migration Politics in the Postwar Years

5.1 Introduction

The starting point for this chapter is the shock of World War II and its end in 1945. The terror of the Nazi years and the war years left behind a permanently altered economic, political, and social landscape in Europe. France was freed from the occupiers and terminated the Nazi-collaborative Vichy Regime. The territory of Germany was divided among and occupied by the allied forces for four years to re-establish a legitimate political regime in the country (ultimately leading to its subsequent division). The same was not the case in North America. However, the global relief for the defeat of the Nazis led to a reckoning in Canada regarding human rights and refugee protection.

The idea that 1945 constitutes a turning point for migration politics is therefore uncontroversial for the French and the German cases, but somewhat disputed for the Canadian case. Some researchers have argued that the end of World War II did not constitute a turning point at all for Canada, as the country largely continued the migration politics path it had set in the pre-war years (i. a. Kymlicka 2004; Ellermann 2021: 195f.). However, I will show in the subchapter on Canada that this period was decisive for Canadian migration history nonetheless, to the point where it does qualify as a critical juncture as it is defined in my work. I will also show why turning our attention to citizenship politics, as well as the politics of 'ethnic plurality', allows for this argument.

In the subchapter on the French case, I will show that 1945 constituted less a turning point and more a point of return for France, as the French government immediately ramped up efforts to increase immigration to the level of the pre-war years. The reasoning behind this will be discussed in this chapter, as well as the tendency within French migration politics to tie immigration to naturalization, so citizenship politics, most directly. Saliently, it is in this period that French migration politics become enmeshed with French colonization politics through the status of citizenship, a pivotal point in French history which affects French migration politics to this day.

The subchapter on Germany will concentrate on the establishment of the German Federal Republic, including the constitution of the Basic Law and the ideas of belonging and exclusion contained in it and how this is connected to both an ethnic conception of nationhood as well as a desire to unite with the

German Democratic Republic. I argue that Germany did become a country of immigration in 1949, albeit exclusively for co-ethnic immigration. I also show how, paradoxically, West Germany experienced a high level of out-migration at the same time as it started to ramp up efforts to recruit its first 'guest workers'.

This analytical chapter ends with a small interim conclusion to lead into the next analytical chapter. Further interpretations and comparative results of the insights presented in this chapter will be discussed at length in chapter 8 on analytical results.

5.2 Canada – Becoming Canadian, 1945–1952

There was always a tension in Canada for the first 50, 60 years, *between the imperative of filling up this land that we'd taken away from the natives and we didn't want the Americans take away from us.* And the reality that there were only so many Scots, Irish, and English that were available and interested. And without the notion of multiculturalism, it was always kind of: 'What's going on here? Why are we doing this?'. We are an Anglo-Celtic country with an inconvenient group of French people over there and these natives, but they don't count. (…) *There was always a kind of anxiety about Canada.* (CPS6: pos. 14)

5.2.1 Pre-History: Creating white European Canada

Europeans began to conquer and settle on the geographical area that is called Canada today in the 17th century, often by displacing or eliminating the Indigenous peoples who had lived there for thousands of years. The Canadian 'federal dominion', an independently governed part of the British empire, was founded in 1867 (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 25). At this point, 92 percent of the Canadian population was either British or French.[56] Prior the establishment of the federal dominion, settler colonialism had taken place in a relatively unregulated manner, with almost all settlers[57] stemming from Northern Europe, particularly Britain, France, and Ireland. The tension between the British and the French settlers were mentioned by some interviewees as path-defining for the Canadian experience of state-building in concomitance with cultural plurality.

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56 With the founding of the federal dominion, nominally French people also became British subjects.

57 Some researchers have called for an analytic distinction between "settlers" that populated the territory of the states that are today settler colonial, such as Australia, the U.S., and Canada, as opposed to "immigrants", who arrived after the establishment of the state (Dauvergne 2016: 129).

As this interviewee argues, the French-British experience and the founding of the dominion resulted in a new type of nation-state:

Being French in the French empire is all very well but being French in the British empire is a handicap. (...) And that's how Canada became a country that by force of circumstance invented another model than the nation-state. And these two populations, the French, and the English, got used to considering diversity as something that can be overcome to make it a strength, not a problem or a headache, and this prepared them to welcome the rest of the world. (CPS1: pos. 18)

In fact, migration politics in the form of active government efforts to manage and steer the arrival of people for settlement in these territories began immediately after the creation of the federal dominion, as one expert stresses: "The first people sent abroad by the Federation of Canada were in 1868, one year after confederation, were immigration agents" (CPS6: pos. 7). Canada's first Immigration Act was introduced in 1869, ostensibly to be able to exclude poor, sick, and people with disabilities from entering (ibid.: 25–26)[58]. As Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos (ibid.) notes, the period between 1860 and 1910 was marked by more out-migration than in-migration, leading the Canadian government to introduce measures to prevent people from leaving (mostly to the United States or back to Europe), and ramping up efforts to recruit from Europe. Concomitantly, the Canadian government began its efforts to limit migration of 'unwanted' origin as early as 1885, restricting the entry of Chinese immigrants.

The early 1900s were marked by rising, at times violent opposition by the Anglo-Canadian community towards non-European immigrants, culminating in further demands for the explicit exclusion of non-white immigrants (Meister 2022: 196).[59] Not only was the immigration of non-European people undesired, numerous political actors at the time expressed their opposition to recruiting people from Continental Europe, with one influential political scientist and later public servant, Oscar Skelton, noting in a public speech that "our most troublesome problem (…) is that of the Jew and the Greek Catholic"

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58 Ellermann notes that this Act also gave a lot of executive power on immigration to the cabinet, which meant that subsequent governments were able to implement short-term regulations without having to go through the drawn-out process of altering legislations (Ellermann 2021: 200).

59 As Meister describes, one of the demonstrations of racist hostility towards non-white immigration were the Vancouver riots of 1907, when around 10,000 Anglo-Canadians took to the streets to violently attack people of Asian descent and their businesses (Meister 2022: 196). In the aftermath of this, the government implemented a "Continuous Journey" clause, meaning that someone could only immigrate if they had made a "continuous journey from their country of birth to Canada". This order allowed Canada to exclude Indians from entering, who were British subjects (and therefore could not be excluded), but always had to stop at least once on their journey to Canada (Meister 2022: 243f.).

(Triadafilopoulos 2012: 30; Meister 2022: 38f.). Canada was not alone in its 'Northern-European-only' approach to immigration. Similar efforts can be observed in the United States and Australia at the same time. Having successfully recruited around three million people in the first decade of the 20th century, the Canadian government manifested its exclusionary stance towards non-white and 'inferior' white immigrants in the Immigration Act of 1910, as Triadafilopoulos explains:

(…) [The] fundamental components of Canada's immigration policy regime were in place. In times of economic growth, a greater proportion of non-preferred groups would be allowed to enter Canada to assuage labour needs. During economic downturns, the main gate would be narrowed, and the back door more thoroughly policed. Groups deemed unsuitable were subject to special restrictions and, increasingly after 1907, outright exclusion. (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 34)

This quote shows that the onset of government immigration policy engendered a direct reckoning with questions on belonging and the 'right' constitution of Canadian society, culminating in the explicitly stated and government-mandated goal of constructing and maintaining a white society, preferably of North and Western European descent. Exclusions on racist grounds therefore continued in legislation like the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923[60], which excluded all Chinese people from immigrating. However, following the Great Depression of 1929, immigration to Canada ceased substantially, a trend that was only reinforced by the Second World War (ibid.: 56).[61]

Nevertheless, the late interwar period and the period of the Second World War in Canada were marked by a hesitant, but notable reckoning with its cultural plurality, leading to state-mandated efforts to include previously undesired European immigrants into the effort of Canadian nation-building, as Daniel Meister explains in his book *The Racial Mosaic: A Pre-History of Canadian Multiculturalism* (2022). During the beginning of the Second World War and throughout wartime, the government tasked the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) with airing programmes designed to demonstrate the cultural diversity and unity of the Canadian population, with radio programmes called things such as the "Canadian Mosaic" (1938) and "Canadians All" (1941), in

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60 Canada was not alone in this. Similar Acts were introduced in the U. S. as early as 1882 and in Australia in 1901.

61 Germans, Italians, and Japanese communities were designated as "enemy aliens" during World War II. However, as Meister notes, the treatment of people of Japanese descent was by far the harshest. Not only were 22.000 of them sent to internment camps (as opposed to merely 600 people of Italian and 800 people of German descent), "the government took the additional step of dispossessing them of property, land, and goods, which were then sold off (…)." (Meister 2022: 198).

which the listeners were educated on the cultural contributions of different European immigrant groups. As Meister notes, this "wartime cultural pluralism was (…) about making European minority groups 'feel like they belong'" (Meister 2022: 216), but also "these efforts were limited to European racial groups, typically ignored Canadians of African, Asian, or indigenous descent, and were expressed in a racialist discourse" (ibid.: 194). Part of this wartime effort by the Canadian government was the creation of the Committee on Co-operation in Canadian Citizenship (CCCC), which was tasked with advising different government departments "on the question of foreign-language speaking groups in Canada" (Meister 2022: 223). The timing and name of this committee are pertinent: At the time, Canadian citizenship did not yet exist independently from British subjecthood. The committee's establishment therefore signaled the government's intention, sparked by wartime and the need for unity, to establish such a citizenship.

When Canadian migration politics are discussed in current discourse, one pertinent historical point is often omitted from Canada's portrayal as country that was built upon immigration.[62] This preceding account shows how the beginnings of Canada's history of migration politics were overtly racist. In fact, the explicitly racist stratification of potential immigrants extended not only to non-white immigrants, but also towards Central and Eastern Europeans that were considered inferior to the 'Nordic' Anglo-Saxons. What we can learn from the history of Canadian migration politics leading up to the end of the Second World War is how notions of exclusion, inclusion, and belonging, so the very Politics of 'Us' and 'Them' were created and adjusted through immigration, citizenship, and integration (here through the promotion of cultural pluralism) politics.[63] Notably, Canada's Indigenous population was entirely absent from these politics or accounts of Canadian nation-building, their presence omitted and consequently erased.

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62 Surprisingly, this point is often used as an explanation for why Canadians tend to be less racist and xenophobic than Northern European countries or even the United States.

63 The boundaries of whiteness shifted from the beginning of the 20th century to the middle of the 20th century to include previously undesired white people. The construction of whiteness through migration politics, notably the discourse on ethnic plurality sparked in the late 1930s and early 1940s reflects the malleability but also the persistence of the idea of a white Canada.

5.2.2 Manifesting a new Canadian Self-Conception through Citizenship

Don't be too quick to think that things didn't change dramatically (…) after 45. (…) Canada had a large European population prior to the Second World War and, you know, in order to ensure the loyalty of European Canadians, particularly German Canadians and Italian Canadians during the Second World War as well as to mobilize their energies into the war effort the various departments of nationality and the emergent citizenship portfolio that came into existence in 1947 and 1948, [we] began to think in terms of Canada as more multicultural than the kind of British Colonial model that existed until see the 1920s and 1930s and things began to move (…) very, very quickly after that (…). (CAC4: pos. 10)

The shock that was set in motion by the Second World War and its end started a critical juncture for Canadian migration politics that lasted from 1945 to 1952. Researchers generally hold that the end of the war did not impact Canadian immigration politics significantly and that Canada continued down its path of a racialized selection system until the introduction of the points system in 1967 (i. a. Ellermann 2021: 195). In this section, I develop a different argument. Analyzing the developments of the immediate postwar period, I establish 1945–1952 as a critical juncture for Canadian migration politics when analysed through the lens of the immigration, citizenship, and integration-nexus. I argue that during this critical juncture, important political and institutional arrangements were introduced for citizenship and immigration which had a bearing on belonging and cultural pluralism and left an enduring legacy for Canadian migration politics.

The changes that were set in motion during this period are mainly connected to the development of an explicit Canadian identity, manifested in the development of the Canadian Citizenship Act in 1946 (Winter 2015a; Alm 2021), but also to the restitution of immigration to Canada in the late 1940s and early 1950s, which had ceased during the war years. Therefore, the war years acted as an antecedent condition for these changes as the expert interviewees have confirmed (CAC4: pos. 19; CPS6: pos. 18). I will tell the story of the postwar years somewhat chronologically, connecting it to the pre-history I told above and the subcategories of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics, all while connecting it to the critical juncture framework for the comparative-historical analysis.

War, Canadian Identity, and Canadian Citizenship: 'We are not them.'
One expert public servant expert offered a lively description of the effects of the Second World War on the Canadian self-conception. In this quote, we can

see the reflection of a self-conscious demarcation from the British and U.S.-American experiences, which was key to forging a new Canadian identity:

We [soldiers deployed by Canada] were quicker learners. We were quicker to learn what worked and what didn't. The British tended be very tradition-bound. The Americans just threw more men at it. We didn't have that many men to throw away. (…) The British idea was: We will bring all these colonials over, we'll put them into our units, into our squadrons, into our ships. And we mix them up. And very early on the Canadians said: No goddamn way. We are not going to be cannon fodder for you. And so, (...) there was a sense that we had done well in terrible, terrible conditions, our people had performed well, they were, the British noticed that even in the Second World War, all of our guys could drive. Most of theirs couldn't. All of our guys could fix cars. Most of them couldn't. And there was a, there was a sense - And the Canadians were always comparing themselves with other people. (…) You know, the Americans didn't bother to compare. They were everything. The British didn't have to compare. They were everything. We had to compare and so we learned. (…) I think our people came back with a strong sense that we are not them. And we, on ourselves, can do very well, thank you very much. We don't need you to tell us, somebody else to tell us. (CPS6: pos. 18)

In short, the war acted as a catalyst for Canadians to get to know themselves as Canadians, forging a Canadian identity distinct from the U.S. and British identities ("We are not them"). This emancipation began in the First and became entrenched throughout the Second World War. Canada had deployed a notable number of soldiers from all over the Canadian dominion territory to both wars. Many people who had fought on behalf of Canada and the Western Allies did not hold Canadian citizenship, which only existed in connection to colonial British subjecthood. In fact, by 1940, about 20 percent of the people living in Canada were "of neither English nor French origin" (Winter 2015a: 4). As this account and the pre-history show, debates around Canadian identity and citizenship took place during the war years, with a clear development and demarcation of 'Canadianness' from the British colonial power.

The war years and the end of the war therefore led to an overhaul and restructuring of Canadian citizenship. Prior to the introduction of the Citizenship Act in 1946, Canadian citizenship only existed as a "corollary" of British subjecthood, a regular dynamic in British dominions and colonies (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 59). Generally, nationality was distinguished between British subjects, immigrants (with their own nationalities, possible candidates for naturalization as of the 1921 Canadian Nationals Act), and Indigenous peoples with so-called 'Indian status'.[64] During the Second World War there was a

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[64] In 1876, the Canadian dominion's government passed the so-called "Indian Act", instated to account for the number of Indigenous people in Canada and their registration under so-called "Indian status" and the administration of their life in the dominion.

recognition on behalf of the Canadian authorities that an explicit and independent Canadian citizenship as a nationality status should be created (Meister 2022: 235).

Postwar, as Winter (2015a: 4) explains, "these normative shifts first became apparent at the bureaucratic level": In 1945, the government nationalities branch was officially renamed into the "Citizenship Branch" (ibid.). The following year, this reckoning led to a significant step in postwar migration politics: The creation of Canadian Citizenship Act in 1946 (in force from 1947 onwards). The act ushered in several significant changes which fundamentally restructured the institutional settings for belonging in the Canadian context. The development of the Citizenship Act was remarkable for several reasons: It introduced the notion of *ius soli*, so every person born on Canadian soil was now automatically a Canadian, no matter their parents' nationality. The acquisition of Canadian citizenship through naturalization was possible after five years of legal residence and if other criteria were met, such as "the possession of good character, adequate knowledge of either the French or the English language, adequate knowledge of the responsibilities and privileges of Canadian citizenship, and the intention to reside in Canada" (ibid.: 5; Bauder 2014: 12; Dauvergne 2016: 23). Additionally, official citizenship hearings and ceremonies were introduced. With this act, Canadians now held a distinct status independent from British subjecthood.

Meister describes the significance of the act's introduction, which illustrates the symbolic dimension the act took on for Canada:

The first week of the month was declared 'National Citizenship Week' and citizenship ceremonies were held all across Canada. The very first was a carefully rehearsed national ceremony, sponsored by the new Citizenship Branch of the state department, held on 3 January 1947 at the Supreme Court in Ottawa. In a radio address broadcast nationwide by the CBC, Prime Minister Mackenzie King declared that while in the past 'divergent racial origins have repeatedly been a source of division,' the new conception of citizenship being inaugurated was 'designed to bridge the gaps created by geography and by racial descent'. To immigrants, he continued, Canada represented 'a homeland where nationhood means not domination and slavery but equality and freedom'. (Meister 2022: 235f.)

This shows how the immediate aftermath of the act's introduction was heavy with symbolism. For instance, the very first citizenship certificate was handed to Canada's Prime Minister (PM) William Lyon Mackenzie King, whereas the second was given to a Ukrainian Canadian, Wasyl Elnyiak, "one of the first Ukrainians to farm in Western Canada" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 59). It is not

by chance that a Ukrainian Canadian[65] was chosen to receive his Canadian citizenship, rather, we can assume that this gesture signified the extension of the boundaries of belonging for Canadians beyond the pre-war prioritization of Northern Europeans. With this Act, all European immigrants could now lay claim to becoming Canadian.

Maintaining White Immigration (while shifting the boundaries of whiteness)
During the war, immigration had ceased significantly, which led the Canadian government to ramp up its efforts for renewed immigrant recruitment after the war. One of the government's immediate postwar efforts was the creation of the Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour in 1946, which remained active until 1953. The work of this committee encompassed the consultation of "business associations, transport companies, organized labour, community organizations, civil servants, ethnic lobby groups, and humanitarian groups, including churches" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 61). The results of the Standing Committees consultations indicated that there was very broad consensus on the need for ramping up immigration swiftly, so the Committee recommended "a well-considered and sustained policy of immigration" (quoted in ibid.). Significantly, the committee also recommended that discrimination in immigrant selection due to "race and religion" should be avoided in such a new policy, if "Canada's traditional pattern of immigration and her strong European orientation" were maintained (quoted in ibid.: 62).

In the wake of this, the Canadian government broadened the possibilities for Europeans outside of their preferred origin group of British subjects and Northern Europeans. However, immigration was to largely remain of European origin. Most of the Canadian population that immigrated to the country from the late 19th century until the Second World War was recruited to establish Canada as a country populated by British and other Northern European people, excluding most Continental Europeans from permanent settlement. Prior to World War II, Canada had made no secret of the fact that most of the world's population was not welcome to partake in Canadian nation-building efforts. This was i. a. manifested in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923, referenced in the prior section. In a frequently quoted speech from 1947, PM Mackenzie King outlined the immigration aims of his government, reverting to these pre-war principles:

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65 Saliently, Ukrainian Canadians form Ukraine's second largest diaspora after Ukrainians residing in Russia today. Ukrainians were historically instrumental in establishing farming in the West of Canada. Over 1.4 million people with Ukrainian roots live all over Canada, and the Canada's deputy PM is of Ukrainian origin (Cecco 2022).

The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by legislation, regulation and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy (...). With regard to the selection of immigrants, much has been said about discrimination. *I wish to make quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a "fundamental human right" of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy* ... There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population. *Large-scale immigration from the Orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population*. Any considerable Oriental immigration would, moreover, be certain to give rise to social and economic problems of a character that might lead to serious difficulties in the field of international relations. (Canadian House of Commons Debates, May 1, 1947; italics by F. A.)

The excerpt from this speech clearly reflects postwar continuity of exclusionary immigration and stands in sharp contrast to the more conciliatory tone by Mackenzie King regarding new citizenship legislation quotes above. As Triadafilopoulos (2012: 58) writes in his own interpretation of this statement that Canadian postwar immigration politics could be considered "janus-faced". The invocation of the threat posed by non-white immigration underlines that the Canadian government was ready to include other European groups into its realm but drew a sharp line for people outside of Europe.

The issue of non-white immigration remained contentious, particularly regarding immigration from Commonwealth members that had gained independence in the years following the end of the war. Canada found itself in a bind regarding Commonwealth partners like India, who had made their Commonwealth membership "contingent on other members revoking their anti-Indian immigration exclusions" (Ellermann 2021: 198). In fact, as Antje Ellermann (ibid.) describes, diplomatic intervention by Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru, who travelled to Canada in 1948 to discuss Indian immigration, led to a change of heart. A "compromise" was reached, and Canada introduced quotas for immigrants from South Asian Commonwealth partners (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 65). A modest amount of Indian, Pakistani, and Sri Lankan (at the time Ceylonese) immigrants could enter yearly (ibid.).[66] Concomitantly, there were on-going debates on how to justify Canada's explicitly discriminatory selection of immigrants considering its postwar commitment to Human Rights. This tension led to the abolition of the 1923 Chinese Exclusion Act in 1947 "in order to stem criticism and to avoid possible embarrassment at the UN" (ibid.: 59).

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66 150 people from India, 100 from East and West Pakistan (now Bangladesh and Pakistan), and 50 from Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 64).

Overall, however, the preference for European immigrants remained dominant, with some readiness to expand entries from 'non-traditional' origins: The 1950 Order-in-Council 2865 manifested the readiness to accept 'other' Europeans into Canada if "they were suitable regarding 'the climatic, social, educational, industrial, labour, or other conditions or requirements of Canada'" (ibid.: 60). In the same year, the Canadian government established the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, elevating the importance of immigration and citizenship to Canadian policy making. Prior to this, immigration had been managed by a branch of the Department of Mines and Resources (ibid.: 63). This department then proposed the new Immigration Act, which was passed in 1952. The 1952 Immigration Act is widely considered a consolidation of the principles that guided immigration to Canada before the Second World War. Northern Europeans were "preferred", Southern and Eastern Europeans "non-preferred", and non-Europeans were "excluded" (Ellermann 2021: 196). Decisions on individual immigrant entry remained entirely discretional (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 64f.).

Postwar Acceptance of European Cultural Heterogeneity?
While the notion of immigrant integration was not used at the time, the analysis of immigration and citizenship politics allows for an implicit deduction of the postwar Canadian approach to integration. In fact, this analytical perspective further strengthens the notion of the nexus between these political fields.

We can observe substantial change in citizenship and immigration politics in postwar Canada. While the selection criteria remained stringent and focused on prewar 'traditional' sources, immigration politics were prioritized by further institutionalization. By maintaining a restrictive and discretionary selection of immigrants, the government could control which people to settle and how to support them. However, independent Canadian citizenship ushered in a notion of being Canadian that would broaden the boundaries of belonging from a strictly Northern European and British notion to encompass other continental Europeans. Wartime efforts to foster solidarity among all people living in Canada, as described above, led to a self-conscious and nascent multicultural notion of 'Canadianness'. While maintaining racially exclusive immigration policies, the political discourse shifted towards the idea that if European homogeneity was maintained in immigration, European cultural heterogeneity could and should be accommodated in settlement.

While pertinent, these political developments might only have had a modest effect on Canada's status within the British empire. In fact, one expert stressed that Canada continued to see itself as "British outpost" long after the end of the war (CAC4: pos. 10). What we can observe in the postwar years,

however, is a timid exploration of a self-conception that would eventually grow beyond British dominance and dependence.

5.2.3 Canada becomes Canadian

As the analysis of this first Canadian critical juncture in immigration, citizenship, and integration politics has shown, the postwar years were essential establishing a Canadian self-conception as independent from Britain. This was further manifested in a confident and central approach to immigration which broadened the boundaries of whiteness to (hesitantly) accept immigrants that were not English- or French-speaking. This step was also borne out of demographic necessity: The preferred group of Northern Europeans just did not yield enough people to fill Canada's economic needs, despite Canadian officials' efforts to actively recruit immigrants by travelling to Europe and lifting the immigration ban on Germans in 1950 (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 60; Ambrose/Mudde 2015: 225).

The establishment of an independent citizenship as a major step in citizenship politics takes centre stage in this critical juncture and implicitly influences the other two political spheres. Decoupling 'Canadianness' from Britishness, as it had long been perceived, opened up new possibilities for belonging and also cautiously allowed for a new self-conception beyond the historical symbiosis with Britain that Canada had maintained pre-WWII. The end of the juncture, 1952, comes with the Immigration Act which remained remarkably conservative in its perspective. Orders-in-council, so small executive decisions, would guide Canadian migration politics into the 1960s, when a new period of change began in 1962. This will be the subject of my analysis in chapter 6.

Table 5.1: Canada – 'The Canadian Citizenship Juncture', 1945–1953

Antecedent Conditions	Shock/ Rupture	Critical Juncture	Mechanisms of Production	Legacy
Military mobilization of Canadian immigrants in WWI and WWII State-level Discussion of broadening cultural	Canadian Participation in WWII End of WWII/Onset of new World Order	1945–1953 Institutionalization of Canadian migration politics uncoupled from British dependence	Standing Committee for Research on Migration in 1946–1953 Creation of independent Canadian	Strengthening Canadian self-conception through citizenship incl. *ius soli* Manifesting immigration as a cornerstone

			Citizenship with *ius soli* 1947	of Canadian state-building
understanding of being Canadian during WWII			Creation of Federal Immigration and Citizenship Department, 1950	Opening the possibility for further diversity in immigrant recruitment
			Immigration Act, 1952	
			Broadening of immigrant admissions (though hesitant)	

Source: Own research

5.3 France – Making a Comeback, 1945–1950

France is the earliest, the oldest and, for a long time in terms of volume, the most important country of immigration in Europe and Western Europe in particular. This is true in the 19th century, it is true in the first half of the 20th century. (FAC1b: pos. 3)

5.3.1 Pre-History: Demographic Struggles and the Establishment of Europe's Oldest Immigration Country

Like most European countries, the early 19th century in France was marked by a significant amount of emigration to the Americas and to countries that were under the rule of the French empire. However, in the latter part of the 19th century, French migration politics took a decided turn as France transformed into Europe's most important immigration country. Ideas of nation-building and increasing the French population through immigration were at the root of

this development, stemming back even to the Napoleonic era. Increased immigration was seen as a possibility to "build France", concomitantly strengthening its demographic and, consequently, military position towards the neighbouring countries (particularly Germany) (Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 77; Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 32; Lüsebrink 2020: 173).

France introduced a liberalized citizenship law as early as 1851 which strengthened *ius soli* for the third generation of immigrants, as immigration accelerated even further after the founding of the Third Republic in 1870. This was the period in which migration politics really started to gain ground in France: In the 1880s, as the North American countries began to tighten their entry requirements, many people in France's neighboring countries made use of its liberal immigration policies, resulting in a significant *immigration de voisinage* (neighbourhood migration) mostly from Belgium and Italy, but also from Germany, Switzerland, and Spain, to fill labour shortages (Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 77). As Antonio Perotti notes, the number of foreigners in France almost tripled from a mere 380,000 in 1851 to one million in 1881 (Perotti 1988: 60). This trend was accelerated by the renewal of the *Code de la Nationalité* (Nationality Law) of 1889, which liberalized the acquisition of citizenship even further, automatically attributing citizenship to anyone born in France to foreign parents at age 18, so the second generation of immigrants. The principles of this law remain in place even today (Perotti 1988: 60; Brubaker 1990: 394; Hagedorn 2001: 42), despite a few political attempts to undermine them throughout the last 150 years. Apart from citizenship legislation, immigration was not dealt with in a legislative manner. Rather, labour was recruited freely, with naturalization happening later-on, or as Gérard Noiriel notes: "Immigration happened as a direct consequence of citizenship" (Noiriel 1996: xiv–xv). The influx of immigrants during those years was not without resistance from the French population, with numerous debates taking place on its impact on French identity, as well as actual physical clashes over the subject (Perotti 1988: 60f.; Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 61).

The early 1900s saw active recruitment of labour immigration on behalf of the French state, with labour treaties signed with Italy (1904) and Belgium (1906) (Noiriel 1996: 81). During the First World War, France also recruited people from its colonies at the time (from North Africa and Indochina) as "colonial workers" to fill the labour shortages left by soldiers deployed to the front, for the first time making use of the substantial colonial population in the *métropole*. Of those 220,000, most were sent back after the war (Perotti 1988: 61). Immigration numbers increased even further in the interwar years, both with people who were moving to France due to the economic crisis in Italy (labour accord of 1919), Poland, and Czechoslovakia (labour accords of 1920) and war

refugees from the Spanish Civil War (Noiriel 1996: 81; Weil 2005: 14; Lüse-brink 2020: 171). In 1927, France liberalized its citizenship acquisition laws even further, reducing the minimum residency period to three years, down from ten (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 5). In 1931, France had almost doubled its percentage of foreign population from 3.9 percent in 1921 to 6.6 percent, or almost three million people, making it the most significant immigration country in the world at the time (Perotti 1988: 62; Noiriel 1996: 5; Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 67). This shows how central developments during the Third Republic were. One expert pointed out that there is a tendency to project the current model of French integration as having begun with the French revolution, however, she notes:

You're right to point out that France's relationship with immigration predates that of many European countries. It's a country that had to be built around the question of immigration, in a co-substantial way (…). During French Revolution and subsequent stages, the question of immigration wasn't completely central. The conception of the French integration model is more a product of the Third Republic than of the revolution. (FAC4: pos. 5)

This point is helpful when current migration politics in France are discussed, where references to the revolution are ubiquitous. The reconstruction of the way that France has dealt with cultural diversity due to immigration should rather be compared with the origins of France as an immigration country during the Third Republic, between 1870 and 1940.

Strictly speaking, however, immigration to France all but stopped in 1932 due to the global economic crisis, when an immigration stop was implemented. The 1930s and early 40s were marked by a significant reduction of immigration due to the global economic crisis and then the beginning of the Second World War, the occupation of France, and the installation of the Vichy Regime. Prior to the beginning of the Second World War, France restricted citizenship acquisition, which did not hinder a swift wave of naturalizations by many people on the eve of the war (Perotti 1988: 63f.). From 1936 to 1946, the foreign population reduced from 2.1 to 1.7 million (ibid.: 63), not least due to the restrictive and racist approach by the Nazi collaborator Vichy Regime (1940–1944).

Immigration during the Vichy years was negligible, as the war stalled migration movements everywhere in Europe. Under the influence of the Nazi occupiers, the Vichy government introduced several draconian measures for citizenship, most notably the denaturalization measures for French Jews. The new citizenship and naturalization guidelines of July 1940, just after the Vichy regime's installation, allowed for the reassessment of all naturalizations that had happened in France since 1927 (Weil 2022: 12). The Vichy regime also

implemented the deployment of around 12,000 Algerians to fight on the German side in the war and the forced deportation of Italians back to Italy to join the war (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 80).

When France is discussed in current discourse on migration politics, its long and significant history of migration as Europe's oldest and at times most important immigration country is sometimes overlooked. In fact, Gérard Noiriel, eminent French migration researcher, notes that France ought to be considered the first "modern" immigration country, as opposed to the older settler colonial states like the US and Canada (Noiriel 1996: 262). This section has shown that the emergence of migration politics in France significantly predates 1945. Notably, two aspects that precede 1945 have coined the French path substantially and distinguish it from the Canadian and German cases. Firstly, the nexus between immigration, citizenship and integration politics already appears in the pre-1945 trajectory. Citizenship legislation emerges as one of the major managing tools for immigration *and* integration, an interaction that would remain pertinent in the decades following, when France would mass-regularize undocumented immigrants to accelerate their path to becoming part of the nation. Secondly, French migration politics pre-1945 are already enmeshed with France's colonial projects, particularly with Algeria, which signals the significance of colonial history for French immigration. This makes the country stand out in relation to Canada, although maybe not entirely to Germany, as the following discussion will show. Lastly, the hiatus that French politics underwent in the Vichy years extends to migration politics, as France transformed from a comparatively diverse immigration country to an occupied country with a Nazi-allied regime that embraced the radically exclusionary and racist precedents set by their German occupier. Therefore, 1945 constitutes a definitive turning point or maybe even a 'point of return' for the French case, as the next section will show.

5.3.2 The Return of a Durable Immigration Country, 1945–1950

In this chapter, I argue that France re-emerged as a durable immigration country with a clearly articulated migration politics nexus in a critical juncture that lasted from 1945 until 1950. During this time, France was very fast in re-establishing immigration and citizenship regulations in an effort to bolster French population growth. Three developments are essential in this period and distinguish France's nexus from the previous period. For one, France tried to (but eventually failed) to implement extensive government regulation of immigration through the establishment of several regulations and institutions. Secondly, due to its citizenship politics, France started to be significantly

impacted by immigration from its colonies, which I will show in the section of colonial entanglements. Lastly, while there was little controversy over the need to return to large-scale immigration that had been the norm during the Third Republic, dissent emerged on the question of who would be suitable for immigration and citizenship acquisition. This conflict will be discussed in the section on French integration politics.

During the Second World War, France was under Nazi occupation from 1940 until 1944, with the type of occupation varying depending on the region. The Nazis surrendered Paris in August 1944 after allied troops and resistance fighters had confronted them through strikes and later active artillery for several weeks. Shortly after liberation, General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the French Liberation Movement, entered the French war ministry building and set up to govern from there. From this point onward, France regained sovereignty over its jurisdiction. France was governed by an interim three-party alliance, the communist, socialist, and Christian Democrat parties from 1944 to 1946/1947, prior to the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1946. This provisional tripartite government oversaw the country during this period, with Charles de Gaulle as the official government chairman until 1946.

After the Second World War officially ended in May 1945, the French government was very quick to introduce new migration politics regulations. Several factors contributed to this decision. Most immediately, France needed to swiftly introduce measures to make up for the destruction left by the war, the French war losses, and to rebuild the economy. Also, France's population had aged and decreased, and the birth rate had dropped throughout the past 20 years. Due to these "demographic and economic demands" the French government, in line with popular demographers and economists, estimated that at least five million immigrants needed to be recruited as swiftly as possible (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 93; Perotti 1988: 64). The urgency of this task is also illustrated by the fact that the French government made these moves before the announcement of the Fourth Republic in 1946, with de Gaulle declaring as early as March 1945 that "desirable immigration for the French nation" as one of the main goals to bolster the postwar recovery (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 6f.).

To manage this substantive endeavour, the French government decided that instead of economic actors going into active recruitment like they had in the 1920s, when more than a million people entered France, the government itself should be in charge of the selection and settlement of new immigrants (Perotti 1988: 64). This was a novel approach for France, where government involvement in migration politics had mostly taken place at the level of citizenship, apart from a few labour accords in the 1920s and 1930s (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 85). Ostensibly, the government wanted to control the composition of

immigrants to "preserve national cohesion", meaning that certain ethnic groups, mostly from northern Europe, would be preferred candidates for immigration (Perotti 1988: 64).

In quick succession, citizenship and immigration politics were reinstated in October and November 1945. The Ordinance of October 19, 1945 (*Ordonnance du 19 Octobre*), citizenship was reinstated "on the principles of prewar republican legislations", with minor changes such as raising the minimum residence from three to five years. Overall, however, citizenship regulations introduced in this ordinance reaffirmed "an open approach to the integration of immigrants and their children regardless of their country of origin", reintroducing the *ius soli* principle for the second generation along with swift citizenship acquisition for the first immigrant generation (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 7). On November 2, 1945, a second ordinance (*Ordonnance du 2 Novembre*) was passed to establish state control over immigration processes. This ordinance included that any immigrant could now only legally settle if they could demonstrate an employment offer in France, contrary to the way immigration was previously handled, but they could then also bring their families with them to settle. Additionally, the French government ensured that immigrant workers would enjoy the same insurance rights and level of salary as French workers (Perotti 1988: 64f.; Noiriel 1996: 87f.; Weil 2005: 15).

Following the Ordinance of November 2, 1945, France also created the National Immigration Office (*Office Nationale de l'Immigration,* ONI), to implement its new immigration plan. This plan included the goal that 50 percent of all new recruits should come from 'northern' countries, including the Benelux countries, Scandinavia, England, Ireland, Canada, and (somewhat surprisingly) Germany. The rest could be from other sources, with Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese preferred, respectively also from the northern parts of their countries. All these groups were considered most assimilable to French society (Hagedorn 2001: 111). Saliently, this selection according to origin was not part of the Ordinance of November 2, 1945. In the ordinance, recruitment was only to take place under strictly economic considerations. This shows what Patrick Weil has called the 'ambiguity' of postwar French immigration politics: "On the one hand, France was a country of immigration without distinction of origin or nationality. On the other hand, it tried without saying it too much to favor European immigration to the detriment of colonial immigration, especially from Algeria." (Weil 2005: 13).

Possibly due to the experience of abundant immigration in the 1920s at the height of the immigration to the Third Republic, the French government vastly overestimated the willingness of people from these desired origins to immigrate in large numbers to France, a country that was like most other European

countries struggling to rebuild its postwar economy. As Heike Hagedorn puts it, "the demographic-economic and the ethnic-nationalist arguments could not be combined in a cohesive immigration concept" (Hagedorn 2001: 111). In short, the French government's approach to control immigration failed (Simon 2014: 196). The ONI turned out to be too sluggish in responding to employers' more immediate needs, which resulted in employers taking matters into their own hands by going to countries to recruit workers themselves to have them 'regularized' after the fact (Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 64f.). Despite the overall failure of the approach, the 1945 immigration ordinance still carried an important symbolic message. By instating government control over regularized labour migration including the possibility of settlement with dependents, France effectively "announced itself as a durable immigration country" (Weil 2005: 15).

Not a single immigration law was passed between the November 1945 ordinance and 1980, spanning most of the thirty years that are referred to as the *Trente Glorieuses* (Glorious Thirty Years) of economic prosperity. However, substantial immigration took place. Many different immigration movements happened during this time, most importantly the immigration from Algeria and from other French-colonized, and later de-colonized countries. Nevertheless, immigration politics at the government level mostly happened in the background, with little control over actual immigration (cf. Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 87f.).

5.3.3 Colonial Entanglements in Postwar Immigration and Citizenship Politics

Indeed, it was at this time that a movement of migration developed, which is what we still know today, which characterizes part of our current configuration, which is immigration from North African countries, so Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and sub-Saharan Africa (…). This is a movement that is growing with (…) a particularity for these migrants from French colonial territories, which is *that most of them have a second-class citizen status*. They are both recognized as subjects of the empire, and as such benefit from a certain number of legal characteristics, but on the other hand, they do not have French nationality and therefore do not have all the rights of citizenship. *This means that de facto, even if they belong to French departments, I am thinking in particular of Algeria, the administrative organization is modeled on the French model, so they have departments and unfortunately, these populations, even if they live in a department, remain foreigners. As soon as they are on French territory, they are foreigners.* Whereas someone who leaves the department of Gironde to live in Paris is not perceived as a foreigner. (FAC3: pos. 7)

FP2: *The word Algerian in this country in France is very symbolically charged.* The word Moroccan, not so much. Tunisian, not so much. Senegal, Mali, ... but Algeria! Symbolically for France ...

FA: So, what does that mean?

FP2: It's very important! *The French and the Algerians are bound by history for the future in a very intimate, intimate way.* They are not Germans and Turks. Germany has never colonized Turkey. (FP2: pos. 29–31)

As the previous section showed, while the French government tried to establish control of both type and composition of immigrants arriving in France in the postwar years, most immigrants arrived from Algeria, which was part of France at the time. This underlines the central argument of this thesis, which is that we cannot understand immigration as independent from citizenship and integration politics. In the case of France, (post-)colonial immigration in general and Algerian immigration in particular play a major role in migration politics, throughout all of the second half of the 20th century. It is therefore salient to understand why Algerians were able to freely move to France at the time, effectively undermining the government's established immigration regime. Central to our understanding of this is the legal status of Algerians through their citizenship.

The management of Algerian immigration did not lie in the powers of the newly established ONI. Prior to Algeria's 1962 independence, it was considered part of France, including three separate 'French' departments. Most Algerians did not hold French citizenship, but a different colonial subjecthood status that did not include all citizens' rights and will be discussed below. However, this changed in 1947. Between that point and 1954, the number of yearly Algerian immigrants increased from 20,000 to an impressive 210,000, far above the modest numbers that the ONI was recruiting (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 109; Hagedorn 2001: 111). Despite government efforts to control immigration through the ONI, Algerians became the largest group of immigrants in the postwar era. As Antonio Perotti puts it, any regulatory efforts by the ONI were trumped by Algerian immigration (Perotti 1988: 64f.).

French imperial efforts had led to the colonization of countries and territories all over the world. However, the French empire was most prominent in North and West Africa. Types of colonization varied significantly. There were countries which were colonized under protectorate with some elements of self-governance, or in the special case of Algeria, explicitly made part of France. Algeria had been colonized by France in 1830 and its territory officially became a part of France through the French constitution of 1848 upon the foundation of the Second French Republic. This did not mean, however, that the

inhabitants of Algeria also automatically became French. In fact, two statuses existed in colonized Algeria, that of the French colonizers who held French citizenship, and that of the Indigenous Algerians, mostly Muslim, but also Jewish, who were French subjects, but not French citizens and could also not become French citizens. Their status was regulated through the so-called *Code de l'Indigénat* (Indigenous Code, ostensibly in contrast to the Nationality Code) (Saada 2005, Weil 2022).[67]

These circumstances changed drastically after the Second World War with the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1946, when France granted citizenship to all its overseas subjects. When Algerians received French citizenship in 1947, they were able to travel freely to France. They had, in fact, been able to do so since 1946 (Weil 2005: 16). As described above, this development sparked the large-scale immigration of Algerians to France. In strictly conceptual terms, it could be disputed whether Algerian immigration to France in this period should be categorized as immigration, since the territory they were migrating from was *de jure* French, and they held French citizenship, which effectively makes this a form of mobility rather than immigration. However, none of the authors I read nor the experts I interviewed considered Algerian immigration at the time as a form of mobility; every single one conceived of it as immigration (Hagedorn 2001: 111; Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 69; 1988: 109; Simon 2014: 196; Oltmer 2017: 189). In all literature and interview sections on this subject it is stressed that it was Algerians who came to France, rather than French citizens deciding to move elsewhere in France. Nobody perceived it that way, including the French authorities. For instance, immigration of French Algerian citizens from Algeria was managed through a separate agency called the National Algerian Office of Manpower (*Office National Algérien de la Main d'Oeuvre*, ONAMO). The ONAMO maintained this regulatory position for Algerian immigration to France until 1973, eleven years after Algerian independence (Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 69).

The immigration of French Algerian citizens to the *métropole* stood in opposition to the immigration that French demographic experts at the time desired. As outlined above, there was an influential group of demographers who

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67 This changed somewhat in 1865, when access to French citizenship was granted under the condition that the person would renounce the Muslim or Jewish religion. Very few people made use of this possibility. In 1870, access to French citizenship was granted to Indigenous Algerian Jews, but not Muslims. During the Vichy years, citizenship for Algerian Jews was revoked again, denaturalizing 110,000 Algerian Jews (Weil 2022: 12). After the First World War, access to French citizenship was eased somewhat for those who had served in the war or those whose father had served in the war under several additional conditions such as language ability. This affected about half a million Algerians.

were strongly informed by notions of racial superiority and recommended quota systems for immigration like the U.S.-American immigration model. Patrick Weil calls this the "American Crisis of French citizenship" (Weil 2022: 13). The French government, however, resisted their calls to tighten naturalization guidelines in line with this goal. French justice minister Pierre-Henri Teitgen stuck by the Third Republic principles for citizenship acquisition: "descent or birth on French soil" (Weil 2022: 13). The conflict between the demographers and the justice minister is described in further detail in the next section.

To conclude, the French government was quick to re-establish the citizenship rules of the pre-war era, including the traditionally liberal approach to *ius soli.* Maybe without proper coordination or consideration, the granting of citizenship to a substantial number of subjects of the French empire would change the composition of immigrants to France and metropolitan French society in the long run. What we see here, then, is a country that re-established itself as a durable immigration country on all fronts. This also applied to French integration politics, as the next section will show.

5.3.4 Postwar French Integration Politics and the Question of Demographic Preference

The 1945 impetus to boost the French population through immigration also had an influence on integration politics. Postwar French integration politics were surprisingly extensive and included a clear objective for the long-term settlement of newly arrived immigrants. The arrival, settlement, family services, social insurance and even the naturalizations of immigrants were not managed by the Interior or Justice Ministries, but by the newly established Ministry of the Population. As Gérard Noiriel points out, the fact that the French government decided to extend the "state's activities beyond the traditional spheres of police and labor" showed their "political willingness to integrate immigrants" (Noiriel 1996: 88). This once again underlines France's overall aim to establish a durable migration politics regime.

However, population politics in postwar France was also marked by group of demographers with a much more ethnically selective perspective on who should be and become part of the French people. Two of them, Alfred Sauvy and Georges Mauco, stand out in their efforts arguments to select immigrants on the basis of ethnicity and origin because of their supposed easier assimilability. Both had previously belonged to the 'pronatalist' school of demography

in the 1920s and now considered themselves 'populationists'. This renaming an attempt to rebrand their efforts and lose the association with Vichy and racism that underpinned pronatalism (Hollifield 2014: 159). Alfred Sauvy was a scholar at the *Institut National d'Études Démographiques* (Institute of National Demographic Studies). He made an impassioned argument for the idea that "a migrant's capacity to assimilate depended on nationality" (Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 68). Georges Mauco, who was now the General Secretary of the High Commission of Population, had been a functionary during the Vichy regime until his defection in 1943. He was also a staunch proponent of ethnic selection in immigration and citizenship (Weil 2002: 13). In June 1945, he formulated a letter to the French justice minister Pierre-Henri Teitgen, which was then signed by Charles de Gaulle, in which he argued for immigrant selection "in the national French interest", meaning an exclusion of "Mediterraneans and Orientals" who, in Third Republic immigration movement, had "dramatically altered the human structure of France" (referenced in Fahrmeir 2007: 166). The justice minister was unimpressed by this intervention. As Fahrmeir explains, Teitgen did not want to implement any restrictions based on ethnicity and origin, rather "his main concern were the proven enemies of the French Republic's political ideals –collaborators not unlike Mauco" (ibid.: 167). Teitgen made sure that ethnicity or origin were not a ground for exclusion in the French citizenship ordonnance of 1945 (ibid.; Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 7; Weil 2002: 150). Weil describes this as the "loss of Mauco's battle" for the ethnic selection in immigration (ibid.).

Demography and considerations on modifying the composition of French society had long been a central component of French migration politics, particularly when it came to questions of integration and 'suitability' or 'adaptability'. This is underlined by this expert:

You have a demographic obsession in France at the end of the 19th and first half of the 20th century. We lack French people, that means we lack soldiers. In any case, we certainly need workers but also parents, people who will produce Frenchmen who can take up arms. The horizon of war and the need for births is very present among French political leaders in a context where, in any case, military power, first of all, Europe has been at war constantly for half a century and military power depends on the number of troops you can field. So, the demographic question is also a key, and you don't have the equivalent in Germany. (FAC1: pos. 13)

In the postwar years, the willingness to establish a durable immigration country was therefore clear. The ambiguity in French migration politics largely arose in connection to which immigrants would be preferred. As outlined above in section 5.3.2, selection based on ethnic origin was not part of new immigration legislation. However, in actual state politics a different picture emerged. As

Weil explains, the ONI ventured out for recruitment in neighbouring European countries like Italy rather than further abroad, ostensibly to counter the high numbers of arrivals from less desirable Muslim Algeria (Weil 2005: 16). As Wihtol de Wenden stresses, the ideas of "adaptation and assimilation" guided most French integration politics beyond settlement support (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 87f.). One emblematic example of this tension are debates on the '*francisation*' (literally 'french-making') of immigrants' names after naturalization. Noiriel describes how after 1945, it became "everyday administrative practice" to change immigrants' first and last names after naturalization to make them sound more French, or more accurately to give the names a "necessary modification to make them lose their foreign character" (Noiriel 1996: 74f.). For instance, an Italian with the last name Ponti might be called Ponty after becoming French, because the replacement of 'i's with 'y's was considered more French-looking. A Polish person with the last name Wanilwelski might be given the name Basile after naturalization, because it was considered that "a French type of surname" would be "easily recognizable by the absence of an accumulation of consonants" (ibid.).

French integration politics in the postwar years were therefore ambiguous, not unlike the efforts made in Canada. Attempts to establish a kind of desired European suitability by demographers had a stronghold on French officials, with pockets of resistance towards this tendency. Overall, however, it was clearly established that immigration itself would be followed by settlement and that people would need government support during this settlement process, particularly regarding their family, housing, and social welfare.

5.3.5 Framing 1945–1950 as a Critical Juncture in French Migration Politics

As the analysis of the post-1945 critical juncture in France shows, this period was essential for establishing France as a durable immigration country. The principles that were (re-)established during this time prevailed throughout the Fourth (1946–1958) and well into the Fifth Republic (1958–present). Most notably, beyond the establishment of principles, the legacy of period is one that is characterized by the French loss of control over immigration in the 20 years that would follow. Equally as important during this period is the way in which colonial entanglements marked French migration politics. The downfall of the short-lived Fourth Republic in 1958, sparked by on-going decolonization efforts, would result in an intensification in (post-)colonial immigration,

permanently altering the composition of French society. The immigration of Algerians could therefore be seen as a precursor to these developments which will be further discussed in the next chapter. The following table gives an overview of the critical juncture following 1945 until 1950.

Table 5.2: France – 'The Third Republic Return Juncture', 1945–1950

Antecedent Conditions	Shock/ Rupture	Critical Juncture	Mechanisms of Production	Legacy
Large-scale immigration from neighbouring countries during the Third Republic 1870–1940 Establishment of *ius soli* and liberal naturalization regime Occupation by France and Nazification/racialisation of migration politics under Vichy regime Disenfranchisement and denaturalization of French Jews Participation of colonial subjects in the war efforts	Liberation from Nazi occupation in 1944 and end of WWII in 1945 Beginning Establishment of a New World Order	1945–1950 Establishment and Institutionalization of a durable Immigration Regime with Colonial Entanglements	Ordinance of October 19, 1945, on citizenship Ordinance of Nov. 2, 1945, on immigration Establishment of the ONI, 1945 onwards 1946 Founding of the 4th Republic, colonial subjects get citizenship 1950 Establishment of the Population Ministry	Laying the foundation for the principles of an immigration country Beginning of postcolonial immigration movements

Source: Own research

5.4 Germany – Establishing a Co-Ethnic Immigration Country, 1948–1953

We've always had immigration in this country. How could it be otherwise? We're in the middle of Europe, so it's hard to imagine – maybe if you were an island, you have it easy, but how should that work here? And in this respect, *Germany's entire development, within whatever borders, has always been characterized by immigration, and in some places also by waves of emigration.* But in recent history in particular it has experienced immigration on a scale where historians then say that what happened in 2015 (…): 'Well, those few people.' ((laughs)) So simply put, yes, in 45, after 45 there have been completely different immigration movements, which have perhaps shaped this society even more strongly than what happened in 2015 and yet, yes, *it is often difficult in the discourse to learn from these experiences, because in the discourse the immigration after 45 is not perceived as 'classic' immigration.* (…) Although, if you talk to people who have experienced that [immigration immediately after 45, F.A] (…), these are typical stories of integration processes. With everything, with discrimination, with marginalisation and so on. So, it's actually not all that different from what we know from other processes, sociologically speaking. But it was not categorized in this way. To this day, we only record the migration background[68] from 1950 onwards, i. e. clearly separated, so that these groups do not count. *Otherwise, we would probably be at 50 percent.* (GPS3: pos. 10–12)

5.4.1 Pre-History: German Historical Resistance to Diversification

As a country situated in the middle of the European continent with frequently shifting borders and almost a dozen neighboring countries both to the east and the west, Germany has long experienced language and cultural diversity

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68 The term *Migrationshintergrund* (migration background) was introduced into official German federal data collection in 2005 to account for population diversity beyond those possessing a foreign passport. Statistically, someone with a 'migration background' has at least one parent who does not possess the German passport by birth. The application of the term is controversial: Some underline that it allows to highlight structural discrimination of people with connection to immigration, others point to a branding of people born in Germany with a German passport as 'others'. (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2023; Destatis 2023)

(Kurthen 1995: 915).[69] Like France, the German territory[70] did not experience immigration that the state felt a need to actively manage until the middle of the 19th century, although its approach to managing it was decidedly different to the French. Throughout the 18th century, people on the German territory had mostly migrated to the East (early 18th century) and the West (late 18th century).[71] However, towards the middle of the 19th century, Polish and Eastern European Jewish migration to different provinces of Prussia increased. As the Polish minority became more and more established, Prussian administrators expressed concern that the Prussian Poles would migrate to the Western Provinces and cause *Überfremdung* ('foreignization') in those areas. They thus implemented a Germanization policy, forcing the use of the German language (Wilhelm 2013: 18).

While the borders to the Polish East were briefly opened and enabled easy passage of Polish agricultural workers in 1867, Cornelia Wilhelm explains that that 1870s saw a further step in German migration politics in the so-called *Kulturkampf* ('culture fight'). This process included the explicit discrimination of unionists, socialists, and Catholics, the forced Germanization of Prussian Poles and Russian Polish immigrants to Prussia, and the successive increase in antisemitism (Wilhelm 2013: 17f.).

Political repression of minority and opposition groups set the tone for the following decades. In 1876, a decade after opening the borders to the East, Prussia initiated and progressively expanded an active *Abwehrpolitik* ('defense politics') towards immigrating Polish agricultural workers. This led to the forced expulsion of 40,000 Polish and Jewish workers and the required registration of arrivals by the Prussian authorities. Saliently, this allowed the Prussian authorities to enforce their departure after the work season in an effort to gain control over their hitherto uncontrolled entry and to prevent long-term settlement (Wilhelm 2013: 19; Oltmer 2017: 103).[72]

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69 In fact, Foroutan points out that at the point of German confederation in 1848, at least seven languages were spoken in the different German territories: German, Polish, Russian, Italian, French, Danish, and Sorbian (notwithstanding non-formalized languages like Bavarian and Low-German). (Foroutan 2019: 220).

70 For the purpose of this pre-history account, Germany here denotes both the territory of the German federation and later the German empire.

71 Between 1815 and 1914, approximately 5.5 million German-speaking people aso emigrated the territory to the Americas. Little is known on how many emigrated to the East prior and concomitantly to this movement (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2019: 6).

72 In fact, the measures went much further to draconian dimensions. So-called *Auslandspolen* ('foreigner poles') always had to carry their red "Polish card" for identity purposes. If they were ever without one and controlled, they could be deported immediately. There was no possibility for family migration as men and women workers were always divided up. Pregnancy was considered a breach of contract, resulting in immediate deportation at one's own cost. (Oltmer 2017: 104).

While immigration continued, Prussia was very strict in its control of migration movements as further institutionalization of migration politics in the early 1900s show. Settlement of non-German immigrants in the territory was outrightly rejected. This rejection was also entrenched in the 1913 *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* (RuStaG, citizenship and nationality law), which would remain in place until 1999 with some modifications, except for the Nazi regime. In this law, *ius sanguinis* was the "prime ground for naturalization" (Wilhelm 2013: 20). The law was set up for the explicit exclusion of immigrants, since "the reference to descent had a racial undertone with the law clearly underscoring that immigrants from the East, such as Poles, Czechs, and 'culturally inferior' Jews should be shunned from naturalization" (ibid.).[73]

After the First World War, the establishment of the Weimar Republic saw the extension of immigration controls from Poles to all foreign workers (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 47). 'Scientific' racism and growing antisemitism resulted in a broader acceptance of the supposed lack of assimilability of Jewish Germans, particularly among conservatives (ibid.). The economic crisis of 1929 stopped all immigration to Germany. The Nazis seized power in 1933, effectively ending the Weimar republic (ibid.: 49). The beginning of the Nazi regime saw the unprecedented mass-denaturalization of Jewish Germans.[74] Additionally, the Nazis undertook the forced large-scale resettlement of people categorized as 'racially' German. In turn, those considered 'not German' according to racist criteria were forcefully deported (around nine million people between 1939 and 1944), while those categorized as 'racially' German were "brought back to the Reich" from outside of the seized territories (around one million people in the same period) (Oltmer 2017: 150; Terkessidis 2020: 151f.).

Concomitantly, Nazis forced around eight million 'alien workers' (*Fremdarbeiter*) to participate in the war effort, filling the shortages left by those fighting in the war and those that the Nazis had forced to leave. Unsurprisingly, this policy was explicitly racialized with "Germans at the top of the employment hierarchy, followed by Italians and other 'Western workers'

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73 Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach argue that the implementation of the RuStaG stands in continuity with other "explicit attempts" by the emerging German elite to "delineate the social and cultural differences between Germans and their Others", like the above-mentioned Bismarckian *Kulturkampf* in the 1870s, German colonial expansion until 1918, as well as "the cultivation of social knowledges of race – such as colonial anthropology, *Ostforschung*, eugenics (…) that legitimated state initiatives ranging from conquest, colonization, nationalization, and deportation to adoption, abortion, Aryanization, sterilization, euthanasia, enslavement, mass expulsion and eventually genocide." (Chin/Fehrenbach 2012b: 16).

74 In the nazi period, around 40,000 Jewish Germans were stripped of their citizenship. This practice began in 1933, with the stripping of citizenship from 33 prominent Jewish Germans. On the practice of citizenship revocation see also: Fargues/Winter/Gibney 2020.

(*Westarbeiter*), with Polish workers and 'Eastern workers' (*Ostarbeiter*) from the Soviet Union at the bottom" (Ellermann 2021: 140).

When Germany is discussed in public discourse on its migration politics, its enduring self-conception as a 'non-immigration country' is often mentioned. The emergence of the 'official' non-immigration paradigm dates to the 1970s. However, this brief description of Germany's history of migration politics shows how Germany had historically resisted rising diversity through immigration and implemented efforts to curb and strictly control immigration from undesired immigrants as early as the late 19th century. In fact, as Antje Ellermann argues, the political developments of the late 19th century amount to "policy legacies inherited by West German officials at the end of World War II" (Ellermann 2021: 137). Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos adds that with the institutionalization of strict immigration measures for labour migration and the implementation of the 1913 RuStaG "Germany had established the central pillars of its twentieth-century migration regime: temporary labour migration coupled with restrictive naturalization and citizenship policies" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 46).

The nexus between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics is absent in this era. On the level of integration politics, broadly conceived as dominant thinking about the belonging of 'Others', historians Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach explain aptly:

German national identity emerged and evolved according to a protracted *politics of difference* that established German subjectivity and superiority by delineating these from their historically, geographically, and politically relevant Others. By the early twentieth century, Germanness was defined in opposition to a number of racially defined categories of perceived aliens residing in Germany, its colonies, and its borderlands, namely Jews, Slavs, Blacks, and 'gypsies'. (Chin/Fehrenbach 2012b: 16)

Superiority and *Otherness* were established both by the tight control of labour migration to Germany as well as the forced Germanization of those who were considered culturally inferior but still resident on the territory. Through the 1913 RuStaG, Germany did away with *ius soli* and established a membership policy that acted as a tool for exclusion and disenfranchisement for those deemed 'un-German'. The ethnically conceived German identity intertwined with racist conceptions of German superiority when the Nazis took power in 1933, a line of thinking that culminated in the terrors of the Nazi regime and the horrific murder of eleven million people in the Holocaust.[75]

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75 I would suggest that the advent of German migration politics in late 19th and early 20th century can be considered as an esodic part of the rise of the Nazi era. That said, racist thinking was

5.4.2 The 'Multiple Meanings' of 1945

The end of the Second World War on May 8, 1945, constituted a massive, all-encompassing rupture for what was now effectively occupied Germany. In the wake of the Nazi surrender, the German territory was divided into four occupying zones with each zone respectively administered by the British, the French, the U.S.-American or the Soviet forces until 1949. While the end of the war and the occupied period with the eventual emergence of two new German states was long seen as a 'zero hour' for German history and politics, this perspective has long shifted, as Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach explain: "We now take for granted that West Germany did not emerge *sui generis* from the ruins of war and occupation, that its society, politics, and culture can only be fully understood as part of the longer continuum of German history." (Chin/Fehrenbach 2012b: 5). It is this shift in perspective which allows for researchers "to grasp the multiple meaning of 1945" (ibid.). This perspective is also significant regarding the influence of the critical juncture that followed the rupture of 1945 in German migration politics.

In the following section I argue that immigration into the German territory in the immediate postwar era had a significant bearing on the way in which the German migration politics nexus was constituted in the newly founded German Federal Republic in 1948. I therefore show how the developments following the war led to the Federal Republic's development into a co-ethnic immigration country in a critical juncture lasting from 1948 until 1953. In this section, I also argue that postwar immigration needs to be considered as part of German migration history. For a long time, it was seen as something other than immigration, both in public discourse and in research in what Thomas Schwarz describes as an enduring *Sprachlosigkeit* ("aglossia") between research on resettlers and research on immigrants in Germany (Schwarz 2001: 37f.).

To be sure, the circumstances of postwar immigration were undoubtedly unique, but so are most other forms of immigration. Excluding this significant immigration from German migration history has long served the purpose of reifying the difference between the people that arrived then to the people that arrived less than a decade later as worthier of access to belonging. Perceiving migration politics broadly as not only explicit policy action but also as major events related to migration as I do in this thesis, several significant events took place in the immediate postwar era, prior to and just after the constitution of the German Federal Republic that we ought to pay attention to. Two groups experienced displacement and eventual resettlement during this period: The

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popular in many countries during this time, not just in Germany. Therefore, it might be a sufficient condition for the Nazis rise to power, but not a necessary one.

group of displaced persons (DPs for short) and the group of 'ethnic' German refugees or expellees (later also called resettlers or *Aussiedler*).

Displaced Persons or Establishing Un-belonging

Before the Nazi regime, Germany was home to around 500,000 Jews. After the war, with the brutal murder and displacement of Jewish people, only 15,000 remained (Grossmann 2012; 55). They were now part of the larger group of displaced persons (DPs). DPs which had survived the Nazi persecution and / or concentration camps included Jews, political prisoners, and other regime opponents. Most DPs were severely traumatized and in bad health, and did not have a place to go, since their social structures and homes that had existed before persecution and war were often completely destroyed (Oltmer 2017: 152). The plight of DPs in the postwar years was therefore significant. Three major sites were set up to take care of them in the German territory, one in Berlin, one in Munich, and one in Frankfurt (Main). Jewish DPs in particular experienced the period between 1945 and 1949 as a "unique transitory society" (Grossmann 2012: 56). As Atina Grossmann explains, "DP life was simulta-neously a final efflorescence of a destroyed East European Jewish culture, a preparation for an imagined future in Eretz Israel, and a 'waiting room' in which new lives were indeed (…) begun." (ibid.). Germans surrounding these sites were often at odds with the DPs, particularly if their resettlement took longer than expected (ibid.). Jewish DPs reported antisemitism regularly. Ini-tially, these reports were dismissed by the Jewish relief officials in charge of their care. DPs were considered traumatized and therefore "inclined to see an-tisemitism where it may not exist" (Grossmann 2012: 66). However, it quickly became apparent that direct antisemitism persevered throughout the postwar years, covered up by the fact that the number of people it could be directed towards had severely diminished (ibid.). These reports are in line with broader research that suggests that while 1945 brought the downfall of an explicitly racist and demonic regime, everyday racist practices persisted (Chin/Fehren-bach 2012b: 9; Fehrenbach 2012).

Resettlement of DPs was largely organized by the International Refugee Organisation, which successfully enabled the resettlement of a vast majority of DPs in the postwar years. Nevertheless, about 150,000 of them remained upon the constitution of the Federal Republic, mostly because they were re-fused access to the International Refugee Organization's emigration pro-grammes due to lack of physical stamina, because they were too old or too sick. As Grossman explains, the remaining DPs were even more vulnerable to discrimination and exclusion by the local population, with reports of their be-ing referred to as "asocial" and "homeless" foreigners, as well as "'parasites'

on West Germany's developing economy and efforts to integrate ethnic German refugees" (Grossmann 2012: 66).

Saliently, the first law enacted in April 1951 to support their living situation was called the law on the rights of *heimatlose Ausländer* (homeless foreigners). In it, the remaining DPs were granted a relatively generous refugee status, but they were not offered citizenship or given a comparable status to the vast number of refugees from the east, whose trajectory is described below. Neither did this law offer these individuals reparations for the hardship they had endured during the Nazi terror (Oltmer 2017: 152). Overall, despite the relatively low number of DPs in comparison to the large number of co-ethnic German refugees, their treatment was a foreboding of the way the German Federal Republic would define 'outsiders' in the decades to come (Chin/Fehrenbach 2012b: 9). The treatment of DPs was the very first act of establishing the German postwar politics of 'Us' and 'Them', particularly when contrasted to the experience of refugees and expellees who arrived at the same time.

'Ethnic' German Refugees and Expellees: Coming back home?

None of the interviewees explicitly mentioned DPs in the context of migration politics, mostly because in contemporary German migration research any immigration prior to the labour agreement with Italy in 1955 is not considered as 'classic migration' as one interviewee stressed. This interviewee was also unsure about whether to include the other, significantly larger, group of refugees and expellees which were either from former German territory in the East or part of 'ethnic' German communities in Eastern Europe, as part of Germany's postwar migration history. In this quote, we can detect the hesitancy to classify the postwar refugee crisis as a migration movement:

This first immigration is quite disputed, is it really immigration or is it a return or how can this form of 'movement' [German word: *Zuzug*] of people to the territory be described (…) how can it be described appropriately legally, but also politically? So, I think with this group [refugees from the East, F. A.] there was already quite classically, the question of how do you understand this group, how do you assess this group? Is it immigration, is it something else? Well, it is certainly the case that if you understand immigration very fundamentally as geographical mobility that crosses national borders, then it is immigration. But of course, it was embedded in the political context and in the political context of the consequences of the war or of the adjustment of the consequences of the war. (GAC1: pos. 8)

To explain: The occupying powers of the German territory decided to move Germany's eastern borders to the West, effectively making the German territory smaller. The borders were shifted by about 280 km to the West, ceding this territory to Poland. People considered 'ethnic' Germans from this territory,

but also from i. a. Czechoslovakia and Romania, were expelled and told to leave these regions to move to the occupied German territory. This resulted in a refugee crisis of a massive scale, with approximately twelve million people having to leave the east to settle in occupied German territory, of which around four million went to settle in what would later become the territory of the German Federal Republic (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 70f.).

Significantly, refugees and expellees from the East would constitute about a fifth of the West German population at the time, and while their arrival and settlement was anything but free from conflict, their labour force was more than welcome. As Geoff Eley describes, the influx of refugees and expellees provided the necessary workforce as they filled the labour demands for the postwar reconstruction of infrastructure and cities. By the 1960s, due to the open arms of the German Federal Republic towards this group of de-facto immigrants, they made up almost a fourth of the total West German population (23.8 percent) (Eley 2012: 157). In a cynical and utilitarian way, Triadafilopoulos notes how their arrival and workforce "served as a useful replacement for the millions of recently departed forced labourers" which the Nazis had indentured during the war years (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 71), echoed in a similar tone by Philip Martin who notes that World War II had given "German employers experience in dealing with foreign workers" (Martin 2014: 226).

The postwar expulsion and on-going flight of people from the former German territory in the East, as well as people considered 'ethnic' Germans from Eastern European countries was partially constitutive of one of the foundational principles laid out in the German Federal Republic's Basic Law which was passed in 1949: Belonging to the German nation.

5.4.3 'A new "Us"'? Citizenship and Integration Politics in the Newly Established Germany

It was completely indisputable that everybody coming from the East should be included. Every resettler (*Aussiedler*) from the East also constituted a victory of the West over communism. (GAC3: pos. 83)

Of course, *it has always been German policy to have open arms for ethnic German immigrants, because they were German qua our reason of state, but also only because of the system conflict to the east*. We would never have taken back Germans or people of German origin from Latin America or the United States *en masse* to this extent and given them citizenship immediately. (GPS2: pos. 24)

It was not problematic at all to formulate this new 'Us' at the time. (GAC4: pos. 12)

The last quote is taken from an expert interviewee describing the introduction of German citizenship law and its open arms approach to 'ethnic' German refugees and expellees. The expert describes how this group was later often conceived of as very easily integrated (a clear myth, as he stressed, and debunked by later research) which served to establish a distinction between this group of immigrants to other, later groups of immigrants (ibid.). Pertinently, the portrayal of these de-facto immigrants as having a natural claim of belonging also served as a precursor to the almost self-evident exclusion of new immigrants which would start arriving in the mid-1950s. Therefore, the reference to the *new* 'Us' might be misleading, since a closer look at citizenship policy as it was established in 1949 reveals surprisingly old notions of a German 'Us', rooted in a persistent understanding of Germans as a nation, a *Volk*-conception. How did this happen?

The Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949. Citizenship acquisition was regulated through the reinstated 1913 RuStAG, which is based on the principle of *ius sanguinis*, so descent. Naturalization would be facilitated for those able to demonstrate their belonging to the German *Volk*, as made explicit in Article 116 of the German constitution, the Basic Law, which formulates the conditions for being or becoming German, worth quoting in full here:

> Unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning of this Basic Law shall be a person who possesses German nationality or who has been admitted as a refugee or displaced person of German nationality or as the spouse or descendant of such a person in the territory of the German Reich as it stood on December 31, 1937.[76]

By virtue of this law in Germany's constitution, three groups, expellees and refugees (*Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge*), people who chose to leave the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to settle in Germany (*Übersiedler*), and co-ethnic immigrants from the Eastern bloc (*Aussiedler*) would juridically be acknowledged as belonging to the German people with automatic access to citizenship. The German constitution also included a very liberal asylum policy to those being politically persecuted. Resettlers, refugees from the GDR, and asylum seekers formed the core of German immigration politics upon the founding of the republic. The way the Basic Law was formulated strengthens my point that the German Federal Republic did declare itself an immigration country right

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76 „Deutscher im Sinne dieses Grundgesetzes ist vorbehaltlich anderweitiger gesetzlicher Regelung, wer die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt oder als Flüchtling oder Vertriebener deutscher Volkszugehörigkeit oder als dessen Ehegatte oder Abkömmling in dem Gebiete des Deutschen Reiches nach dem Stande vom 31. Dezember 1937 Aufnahme gefunden hat."

from the start, however with a focus on co-ethnic immigrants, excluding all other possible immigrant groups.

To be sure, the Basic Law formulated the conditions for belonging to the German nation. Administratively, the automatic access to German nationality for resettlers and their integration were regulated through the 1953 *Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz* (Federal Expellee and Refugee Law). Saliently, the law regulated that resettlers were entitled to German citizenship upon application. Their access to German nationality was therefore automatic. This contrasts with other immigrants applying for German citizenship. They had the possibility to do so, but access was restricted by a discretionary clause, meaning that the administrative power could reject any applicant on the ground that their naturalization may not be in Germany's interest. Citizenship was therefore organised in a two-tier system and a structuring device for belonging, privileging those with 'ethnic' German roots and decidedly excluding those without from the start. The same holds true for immigration, described above, and integration, as the next section will show.

The Power of Belonging – Integration Politics in Postwar Germany

In terms of political authority and social demographics, May 1945 represented an abrupt rupture for Germans. The resident population within their occupied borders increased and became ethnically diverse. Due to military occupation, moreover, Germans had lost their formalized political and social superiority. They no longer exercised authority at home or abroad. Their hierarchical social and racial order had become disordered. (Chin/Fehrenbach 2012b: 17f.)

Upon the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, the on-going immigration of expellees and refugees was acknowledged administratively with the creation of a Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and the War Aggrieved (*Bundesministerum für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte*) in 1949. This ministry was given the task to organize all issues pertaining to resettlement, including integration measures (referred to not with the word integration but with the word *Eingliederung,* which could also be translated to incorporation) (Beer 2003: 295; Klekowski von Kloppenfels 2003: 402).[77]

The first democratically elected government led by Christian Democrat Chancellor Konrad Adenauer implemented the Federal Expellee and Refugee Law (*Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz,* BVGF) in 1953. This law gave more explicit administrative grounds to the preliminary formulation of

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77   The ministry changed its name several times throughout the years, this was its initial title. It was abolished in 1960, mostly because its competences were shared with too many state-level administrative bodies which hindered its executive capacities (Schwarz 2001: 41).

belonging entrenched in the 1949 Basic Law. The BVGF remained in place until 1993 and it regulated the integration and on-going admission of resettlers throughout the decades to come. It facilitated the admission of altogether four million co-ethnic immigrants up until 2000. However, until the collapse of the Soviet Union, a mere 1.4 million people immigrated as part of these regulations. This was mostly because immigration from the Eastern bloc was very difficult, with borders mostly closed.

Even though integration as a social concept was not yet part of public discourse or policy making, the efforts put into the de-facto integration of resettlers in the postwar period were manifold and manifested in several policy acts. In addition to the automatic access to German nationality, co-ethnic immigrants were beneficiaries of several far-reaching measures designed to facilitate their participation in the newly established West German society, including support for housing, access to the labour market, and extra schooling for kids (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2019: 10). In fact, some measures went so far as constituting what would today qualify as affirmative action or 'positive discrimination', such as the privileging of resettlers in social housing matters (Klekowski von Kloppenfels 2003: 403).[78] Saliently, this was all under the condition of their proving their belonging to the German nation as formulated in the German Basic Law and explicated in the 1953 Law on Expellees and Refugees.

A closer look at the way German ethnicity is outlined in the Law on Expellees and Refugees is helpful, since it makes explicit the exclusive character of co-ethnic German immigration. In Article 6, it states: "A member of the German people within the meaning of this law is anyone who has professed German ethnic membership in his homeland, provided that this confession is confirmed by certain characteristics such as descent, language, upbringing, culture" (Paragraph 6, BVGF)[79]. The law was therefore designed to foster solidarity of resident Germans with their new co-ethnic immigrant neighbours and manifest the belonging of co-ethnic immigrants. To be sure, integration of the newly arrived co-ethnic immigrants was by no means easy, as any process of

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78 Klekowski von Kloppenfels explains the far-reaching consequences of the social support of resettlers in the decades to follow. Health insurance and pension insurance was kept at the same level as other Germans and foreigners who were permanently working in Germany. For instance, she explains that "a resettler who had worked as a plumber in Poland for 30 years would receive the same pension as someone who had worked as a plumber in Germany for 30 years" (Klekowski von Kloppenfels 2003: 407).

79 „Deutscher Volkszugehöriger im Sinne dieses Gesetzes ist, wer sich in seiner Heimat zum deutschen Volkstum bekannt hat, sofern dieses Bekenntnis durch bestimmte Merkmale wie Abstammung, Sprache, Erziehung, Kultur bestätigt wird."

large-scale immigration is often full of challenges. One of the interviewees described and interpreted his neighbour's experience thusly:

My neighbor was a refugee from Goldap near Köngisberg (…). I also asked her (…): "What was it like when you came to [Catholic city in Germany] in 44, 45, as a Protestant?" Then, of course, she said: "That was terrible. The people were not friendly." And then she applied to companies as an accountant and the question was: "Are you Catholic?" She wasn't Catholic, so she didn't get the job. So that was, I think, very painful. So once the escape was, of course, that's a terrible event, subjectively. Then coming here and actually not being welcome, that was an experience that was ultimately understandable, people had nothing. On the other hand, it is Germans who are coming to Germans. That was the narrative, but in reality, the situation was of course much, much more difficult. (CPS1: pos. 7)

This shows that the idea that it was 'Germans who are coming to Germans' was very much foundational to the justification of the integration efforts implemented by the newly founded German Federal Republic. The supposed "myth of quick integration", which was invoked in the decades after and served to distinguish the 'positive' experience of integrating the co-ethnic immigrants as opposed to the problems that society was facing with 'guest-worker foreigners' held true on a structural and institutional level (GAC4: pos. 9). In many ways, the everyday antagonisms that this group faced upon arrival and in the process of settlement was swiftly mitigated by laws that postulated their specific inclusion and supported their incorporation into German society. This demonstrates the effectiveness of a strong migration politics nexus, even if in this case, it was only in place for one specific group.

5.4.4 Framing the postwar Critical Juncture for German Migration Politics, 1945–1953

There are two competing arguments in migration research regarding the particularity of the privileging of German co-ethnic migration during the Cold War Era. One postulates that German co-ethnic immigration politics were a continuation of a blood-based conception of German nationhood from the Wilhelmine era (e. g. Brubaker 1992: 169; Bauder 2014: 17). Others, like many of my interviewees, claim that this specific type of immigration needs to be understood in its historical context of 'system competition' (Klekowski von Kloppenfels 2003: 399) in the sense that the Federal Republic wanted to clearly demonstrate to the Communist Bloc that its system was superior and that people desired living in the capitalist West rather than in the communist East, and "maintain the idea of a single German nation despite the division of Germany"

(Schwarz 2001: 53; Klekowski von Kloppenfels 2003: 399–400; Triada-filopoulos 2012: 73f.; Wilhelm 2013: 21; Thränhardt 2014: 252f.).

I argue that two things can be true at the same time. Returning to the 1913 RuStAG was a decisive step and a reference to the past for the newly founded Germany. It could have easily chosen a different path at the time and implemented a more liberal citizenship regime like its French neighbor or the culturally and politically influential U.S.-Americans. However, taking a stance against the communist East allowed for the old constellation of citizenship politics to be retained. Void of its explicit racism like the citizenship regime of the Nazis, it did not break with the idea that there was such a thing as a single, ethnically conceived German people that belonged together. The cultural imagination of a German nation and "the ethnic principle of national belonging" had therefore successfully "prevailed throughout the Wilhelmine Empire, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and the Federal Republic of Germany" (Bauder 2014: 14). As Triadafilopoulos puts it aptly: "Descent-based citizenship helped maintain the notion of a unified nation that persisted in spite of the country's partition into separate, ideologically antagonistic states" (Triada-filopoulos 2012: 74).

My analysis of the developments in migration politics of the immediate postwar is in line with Chin and Fehrenbach's contention that "in times of military defeat, foreign occupation, and perceived social and moral disorder, the impetus for a politics of national redefinition and reconstitution intensified. (…) How they defined themselves and their Others was key to this process" (Chin/Fehrenbach 2012b; 19). The nexus between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics was set up in a very interconnective way like never before, with the caveat that only co-ethnic immigrants were considered in this process.

Therefore, two points are salient here: As outlined above, Germany did become an immigration country right from its founding in 1949, both by virtue of large-scale de-facto immigration happening in the aftermath of the Nazi defeat, and in the provision of open doors to co-ethnic immigrants in the immediate postwar era. This was initially clearly a legacy of both the war and subsequent large-scale displacement. The decision to continue an open-door policy of co-ethnic migration, however, had numerous entangled objectives. Most importantly, it drew an explicit connection between those refugees who had to leave in the immediate aftermath of the war and those co-ethnic Germans who might still want to join the German *Volk* later-on. In this sense, interpretations of an ethnic nature of German migration are correct. A sense of solidarity and belonging was made explicit both in the formulations of the Basic Law and the 1953 Refugee and Expellee Law. Pertinently, Germany set up large-scale

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structures of immigration, naturalization, and integration politics in the postwar years only for one specific group. For all other immigrants, in the decades to come, naturalization and integration were not part of one cohesive administrative structure. Becoming a citizen without being a co-ethnic immigrant was framed as an absolute exception, rather than a "consequence of immigration" (Hagedorn 2001: 56).

Secondly, the privileging of co-ethnic immigration distanced Germany from any other forms of permanent immigration (apart from scarce political asylum seekers). The decision to exclude other immigrants also explains the category of 'guest worker' immigrants that became important in the mid-1950s amid the first labour agreement with Italy.

Therefore, descent-based thinking was maintained and served as a justification for solidarity with the arriving *Aussiedler* for the receiving German population. Simultaneously, a more liberal approach to citizenship attainment was excluded from the beginning, an idea that only became undone after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc after 1989 as my following analysis of Germany's migration politics in the 1990s will show.

Table 5.3: Germany – The Co-Ethnic Immigration Juncture, 1949–1953

Antecedent Conditions	Shock /Rupture	Critical Juncture	Mechanisms of Production	Legacy
1913 Wilhelmine citizenship law establishing *ius sanguinis* as a guiding principle for citizenship acquisition	1945 Nazi Defeat and End of WWII	1949–1953 German Citizenship re-established on *ius sanguinis* principle and notion of ethnic belonging	Reinstating the 1913 RuStAG in the 1949 Basic Law	Any durable immigration limited to co-ethnic immigration until the 1990s
Nazi rule, denaturalization and murder of Jews	1945–1948 Occupation of German territory by allied forces	Institutional Establishment of durable co-ethnic migration and subsequent integration	1953 Establishment of Ministry for Resettlers and Refugees	
Defeat of Nazi regime in the war	Large-scale movement of expellees and DPs into the occupied German territories		1953 Citizenship for co-ethnic immigrants further facilitated	

Source: Own research

5.5 Interim Conclusion: The Politics of 'Us' and 'Them' in the Postwar Era

Migration politics were part of the political (and not least, economic) reconstruction in all three countries in the postwar era. In Canada, the end of the war led to a reckoning on its own self-conception as independent from the British colonizers and the establishment of an independent Canadian citizenship before its formal independence from the British empire in 1982. The establishment of its own citizenship also included a renewed definition of who could be Canadian. Prior to this, most arrivals to Canada had been divided into British subjects or immigrants. Now, those immigrants from people who did not originate from Britain could lay claim to becoming Canadian. This also affected notions of cultural pluralism as precursors to multiculturalism, which were first invoked in the interwar era and would be established as a state doctrine in 1971. This will be the subject of the following analytical chapter. Immigration politics itself remained focused on the principle that people from Europe were preferable to people from the Global South. This would not change until the beginning of the 1960s, when Canada decided to depart from choosing their immigrants on the grounds of ethnicity or religion. This will also be the subject of the following chapter. The nexus of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics therefore shifted most significantly on the parts of citizenship, with an effect on who could be considered Canadian. This view broadened to Europeans who were not part of the British realm, effectively easing their settlement in Canada in the long run.

France emerged from the war after years of Nazi occupation with a determination to quickly re-establish its prewar order. Part of this was the swift establishment of immigration politics in the Ordinances of October 19 and November 2, 1945, which reinstated republican citizenship principles and created the ONI and put an impetus on large-scale immigration and settlement. While the ordinances themselves do not explicitly call for immigrant selection on the ground of ethnicity, the ONI was ordered to do precisely that, with Northern Europeans as their preferred prospective immigrants. Concomitant developments saw the introduction of citizenship to some parts of the population of the French empire, particularly Algeria, at the time formally a part of France. Large-scale Algerian immigration started in 1946 and would become the most significant immigrant group in the following decade, outnumbering immigrants recruited by the ONI. This marked the beginning of colonial entanglements in French migration politics, a subject which would remain pertinent throughout the following decades. The nexus of immigration, citizenship, and

integration politics in postwar France was therefore particularly strongly marked by developments in citizenship, like in Canada. While the state tried to gain control of immigration, the politics of citizenship led to the large-scale unplanned immigration of Algerian French people. On the level of integration, France set itself up for durable integration and settlement for those it had recruited, but not necessarily those who it had not foreseen to settle. Discussions on this would become politicized in the 1970s, which will be the subject of the next chapter.

In Germany, the chaos and uncertainty of the immediate postwar years saw the large-scale immigration of expellees, refugees, and DPs to the German territories. When West Germany adopted its Basic Law in 1949, this included a notion of Germanness explicitly referencing the idea of belonging to one ethnic community. Also, the 1913 RuStaG, based on the principle of *ius sanguinis*, was reinstated as citizenship legislation. From the start, Germany set itself up as a co-ethnic immigration country. Expellees and resettlers from the East would have swift access to citizenship and integration measures, further institutionalized in the 1950 ministry of refugees, expellees and resettlers, and manifested in the 1953 legislation regulating access to nationality for this group. DPs on the other hand, many of whom were Jews who had survived the Holocaust, were not granted access to citizenship or settlement provisions. They were referred to as 'homeless foreigners' and their departure from Germany was generally encouraged. Some researchers have pointed to the fact that West Germany set up this particular framework as a way to distance itself from the Eastern Bloc and open its arms to 'ethnic' Germans from this area. The nexus of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics at this time clearly shows that co-ethnic migration was welcome and encouraged. The fact that DPs, which had suffered severely under Nazi rule, were excluded from any of these measures shows that the German authorities were unwilling to compromise on their conception of an ethnically conceived German nationhood. This laid the foundation for the idea that Germany was not a country of immigration, which will be discussed in the following analytical chapter.

6. 'Who are we? Who do we want to be?': Mid- to late 20th Century Migration Politics in Canada, France, and Germany

6.1 Introduction

We continue our analysis into the latter half of the 20th century, encompassing the 1960s to the 1990s, when all three countries experienced political change and turmoil, and, as a result, significant shifts in their migration politics. During the two decades of economic prosperity that followed the end of WWII, Canada, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany (at first only comprising the West, later united with East Germany), established themselves as influential democracies. All three experienced ever-heightening immigration numbers with the origin countries of those immigrating diversifying as well. It is in this period that migration politics became established as a permanent feature of everyday political life in all three countries. It is also a period in which migration politics became increasingly politicized, particularly on the European side of the comparison, as arguments pointing to immigration's economic advantages (and not least, necessity) clashed with questions on social cohesion and national self-conception. On the North American side of the comparison, questions on national unity also emerged, not only regarding immigration but also in relation to Canada's province Quebec, which laid claim to specific forms of recognition within the Canadian federation. This tension and its results would have unexpected effects on migration politics as they are conceived in this thesis. In short, migration politics became part of larger questions concerning the self-conception of each country, processes that each case underwent albeit at different points in time.

This chapter traces these developments in a complex analysis. For Canada, I delve into the period between 1962 and 1988, encompassing more than 20 years. It was in this time that Canada developed an elaborate migration politics nexus with clear interactions between immigration and citizenship politics, and a state approach to integration politics in the form of multiculturalism.

In France, the examined period between 1974 and 1993 shows equally complex developments. Spanning from the immigration stop in 1974, this period sees a significant tightening and eventual abandonment of France's status as an immigration country. On the level of citizenship politics this is reflected also, when historically liberal principles for naturalization and citizenship

acquisition are put into question, particularly regarding France's growingly diverse immigrant population and their children. The latter issue is cause for a significant politicization of migration politics, emerging in the 1980s and remaining constant even until today. Falling on fertile ground, a newly established far-right party, the National Front, succeeds in growing on a single-issue: anti-immigration demands in the 1980s, also called the "*Lepenisation*" (Raissiguier 2010: 80), after their infamous party leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, of these political issues. To understand these developments, it is again necessary to take France's colonial history into account. Decolonization brought with it fraught questions about the political status of those stemming from former colonies and their children now living in France. No issue had more pertinence for France's immigration, citizenship, and integration politics during this period than immigration from formerly French-colonized Algeria, as this chapter will show.

The analysis in Germany begins a little later, with post-unification developments in the Federal Republic. A belated reckoning with the established presence of immigrants in the country, which had increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s, led to a decade of migration politics turmoil in the 1990s. Saliently, this is when Germany abandoned its prioritization of co-ethnic immigration, leading to a significant shift in its migration politics nexus. These developments eventually led to a liberalization of citizenship politics in 1999 with the official introduction of *ius soli*, a precursor to new immigration and integration politics innovations in the early 2000s.

6.2 Canada – Paradigmatic Transitions to Establish Cohesive Migration Politics, 1962–1988

In this chapter, I argue that Canada underwent a critical juncture in migration politics from 1967 to 1982. The legacy of these paradigmatic developments is felt until today. This critical juncture is framed by complex and intricate developments in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, spanning four different governments, and mark the foundation of Canada's migration politics as they continue to this day.

The shifts in these periods begin with immigration politics: In 1962, Canada first dropped religion and race from its immigration criteria through an executive order-in-council. This chapter traces the consequences of this rupture, like the introduction of points system for immigrant selection in 1967, and a new Immigration Act in 1976, including the tripartite division of

immigration in professional / work immigration, family-class immigration, and humanitarian immigration that further propelled Canadian immigration politics to the center-stage of Canadian policymaking. In the 1960s, Canada was experiencing increasing tensions with Quebec, which meant that PM Pierre Elliott Trudeau introduced multiculturalism as an official state doctrine in the Canadian House of Commons in 1971, which was followed by the adoption of multiculturalism as official state doctrine 1982 in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, further entrenched in the Multiculturalism Act passed in 1988. This period also marked the beginning of the federalization of Canadian immigration politics, beginning with Québécois particularism in the 1960s.

6.2.1 No more race, no more religion, 1952–1962

A Canadian expert who served as a public servant in migration politics from the late 1960s onwards offered a lively description of the developments that shaped the 1960s and led to the conservative government dropping race and religion from their immigrant selection criteria:

And then when the first conservative government of John Diefenbaker comes in - remembered for being a cantankerous and miserable old son of a b (sic), but one of those people who hates people but loves human rights ((laughs)), you encounter them - he brings in a Bill of Rights, but it only applies to federal jurisdiction. But they look at it, they look at the immigration law for 1951 and Ellen Fairclough, the first female cabinet minister, is given the job doing something, she wants to change the Act. *Nobody wants to open the Immigration Act. So, they bring in the famous 63 regulations, except with a few small exceptions say (...) you're no longer to consider race and religion here*. Do they have the skills and the education, language to make it in Canada? If so, you can let them in. But they provide no other guidance. So, it's hard to explain what's going on. (CPS6: pos. 26)

As chapter 5.2 on the Canada's postwar critical juncture showed, the central legacy of the immediate postwar years in Canada was the development of a confident Canadian self-conception independent from Britain. As the same expert interviewee put it aptly: "The real history of Canada in the 50s and 60s in particular is becoming *Unbritish*" (CPS6: pos. 18, italics by FA)[80]. At the end of the 1940s and throughout the 1950s, under Liberal PM Louis St. Laurent, Canada ramped up its immigration numbers to bolster its labour force. Most immigrants came from Europe, as this was still the desired origin in Canadian

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80 The expert interviewee referenced a close colleague he had worked with, who said this. Since I think this would be important to the expert, I'd like to add this caveat while still maintaining anonymity.

immigration. Most, however, did not come from the United Kingdom or France, but from Italy, Portugal, Greece, or Hungary. This led to an increase in immigrants (and eventual Canadians) of non-French, non-British origin, marking the beginning of a transformation of the overall composition of Canadian society.

The approach of selecting by European origin was met with only modest criticism domestically. In fact, surveys at the time revealed that the Canadian public held "deeply ambivalent, if not unequivocally racist, attitudes towards the admission of non-European immigrants" (Ellermann 2021: 202). These data were confirmed by the personal experience of one of the expert interviewees who pointed out that "coming to Canada in 1950 was a harrowing experience. I mean it was truly a racist country and this racism continued even though laws were passed on anti-discrimination and fair practices" (CAC4: pos. 22).

However, change was on the horizon. In 1957, conservative John Diefenbaker, the first Canadian PM of neither French nor British descent, was elected. Also referenced in the quote above, Diefenbaker was deeply committed to anti-discrimination due to his own experience growing up in the Canadian prairies and experiencing discrimination of French Canadians and Indigenous Canadians first-hand (Carlson 2012). He introduced the Canadian Bill of Rights and is credited with ushering in the first significant reform of the Canadian immigration system since 1952, the 1962 rupture, which sparked the coming critical juncture. In this 1962 amendment to the 1952 Immigration Act, neither race nor religion were to be considered when evaluating a candidate seeking immigration admission.

The introduction of the 1962 immigration regulations reformed the 1952 Immigration Act short of abolishing it. In fact, sparking fundamental policy change through a regulatory reform is a typical pattern for the Canadian case, as one expert interviewee stressed (CAC5: pos. 13). I am not alone in the argument that the 1962 regulations constituted a rupture. Ellermann has also called the introduction of the 1962 regulations the "paradigmatic watershed" or "turning point" of Canadian immigration politics, which "sounded the death knell for the White Canada policy" (Ellermann 2021: 195), while Fleras has called their introduction a "radical change" (Fleras 2015: 91).

The new regulations put an emphasis on skills and excluded race or religion as selection criteria for potential immigrants. To be sure, the introduction of the 1962 regulations were not only based on a normative desire for anti-discrimination. As time progressed, the number of potential immigrants from preferred origins was becoming limited (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 88). The exclusionary approach of the 1952 Act therefore also became pragmatically untenable if Canada wanted to maintain its immigration numbers, as well as

increasingly normatively untenable in light of the Canadian Bill of Rights as Canada's democratic self-conception.

Concomitantly to the changes that were occurring on the immigration level, the Canadian government was grappling with a threat to social cohesion, which initially had no explicit connection to migration politics but would have a remarkable effect on the eventual development of multiculturalism: The enduring threat of Québécois separatism. PM Diefenbaker had domestically pursued a 'One Canada' policy, which meant that he opposed any political concessions to Quebec, fearing that this would entrench the idea that Canada was home to only two major founding powers, the British and the French. With few Québécois members of Cabinet and little sympathy from the Conservative PM, the tension between the federal level and the province increased throughout Diefenbaker's 1957–1963 term. As a result, the Progressive Conservative party lost ground in Quebec, leading to Diefenbaker's electoral defeat in 1963. He was succeeded by Liberal PM Lester B. Pearson, who pursued a different approach, as the next section will show.

From Québécois Separatism to Québécois Exceptionalism
The history, political status, and particularity of Quebec warrants close attention regarding the development of Canadian migration politics. While Canada is divided into ten provinces and three territories, Quebec is the one province which has continuously challenged federal approaches and claimed political concessions in migration politics for the province.[81] Today, Quebec has its own immigration system which includes the selection of immigrants through its own points system, with the aim of maintaining a mostly Francophone population. Québécois particularism in migration politics found its origins in the 1960s, in the aftermath of the Quiet Revolution. It was in this period that Quebec established a strong 'national' identity and the Québécois also became aware of the need to seize control over immigration in order to maintain a majority French-speaking population (Wood/Fetzer 2022: 60). The Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism, established by the Canadian government to work out the way in which Quebec ought to be privileged, was also

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81 Provinces by population size: Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Sasketchwan, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Prince Edward Islands. Territories: Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon. While the provinces have federal powers, the territories are not sovereign. Eight provinces have English as their official language. Quebec is the only one who has French as its official language, while New Brunswick is the only province that is officially bilingual (English/French). It is sometimes overlooked that Canadian Francophonie is not limited to Quebec. In the New Brunswick province, more than 30 percent of the population is Francophone.

instated during this time. One inadvertent effect of this Commission was that it laid the foundation for Canadian multiculturalism, as this section shows.

To be sure, with its mostly French-speaking population, Quebec had always been exceptional within Canada (Sanguin 1984; Balthazar 1995).[82] The ever-growing population of Quebec made up almost 30 percent of the Canadian population in the 1950s and 60s, which meant that the possibility of Quebec separatism, a continuing threat, would significantly impact Canada as a whole. The Quiet Revolution in Quebec took place throughout the 1960s and among other things deeply "transformed [Quebec's] relationship with the Canadian federation" (Gagnon 2022: 2). It was during this period that Québécois society underwent significant social change characterized by a turn away from the Roman Catholic Church towards a secularized political system and the development of a confident Québécois identity (Adams 2008: 121; Fontaine 1995: 1042).

By the end of the 1960s, Quebec's quest for political acknowledgment regarding its special status within Canada had been successful. By 1969, the Pearson government had acknowledged French as an official language and bilingual public service had been established, which meant that public service could also be received in French anywhere in Canada. In the same year, Quebec passed a law that ensured that new arrivals were able to speak French upon immigration to Quebec (Fontaine 1995: 1043). Most importantly, however, the inquest of the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism was under way, which marked an important moment for Canadian migration politics.

In response to growing pressure from newly assertive Québécois politicians, who were disgruntled after the dismissal of their claims during the Diefenbaker years, the new Liberal government under Lester B. Pearson established the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963 (Seidle 2014: 122f.). This commission was tasked with coming up with recommendations on how to unite Anglo- and Francophone Canada, or, as the initial order to found the commission reads, to establish equality between "the two founding races" of Canada all the while "taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measure that should be taken to safeguard this contribution" (Bloemraad 2015: 64). It is clear, both by the name of the Commission ("bi"-lingual and "bi"-cultural), as well as the fleeting reference to "other ethnic groups", that the initial aim of commission's work did not reflect the idea of multiculturalism, as it was to be introduced in parliament by Liberal PM Pierre E. Trudeau in 1971. However, the results of the commission, presented in 1971, had an

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82   85 percent of the Québécois population is Francophone (Lüsebrink 2020: 171).

important effect: Amongst the fact that it acknowledged Canada's official bilingualism, it also noted that it had "more than one culture" (Adams 2008: 116). As Michael Adams notes:

This recognition of the multicultural fact of Canada, the fact that fully a quarter of the non-Aboriginal population was of neither British nor French heritage – was certainly not a project spearheaded by Quebecers. Far from seeing themselves as just one of the gang, francophone Quebecers conceived of themselves as one of the two founding nations – *deux peuples fondateurs*. The dualistic conception of Canada was powerful in Quebec, although whether to remain yoked or to break away from the other nation, was, of course, another matter. (Adams 2008: 116)

The establishment of this commission and its eventual report highlighting the multiculturalism of Canadian society was an important precursor to the introduction of Multiculturalism in 1971. This commission therefore marked not only the start of Québécois migration politics detached from federal priorities, but also the beginning of state-mandated multiculturalism, as the following sections will show. What had begun as a process that sought to highlight and privilege Franco-Canadian society in general and Quebec's status in particular was redirected by the empirical reality of the socio-cultural composition of Canadian society. Nevertheless, Quebec was able to stake its claim for taking control of its own immigration, a process that slowly began in 1971 and was firmly established through the Cullen-Couture agreement in 1978 (Strazzari 2017: 66; Seidle 2014: 122f.). Throughout the following decades, Québécois migration politics became increasingly detached from the federal level, marking a federalization of immigration politics that would also influence the other provinces in the new millennium. This will be further discussed in the final analytical chapter.

6.2.2 The Emergence of the Points System and Multiculturalism as a State Doctrine, 1963-1988

Points, Points, Points
The introduction of 'colour-blind' universal immigration regulations in 1967 is one of the most important developments marking the beginning of this crucial decade of migration politics which encompassed two critical junctures. This section focuses on the juncture in development of immigration politics. What led to this introduction?

In addition to the change that occurred in immigration regulations in 1962, several developments followed which must be considered part of broader

political change that led to an overall attitude shift in this historical period. As one expert interviewee stressed, Canadians' observation of the racist riots that took place in the United States in the late 1950s and 1960, as well as the Canadian openness to offer shelter to U.S.-Americans who refused to be drafted for the U.S.-Vietnam war led many to the perspective that: "This won't happen in Canada. We are not like them. We are not racists like the Americans are (…)." (CP1: pos. 10). Once again, like in previous period with the British, it was the clear self-differentiation from another, more powerful actor, that led to a new Canadian self-conception. What followed in the mid- to late 1960s, according to another interviewee, was a period of great "outward ebullience, a great modernizing (…) and there was broad public support. The country was feeling its cultural adolescence for the first time, wanted to get out from the U. S. shadow." (CPS3: pos. 21). The image of Canada as a burgeoning and progressive middle-power state was instated.

The regulatory change of 1962 had opened the floor to the possibility of further innovation in immigration politics, which would institutionally cement Canada's shift in the migration politics nexus. The government reacted by first reorganizing the institutional setting of immigration: PM Lester Pearson merged the Department of Immigration and Citizenship with the Department of Labour into the Department of Immigration and Manpower 1965, a move which "signaled that immigration would be dealt with in a more technocratic matter, such that immigrant admissions better complemented the government's labour market policies" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 98). As the introductory quote to this section signals, the 1962 regulations left too much room for discretionary decisions, leaving some immigration officials without clear guidance for their decision-making. A new system was needed, a neutral, 'color-blind' tool for immigration: The points system. One expert tells the story thusly:

In '67, a guy by the name of Tom Kent, editor of one of the Winnipeg newspapers, is brought in as Deputy Minister. Again, somebody who cares about Human Rights and he brings in the best immigration officers, the best, the best reputation, and they sit together for a couple of weeks and they come up with the points system, half of which looks at short-term, and half of which looks at long term. We've always been a tug-of-war between the labor ministry and the immigration ministry. Immigration taking the long view, labor wanting skills for dates, and that's why they bring that in and Manpower and Immigration is a way of trying to rationalize that. So that's 67, the point system comes in and *all of a sudden, if you're in Yugoslavia or Yokohama and you have the same objective qualifications, you get the same decision. You might be negative, might be positive, but you get the same.* (CPS6: pos. 26)

The points system is arguably one of the most well-known tools of Canadian migration policy making, known well beyond its borders and a point of reference (and at times, inspiration) for policymakers. It may come as a surprise

that the points system itself was initially not introduced as an Immigration Act, but once again as a regulatory reform to provide clear guidance on immigration admission decision-making. As the above quote by the expert interviewee highlights, the change ushered in by the points system was fundamental. A government white paper outlining the discriminatory shortcomings of the 1952 Act and the 1962 regulations sparked the creation of the taskforce led by Tom Kent described in the expert quote above. The task force's proposal brought in two fundamental changes: Firstly, the clear differentiation between different immigration statuses, namely the immigration of independents, immediate dependents, admitted "as a matter of course", and more distant dependents "whose admissibility was subject to qualifications" similar but narrower to the points scheme established for independent applicants (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 99). Secondly, the task force proposed a points system for the admission of individual applicants. The initial points system (it was revised several times in the coming years) assigned a score according to educational level, language ability in English or French, work experience, age, employment opportunities, and presence of relatives in Canada. Nine categories were drawn up in which an applicant could score up to ten points respectively. If the final score exceeded 50 points, an applicant would be admitted (ibid.: 101). Saliently, one expert highlighted that the points system was also a tool to facilitate immigrant integration: "The big policy shift was that we were looking for human capital in general. (…). So, the integration would go more easily." (CP1: pos. 12).[83]

The differentiation between economic immigrants and family-class migration was further complemented by the introduction of a humanitarian immigration system for refugees, in line with the Canada's signing of the UN Convention on Refugees in 1969. As one expert interviewee, who was a public servant trained at the time in the Department of Immigration and Manpower, put it: "By the time I come to Ottawa it is clear: Refugees are our business" (CPS6: pos. 14). For none of the categories, work, family-class, or humanitarian immigration, were race or religion to play a role. A fundamental shift in Canadian immigration politics had occurred.

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83   One expert noted that the objective of a 'colour-blind' and neutral selection system was never truly fulfilled: "You're assuming that that point system is truly objective, which I think is a huge assumption. And I, at this point, I don't believe its objective at all. (…) The people, who are going to be assessing the criteria, they're going to bring their own biases to it as well. Because in our system the officers who do that assessment, have a fair amount of flexibility in their decision-making. Because they are the decision-maker and that means we take special measures to make sure not to constrain their ability to make their own decision. So. we can set sort of guidelines but then it's up to the decision maker to make the decision. (CPS5: pos. 11)

The consequences of these regulatory changes for the composition of Canadian society cannot be understated: In 1969, merely half of all immigrant admissions were from non-European countries, a substantial change from 1966, when Europeans had still made up almost 90 percent of all admitted immigrants (Winter 2015a: 6; Bloemraad 2015: 63). In many ways, the regulatory shifts in immigration politics would alter Canadian society to an extent that an assimilatory stance towards integration, which had long been the norm like in any other "British settler society", became more and more untenable (Banting 2014: 71). One expert interviewee from public service describes his own puzzlement during his training at the possibility of a completely altered Canadian society thusly:

And I think in my training [which took place in the late 1960s, F. A.], we spent some time with the citizenship bureau, and I remember we all looked at each other when they said, well, you know, Canada will gradually become more brown than white. I went: "Well, how could that be?" Now we were being trained to go out to all corners of the world and bring people in, but even at that stage, I was 22 years old, we were not quite able to absorb that if we did our job quickly, *if we did our job properly which we did, that, we would see in our lifetimes, a Toronto, and a Vancouver, where in Vancouver white people (…) were no longer the majority.* (CPS6: pos. 14)

The reality of a shifting composition of Canadian society had not yet been acknowledged in any notable integration legislation. The years after the introduction of the new immigration regulations in 1967 showed an even starker shift in both the number and composition of immigration numbers: While 122,006 immigrants were admitted in 1972, this number almost doubled in 1974, when 218,465 new immigrant arrivals were registered. Not only were these unprecedented numbers that policy makers were "caught unprepared" by, the composition of these immigrant groups had also shifted significantly – by 1974, immigrants of European origin accounted for a mere 40 percent of all admissions (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 106).

From By-Product to the Center Stage – Multiculturalism becomes a State Doctrine
The Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism had been under way since 1963 and submitted its report in 1969. The report's fourth book on "the cultural contribution of other ethnic groups" introduced the notion that Canada was "officially bilingual, but fundamentally multicultural" (Royal Commission 1969, IV Book: 12). Following this report, PM Pierre Elliott Trudeau stepped in front of the Canadian House of Commons on October 8, 1971, to announce a "Policy of Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework". The speech he gave was relatively short and stated that the government agreed with

the final fourth report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism that "there cannot be one cultural policy for Canadians of British and French origin, one for Canadians of French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third for all others" (Canadian House of Commons Debates, Oct. 8 1971: 8545–8548). PM P. E. Trudeau went on to remark that:

A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring cultural freedom of all Canadians. Such a policy should help to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes, and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence. It can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for all. (ibid.)

To be sure, this is not the first time that the term multicultural had been used to describe Canada's society. Canadian MPs of non-British, non-French origin had already invoked this notion in parliament in the 1960s (Bloemraad 2015: 68), and researchers on the genealogy of multiculturalism convincingly explain how Canada's settler colonial foundation predisposed it to an approach of multiculturalism that was already discussed in the pre-war years (i. a. Meister 2021). However, PM P. E. Trudeau's 1971 speech, which included the promise of funding for cultural groups and the access to multicultural education, is widely considered as the institutional foundation to Canadian multiculturalism. The 1971 speech laid out multiculturalism as a state doctrine that continued to become a versatile approach to integration politics in the decades to follow.

Overall, P. E. Trudeau's speech was very well received with little opposition from the anglophone part of Canada. However, it was not welcomed in Quebec, where it was perceived to diminish Québécois' claims to cultural, social, and political parity with anglophone Canada (Kastoryano 2011: 1630). Today, there is wide agreement in research that P. E. Trudeau's introduction of multiculturalism in 1971 was a strategy to impede on Québécois claims-making (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 105; Winter 2011: 31; Bloemraad 2015: 68). This quote by an expert interviewee underlines this contention:

The multiculturalism angle completely cuts the ground from under the feet of all the neo-Quebecers who do not identify with the French-Canadian model. They propose a model that ... Canadian national identification, which is of an openness and flexibility with which any Quebec definition could ever compete. (CAC10: pos. 9)

Invoking the notion of multiculturalism therefore helped P. E. Trudeau in hitting two birds with one stone. While maintaining the bilingual approach, he

turned away from the idea that people British and French origin constitute the dominant cultural groups in Canada, and therefore implicitly rejected Québécois claims to more sovereignty. At the same time, he opened up Canadian self-conception to the possibility of a multitude to cultural influences. This was not done altruistically, but in light of political pressure, and, not least, Trudeau's own political stance towards Quebec, as this expert explains:

So, Trudeau tried to help settle the Quebec separatists by declaring (…) a federal policy of Bilingualism and Biculturalism. And that was to help ease tensions between French and English Canadians. Then you have some of the long-standing immigrant groups standing up and saying: Well, what about us? Are we not equally Canadian? It was the Ukrainians, they started arriving in the late 19th century, who kicked up the biggest fuss. Partly because they were very well organized, again because they'd been here for over a hundred years. Roughly 100 years. And so, they raised a stink. (…) They had allies in Parliament. There were some Ukrainian members of parliament. So, this stink ended up with the multiculturalism policy. *So, Canada wasn't just a country of English and French. It was a multicultural, a multiethnic, a multinational type of country and Trudeau loved this, because he was very much a Cosmopolitan and couldn't stand the parochialism of Quebecers, even though he was a Quebecer himself, but he was, he was from Montreal. He was a Cosmopolitan and he wanted all of Canada to become cosmopolitan.* (CP1: pos. 18)

The complex interplay of Québécois separatists, Trudeau's personal view on what kind of Canada he envisioned, and the claims-making by European immigrants that were not of English or French origin brought about this significant shift. Bit by bit, multiculturalism evolved over the years from an initial appeasement policy meant to acknowledge mostly white European cultural diversity, to a framework that allowed for the socio-cultural integration of newcomers from all over the world (Banting 2014: 72). Multiculturalism went on to be officially recognized as a state doctrine in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as part of the 1982 Canadian constitution repatriation in a process overseen by PM Trudeau. In 1988, PM Brian Mulroney of the Progressive Conservative Party then introduced the official Multiculturalism Act, which finally entrenched multiculturalism federal legislation (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 118). As one interviewee explains, the introduction of the Act was also an exercise in political stability:

[T]he Multiculturalism Act was kind of twinned with the Bilingualism Act, they're an odd and interesting balancing act, right? Affirming a dualist identity and multiple identity at the same time. Some would say contradictory. But it was a contradiction needed at the time for political stability. (CPS3: pos. 21).

It might be surprising to see the widespread consensus on multiculturalism that developed over time and that the actual Multiculturalism Act was introduced

by a conservative PM. However, by the end of the 1980s, immigrants from Asia made up close to half of all new arrivals, with people from the United States and Europe barely making up a third (Bloemraad 2015: 68). Multiculturalism as a state doctrine was therefore also a pragmatic approach for dealing with the demographic reality of immigrants' diverse origin composition. The nexus was supported by a strong partisan consensus on migration politics (CP3: pos. 47).

6.2.3 Understanding the shifting Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics Nexus, 1967–1982

The 1960s and 70s introduced a paradigmatic watershed for Canadian migration politics, framed by its antecedent conditions in the 1960s and the legacy of enshrining these developments in legislation as late as the 1980s. Not only did the decade of the 1970s witness the introduction of multiculturalism as an official government doctrine, but the societal shift also that had occurred due to the introduction of the points system in 1968 led to a new Immigration Act in 1976 and a new Citizenship Act in 1977, both of which enshrined the modernization of Canadian migration politics in concrete laws that signaled that the era of institutionalized racialized exclusion had come to an end.

Government functionaries from the Department of Immigration and Manpower had been calling for a new immigration law since the beginning of the 1970s. Small innovations like the NIEAP[84] did only "address the symptoms of more fundamental problems in Canada's immigration policy" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 107). The passage of the 1976 Act is widely acknowledged as the finalizing step of the prior ground-breaking policy changes that had transformed Canadian immigrant admission procedures, and were already in the process of fundamentally transforming Canadian society in the way the expert interview quote above described (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 115; Fleras 2015: 92; Ellermann 2021: 215; 2021, 213f.). The Act formalized the tripartite division of Canadian immigration policy into labour, family, and humanitarian

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84 Canada also introduced its first temporary foreign worker program in 1973 with the remarkably explicit title: Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP). This program initially only admitted relatively modest numbers and was also only targeted at workers with very particular, "highly specialized" skills to fill a temporary shortage or demand (Reitz 2014: 97f.). Nevertheless, the introduction of this program marks a "structural shift" that allowed for labour shortages to be filled by temporary workers, rather than permanent immigrants (Fleras 2015: 139). This trend would become much more important towards the end of the century.

immigration, and a commitment to "the promotion of the country's economic, demographic, social, and cultural goals, the principle of non-discrimination, the importance of family reunion, and a commitment to refugee protection" (Ellermann 2021: 213f.).

Undoubtedly, the political developments of the 1960s to 1980s in Canada were foundational for the Canadian approach to migration politics. While multiculturalism was a malleable policy that adapted to the changing Canadian context after its official policy invention in 1971, less attention has been drawn to the way in which the changes in immigration policy through the points system, as well as the integrationist approach through multiculturalism was eventually enshrined in the modernization of Canadian citizenship law in 1977, which made Canadian citizenship more open and accessible (Winter 2014: 42; 2015a. 7). As Winter writes, the membership politics that were put forward in the 1977 Act rendered Canadian citizenship "almost literally 'multicultural'" (ibid.). From this point onward, immigration, citizenship, and integration politics became inextricably linked. As Boucher and Gest (2018: 133) explain, it was the normative desire for integrating people swiftly through citizenship and their inclusion through multiculturalism that produced the Canadian approach. Aptly put by Bloemraad: "High immigration combined with high levels of citizenship generate pressure for political leaders to articulate inclusive notions of national identity" (2015: 68). The introduction of the Multiculturalism Act in 1988 finalized the process that all three political fields had merged into one cohesive approach with explicit connections made both in policy and in the workings of Canadian political institutions. One expert also described the underlying attitudinal shift in Canadian society, that accompanied the changes in migration politics:

But all of a sudden, in 1978, for reasons that are really difficult to understand Canadians form 7,000 sponsoring groups and bring in almost 40,000 Vietnamese refugees. And they take them home. They take them to their homes. They take them to their community. They get them set up. They get involved in their lives. (…) And so, I think (…) for the active part of the community, multiculturalism became a lived experience. (…) people really began to understand then that we are totally different and completely the same as human beings. (…). And there's a growing sense of confidence and these people can come, they can remain themselves, but they will become part of us. (CPS6: pos. 42)

The following table summarises the critical juncture from 1967-1982. A further discussion of this juncture is included in chapter 8.

Table 6.1: Canada - 'The Points System and Multiculturalism Juncture', 1967-1982

Antecedent Conditions	Shock/ Rupture	Critical Juncture	Mechanisms of Production	Legacy
Less availability of European immigrants for migration throughout the 1950s Introduction of the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960 by PM Diefenbaker The founding and subsequent inquests of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963-1971	1962 PM Diefenbaker drops race and religion from immigration admission regulations in accordance with the Bill of Rights Quebec's Silent Revolution and political tensions regarding Quebec's status within the Canadian union throughout the 1960s Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism introduced in 1963	Introduction of the 'colourblind' points system for immigrant admission in 1967 Fourth Book of the Royal Commission Report on the "Contribution of other ethnic groups" published in 1969 Trudeau announces bilingualism and multiculturalism as official state doctrine in 1971 Entrenchment of the Points System in the Immigration Act of 1976, division between humanitarian, family, and professional / work immigration Multiculturalism becomes part of the Canadian Charter of Rights and	No more immigrant selection by origin country Move away from discretionary decision-making in immigrant selection Setting up interlocking but independent institutional structures for the three different kinds of migration Ministry of Multiculturalism introduced in 1973 Further liberalization in Canadian citizenship acquisition in 1977	PM Brian Mulroney introduces the Multiculturalism Act into law in 1988 Entrenchment of diverse immigrant origins as a cornerstone of Canadian immigration politics Affirmation of humanitarian migration as a mainstay of Canadian migration Multiculturalism continues to be the central approach to Canadian integration politics

		Freedoms in 1982		

Source: Own research

6.3 France – From 'Open Door' to Zero Immigration, 1981–1988

I think that, without taking sides, we can say that we [in France] have rather acquiesced to immigration that is to say that we do not choose immigration as Canada does on the basis of a file, of particular profiles, *we inherit an immigration that is the fruit of our history, a post-colonial immigration (…) we are a country of historical immigration and also, it may be a bit harsh but, by default*, and that the question of immigration has always been in the political debates since the 1990s a lever of cleavage within the society (…). (FPS1: pos. 15)

France underwent significant change in its approach to migration politics over the course of two decades, 1974 to 1993. As the expert quote above shows, this period was marked by a reckoning on France's status as an immigration country in the late 20th century, leading, overall, to a more restrictive migration politics nexus than the one which had been established in the postwar era. To discern these developments in the analysis, it is helpful to distinguish between the antecedent conditions in the migration politics between 1974 and 1980, which is a period of uncertainty on migration politics, since immigration is stopped for the first time since 1945; and between 1981 and 1988, in which a clear political cleavage on migration politics emerges. As I will show and several of the experts stressed, the legacy of the 1981–1988 cleavage prevails into the 21st century, which will be further discussed in the final analytical chapter.

France experienced a period of relative calm regarding migration politics in the 1950s and 60s. Immigration happened on a considerable scale, but it was neither very politicized, nor was much legislation introduced to shape it. This changed in the early 1970s, when the economic downturn resulted in several paradoxical decisions, a tightening of labour immigration, and a further liberalization of citizenship acquisition until immigration came to an abrupt stop in the wake of the 1974 oil crisis. The years following were marked by turmoil, as different French governments introduced contradictory approaches to migration politics. This led into the 1980s, which is widely held as the decade of politicization for migration politics in France, and the decade in which migration politics emerge as an on-going political cleavage between the left and the

right, spurred by the emergence and success of the far-right anti-immigration and anti-immigrant National Front party. Towards the end of this critical juncture this manifested in arguments of the incompatibility of religious differences, as a result of an increasing presence of Muslim immigrants and French Muslims. This became a perpetual and guiding issue for French migration politics, another legacy which also prevails until today.

Both decades, the 1970s and the 1980s, are distinct, but interconnected. What also emerges during this period is the on-going reckoning with France's colonial past and the legacy of this past within French migration politics, as well as the political polarization around migration politics, which would accompany France's migration politics into the 21st century.

6.3.1 Migration Politics and Colonial Entanglements, 1953–1973

After the Ordinance of 1945, the creation of the National Immigration Office (ONI), and the reinstatement of naturalization guidelines in the late 1940s, migration politics took on a minor role in French everyday political life. Immigration happened relatively unhindered, through official recruitment, but also through mostly uncontrolled recruitment by employers and the later 'regularization' of their workers, and from Algeria and other French-colonized territories. As one interviewee noted, the migration politics of the 1950s and 60s are notable in how unencumbered they were because they were "not an element of political cleavage. We speak about [them] very little." (FAC2: pos. 13). Migration politics throughout the 1950s and 60s until the mid-1970s, another expert notes, were a "completely invisible political subject" (FAC6: pos. 3).

Despite the economic stability and prosperity enjoyed by the French population during the so-called *Trente Glorieuses* (Glorious Thirty)[85], French politics were all but peaceful during this period, specifically due to colonial and foreign politics. From its onset in 1946 to its end in 1958, the Fourth Republic was marked by crisis. Since the end of the Second World War, several insurgencies, revolts, demonstrations and eventually wars of decolonization had taken place in the French-colonized territories all over the world, starting with the independence of Lebanon and Syria in 1943 and 1945 respectively, and continuing with the Indochina war in 1946, which France lost in 1954 and led

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85   A term denoting the period of postwar prosperity in France.

to the independence of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.[86] In the 1946 constitution of the Fourth Republic, France had given its colonies the status of membership in the so-called 'French Union', which was meant to accord more rights and possibilities of participation for the colonies and its populations. However, most colonies were dissatisfied with the on-going French reign. In 1954, the war against French colonization in Algeria began. Brutally waged, this war led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic: During the putsch of May 1958, former president Charles de Gaulle retook power and announced the beginning of the Fifth Republic.

The Algerian War was distinct from other decolonization wars because a significant number of people in Algeria strongly identified with the French occupiers and desired no end to colonization. This led to a large exodus of people from Algeria during and right after the end of the war in 1962 (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 118), including the so-called *Pieds-Noirs*, Algerians of French origin who had to flee Algeria after independence due to their support of the French, and the so-called *Harkis*, Muslim Algerians not of French origin, who also had to flee due to their support of the French reign of Algeria. The way these groups were welcomed and settled in France during the 1960s differed significantly. The *Pieds-Noirs* were welcomed to France as Frenchmen and -women, their arrival and settlement generously supported both politically and by the public. This stands in contrast to the treatment of the *Harkis* of Muslim Algerian origin. Despite their allegiance to French colonialism, French authorities initially prohibited their immigration to France. Those that did arrive were separated in large camps created only for this group where they lived under difficult conditions (Oltmer 2017: 175f.).[87]

From 1960 to 1962, 14 French-colonized countries became independent. This would also have an impact on immigration to France, because France was quick to establish bilateral accords with its former colonies also regulating the possibility of immigrants from these countries to work in France and attain French citizenship with very few obstacles (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 147; Perotti 1988: 67; Hagedorn 2001: 112). 1961 and 1962 are described by Wihtol de Wenden as the period of "*porte ouverte*", open door-period, with an impressive 2.1 million immigrants arriving in 1962 alone (Wihtol de Wenden 1988:

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86 Of course, resistance against French colonialism had always taken place. However, the resistance beginning in 1945 marked the beginning of the end for the French colonial empire. Today, there are a few remaining French-colonized regions in the world.

87 In 1961, a demonstration of about 30 to 40,000 National Liberation Front supporters protested against the war in Paris. During this protest, a large number of protesters was killed by the police. The number of people killed in this protest is still disputed. The French government conceded to 40 deaths in 1998 (almost 40 years after the attacks), while historians estimate the number to be closer to 200 protesters killed by police) (Rouaba 2021).

118). In addition to this, there were 1.8 million French returnees from the former colonies that arrived in France after decolonization throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with 800,000 arriving from Algeria during 1962 alone (Oltmer 2017: 175). The effects of decolonization on French migration politics and French politics in general are manifold and have effects until today, as this expert underlined:

> Well, the history of colonization is central, not only to these policies, but it has a considerable influence on different areas of French political life. And then there is another migration that comes partly from the former colonial empire after its dissolution. This has had a strong influence because, first of all, it updates and brings back[88] representations, structures, and histories that were built in this colonial empire. And then the way people are perceived today. Immigrants and their children coming from this France of the colonial empire are strongly influenced by representations that have been used and that are constructed in this colonial history. (FAC4: pos. 9)

Immigration numbers remained high and largely out of the state's control throughout the 1960s, with many immigrants 'regularized' after their recruitment and arrival by French companies (Perotti 1988: 68). By the end of the 1960s, immigration to France had started to diversify significantly, with immigrants arriving from countries outside Europe due to both decolonization, from Tunisia, Algeria, and West African countries, but also from Turkey (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 91f.; Hagedorn 2001: 112)[89]. The labour accords signed with these countries were an attempt by the French government to gain control of the relatively unregulated immigration taking place at the time. This effectively put an end to any attempts by the ONI to manage the composition of immigrants to France (Perotti 1988: 67). Until 1968, immigration continued in an unregulated manner (Hagedorn 2001: 112; Weil 2002: 160). Between 1946 and 1968, the number of foreigners in France increased from two million to 3.2 million (Amiraux/Simon 2006: 196). Significantly, 30 percent of all foreigners lived in the Paris metropolitan area, pointing to the concentration of immigration in urban areas (Perotti 1988: 67). One expert noted that the dissolution of a clear migration strategy by the French government was also due to the diffusion of different interests at the institutional level. The ministry of demography had different interests than the ministry of labour, while post-colonial immigration was largely managed by the ministry for foreign affairs. In

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88 The term used by the expert here is *rapatrier*, literally translated as 'repatriate', so bringing back to the origin country.

89 France signed independent labor accords with Morocco, Tunisia, Mali and Mauritania in 1962, with Senegal and Algeria in 1964, and with Turkey and Yugoslavia in 1965 (Hagedorn 2001: 112).

this hodgepodge of interests and "logics" of immigrant selection, a period of relative stasis is comprehensible (FAC6: pos. 63).

Starting in 1968, an increased awareness took hold at the political level that immigration to France and settlement of immigrants would need to be managed more effectively. The number of arrivals continued to stay high, and immigrant origins were increasingly diverse, as "the authorities [were] becoming aware of the need to go beyond the economic understanding of migration to study the human and social aspects" (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 148). Gaining control of immigration movements after twenty years of de-facto *laissez-faire* politics in this area proved difficult, not least because of the multitude of unexpected effects stemming from citizenship politics. For instance, a significant group of immigrants from the former colonies could lay claim to "reintegration" into French nationality by virtue of their being born in a French colony, effectively becoming French due to the French history of colonialism (Hollifield 2014: 164). This demonstrates just one of the many ways in which colonialism and migration politics intersect in the French case.

On the level of integration politics, France had started to house immigrants separately from local populations starting in the 1960s, often locating immigrants from the same ethnic groups together in so-called *bidonvilles*, peripheral settlements outside urban centers that were often socially and structurally disconnected (Fahrmeir 2007: 190). As Patrick Weil describes, there were 19 *bidonvilles* surrounding Paris in 1966, with *bidonvilles* developing around Marseille, Bordeaux, and Nice. This marked the beginning of the spatial separation of immigrants, mainly of non-white origin, which persists until today (Weil 2005: 51).

Migration politics in France during the 1950s and 60s were coined by the absence of an overarching strategy for arrival and settlement on the part of French authorities (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 85f.). Concomitantly, with the fall of the Fourth and the beginning of the Fifth Republic and decolonization, the composition of immigrants arriving in France was increasingly diversifying throughout this period and a differential treatment of those arriving from former colonies and those arriving from Europe set in (Spire 2005: 409), marking the start of contention in integration politics. The late 1960s saw first attempts to manage immigration and settlement, mainly through the way in which housing of newly arrived immigrants was organised. This marked the beginning of attempts by the French government to gain control of migration politics.

Prior to the immigration stop in 1974, there were several political developments in France which served as precursors to the restrictive approach to migration politics that would dominate the 1970s. In 1972, the *Circulaires*

Marcellin-Fontanet[90] introduced regulations to diminish the influx of labour immigrants and also made it almost impossible for those without regular status to stay in France, hereby "setting the tone" for the rest of this decade (Lochak 2020: 14). These *circulaires* were followed by hunger strikes by irregular immigrants, *sans-papiers*, all over France from March to June 1973, successfully advocating for attaining regular status in France (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 166).[91] Also in 1973, racist riots erupt in Marseille, targeting people of Algerian origin. Outraged by the racism against Algerians, the Algerian government unilaterally decided to halt all emigration to France (Hollifield 2014: 165). President Georges Pompidou reacted with strong condemnation of the racist attacks, claiming that "France is profoundly anti-racist" and that the attacks revealed the need to establish firm control of immigration and a less concentrated distribution of immigrants across the national territory (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 161f.). Concomitantly, a new citizenship law was introduced in 1973 which abandoned all discrimination on the basis of gender in questions of naturalization and citizenship acquisition, effectively liberalizing naturalization further by facilitating family immigration and naturalization for all immigrants (Weil 2002: 161).

6.3.2 Migration Politics in Turmoil, 1974–1980

After the end of the *Trente Glorieuses*, 1975, the political problem started and the economic problems too. (…) From 1975, the legitimacy of the guest workers and their children, who were born in France, was questioned. Since 1975 until today this problem of migration and legitimacy is still relevant. (FP2: pos. 23)

The global economic downturn which began in the early 1970s marked the end of the *Trente Glorieuses* and further strengthened the impetus to change France's approach to migration politics. The oil shock of 1973 led to many European countries stopping immigration altogether, with Austria, Belgium,

90 In France, *circulaires* are administrative regulation orders circulated amongst members of the public administration for their swift implementation. This is similar to the Canadian orders-in-council.

91 *Sans-papiers* stands for without paper and is a popular term for immigrants in France without a regular status. This episode marked the beginning of the *sans-papiers* movement in France, a movement of irregular immigrants which remains active until today. The main aim of this movement is their regularization in France with permanent residency or citizenship status. The movement gained particular momentum and international media attention in the 1990s, when French migration politics grew more restrictive once again. The existence of this movement is significant due to its scale, which supersedes similar movements in Germany or Canada. For an in-depth analysis of this movement, see Freedman, Jane (2008): The French "Sans-Papiers" Movement. An Unfinished Struggle.

the Netherlands, and Germany starting in 1973, followed by France in 1974. Immigrants, or rather 'foreign workers' as they were conceived of at the time, were seen as a "political and economic liability" that needed to be curbed imminently (Hollifield 1986: 114). The recruitment stop was implemented in the hope that many of the immigrants now experiencing unemployment due to the economic downturn would simply return to their sending countries, effectively as, Hollifield puts it pithily, "exporting unemployment" (ibid.).

By 1974, France had been governed conservatively by Charles de Gaulle, who took power with the onset of the Fifth Republic, and Gaullist successor Georges Pompidou since 1969. President Georges Pompidou died in office in 1974, leading to the election of Republican Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in May 1974. Giscard d'Estaing would emerge as a strongman in matters of migration politics, with many restrictive policies passed during his presidency which lasted until 1981.

When immigration to France was officially halted on July 3, 1974, there were more than 3.4 million foreigners residing in France, making up 6.2 percent of the population (Weil 2005: 16).[92] Shortly after the election of Giscard d'Estaing, his government under PM Jacques Chirac set up the State Secretary of Immigrant Travelers, the first new migration institution since the end of the Second World War. One of the main goals of this agency was to reduce the number of immigrants in the country by one million within five years (Perotti 1988: 68f.).

The immigration stop in 1974 had several unintended consequences, which would alter French migration politics in the long run. Like in other European countries, this stop had the effect of "freezing the immigrant population in place", leading to the long-term establishment of the existent immigrant population in France, and effectively making out of a temporary foreign population a permanent immigrant population, with an emerging second generation (Hollifield 1986: 128; Perotti 1988: 59; Hollifield 2014: 165). Immigration to France continued after the official immigration stop due to family immigration, often motivated by the very fact labour immigration to France was halted. Almost half a million people arrived through family immigration between 1975 and 1984 (Perotti 1988: 59). Clandestine immigration also increased during this period because of the continued availability of jobs in sectors where French people were unwilling to work (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 220f.).

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92 Weil also remarks that the composition of the 3.4 million immigrants shows the diversity of immigration at the time: 758.000 are Portuguese, 710.000 are Algerian, 497.000 are Spanish, 462.000 are Italian, 260.000 Moroccan, 139.000 are Tunisian, and the rest is made up of immigrants from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and West and Central Africa (Weil 2005: 16).

In the years right after 1974, the French government had not yet conceded to the inevitability of these developments. In fact, there was the optimistic assumption on the government level that the economic downturn would be a brief affair. However, by 1977, the government became nervous: Return migration had been continuously encouraged, but with little effect. In 1977, France was therefore the only European country that tried to implement the forced return for North African immigrants (Weil 2005: 17; 2002: 167). In fact, President Giscard d'Estaing asked Algerian officials to cooperate on this issue, threatening them with the forced return of tens of thousands of Algerians in case they would not support the new policies, which included measures such as the loss of residency permits in case of prolonged unemployment. This approach was solidified in the 1980 Bonnet Law, which was the first law to change the Ordinance of November 2, 1945. This law included forced return migration measures, but it was met with fierce resistance from churches, NGOs, unions, and left-wing parties and was eventually toppled by the Socialist French government in 1981 and thus never came into action (Weil 2005: 18; Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 69f.).

The most salient effect of the 1974 recruitment stop was the French government's acknowledgment of the need for a cohesive integration policy, slowly beginning in 1975. The 1970s are marked by turmoil and a reckoning process mainly regarding immigration politics, concerning both the composition of immigration and the way in which immigrants are treated in France. The conservative government however remained steadfast in its conviction that there was an element of reversibility to the number of immigrants in France. They were not wrong when it came to immigrants from Italy, Spain, and Portugal, many of whom returned due to improved political circumstances in their sending countries, especially democratization processes in Spain and Portugal. One expert explained the period of the 1970s thusly:

This is indeed an important period because of the effects of the global crisis, of oil on all European and Western economies, with France's desire to significantly reduce migration. Not completely, because there is still a problem of family reunification which means that the counter is not at zero, but the pace linked to the fact that the needs of the economy are much less important are obviously notable. We must add to this fact (…) that France is already at this time, compared to Germany and other European countries, in a demographic situation that is a little less deteriorated (…). The fertility rate was around two, or even slightly higher than two, which normally allows for the renewal of generations in a country with a welfare state system and a relatively good level of health. *So, all this explains why the crisis, this demographic situation, and the difficulties of integration that are becoming obvious, are leading political authorities to be extremely restrictive in terms of immigration. This opens a new chapter in the history of migration, a chapter from which we have not completely emerged since that period.* (FAC3: pos. 11)

Worries about the irreversibility of immigration, particularly from former colonies, opens this "new chapter" and lead into the 1980s, when migration politics would become a matter of partisan to and fro, with the liberalization of migration politics being followed by restriction under different governments. The overall desire to reduce migration would win in these debates, as the final section will show.

6.3.3 The Politicization of French Migration Politics, 1981–1988

If the 1970s are coined by the French government wrestling with the permanence of immigrant presence in France and efforts to curb future immigration, then the 1980s are characterized by migration politics solidifying as a constant in French political life. To explain this development, two factors are salient: The ambiguous treatment of migration politics during the left-wing presidency of François Mitterrand from 1981 to 1995, which served to solidify a permanent cleavage in French politics; and the establishment of a strong right-wing movement on the grounds of anti-immigrant platform in the form of the *Front National* (FN), which would shape French migration politics for the following decades. The tensions in this area are also reflected on the legislative level: While no explicit immigration laws had been passed between 1945–1980, the 1980s and early 1990s saw the introduction of no less than seven different pieces of legislation concerned with immigration, citizenship, and integration politics (Wihtol de Wenden 2014: 191).

To analyze the developments in this period, the nexus between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics is therefore a helpful tool. While immigration matters dominate the 1970s, migration politics in the 1980s would predominantly focus on issues of citizenship and integration politics, national identity and what it meant to be French. Notably, the most anti-immigration and anti-immigrant legislation introduced during this period was during the two cohabitations of left-wing President Mitterrand with conservative PMs, pointing to the partisan division on the subject.[93]

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93 In France, *Cohabitation* is a constellation that can occur within the French political system in which the President is from a different party than his Prime Minister. This can sometimes lead to ideological tensions among the two leaders. Presidential and parliamentary elections are not connected in France.

From Labour Issue to Social Issue: Migration Politics become established
In 1981, François Mitterrand was elected as the first left-wing President of the Fifth Republic. He would remain in office until 1995, becoming the longest serving president in French history. François Mitterrand started his left-wing presidency with a host of "generous" measures in migration politics, especially in the first two years, 1981 and 1982 (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 192). He refused to implement the restrictive Bonnet Law which had passed in 1980 and which included forced return measures. He gave 130,000 irregular immigrants residency permits, eased family reunification measures and increased support in education for immigrant communities (French Immigration Museum 2022). These steps marked the beginning of the treatment of migration politics as a social issue, rather than part of labour policy as they had been prior (Soysal 1994: 152). The establishment of a permanent immigrant population of about 3.5 million immigrants in the 1970s had made these political developments necessary. The increasingly diverse immigrant population, with respect to religion and ethnic background, called into question the "myth of an ethnically homogenous population" and challenged common notions around national identity (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 67). The ambivalence of French migration politics revealed itself in the coming years. This tension found its outlet in several developments.

Due to the right of association for foreigners granted by Mitterrand, there was an increasing political mobilization of the immigrant population, notably of the younger second and at times also third generations. In 1983, a small group of about 40 second generation immigrants started the *Marche des Beurs*[94] in Marseille. Seven weeks later, they arrived in Paris and were greeted by a massive solidarity protest of 100,000 people and received by President François Mitterrand. One of the organizers, Toumi Djaja, declared on the steps of the Elysée palace that the President had accepted the possibility of an immigrant residency permit for ten years. The legislative proposition of this residency permit passed in parliament in 1984 (Weil 2005: 57; Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 70f.). This law not only created the ten-year residency permit though, it also introduced the automatic renewal of the permit after ten years to "foreigners who had married a French national, for parents of French children and persons who had been residing in France for more than fifteen years" (Wihtol

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94 The *Marche des Beurs* is a movement that had it origins at the beginning of the 1980s. *Beur* is the Verlan word for *Arabe*, popularly used for French people of Maghrebin origin. Verlan is a popular French slang language that is often spoken in *banlieue* and immigrant communities and generally popular amongst young people in France. *Verlan* is the verlan word for *l'envers*, literally meaning 'backwards'. In Verlan, words are often turned around, like the word *lourd* (heavy) becoming *relou*, or *fou* becoming *ouf*. The word *beur* is so common today that there is even a Parisian radio station called *Beur FM*.

de Wenden 2011b: 70f.). As Wihtol de Wenden put it: "Although foreigners had equal social rights since 1975, it was not until 1984 that the French public recognized immigrants not only as workers but also as settlers" (ibid.).

Concomitantly, an increasingly powerful right-wing movement developed in the form of the FN under its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, who celebrated an astonishing victory in the local elections of 1983 on an anti-immigration platform. The FN had been founded in 1972 but risen to no substantial power prior to these elections. At the centre of Jean-Marie Le Pen's electoral platform was the demand to halt all immigration and the forced deportation of all African immigrants. This single-issue approach proved successful. In the years to come, the FN would gain popularity by invoking the issue of immigration (Weil 2002: 170; Hollifield 2014: 166f.). As Hollifield explains, Jean-Marie Le Pen would "call for a physical separation of the races in discourse that mixed xenophobia, nationalism, and antisemitism with appeals to the economic and physical insecurities of the French working class" (ibid.).

Colonial Entanglements substantiate as Citizenship takes Centre Stage
Starting in 1983, citizenship became the rhetorical centre stage for issues concerning immigration, integration, and national identity in France. As Wihtol de Wenden describes, while immigration politics moved to being the "heart" of the political debate in France, the discourse hardened and became sharp, fundamentally questioning the role of immigrants in French society, and the legitimacy of their possible (or actual) French citizenship (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 192).

The event that propelled citizenship to become a central area of concern for the rising far right was a colonial legacy which had its origins in the decolonization and migration politics of the 1960s. When Algeria gained independence in 1962, many Algerians opted to change their French citizenship to Algerian citizenship. However, if they were born prior to 1962, immigrated to France, and then had children on French soil, these kids, due to the *double droit du sol*, so double *ius soli*, automatically (and mandatorily) acquired French citizenship. Even though their parents might now be Algerian, these immigrants had been born on a territory that had been declared as French by France, meaning that their children were born to nominal Frenchwomen and -men (Hagedorn 2001: 44; Weil 2005: 62). A lot of these children only found out about the fact that they were French at the age of 16, when they went to apply for residency and found out that they had obligatorily been given French citizenship (Weil 2005: 58). This led to several protests from Algerian immigrants who were unhappy about their forced 'francization' of over 400,000 French-Algerian children

(Hagedorn 2001: 44), considering they themselves had often been active in the fight to become independent from France (Weil 2005: 58).

This development was promptly instrumentalized by the FN in what Patrick Weil calls "The Algerian Crisis" of French citizenship. The FN criticized the comparatively swift acquisition of citizenship in the French case, asking for *ius soli* to be abolished and a reintroduction of *ius sanguinis* as the sole guiding principle for citizenship (this constellation had not been in place in France since 1803) (Weil 2022: 13f.). Debates around citizenship, who should be able to hold it, what it should entail, and how hard it should be to acquire, came to denote a plethora of controversial questions, as Wihtol de Wenden aptly describes:

From 1983 [citizenship became] the object of a kind of political dramatization, especially among its detractors: it is henceforth posed in terms of constitutional philosophy, of defense of the borders, and put in connection with rights and duties, the redefinition of the terms of the social contract in a threatened nation-state. The virulent opponents [of the way citizenship is designed, F. A.] do not hesitate to resort to the old myth of national homogeneity, to a certain mystification of citizenship and republican democracy, to a crystallization and a tightening of positions on nationality, citizenship and political rights. (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 307)

The right-wing think tank Club de l'Horloge started a campaign in the mid-1980s, claiming that "*Etre français, cela se merite*" (Being French is something you earn), and started to distinguish between being *Français de souche* (natively French, literally translated as 'French from the tree trunk') and *Français de papier* (French on paper). The protests by French-Algerians who had automatically attained French citizenship through double *ius soli* strengthened this distinction, as they claimed that this group had become French "despite themselves", and rejected wanting to be French (Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 77f.).

Starting in 1986, the issue of citizenship in connection to immigration entered "high politics" (Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 78). In the parliamentary elections of 1986, the right-wing National Front entered French parliament for the first time with almost ten percent of the vote. To win over far-right voters, the conservative right proposed several radical legislative proposals in the following years, including the abolishment of *ius soli*, part of the *Code de la Nationalité* since 1889, and the necessity for children born in France to foreigners to apply for naturalization (Weil 2005: 59f.). In the same elections, the conservative movements gained the majority in parliament so that France entered its first period of so-called *co-habitation*, with a left-wing President (François Mitterrand) naming a conservative Gaullist as PM, Jacques Chirac.

With this new PM in place, the now conservative government introduced a legislative proposition for a new citizenship law in November 1986, which included and obligatory 'declaration of intent' (*manifestation de volonté*) for immigrant children of the second generation. Upon maturity, maintenance of French citizenship would become conditional on declaring the intention of being French. If they did not declare this intention, they would automatically be given the citizenship of their parents. This legislative proposition was met with a lot of criticism and swiftly withdrawn. However, Jacques Chirac imminently set up a Wise Men Commission (*Commission des Sages*) on nationality. This commission published a report called "Being French today and tomorrow" (*Etre Français aujourd'hui et demain*) in 1988 (Hagedorn 2001: 46f.). In this report, the commission once again recommended the implementation of a *manifestation de volonté* (ibid.).

Where did the idea of a declaration of intent come from? And what would be its political use? The idea of a declaration of intent for becoming French presupposed a lack of integration as the root of the social problems of second-generation immigrants and undermined the *ius soli* principle of the *Code de la Nationalité* from 1889. The argument for introducing this declaration of intent of wanting to become French was that it would solve parts of the social problems by introducing an extra element of belonging into citizenship policy. The declaration of intent would then serve as an explicit declaration of 'fulfilled integration'. For those who would not do it, their right to become French would be revoked. The element of conditionality of integration for the acquisition of citizenship introduced through this measure explicitly links integration and citizenship politics and shows how these matters have long continued to be interconnected in the French case. This constitutes the heart of the republican paradox, described by another expert:

So, the paradox is that this shift was very much presented as a reaction against the National Front. So, it was not presented as basically accommodating the National Front. It was presented as a republican logic of integration, so basically the reference was the text by Rénan.[95]

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95 The French philologist Ernest Rénan is a "Third Republic Icon" in France (Gouvernement de France 2017). His 1882 essay called "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" is a staple of republican thinking about the nation. The French government's website has a section dedicated to Rénan, referencing one of the key insights from his essay: "The existence of a nation is a daily plebiscite (…). A nation is therefore a great solidarity, made up of a sense of the sacrifices we have made and those we are prepared to make again. (…) Man is not a slave to his race, his language, his religion, the course of his rivers or the direction of his mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sound of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral conscience which is called a nation" (referenced in ibid.) Rénan was mentioned three times in French expert interviews, all in reference to the question of who belongs to France (FAC7: pos. 26; FAC1: pos. 97; FAC3: pos. 39).

And so, in a way, this was presented as a third Republic legacy, if we choose to be a nation, then we should choose to become French. Of course. What it means is that they should choose to become French, manifestation de volonté etc. So, I think the paradox in France is that the rise of the racially based logic is not just by racists. It's also as a way to counter racism. And to say: Of course, they are welcome to France, provided they want to. Which means the suspicion that they might not want to, it's part of the equation. Which means that some of us are automatically French because we were born in France to French parents or because we're born to French parents. And some of us are not automatically French, which means it creates this distinction, which is purports to erase, that's the Republican Paradox, and it has to do with integration. The shift from intégrer to s'intégrer. *Some of us are not like us*. Some of us have to say that they want to become like us in order to be accepted as us. And, of course, the question is, once you said that, will they ever be accepted as part of us? (FAC7: pos. 26)

Another expert highlighted that the discussion on the *manifestation de volonté* constituted a "rupture" for France, which served to reify immigration as "the central political cleavage in French society", averting attention from other important subjects, because "when we are talking about the manifestation, we're not talking about unemployment, economic integration, discrimination, salaries. We are putting nationality at the center." (FAC6: pos. 87). Thus, the political back and forth on the *manifestation* could be seen as emblematic for the way migration politics issues would continue serve both as a deflection from other social problems and a stage for producing a partisan cleavage.

Legacies: The further Entrenchment of a Political Cleavage
Another issue connected to migration politics started to arise in the late 1980s: The increased presence of Muslims in the country. Due to its colonial history in many majority-Muslim countries, France is to this day the EU country with the largest Muslim population. First tensions about the accommodation of religious minorities in a country that insists on a strict separation of religion and state erupted in the 'Headscarves Affair of 1989'. Three Muslim students refused to remove their headscarves at school despite being asked to do so by the educators and were subsequently expelled. The case took on national dimensions, as the now Socialist government with education minister Lionel Jospin took a more lenient stance towards the issue and stated that students should be discouraged, but not forbidden from wearing headscarves, and they should never face expulsion due to their religious attire (Thomas 2011: 161). President Mitterrand, however, did not follow Jospin's more conciliatory approach. In 1989, in the context of the headscarf debate, he declared that France had reached its "*seuil de tolerance*" (tolerance threshold) for immigration (quoted in Vichniac 1991: 50). As Judith Vichniac analyses, this contention by Mitterrand marked the way in which the Socialist party had effectively been

transformed within the decade of the 1980s from a party propagating a "pluralist conception" of French society, to a more careful and closed stance towards immigration and immigrants (Vichniac 1991: 56). Clearly, the cooptation of migration politics by the far right as a central political issue had put pressure on all parts of the political spectrum (Vichniac 1991: 45; Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 10).

In 1993, the second period of cohabitation of a Socialist president and a conservative PM began, doubling down on the restrictive stance on migration matters. The government under PM Edouard Balladur introduced a host of restrictive measures in migration politics, mostly in immigration and citizenship. In 1993, conservative interior minister Charles Pasqua declared in an interview with *Le Monde* that "France has been an immigration country, but it no longer wants to be one" (Le Monde 02/06/1993). In late 1993, the Pasqua laws proposed this 'zero immigration' objective, introducing restrictive measures on all kinds of immigration, so that immigration to France would only remain possible through family unification or asylum (Wihtol de Wenden 2011b: 72; Hollifield 2014: 171f.). However, as Patrick Weil puts it, the discourse by the right and the left surrounding immigration at the time was organized by opposing the stance 'yes to immigration' to the stance 'zero immigration', not recognizing the fact that most immigration remained possible. In addition to family immigration and asylum, the immigration of EU citizens was also possible (Weil 2005: 19).

Together with the zero-immigration law, citizenship acquisition for second generation immigrants was also reformed. The idea of a *manifestation de volonté* (declaration of intent) for citizenship acquisition, which had been so harshly criticized and rejected in the late 1980s, now became reality. The acquisition of citizenship by maturity which had been relatively straight-forward before, was now more complicated, as second-generation immigrants now had to declare their willingness to become French. If they did not do so, they would automatically attain their parents' citizenship and have to apply for naturalization (Fahrmeir 2007: 206). This law went back to the 1986 proposal of this measure and the recommendations of the 1988 commission report on French nationality, referenced above. One expert stressed the importance of the symbolism of this law, which had relatively few real-life effects but marked a new perspective on citizenship acquisition all the while keeping the costs of these changes to a minimum:

I think that these themes and discussions [about the *manifestation de volonté*] have a huge advantage, which is that they don't cost much in terms of public policy, you don't have to invest in changing the nationality code, you don't have to pay taxes, but *they offer a fairly easy way to mark the differences between central political forces.* It's easy and cheap, and it

can draw on old rhetoric and rhetorical funds to be mobilized over time by these political universes. (FAC1: pos. 29)

The 1993 law included a host of other restrictive measures, such as the minimum residency of two years for foreign spouses to French people for the application for citizenship (prior set at six months), or the restriction of citizenship acquisition for the children of Algerian immigrants born after 1994 (Hagedorn 2001: 48). As Heike Hagedorn explains, this modification of French citizenship law was therefore paradigmatic also in its symbolism. Since the introduction of the Nationality Code in 1889, citizenship had only been amended four times (with the exception of the Vichy years): 1927, 1945, and 1973. In all these cases, citizenship measures had been liberalized. This was the first time that restrictive measures were introduced, which, according to Hagedorn, signified the paradigmatic change in French citizenship law (ibid.). However, these measures only lasted until 1997, when a new socialist government, this time in cohabitation with a conservative president, reintroduced the automatic acquisition of citizenship for the second generation (ibid.: 99). This will be the subject of the analysis in chapter 7.

6.3.4 The Foundational Years: Making Sense of French Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics, 1980–1988

Hollifield describes the ideological battle around immigration, integration, and national identity that unfolds in the beginning of the 1980s as creating a "continuous atmosphere of crisis" around migration politics in France (Hollifield 2014: 171). Four experts stressed at several points that the political cleavage of migration politics on the left and the right which emerged in the 1980s is one which prevails until today. Two experts echoed each other, worth quoting in full: "Something that has been recurrent since the 1980s is the fact that on the right of the political spectrum, they try to put immigration at the center of the public debate and make it a central cleavage." (FAC6: pos. 89)
Another expert confirmed this view:

What is certain is that, while in the early 1980s, it was possible to think, and indeed it is often thought, that the episode of intense politicization of migrant issues, of a resurgence of the extreme right, which in fact has as its core business the hatred of immigrants, could be a kind of crisis, a passing phenomenon, it is quite clear that *at the end of the 1980s, we are in a new structure that will be lasting. The presence of the extreme right has not faded since then, the presence of immigration in the political debate has not regained the modesty it had in previous decades. We are in a different world from that of the 1970s*. (FAC1: pos. 17)

Or another expert, who stressed the cleavage has prevailed until today explained one of President Mitterrand's unimplemented proposals of detaching nationality from citizenship, providing citizenship to French immigrants before the attainment of nationality. This proposal from 1981 was quickly buried,

because it was a proposal that very quickly became divisive, and the emergence of the National Front in the mid-1980s strongly reinforced this divide and made it politically unlikely that this measure would be implemented. From that moment on, the migration issue became a *political issue from which we still haven't really emerged*. Look at Zemmour, Le Pen ... today, we are still in this debate. I would say that this explains why the nature of the issues surrounding migration has changed significantly. We have a paradox where there are less and less migrants. There are still some, but there are far fewer than in the 60s and 70s, but *the place of migration in the political debate has become obsessive*. (FAC3: pos. 14)

This intense polarization, in turn, has led to a kind of political stalemate on any issues connected to migration politics, which makes it very difficult to implement even small changes to the system because they often take on highly symbolic dimensions, resulting in heated debates, as FAC3 further explains:

[T]he system has effectively stalled at a given moment, (…) the political and ideological polarization will make things much more difficult because the slightest difference will be perceived as being a kind of challenge, hence the absolutely bewildering debates we can have about food, for example. The fact of eating couscous calls into question our belonging to France. Of course not! Eat couscous or eat kosher or eat what you want, that's not the problem, but at some point, we're going to have political actors who are going to use elements of these differences for political purposes, with all the attitude, which become markers that aim to denounce the refusal to integrate. *This is probably one of the important transformations*. (FAC3: pos. 33)

Lastly, one expert noted the shifting role of citizenship during this decade, from an end of belonging to the community, to the starting point to proving one's belonging to the community.

The debates of the 1980s show that, in fact, we are beginning to dissociate ourselves from the specific role played by nationality in these operating mechanisms. *We start to say that, on the one hand, it is not the end of the integration process and nationality but rather the beginning, when the person becomes French, he or she is not going to logically enter the community of citizens, it is rather a prerequisite (…). So, we modify the role of nationality.* (CAC4: pos. 15)

While the 1980s were stressed as the decade in which important changes occurred, the 1970s set the tone for these developments, which is why they were also discussed at length in this chapter. The following table summarises the

critical juncture of the 1980s, with the 1970s included in the antecedent conditions.

Table 6.2: France – The Far-Right Cleavage Juncture, 1981–1988

Antecedent Conditions	Shock /Rupture	Critical Juncture	Mechanisms of Production	Legacy
1950–1970 Unencumbered and uncontrolled immigration, accepted for labour purposes.	1974 immigration stop due to global oil crisis	1981–1988 Migration politics becomes politicised and a partisan cleavage, with a strong anti-immigrant and anti-immigration far right	1981 Election of François Mitterrand, brief liberalization of migration politics	Citizenship and immigration emerge as on-going divisive, cleavage-producing issues
Decolonisation and facilitation of quick citizenship acquisition of former colonial subjects, particularly Algeria.	1974–1977 general negation of the irreversibility and durability of the immigration of past decades		1983–1987 The Front National establishes itself in French politics on an anti-immigrant platform	The far right becomes a guiding force on France's migration politics
1950s and 60s Rising diversification of immigration from colonies/former colonies, particularly Algeria	1977–1980 recognition of the large immigrant presence (from former colonies and Algeria) and (unsuccessful) attempts to force their return		1986–1988 First Cohabitation of Socialist President and Gaullist PM (Chirac), to and fro of restrictions on migration politics	Issues of Second and Third Generation Immigrants and questions of their belonging become one of the core tenets of migration politics
Liberalization of naturalization in 1973	1980 Bonnet law, attempt at forced return of African immigrants (failed)			1988–1993 Second cohabitation with Balladur, introduction of the *Manifestation de Volonté*

Source: Own research

6.4 Germany – The Transformational Decade, 1989–2000

Taking a big historical step forward in our analysis of Germany, from 1953 to 1989 to be precise, might seem counter-intuitive to the informed reader. Arguably, the Federal Republic of Germany developed into a "de-facto immigration country" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 2) throughout the 1960s, 70s, and 80s by virtue of its labour recruitment accords. However, from a migration politics perspective that takes critical junctures into account, no period contained events as impactful on German migration politics as the 1990s and early 2000s, a critical juncture following the end of the Cold War and the unification of East and West Germany. In this chapter, I show how the 1990s, or more precisely 1989 to 2000, constituted the critical juncture that enabled Germany's migration politics paradigm shift.

The developments of the 1990s therefore set the stage for the transformation of Germany's migration politics nexus. Despite decades-long labour immigration, Germany had not acknowledged its immigration country status in citizenship or integration politics, maintaining an approach that aimed at the eventual return of the 'guest workers' that had long started to settle in Germany for good. In citizenship politics in particular, Germany was increasingly at odds with its European neighbours, as it continued to embrace a comparatively restrictive naturalization procedure (Fahrmeir 2007: 209). The 1990s opened the door to fundamentally transforming this paradigm in all areas of migration politics. The questions facing Germany in the post-unification decade are pointedly summarized by Wilhelm, who points to the different challenges that this decade sparked:

In light of German unification in 1990, many factors collided, launching a gradual change of German self-definition, patterns of memory, and civil awareness. Germany lost its provisional postwar status and was united, suddenly challenged with integrating 17 million new Germans, who sought union as one *people (ein Volk)*. Ironically, the challenge to integrate this massive population of former East Germans came somewhat from within and forced Germany to redefine and confront its identity as a nation. Was German identity still to be found in one people, or was this specific moment in German history calling for a reconsideration of existing patterns and an adaptation to existing realities? The question was not only forced by rising migration movements from East to West and West to East in a newly unified Europe, but also by numerous acts of violence and assaults against foreigners – such as in Rostock, Mölln, or Hoyerswerda – killing many and drawing new attention to the importance of the topic and the urgency to address difference as part of German society. The setting ablaze of minorities' homes and businesses in Germany elicited well known images of the past and prompted a discourse over who the Germans were in the 1990s. (Wilhelm 2013: 24)

The complexity of the developments of this decade will be discussed in detail in the analysis below. Before I begin the analysis of the historical developments of the 1990s, it is important to look at the antecedent conditions that formed the basis for these developments, which is why I begin with a summary of the decades that preceded 1989 that set the antecedent conditions for the critical juncture of the 1990s.

6.4.1 Becoming a 'de-facto immigration country', 1955-1988

1955-1973: Recruiting 'Guest Workers', Receiving Immigrants

What I think you can see very well regarding this migration, that is, this migration from 1955 to 73, was very strongly this argument, which later also had a certain traction: *"They're not coming forever. They should come here, they should work a bit and then they should leave again",* and that was of course very strongly anchored also in the communication, also in the way in which the whole thing was then also argumentatively processed within the government coalition. Of course, the whole thing then turned out to be unmanageable. *But I think the argument of reversibility, the argument of the temporary, the argument of the provisional, played a very strong role.* Also, in order to circumvent the corresponding internal resistance. We all know how the whole thing turned out. (GAC1: pos. 12)

The Federal Republic began recruiting labour immigrants from other European states as early as 1955, when the first labour treaty with Italy was signed. To be sure, the framing of this immigrant labour recruitment was economic, as the introductory quote above underlines. There was no integration legislation provided to guide the settlement of these so-called 'guest workers'[96]. In contrast to the policy provisions for resettlers discussed chapter 5.4, the only legislation that provided guidance on the status and treatment of the newly arrived immigrant workers was provided by a Nazi regime law from 1938, the *Ausländerpolizeiverordnung* (police ordinance on foreigners). The 'guest workers' were provided with housing and a rotation system was instated to ensure that settlement was out of the question. Bit by bit, the economic boom of the 1950s and 60s prompted more labour agreements, with Spain and Greece in 1960,

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96 Much has been written on the heavy connotation that the term 'guest worker' carries. I will not include an in-depth analysis of the term here but include a quote by Rita Chin who hits the nail on the head in her swift takedown of this term: "This euphemistic label crystallized key assumptions about the specific role that such workers would play in the Federal Republic and functioned quite literally to define labor recruits as 'guests' and 'workers.' It reduced their presence in West German society to economics, suggesting that their impact could be limited to the labor market; and it simultaneously insisted that their stay would be short-lived, taking for granted that most if not all foreign workers would eventually return" (Chin 2012: 84f.).

with Turkey in 1961, with Morocco in 1963, with Portugal in 1964, with Tunisia in 1965, and with Yugoslavia in 1968.

Consequently, the immigrant worker recruitment that started off with relatively modest numbers in 1955 accelerated into mass-recruitment throughout the 1960s, when the number of immigrant workers grew significantly until the eventual labour recruitment stop in 1973. While Germany was home to only around 500.000 immigrant workers in 1961, this number had doubled to one million by 1964 and more than quadrupled to 2.6 million in 1973 (11.6 percent of the total labour force), a quarter of which were Turkish, constituting the largest immigrant group (Chin 2012: 80; Triadafilopoulos 2012: 75; Wilhelm 2013: 14).

In the wake of the acceleration of immigrant recruitment, Germany introduced the 1965 foreigners' law to provide guidance on the status of foreigners in Germany and do away with the and "unsavoury" Nazi foreigners police ordinance (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 77). While the 1965 law could be considered a step towards the recognition of the presence of immigrant workers, it did not go beyond status regulations for foreigners and include any new citizenship or integration settlement policies (Fahrmeir 2007: 191). In fact, many basic constitutional rights were denied to foreigners in this law: Foreigners were not allowed free choice of occupation or place of work. They were also denied freedom of assembly and association (Soysal 1994: 123). If anything, this law "coined the status of immigrant workers as one permanently separate from German society" (Wilhelm 2013: 21). Saliently, many of the restrictions put on foreigners in this law would only apply to the significant Turkish population, since immigrant workers from European countries had access to more rights through EEC, eventual EU, legislation. This meant that non-EEC immigrant workers, numerically the largest group of Turkish immigrants, quickly faced a situation in which they were 'other than other': Within the group of immigrant workers, they were given a special status resulting in their increasing isolation, an issue that would become more pertinent in the 1970s and 1980s (Wilhelm 2013: 22).

Retrospectively, it may appear puzzling that West Germany's immigrant labour recruitment did not prompt a discussion on the possibility of becoming an immigration country, even more so once the rotation regulation was abandoned in the early 1970s (employers had complained that constant retraining of new workers hampered with the overall productivity) (Fahrmeir 2007: 192). The end of the rotation system led to the successive settlement of labour immigrants and their families (Wilhelm 2013: 14). However, many West European countries went through similar labour recruitment processes, among them France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, and the consensus appeared to be in

most that labour immigration was a temporary economic phenomenon. Saliently, many immigrant workers did return as intended: Of the 14 million immigrant workers which were recruited between 1955 and 1973, 80 percent returned to their sending countries (Oltmer 2017: 20). Much of this return movement had to do with the recruitment stop in 1973 in the wake of the oil crisis, discussed below.

The migration politics developments in the 1950s and 1960s are best understood through the semantic distinction between foreign workers and immigrants. Germany wanted to invite 'guest workers', but it was not cognizant of the fact that it was de facto partially recruiting immigrants for permanent settlement. The former invitation had an imagined "expiration date" (Chin/Fehrenbach 2012a: 108), the latter would have necessitated some kind of permanent settlement strategy.

Altogether, the nexus of migration politics as it is conceptualized in this thesis was significant by its absence for immigrants outside the co-ethnic group in this period. By its own rationale, Germany did not require cohesive migration politics, comprising immigration, integration, and citizenship regulations, in the 1950s and 60s, since it recruited workers who happened to be from other countries for what was intended to be a temporary period.

1974–1988: 'There is nothing more permanent than a temporary worker'[97] – Germany becomes an Immigration Country against its Will

A clear paradigm shift occurred; we no longer saw these people from the perspective of useful workers but as worrying aliens that need to be deterred. (GAC6: pos. 16)

After the oil shock and the ensuing economic crisis of 1973, Germany (along with many other European countries which had instated labour recruitment agreements) halted all immigrant labour arrivals in a recruitment stop on November 23, 1973. In Germany, the migration politics of the 15 years following the recruitment stop were characterized by its self-octroyed tension of not wanting to be an immigration country but de-facto having become one.

The immigrant recruitment stop in 1973 was implemented to halt immigration and ideally incentivize many of the now unemployed immigrant workers to return to their home country. Half of the foreign population was unemployed by 1973 (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 79). However, an unintended effect set in (Chin 2012: 86). Prompted by the recruitment stop, many of the immigrants, particularly those who were not part of the European community, chose to

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97 This expression was used by one of the expert interviewees but is a common aphorism that can be found in many research texts on temporary foreign worker programs (CPS6: pos. 7).

remain and have their families join them.[98] The settlement of Turkish and other non-EEC immigrant communities due to family reunification and refugee immigration led to a further doubling of in the overall foreign population from 1973 to 1983, when 4.5 million nominal foreigners resided in Germany, making up 7.3 percent of the total German population. As Chin explains: "Even though the presence of guest workers and their families ceased to be advantageous for Germans, Germany continued to offer significant benefits for guest workers and their families" (Chin 2012: 86).

Migration politics were catapulted to the center stage of state policy making in the 1970s, where they remained throughout the 1970s and 1980s as a host of make-shift regulations and measures were proposed to deal with the new socio-cultural composition of German society while wanting to maintain the non-immigration country "state doctrine" (ibid.: 88). A federal commission was instated in 1976 to grapple with "the future of German *Ausländerpolitik*". Their report, submitted in 1977, "reflected the ambivalence of its mandate" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 123). Germany should no longer encourage immigration in any form by maintaining the recruitment stop and further encourage the return of foreigners to their sending countries. Conversely, the commission asked that "the legal status of families remaining in the Federal Republic be enhanced and their integration into West German society promoted" (ibid.).

This was also reflected on the level of citizenship, where changes were added to the citizenship law (hailing back to 1913) in the form of even stricter naturalization guidelines in 1977. These guidelines doubled down on the idea that attaining German citizenship was an exceptional event under a restrictive procedure (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 123f.). They stipulated that an applicant's desire for German citizenship was not sufficient for granting it, rather it ought to be shown that the applicant's prospective naturalization was in the German public interest. Whether or not this was so would be decided at the discretion of the public servants responsible for the respective process. The guidelines also underlined that Germany was not a country of immigration and had no intention of "enlarging the German *Volk* through strategic naturalization". These formulations reinforced the conception of naturalization as an absolute exception rather than a regularized procedure, a normative contention meant to deter prospective applicants (Hagedorn 2001: 52f.).

Concomitantly, Social Democrat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt instated a *Beauftragten der Bundesregierung fuer Ausländerfragen* (Federal Government Commissioner for Questions regarding Foreigners). Heinz Kühn, the first

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98 Immigrant workers from European countries, however, opted to return more frequently because of better socio-economic and political circumstances in their sending countries. They also enjoyed more visa rights than before (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 83).

commissioner in this role, published a report in which he officially acknowledged Germany as a destination for migration and formulated ideas for immigrants' integration (Bendel/Borkowski 2016: 100).

However, the election of a conservative government under chancellor Helmut Kohl, which would remain in power until the end of the 1990s, further cemented the self-imposed non-immigration state doctrine, leading to what Klaus Bade calls "the lost decade" of German migration politics (Bade 2013; Bendel/Borkowski 2016: 101). This was made explicit the coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats in 1982, the possibility of Germany's status as an immigration country is wholeheartedly rejected: In 1982, after official parliament debate on the issue of immigration, the Interior Ministry issued a statement in which it postulated: "There is unity that the Federal Republic (…) is not a country of immigration and should not become one. The cabinet agrees that a further influx of foreigners from outside the European Community should be prevented by all possible legal means." (Chin 2012: 94). The same statement was included in the 1992 coalition agreement, which stated that "The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration. Therefore, all measures that are justifiable from a humanitarian perspective must be taken to prevent the further influx of foreigners" (Results of the Coalition Deliberations 1982: 6). The recruitment stop was to be maintained.

Overall, the developments of migration politics of the 1970s and 80s were stuck in a "vicious cycle" (Ellermann 2021: 159). The election of a conservative government on an anti-immigration platform that fostered an anti-immigrant discourse of exclusion, particularly towards the Turkish immigrant community[99], led to further and further delays in the official recognition of the "finality of immigration" that had occurred in Germany (ibid.).[100] One of the

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99 This thesis does not include an in-depth discussion of the viciousness of racist exclusionary rhetoric directed towards the Turkish immigrant community during this decade since it would go beyond the scope of my analysis, but I want to recognize the extensive work done by other researchers who were able to show the extent of racism and exclusion faced by the Turkish immigrant community at the time which culminated in the early 1990s in several racist attacks and the murdering of members of the Turkish immigrant community. It was not unusual to invoke references to immutable cultural difference according to religion and ethnic origin in order to conjure up a so-called "foreigner problem" (*Ausländerproblem*) at the time. Conservative politicians also raised concerns that the sheer presence of Turkish immigrant communities could lead to the rise of a new radical right, effectively scapegoating the community for possible attacks (Wilhelm 2013: 15; Chin/Fehrenbach 2012a: 108; Triadafilopoulos 2012: 126; Chin 2012: 90).

100 Notably, there was some movement on the communal level where other parties had more influence. For instance, the Green-led ruling coalition in Frankfurt am Main instituted the Office for Multicultural Affairs in 1989 in an effort to coordinate "the work of all administrative bodies in relation to issues of cultural pluralism" (Schönwälder 2010: 159).

expert interviewees described the treatment of migration politics in the 1970s and particularly 1980s as Germany's *Lebenslüge* (life lie) When asked to elaborate, he explained it thusly:

I mean (…) this lack of integration policy and this non-recognition of the immigration situation. This has of course had very concrete and in some cases dramatic consequences for those individuals that were affected. So, one example that I always bring up is that in education policy. There we had the situation in the seventies and eighties of the so-called foreigner classes. Immigrant children, foreign children were not taught in the German school classes, they were in extra, not extra schools, but in extra classes and mostly in the secondary schools. (…) We also looked at the official regulations in Bavaria and there it said word for word that this is done to maintain the children's ability to return [to their parents' sending country]. (…) And I find that quite apt, that is, this term *life lie*, because it simply had such a massive influence on these biographies. It affects a whole life, right? It's not just a thing, yes, 'that was kind of weird back then', but it really had a massive impact on people's lives. (GAC2: pos. 8)

The consequences of the 'life lie' came to a head at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, when German unification provoked a process of reckoning, both with the German past and its role in Germany's self-conception, as well as what the future of Germany should look like, as the following chapters will show.

6.4.2 'A painful process of acknowledgment': Migration Politics in Post-Unification Germany, 1989–2000

On November 11, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and people from the Democratic Republic of Germany started to be able to move freely between the two German states. The fall of the Berlin Wall was symbolic for the end of the Cold War, which had dominated world politics for more than 40 years. Formal German unification followed on October 3, 1990. The shock of the system collapse and the challenges posed by unification would also lead to a critical juncture in migration politics that made the 1990s the most transformative decade of German migration politics as Germany underwent a "painful process of acknowledgment" (GPS1: pos. 11) of its immigration reality and eventually a paradigm shift. This expert describes the painful aspect of this acknowledgment thusly:

I think *it was painful for a part of the political elite that they had to realize that such ideas of national homogeneity and we are not a country of immigration, and we don't want a multicultural society, because they saw the dangers, these people had to realize that there is no*

alternative to immigration. Who was going to do the work? The German economy is so productive, so productive to this day, it just needs people. And one could have chosen then: Either probably this is the decision that a Mr. Orbán has in mind today, you do without economic growth and prosperity, but you have a homogeneous society and not a multicultural society, or you want growth and prosperity, but then you also have to accept immigration. (…) So, I think that was a painful process for the political elite. (GPS1: pos. 11)

To understand the complicated and "painful" processes of acknowledgment of this decade, it is helpful to divide it up into two phases, the critical juncture of 1989 to 2000 and its legacy from 2001 to 2005.

Post-Unification Immigration Politics, 1989–2000: The Emergence of a Migration Society

Unification is seen as one of the most important and positive developments in recent German history. This portrayal tends to gloss over both the difficulties faced by many East Germans in adapting to the new political and economic system (the so-called *Nachwendetrauma,* post-unification-trauma), and the fact that unification was not met with optimism by a number of critics at the time who feared that a unified Germany might conjure up ghosts from a fascist past (Chin/Fehrenbach 2012a: 116). The same ambiguity emerges with respect to unification's effects on migration politics in the critical juncture that followed. Many of these migration politics developments were accompanied by a process of reckoning with the German self-conception as an immigration country in relation to the horrors of the Nazi regime. This expert made the connection explicit:

Everything that had to do with migration and integration always had a very strong reference to what had just been, to Germany's special role. To what Germany used to be, to Germany's political responsibility, to Germany's past. And all the political measures that were discussed at that time were discussed with regard to Germany's role in National Socialism or Germany's legacy as the successor state of the National Socialist regime (…) So the famous asylum compromise in the nineties. The opposition, which was very strong at that time, was also processed very strongly in terms of arguments, also with regard to: "Can Germany do something like that?" Germany is a country that has a history, well, as a state that succeeded the National Socialist regime. And the citizenship law was discussed in such a way. The immigration law was also discussed in a certain way with reference to National Socialism. (GAC1: pos. 14)

Indeed, many of the postwar developments in migration politics which had been established in connection with the collapse of the Nazi reign, were reversed or reconsidered in the 1990s. Particularly the prioritization of co-ethnic immigration, as well as the special status of humanitarian immigrants underwent significant change during that time. In the wake of the collapse of the

Berlin Wall, three large migration movements occurred simultaneously in Germany. The migration of East Germans to West Germany, a large immigration movement of *Spätaussiedler* (late co-ethnic immigrants) from former Soviet states, and many asylum seekers which had fled in the wake of the collapse of the Yugoslav regime and the ensuing wars. As one million people arrived in 1990 alone, the subsequent years saw similarly high arrivals (Hollifield/Martin/Orrenius 2014: 16). One expert explains the ensuing uncertainty of the arrival of these different immigrant groups:

[N]ow, for the very first time, different movements, such as asylum here, labor migration there, resettlers there, which until then had not been thought of together, had not been processed together politically, are being brought together. And this also leads, I think, to this specific drama of the situation, because now the perspective is increasingly asserting itself: We, this Federal Republic, the society of the Federal Republic, are now confronted with massive migration movements, not even individual movements that are processed individually, so to speak, that mean individual things, but massive migration movements that we have to deal with. *And depending on how you define it, you could also explicitly talk about the emergence of something like a migration society here. A migration society, at least in my understanding, does not mean a society that reacts positively to migration in any way, but rather a society that negotiates migration daily and where migration is a topic that is significant in many respects for debates about self-conception. I would say that this is the very first time that we have reached or experienced such a constellation in the Federal Republic at the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s.* (GAC6: pos. 24)

Overall, Germany's conservative government under chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had also governed in the 1980s, was aghast at this sudden rise in immigration in 1990. For a government which had continuously held tight to its conviction that Germany would not be an immigration country, these developments threw it into a crisis regarding Germany's long-established migration politics nexus. The freedom of movement instated by the collapse of the Soviet Regime meant that resettlers arrived in unprecedented numbers that surprised the German government and the public. Prior to the late 1980s, the numbers of co-ethnic immigrants per year had consistently hovered around the 10,000 mark, with 1.5 million resettlers immigrating between 1950 and 1987. In 1988, the number of resettlers arriving jumped up to 200,000, doubling to 400,000 in 1990 (Oltmer 2017: 230). Altogether, three out of the 4.5 million resettlers immigrated post-1987 (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2019: 3). Very quickly, there were discussions on the need to maintain the privileging of co-ethnic migration as opposed to other forms of migration. As Kleckowski von Kloppenfels aptly points out, now that Germany was unified, what implications would the "blood-based" principle of belonging in the form of maintaining co-ethnic immigration have for "the self-conception of German society and

its general attitude towards immigration, integration, and the treatment of foreigners"? (Klekowski von Kloppenfels 2003: 399)

The political response to this "delicate" (ibid.) challenge was somewhat muddled. Short of abolishing co-ethnic immigration, the German government decided to tighten restrictions to stem the influx of resettlers in the coming years. In 1992, overwhelmed by the rising numbers of resettlers seeking entry and settlement in united Germany, the German parliament passed the *Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz* (Law for the Removal of War Consequences), including an annual quota for the admission of resettlers, set at 250,000 (Kurthen 1995: 922), which was then further reduced to 100,000 in 2000 (Farahat/Hailbronner 2020: 21). Prior to the 1992 law, anybody with German ancestry from the Eastern Bloc was presumed to be politically persecuted due to their ethnicity. Now, potential resettlers had to prove their on-going persecution in their application, rendering the process much more difficult for people who were not resident in the former USSR, effectively stemming immigration numbers for this group significantly in the following years. Four years later, the government also introduced mandatory German language tests for those arriving through co-ethnic migration, reducing the arrivals even further (Klekowski von Kloppenfels 2003: 418).

This coincided with significant developments in asylum politics. At the beginning of the 1990s, Germany still had one of the most liberal asylum laws world-wide, going beyond the requirements of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Many asylum seekers arrived at the beginning of the decade in the wake of the wars taking place in former Yugoslavia, but also from other parts of the world (Oltmer 2017: 203f.)[101], in the wake of unification and the increasingly hostile and racist atmosphere towards 'foreign' people in Germany[102], which will be discussed in more detail in the below section on integration politics in post-unification Germany. Asylum applications rose substantially in the post-unification years, from 103,000 in 1988 to almost half a million in 1992.

The conservative Kohl government connected the increase in hostility towards immigrant communities with the growing presence of asylum seekers. The government proceeded to amend the Basic Law, modifying Article 16 that includes the right to political asylum in 1993. This so-called asylum

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101 Between 1990 and 1995, approximately 3.7 million people fled the wars in former Yugoslavia. Germany was the most significant receiving country of this refugee movement in the European Union (Oltmer 2017: 203f.).

102 Clearly, not all 'foreign' people experienced this vitriol in equal fashion. Most attacks were directed at people of colour and Black people, predominantly people from the Turkish and Vietnamese communities. In West Germany, people from the Turkish community (and many visibly Muslim people) had been increasingly the receiving end of hostility and racism throughout the late 70s and 80s.

compromise made it impossible for anyone to apply for asylum in Germany arriving by land through a 'safe-third-country' clause that determined all countries surrounding Germany to be safe (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 142f.; Martin 2014: 233).

Discussions around this compromise invoked questions of responsibility regarding Germany's Nazi past. On the one side, there were those who argued that Germany could not let go of this responsibility in the form of its liberal asylum law. On the other side, there were those calling for a 'normalization' of Germany's asylum politics in line with other European Union countries. EU asylum guidelines justified the Article 16 amendment, effectively adapting them to the developing common European Union migration framework (Weil 2005: 28f.). The amendment to Article 16 made it harder for people to apply for asylum, stemming the influx of asylum seekers in the coming years. Jochen Oltmer connects the amendment to Article 16 to German unification. With the end of the Cold War, he claims, "giving asylum was no longer a sign of success in the global system competition" (Oltmer 2017: 230)

In many ways, the political move of implementing this amendment to the Basic Law is emblematic of the way in which migration politics are interconnected. It is symbolic of unwillingness of the German government to address the root matters of migration politics. The asylum compromise sent two messages: It asserted that the government was in control of the mounting migration movements and it also sent a message of hostility towards the already present immigrant population, most of which had not entered through the asylum programme.

Citizenship Politics in Post-Unification Germany – A Quiet Move towards Belonging

In the excitement of the 1989 fall of the wall and the prioritization of 'German-German' politics in public discourse, Germany passed a new *Ausländergesetz* (foreigners' law) in 1990 that received relatively little public debate, although one of the interviewees viewed as one of the most prolific material milestones in German migration politics history (GAC1: pos. 26). While the law's name implies the regulation of entry and settlement directions, it effectively opened access to German citizenship to an unforeseen extent.

There had been no new legislation regarding immigrants or 'foreigners' since the 1965 foreigner law and the subsequent naturalization guidelines in 1977. However, it had become clear that the current situation had become untenable for the immigrant population. With the proposition of the foreigners' law, interior minister Wolfgang Schäuble of the governing Christian Democrats tried to straddle this development. The law sought to alleviate some of the tensions

that the immigrant population had been bearing the brunt of. Most significantly, starting in 1990, foreigners in Germany would be able to claim the right to naturalize. What had previously been an arduous process riddled with obstacles, in which an applicant would have to face paying three months' salary to go through a process whose outcome would ultimately be determined at the discretion of an administrative public servant, the procedure now shifted. Anybody who had lived in Germany for 15 years, providing proof of their successful integration, financial stability, and no criminal record, now had to be naturalized upon application, children between the ages of 16 and 21 were even able to naturalize after only eight years of residence. The application fee was lowered to 500 DM for adults and 100 DM for minors (Hagedorn 2001: 56; Fahrmeir 2007: 211; Triadafilopoulos 2012: 135; Fachkommission Integrationsfähigkeit 2020: 25). On expert interviewee evaluated the significance of the 1990 law thusly:

Well, that is, if you look at the... now this stuff is peanuts (*pillepalle*): Legal claim to naturalization, of course you have a legal claim. You have certain criteria and if you meet the criteria, then you have a legal claim to naturalization, so what? But if you beam yourself, so to speak, 30 years into the past, then that was a sensation. *You have a legal right to naturalization? That's wild! Previously, (...) based on the law of 1965, there were more discretionary procedures, more discretionary processes. That is, the authorities decided whether you were good enough or not good enough. And now there is supposed to be a legal right? Amazing*. And in this respect, I think there are good reasons, without minimizing the 2000 reforms, good reasons to say the decisive thing in this area was the 1991 reform. So, the Foreigners Law of 1991, because it was very, very cautious and with 15 years minimum stay if I'm rightly informed, really based on very restrictive criteria, but from a dogmatic perspective, from a substantive law perspective, this is a sensation. Entitlement! Enforceable claim! That is somehow something that was not really thought to be possible in this Germany. (CAC1: pos. 26)

Saliently, the 1913 RuStaG (which was maintained in until 1999) never required a specific ethnicity for naturalization, a well-maintained misconception throughout the years. What had prevented immigrants in the first generation from naturalizing had been the strict and discretionary guidelines that were maintained throughout the decades prior for anybody outside of the co-ethnic immigrant group (Hagedorn 2001: 56f.). This had also had a direct effect on second generation immigrants. The foreigners' law of 1990 still did not provide for the status of second-generation immigrant children (except for the reduced residency period) or introduce the naturalization principle of *ius soli*. This would have to wait until 1999. Nevertheless, the German naturalization rate quadrupled in the years following the law. However, this could also be attributed to the increased naturalization of resettlers post-unification (Hagedorn 2001, 126).

After unification, there were on-going discussions about German citizenship law throughout the 1990s pointing to the interconnection between citizenship and immigration politics. The rollback of the privileged treatment of resettlers, or as they were now referred to 'late' resettlers, made sense to many, considering that very often their actual connection to Germany and its culture had diminished by the early 1990s in comparison to earlier generations. One expert interviewee described the situation thusly:

Especially at the beginning of the 90s is: they [late resettlers, F. A.] come to Germany, they don't speak German, but they are German and how should they behave? Everyone tells them they are a foreigner, but they say: *I have a German passport. And you have to imagine that on the other side is the second-generation Turk who speaks fluent German, but has no chance of getting a German passport, but is somehow clearly more German than the sociological Russian, who is a German citizen.* (GPS2: pos. 16)

The irritation over this untenable situation was reflected in the political demands by the more liberal opposition parties to the conservative Kohl government, calling for a new and liberalized citizenship law (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 146f.). However, short of some meek policy proposals considering a new citizenship law, the Kohl government stood firm with the conservative principles on immigration it had been following since Kohl's election in 1982, reified in the asylum law of 1993 discussed above (ibid.).

Integration Politics in Post-Unification Germany
Despite the initial enthusiasm, the post-unification years were marked by economic and societal turmoil. Unification had merely stalled a looming economic recession, which had been in the making since the late 1980s. As economic uncertainty took hold, it contributed to a feeling of widespread insecurity about the future and deep societal discontent (GPS5: pos. 33). Immigrants got caught up in this tense economic and societal atmosphere of a country coming to terms with itself. This interviewee highlights how immigrants bore the brunt of these developments:

Against the backdrop of all these debates about unification or reunification, whatever you want to call it, against the backdrop of the fact that there no longer seems to be this bipolar confrontation of West and East to the same extent. One has, it seems to me, a very strong reference back to oneself. *For the first time again, certainly not for the first time, but once again national debates about the question: What is it actually now, this Germany? And what is its position in the world? What position does it have in the minds of those who live in this country? So, against the backdrop of this strong self-reference and the debate about oneself, this strong self-observation, there are also these explicitly racist manifestations that ultimately lead to massive violence.* (GAC4: pos. 30)

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The immigrant population in Germany had grown throughout the 1980s as an unprecedented number of newly arrived immigrants in the late 1980s and early 1990s further increased the presence of nominal foreigners in the country. Particularly those from visibly Muslim and Turkish communities had been experiencing ever-heightening hostility starting in the 1980s. This only increased after unification, in both East and West Germany.

In late 1991, a "week-long anti-foreigner riot" took place in the East German city Hoyerswerda (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 138). The mob attacked the housing of former GDR contract workers, threatening violence and committing arson, all while shouting slogans like "Foreigners out" and "Germany for the Germans" (Chin/Fehrenbach 2012a: 116). Police left the scene after being attacked by the rioters, leaving those in the asylum residence to fend for themselves (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 138). Following the Hoyerswerda attacks, two young refugee children were seriously injured in another arson attack in October 1991 in the West German city of Hünxe. In August 1992, in the East German city of Rostock, asylum seekers and former GDR contract workers were attacked in their housing, which was set on fire. Like Hoyerswerda, police left the victims to fend for themselves while the violent mob outside of the housing shouted racist and nationalist slogans. In November 1992, ten-year-old Yeliz Arslan, 14-year-old Ayşe Yilmaz and 51-year-old Bahide Arslan burned to death after their accommodation was set on fire by racists in the West German city of Mölln. In May 1993, Gürsün İnce, 26, Hatice Genç, 18, Gülüstan Öztürk, 12, Hülya Genç, 8, and Saime Genç, 4, were murdered in an arson attack on their home in the West German city of Solingen.

The reaction by the German government to these and the other close to 600 arson attacks and 3365 violent attacks on immigrants that took place in 1993 alone was ambiguous due to decades of an undecided approach to migration politics (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 143). Two different responses emerged, one conciliatory and one confrontational. On the conciliatory side, in reaction to the attacks on members of the Turkish community, the Kohl government conceded that dual nationality might be made available for member of this community to encourage naturalization (ibid.: 145). On the confrontational end, the Kohl government blamed the victims of the attacks themselves, pointing to their presence as a supposed provocation for the attackers. In the wake of this response, the asylum compromise, described above, was implemented, limiting access to asylum in the coming years and effectively reducing the presence of asylum seekers.

Publicly, the attacks sparked outrage and condemnation both nationally and internationally. In an unprecedented act of solidarity, Germans took to the streets to demonstrate against the racist violence. Around two million people

participated in candlelight vigils to publicly condemn the attacks in late 1992 and early 1993, and numerous grassroots organizations emerged to combat racist violence in the long run (Kurthen 1995: 928; Chin/Fehrenbach 2012a: 118). The U. S. government issued a travel warning for Germany, while the Turkish ambassador to Germany warned the Turkish community that more attacks were likely and that they should probably "purchase fire extinguishers and secure their doors" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 144).

Integration politics as they are conceptualized in this thesis comprise political events and measures that reflect the treatment of the immigrant population by the receiving society, which is why these attacks feature in this subchapter. Overall, actual integration policies were neglected in these years of turmoil, as the Kohl government stood firm in its 'no-immigration-country' paradigm. The violence of the early 1990s can also be attributed to the lackluster approach that the German state had had towards its immigrant population in the decades prior. While economic hardship and overall political insecurity also played a major role in these attacks, particularly in the German East, the fact that this tension was unloaded on the immigrant population is telling. Newly unified Germany was a profoundly insecure and strained country, fraught with the looming questions of what it would mean to be Germany again. The immediate response, evidently, was one of exclusive nationhood, which the government did not reject as clearly as it could have, with fatal results. As Foroutan pointedly puts it: The lack of recognition of the empirical reality of immigration "stabilized racist structures and the imagination of purity and exclusivity in society" (Foroutan 2019: 37f.).

However, what should not be left out of the history of integration politics in the 1990s is the successive coming of age of young urban immigrant youth movements, which confidently channeled their grievances and frustrations with the system in a sprawling art and music scene. One interviewee stressed that the development of this scene, often in larger cities and often comprised of young people who had been born in Germany to immigrant parents, had a major impact on a collective empowerment of the young immigrant community, and a reckoning with the perilous structures that the German state had prepared for them (GAC5: pos 20). Also, the late 90s marked by tension amongst young people of immigrant non-immigrant descent, described aptly by the same expert, pointing to the level of ignorance within German public discourse regarding these processes:

It was everyday life that right-wing and migrant youths had brawls. And in a way that you can't imagine today. (…) And everything was under the radar, no one noticed. And that's like the right-wing extremist scene in Thuringia, for example, which nobody took seriously in the 1990s (…). But there were really niches, very violent niches, where outrageous things

[*krasse Sachen*] happened. So, violence happened, but also intellectually highly contemporary stuff. So, if you compare what happened there with what was reported on public radio, you can say that they were different decades, even if it was on the same day. (CAC5: pos. 20)

In a more quiet, less controversial political move, the Kohl government also slowly but surely withdrew the structural support for resettlers in the early 1990s. In addition to stemming their arrivals by introducing tougher conditions for admission, they also reduced economic support for resettler communities, reaching a sort of alignment of this immigrant group with the other immigrant groups (GAC3: pos. 33). By the end of the decade, a transformation in the perception of Germany as an immigrant country had occurred, reflected in the introduction of a new citizenship law in 1999.

A New Citizenship Law ushers in a Fundamental Paradigm Shift

[O]ne of the most important breakthroughs of all was the citizenship law on January 1st, 2000. (…) [T]he highlight of the whole thing was: foreigners give birth to German children. This had not existed to date (I: That was actually impossible, yes). It was always inherited. The status of foreigner has always been inherited, so to speak. Of course, you could become German through immigration, but now foreign parents, six, seven years residence [eight, F. A], not criminal, have a child. *The child is German. The parents are foreigners, the child is German. That's sensational, I really have to say*. (GPS1: pos. 19)

In 1998, a new government was elected as 16 years of conservative rule came to an end. The new Social Democrat-Green coalition under Social Democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schröder would introduce sweeping changes in migration politics, consolidating the demographic paradigm shift that Germany had undergone in the decade after unification. Surprisingly, the SPD-Green coalition initially had no plans to implement a new immigration law. In the 1998 coalition talks, the SPD in particular was skeptical of any efforts to manage large-scale immigration, claiming that "Germany had already exceeded its tolerance for immigration" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 152f.).

Under the new government, Germany bid goodbye to the non-immigration paradigm that had shaped so much of its migration politics in the decades prior. Most significantly, the new German government introduced a new citizenship law in 1999, the impact of which is described in the quote above. The passage of the citizenship law in 1999, which came into effect on January 1st 2000, marked the first decisive step into a new direction. Many interviewees stressed that this was a watershed in German migration politics. The law introduced *ius soli* for the first time for children born to immigrant parents, if at least one of the parents had resided in Germany for eight years. The minimum residency to apply for citizenship was reduced to eight years. (Winter 2014: 36).

In the year 2000 alone, several additional developments occurred. For one, the government set up an Independent Commission on Immigration, chaired by the CDU's Rita Süssmuth. The Süssmuth commission's report, tabled after nine months of consultation, was significant and reflected the profound changes Germany had undergone in the decades prior. The report finally declared what the Kohl government had been denying for decades prior: "Germany is de facto an immigration country. People have arrived and stayed." This statement, many experts and researchers agree, was "long overdue" (Foroutan 2019: 37f.). In the same year, after mounting pressure from business and economic actors, who were worried about the lack of IT experts to tackle the unfolding digital revolution in Germany (ibid.), changes were made to encourage the recruitment of this group with little success. In 2000, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder introduced a Green Card scheme for immigrants from the IT sector. However, this approach flopped, Germany seemed to have little to offer to potential immigrants. The fact that there was widespread political opposition towards the Green Card, with one conservative politician coining the racist phrase that Germany needed "children instead of Indians" (*Kinder statt Inder*) probably did not help (Ellermann 2021: 173).

As the expert interviews confirmed, the demographic change of the last 40 years and the political developments of the 1990s paved the way for these political developments. Granted, they may have taken longer or taken a different shape under a different government, but they were inevitable: By the late 1990s, 50 percent of all immigrants had been in the country for longer than ten, 40 percent even for longer than 15 years (Hagedorn 2001: 115).

6.4.3 The Legacy of Post-Unification Migration Politics, 2000–2005

Since the appointment of the Süssmuth Commission and the passage of the citizenship act in 2000/2001, the government coalition had been debating a new comprehensive immigration law. While the Green party wanted to see significant change and a law was proposed that was modelled after the Canadian points system of immigration, the Social Democrats were much more hesitant. This on-going discussion lasted until 2004. By 2004, Germany had become the most important immigration country in Europe by numbers alone, with the foreign population making up almost ten percent of the total population (Weil 2005: 30). Upon much discussion, the federal government passed the Act on the Management and Containment of Immigration, on the Regulation of Settlement, and on the Integration of EU citizens and Foreigners *(Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung von der Zuwanderung und Regelung des*

Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern) in 2004, which came into power on January 1, 2005. Widely referenced as the 'Immigration Law' for short, the law focuses a lot on integration politics. It provided guidance for those immigrants already in Germany, including clearer guidelines on their residency, ability to work and integration in so-called integration classes and mandatory language instruction for German (Bauder 2011: 4; Triadafilopoulos 2012: 156; Bauder 2014: 14; Thränhardt 2014: 253; Ellermann 2021: 186).

As Ellermann points out, the 2005 immigration law effectively maintained the 1973 recruitment stop, adding few exceptions for highly skilled immigration (ibid.: 186). In material terms, then, this law did little to change the status quo that Germany had established in the decades prior. On a discursive level, the change was significant, since there was finally a concession that Germany needed to face the reality of its immigrant population and the increasing need for immigration in the years to come. As one interviewee put it: "The terminological change was significant because it was no longer a 'foreigners' law' but an 'immigration law'" (GPS6: pos. 28). This law therefore provided the ground for the further liberalization of immigration, effectively giving this development a "go-ahead" (*Startschuss*) (ibid.).

When conservative chancellor Angela Merkel was elected in 2005, she also conceded to demographic reality. Effectively breaking with her predecessor Helmut Kohl's anti-immigration stance, she asked her interior minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, to organize Germany's first "Islam Conference", bringing together Muslim immigrant communities to discuss their needs and position within German society. In a newspaper interview at the time, Schäuble said that obviously, by now Islam had become part of Germany (Foroutan/Hensel 2020: 169). This unprecedented move signaled the sea change that Germany had undergone in the decade prior, leading some to argue that the decade of the 2000s did not make Germany into an official immigration country, nor did these developments maintain its status as a non-immigration country, rather, a consensus had been reached that Germany had now become "an integration country" (Bauder 2014: 18).

6.4.4 Learning from the Migration Politics of the Post-Unification Decade

We have been making immigration policy since the founding of the Federal Republic. We just don't call it immigration policy. The immigration of displaced persons, the immigration of guest workers after 55, the regulations in the European Union, the freedom of movement,

these dozens of legal titles that we have always had for residence, that is of course immigration policy. In the United States, we would also call it immigration policy. They also say immigration policy to programs that are limited in time. *But we have never done that, but we have effectively always done it. So there has never been this categorical difference to the U.S., Canada. Just this linguistic difference. And I think that was also quite good, because you could then and also the companies, they could do quite a lot, so to speak, behind the partition walls, behind the curtain, to the outside the narrative that was cultivated was always a contrary one.* So that one could always say: We don't really do it at all. But de facto it was done. My thesis used to be: If what was possible de facto and de jure in terms of immigration and nationality in 1990 had been put to the Bundestag for decision, it would not have found a majority. Because I think people, especially in the conservative parties, would have said: "For God's sake, we don't want that." It had long been a reality. People were interested in it, some were not interested in it, then it didn't become so well known. *But that was one of the points that Michael Bommes once made, that it was precisely this offensive outward representation of "We are not an immigration country" that made a lot of concrete steps in immigration policy possible at the practical level.* (GPS1: pos. 5)

What does it mean to be an immigration country? Does the permanent large-scale presence of non-nationals suffice? For a nominal and de facto immigration country status, possibly. However, the decades described in this chapter marked a shift from a de-facto immigration country in denial the (although persistently hesitant) acknowledgement and self-conception of Germany as an immigration country beyond a co-ethnic conception. The causal mechanisms at the root of this shift are manifold. Some are clearly partisan, reflected in the fact that most major changes occurred after the transition from the conservative Kohl government to the Social Democrat and Green coalition in 1998. However, only seven years later under a new conservative government, the shift had been embraced and a further entrenchment through policy and institutionalization of migration politics occurred. A merely partisan explanation for understanding the decades between 1980 and 2005 would therefore not suffice. Clearly, an overall societal shift in recognizing Germany as an immigration country had also occurred.

My argument holds that the answer to the political changes in the late 1990s and early 2000s are found in the years of the critical juncture between 1989 and 2000. Unification was the straw that broke the camel's back, since the paradigm of co-ethnic immigration was effectively broken. This, together with racist and xenophobic attacks of the early 1990s, led to a necessary reckoning on the status of those who had made a life in Germany and had effectively become part of German society. While the conservative Kohl government had somewhat atrophied on its position that Germany was not and would not be an immigration country, reality overtook in these years. This is why so much changed immediately after a new government came in in 1998, and as opposed to the French case, there were no real attempts to reverse these developments

once a new conservative government came in in 2005. The following graph illustrates the critical juncture of 1989–2000.

Table 6.3: Germany –The Transformation Juncture, 1990–2000

Antecedent Conditions	Shock /Rupture	Critical Juncture	Mechanisms of Production	Legacy
1955–1988 Establishment of a large and diverse immigrant community in Germany 1980 onwards Denial of Germany's status as an immigration country in policy; "not an immigration country" paradigm instated by conservative Kohl government	1989 Unification of East and West and subsequent arrival of unprecedented numbers of resettlers and asylum seekers 1990 Introduction of liberalised Citizenship law, including the right to claim citizenship after 15 years of residence, eight years for second generation immigrants	1990–2000 1991-1994 Increase in violence towards nominal foreigners, several deadly attacks 1993 Asylum compromise 1993 onwards Resettlers lose their special status, diminishing co-ethnic migration privileges 1999 Citizenship law including *ius soli* introduced, marking a paradigm shift	End of separation between the two Germany's renders co-ethnic migration privileges unnecessary Change of the conservative Kohl government to red-green coalition in 1998 allows for political shift that had been brewing for years	Co-ethnic abandoned, other forms of migration introduced Citizenship acquisition becomes open to immigrants and their children 2000–2001 Independent commission concedes to Germany's de-facto immigration country status Move away from the "not an immigration country" paradigm, new immigration law introduced in 2005

Source: Own research

6.5 Interim Conclusion: The Politics of 'Us' and 'Them' in the mid- to late 20th Century

Migration politics in Canada, France, and Germany underwent significant changes in the latter half of the 20th century. For all three countries, the analysis of the nexus between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics is revelatory of complex developments which reflect each country's reckoning with growing immigrant origin diversification. In Canada, economic necessity and pressure to abide by its democratic self-conception led to the introduction of an immigration system that no longer selected on the basis of race or religion. Simultaneously, internal tensions with Quebec and the question of what it means to be Canadian led to the introduction of a comprehensive self-conception in multiculturalism, which allowed for the inclusion of immigrants from diverse backgrounds. A naturalization policy which allowed for quick accession to the national community accompanied these shifts to reach the migration politics nexus which Canada is widely known for. To what extent this model is still in place and how it has been challenged in recent years will be discussed in the next chapter.

In both Germany and France, the economic upturn of the postwar years led to the relatively unmanaged recruitment of immigrant labourers. In the French case, easy naturalization guidelines, particularly for those from former colonies, led to the establishment of a permanent immigrant population with quick access to French citizenship. Colonial entanglements pervaded French migration politics. Simultaneously, citizenship was one major aspect of migration politics under scrutiny during the politicization of migration politics in the 1990s, particularly for those from former colonies. In the 1990s, migration politics underwent an overall tightening with the continuing stop to all immigration and the tightening of naturalization procedures. Migration politics emerged as an issue of continuous partisan tensions, which it remains until this day. France effectively abandoned its previous status as an immigration country. The effects of this will be the subject of the final analytical chapter.

For Germany, the period under study showed the transformation into a (hesitant) self-declared immigration country, propelled by the post-unification developments. The final analytical chapter examines whether this nexus underwent further change, particularly in the context of the large-scale immigration to Germany in 2015 and 2016. This will also feature in the final analytical chapter.

7. Moving forward, Remaining the Same: Migration Politics in Canada, France, and Germany in the New Millennium

7.1 Introduction

In this final analytical chapter, we turn our attention to developments in the 21st century. The last 20 years have been impactful for all three countries, but no country has undergone more significant change than Germany. It emerged as the second most important immigration country in the world after the United States, with the structures and institutions that match this development either already in place or under development. Both in Canada and in France, migration politics were significantly impacted by their respective political leaders, conservative PM Stephen Harper, and conservative interior minister, later President Nicolas Sarkozy, particularly in the 2000s and early 2010s.

For Canada, the election of Stephen Harper threw into question the long-established 'immigration as nation-building' – paradigm. As this chapter shows, Harper was staunchly in favour of labour immigration, but became far more rigorous in the bifurcation of immigration between the selection of highly skilled immigrants for permanent settlement and the recruitment of low-pay sector immigrants for temporary settlement. This bifurcation was supported by developments on the levels of citizenship and integration politics. Requirements for citizenship acquisition were increased and made contingent on a stricter integration regime. The Harper years ended with his defeat in the 2015 election in which immigration played an important role. However, as Liberal Party's candidate Justin Trudeau emerged as the new PM, the economic expediency paradigm which shaped the Harper years have been maintained. The Harper governments and their lasting impact on Canadian migration politics will be dissected below.

In France, interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy started to emerge as a strongman on migration politics in 2003. While he opened up labour immigration for the first time since 1974 (for highly-skilled immigrants), he tightened citizenship acquisition requirements and integration politics, particularly after the impactful *banlieues* riots of 2005. Positioning himself as an alternative to the far-right Front National's stance on immigration, he won the presidency in 2007 and continued to center migration politics as the mainstay during his

presidency. Sarkozy's emergence as a complex and impactful figure for French migration politics will be analyzed below.

In Germany, the analysis begins in 2006, which marked the beginning of the further institutionalization of integration politics and liberalization of labour and citizenship politics. The years 2015 and 2016, which saw the arrival of over one million humanitarian immigrants, are widely held as an important reference point for German migration politics. However, as my analysis will show, the developments of 2015 and 2016 did not constitute a 'turning point' for German migration politics.

As usual, this chapter closes with a small interim conclusion before proceeding to the ultimate part of this thesis, which concludes with the most important comparative insights gained from the analyses.

7.2 Canada – The Harper Years challenge the Status Quo, 2006–2015

The two conservative governments under PM Stephen Harper from 2006 to 2015 constituted the first veritable challenge to Canada's status quo of migration politics. During his period in power, Harper's approach was characterized by an overall tightening, particularly regarding citizenship and integration politics. His vision of Canada as an immigration country was one where high economic immigration targets were married with a tough and more exclusive approach to belonging, as the following sections will show. As one interviewee underlined, PM Harper never wavered on his embrace of high immigration targets, but he and his governments always "flirted with the fear of the Other, with anti-Muslim motives in particular" (CAC3: pos. 10).

In this chapter, I analyze the nine years from the beginning of Stephen Harper's time in office to the power change to Liberal Party PM Justin Trudeau. My key argument holds that the Canadian migration politics nexus did not transform because of the Harper years. I show that many of the developments in migration politics that have sometimes been ascribed to Harper, such as the focus on economic expediency in permanent immigrant selection and the bifurcation between permanent and temporary immigration, began before his time in office. He merely accelerated these developments. The more far-reaching changes during his time in office particularly in citizenship and integration politics, were reversed once Trudeau came to power. This is why the pivotal 2015 election warrants its own analysis since it had migration as one of its central issues.

To make my argument, the events prior to Harper's time in office are also important, which is why this examination of the Harper years begins with the developments of the 1990s and early 2000s. This includes the onset of the increasing federalization of Canadian migration politics beginning in the 1990s as well as the introduction of the 2002 Immigration Act. I then analyze the changes in migration politics during Harper's time in office. After a discussion of the 2015 election, in which migration politics, a topic that usually enjoys a cross-party consensus, played a major role, I analyze what has changed and what has remained the same once Justin Trudeau became Prime Minister.

7.2.1 Migration Politics in the 1990s and early 2000s

With the introduction of the Immigration Act in 1976, which manifested the Canadian points system, the Citizenship Act in 1977, which cemented Canada's liberal approach to *ius domicili* and *ius soli,* as well as the Multiculturalism Act in 1988, which further entrenched multicultural policies as the official approach to immigrant integration, Canada's approach to migration politics had been established. It was largely maintained with minor changes throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (CP1: pos. 30; CPS3: pos. 47).

What is noteworthy throughout this time is increasing prioritization of temporary labour immigration. To be sure, temporary labour migration had been part of Canada's migration regime since the 1950s, albeit with negligible admissions through these programs. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, slowly but surely, a two-tier system for labour immigration emerged: The selection of permanent immigrants for settlement based on human-capital criteria, and the recruitment of temporary foreign workers (TFWs) for jobs in the low-pay sectors like service and agricultural work in line with labour market demands (Ellermann 2021: 215f.; CP1: pos. 36). The 'human capital' model of immigrants selected for permanent settlement was entrenched in the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The act did not fundamentally change the Canadian approach to immigration at all, but rather included into its policy the regulations that had been introduced in the decade prior by

(a) imposing additional restrictions on entry, (b) recruiting immigrants who easily integrated into the workplace and society, (c) emphasizing flexible and transferable skills as income-generating potential, (d) strengthening language and education requirements as a precondition for entry, and (e) firming up sponsorship rules to share the burden of costs in resettlement. (Fleras 2015: 92).

If anything, instead of bringing in a major change, this act adapted the existing system to the new "logic" of the times, by "meeting the structural demands of a globally competitive knowledge economy" (Ellermann 2021: 215; CAC5: pos. 15). Citizenship continued to be an integral part of this approach: the naturalization rate continued to top all OECD countries at 75 percent (Winter 2014: 43).

A second development emerged in the 1990s: Canada began to federalize its immigrant selection system by allowing the provinces to recruit immigrants according to their respective labour market needs. This shift did not come out of nowhere, rather, it occurred in connection with the tensions with Quebec, and demands by the Québécois government to fully control immigration to the province. In 1991, the Canada-Quebec accord was signed between the Quebec and the federal government, stipulating that Quebec was now free to select all its economic immigrants (Seidle 2014: 122f.). This finalized decades of concessions from Ottawa to Quebec regarding immigration, such as the possibility to send Québécois officers to Canadian immigration offices internationally in 1975, or the establishment of a Québécois points system for immigration in 1978 (DeVoretz/Pivnenko 2007: 3; Banting 2012: 88). The complete control over immigration allowed Quebec to, for instance, prioritize the ability to speak French for prospective immigrants by allocating more points to this skill than the federal program does for fluency in English (Wood/Fetzer 2022: 60). As Wood and Fetzer's study shows, this prioritization has been successfully maintained throughout the last three decades, as the majority of immigrants to Quebec come from countries that are part of the Francophonie (ibid.), like Morocco, Algeria, and France (Seidle 2014: 123).

However, the 1991 agreement with Quebec also marked a "turning point" for provincial nominee programs (PNPs) in general (Strazzari 2017: 70). Other provinces insisted on equal treatment on the matter, and the federal government began to reluctantly "promote generalized decentralization in all immigration matters" (ibid.). Since most immigrant arrivals favoured Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia for permanent settlement, and especially urban areas like Toronto, Montréal or Vancouver, a leading argument for other provinces was that they were left behind in terms of the economic advantages of immigration (ibid.). The process of federalization was arduous and took more than a decade, but by 2009, every province had entered federal government agreements on immigrant recruitment (ibid.; Paquet 2014: 521).

The first impetus for these agreements is to select immigrants in accordance with the "province's specific labour market needs". However, provinces also provide settlement services to facilitate the arrival of new immigrants, and to put it pointedly, ensure that they do not leave to another, more attractive place

in Canada (ibid.: 520). In her in-depth evaluation of the federalization of Canadian immigration politics, Mireille Paquet concludes that this drawn-out process of change "corresponds to a gradual process of institutional change", rather than a "critical juncture" brought about by an "exogenous shock" (ibid.: 524). This gradual process, according to Paquet, has led to the emergence of the provinces as a "new legitimate institutional group of actors", breaking with the "previous pattern of federal dominance and provincial avoidance" (ibid.: 521). Today, PNPs are the second most important channel for new immigrant arrivals (Strazzari 2017: 71). Notably, PNPs recruit on the basis of labour market needs first, with a secondary focus on human capital.

In addition to the federalization of immigration politics, the Quebec conflict also sparked a shift in multicultural politics that moved the emphasis away from group-based rights, which had long been viewed as outdated and divisive, to a perspective that equated multiculturalism with an emphasis on "individual choice" (Winter 2015b: 643). This allowed multiculturalism to both maintain legitimacy as a fruitful approach to integration and adapted the discourse of multiculturalism to the neoliberal and entrepreneurial spirit of the times. Also, this further entrenched multiculturalism as a cross-party consensus for Canada's approach to integration politics.

However, change was to come. In 2003, the Canadian Alliance Party merged with the Progressive Conservative Party to emerge as a new conservative party, the Conservative Party of Canada. This party differed from its previous iterations as it fully "embraced an expansive immigration policy" and "defended official multiculturalism" (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 119). In 2006 this newly founded party was elected, with PM Stephen Harper leading the new minority conservative government. The Harper years would challenge Canada's migration paradigm on all three fronts, immigration, citizenship, and integration politics, in many intricate ways. In a country where a widespread consensus on the necessity of labour immigration had been established, it was questions of family reunification, religion, humanitarian immigration, and citizenship attainment which were at stake throughout this time.

7.2.2 'A rude awakening' – The Harper Years, 2006–2015

Both in the academic literature on the Harper years and in my expert interviews, there was no consensus on whether the period of his government severely undermined the central paradigm of Canadian migration politics or whether his government just continued the logical path that had been

established in the years prior (i. a. Reitz 2014: 88f.; Soennecken 2014: 101; Winter 2015a: 2; Fleras 2015: 148, 155; Dauvergne 2020: 102; Ellermann 2021). Augie Fleras argues that the way the Harper government's policy changes impacted migration politics does not necessarily constitute a paradigm shift but a "paradigm muddle" by "superimposing new patterns on conventional forms [of immigration, F.A.] to create a two-tiered model that hybridizes permanent immigrants with temporary immigrants" (Fleras 2015: 155). Or as one expert interviewee succinctly put it: "I think the academic reaction to the Harper years is overblown. I think Harper did nothing more than continue a pattern. He's often described as anti-immigration. That's ridiculous." (CP1: pos. 36).

So how did Harper unite being Canada's most pro-immigration conservative Prime Minister while also purportedly undermining the Canadian immigration paradigm? The analytical perspective on all three political fields reveals the lengths that the Harper government went to in order to rattle the established nexus. While the Harper government continued Canada's approach regarding high labour immigration to benefit the economy, it is in citizenship and integration politics that we can see the most fundamental shifts that tampered with the image that Canada had built of itself in terms of a liberal and progressive nation-building-through-immigration country. In the following analysis of the Harper governments along developments in immigration, citizenship, and integration politics, the impact of these years clearly emerges.

Immigration politics – Nation-building makes way for Economic Streamlining

[T]his is what made Harper a bit of an anomaly in that the conservatives under Harper *no longer subscribed to the kind of nation-building function of immigration. And so, the focus was more on meeting short-term economic needs.* Hence, enormous temporary foreign worker recruitment, hence employee selection of immigrants. And hence, discouragement of family immigration, hence, discouragement of humanitarian immigration, right? You don't need it for nation-building. *Immigration is used for economic purposes and that also makes sense in terms of the attacks on citizenship, even though they were mild, it still fits into that paradigm or the abandonment of that paradigm.* (CAC5: pos. 39)

As has already been established, the Harper government did not challenge the idea of immigration as a necessary and integral component for Canada's economic growth. However, the government did not necessarily agree with the idea that immigration ought to be part of nation-building. If there was a way to make use of immigrant labour without having to go through the rest of the process of becoming Canadian, why not use it? Two developments in immigration politics in line with this credo stand out during the Harper years: the increase in TFW recruitment and a shift to a market-needs-based selection

model with a prioritization of employers as primary immigrant-selectors, notably through the aforementioned PNPs. In fact, one interviewee from public service stressed that the shift to the provinces in immigrant selection responsibility was a "fundamental change in the Canadian model" because it "stopped immigration from being an Ontario, Quebec and BC phenomenon and made it national". In the course of CPS3's career, PNPs went from being "tiny and amateur" to "foundational" to Canadian immigrant recruitment (CPS3: pos. 43). Saliently, as another expert stressed, this shift was not implemented by Harper, but had been in the making for longer (CAC7: pos. 18).

While temporary labour migration had been part of the overall Canadian approach to immigration since the 1950s, it was in the early 2000s that this program really gathered steam. The recruitment of TFWs surpassed all three other channels of labour, family, and humanitarian immigration in 2008. Prior to the 2000s, temporary labour migration had mostly been an admission program for people with highly specialized skills asked to perform for a restricted time-frame (including, for instance, music artists performing in Canada or else), new programs for low-pay labour migration in agricultural and care sectors increased the numbers of those whose labour was desired but whose permanent presence was not. As Dauvergne puts it: The Harper government introduced temporary labour migration as a "migration panacea", since "temporary foreign work makes better, and faster, economic sense than permanent migration" (Dauvergne 2016: 129). One expert underlined that the increase in TFW recruitment was "not a new trend, but the acceleration of a trend" under Harper (CAC5: pos. 19). Another interviewee suggested that the Harper government probably realized that the approach of the German 'guestworker' system maybe was not so stupid after all, if economic needs trump all other priorities in immigration (CAC3: pos. 22).

Overall, this development was to the detriment of the rights of TFWs, particularly in low-pay sectors like agriculture and care, by not being provided with the same "standard regulation pertaining to overtime, holiday pay, and hours of work. Nor are they always informed of the rules or offered health and safety instruction" (Fleras 2015: 148). One interviewee from the Canadian public service said that the enforcement of temporary labour migration during the Harper years personally was their "most difficult time as a public servant", because they were asked to do things that pushed the limits of their integrity (CPS6: pos. 21). In fact, reflecting on the effects of the temporary work program, their judgment is quite clear:

There is that challenge when you're bringing in a temporary workforce like that and that workforce doesn't have the same rights as the citizens. *You've then created sort of a different level of citizenship in your country, right?* Not explicitly, but it amounts to that because you

have a group of people, a large group of people in the country who don't have the same rights as other people in the country which makes them inherently vulnerable to abuse. And that's what happens. They get taken advantage of and they get exploited, right? (CPS6: pos. 23)

What is noteworthy in this quote is how this public servant draws an explicit connection between temporary labour migration to issues of rights, citizenship and belonging in Canada, arguably one of the reasons why the Harper years were so challenging for him.

While globally the points system was still perceived as one of the main components of Canadian immigration, this was curtailed by a ministerial order in 2008 which "removed the human capital core of the system" (Kolb 2014: 63). In fact, to even be considered in the points system, a candidate first had to provide proof of a job offer "or experience in a specific state-defined shortage occupation" (ibid.). Basically, the process for permanent immigrant recruitment as postulated in the 2002 had now become inverse. Prior, a job offer was one of the tiers for being afforded points. Now the job offer had become conditional to even be considered in the points system (ibid.). This approach was further entrenched in the Express Entry System introduced in 2015.[103] The Harper government effectively shifted from a "human capital to an occupational demand-based model" (Ellermann 2021: 253), or as Fleras put it more pointedly: "a pick- and-choose model consistent with the principle of just-in-time labour market needs (…) neoliberalism displaces the protectionist model of nation-building" (Fleras 2015: 125). However, as one expert underlines, just like the acceleration of TFW recruitment, the economic expedience prioritization for immigrant selection was "not new, it was just more pronounced under Harper" (CAC5: pos. 19). Notably, this shift provided employers with much more power in who gets to be selected as a permanent immigrant.

Citizenship Politics– Not every Canadian is a Canadian
Harper's start in office coincided with the 2006 War in Lebanon, leading to thousands of Canadian citizens being evacuated from Lebanon to come to Canada for protection. Many of these Canadians had attained citizenship through *ius soli*, so by being born in Canada to Lebanese parents, or *ius sanguinis*, by being born in Lebanon to at least one Lebanese-Canadian parent. This prompted irritation amongst the Canadian public, and questions on whether

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103 The Canadian Express Entry Program establishes a pool of "immigration-ready" economic applicants for permanent residency. The Canadian government uses this program to streamline the immigration process and have access to just-in-time immigration (Government of Canada 2017). Applicants to express entry can either be selected by a province (coupling this program with provincial nominee programs) or they can be selected because they are "among the top ranked in your pool based on your skills and experience" (ibid.).

these Canadians were in fact 'real' Canadians or rather "citizens of convenience" (Winter 2014: 44).[104] One expert interviewee explained the effects of the Lebanon crisis thusly:

Now, we had a rude awakening under Harper. There was a Civil War in Lebanon. And it got pretty nasty, and the Canadian government decided that we had, we learned that there were a number of Canadians, Canadian citizens in Lebanon. We were going to evacuate them. What we didn't realize, well, I mean some people did, but the government didn't, but those Canadians in Lebanon numbered 50,000. We evacuated them all, at least all of those who wanted to be evacuated. But Canadians were outraged. Here, we brought them to our country. We gave them their integration services. We gave them citizenship (…). And this is what they do to us. They treat us like a hotel. So, you know, people were going around talking about 'Hotel Canada', and how immigrants were abusing us. *And so, the government decided that they wanted to, to use their language, increase the value of Canadian citizenship.* That it wasn't just some instrumental thing to allow people to have a better passport. We wanted to increase its value. Well, what they did was to raise the price. (…) The citizenship test became more difficult (…). *And so, what I'm trying to illustrate is that the Canadian system, I'm now talking not just about a policy system but a belief system of this continuity between immigration through to citizenship and the idea that you spend the rest of your life. This was shown to be mythical* (…). (CP1: pos. 63)

In response to this development, the Canadian government introduced the first-generation limitation in the amendment to the Citizenship Act in 2008. From now on, Canadian citizens who were born abroad could no longer pass on their citizenship to their children if those children were also born abroad (ibid.). Concomitantly, and in contrast to this development stood the treatment of so-called 'Lost Canadians'. 'Lost Canadians' are people "who are born in Canada, and / or have a Canadian parent, but who lack or have lost citizenship due to provisions of the 1947 Citizenship Act that were overhauled in the 1977 Citizenship Act but not rectified retroactively" (Winter 2015a: 11). With the 2009 "repatriation clause", people who were affected by the intricacies of these laws could now (re-)claim Canadian citizenship. Winter notes the difference with which these two parallel citizenship issues were addressed both in policy and public discourse: "While Lost Canadians were portrayed as individuals who deserved to fit into the expectations of what a Canadian should look like, the Lebanese-Canadians were not perceived a 'real' Canadians and, thus, not seen as deserving to be rescued from the dangerous situation in Lebanon" (ibid.: 16).

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104 Estimations show that about 50,000 Canadian-Lebanese dual citizens resided in Lebanon at the time, out of which merely 15,000 sought to be evacuated by the Canadian government. This did not lessen the outcry (Winter 2014: 44).

In 2009, the Canadian government also introduced a "Citizenship Action Plan", a program intended to "strengthen the integrity of the citizenship program" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010: 23, also referenced in Winter 2015a: 18), which ran from 2009 until the introduction of the new Citizenship Act in 2014. It made the citizenship test required for naturalization harder to pass in 2010. The 2014 *Strengthening Canadian Citizenship* Act i. a. excluded time spent in the country as a temporary resident as a measure for *ius domicili* in naturalization procedures, expanded the necessary residency by a year from three to four, and introduced the possibility of citizenship revocation for dual citizens involved in terrorist actions (Dauvergne 2016: 103).

Altogether, these developments point to a significant shift in Canadian citizenship politics, which tampered with the long-standing tradition of easy and swift naturalization and dual/multiple citizenship as an integral part of the migration process. Merit had now become part and parcel of becoming a Canadian. Proving your merit to become Canadian was no longer something that one could achieve through their selection in the immigration program and residency. Rather, newcomers' residency was made more provisional, as the government moved away from seeing immigrants as "citizens-in-waiting", which had been the predominant principle prior to Harper, towards the idea of "integration before (and as a condition of) citizenship acquisition" and therefore "naturalization as the end point of the integration process" (Winter 2018: 231, 229; 2015a: 30). This process also had an effect on Canada's historically high naturalization rates, which fell three points, from 85.6 percent to 82.7 percent between 2011 and 2016 (Winter 2018: 231).

Integration Politics – A Conservative Embrace of Multiculturalism
Despite the evident shifts in Canadian immigration and citizenship politics, the Harper government remained relatively consistent with its approach to multiculturalism, albeit with some curtailments (Banting 2014: 78). Several factors play a key role here, not least the desire to attract voters from communities of more recent immigrants (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 119), as well as a by now long-standing tradition of ethnic community groups facilitating the settlement of newcomers and through multiculturalism funding, substantially supporting the Canadian government in the integration process (Bloemraad 2015: 74).

Once in power, the conservative government began to repent for Canada's racist immigration policies of the early 20th century, offering official apologies to immigrant communities affected by these policies (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 119). In his re-election campaign of 2011, PM Harper "campaigned aggressively" for the votes of "new Canadians". He was seen "attending religious ceremonies, donning 'ethnic' attire in numerous meet-and greet sessions,

granting interviews to the 'ethnic press', and promising to maintain an expansive immigration policy" (ibid.).

One prominent figure in the Harper government was immigration minister Jason Kenney. Several of my interviewees mentioned Kenney's work as minister as extremely valuable to the conservative government (CP1: pos. 36; CAC4: pos 25; CPS3: pos. 47; CPS5: pos. 25; CPS6: pos. 52). Not only was he successful in garnering support from recent immigrant communities, he also showed face:

Jason Kenney, *he consciously set about trying to detach Canada's ethno-cultural communities from their generation-long habit of voting liberal, right?* Which was wise politically, he knew that a lot of these communities were socially conservative. They were also law-and-order oriented. They came legally, they followed the rules and shouldn't everyone? (…) *Canadian ethno-cultural communities aren't particularly more or less pro-immigration than average, if there are any non-ethnic-cultural Canadians left. We are all ethno-cultural, right?* You know what I mean, communities of color, or recent immigrant communities, whatever communities. Their leadership is always extremely pro-immigration (…). So, Jason Kenney worked tirelessly to try to find the sweet spot between pro-immigration, "high wall, big gate" was one of his metaphors, you know. Big open gate if you follow the rules. And the ethno-cultural communities liked that. (CPS3: pos. 47)

However, there was some ambiguity to the Harper government's treatment of multiculturalism. For instance, the term multiculturalism was dropped from ministerial denominations in 2013, the first time since 1973 that no ministry included the notion (Dauvergne 2016: 97). Also, the conservative government sought to increase the importance symbols like the British monarchy and the military for Canadian national identity (Banting 2014: 78). Most notably, the Harper government was very critical of the Muslim community and its religious practices, introducing several symbolic measures meant to appease Canadians' anti-Muslim sentiments, particularly from strongly secular Quebec (Foner/Simon 2015: 9). In 2014, immigration minister Jason Kenney introduced the rule that no face coverings were allowed at citizenship ceremonies (Winter 2018: 229).

It is in the area of integration politics that the result of the migration politics nexus was in fact most palpable, as Winter explains: Processes of "cultural pluralization" (Winter 2011: 19) had become part and parcel of the Canadian approach to migration processes "By balancing out the composition of its immigrant population (no single immigrant group forms more than 15 percent of the total immigrant intake) Canada also escapes the prospect of one particular immigrant group challenging the hegemony of the national languages and institutions" (ibid.). In fact, multiculturalism remained unchallenged and easy to maintain, because "by selecting the type of immigrants that it finds most

suitable (…) the Canadian government reduces the risk of creating an ethnic underclass [and] avoids the massive intake of those immigrants who are (perceived to be) an economic burden" (ibid.). In other words, multiculturalism was implicitly challenged during the Harper years due to the reconfiguration of citizenship and immigration politics (Winter 2015b: 640).

7.2.3 Migration Politics Take Centre Stage – The 2015 Election Campaign

In the 2015 election campaign that ushered out the conservative Harper government and put Liberal Party Leader Justin Trudeau in power, issues of citizenship, integration, and humanitarian immigration took center stage "in a completely unprecedented way" (Dauvergne 2020: 101). According to the expert interviews, two major issues led to Justin Trudeau's victory: The issue of humanitarian migration, namely the Liberal Party's campaign promise of resettling 40,000 Syrian refugees, and the issues of integration and belonging, notably of the Muslim Canadian community, which the Harper government had repeatedly taunted in the years prior to the election and during the election year (CAC5: pos. 29; CP2: pos. 48; CP2: pos. 54; CPS1: pos. 31; CPS3: 57; CPS6: pos. 27). In Canada, where migration politics had historically enjoyed a cross-party consensus, the politicization of migration issues during an election was a novelty. It reflected the challenges the Harper government had posed to the Canadian migration politics paradigm and the extent to which his opponent was willing to contest him on those. The following sections show how these issues were decisive during the campaign.

'Oh my God, He Means It.'
An expert from public service explained the developments in humanitarian immigration during the Harper government thusly, pointing out the restrictive approach that was the norm at the time:

They [the Harper government] did everything in their power, as things went bad in Syria, to avoid getting involved because *they didn't want Muslims coming*. And they couldn't tell the immigration department: "Just bring in Christians". Although I suspect they put some pressure on them to do that. And they wanted nothing to do with the Palestinians that were being squeezed out of Iraq. And I'm very proud of the immigration department because they ignored the instructions and brought them in. A group of them needed to come. (CPS6: pos. 52)

Humanitarian immigration, a part of Canada's immigration scheme that was historically important not only to its population but also as a normative

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counterweight to economic immigrant selection, was therefore challenged during the Harper years. In the 2015 election, this would be to the detriment of Harper's re-election campaign.

On September 2, 2015, amid the Syrian refugee crisis, Alan Kurdi died. The two-year-old Syrian boy had been on the way to seek refuge in Canada by way of Greece when the boat he was on with his mother and brother sank. His dead body was washed up near Bodrum in Turkey, where a reporter took an image of it which sent shockwaves throughout global media. The public shock was particularly stark in Canada, which was in the midst of the 2015 electoral campaign with the election set to take place about six weeks after the discovery of Alan Kurdi's body. Alan Kurdi's aunt lived in Vancouver and had intended to apply for refugee status for the family (Tu Tanh Hah 2015).

Very quickly, the Syrian refugee crisis became a central issue of the electoral campaign. To be sure, the war in Syria had been going on for four years at this stage and the conservative government had largely averted the arrival of Syrian refugees. Several of my interviewees in fact stressed that Alan Kurdi's death constituted a "turning point" (CP2: pos. 58; CPS1: pos. 31). In a country where immigration itself had for a long time not been a central issue of debate of cleavage, the fact that humanitarian immigration took center stage during the election was a novelty. While the Harper years had put in question many cornerstones of the Canadian model, immigration as a good idea had remained an "unchallenged elite consensus" throughout (CAC5: pos. 8). The death of Alan Kurdi threw into question the Canadian approach to humanitarian immigration. As one interviewee put it, the reproaches by Alan Kurdi's aunt were especially impactful: "She criticized the Harper government with so much authority: My nephew got killed because of your policy. Nothing can be more powerful." (CP2: pos. 60).

In the aftermath of Alan Kurdi's death, Canadian parties began what two interviewees describe as a 'bidding war' between the Conservative and the Liberal Party (CP1: pos. 38; CPS3: pos. 57). Each promised voters to increase the intake of Syrian refugees. The Conservative party spoke to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and came back with the most realistic offer possible, 10,000 resettled refugees within the next year. But Justin Trudeau's promise was more ambitious: In his campaigning, he promised that he would resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees by Christmas of the same year, and 45,000 within his first year in government. As CP1 put it jokingly: "Trudeau comes along, ignores the department, says 45,000 and Canadians loved it, because that's how Canadians are ((laughs))." (CP1: pos. 38).

Justin Trudeau's campaign promise worked. On October 9, 2015, the Liberal Party unexpectedly won the election by a landslide, with one interviewee

describing that he had been assigned to cover an election win party for the Conservative party and then had to run over to the Liberal Party's candidate who won the riding instead (CP2: pos. 44). After the election, this promise led to an incredibly intense few months in Canadian public service, which one interviewee described thusly:

And we all said: Well, he may wish he can do 25,000 by Christmas, but he can't. But he did do 25,000 by February of next year. And over all well over 40,000 by the middle of the next year, which think of it in proportional terms would be like resettling half a million to the United States or almost a million to the European Union through planned resettlement. It was a staggering, it almost killed all of us. There were 42 consecutive eight a. m. deputy ministers' calls, seven days a week with like eight deputy ministers. I know because I was on them. (…) And so, the deputy minister of the day, came back from her first meeting with the transition team, wasn't even a minister yet, with the Prime Minister [Trudeau, newly elected] (…) *and she came back and she convened a meeting of her senior assistant deputy ministers and she said something like: "Oh my God, he means it". We thought: "Okay, you say things during an election campaign". And she'd gone in to brief him carefully on what the department was, you know, using its most ambitious scenarios it could, of what you could do by when.* Because we knew we couldn't resettle 25,000 in the next six months, because we didn't even have case inventory from UNHCR and UNHRC couldn't give them to us that fast. But we did. But we did. Because Trudeau said*: "Madam Deputy, I'm not yet ready to put any water in my wine. Come back."* (CPS3: pos. 57)

Justin Trudeau's government ended up resettling about 40,000 Syrian refugees by February of 2016.

'A Canadian is A Canadian is A Canadian'
During the 2015 electoral campaign, PM Harper promised the introduction of a hotline for Canadians to report "barbaric cultural practices" to the authorities, mostly, as some interviewees noted, to rally voters in Quebec – a "terrible miscalculation" according to CP1 (pos. 36). This proposition was not well received by many immigrant communities and arguably contributed to Harper's loss in the 2016 election (Winter 2015b).

Anti-Muslim rhetoric and policy were part of Harper's portfolio throughout his years in government, particularly regarding citizenship ceremonies. In fact, the banning of the niqab in citizenship ceremonies, introduced by immigration minister Kenney, was rejected by a federal judge in 2015 as "unlawful". Kenney was outraged by this rejection and promised that upon re-election in the autumn, the conservative government would entrench the ban in law. As Elke Winter notes: "Arguably, it was this political move that brought an end to the Conservative era on 20 October 2015" (Winter 2015a: 24). The electorate was unconvinced by Harper and Kenney's proposition of selective diversity that

mostly targeted people of Muslims faith, as "many Canadians were appalled by the attempt to turn 'the niqab question' into an election issue" (ibid.).

On the night of his election victory, Justin Trudeau gave an acceptance speech in which he coined the phrase that heads this subsection. Several interviewees (CP1: pos. 63; CAC2: pos. 14; CAC5: pos. 23) referenced this acceptance speech on the eve of his election and the phrase as a symbolic shift by Trudeau towards a more inclusive conception of what it means to be Canadian in contrast to his predecessor:

Last week, I met a young mom in St. Catharines, Ontario. She practises the Muslim faith and was wearing a hijab. She made her way through the crowd and handed me her infant daughter, and as she leaned forward, she said something that I will never forget. She said she's voting for us because she wants to make sure that her little girl has the right to make her own choices in life and that our government will protect those rights. To her I say this: you and your fellow citizens have chosen a new government, a government that believes deeply in the diversity of our country. *We know in our bones that Canada was built by people from all corners of the world who worship every faith, who belong to every culture, who speak every language. We believe in our hearts that this country's unique diversity is a blessing bestowed upon us by previous generations of Canadians, Canadians who stared down prejudice and fought discrimination in all its forms.* We know that our enviable, inclusive society didn't happen by accident and won't continue without effort. I have always known this; Canadians know it too. *If not, I might have spoken earlier this evening and given a very different speech.* Have faith in your fellow citizens, my friends. They are kind and generous. They are open-minded and optimistic. *And they know in their heart of hearts that a Canadian is a Canadian is a Canadian.* (Acceptance Speech by Liberal Party Leader Justin Trudeau, October 20, 2015, italics by F. A.)

In her evaluation of the 2015 campaign and Trudeau's election victory, Alexandra Dobrowolsky reflects on the ways in which the Liberal Party married references to the senior Pierre Elliott Trudeau's ideals and aspirations in Canadian migration politics of the mid- to late 20th century with a modern and "newer" vision of Canada, "conjoining immigration and multiculturalism with explicit, positive appeals to gender, ethnicity, and middle-class families" (Dobrowolsky 2018: 188). The younger Trudeau therefore "epitomized a new, fresh politics by selling hope and optimism through iterations of an idealized Canadian imaginary: an internationalist, multicultural, open-door Canada" (ibid.: 194).

7.2.4 The Harper Effect on the Migration Politics Nexus, 2015–2020

Are we talking about continuity and change or are we simply talking about playing with semantics? (CAC4: pos. 34)

A few aspects of Canadian migration politics changed immediately after Trudeau's election in 2015. In addition to the admission of 40,000 Syrian refugees, annual immigration targets have continually increased and family migration, which had been restricted during the Harper years, was facilitated, e. g. with the doubling of parent and grandparent visas in 2016 (Triadafilopoulos/Taylor 2021: 15; Ellermann 2021: 263). There were also reversals on the stricter citizenship measures, with the minimum residency once again reduced to three years. The "harder to get, easier to lose" approach to citizenship acquisition which had been established during the Harper years was also reversed somewhat when Trudeau entered office, however, some of the measures have remained in place (Winter 2018: 231).

Humanitarian migration targets returned to their pre-2015 size after the Syrian resettlement, which underlines how Trudeau's campaign promise was a one-off affair, rather than a grander commitment to increasing humanitarian migration in the long term (Dauvergne 2020: 101f.). One interviewee remarked on this by drawing a comparison with Germany, which experienced a numerically and proportionally much larger arrival of refugees in the same time period and hinted at the purpose of the resettlement:

The difference to Germany was that, due to its geographical location, Canada could say that after 40,000 or after 30,000, it was over. Now we, Trudeau or his government, have said: we have achieved what we wanted. *We feel good that we are Canadians.* We have shown the world that we can do it. That we are a good country. Whether the world listened or not, that's another question. It's more internally about how we feel. And because of the geographic location, because these are resettled refugees, you could close the door again afterwards and say: so, that's enough. *And then it ended up being about 40,000, and then it was over.* (CAC2: pos. 12)

The reflection on this particular campaign effort by Trudeau shows how much the resettlement was also an effort to bolster Canadian self-conception as generous, welcoming, altruistic, or, as one interviewee put it more cynically: "magnanimous" (CAC4: pos. 16).

In early 2015, the conservative government had introduced sweeping migration politics innovations like the Express Entry System and the so-called Super

Visa[105], just before the election campaign began. The changes to the Canadian immigration system introduced during the conservative Harper government, particularly regarding labour immigration, were not revised during the Trudeau years until 2020. As one interviewee aptly put it: "For economic immigration, there is kind of a consensus that's the Holy Grail, nobody attacks that" (CAC5: pos. 33). The Express Entry system was tweaked somewhat to put more emphasis on education rather than labour-market-readiness. The Super Visa requirements were also softened. Trudeau also introduced more pathways to permanency for temporary immigrants, allowing a change in status (CPS4: pos. 16). However, recruitment through Express Entry and PNPs prevailed.

When asked about the explicit difference between the conservative Harper government and the liberal Trudeau government regarding migration politics, most interviewees were hesitant. While several interviewees stressed that there was some relief in the migration expert community upon the election of Trudeau, who promised a return to a less neoliberal model to a more nation-building model (CAC5: pos. 30; CAC7: pos. 24), they pointed out that ultimately, the changes were "operational" and had been more on the cosmetic or discursive levels, rather than a fundamental shift in the approach (CAC7: pos. 24; CAC10: pos. 47). One interviewee from academia put it thusly:

I mean prior to Stephen Harper already under the liberals, they were pursuing economic pathways over family pathways. So, the neoliberal inference was definitely there under the liberal government prior to Stephen Harper. *So, Stephen Harper was basically accelerating and accentuating those trends that were already in place under the Liberals.* But under Trudeau, this young, new progressive leader, he was suggesting that, you know, we're going to go back to this mythologized Canada, where we are open door and welcoming. (CAC6: pos. 4)

Ultimately, it appears that the Harper years did exactly what this interviewee described, they 'accelerated and accentuated' tendencies that had already been in place, adopting a neoliberal and conservative vocabulary regarding migration politics that displeased liberal voters. One interviewee opined that "in general, the Harper government was no different from the last 50 years of governments in supporting high immigration." (CP1: pos. 36). Several interviewees suggested that the discursive shift to Trudeau was important. The discourse targeting some immigrant groups which was prevalent during the Harper years reversed under Trudeau. The Harper governments had been outspoken on the

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105 The Super Visa or multiple-entry Visa allows parents and grandparents of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident to visit Canada several times throughout a ten-year period, as opposed to having to reapply for individual visitor's visas for every entry or applying for long-term settlement through family immigration. To be eligible, your child or grandchild must be able to provide for you financially throughout your visit (Government of Canada 2023).

fact that they wanted the 'good' immigrants while rejecting the 'bad' ones, as this expert explains:

I think they created that notion of good immigrants and bad immigrants. That's something new, I had not seen from any of the other governments. They, the approach is (…) they pick and choose, and they conquer and divide within the immigrant communities. I think, that's you know, something that they created and that has had an impact on Canadians' perception of immigrants, too, I think in those ten years. (CP2: pos. 34)

Ultimately, the Harper years did not so much undermine but rather underline the durability of the Canadian migration politics nexus as an interactive and firmly established interconnection between immigration, citizenship, and integration, all with a focus on economic expediency. One expert summarizes this constellation aptly:

Canadians believe in the planning. They know how many immigrants will show up next year approximately. School boards can plan on it. Health authorities can plan on it. Urban planners can know what's happening. People believe it works because, yes there are new children in their school each year, but it's not suddenly quadrupled (…). It works, you know? (…) It's an iterative or self-reinforcing outcome, but government plans carefully, the public sees that the planning seems to be effective. *They see the economic dynamism of the new immigrants because Canada's program is not humanitarian. Part of it is. The rest of it is done in Canada's own interest, and quite consciously. And the public says that's okay. It's okay to get the best, why not?* (CPS3: pos. 15)

Table 7.1: Canada – The Period of the Harper Years, 2006–2015

Antecedent Conditions	Shock /Rupture	Critical Juncture	Mechanisms of Production	Legacy
Beginning of Development of PNP 1991 Immigration Act 2002, Human Capital Focus for permanent admissions Broadening of categories for Temporary Foreign Workers Onset of securitization of Humanitarian Immigration 1990s/early 2000s	Election of Harper 2006 Lebanese- Canadian Citizenship Crisis Debate on 'Lost' Canadians	Harper governments 2006-2015 Pro-Labour Immigration tied with stricter citizenship acquisition, undermining of the nation-building paradigm	Unprecedented increase in temporary labour migration recruitment Increasing restrictions on citizenship acquisition Strategic canvassing of immigrant population by immigration minister Jason Kenney ("high wall, big gate") Express Entry Program 2015/ Super Visa 2015	No legacy, acceleration of previous path

Source: Own research

7.3 France – 'Plus ça change?' Migration Politics in the Sarkozy Era, 2002–2012

In the first two and a half decades of the 21ˢᵗ century, interior minister and later President Nicolas Sarkozy emerged as the dominant figure in French migration politics. He attempted to re-liberalize French migration politics and bridge the cleavage on migration in French politics. However, his attempts were not fruitful, as the analysis shows.

To make sense of the last 25 years also warrants a focus on 2005, a pivotal year for French migration history which led to a number of government reactions from Sarkozy, in the form of policy and institutional innovation. In 2005, riots broke out in large cities all over France, led by young people of immigrant background, most of them French. Following these riots, intense debates began regarding the failures of integration, some blaming the French government for not doing enough, others the young people for being unwilling to integrate despite their being French. This tension reinforced the strength of the far-right FN (which changed its name to *Rassemblement National* in 2018), which continued to dominate these debates. Concomitantly, after about a decade of commitment to a zero-immigration goal, and thirty years after the recruitment stop, Nicolas Sarkozy reopened French labour immigration to highly skilled immigrants in 2006, then as interior minister.

In this chapter, I argue that while 2005 constituted a crisis for French migration politics, it did not spark a critical juncture with a long-term legacy. The analysis also shows that Sarkozy's time in charge of migration politics was important, but it did not produce a durable legacy, as he failed to bridge the migration politics cleavage which had emerged in the 1980s. I begin this subchapter with an overview of migration politics in the late 1990s and early 2000s. I then go on to describe the events of 2005 its aftermath. I end the subchapter with a perspective of the migration politics in the mid- and late 2010s.

7.3.1 Migration Politics under Conservative Reign, 1995–2004

France entered its second longest period of conservative Presidency under Jacques Chirac, elected in 1995. Chirac would remain President until 2007, when conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy, who had served as interior and finance minister during Chirac's term, succeeded him. Notably, Chirac won his first presidency against socialist Lionel Jospin (who later served as socialist PM during the only period of cohabitation in Chirac's presidential terms from 1997 to 2002). He won his second presidential election in 2002 against FN

politician Jean-Marie Le Pen, the first time in French history that the far-right FN had entered the presidential run-off. It is no coincidence that Le Pen entered the 2002 run-off. He had maintained a single-issue approach of an anti-immigration platform, and this issue had increased in pertinence at the time of the 2002 presidential elections.

Since the early 1990s, France had pursued a zero-immigration goal, with a general consensus that increased immigration would harm social cohesion and with an out-right rejection of France's previous status of an immigration country (Hollifield 2014: 160f.). Immigration, so it was claimed, no longer served France's demographic or economic interests, and should therefore be avoided as best as possible (ibid.). Also, immigration became increasingly framed as a security issue, with terrorist attacks and civil wars in former French colonies and in France, with terrorist attack spillovers from the Algerian conflict into France in 1995 (Raissiguier 2010: 81; Hargreaves 2015: 109).[106]

During Chirac's presidency, there were a few notable changes in migration politics, with a contrast between changes ushered in by socialist interior minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement (1997–2000, part of the cohabitation government under PM Lionel Jospin) and conservative interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy. Chevènement's most important intervention in migration politics was the re-liberalization of citizenship acquisition through the abolishment of the *Manifestation de Volonté* which had been introduced in the early 1990, described in chapter 6. Chevènement was a staunchly republican socialist. In his view, the acquisition of citizenship was the most important step in any integration to France. Citizenship acquisition therefore allowed for the creation of a 'republican identity' and would erase all "cultural, ethnic, and racial differences" (Hagedorn 2001: 212). According to a report presented by the newly elected Leftist government, the long French tradition of second generation *ius soli,* which had been undermined by the *Manifestation de Volonté* regulations, was central to French republican identity. The abolishment of this regulation became a central component of the Leftist governments aims, pointing to the urgency of this development (ibid.: 48). Lionel Jospin's reasoning for a leftist republican turn in migration politics is made explicit in his speech before parliament in 1997:

France, with its old republican traditions, was built in layers that flowed together into a melting pot, thus creating an alloy that is strong because of the diversity of its component parts. For this reason, birthright citizenship is inseparable from the French Nation (…). We will re-establish this right. Nothing is more alien to France than xenophobia and racism. (…)

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106 In 1995, there were a series of bomb attacks in Paris, Lyon, and Villeurbanne (a satellite city of Lyon). The young men carrying out the attacks were French citizens of Algerian origin, recruited by Islamist militants from Algeria (Hargreaves 2015: 99).

Immigration is an economic, social, and human reality which must be organized and controlled. France must define a firm, dignified immigration policy without renouncing its values or compromising its social balance. (quoted in Hollifield 2014: 176)

This shift was significant and pointed to a reclaiming of French migration politics by the French left as both republican and irreconcilable with the right-wing anti-immigrant agenda, which previous developments under the conservatives had pandered to. The parliamentary election victory of the French left came at the heels of several hunger strikes by immigrants of the *sans-papiers* movement, which the conservative government had struck down violently and as a result shifted French public opinion to support of the *sans-papiers* movement (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 73).[107] In 1998, the new socialist government introduced a law that would amend the controversies of the restrictive 1993 law. The *Manifestation de Volonté* was abolished, several other restrictive measures rolled back and more liberal asylum requirements were introduced (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 13, 24). However, most of these more liberal interventions were once again abolished by the conservative government that followed and introduced a more restrictive law in 2003.

In 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen entered the presidential run-off for the very first time 2002, pointing to the increasing power of its anti-immigration platform (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 25). The migration politics cleavage had ostensibly prevailed throughout Chirac's presidency. Chirac won the presidency and a new conservative government took power in the same year. While the left

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107 France's reluctance to properly acknowledge issues of historically grown systemic and institutional racism also became clear during this period. There is a clear aversion in French social science and public discourse to naming racist differences for fear of reifying them through the process. This leads to the paradoxical outcome that little actual data exists on racism as the categories to properly name it do not exist. In 1999, a first hesitant move was made to properly measure France's immigrant population, as the census for the first time introduced the distinction between foreigners in the country and immigrants, categorized as people born outside of the country but having acquired French citizenship (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 62). Valérie Amiraux and Patrick Simon try to explain this French specificity thusly: "The French social sciences offer a remarkable exception when compared with the social sciences in major immigration countries: the use of concepts that are common tools for ethnic and racial studies are very rare and often criticized, while the analysis of racism and the sociology of migration remained marginalized in the academic 'field' until the early 1990s. This French exception is difficult to understand as the experiences of slavery, colonization and mass migrations have marked the nation's history. It is rooted above all in the influence of the republican model of integration on the representations and framing of society. This performative model seeks to maintain the fiction of a universalist nation that has succeeded in overcoming ethnic and racial divisions and that has broken with the traumas generated by slavery, colonization and the often violent re-configurations which accompanied the successive waves of immigration since the middle of the 19th century (Citron, 1987)." (Amiraux/Simon 2006, 191f.) See also: (Raissiguier 2012: 110).

had prioritized questions of identity and belonging through citizenship and asylum, the new conservative interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy took up the issue of immigration once more from an economic perspective.

In the early 2000s, France's goal of zero immigration had become untenable. While the question of non-European third country immigration was still hotly debated, France needed highly skilled workers just like other Western countries. Sarkozy's core aim was therefore to establish a system that allowed for immigration to be *'choisie, non subie'*, a slogan roughly translating to the notion that "France (…) had the right to choose its immigrants rather than the immigrants choosing France" (Hollifield 2014: 179). During his time as interior minister and later president, Sarkozy introduced four laws regarding immigration. All of these were in line with this credo, pushing for restriction by "limiting unskilled workers in favour of the highly skilled, further cracking down on illegal immigration, and requiring immigrants to demonstrate their willingness and ability to integrate" (ibid.). Through this combination, Sarkozy attempted to bridge the right-wing cleavage on immigration.

Sarkozy's first immigration law, introduced in 2003, was emblematic of this approach. It sharpened regulations pertaining to non-labour related immigration, which had remained in place in recent years, including family reunification, asylum, and conjugal immigration (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 75; Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 14). The move to restrict asylum law in particular came at the heels of increased asylum applications due to several on-going political crises and civil wars in former French-colonized territories. The unintended consequence of the severe asylum law restrictions was a rising number of irregular immigrants (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 63). To alleviate this problem, Sarkozy maintained a discretionary clause in his 2003 law that allowed for the selective regularization of irregular migrants, an inevitability in the light of the growing numbers of *sans-papiers* in the country. This allowed him to avoid mass-regularizations while maintaining a tough stance on irregular migration and asylum (Weil 2005: 39).

In addition to these developments, integration and citizenship politics also underwent changes. Permanent residency was tied to an integration contract, a demonstrated "willingness to demonstrate 'republican integration'." (Hollifield 2014: 180). For naturalization, prospective applicants now had to prove their assimilation to French society both through acquired language skills and a knowledge of the rights and obligations of French citizenship (Michalowski 2007: 86).

French migration researcher Patrick Weil offers several critical analyses of the 2003 developments in citizenship in particular. He notes that the tightening of naturalization rules and the discussion surrounding the question of who a

'real' French person is and who is only 'French on paper' left a bad taste in the mouth of those naturalized:

[C]onfronted with diversity, a part of the French society wanted to break the principle of equality, and to go back on a secular tradition of the right of the soil which meant integration in the nationality, independently of the origins. And this refusal of diversity, this inability to perceive the particular sensibility of future Frenchmen marked by the colonial experience of republican France, has certainly contributed to interrupt a process of identification that was underway, and to provoke a rejection based on the feeling of feeling oneself rejected, of being only a paper Frenchman admitted against France's will. (Weil 2005: 64f.)

Weil's analysis shows the interconnection of questions of belonging and citizenship acquisition, and the effects of the hostility to growing diversity at the time. His analysis also highlights the complicated connection of immigration to colonialism in the French case. The rising tensions surrounding diversity and immigration in France, the disaffection of young second and third generation migrants, boiled over in 2005, as the next section will show.

7.3.2 'A past that does not pass.' – 2005

2005 was a pivotal year for French migration politics with several developments happening concomitantly, as one interviewee put it aptly: "What happened in 2005 was the convergence of several elements. (…) This is a year when you have many things happening." (FAC7: pos. 30). This was the year in which French migration politics, in particular on the level of integration politics, were pronounced to be in a profound crisis (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 25). To understand the developments in migration politics in this year, and their later impact on Sarkozy's migration politics, it is helpful to distinguish between the legislative and social developments at the beginning of the year, which are connected to the riots that broke out at the end of 2005.

Early 2005: New Migration Politics, New Activism
On the legislative level, a new immigration law was passed in March 2005 to amend and partially replace the 1945 Ordinance, called *Code d'entrée et de séjour des éntrangers et des demandeurs d'asile* (Code governing the entry and residence of foreign nationals and asylum seekers, CESEDA). As Patrick Simon explains, CESEDA was an "inflection point", rather than a "radical change of direction", with its regulations aiming at "greater effectiveness in flow management and more active coercion against migrants and their families" (Simon 2014: 195). Overall, it made the lives of immigrants harder, as residence permits became harder to obtain, short-stay visas were increased

resulting in less security after arrival, and family and spousal immigration was made more difficult. Simon notes that CESEDA resulted in a "significant reduction in opportunities to migrate to France and an increased burden on foreigners living in France and their relatives" (ibid.). Evidently, the law would not only affect immigration processes, but also settlement and integration processes for those who had already arrived (Hollifield 2014, 180). CESEDA therefore contributed to a growing legislative distinction amongst immigrants in France between the good ones, "those who work", and the bad ones "those who have rights" *("les bons – 'ceux qui travaillent' et les mauvais – 'ceux qui ont des droits'"*) (Weil 2005: 41).

The early 2000s also saw an increasingly public discussion of France's colonial legacies, both publicly and academically (Stoler 2011: 125; Grewal 2011: 232). In February 2005 a controversial law on "the recognition of the nation and national contribution in favour of the French repatriates" was passed, which concerned the memory politics of French colonialism. Among other things, the law required French schools to teach French colonial history in a positive light (until then, French colonial history had hardly featured at all in school curricula) (Weil 2005: 107; Stoler 2011: 126). Article 4 of the law read: "School programs recognize in particular the positive role of the French presence overseas, especially in North Africa, and give the history and sacrifices of French army combatants from these territories the prominent place they deserve". The wording pointing to the 'positive role' of the French presence was particularly incendiary and caused an uproar both from the French left, and internationally from high-ranking functionaries in former French colonies. By April 2005, over 1000 professors, doctoral students, and teachers had signed a petition against the law. President Chirac abolished this part of the law in early 2006. As a precursor to this discussion, Weil explains the salience of this law in connection to migration politics, and the lack of recognition of France's colonial legacy, particularly for those of the second and third immigrant generation population:

Immigration, colonization, and slavery are not in opposition to French history, they are an integral part of it. (…) The consequences of the omission, the official denial [of these parts of French history] (…) [is] a confusion between the past of the colonized and the presence of the discriminated. (Weil 2005: 107).

Concomitant with these developments, 2005 also marked the establishment of a "radical" movement called the l*es Indigènes de la Republique* (the Indigenous of the Republic) who published a manifesto in January deriding France's lack of recognition and memory politics regarding its colonial history (Grewal 2011: 235; Fassin 2015: 234). What made the creation of this anti-racist, de-

colonial movement significant was its openly confrontational and antagonistic stance towards the French state and the values of Republicanism. Other anti-racist movements with origins in the 1980s, such as *SOS Racisme*, had been more conciliatory in their tone and tended to underline their alliance with the values of the Republic (Ghiles-Meilhac 2021: 268f.). The Indigenous of the Republic, on the other hand, came to denounce and to fight the French state "which was a colonial power and remains one" (Harrison 2018: 64; Ghiles-Meilhac 2021: 267). Its original leadership consisted of academics and teachers in their late 40s and early 50s, all of them the children of immigrants from former French colonies in North and West Africa.[108] In their manifesto, published online, the movement took a decisive stance against the French Republic:

We are the Indigenous of the Republic! The decolonization of the Republic remains on the agenda! The Republic of Equality is a myth. The State and society must make a radical critical return to their colonial past-present (*le passé-present*). It is time for France to question its Enlightenment, for the egalitarian universalism, affirmed during the French Revolution, to push back this nationalism that is tied to the "chauvinism of the universal", supposed to "civilize" savages (*sauvages et sauvageons*). It is urgent to promote radical measures of justice and equality that put an end to racist discrimination in access to work, housing, culture, and citizenship. We must put an end to the institutions that reduce the populations of colonial origin to a status of sub-humanity. (Appel des Indigenes de la Republique, January 2005)[109]

The *Indigènes* were the first group to formulate anti-racist critique of France's treatment of its immigrant population by explicitly connecting it to French colonial history, embedding the difficulties experienced by immigrants in this historical context, thus embodying a "turning point in [French] minority politics" (Ghiles-Meilhac 2021: 268f.). The choice of the word '*indigène*' is deliberate, its significance is two-fold. For one, it references the *Code de l'Indigénat* of 1887, French colonial legislation in Algeria distinguishing between French citizens and the inferior status of the 'indigenous' Muslim population (ibid.;

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108 Emblematic of the confrontational stance by the Indigenous of the Republic towards the Republican model of integration is one of their principal slogans, "Va te faire intégrer" (Go integrate yourself), a play of words on the derogatory expression "Va te faire foudre" (Go fuck yourself) (Robine 2006: 139).

109 The words "passé-present" reference the fact that France continues to have colonial possessions, as referenced by the manifesto. The wording "sauvages et sauvageons" references a statement by former Interior Minister Chevènement in 1999 in which he called the young people of immigrant origins in the banlieues "sauvageons". The -on is a diminutive (little wild person, basically). The term raises colonial connotations, considering the mission civilatrice (civilizing mission) of the French colonizers, wanting to save and civilize the 'savages' in their colonial possessions. Using it in this context therefore provoked and irked many people in France.

Harrison 2018: 64, also discussed in chapter 5.3). It also reifies the belonging of the 'Indigenous' to France, rather than their being outsiders. Their manifesto would take on a new and heightened significance throughout 2005, and particularly resonated during the November riots all over France (Robine 2006: 118).[110]

Throughout 2005, tensions had been rising in the suburbs of most major French cities, called *banlieues* or *cités,* which were built for the immigrant population in the 1960s. The *banlieues* often had bad infrastructure, were underserviced, and their inhabitants had a high unemployment rate. The evident precarity of life in the *banlieues* had led many public commentators, including academics and politicians, to announce that there was a general "problem of integration" in the suburbs. The cause of this problem was either connected to the lack of integration by the suburbs' populations or their discrimination (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 25). These suburbs continued to be the home to many first, second, and third generation immigrants and their young children. The tensions which had been rising throughout 2005 came to a head in the November 2005 riots which started at the outskirts of Paris and spread all over France.

Late 2005: The Banlieues *Riots*

On October 27, 2005, two teenage boys, Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré,[111] died from electrocution while hiding from the police in an electrical substation in the Paris *banlieue* Clichy-sous-Bois. The following day, interior minister Sarkozy gave a speech in which he freed the police from all responsibility in the incident and deaths, a version of events that many young people in the *banlieues* disagreed with (Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 270). Riots and unrest followed in Clichy-sous-Bois, and in the following days, the riots spread to other Paris suburbs until extending across all the urban areas in France in early November 2005. The riots lasted three weeks in total, affecting almost 300 French towns, resulting in three additional deaths, and almost 2000 arrests by the police. The burning of cars and of public buildings, including schools, churches, and mosques were the primary mode of rioting, with 10,000 cars burned, 233 public and 74 private buildings torched (ibid.: 271). In early November 2005,

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110 The Indigènes transformed into a political party in 2010 and remain active until today. They have faced continuous criticism (Harrison 2018: 64) Since 2015, their rhetoric has become at times openly anti-Zionist and anti-semitic, when they criticized France of "state philosemitism", meaning that France "privileged antisemitism over other racisms". Their (now former) leader Houria Bouteldja has made several incendiary remarks regarding Israel, Palestine, and Jews in France (Ghiles-Meilhac 2021: 279).

111 Bouna Traoré, 15, was one of eleven children of a family of Mauritanian descent. His father was a Paris city dustman. Zyed Benna, 17, was one of six children of a family of Tunisian descent (Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 270).

President Chirac imposed a state of emergency, which lasted about three months.[112] The riots were the largest in scale and most long-lasting in the last 40 years. What sparked this civil unrest?

It is helpful to distinguish between the explanations offered by politicians at the time, which influenced policymaking in the aftermath of the riots, and academic analyses of the origins for the riots. Politicians' responses and efforts to explain the outbreak of the riots focused on two aspects: The propensity to delinquency of the (mostly teenage, mostly male) rioters and their religious and ethnic backgrounds.

The government's response primarily pointed to the rioters' delinquency and willingness to commit crimes. Interior minister Sarkozy made this explicit: "The main cause of unemployment, despair, and violence in the suburbs is neither discrimination nor the failure of schools. The main cause of despair (…) is drug trafficking, gang rule, the dictatorship of fear and the resignation of the Republic" (quoted in Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 278). The young age of the rioters (on average 16) seemed to support this perspective, however, the majority of those arrested had not committed any crimes prior (ibid.).   In   the months leading up to the November riots, Sarkozy had visited several suburbs which were experiencing tensions between the youth and police forces, leading to several statements which were later marked as incendiary (Wihtol de Wenden 2006: 52; Stoler 2011: 127; Hollifield 2014: 180; Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 270). In June 2005, Sarkozy declared that he was willing to clean the streets from the youths with a high-pressure cleaner (*« nettoyer les rues au Kaercher »*). In October 2005, shortly before the outbreak of the riots in Clichy-sous-Bois, he promised residents of another suburb to "get rid of the scum" *(« Vous en avez assez de cette bande de racailles ? On va vous en débarrasser. »)*. The latter statement in particular, calling the young people "scum", has often been pointed out as a dehumanizing and incendiary moment in Sarkozy's treatment of the riots' participants, with "*racaille*" reminiscent of racialized vocabulary describing colonized peoples (Stoler 2011: 127). This connects to the second motive that coined politicians' explanations: ethnic and religious backgrounds of the young participants in the riots.

Some high-ranking politicians pointed to the irreconcilability of the ethnic and religious background of the rioters with life in France and French values (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 3; Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 276; Fassin 2015: 244). It is worth highlighting that of the 2000 arrested rioters, 90 percent were French

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112 Researchers have pointed out that it is not without irony that the law used to impose a state of emergency goes back to 1955 legislation used to squelch protests by the Algerian liberation movement, with one researcher pointing out that "the law was aimed fifty years ago at the grandparents of some of the current rioters" (Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 276f.).

citizens (Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 272). As Christophe Bertossi and Abdellali Hajjat underline, this reveals "the interplay between the objectives of immigration policies and the evolution of nationality law" in the French case (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 3). To what extent does it make sense to reproach young French people of not being sufficiently French? Only in a context in which the 'Frenchness' of the young rioters is contingent or even impaired their parents' immigrant status or rather their ethnic and religious background.

For instance, in the context of several deadly Islamist terrorist attacks, most recently in London in June 2005, a lot of media reporting centered on the young people's religion, which was mostly Islam, as a reason for the unrest. In fact, interior minister Sarkozy tried to quench the unrest by getting the Muslim Council of France to issue a fatwa against the riots, but to no avail. Canet et al. conclude that while the "themes of insecurity and Muslim fundamentalism were tempting from a political point of view (…) radical Islam did not play a role in the riots. On the contrary, (…) Muslim religious institutions had very little control or influence on the youths involved in the riots." (Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 276). This does not take away from the fact that the young rioters' predominant religion entered the political discourse and remained one of the central tensions in France's migration politics, as this interviewee highlights:

I think that the essential characteristic of those years is the questioning of the French society on the place of Islam with two prejudices (…) that there is a problem with Islam in France and that in particular the riots (…) translate a deficit of integration of these populations. Even if the main problem for me is not in the practice of Islam but in the fact that for reasons linked to their economic situation to the ghettoization I would say of these populations in French metropolises, we obviously have a broken integration scheme that causes these populations to revolt regularly because they are suffering. (…) *It is also linked to old dependencies with the past, it also happens that these migrants of Muslim faith are also often Algerian and Moroccan, which were French colonial territories. And so, what we are experiencing is a sort of, to use the expression of the historian who used it as a metaphor*, it is a past that *does not pass*. We remain effectively with a kind of nostalgia for the French presence in Algeria and elsewhere, which means that these migrants are doubly perceived as coming from a land that fought against France and as being, moreover, a faith with a certain number of particularly intransigent and radical interpretations that don't do a lot to help them integrate and thus develop in them the feeling that France does not want them. (FAC3: pos. 19)

In academic literature on the riots, researchers point to the amalgamation of socio-economic precarity in French *banlieues* (which had not been alleviated for decades) and everyday experiences of racism and police brutality in the *banlieues* as the reasons for the riots (Grewal 2011: 231; Hargreaves 2015: 99; Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 279). Another interpretation points to the tensions of the French model for integration, which "presupposes that through the

promotion of citizenship, the population will become more integrated, embracing equal rights, the social contract, and secularism" (Wihtol de Wenden 2006: 51). This ideal of French integration through citizenship had run into trouble at the time, since politicians in charge of its implementation refused to account for the evident ethnic inequalities experienced by a significant share of the French population, which basically meant that "the government (…) put little emphasis on implementing such values effectively on the ground" (ibid.).

Putting the riots into historical context, researchers also note that the creation of the *banlieues* themselves as hotbeds for social struggle and marginalization of the French immigrant population has its origins at the onset of the Fifth Republic (Wihtol de Wenden 2006: 49). The suburbs as a site for struggle and resistance to marginalization have a long history: For instance, researchers point to the history of banlieue uprisings in France, notably the 'hot summer of the Minguettes' (*Été chaud des Minguettes*), riots which took place around Lyon in 1981 as a precursor the second generation activism during the *Marche des Beurs* in 1983 (Wihtol de Wenden 2006: 49; Grewal 2011: 230; Canet/Pech/Stewart 2015: 282; see also chapter 6.3).

Comparing the uprisings of the early 1980s to those of 2005, researchers note that the young rioters in 2005 had a less pronounced political message and organizing force than those in the early 1980s. Also, the Socialist party in power in the 1980s was more sympathetic to the rioters' grievances and supported the creation and institutionalization of a strong anti-racist movement and government programs to counter social marginalization of immigrants (Grewal 2011: 226). This was not the case in 2005 and its aftermath, when politicians' responses were far more hostile.

7.3.3 After 2005 – Sarkozy, the 'pyromaniac' of migration politics?

The riots led to shock and outrage in France and internationally, both regarding the scale of destruction and because they laid bare the social difficulties encountered by young people of the second and third immigrant generation. On the political level, there was recognition of the immediacy of the social malaise of discrimination that needed to be tackled. As early as November 2005, Conservative President Jacques Chirac stressed that "the future of the nation could not be secured without combatting the poison to society that are discriminations" (referenced in Hargreaves 2015: 96). He also stressed that the widespread inequalities were "undermining the very foundations of the Republic" (ibid.).

Little structural change occurred in the *banlieues* in the following years (Hargreaves 2015: 112). However, the riots did lead to a renewal of anti-racist and anti-discrimination activism in France, as one interviewee highlighted:

The 2005 riots were in fact an important moment for the immigrant movements themselves, for the people concerned, for the social movements themselves. The debate was: are these riots political or not? Is the fact of destroying everything a sign of pure violence and apoliticism, of defiance towards associations, big brother, or political conciliation, or is it in spite of everything political, a way of entering loyally in the public debate and especially after the 2005 riots, there will be a certain number of initiatives, new associations. There is a kind of renewal of the movements of fight against discriminations, racism, (…). So that generated then a reaction of activists, to say here it is necessary to go closer to the immigrant populations who suffered from discrimination in school, at work, etc. (FAC2: pos. 40)

The events of 2005 paved the way into Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency, who made immigration his main political issue. He set the stage for this development in 2006, with the passage of another immigration and citizenship law that doubled down on his central idea that immigration should be chosen rather than endured ('*immigration choisie, pas subie*'), an indirect hint at the way in which France had had to struggle with its 'unchosen' immigration population in recent years.

In his 2006 immigration and citizenship law, Sarkozy offered a mix of progressive measures for immigration and restrictive measures on citizenship and integration. On immigration, Sarkozy introduced more categories for selective immigration of highly skilled and entrepreneurial immigrants as well as possibilities for short-term immigration to fill labour shortage gaps. This law constituted a "turning point" away from the previously held 'zero immigration' aims of the 90s and early 2000s (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 76). It was the first time that France allowed labour immigration since the recruitment stop in 1974 (ibid.). Sarkozy stressed that this move was necessary to "remain competitive in the global competition for the highly skilled". However, as Wihtol de Wenden points out, the law remained mostly "symbolic", as it opened the door only to several thousand people while maintaining its tough stance on family reunification and spousal immigration (ibid.).

On citizenship and immigration, the period for spousal citizenship was extended and the privileges for immigrants from former colonies, which had enjoyed less stringent residency conditions prior, were abolished (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013, 24, 27). Bertossi and Hajjat succinctly explain the transformation that this law ushered in and how this affected the interconnection between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics:

In the 1990, the citizenship policy was supported by restrictive immigration policies as a precondition for an effective integration policy. In the 2000s, the emphasis shifted to the selection of migrants who would be compatible a priori with French society. Conditions that were traditionally part of the process of acquisition of nationality are now directly part of the new 'immigration *choisie'* policy. (ibid.: 26)

For instance, the law also required new immigrants to sign an integration contract (*Contrat d'accueil et d'integration*) to "prepare their republican integration into French society" (ibid.). This combination of migration politics remains the formula for French migration politics until today.

As Nicolas Sarkozy campaigned for the presidency, he continued to center issues connected to migration politics in his campaign (Gastaut 2012: 333; Carvalho 2016). As president, his was a peculiar and ambivalent mix of different perspectives on migration politics. For one, his campaign and the policies pursued under his presidency continued to impinge on immigrants' rights (ibid.: 334). However, he also implemented several progressive policies and made sure to include people of immigrant heritage in his cabinet. Saliently, the 2002 presidential election had gone to a run-off between Chirac and far-right leader Le Pen, which is why Sarkozy was particularly mindful in taking the migration issue away from the far right in his campaigning. In a parliamentary speech in 2006, following the introduction of his new immigration law, he explicitly stated that he rejected the far-right stance on immigration and promoted his 'chosen immigration' paradigm, which in his view offered "conformity with the republican ideal" (referenced in Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 26).

After being elected president, Sarkozy created a Ministry on Immigration, Integration, and National Identity in 2007 and an intervention plan for French suburbs called '*Espoir Banlieues*" (Hope for the Suburbs), also sometimes controversially called the 'Marshall plan for the banlieues' in 2008. Incidentally, both projects failed within three years of their creation, by 2011. The creation of the ministry was a central part of Sarkozy's presidential platform, and many interviewees stressed the symbolic importance of the creation of this ministry. Sarkozy also borrowed from the far right regarding his rhetoric on French identity and questions of immigration, while simultaneously opposing them. As one interviewee highlights, Sarkozy succeeded in this novelty of connecting the question of identity with the question of immigration by proposing to create a new ministry of immigration and national identity:

This means that Sarkozy will explicitly link the two issues, which had not been done before. A ministry, it means grouping together services that existed in other ministries. Most of the time, it is a redistribution. This means that the services that deal with citizenship issues will be grouped under the same authority as the services that deal with borders and entry and stay issues, which is unheard of in the French context. *This is part of a strategy of Nicolas Sarkozy*

who led these campaigns with a clear strategy which was to get elected by going to take votes from the extreme right and in particular, and from the first round this is what he did, even though he is fundamentally a liberal. He has little to do with a nationalist extreme right. He is the son of an immigrant, a Hungarian. In this story, he is a Hungarian nobleman. *So, I think that there was really an instrumentalization of a theme that allowed to buy a certain number of votes and voters by displaying an extreme rigor on the questions of border security, deportation, refoulement and expulsion, and also to pose as a defender of the national identity and of eternal France.* (FAC1: pos. 53)

This insight provides an important aspect to explain the creation of this short-lived ministry: Linking immigration to national identity. Connecting the two issues and taking this concern away the far right (who did not enter the 2007 presidential run-off), gave Sarkozy the opportunity to show that "I understand what you're saying, you're worried about your national identity" (FAC7: pos. 30). Several experts agreed on this symbolic dimension of the ministry, which united several issues into a cohesive narrative about the role of immigration, colonialism, integration, and national identity in France (FPS1: pos. 29; FPS2: pos. 59):

I think that what is important in this ministry is the national identity. (…) This Ministry of Immigration and National Identity is clearly a political object. Its administrative perimeter is quite small. It takes over a certain number of sectors of the French administration that was historically in charge of migration issues. (…) But the main thing is to initiate a debate on the issue of national identity for electoral purposes, in order to fight against the strong hold of the extreme right in France, which means that for a right-wing government, there is a real threat in leaving the issue of immigration as a term of the extreme right. *We are going to reassure the electorate by implementing a complementary requirement, which is that migration must not call into question a certain definition of national identity. In the same movement, we will also rewrite our own colonial history. It was at this point that we began to consider that it would be good for school textbooks to say how progressive France was when it was a colonial nation and that there was a positive side to colonization.* (…) Basically, I would say that it only reinforces the discourse of the extreme right since it is trivialized in a certain way in the French political field. (FAC3: pos. 21)

Anti-Muslim rhetoric also sharpened under Sarkozy, a development which was facilitated under his agenda, notably by a 2010 law prohibiting the wearing of the burka. Sarkozy laconically declared that multiculturalism was a failure in 2011 (Villard/Sayegh 2012: 238), stressing the need for the creation of a "French Islam" instead of an "'uncontrolled' Islam in France" (Gastaut 2012: 340). As opposed to the 1990s, access to citizenship was no longer the main contentious issue. Rather, under Sarkozy the debate shifted to those who were already citizens, and their alleged "cultural and religious deviance", and the alleged rift between "Islam and republican values" (Bertossi/Hajjat 2013: 25).

This once again clarifies the connection between the 2005 riots and the Sarkozyist approach to migration politics: Most of the young rioters were born in France and French citizens, but their presence was nevertheless perceived as a problem. The previous model of acquiring citizenship as a means of integration was no longer tenable from this perspective, "the proposed solution to the 'problem of integration' shifted from nationality to new politics of national identity, a wider agenda in which regulating the legal status of nationality was not a key policy anymore" (ibid.). Yvan Gastaut concludes that Sarkozy's aim "to provide reassurance to the French" on migration politics matters failed. Rather, his "much energy, little focus" policies on migration politics have shown him to be "a 'pyromaniac' on the immigration issue" (Gastaut 2012: 343).

7.3.4 Whither a Sarkozyist Approach? – Migration Politics in France, 2012–2020

There have been changes in immigration and integration policies. But they are not brutal ruptures. In fact, there has been a continuity of state positions on these issues, regardless of the president or the teams in power. (…) Immigration policies are transpartisan in a certain way and therefore, they embody where the style can be different through the different presidents or speeches but also, there is no rupture. In fact, all the comments we make when we look at the agendas and legislative calendars on immigration and integration issues, there is a great deal of consistency in the trajectory, which shows that there is in fact a strong consensus. Even if there are differences in the rhetoric, there are no differences in the politics. (FAC4: pos. 13)

The contention that there has been a continuity in the approach to migration politics in France since the Sarkozy years throughout a socialist presidency under François Hollande and a centrist presidency under Emmanuel Macron was echoed by other interviewees (FAC2: pos. 49; FPS1: pos. 33). As FAC2 aptly put it: "There are reforms, but they do not change the objectives of the policy". In fact, one interviewee highlighted that the main impact of the Sarkozy era is that the political cleavage on migration politics has shifted from a left versus right issue to an extreme right versus the rest issue, which contributed to the consistency and continuity in migration politics throughout the 2010s (FAC6: pos. 103). Another interviewee highlighted the way in which migration politics have become very symbolically charged with little actual impact on political outputs (FAC1: pos. 57).

Sarkozy attempted to take migration politics away from the far right but did not succeed in doing so at all. The fact that the National Front (now National Rally) has continuously entered the run-off in presidential elections in

the past decade seems to prove this point. One interviewee explained this continuing difficulty with the far right thusly:

When you are a politician in this country, and you want to be elected, and elected again, you have to take on the issue of immigration. Otherwise, the National Front will take it on by itself. So, the right and even the left are obliged to come to this immigration issue and it has become a national political problem for 25 years. *So, the real problem of France is not immigration, on the contrary, immigration is always a solution for France, it is not a problem. But politically it is an important issue that everyone, all parties, left, right, center, want to seize so as not to leave the supremacy to the National Front to manage this issue.* The National Front bridges the gap between immigration and identity. It is not between immigration and the economy; it is the problem between immigration and identity. This is how the drift of the term immigration has become political and very detrimental to an authentic, clear policy of the French society that is always surfing on the waves. (FP2: pos. 25)

Another interviewee sees a general deterioration in debates about migration politics and national identify in the French case, which she also associates with the continuing influence of the far right, which is much more prominent in France than in Canada or Germany and therefore holds more sway about these issues:

France is a country which, from a legal point of view, has a lot of difficulty in thinking of itself as being composed of entities with cultural specificities. (…) *This question is particularly difficult to ask in a society marked by an extremely high influence of the extreme right, with debates which make that as soon as one speaks about multiculturalism, one has the feeling that one calls into question a French identity which would exist like an essence... even to protect the natural essences. This debate is even more difficult today than it was twenty years ago for these reasons.* (…) France had succeeded with contradictions, with difficulties to escape from an essentialist model of identity and it is true when in the political debate and the polarization of our political debate, *there is a strong place of a closed identity compared to an open identity, which was that of the Republic nevertheless for a very long time. It was not open to everyone, but it was still more open than what we can see in some political debates today.* (FAC3: pos. 39)

Lastly, the continuing effect of France's colonial history on France's migration politics ought not be underestimated. If there is such a thing as a French exception, it can be found in this specificity which leads to a particular tension among the immigrant population's relationship to France (Simon 2014: 197). This colonial continuity in immigration may be mirrored in other immigration countries that were former colonial empires, such as Britain or Spain. In the triad between France, Germany, and Canada, this issue stands out for France. To date, this has contributed to the migration politics cleavage within the country, once that this interviewee frames as the defining "paradox" of French society:

There are many effects [of colonialism] that are still there, that will never go away if French society still refuses to talk about this question of colonialism and imperialism, which is a very important political question. The National Front and the extreme right say today in France: too much immigration is a problem for our identity. And we, the children of immigration, say: we want to talk about this question of colonialism which is still very present in French society. *These are two very different, antagonistic political versions of contemporary French society. The politics wants to use the question of immigration to release the immigrants and their children. And the immigrants and their children, who have become French, they want to speak about this question to say we are still suffering from racism and colonialism, and we must speak again. This is the paradox of the contemporary French society.* To speak or to remain silent. The silence. (FP2: pos. 45)

Table 7.2: France –The Period of the Sarkozy Years, 2002–2012

Antecedent Conditions	Shock /Rupture	Critical Juncture	Mechanisms of Production	Legacy
Conservative Presidency with socialist cohabitation from 1997–2002, reversal of some of the harsher changes in citizenship law 2002 Sarkozy becomes Interior Minister, re-establishes tough immigration stance in immigration and citizenship law 2003	2005 laws on the positive influence of French colonial immigration Establishment of anti-racist, anti-colonial movements Largest *banlieues* riots in 40 years	2005–2012 After riots and during Sarkozy presidency Sarkozy attempts to take immigration issue away from far right Front National Cleavage on immigration gets entrenched and moves from between left and right to between the far right and the rest of French politics	2006 Interior Minister Sarkozy introduces immigration law tightening citizenship acquisition (particularly for immigrants from former colonies) and establishing more extensive integration measures and introducing high-skill immigration (*choisie, pas subie)* 2007 Sarkozy becomes president Establishment of Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity (2007–2010)	None, maintenance of the nexus between immigration, citizenship, and integration since Sarkozy years, entrenchment of the cleavage on migration politics

Source: Own research

Post-script: The Killing of Nahel Merzouk and the ensuing Riots in 2023
On June 27, 2023, Nahel Merzouk, a French 17-year-old from Nanterre in Paris was shot by a French policeman. In the days following his killing, large scale protests took place and riots broke out all over France. At the time of writing (July 3rd, 2023), well over 2000 people have been arrested in riots and looting, over 230 buildings were set on fire, and over 1350 cars were burned. The average age of those arrested in the riots is 17 (Willsher 2023). For now, the unrest is on-going, but has shown signs of abating in the last two nights (Borutta 2023). This development eerily mirrors the events of 2005. The difference lies at the level of political reaction, where rather than condemning the anger of those protesting and excusing police action, President Macron immediately expressed condemnation at the police violence, calling the act "inexplicable" and "unforgiveable" on the day after Nahel's death (Brunet 2023). However, with the riots lasting for almost a week now, one French police Union declared that it was at "war" against "pests and savage hordes" (Willsher 2023).

Since 2020, 23 people have been killed at the hands of the French Police in similar circumstances, most of them of Black or North African descent (ibid.). The widespread reaction of public solidarity with Nahel's mother and protests against institutional racism stand in contrast to the concomitant unprecedented violence, also against people, which took place this time around. Since 1977, ten government action plans for the *banlieues* have been initiated, but none seem to have alleviated the hardship and sense of exclusion that contributes to the anger of the young people (Borutta 2023). My preliminary perspective on this development is that this shows the on-going tension regarding the place of young French people who have a family history of migration within French society. It also demonstrates the persistent inertia by the French state to effectively tackle the structural disadvantages that a significant part of its population faces, due to the entrenched political cleavage on migration politics. Wanissa is a cleaner from Aubervilliers, a *banlieue* north of Paris. She was interviewed by the Guardian and articulated this connection pithily:

What we're seeing is tension that has been growing for years: the shooting of Nahel is a reminder there's too much racism in France. (…) The government has to act on racism. We've been saturated by it since the 2022 presidential election campaign where [the far-right candidate] Éric Zemmour was all over the media attacking foreigners and immigrants. Marine Le Pen is gaining support. The government constantly talks about new immigration laws, which stigmatises people further. When my colleagues who get up to clean at 4am or 5am look around at other cleaners, we are all Black and North African. France is divided and this police shooting has brought it all to the fore. That boy is not the first to be killed by police and we're all waking up today thinking it could be my nephews, my son who is shot. The government has to tackle racism if anything is to move on. (referenced in Chrisafis 2023)

7.4 Germany – Becoming the Most Important European Immigration Country, 2006–2020

Germany's migration politics nexus as it emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to the establishment of the world's second most important immigration country in the world today. In this chapter, I argue that the changes made to the nexus in the previous period became further entrenched between 2006 and 2020. Therefore, there was no further critical juncture in German migration politics in the new millennium.

To establish this argument, I discuss the significance of the events of 2015, when a substantial number of asylum seekers arrived in Germany. The arrival of almost one million asylum seekers in 2015 made global headlines and is widely held as an important event or even a 'caesura' in German migration politics. I counter this assertion in line with the expert interviews I conducted. My argument holds that the way the German government reacted to the events of 2015, despite their significance in scale, are the logical conclusion of the direction in which German migration politics (and not least, German society) had been developing in the decades prior.

I begin by outlining the way migration politics were further liberalized in the late 2000s and early 2010s under conservative party Angela Merkel's chancellorship. I then present a subchapter on the developments in 2015 and their significance for German migration politics. Lastly, I reflect on migration politics development in the five years following 2015, ending my analysis in 2020.[113]

7.4.1 How to be an Immigration Country – Institutionalizing Migration Politics, 2006–2014

The decade after the election of a conservative government in 2005 was characterized by the institutionalization and further liberalization of migration politics. The amount of government initiatives for migration politics, particularly integration politics, that were implemented in this decade is striking. In this section, I present the ways in which this government took on the task of developing the structures that an immigration country requires. Short of developing

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113 I end my analysis prior to the start of the pandemic. The impact of the pandemic on migration politics is not part of the formal analysis of this thesis, but I will include a discussion of it in the conclusion.

a coherent strategy encompassing all political fields of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics, this period was characterized by a shift in Germany coming to terms with the fact that it had become an immigration country. In short, German was figuring out *how to be* an immigration country.

A mere descriptive list of all the structural and institutional innovations of this decade may go beyond the readers' interests, so I will highlight the most important contributions that marked this period: The introduction of integration ministries at the *Länder* level starting in 2006, the introduction of the 'national integration plan' (*Nationaler Integrationsplan*) in 2006, the founding of several national conferences on integration and for immigrant communities including the annual integration summit, and government funding of several independent think tanks on immigration and integration. Throughout these processes, migrant organizations were explicitly included and consulted for expertise (Bendel/Borkowski 2016: 103). Chancellor Merkel also promoted the status of the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration to a state minister, working with her in the Federal Chancellery since the beginning of her chancellorship in 2005 (GPS6: pos. 32; GPS2: pos. 47; GPS1: pos. 19). Last but not least, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*) was extended both in power and resources to support the management and institutionalization of migration politics (Brinkmann/Sauer 2016: 1).

In short: Merely six years after the passage of a new citizenship law which redefined the boundaries of belonging for German society, Germany could no longer be classified in the way in which many migration typology researchers had done in the 1990s. The times of Germany as an 'ethnic' immigration country, institutionally and structurally, had passed (Bauder/Lenard/Straehle 2014: 2; Bauder 2014: 10). Petra Bendel and Andrea Borkowski therefore categorize 2006 as the year in an integration politics paradigm shift occurred (Bendel/Borkowski 2016: 103). Saliently, while this shift in institutional structures was under way, public discourse on migration politics was often more negatively tinged. Baringhorst et al. explain that the criticism of government deficits in migration politics, as well as the government's on-going problematization of migration politics concealed the actual progress that had been made and resulted in a "contradiction between the official portrayal of foreigner politics (*Ausländerpolitik*) and the differentiated reality of the way in which the immigration reality was actually handled" (Baringhorst/Hunger/Schönwälder 2006: 11).

This transformation was not only significant on the state-level, but also for the governing party, under whose former leader Helmut Kohl none of these developments would have been imaginable. One interviewee describes the

transformation of the Christian Democrats by referencing politician Armin Laschet of the Christian Democrats, the first integration minister in North Rhine-Westphalia, who undertook a reframing of migration politics for the party in the mid-2000s. Armin Laschet, so he describes, came in and said:

"I [Arming Laschet] have a story. Or we as the Union have a story. Namely: We are Christian Democrats, but we can deal with foreigners." That was not the case before. Before, it was somehow clear that Social Democrats were able to work with foreigners because of trade union cooperation. *Now a Christian Democrat comes along and can deal with foreigners (FA: Takes the issue away from them.) Takes the issue away from them, too, and can even do that better than the Social Democrats. And that made him exciting.* Because that was new. The media also asked about it. He was invited to talk shows. He was the first integration minister. So that was a story, a narrative, and it was all very media-friendly. And he was able to do that. He was able to serve the public and then also had the courage to make pithy statements. And he also more than confused some Christian Democrats with his. But he was brash, courageous, and then pushed it forward and did things like this: "I'm now the integration minister, but I don't want to be the only one, so let's have a conference of integration ministers." And then he approached the federal government, he approached Schleswig-Holstein, the then Minister Stegner and then North Rhine-Westphalia (...) held the first integration ministers' conference. And at that time on an organizational level, because we all did not know how it works, such a conference of ministers. The ministers of the interior and labour had been doing this since 1949, and we didn't know anything about it. And in retrospect, we did it, how shall I say, amateurishly. But that didn't really matter because there was such a spirit. And then at some point there was the Conference of Integration Ministers, and this policy field of integration was institutionalized. The same procedures were introduced as in other policy areas. It was no longer just nice to talk about it and say "we have to", but we had structures. (GPS1: pos. 21)

There was a certain irony to this development: Just as Germany was starting to make up for the policy developments structurally and institutionally it had missed out on decades prior, Germany experienced historically low immigration numbers. After the introduction of the immigration law in 2005, it experienced a period of prolonged cessation in immigration numbers, to the point where a national think tank on immigration warned that a continued lack of immigration would damage the German economy as Germany would not be able to sustain its level of productivity (GAC6: pos. 40). One expert wondered whether the many innovations in migration politics at the time were enabled by these relatively low numbers in humanitarian immigration (GPS5: pos. 50).

Nevertheless, there were significant developments in immigration politics as well, supported by the Europeanization of immigration politics. With the accession of several Eastern European states to the European Union in 2004, around 510 million people now had access to the German labour market through EU freedom of movement (Fachkommission Integrationsfähigkeit 2020: 18). An EU directive from 2009 called for the introduction of a so-called

Blue Card for highly skilled third country national immigrants. Introduced in Germany in 2011, this Blue Card initiative further complemented the immigration law of 2005, facilitating the even easier entry of highly skilled migrants in a surprisingly "generous" way (Kolb 2014: 65). However, as Boucher and Gest point out, the output of these generous policy innovations ought not be overestimated. Clearly, Germany, as well as other EU countries, privilege EU-internal migration over third country national migration, an overall preference which reinforces "origin-based recruitment hierarchies" (Boucher/Gest 2018: 86).

One expert stressed that by the middle of the 2010s, Germany had developed one of the most liberal migration frameworks in the OECD. The only thing lacking was "a clear acknowledgment that we have a migration framework" (GPS2: pos 50). Complaining about the on-going discussions concerning the 'lack' of immigration legislation, he explained:

We have everything [in terms of migration legislation, FA]. As the OECD confirmed back in 2013, we have one of the most liberal immigration laws in the OECD countries. *It's just insanely convoluted and complicated*. The regulations on family reunification alone are sooo long (sic) and constantly refer to each other, and the immigration of skilled workers, which has now been reorganized by the Skilled Workers Immigration Act, has become somewhat clearer, but it still all remains within the framework of the Residence Act. It is not called immigration law. It is called the Skilled Workers Immigration Act, but the law that is applied remains the Residence Act. *It's a bit of symbolic politics that we don't have a 'migration code' or anything like that.* (GPS2: pos. 50)

Academic analyses of the early 2010s show that a transformation had already occurred, away from Germany's status as a "'reluctant' (Martin 1994) or 'undeclared' (Thränhardt 1995) country of immigration to a country (…) – at least as far as recruitment schemes for the highly skilled are concerned- belongs to the liberal pioneers" (Kolb 2014: 69).

Leading up to the events of 2015, immigration numbers, in particular those for humanitarian immigration, had continuously been rising. One expert stressed that the high numbers of admissions in 2015 did not come out of the blue, they were expected (GPS6: pos. 38). What was not expected was the conservative government's reaction to the refugees fleeing Syria. This led to the events of the late summer in 2015, when close to a million asylum seekers entered Germany.

7.4.2 'Germany, of all countries' – 2015

2015 was a momentous year for German migration politics, particularly for humanitarian immigration. In the years leading up to 2015, the civil war in Syria had been accelerating, with more and more people fleeing the country and seeking refuge in neighbouring countries and further away, in Europe. Due to the EU Dublin II agreement[114], humanitarian migrants would have to apply for asylum in the very first European country that they entered by land. For many, due to the popular refugee routes to Europe at the time, this was Hungary. By the middle of 2015, hundreds of thousands had arrived in Hungary, from civil war-torn Syria but also from other countries, like Afghanistan, where the political, economic and security situation brought many people to leave their home countries as well. Hungary was governed by Viktor Orbán of the right-wing Fidesz party, who quickly refused to fulfill the Dublin II agreement, asking other EU countries to receive the high number of refugees arriving in the country.

Dramatic pictures of people living in make-shift housing on the streets of Budapest emerged in late 2015. They were stuck in a country that was refusing to process their arrivals. In a federal press conference on August 31, 2015, chancellor Merkel coined her much-referenced phrase "*Wir schaffen das*" (We can do it), referring to possibly accommodating the high number of humanitarian immigrants seeking refuge in Germany. On the night of September 4 to 5, 2015, the chancellor decided that Germany would receive those stranded in Budapest, and other people arriving in Europe at the time.

At main train stations all over Germany, particularly in the south like in Munich and Stuttgart, but also in Frankfurt, Cologne, and Berlin, thousands of people gathered to welcome the asylum seekers. Hundreds of ad hoc groups formed in cities and villages alike to support the humanitarian immigrants materially, administratively, or by giving language classes. The widespread support for the arrival of refugees coined the phrase *Willkommenskultur* (welcoming culture). Altogether, 890,000 refugees applied for asylum in Germany in 2015, the highest number recorded since the founding of the Federal Republic. Taken together with 2016, well over one million people arrived in those two years, marking one of the most significant periods of humanitarian immigration to Germany.

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114 The Dublin II agreement is part of the EU Schengen regulations. It stipulates that arriving refugees have to apply for asylum in the first EU member country they set foot in, as opposed to travelling through different countries to apply for asylum in a more preferred place (Siegl 2023).

However, the events of 2015, widely described as a 'crisis', did not spark a critical juncture, despite the importance it is afforded in both public and academic discourse, particularly from academics outside of Germany (Boucher/Gest 2018, 6f.; Dauvergne 2020: 104). In the expert interviews, 2015 clearly emerges as an extraordinary year regarding the outpouring of public support. In spite of this, Angela Merkel's decision to suspend European Union refugee regulations, to "step out of line with the European status quo on migration" (Dauvergne 2020: 104) and receive and accommodate a large number of refugees does not surprise in the context of previous migration politics developments described above. Germany had long established the institutional and structural settings of an immigration country. Clearly, Germany had not been an ethno-cultural and exclusivist immigration country up until 2015 when a sudden change of heart changed everything. Rather, 2015 contributed to the public realization process, both at home and abroad, of nominally having become an immigration country. Through their actions, the German public contributed to the process of normalizing Germany's status as an immigration country, as the expert interviews also show.

One major emerging theme from the interviews is that of surprise and optimism regarding the decisions that the chancellor took and the way in which the German population reacted. One expert summarized the astonishment that was felt internationally at the development in Germany, particularly with regards to the welcoming culture:

If you consider, from 2000 to 2015, to the time when we were so amazed with *Willkommenskultur* and so on, when everybody in the world was so amazed, what's up with the Germans? That's 15 years only. 15 years. If you look at how little has happened in Canada in 15 years, in the same 15 years, it's totally astounding. *So, I would say we've made progress in 15 years that other countries take 50 to 100 years to make. Okay, no, 100 is an exaggeration, 50 is close.* And that's why we've caught up with the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada in terms of open society, liberalism and so on. We've even overtaken the Netherlands ((laughs)). (GAC5: pos. 14)

Several interviewees compared 2015 with two prior periods of large-scale humanitarian immigration and political crisis: postwar and post-unification (GAC4: pos. 41; CAC1: pos. 34; GPS5: pos. 45; GPS6: pos. 34). CAC1 highlighted that the way that the German public reacted as a testament to how much Germany had changed. In comparison to the refugee arrivals and racist crisis of the early 1990s, Germans were by default supportive of refugee arrivals with their "exuberant welcoming culture" (CAC1: pos. 34).

Two experts from the federal ministries which were part of task forces in charge of managing the arrival at the time stressed that in comparison to the early 1990s, there was no realistic scenario in which the newly arrived asylum

seekers could be expected to return to their countries of origin in the foreseeable future. This early realization led to a degree of pragmatism among officials that certain decisive steps for permanent settlement would have to be taken. In comparison to the early 1990s, there was no possibility for "self-hypnosis that these people would leave again" (GPS5: pos. 45). However swift, this was not a straightforward realization. GPS5 also explained how it was revelatory of the fragmentation of the management of German migration politics amongst the different ministries. The Interior Ministry, for instance, was adamant that numbers had to be reduced as soon as possible:

All they [the Interior Ministry] talked about was pull-factors, to eliminate pull-factors. A: How do we prevent more people from arriving? And B: Once they have arrived, how to we get rid of them as quickly as possible. The perspective of the Labour Ministry, on the other hand, was: "Hey, we have to deal with the people here, we can't build up a new precariat again. They will stay for a long time. How do we get them integrated? How do we get them into the labor market?" And that clashed pretty hard. Plus, the Ministry of Justice, which was very (…) how do I say this now, like 'foreigner-friendly'. They saw it from a constitutional point of view and said: "Guys, we have a mandate here, and people have to be treated decently. And these are refugees, they need our protection". And that was already a hot melting pot. (GPS5: pos. 64-65)

From the descriptions of the interviews, it appears that this internal fragmentation of different goals amongst the ministries is an on-going characteristic for German migration politics, lasting at least until the end of the Merkel chancellorship in 2021.

The experts underlined the central argument of this chapter. They all had in common that they did not view 2015 as having had a significant impact on Germany's migration politics, but rather on the way Germany viewed itself as an immigration country on a discursive level. This included a level of skepticism regarding the positive impact of 2015 considering the more hostile discussions that followed at the beginning of 2016, when German media, following the Cologne New Year's Eve sexual assaults and attacks on women by immigrant men, took a U-turn and wondered aloud whether Angela Merkel had made a major mistake. One expert explains this development as ambiguous, stating:

[F]or a moment, it looked as if that [the humanitarian immigration of 2015, F. A.] would be, so to speak, the completion of Germany as an immigration country, in the sense that you really acknowledge it now and make it positive. (…) [T]here was this *Willkommenskultur* and this broad approval if we think about the pictures at the train stations and so on (…). But then it just flipped [in response to the NYE assaults in Cologne, F. A.]. And I would say that the time was probably not quite ripe for the completion of this process, the real acceptance." (GAC2: pos. 54)

This was echoed by other experts, who stressed that 2015 was insignificant in comparison to previous events in German migration politics and that the impact of the arrival of 800,000 people was wholly overestimated. In the exact same time frame, Germany had seen the arrival of about 800,000 immigrants from the European Union, but they were less visible, because they did not have to stand in line to register for their arrival: "Nobody noticed, except maybe in Prenzlauer Berg [a district of Berlin, F. A.], where everybody was suddenly speaking Spanish." (GPS3: pos. 40–41). Overall, according to the same expert, 2015 tends to be discursively overblown as a development in German migration politics: "It's quite amusing to see how the debates tend to focus on developments in migration that are not actually significant, but to make small groups [of immigrants, F. A.] suddenly look quite big". Generally, there is a need for much more differentiation amongst the different developments (GPS3: pos. 40–41). Another expert from a state-level administrative position explained how there was an overall attitude to view the arrival of refugees in 2015 as a communal societal task, for which he witnessed many administrative personnel "working the necessary long hours with enthusiasm". The same expert also emotionally expressed a sense of pride that 2015 evoked for him:

I still get tears in my eyes today when I see how people were received in Munich and in Dortmund. (…) This short summer of euphoria, where one perhaps also thought, or where I can well remember articles in the New York Times (…), where they wrote: "Germany, this good country". *That now Germany, of all countries, Germany, of all countries, opens the gates*, by that, of course, my soul was incredibly flattered that suddenly, on the grounds of moral, human rights action, our own country comes first. Others would now say that there is also a false pride that is expressed there again, but I found, I think what happened is great, the statement of Angela Merkel "We can do it". That was phenomenal. (GPS1: pos. 23)

Most experts would therefore agree with the assessment that Merkel's actions were "one of the most optimistic gestures towards change in immigration politics" (Dauvergne 2020: 104), while many also stressed that the enthusiasm was short-lived, and that the events of New Year's Eve 2015/2016 dampened the overall public view that new arrivals were welcome (Ellermann 2021: 189).

The preceding discussion shows how the significance of 2015 can be found not in a policy legacy that followed, but rather the pragmatic way in which the German public and German political actors reacted to it. Germany had acknowledged its status as a significant immigration country both structurally and institutionally prior to 2015. 2015 marked the moment in which this change became apparent and the process of discursive normalization of Germany's immigration country status began. In the next section, I show how the normalization process is institutionally and discursively on-going until today.

7.4.3 Normalizing Migration Politics, 2006–2020

German migration politics have changed fundamentally since the early 1990s. Migration politics are no longer a hidden issue, nor is Germany officially in denial of its status as an immigration country. Rather than attributing this change to the more recent events of 2015, my analysis shows how this development is a legacy of the critical juncture of the 1990s and early 2000s. Not least, the overall demographic transformation ought to be noted as well: In 2019, 40 percent of all children under ten in Germany have a migration background and 13.9 million people living in Germany hold a foreign nationality (Fachkommission Integrationsfähigkeit 2020: 43). German society has become culturally and ethnically diversified.

Germany has become and remained the second most important immigration country, not only in the EU or in the OECD, but in the world after the United States in numbers since 2012 (Brinkmann 2016: 146). The dwindling birth rate means that demographic growth in Germany can solely be attributed to immigration (ibid.: 18). Germany is now also the fourth most important country for education immigration, after the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia (ibid.: 30). As university courses taught entirely in English are on the rise in Germany, this number is projected to rise (ibid.). To maintain its wealth and economic productivity, experts project that a yearly net migration of 400,000 immigrants is necessary (Deutsche Welle 2021).

Since 2015, several new laws have been introduced to facilitate both the integration of newcomers and strengthen Germany's immigration framework, particularly for refugees and asylum seekers. The 2019 Skilled Worker Immigration Act was the first in German history that confidently used the term *Einwanderung*, rather than the more hesitant and less definitive *Zuwanderung*, "signaling an acceptance that Germany is and will remain a country of immigration" (Ellermann 2021: 190). As one expert points out, two decades ago any politician trying to propose a law with the word *Einwanderung* in it would have been "tarred and feathered" for using the word, and in 2019 it was announced by a conservative Interior Minister (GAC1, pos. 69). Three of the public service experts interviewed, who were part of the legislation process of this law, also pointed out that there was a lot of internal debate over whether to use *Einwanderung* or *Zuwanderung* in the law's name (GPS5: pos. 13; GPS7: pos. 6; GPS6: pos. 6). GPS5 stressed:

This [discussion about the law's name, F.A.] could be considered trivial, but it goes really deep, it fundamentally poses the question: Is Germany an immigration country or is it not? (…) And with this final decision to call it *Einwanderungsgesetz* for the first time, they said: Yes, we are an immigration country. We want people in Germany on a permanent basis. We want them to integrate. A word the Interior Ministry is quite scared of. Integration. But that's precisely the goal. *We want people to come permanently, to integrate, to build a life here.* (GPS5: pos. 13, pos. 18).

Apart from this semantic shift, this law opened immigration up to any third country individual with a skilled qualification with a job offer or with the option of securing one within six months. This law was not prompted by 2015 but had been a long on-going negotiation in the government since the early 2010s (ibid.).

In the area of citizenship politics, dual or multiple nationality officially has remained an impossibility within the timeframe of this analysis. Winter explains that the long-standing insistence on single nationality with "Germany's long-standing quest for national unity – at the time of Herder and Fichte as well as after the Second World War" (Winter 2014: 46). This insistence has meant that many immigrants choose not to naturalize to retain their nationality of origin (ibid.). However, just like in German immigration politics, the picture is not as clear upon closer examination: There are many legal loopholes and concessions that today more than half of all naturalized people continue to hold dual or even multiple nationalities. Those coming from European Union member states can hold dual or multiple citizenship by default. Since 2014, the short-lived *Optionsregelung* (option regulation) has been abolished, which means that it is now accepted for children born as Germans to foreign parents to hold dual or multiple nationalities (Fachkommission Integrationsfähigkeit 2020: 147). Also, extra regulations stand for the group of resettlers, people who have been granted asylum, as well as people from states that do not allow the cessation of their nationality, e. g. Cuba, Morocco, Iran, or Iraq or states in which the cessation of citizenship would be very costly, such as the United States. One remaining legacy of the 'guest worker' era is the missing option for Turkish immigrants, particularly of the older generations, to hold double nationality.[115]

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115 This is due to a complicated convolution of different regulations, which result in some parts of the Turkish-German immigrant population holding double citizenship while another, much larger part, does not. In the 1990s, there was a brief period in which Turkish citizens renounced their Turkish nationality to acquire German citizenship, only to immediately reacquire Turkish nationality after. Germany set an end to this procedure with the nationality law in 1999, which introduced a regulation which meant that German citizenship was lost if someone acquired another citizenship voluntarily. German-Turkish children born after 1990 can also hold both Turkish and German nationality (Farahat/Hailbronner 2020: 26). However, for many Turks of

The official maintenance of the single nationality paradigm has therefore long been undermined procedurally, that is at the output-level. Discursively, citizenship politics have generally taken a back seat to immigration and integration politics. One expert attributed this to the fact that immigration and integration are both subject of daily politics connected to the welfare state and economic politics, two central pillars guiding German political identity since the end of the Second World War. Citizenship poses more fundamental questions about ideologies of belonging, which do not fall within either of those two guiding pillars. This has led to a neglect of this topic both by the public and in political research (GAC3: pos. 149). Nevertheless, another expert stressed that citizenship is the most central category for them, and should, like in Canada, be the "conditio sine qua non" for the German case, marking the beginning of belonging to the state (GAC2: pos. 68). The treatment of citizenship as exclusive on a discursive level, but then far more liberal on a procedural level is emblematic of the way in which Germany has changed into an immigration country in the past 20 years: Shy of grand announcements, change has come through formalistic, matter-of-fact developments that adapt to the realities of the time. This is also the case for integration politics.

Most change has occurred on the level of integration politics since 2015. On the discursive level, debates tend to still simplify and politicize integration issues, framing them in the logics of security and threat. This was further bolstered by the emergence of the right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in 2013. While the AfD initially positioned itself as an anti-establishment, anti-European Union party, entering the German parliament on this platform in the federal elections of 2013, it has since transformed into a far-right party, with leaders that openly embrace racist and anti-immigration ideologies. With the concomitant rise of right-wing movements and parties all over Europe, German officials have started to acknowledge racism and extreme right ideologies as a problem that needs tackling, shifting away from a perspective of the early 1990s, when it was more common to engage in a victim-blaming logic that attributed rising racism to the increased presence of immigrants. Apart from the far-right AfD, even those conservative politicians which long opposed Germany's status as an immigration country have now acknowledged that Germany has transformed, as one expert and policy adviser explains:

the older immigrant generations, acquisition of German citizenship would mean the loss of privileges of Turkish nationality, not only pertaining to voting rights but also to property and inheritance rights. 1.5 million immigrants in Germany remain Turkish nationals, even after long-term residency in Germany, making up half of the overall Turkish-German immigrant population.

I've been working in the field of political consulting for many years now, and when you talk to people from the CDU/CSU, I don't know, ten years ago or 15 years ago you could have annoyed them if you had said: "Germany is an immigration country". If you do that now, then they say: "Yes, we are! This is an immigration country. We don't think that's good." It may well be that some people recognize that and say: "That's annoying, we'd rather have a birth rate, and we'd rather have, I don't know, something else." But I think the recognition, this is the way it is, is already complete. (GAC1: pos. 4)

This recognition is not a confident embrace of the fact, GAC1 explains, but rather mixed one between the "mode of regret and the mode of joy" (ibid.). The conservative CDU has undergone the most substantial transformation in the past 20 years, acknowledging the reality (and necessity) of immigration, albeit sometimes begrudgingly.

As mentioned previously, integration politics are managed by German states individually, an approach that makes sense considering the different immigration population levels between the states. Thus, we can observe a certain level of differentiation amongst the 16 states. The state that emerges as the most innovative and a 'trendsetter' here is North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's most populous state and also the one with the highest immigrant population (Schmidtke 2014: 87). It is the same state that set out to have the first integration ministry under Christian Democrat PM Armin Laschet in 2005–2006, who initiated the federal conference of integration ministers. Research shows that North-Rhine-Westphalia distinguishes itself by a pragmatic approach that is framed "in terms of the region's interests and the need to provide migrants with equitable opportunities in the educational sector and labour market" (ibid. 85). This pragmatism and "formalism" tend to coin a lot of integration policy at the state and regional levels, with one expert remarking: "It's more about the correct way to separate your rubbish than about Goethe" (GAC1: pos. 57). This demonstrates the multifaceted and at times contradictory approach to migration politics in Germany today. To a certain extent, Germany is in an on-going negotiation process with its status as an immigration country, as another expert explained, comparing this process with the psychological process of going through a crisis:

And the first [phase, FA] is ignorance or denial. And that was also the case in immigration. And then there is aggression. That you get angry, and you don't want to believe it. And then there is depression. That's when I always say, that's Sarrazin.[116] Germany is doing away with

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116 In 2010, Social Democrat politician (he has since left the party) and economist Thilo Sarrazin published a widely discussed book called "Germany abolishes itself: How we put our country in jeopardy" (Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aus Spiel setzen). In the book, Sarrazin argues that increased immigration, particularly from supposedly culturally inferior Muslim countries, has had a detrimental effect on Germany's overall economic performance.

itself. Fatalistic. Everything is over, but that's a phase. And then comes the phase of negotiation. *And I would say we are in the phase of negotiation at the moment.* (GAC2: pos. 56)

This process of negotiation, another expert claims, has laid bare the necessity for an overarching national strategy for migration politics, which Germany currently lacks. When asked about the possibility of having an immigration ministry, this expert points out that it is not so much a ministry that is needed. Rather, he stresses the need for an officially implemented approach that clearly articulates the relationship between immigration, integration, and citizenship in the German case to get rid of the "chaos" that currently exists, particularly regarding loopholes and parallel structures on the federal and state levels. These loopholes mean that some parts of the immigrant population are still not provided with the necessary support for lack of proper resources on the communal level. The lack of a clear strategy therefore means that the burden of managing day-to-day challenges lies at the communal level, with "unjust results, both for the immigrants and the communes" (GAC: pos. 9–10).

Overall, experts agree that Germany has undergone a fundamental shift in the last 15 to 20 years towards a more liberal approach to migration politics, and certainly one that embraces its status as an immigration country for the most part on an institutional and structural level. Pertinently, the on-going inherent ambivalence of the German case regarding migration politics was also reflected amongst the expert interviews. Some point out that there continues to be a disconnect between the everyday political challenges of migration politics and who oversees them, and the discourse on the federal level. This feeds into a prevailing political ambivalence towards migration politics, as hesitant experts like GPS5, quoted above, underline. Another expert highlights the fact that despite the significant changes, the political messaging on migration politics has continued to be contradictory:

It is so unbelievably contradictory, janus-faced, that it sometimes seems really bizarre to me when people talk today about why we have so many difficulties accepting certain things socially. If we have a very deeply rooted narrative of the rejection of immigration and how should we then counteract it? (GAC6, pos. 6)

This perspective is in stark tension to other experts, like GAC1, who claims that Germany has made its way from "the strange outsider" in migration politics to the "the moral superstar" of migration politics, taking that title away from Canada (GAC1: pos. 62).

His book sparked controversial public discussion on immigration and immigrants in Germany, many criticizing his arguments and problematic approach, others supporting his view.

Table 7.3: Germany–The Entrenchment Years, 2006–2020

Antecedent Conditions	Shock /Rupture	Critical Juncture	Mechanisms of Production	Legacy
Since 2006 formal institutionalization of integration politics Support of immigrant groups, funding in conferences National Integration Plan 2006	2015-2016 Large influx of over one million refugees/asylum seekers from i. a. Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq	2015-today Progressive Liberalization of Immigration on Labour, Education Structures of Humanitarian Immigrants strengthened		Normalization of Status as an Immigration Country

Source: Own research

7.5 Interim Conclusion: The Politics of 'Us' and 'Them' in the New Millennium

This chapter concludes the analyses of all three countries' migration politics trajectories in 2020. What has emerged from the analysis of their immigration, citizenship, and integration politics are three countries that have transformed tremendously in the last 70 years. The comparative chapter in the concluding part of this thesis will dive deeper into the transformations on a comparative level.

We can observe that Canada's model was further bifurcated during the Harper years. Attention ought to therefore be drawn to Canada's rhetorical self-representation under PM Trudeau, and the actual migration politics which have throughout the past 20 years become an economic expediency system with high levels of TFW recruitment. A final evaluation of this development will feature in the chapter on comparative results, including an analysis of the dynamics of the migration politics nexus in Canada.

Migration politics in France continue to be at the center in public discourse, while little has substantially changed in the last twenty years. This chapter has shown that this is due to an entrenched cleavage between the far right and the other political parties, in which the conservative, moderate, and left parties are worried of losing support if they soften their stance on migration politics. France is still among the most important immigration countries in Europe, but as a result of this on-going tension, it has retained the ambiguous migration politics nexus which emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s, coupling citizenship acquisition with highly selective labour immigration and contentious approaches to integration politics.

Germany experienced a role reversal in the 21st century, in which it finds itself as the most important immigration country after the United States. In this development, Germany often seems to be catching up politically with the changes it has already experienced structurally and institutionally. The next chapters present the major comparative insights gained from the previous analyses.

III. Comparative Results

The previous chapters have presented complex historical analyses which included the identification of critical junctures for the migration politics nexus in Canada, France, and Germany. As this substantial case-by-case analysis has drawn to a close, this final part of the thesis is dedicated to presenting the results of the analyses from a comparative perspective, both ***within-case across time*** and ***across-case***. To reiterate, the central research question guiding the work presented in this thesis inquires:

> How can we conceive of the commonalities and differences in the historical development of Canada, France, and Germany's immigration, citizenship, and integration politics since 1945?

This question warrants both within-case and across-case comparison. While the previous chapters have presented nine pertinent periods for all cases, showing their dynamic trajectories in migration politics in deep within-case analyses across the examined postwar period into the 21st century, the following chapters are dedicated to three tasks: 1. An account of the results of the critical junctures analyses ***within-case across time***. This includes an account of whether the examined periods qualify as critical junctures; 2. Discerning the ***differences and commonalities*** of the cases from the perspective of ***across-case*** comparison: 3. Summarizing the results of this thesis.

In chapter 8, I present the results on the first two tasks. Chapter 9 is dedicated to the to the final conclusion, thus the third task, including a brief synthesis of the insights provided throughout the first and second segments of the thesis, a reflection on the merit and the limitations of this research project, and an outlook for future research.

8. Dynamic Typologies of the Migration Politics Nexus in Canada, France, and Germany

This chapter serves to analyse and reflect on the results of the analyses in the previous chapters. I begin with the comparison of the possible critical junctures *within-case across time,* explaining my findings and reflecting on the methodological **insights gained on the critical juncture framework** in this thesis. Secondly, I offer *a comparison of the migration politics nexus across-case* to discern differences and commonalities across time. In the last step, I reflect on the **interactions in the nexus across time and cases**, using the insights gained from all three countries.

8.1 Critical Junctures and Migration Politics

In this thesis, critical junctures served as a methodological framework for the identification of periods of pivotal change in migration politics for each country case. To reiterate: According to comparativist David Collier, a critical juncture is "(1) *a concentrated period of innovation* that (2) *generates an enduring legacy".* Collier stresses that the production of a legacy is essential. Saliently, "the negative finding that a given episode is not a critical juncture is just as valuable as the positive finding that it is one" (Collier 2021, 34). To identify a critical juncture, its framework is comprised of five essential tenets: antecedent condition, a shock or rupture, the critical juncture, the productive mechanisms during the critical juncture, and the juncture's legacies (Collier and Munck 2017, 3; see also chapter 3.2.3).

  To apply this approach, I drew up an extensive tabular timeline of Canada's, France's, and Germany's migration politics history since 1945, and then identified possible critical junctures. At the end of the analysis conducted in this thesis, six of the nine identified periods, or two per country case, emerged as critical junctures, while the other three periods did not. In the following, I further explain and illustrate this finding. Both the tabular timeline and the tabular summaries of each country's critical junctures / important periods can be found in the appendix.

8.1.1 Critical Junctures for the Migration Politics Nexus in Canada

1945–1952	1967–1983	2006–2015
'The Canadian Citizenship Juncture'	'The Points System and Multiculturalism Juncture'	'The Harper Years'
✓	✓	☒

The first two examined periods for the Canadian case, 1945–1952 and 1976–1983 (within the broader context of 1962–1988) qualify as critical junctures since they meet all the conditions outlined above. The Harper Years period, while it was incisive, accelerated rather than reformed tendencies within the Canadian nexus. I elaborate on these findings in the following.

'The Canadian Citizenship Juncture', 1945–1953

The Canadian Citizenship Juncture was offset by the end of World War II, lasting from 1945 until 1953, when the Standing Committee on Migration and Citizenship concluded its research. During this time, Canada established its first institutional structures to become an immigration country independent from the British empire, notably through the introduction of official Canadian citizenship in 1947.

Antecedents and shock: As people from Canada had fought on the side of the Western Allies in two World Wars without any proper recognition of their being *de jure* Canadians (for want of such a status), voices were raised during the Second World War regarding the importance of a pan-Canadian identity. The Canadian government founded the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship (CCCC) during this time, tasking government departments with the investigation of the treatment of people in Canada who had settled in Canada who were not British subjects. The creation of the CCCC indicated that the government was starting to recognize that the current constellation would eventually have to change. Also, the CBC set up several large radio series about the contribution of different cultural groups within Canada to stress the plurality of population in an effort to foster solidarity for the war-effort amongst the Canadian population.

Critical Juncture: After the war, Canada quickly aimed to resume immigration, with statements by public officials stressing the need for immigration to grow the country's population and economy. The most meaningful

innovation during this time came in the form of official Canadian citizenship including a *ius soli* regulation, introduced in 1947 (which is therefore what I called this juncture). This status established formal Canadian citizenship which allowed people in Canada to become *de jure* Canadian, and therefore to formally belong to Canada. Other institutional innovations, such as the standing committee for research on migration from 1945–1953, and the creation of the Federal Immigration and Citizenship Department in 1950 manifested a substantial change in Canadian migration politics from settler-colonial immigration to the beginning of a state-led migration politics nexus. In 1952, Canada passed a comprehensive immigration law, which stipulated the focus on Europeans in immigrant selection.

Legacy: The legacy of this juncture is a strengthening of Canadian national self-conception independent of the British dominance, and the manifestation of immigration as a cornerstone for Canadian nation-building. Without these innovations, the next changes in the nexus could not have occurred.

'The Points System and Multiculturalism Juncture', 1967–1982
In the 1960s, 70s, and 90s, Canada's migration nexus changed significantly. The most innovations during the critical juncture occurred between 1967 and 1982, lasting from the introduction of the points system for immigrant selection to the constitutional entrenchment of multiculturalism as Canada's official approach to immigrant integration in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982.

Antecedents and Shock: Throughout the 1950s, there had been less availability of European immigrants, leading to first considerations that the strict criteria for European only immigration might not result in the number of immigrants Canada needed to maintain for sustained immigration into the country. After the atrocities of the Nazi regime, Canada, along with the rest of the world, was also undergoing a reckoning with the question of human rights. Conservative PM Diefenbaker introduced the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960, which, among other things, called for the end of discrimination on the basis of race or religion. In the years to follow, several laws came under scrutiny for their inability to meet the Bill's normative criteria. This included the 1952 immigration act, which openly discriminated on the basis of race and religion. Through an executive order-in-council, PM Diefenbaker ordered for race and religion to be dropped from immigrant selection criteria in 1962. This small change would eventually lead to an overhaul of Canadian immigrant selection.

In 1963, Liberal PM Pearson succeeded Diefenbaker. At this time, intra-Canadian tensions were on the rise, as Quebec was undergoing its Silent Revolution and was making demands to be acknowledged as distinct within Canada and be given concessions in policy accordingly. PM Pearson ordered the creation of the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963, which was initially supposed to investigate how to establish equality between Anglo- and Franco-Canadians. The work of this commission would eventually lead to the announcement of multiculturalism in 1971.

Critical Juncture: The critical juncture began with the introduction of the Canadian points system in 1967, a supposedly 'color-blind' system which afforded potential immigrants a number of points on the basis of their qualifications / profession, age, language capability and familiarity with Canada. The points system took effect in 1967, but only became entrenched in its own law in the 1976 Immigration Act.

In the meantime, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism had been at work and published their report, in which they pointed to the fact that Canada was not only bilingual, but multicultural. Building on this report, PM Pierre E. Trudeau, in office since 1968, announced an official policy of multiculturalism in a parliamentary speech in 1971.

The 1976 Immigration Act entrenched the points system and established the division of Canadian immigration between labour, family, and humanitarian 'streams'. The constitutional entrenchment of multiculturalism as Canada's official approach to cultural plurality generally, including immigrant integration, followed in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, concluding this critical juncture. It needs to be noted that by virtue of introducing the points system, Canada's immigrant population was diversifying, which reinforced the call for multiculturalism as a state doctrine.

Legacy: This critical juncture established the Canadian migration politics nexus which would remain the central constellation of Canada's model. This nexus combines the stringent selection of labour immigrants and the possibility family and humanitarian migration with swift citizenship acquisition for immigrants as well as multiculturalism as a mainstay for immigrant integration. This is also reflected in the fact that the nexus' constellation garnered cross-party consensus (e. g. the entrenchment of Multiculturalism in its own law by PM Mulroney in 1988). To be sure, all three constituent parts underwent modifications in the decades to follow (as the next section will show). However, none of these changes fundamentally undermined this nexus constellation or the Canadian status-quo in the long run.

The Period of the Harper Years, 2006–2015

The Harper years are the only period which do not qualify as a critical juncture for the Canadian case. This was surprising to me, since many expert interviews stressed how challenging his conservative stance on all aspects of migration politics was, and how his government's actions in migration politics undermined the Canadian status-quo of immigration through nation-building. However, the Harper period does not constitute a critical juncture for want of a clear legacy. Three reasons are often held up as the main indicators that Harper undermined the migration politics nexus: The increase in TFW recruitment and the economic expediency prioritization in permanent labor immigrant selection, his tightening of citizenship acquisition rules, and his exclusionary discourse towards certain immigrant groups, particularly Muslims.

Upon closer inspection, the first development did not have its origins with Harper – economic expediency had played a role for Canada since at least the 1990s, together with human capital selection. If anything, the Harper years accelerated both the economic expediency trend and the bifurcation between temporary and permanent immigration schemes. For instance, the Provincial Nominee Programs (PNPs) had started to emerge in the 1990s, at first as a concession to Quebec which was then extended to the other provinces. TFW admission had been part of Canada's immigration scheme since the 1950s, but the categories were broadened even before Harper took office, which increased their number exponentially. It is true that Trudeau maintained the Express Entry System and the Super Visa, both Harper policies, although the latter was significantly softened, therefore rolling back some of the more staunchly neoliberal elements of these programs. Also, Trudeau introduced pathways to permanency for TFWs, softening the bifurcation between temporary and permanent immigration. Overall, the maintenance of the Express Entry System does not provide enough of a legacy to argue that the Harper years constituted its own critical juncture.

The tightening of citizenship regulations and an exclusionary discourse towards Muslims were not maintained by the subsequent government. For one, Justin Trudeau specifically attacked Harper on his migration politics approach in the 2015 election campaign vehemently countering Harper's anti-Muslim rhetoric. My analysis showed that this election was unusually fought over migration politics. This included humanitarian immigration in particular, but also citizenship and integration politics. Harper had tightened the rules of citizenship acquisition, which Trudeau dropped once again after his election. As already pointed out, most experts agree that Trudeau's election win was due to his more liberal stance of migration politics. This already indicates a general

unwillingness by Canadians to accept the migration politics nexus shift through Harper.

8.1.2 Critical Junctures for the Migration Politics Nexus in France

1945–1950	1980–1987	2002–2012
'The Third Republic Return Juncture'	'The Far-right Cleavage Juncture'	'The Sarkozy Years'
✓	✓	☒

Like in Canada, the first two examined periods in France meet the criteria of a critical juncture, while the last one does not. In the following, I elaborate on this finding and explain how I came to these respective conclusions.

'The Third Republic Return Juncture', 1945–1950
The "Third Republic Return Juncture" from 1945 until 1950, immediately after the end of World War II, set the course for French migration politics for the following twenty years. Analytically, I struggled with the question of whether this period constituted a genuine critical juncture or a kind of 'return' to Third Republic migration politics. Below I conclude that this period's legacy is so distinct that it constitutes a critical juncture. I elaborate on this finding further below in the section on methodological insights for the critical juncture framework drawn from this thesis.

Antecedents and shock: Prior to WWII, France had been Europe's most important immigration country, at one point even overtaking the United States in immigrant arrivals during the 1920s. While the other two country cases had no clear migration politics nexus in place, France had already implemented a simplified nexus of migration politics in which citizenship acquisition acted both as the formalization of immigration and the conclusion of integration for immigrants. Often, this step was the only moment of state interaction in immigration processes. Immigration itself had occurred mostly uncontrolled, predominantly from neighbouring countries but also from countries in Eastern Europe, like Poland. Immigration was a welcome and relatively uncontroversial tool to grow the French population. WWII ended this constellation and during the Vichy years, France was forced to adopt an exclusionary citizenship regime. Hardly any immigration occurred at this time. After German

occupation and the dissolution of the Vichy regime, even prior to the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1946, immigration was taken up again.

Critical Juncture: Lasting from 1945–1950, several mechanisms of production occurred. In 1945, two ordinances were issued by the interim French government. One called for the resumption of immigration as well as the return to Third Republic citizenship regulations. The resumption of immigration should, counter to the Third Republic procedure, occur in a more systematic and state-led manner. For this, a new agency was founded, the *Office National d'Immigration* (ONI) in 1945. In 1946, the ONI was also charged with facilitating family reunification for immigrants. In the same year, the Fourth Republic was established. As part of this establishment, French colonial subjects were given formal French citizenship facilitating their free movement to the metropole from here on. This led to a significant influx of people from colonized French Algeria and other parts of the French colonial empire in the decade to come, prior to decolonization. In 1950, France founded a Population Ministry in charge of managing immigration, immigrant integration, and overall population growth.

In the postwar years, there had been on-going discussions on whether and how to select prospective immigrants. Some parts of the government were of the view that France should prioritize people from Western Europe both in its immigration and naturalization policy. This included Charles de Gaulle. The arguments for such a selection were based on the perceived easier assimilability of these prospective immigrants to France. However, these discussions were abandoned as early as 1952. France also introduced integration measures to facilitate long-term settlement including for support for the immersion in the labour market and in education.

Legacy: In the five years after the end of WWII, France re-emerged as an immigration country. This included its previous attributes, such as swift citizenship attainment, as well as integration measures and measures that reflected the state's intent to manage immigrant selection more thoroughly (although this would fail, as the next period shows). According to the analysis, French officials ostensibly intended a return to the Third Republic's simplified nexus. What distinguishes this nexus from its previous simplified iteration during the Third Republic is the clear articulation of immigration management by the state (which had previously been comparatively unmanaged), as well as the intent to support immigrant settlement more thoroughly. Also, the extension of full French citizenship to some parts of the colonial population in 1946 would have inadvertent but significant effects on the composition of the French

immigrant population. These innovations led to a new constellation in the nexus, the legacy of which prevailed into the late 20th century.

The Far-Right Cleavage Juncture, 1981–1988
The second analyzed period covered a large timeframe from 1974 to 1993. Within this timeframe, it is the period between 1981 to 1988 which qualifies as a critical juncture. Within these years, the socialist government briefly attempted to further liberalize migration politics but received pushback not only from the center right, but also from a growing far-right party, which centered immigration as its single issue by the mid-1980s. Throughout the 1980s, France experienced intense discussions on the presence of immigrants, particularly those from former colonies, and their right to become French. It is during this time that a significant political cleavage on immigration emerged, with far-reaching consequences for French migration politics in the long run.

Antecedents and shock: Throughout the 1950 and 60s and into the early 1970s, France experienced large-scale, largely unmanaged immigration from neighbouring countries as well as its (former) colonies. This came to an abrupt halt as the economic crisis sparked by the oil shock led France, like other European countries, to impose an immigration stop in 1974. After this stop, the period from 1974 to 1980 is marked by political inertia on migration politics, as France grappled with the economic crisis and the realization that a large number of those who had immigrated would not leave of their own accord despite the recession. A realization of the permanency of a large immigrant population which was composed of many immigrants from (by now) former French colonies led to a proposal by the conservative President Giscard d'Estaing to forcefully expel North Africans in 1980, which never came into action because it was countered by the left.

Critical Juncture: Socialist President Mitterrand was elected in 1981 on a platform that promised the liberalization of migration politics, including more anti-discrimination measures, better integration policy, and easier access to family unification. Mitterrand's progressive stance on migration politics arose concomitant to the activist mobilization of second and third generation immigrants, who demanded recognition and support in the early 1980s. However, this brief period of openness was stunted by the success of the single-issue anti-immigration FN and their leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in several elections in the following years. As my analysis shows, the rise of the FN not only blocked any form of progress in migration politics, but their increasing success also hampered the previously established nexus. The FN's election to French Parliament

brought with it numerous proposals to reverse French citizenship law to impede on the possibilities of second-generation immigrants to become French. The other parties tried to catch up with the FN's exclusionary stance. In the first cohabitation government with a socialist President and a conservative PM between 1986–1988, the conservatives took up the suggestions of impeding on the possibility to naturalize. This suggestion initially did not pass, but the cleavage had been established.

Legacy: By the second cohabitation government between 1988–1993, any attempts to liberalize migration politics by President Mitterrand had been abandoned. Conservatives united with the far right in claiming that France no longer wanted or needed any immigration, and the left also conceded that there might be a 'tolerance level' that had been reached. The 1974 immigration stop was maintained. The conservative cohabitation government introduced the *Manifestation de Volonté* for second generation immigrants, asking them to declare their willingness to become French and therefore taking away from the traditional double *ius soli* right, which had been part of French citizenship politics since 1870. Although this regulation was abolished in 1997, when a left-wing government took power, this had demonstrated the willingness of the far right to break with the French status quo on migration politics. As the final analyzed period shows, the 'far right versus the rest' cleavage on migration politics remains pertinent until today.

The Period of the Sarkozy Years, 2002–2012

The final period examined for the French case spanned the time that the conservative politician Nicolas Sarkozy oversaw French migration politics, first as Interior Minister and later as President, 2002–2012. His time in charge of migration politics was tumultuous and full of migration politics innovations to the extent that it could have qualified as a critical juncture. However, Sarkozy's migration politics and attempts to take the matter away from the far right failed to produce a legacy. If anything, this period entrenched the cleavage between the far right and the rest even further, leading to an enduring stalemate on migration politics in France.

To understand these developments, it is important to recognize that the migration politics cleavage in France was nourished mainly by questions on humanitarian immigration, clandestine immigration, and, not least, the integration (or perceived lack thereof) of second and third generation immigrants. The latter became highly politicized in the aftermath of the 2005 *banlieues* riots. Therefore, when Sarkozy re-opened high-paid and / or high-skilled immigration in 2006 for the first time since 1974, conceding to the necessity of this

kind of immigration for the French economy, this was seen as less controversial.

With his promise to solve the issue of integration in the *banlieues* and develop France's migration policy further with a focus on economic advantages *("choisie, pas subie"*), Sarkozy was elected president in 2007. He attempted several policy and institutional innovations, such as a French ministry for immigration, integration, and national identity and a 'Marshall plan' for the *banlieues*. However, the ministry was short-lived, and the plan did not come to fruition. Overall, the migration politics nexus became further entrenched during this time, with the small caveat that France now allowed selective and limited labour immigration. Neither of Sarkozy's successors, the socialist Hollande, or the centrist Macron, have attempted to significantly alter the French status quo, once again pointing to the entrenched division between far right and the rest in French society.

8.1.3 Critical Junctures for the Migration Politics Nexus in Germany

1949–1953	1989–1999	2006–2020
'The Co-Ethnic Immigration Juncture'	'The Transformation Juncture'	'The Entrenchment Years'
✓	✓	☒

As in Canada and France, the first two analysed periods for the German case qualify as a critical juncture, whereas the third does not. In the following, I elaborate on this finding.

The Co-Ethnic Immigration Juncture, 1949–1953
In the immediate postwar years, defeated Nazi Germany was dissolved and the German territory was occupied. The actual critical juncture therefore lasts from 1949, upon the founding of the Federal Republic, to 1953, concluding with the establishment of the Ministry for Resettlers and Refugees. It is in this time that the newly founded Germany emerged with a fully developed migration politics nexus, albeit limited to co-ethnic immigrants.

Antecedents and Shock: Germany prior to Nazi rule had no migration politics nexus, and the conception of an ethnic German people was entrenched in

the 1913 RuStaG. The atrocities committed during the 12-year period of Nazi dictatorship and the destruction wrought by the Second World War fundamentally altered Germany.[117] The allies soon united in their view that the defeat of Nazi Germany required the creation of a new political system. In the aftermath of the war, millions of people arrived on German territory as expellees, refugees, and DPs. Expellees and refugees were received, albeit at times begrudgingly, with an acknowledgment of the permanency of their immigration. DPs' residency was conceived as strictly temporary.

Critical Juncture: The critical juncture in migration politics took place between 1949 and 1953. In the 1949 Basic Law, the Federal Republic reiterated its conception of an ethnic German people. Also, the Federal Republic re-adopted the 1913 RuStaG, including the *ius sanguinis* approach, as its citizenship law. This would allow for the absorption of the large number of resettlers and expellees from the East, because it affirmed their status as part of the German people. Discussions on the re-adoption of the RuStaG also point to the fact that the Federal Republic perceived the division of Germany as a temporary status and wanted to reaffirm the belonging of people from East Germany to the German people. This also meant that those fleeing from the East in the decades to come could count on being received as Germans. What sets this period apart as a critical juncture is the establishment of a pronounced integration and citizenship politics framework for resettlers, and to a lesser extent, humanitarian refugees, in the early 1950s. Resettlers were supported in housing and education, offering them extensive integration measures. Citizenship acquisition, which despite the 1913 RuStaG had been complicated, was facilitated further in 1953. In 1953, the Federal Republic also founded its own Ministry for the issues of Resettlers and Refugees.

Legacy: This migration politics nexus would endure until 1989, despite the large-scale immigration of foreign workers throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Their presence was intended to be temporary and explicitly not for permanent settlement, which is why the nexus was not broadened to account for them.

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117 It ought to be reiterated that the Nazis used foreign labour extensively during the war, in the form of forced and indentured labourers from Eastern and West Europe. This exploitation, particularly harsh on Eastern European forced labourers, was emblematic of their hateful condescension towards people they considered inferior.

The Transformation Juncture, 1990–2000
The next examined period which ushered in significant change in migration politics lasted from the introduction of a more liberal citizenship law in 1990, to the eventual adoption of *ius soli* for second generation immigrants in 2000. This period qualifies as a critical juncture because of its far-reaching legacy. It marked the transformation of Germany from an exclusive co-ethnic immigration country with an according nexus, to denser nexus that allows for the immigration, integration, and citizenship acquisition for people outside of the co-ethnic group.

Antecedents and shock: Since the 1950s, Germany had received a large number of so-called 'guest workers' from Southern Europe and Turkey through labour policy accords which stipulated their strictly temporary residence in Germany. After the immigration stop in 1973, a significant proportion of those who had come for temporary labour chose to remain in Germany. By the end of the 1980s, Germany had a sizeable immigration population, the majority of which was from Turkey. The conservative German government put up the proverbial blinders to this development and reacted with the reiteration of the mantra that Germany is not and does not want to be an immigration country. Ostensibly, the co-ethnic immigration paradigm was to be maintained. By the end of the 1980s, the Federal Republic was suffering from an economic downturn which only intensified calls for the limitation of the German immigrant population. In 1989, two separate unconnected events occurred, which would affect German migration politics: conservative interior minister Schäuble introduced a new foreigner law which included the entitlement to naturalisation for any foreigner present for 15 years. This effectively ended the previous citizenship paradigm, in which naturalization was only afforded on strict discretionary grounds, without any claim. On November 9, 1989, the Berlin wall fell, starting the process of unification.

Critical Juncture: Unification formally occurred in October 1990, when the GDR was dissolved, and East Germany became part of the Federal Republic. In the years following unification, the breakdown and subsequent civil war in (now former) Yugoslavia as well as the overall system collapse in Eastern Europe led to the arrival of several different immigrant groups to Germany: refugees, asylum seekers, and people from Eastern Europe making use of their freedom of movement to go to Germany and apply as immigrants through the co-ethnic immigration scheme. Very quickly, the Federal Republic became overwhelmed with the large number of immigrants arriving concomitant with the process of establishing itself as a newly unified country and with a looming

economic crisis, which had started in the late 1980s and had been stalled only a little by unification enthusiasm.

Starting in 1991, Germany saw a rise in violence against nominal foreigners in both East and West Germany. In the East, a lot of the violence was directed towards newly arriving asylum seekers as well as GDR contract workers, whereas the attacks in the West were also directed towards people who had been long-term residents or born in Germany. The government condemned the attacks, but also ushered in a restriction of asylum laws in the so-called asylum compromise in 1993 to reduce the number of arrivals. In the same year, in reaction to the large number of applicants through to the co-ethnic immigration scheme, the German government also introduced an annual quota for co-ethnic immigrants, which marked the beginning of its roll-back of the co-ethnic immigration paradigm. Through unification, the maintenance of this paradigm had lost one of its major rationales: to keep the door open to possible unification and underline the provisional status of Germany's division.

With all of these developments, the middle of the 1990s saw an increase in discussions on Germany's citizenship law, which despite its 15-year *ius domicili* naturalization claim introduced in 1990 did not provide for the naturalization of second generation immigrants born in Germany. This had led to the ongoing growth of Germany's nominal foreigner population, as children of the second and third generation 'inherited' their parents' foreigner status. Increasingly, it appeared that this situation was untenable. In 1998, Germany elected a new government, ushering out the long reign of the conservative Kohl government together with its 'not an immigration country' mantra, which had resisted any fundamental change to Germany's migration politics nexus. The new red-green government swiftly introduced a new citizenship law which included the reduction of *ius domicili* to eight years and introduced *double ius soli* for second generation immigrants. With this, Germany had begun to fundamentally transform its migration politics nexus.

Legacy: In the post-unification years, co-ethnic immigration lost its precedence, leading to the abandonment of the specific focus on this immigrant group. Also, second generation immigrant children could now attain German citizenship by birth, a concession to the large and established immigrant population in Germany, which until now had largely remained nominal foreigners. In 2000, Germany's red-green government instated an independent commission on immigration, led by conservative MP Rita Süssmuth. This commission's report, published in 2001, reaffirmed the perspective which had replaced Kohl's non-immigration country insistence: Germany had become a de-facto immigration country in the last fifty years. Policy recommendations included

the introduction of an immigration law for skilled labour immigrants modeled after the Canadian approach. This law followed in 2005. By the time that the red-green government was succeeded by a conservative government in 2005, a cross-party consensus on the reality of Germany's de-facto immigration country status had emerged. To be sure, politicians on both sides, but particularly form the conservative camp, accepted the irreversibility of this reality begrudgingly, not with enthusiasm. That said, the conservative government entrenched the 2005 law's call for a comprehensive framework for immigrant integration through an institutionalization of integration politics in the years to come. Germany's new nexus had now fully emerged.

The Entrenchment Years, 2006–2020
The final period analyzed in the German case lasts from 2006 to 2020. I analysed this period with the possibility of identifying a critical juncture following the large-scale arrival of refugees and asylum seekers in 2015. I concluded, however, that 2015 did not spark a critical juncture.

As described above, Germany's migration politics nexus had transformed between 1990 and 2006. In all three constituent areas, Germany was now open to the immigration, long-term settlement and eventual naturalization of people from everywhere, provided they fulfill the criteria for labour immigration, family reunification, or asylum. This development was not met with widespread enthusiasm, but rather a mixture of pragmatism and concession to the reality of economic needs. Some parts of the political spectrum, such as the right-wing AfD, argued against this development and called for a clear restriction of immigration to Germany, particularly in the area of humanitarian immigration. This occurred together with the Europe-wide rise in refugee and asylum seeker numbers as an effect of the on-going crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the civil war in Syria. This development came to a head in 2015, when conservative chancellor Angela Merkel decided to suspend the European Dublin agreement and allow asylum seekers who had been stranded in Hungary (which was refusing to process them) to come to Germany. In 2015 and 2016, over one million people arrived in Germany to apply for asylum.

Without a doubt, 2015 stands out as an exceptional year in the history of German immigration. The international headlines came with pictures of swathes of people hurrying to support newly arriving humanitarian immigrants. The widespread public support for their admission, as well as the willingness to commit to volunteering positions, was unprecedented. However, my analysis shows that contrary to some perspectives in the media at the time and some international academic commentators on these events, 2015 did not usher

in the fundamental transformation of Germany's migration politics nexus. This transformation had already occurred. The significance of 2015 may best be understood on the level of public discourse, in which support for the admission of a large number of people for their permanent settlement was wide-spread and (initially) largely uncontested. This was often contrasted with the violence against asylum seekers in the early 1990s. However, some of this support given was fickle, and easily swayed. The mood shifted by the end of 2015, with attacks on women in Cologne during New Years Eve, committed largely by men of North African origin. The swift shift in public opinion following these attacks reifies the ambivalence that Germany continues to hold towards its status as Europe's most important immigration even today.

8.1.4 Methodological Insights for Critical Junctures from this Research Project

Critical Junctures were a central part of my research approach and a helpful tool for discerning different meaningful periods of change for all three countries. Out of the nine analyzed periods in this thesis, I concluded that merely six constitute genuine critical junctures as defined in the academic literature, while the rest do not qualify. Reflecting on the methodological application of critical junctures, I believe that this project contributes to the critical juncture literature in three meaningful ways.

Renewal or Reversion? I categorized the period following World War II as critical junctures for all three of the cases. For both Canada and France this could be disputed. For the Canadian case, I can show that the introduction of Canadian citizenship was a meaningful change that sparked the introduction of a new postwar migration politics nexus that allowed for the creation of *de jure* Canadians. For the French case, however, it could be argued that the postwar developments were merely a reversion to the pre-war Third Republic status quo. However, I showed that sufficient institutional innovation took place to argue that the migration politics nexus was newly established postwar. Nevertheless, it is helpful to draw attention to the fact that many of the French regulations, and not least France's self-conception as an immigration country was strongly connected to the Third Republic, to the point that it could be classified as a reversion. It is possible that the reversion to a revered former political period can be sparked through a shock like the war. A similar development could be observed in the German case, where the postwar citizenship law was taken from the Wilhelmine period. However, the otherwise complete overhaul

of the political system, in particular regarding the special provisions for co-ethnic immigrants, qualify this period as a critical juncture for the German case.

Transformation or Acceleration? As Collier explains in his definition of a critical juncture, even identifying that a possible critical juncture is not one can be an insightful finding. This is the case for two periods studied in the analysis, Canada 2006–2015 and Germany 2006–2015 (with the time until 2020 considered for legacies of those periods). Major events can often be misidentified as triggering a critical juncture when they possibly just accelerated political transformations that were already under way. In these episodes, this was the case. The election of PM Stephen Harper and his subsequent tough and conservative stance on migration politics is often characterized as a rupture with the Canadian paradigm. After the Liberal election win in 2015, PM Justin Trudeau rolled back many of the more conservative innovations in citizenship and multiculturalism, but largely maintained the economic expediency approach to immigration. However, a closer look at the historical developments shows that the bifurcation of immigration and the economic expediency approach were not genuine 'Harperian' innovations. This period therefore accelerated rather than transformed the developments in immigration, with increasing TFW recruitment and PNPs originating in the 1990s. Harper's conservative stance on citizenship and integration was done away with once Trudeau was in power. Therefore, while the Harper years posed a challenge to the migration politics nexus, they do not constitute a critical juncture. In Germany, the events of 2015 are often held as a turning point for German migration politics. The analysis shows that this was not the case. If anything, 2015 accelerated developments which had been under way for the past decade at least. It demonstrated a transformation that already been under way and accelerated the German self-conception as an immigration country, albeit reluctantly for a significant part of the population. Therefore, we can see that what might present as a critical juncture could merely be an acceleration of developments that had already been under way, and it is helpful to distinguish between a genuine transformation and a mere acceleration.

Legacy or Entrenchment? Since the major qualifying indicator for a critical juncture is a demonstrable legacy, the final period that did not qualify as a critical juncture was the Sarkozy reign in France between 2002 and 2012. Several events, such as the 2005 *banlieues* riots, once again increased public and political attention to matters of immigration and, more importantly, integration. Sarkozy took charge of these matters as interior minister and then later as president, promising much and even institutionalizing a new ministry for immigration, integration and national identity in 2009. However, the ministry was

shut down after merely two years and Sarkozy left office with no palpable legacy in migration politics, only a number of failed projects in these matters. If anything, his time in office further entrenched the political cleavage on migration politics had become, and his attempts to take the matter away from the far right failed miserably. Since his reign, no politician in power, of no matter what *couleur*, has succeeded in mitigating the cleavage on migration politics.

8.2 Comparative Insights on Canada, France, and Germany by Period

In this section, I focus on the cases' respective migration politics nexus to discern the commonalities and differences between the three countries across-case and across time. While the perspective of comparison is different to the previous subchapter, some insights from above may be reiterated to highlight important insights.

8.2.1 Comparing the Migration Politics Nexus before the End of World War II

Prior to WWII, France, Canada, and Germany had few things in common regarding their migration politics, with only rudimentary nexus constellations present in each country. The systematic management and control of immigration had only emerged with the establishment of nation states in the late 19th century, paired with an increase in the ability of states to formally register and document their populations. Nevertheless, some initial manifestations of the nexus could be observed in the latter half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, as this section shows.

Prior to 1947, inhabitants of Canada by status were either British subjects, immigrants, or Indigenous people. Canadian citizenship existed as an extension of British subjecthood. The establishment of Canada as a federal dominion of the British empire brought with it first efforts to recruit immigrants to boost the population. In a series of explicitly exclusionary policies, it became clear that the kind of immigrants desired were those mirroring the demographic make-up of most of the settlers which were already in Canada: White, preferably Northern European, Christian immigrants. These preferences endured into the early 1960s. However, it was during the WWII that first public state-level discussions and institutional efforts concerning Canadian identity as distinct

from British identity emerged, forging the path towards independent Canadian citizenship and a conception of Canadian identity as independent from the British Empire. This was bolstered by public broadcasts on Canadian cultural plurality during WWII, ostensibly to foster solidarity amongst Canadians of different European origins. This shows, however, that conceptions of Canadian cultural plurality were limited to people from Europe. Notably, these considerations omitted the presence of Indigenous Canadians, a precursor to their enduring absence from discussions on Canadian cultural plurality until later in the century. Settler colonialism was therefore sanctified and entrenched as natural and unquestionable in the creation and further state-building of Canada.

Canada's migration politics nexus was not fully articulated during this period. Migration politics are managed through a combination of racialized immigrant selection, a yet absent citizenship regime due to its status as a British colonial dominion, and the facilitation of integration through the selection of immigrants deemed 'suitable'. Additionally, there were first attempts to foster notions of cultural plurality amongst European immigrant groups.

In France, first iterations of the migration politics nexus emerged from the start of its establishment as an immigration country in the mid-19th century with the establishment of a liberalized citizenship law in 1851, entrenched during the Third Republic starting in 1870. It was during this time that immigration became and stayed part and parcel of French demographic politics until a century later, with the exception of the Vichy years. Immigration was an important source for increasing the workforce and, not least, to strengthen France's military might. This included the swift establishment of citizenship politics as an instrument for immigration in the liberal *Code de la Nationalité* (Nationality Code) in 1889, which established *ius soli* for second generation immigrants and remains in place even today. People from neighboring countries immigrated freely and their immigration was then formalized upon citizenship attainment. In the early 20th century, France also began to actively recruit labour from its neighbouring countries in several bilateral accords, a precursor to the foreign labour recruitment policy that would impact so much of Western Europe in the latter half of the 20th century. In fact, immigration to France was so encouraged and facile that France overtook the United States in its importance as an immigration country worldwide in 1927, at the heels of an even further liberalization of its citizenship and naturalization law.

The Third Republic coined France's reputation as Europe's oldest and most important immigration country during this period. The principles set in place during this time would continue to influence migration politics in the Fourth and Fifth Republics. In terms of integration politics, little was done. After immigration, long-term settlement was formalized with the admission into the

republic as a citizen through the process of naturalisation. There was no intermediary period that the state had much control over.

Notably, citizenship had also become a sorting device for the French Imperial Empire during the same period. French colonizers grouped imperial populations as either subjects or citizens by different degrees. This was formalized in the *Code de l'Indigénat* (Indigenous Code), which originated in the French-Algerian administration and was then applied throughout the French Empire. The implications of colonial citizenship politics were most pertinently reflected in imperial Algeria, where the Algerian Jewish population was granted full French citizenship, while the Algerian Muslim population remained 'indigenous subjects'. These developments would have repercussions for French migration politics in the latter half of the 20th century. Under Nazi occupation and during the Vichy government, France rolled back all liberal citizenship politics, in addition to denationalizing French Jews and political opponents to the regime. However, postwar France quickly tried to return to its Third Republic status quo on immigration. *France's migration politics throughout the Third Republic were characterised by openness to (mostly uncontrolled) immigration, as well as a pronounced interaction between immigration and citizenship acquisition as the main formal instrument for immigrant integration into the nation. The migration politics nexus existed in a simplified version during this time.*

Based on the research presented on the historical origins of German migration politics, Germany had ample experience with immigration prior to the 1950s. Immigration from neighboring countries, particularly from Poland, had been a constant feature of a country whose geographical location surrounded by almost a dozen different countries naturally entails cross-border population mobility and settlement. However, developments in Germany of the late 19th century reflect an opposite approach to French migration politics of the Third Republic. In the 1870s and 1880s, the increase in Eastern European Jewish and Polish immigration was perceived with concern and impeded through policy. In a similar vein, Prussian officials expressed concerns over 'foreign infiltration' regarding this specific immigration. To counter this, policies of forced 'Germanization' were implemented as early precursors to what may be considered integration politics.

In stark contrast to France, naturalization was the exception in Germany, based on the 1913 RuStaG law that prioritized the principle of *ius sanguinis*, part of the conception of an ethnically defined German people. The 1913 RuStaG set the tone for the further development of an exclusive national identity which left little room for the acceptance of newcomers. *The migration*

politics nexus during this period was therefore characterized by control, exclusion, and refusal of settlement, thus by its absence.

The Nexus of Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics, late 19th century until 1944

Canada (until 1944)	Absent nexus. First interaction between immigration and integration politics through strategic immigrant selection.
France (until 1939)	Simplified immigration-integration nexus. Citizenship acquisition as the main instrument to formalize (largely uncontrolled) immigration and for integration into the republic.
Germany (until 1933)	Absent nexus.

This shows that even prior to the end of the Second World War, the three countries had comparatively divergent approaches to migration politics. Since there was no formal status of Canadian citizenship, immigrants to Canada of non-British, non-French descent remained immigrants by legal status. France's use of citizenship as its main instrument of migration politics could be considered as the most pronounced first iteration of a migration politics in comparison with that of the other countries at the time. Germany's experience with migration politics prior to the Second World War was modest. There was no conception of Germany as a country facilitating immigration paired with long-term settlement, a view that recurred after WWII. WWII interrupted developments in migration politics on all fronts for all three countries, with the slight exception of Canada, where the necessity for a unified national identity emerged as one of the concerns of Canadian subjects including Brits and immigrants fighting alongside the Allied Forces. France experienced a roll-back of its comparatively pronounced migration politics during the Vichy years.

8.2.2 Comparing the Migration Politics Nexus in the Postwar Years

All three countries developed institutional structures for immigration in the postwar period, albeit exclusively for co-ethnic immigration in the German case. For France and Canada, the late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by similar concerns: Canada preferred the immigration of Europeans until the

early 1960s, while France had formally abandoned this preference in naturalization by the early 1950s and informally in immigration by the late 1950s.

Using the nexus as an analytical tool shows that the establishment of independent Canadian citizenship in 1947 was pivotal for the Canadian case. The implementation of citizenship acquisition for first-generation immigrants based on comparatively brief *ius domicili* and fully-fledged *ius soli* for second generation immigrants, allowed for the further institutionalization of Canadian migration politics as a distinct political field independent from its on-going colonial ties to the United Kingdom.

After WWII, the group of desired immigrants was hesitantly broadened to all Europeans, stepping away from a focus on Northern Europeans. Nevertheless, in a widely cited speech by Liberal PM Mackenzie King, the conviction that undesired immigration of 'Orientals' should be stemmed was clearly articulated. However, the establishment of institutional structures, such as the Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship in 1950 and the implementation of the Immigration Act in 1952, pointed to the intention of creating a sustainable immigration country in the long-term. This period therefore marks the beginning of the devolution of the settler colonial model of immigration. *After the critical juncture of the postwar years, Canada's migration politics nexus emerged as more interactive, facilitated by the institutionalization of independent Canadian citizenship. The focus on European immigration was maintained, although broadened to European groups which were hitherto not considered appropriate candidates for immigration.*

In France, developments in the postwar years bear a striking resemblance to the Canadian case. The shock of WWII and the roll-back of civic and democratic rights during the Vichy years left a deep mark on France. The newly instated French government facilitated a swift return to Third Republic style migration politics order as early as 1945 – not only because a return was normatively desired, but also out of the necessity to quickly fill the demographic gap that the war years had left in France. This is remarkable because these changes were made even before the constitution of the Fourth Republic, pointing the urgency that French authorities felt regarding this issue and the normative desire to return the Third Republic status quo on migration politics. Going even further than in the prewar years, institutional structures such as the *Office National d'Immigration* (ONI) were introduced to manage migration at the state-level.

There were tensions in the early postwar years as to what kind of immigration should be facilitated, or rather, what immigrant origins where desired. The infighting of demographers and high-ranking politicians on a more selective, Northern European focus in immigrant recruitment versus a focus on anybody

with the right skillset needed in France led to contradictory messaging by the French government. Like his Canadian counterpart Mackenzie King, French President de Gaulle underlined the importance of cultural compatibility for the selection of immigrants, articulating a preference for Northern Europeans or Southern Europeans from the Northern parts of their respective countries (i. e. North Italians or North Spaniards). However, he was overruled by members of his own government, who chose a more pragmatic approach. Not least, such an approach became untenable due to the increase in immigration of people from the French colonial empire.

Shortly after the end of WWII, due to a newly afforded citizenship status to French colonial subjects in the 1946 constitution of the Fourth Republic, immigration from Algeria and other (at this time still French-colonized) countries took off and quickly outnumbered those who were recruited by the ONI. This marked the beginning of more than two decades of open-door immigration with little influence on the origins of immigrants by the French state. The reinstatement of liberal citizenship acquisition rules from the prewar years further facilitated this development: Immigrants were widely perceived as future citizens. The similarities with the Canadian case during this period are striking, with the important difference of geopolitical circumstances, with classic sending countries like Spain and Italy right next door, as well as the colonial entanglements which started to impact immigration at this time and would further evolve to significantly impact the nexus in France in the long run. *The migration politics nexus in this period emerges as similar to the previous period, as citizenship remained as a tool for long-term settlement and integration remained at the nexus's core, a legacy of the Third Republic. Due to colonial ties, the crucial difference lay in the attempted state control of immigration (though failed in the long run). Immigrant origins were diversifying significantly. Also, in contrast to the Third Republic, integration politics became more pronounced, including a range of social measures (family reunification, education, insurance measures) for settling immigrants.*

Developments in Germany did not mirror those in France or Canada. Due to the downfall of the Nazi regime, the first few years after the war were characterized by the re-establishment of political order and democratization processes which took on different forms depending on the occupied territory. The immediate postwar years also saw the arrival of millions of war refugees and expellees on occupied German territory, a number which would later account for almost a fourth of the West German population. By virtue of this large-scale influx, in addition to the separation of Germany between the Western Allies-occupied West and the Russian-occupied East, Germany's 1949 Federal Republic Basic Law introduced a notion of the German people that based

belonging on ancestral connection. This meant that anybody of proven German ancestry in Eastern Europe, and any East German resident of the German Democratic Republic could lay claim to belonging to the German people and therefore, to German citizenship. This was strengthened by the reinstatement of the 1913 RuStaG which used *ius sanguinis* as its underlying citizenship principle.

For those arriving with this claim, settlement was facilitated in housing, labour, and education, in short: Structures for the integration of co-ethnic immigrants were swiftly provided. The immigration of others beyond co-ethnics was not intended. Therefore, all co-ethnic immigrants were 'citizens in waiting', all other immigrants were not. They were nominal foreigners, and remained so as a rule, with naturalization as the absolute exception. *The migration politics nexus in Germany in this period reflects the establishment of a pronounced nexus for co-ethnic immigrants, including the granting of citizenship and wide-ranging settlement and integration measures, while the nexus continued to be absent for those outside of the co-ethnic immigration group.*

The Migration Politics Nexus established in the Postwar Years

Canada 1945–1952	Migration politics nexus emerges exclusively for European immigration (as an instrument for later integration), with established independent citizenship law enabling swift acquisition of citizenship.
France 1945–1950	Migration politics nexus (re-)emerges, initial state preference for European immigration, instauration of liberal citizenship law, facilitation of immigration of colonial citizens, settlement provisions for immigrants conceived of as citizens-in-waiting.
Germany 1948–1953	Co-ethnic migration politics nexus emerges with corresponding integration and citizenship politics for one specific immigrant group, excluding long-term immigration and settlement of people outside of the co-ethnic group.

Remarkably, all three countries swiftly developed coherent migration politics in all three of the examined areas, with the exclusion of non-European, and in the German case, non-German, immigrants. Canada maintained this model until the early 1960s, while the French prioritization of Northern European immigration broke down and shifted as earlier in the 1950s, due to both normative objections on the administrative level as well as growing immigration from the colonies. However, an official change to French migration politics in law would not be implemented until 1980. Germany maintained its chosen nexus

approach until 1989, despite the large-scale immigration of labour immigrants, called 'guest workers', almost throughout this whole period.

8.2.3 Comparing the Migration Politics Nexus in the mid- to late 20th Century

It is in the middle to late 20th century that Canada develops a strongly interactive nexus of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics, while France, inversely, experiences an attempted devolution of migration politics nexus, and the emergence of a significant political cleavage on migration politics. Germany comes to terms with its de facto status as an immigration country throughout the 1990s and slowly but surely prepares for a political transformation away from its previously staunch aversion to being an immigration country beyond the prioritization of co-ethnic immigration.

Canada experienced an overhaul of its migration politics nexus from the 1960s to the 1980s, particularly on the level of immigration and integration politics, with citizenship politics remaining largely constant throughout this time. At the end of conservative PM Diefenbaker's term in 1962, Canada dropped religion and race from its immigration regulations through an order-in-council. What was just meant to be an amendment to the existent policies would eventually result in a reconstitution of the entirety of Canadian society. The focus on Northern Europeans had become untenable if immigration numbers were to remain relatively high to maintain economic strength. By dropping race and religion from its recruitment criteria, Canada enlarged its potential immigrant pool significantly and effectively dropped its 'White Canada' immigration approach that had coined immigrant admission for the first half of the 20th century. Some researchers have argued that the change in the 1962 regulations occurred due to the postwar normative context. According to my analysis this is partially correct, although I would not agree with the contention that it was international pressure that led to Canada's shift. Rather, PM Diefenbaker's commitment to a Canadian society constituted of more than two 'founding races', the British and the French, paired with the introduction of his anti-discrimination Bill of Rights enacted in 1960 were more impactful in this process. In the year following this immigration amendment, a new government took power under liberal PM Pearson. Doubling down on the 1962 regulations, the Pearson government introduced the well-known 'color-blind' points system for immigration in 1968, institutionally entrenching and adding concrete guidelines to the 1962 amendments. In 1976, PM Pierre E. Trudeau embedded

the points system in its own legislative Act, the 1976 Immigration Act, which would remain in place until 2002.

Concomitantly, Canada instated a new approach to integration politics. In 1963, in a concession to pressures from Quebec, PM Pearson instated the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Initially intended as a bridge-building measure between Anglo- and Francophone Canada, the Commission's fourth report on the contributions of other cultural groups would eventually lead to PM Pierre E. Trudeau's announcement of multiculturalism as Canada's official integration politics approach in 1971. The announcement of multiculturalism in 1971 was constitutionally enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and finally in official policy in the Multiculturalism Act in 1988. This act was introduced under conservative PM Brian Mulroney, pointing to the cross-party consensus that had emerged on Canada's migration politics nexus. Multiculturalism had become an individual as well as a collective endeavour for the long-term settlement of immigrants.

The complex and interconnected developments of these decades in Canada resulted in a strongly interactive nexus of migration politics including the institutionalization of human capital-based immigrant selection, family migration, and humanitarian immigration, swift citizenship acquisition for immigrants, as well as a state doctrine for immigrant settlement and long-term immigrant integration.

While Canada experienced a substantial change to its migration politics nexus, France experienced a stalling and attempts of a devolution of its migration politics during the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s. It was during this period that France began to actively steer against the developments of the post-war decades, effectively breaking with its Third Republic migration politics approach. Migration politics emerged as a cleavage within French politics with a growing far-right movement that focused on immigrants and immigration as the root causes for their grievances.

This transformational period began with the immigration stop in 1974, in the wake of the global economic crisis sparked by the oil crisis. Other European countries also stopped immigrant recruitment at the time, but what was different in the French case was a coming to terms with the fact that the open-door migration politics of the prior decades had led to the establishment of a sizeable immigrant population stemming from former colonies. While other European countries also encouraged the return of their immigrant workers, France was the only country which attempted to force the return of those coming from African countries (although this policy proposal failed), which were less inclined to 'return' than immigrants from other European countries. This

was a precursor to the hostility aimed at immigrants from former colonies that would coin much of the 1980s.

While the early 1980s were marked by the brief liberalization of migration politics under Socialist President Mitterrand, the decade took a turn around 1984, when a cleavage on migration politics emerged due to the emergence of a strong right-wing anti-immigration party, the *Front National*. The thorn in the side of the *Front National* was the citizenization of immigrants of non-European origins. Fervent debates on this resulted in the *Manifestation de Volonté*, as an attempt to stifle the naturalization of second-generation immigrant children. This citizenship regulation was finally introduced in 1993 by the conservative government under PM Edouard Balladur in cohabitation with Socialist President Mitterrand. Labour immigration remained suspended throughout this time until the early 2000s.

French migration politics during this period underwent a nexus shift to the point that its status as an immigration country was shaken. The migration politics nexus is characterized by stagnancy. Immigration has been halted entirely, citizenship acquisition, although remaining easily attainable, comes under scrutiny along with immigrant integration on the level of national identity and belonging, because of an emergent and solidifying political cleavage between right and left on migration.

The analysis of the German case takes us into the 1990s. While large-scale immigration occurred in the form of labor recruitment for 'guest workers' throughout the 1960s and 70s, Germany's migration politics nexus instated in the early 1950s was not altered by this influx. While Germany's approach was challenged, not least domestically by opposition parties from the left and mobilization of 'guest workers' through unions, no substantial shift occurred in its status as a co-ethnic immigration country. Germany did not want to be an immigration country for anybody but co-ethnic immigrants, which were not conceived of as immigrants but rather as Germans coming home. This was expressed in the 1982 coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, which unequivocally stated: "Germany is not an immigration country. All humanitarian measures justifiable need to be taken to prevent a further influx of foreigners" (CDU-FDP coalition agreement 1982). On the level of politics, this 'mantra' was maintained until the late 1980s, when a new citizenship law which introduced the claim to citizenship through *ius domicili* after the rather long period of 15 years of residence.

In the wake of German unification, several political developments influenced the eventual shift in German migration politics that occurred throughout this and the next decade in the new millennium. After unification, a high number of immigrants, refugees as well as immigrants from the East of Europe and

former USSR laid claim to German citizenship through its co-ethnic immigration scheme. One of the key arguments for the maintenance of this scheme had been the connection between Germans in East and West Germany, but this had now become moot due to unification. The German government reacted by introducing a quota for the naturalization of resettlers to stem their immigration and long-term settlement. Additionally, asylum law was restricted to decrease the number of claimants which had risen significantly in post-unification years.

After a period of widespread elation due to unification, Germany was hit by an economic downturn that had already been approaching prior to 1989. Economic insecurity and the large-scale arrival of immigrants amalgamated into an atmosphere of discontent in both West and East Germany. In this tense atmosphere, violence erupted against immigrants in a series of arson attacks on immigrants' housing and several people lost their lives. A sizeable part of the German population reacted with condemnation towards these incidents, illustrating an evolved perspective towards the immigrant population. Following the attacks, Germans rallied in large-scale anti-racism demonstrations, increasing the tensions between the opposition parties and the governing Christian Democrats regarding the government's seemingly untenable approach to migration politics.

Due to the lack of naturalization options for immigrants, a sizeable and ever-growing immigrant population in Germany saw itself disenfranchised of political participation rights and not least a recognition of their belonging to Germany. These circumstances led the opposition parties to demand for changes in German citizenship law to adapt it to other European approaches. The extensive cross-partisan discussions on amending German citizenship stretched across the 1990s. With the election of a Social Democrat-Green coalition in 1998, the long conservative reign under Chancellor Kohl came to an end and a new citizenship law was introduced. The new Citizenship Act was passed in 1999 and aptly came into power on January 1st, 2000, heralding a new millennium in which the German approach to migration politics would continue to undergo a substantial transformation.

Briefly put, the post-unification years brought with them a host of contradictory events in migration politics which eventually would lead to a tipping point with the election of a new Social Democrat-Green government in 1998. This government conceded to the untenable constellation of migration politics in Germany. They instated a cross-partisan commission on immigration and passed the 2005 immigration law, which finally acknowledged Germany's de-facto status as an immigration country and brought with it changes in citizenship, immigrant admission, and most importantly integration.

In the 2000s, Germany emerged with a completely new and interactive migration politics nexus. It had abandoned the restriction to co-ethnic immigration and developed growing interconnection between citizenship acquisition and integration politics, at the state level and at the federal level in the form of increased government cooperation with the immigrant population and their needs.

The Migration Politics Nexus established in the mid- to late 20th century

Canada 1967–1982	Migration politics nexus transforms and is institutionalized through human-capital immigration, family, and humanitarian immigration, swift citizenship acquisition, and multicultural approach to immigrant settlement and integration.
France 1980–1987	Migration politics nexus stagnates in the aftermath of heightened immigration numbers. Labour immigration is stopped and discussion and first implementation of exclusionary integration and citizenship politics as an effect of the political cleavage between right and left that would prevail into the future.
Germany 1990–1999	Migration politics nexus is transformed through abandoning co-ethnic immigrant preference, with a growing interconnection between citizenship acquisition and the institutionalization of integration politics.

The prolonged period under study in this chapter is at the root of the juxtaposed positioning of the three countries in academic literature. Taking a closer look at the developments of these decades, a more nuanced perspective sheds light on processes which led to interesting overlaps and divergences between the countries at different times.

Beginning with the 1960s and 70s, this period saw increasing immigration form ever-diversifying sending countries to all three countries. Canada reacted by instating a clearly articulated connection between immigration, citizenship, and integration relatively early on, institutionalized in the 1970s and 80s. France largely maintained its postwar nexus until the 1970s, when the oil crisis led to the first stop of labour immigration since the end of WWII in 1974 and sparked the onset of the realization of the challenges that the long-term settlement of immigrants-then-citizens might bring. Germany reacted to the arrival of its 'guest workers' similarly to France's initial approach, with benign neglect. However, because the postwar constellation of the German migration nexus was so different to the French, the long-term settlement of immigrants, particularly in the form of naturalization into German citizenship, was not facilitated. While the Canadian case had fully institutionalized its nexus by the

end of the 1980s, including a cross-party consensus on the central tenets of Canadian migration politics, the same decade led to the emergence of a deep political cleavage on migration politics in France. This was fueled by the success of the anti-immigration far-right National Front. Discussions on tightening the liberal approach to its overall migration politics led to attempts by the conservatives to pander to potential far-right voters by abandoning long-held French principles of naturalization, such as *ius soli*.

In the early 1990s, the German and French cases briefly converged for the first time, as both countries' conservative governments argued against further immigration. The 1990s in Canada were tumultuous as Quebec emerged with a renewed desire for independence, leading to further concessions on the part of the Canadian government to allow for Quebec's status as a 'distinct society'. In the area of migration politics, this also marked he onset of the federalization of Canadian migration politics, a development which would become pertinent in the 2000s as the points system increasingly lost relevance in labour immigrant recruitment.

8.2.4 Comparing the Migration Politics Nexus in the early 21st Century

Since the beginning of the 21st century, all three countries have experienced significant events pertaining to their migration politics, sometimes challenging the prevailing nexus status quo. However, as the analysis of the junctures above shows, none of these developments significantly impacted the nexus that emerged in the previous period. While Canada experienced the first substantial challenge to its migration politics status quo, France was hit by turmoil in the form of large-scale riots and numerous terrorist attacks, which intensified debates on migration politics and led to the entrenchment of a deep political cleavage on migration issues. Since the late 2000s, Germany has established itself as Europe's most important immigration country. The events of 2015, while significant, did not alter Germany's migration politics nexus.

In the early 2000s, Canada's usually dominant Liberal Party faltered due to several crises. As a result, Stephen Harper, leader of the newly founded Conservative Party of Canada, won the 2006 elections. Stephen Harper would remain Canada's PM until 2015. During his time, Harper's unique but conservative stance on migration politics emerged as a defining issue of his era in power, which some experts and academics view as undermining Canada's previous model.

Harper's challenge to Canada's migration politics nexus can be observed in all three political areas. Arguably one of the most notable developments in the Harper period is the entrenchment of the bifurcation of labour immigration between temporary and permanent immigrants, the former recruited for temporary support in low-pay sectors and the latter selected on the basis of skill-set for eventual permanent settlement. While temporary labour immigration had been part of the Canadian immigration system since the 1950s, the recruitment of temporary foreign workers tripled under Harper's reign, and since 2007 the annual number of temporary foreign workers surpasses that of immigrants with permanent settlement status. Additionally, during his period the emphasis of the economisation of labour immigration through various measures introduced a shift away from the human capital paradigm in immigrant recruitment towards increased recruitment through Provincial Nominee Programs and the 2015 Express Entry Program.

On the level of citizenship and integration politics, Harper made several efforts to 'increase the value' of Canadian citizenship by tightening admission rules. He also introduced a more critical discourse on the adaptability of immigrants from Muslim cultures. The latter would also herald his eventual defeat in the 2015 election. This election saw the politicization of migration politics in a country which is usually characterized by partisan consensus on migration. Liberal Party candidate Justin Trudeau succeeded in positioning himself at the opposite of Harper regarding citizenship, and integration politics, and not least regarding humanitarian immigration, including a promise to resettle 45,000 Syrians during his first year in office. Notably, after Trudeau's election, the government's official discourse on migration politics became more inclusionary.

However, the further economization of labour immigration, including its bifurcation as well as the economic streamlining through the Express Entry Program and the PNPs was maintained after Trudeau came to power. The analysis therefore concludes that the Harper years did constitute a challenge to Canada's migration politics nexus on the level of citizenship and integration politics in particular, developments which were largely withdrawn after Trudeau's election. The economic streamlining of immigration, however, was maintained, pointing to the consensus that immigrants to Canada should first and foremost serve its economic interests, with only a part of the selected immigrants ultimately becoming Canadians and serving the nation-building paradigm. The trend to economic expediency labour immigrant selection was not a Harper innovation. His time in office only accelerated this tendency which had been part of the Canadian approach since the 1990s. *While aspects of the*

migration politics nexus are challenged during this period, it is largely maintained.

While Canada was influenced by conservative PM Harper's views on migration politics in the late 2000s and early 2010s, France also elected a conservative President whose views on migration would lastingly shape France's migration politics nexus: Nicolas Sarkozy. Before becoming President in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy served as interior minister in the Chirac governments and was therefore in charge of shaping migration politics from 2002 to 2004 and then 2005 until his election in 2007 (with a brief interim as finance minister). The analysis shows that France's migration politics were coined by a distinctly 'Sarkozyist' approach from 2002 until the end of Sarkozy's presidency in 2012.

As France began the century with a notably harsh stance on migration politics, Sarkozy ushered in a two-pronged approach of softening the requirements for labour immigration (ultimately opening up labour immigration for the first time since 1974 with his 2006 immigration act), while simultaneously introducing tougher measures for citizenship attainment and integration. He joined these two areas of politics to increase the conditions for citizenship attainment. Sarkozy's approach to migration politics was significantly impacted by the events of the 2005 *banlieues* riots, the largest civil unrest in France for 40 years. While the rioting of thousands of young residents of the *banlieues* all over France, most of whom were French citizens with a family history of immigration from former French colonies, elicited public outrage, it also solidified the recognition that *banlieues* were structurally underserved and disadvantaged. While this acknowledgment led to some reactions by the Sarkozy government, including the ill-fated 'Marshall plan' for the *banlieues*, he also doubled down on the anti-immigrant sentiments fanned by the far right by introducing a French Ministry of Immigration, Integration, and National Identity whose tasks were mainly to stem irregular immigration.

In his attempt to redesign French migration politics, another of Sarkozy's main objectives was to take the topic of immigration away from the far right. However, Sarkozy's attempt to co-opt the far right's single issue, immigration, and treat it in a conservative manner, did not convince French voters in the long run. If anything, the far right's influence on French migration politics has increased in recent years, while other French parties have struggled to formulate an alternative to the Sarkozyist *'choisie, pas subie'* (chosen, not endured) approach to immigration without further fanning the flames of the far right anti-immigration and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

The analysis shows that the French migration politics nexus has been maintained (albeit with hesitant opening for high-skill immigration), paired with

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the maintenance of relatively liberal citizenship acquisition due to historical reason. Shifting from its historical status quo, proving one's 'successful' integration had become conditional for the admission as a citizen.

All interviewees as well as the academic literature unite in underlining Germany's major transformation in immigration politics in the last 20 years. Does this also hold when the nexus is closely observed? In fact, my analysis shows that the course for Germany's evolution into the second most important immigration country in the world was set by 2006. The institutionalization of integration politics, both at the state and federal levels, shows an acknowledgment both of the multicultural composition of the German population, as well as the fact that immigration has become an on-going feature of Germany's future. The change was therefore two-fold. While Germany was preparing for a more de-facto multicultural, de-facto immigration country future, it concomitantly had to reckon with its past and the fact that immigration and the immigrant population had shaped Germany in numerous ways since the end of WWII.

For many, 2015 was a pivotal year for Germany's progress. The unprecedented immigration of over one million refugees to Germany since the late summer of 2015 and into 2016, made international headlines and reactivated old narratives, which portrayed the arrival and processing of over one million refugees as a turning point for Germany's hitherto ethno-exclusionary history in migration politics. While the events of 2015 were undoubtedly unprecedented and historic in their nature, they did not constitute an actual turning point for Germany's migration politics nexus. On the contrary, many experts confirmed that the settlement process of the refugees was consistent with the structures and institutions that Germany had been developing for years. Nonetheless, 2015 did have an impact (although one that is difficult to measure in the context of this thesis) on Germany's overall self-conception and therefore has contributed to the discursive treatment of Germany as an immigration country.

To be sure, my final categorization of Germany in this thesis is not one of utmost optimism. Until 2021, und thus beyond my analytical frame, Germany was governed conservatively, and many interviewees both from public service and academia stressed the ambivalence and reluctance of some members of the conservative Christian Democrats to concede to the reality of Germany's immigration-country status. In one particularly revelatory moment in my interviews, a public servant from one of the then conservatively governed Ministries in charge of migration processes stressed that "Germany is something like an immigration country", to which I asked what the actual difference was between being "something like" and an actual immigration country. She replied that it was probably true that Germany was an immigration country, but the

official position of the ministry was to never actually admit to this when asked. I inquired whether this was likely to change once there was a different party in charge of the ministry and she replied that this was very probable (GPS6, pos. 24). This interview was held in 2021.

The ambivalence of the Christian Democrat governance had effects on citizenship politics as well, where Germany remains one of the few European countries that does not accept dual citizenship officially (although it is given procedurally in over 50 percent of the cases). Similarly, on the level of humanitarian immigration, Germany wavers between openness and closure. Germany's development has not been straight-forward and there are elements of tension and ambiguity in the migration politics nexus. However, the overall transformation of the German case within a comparatively small timeframe is noteworthy: In 2019, it introduced Skilled Worker Immigration Law, which facilitated the further immigration of third-country nationals into Germany and therefore entrenched immigration as a long-term project in German politics. *At the end of this analysis, Germany's migration politics nexus continues to pair a strong articulation of integration politics with further liberalized immigration politics, and a liberalized approach to citizenship politics.*

8.3 Interactive Dynamics in the Migration Politics Nexus

Based on the insights presented above, we can distinguish between the articulation of the nexus across time and across cases. To do so, I have drawn up a table to illustrate the evolution of the nexus for each country case, which can be found in the appendix. This table illustrates the overall findings of the shifting nexus across time and country cases:

Table 8.1: The Nexus across Time and Cases

	Post-1945	Late 20th Century	Early 21st Century
Canada	*New Nexus:* Independent citizenship allows for the inclusion of selected immigrants as Canadians	*New Nexus:* Strong articulation of human capital immigration paired with liberal citizenship acquisition and long-term settlement plan in the	*Nexus maintained:* Further bifurcation among temporary low-pay labour immigration and permanent, mostly middle-class labour immigration, preselection for citizenship and

		form of multicul-tural policies	facilitation of settle-ment through this stream
France	*New Nexus:* Immigration is managed through citizenship acquisi-tion	*New Nexus:* Labour immigration stopped, attempts to tamper with citi-zenship acquisition in an effort to curtail further settlement of immigrant groups particularly from former colonies, in-tegration measures stratified by immi-grant origins	*Nexus maintained:* Merit-based labour im-migration tentatively reopened (thus pre-se-lected for swift integra-tion), citizenship acqui-sition made conditional on proof of integration through tests / lan-guage acquisition
Germany	*New Nexus:* Bifurcation of im-migration between co-ethnics for per-manent settlement and labour immi-grants for tempo-rary settlement. In-tegration measures dependent on sta-tus group. Citizen-ship reserved for co-ethnic immi-grants.	*New Nexus:* Dissolution of co-ethnic immigration paradigm and broadening of cate-gories for citizenship acquisition, tighten-ing of humanitarian immigration to cur-tail large numbers	*Nexus maintained:* Merit-based labour im-migration (thus pre-se-lected for swift integra-tion), liberalization of citizenship acquisition detached from ethnic origin, institutionaliza-tion of integration measures to accommo-date long-term settle-ment.

Source: Own research

Interactive Dynamics in the Migration Politics Nexus

This thesis does not presuppose that there is a starting and an end point in the migration politics nexus or an 'evolutionary' development of countries regard-ing immigration. Rather, the proposed analysis of the nexus dynamic across history is particularly helpful because it demonstrates the malleability of mi-gration politics due to historical events, political constellations, and path de-pendency. It allows us to not portray each country as a monolithic immigration country with only one historical path, but across several interactive indicators which might run counter to one another and explain why the emergent picture is not as clear-cut as might be desired. After the analysis, a few common inter-actions in the nexus have emerged:

The Immigration-Citizenship Interaction
This interaction emerged most prominently in Third Republic France and remained France's dominant approach to the migration politics nexus until 1974. It was characterized by relatively free and uncontrolled immigration that was later regularised through the swift and facile naturalisation of immigrants. A later iteration of this interaction emerged in Canada post-1947, when a lot of the immigrant settlers that had arrived in the decades prior were now able to attain citizenship to finalise their ascent into Canadian society. However, Canada was always able to and consciously selected amongst potential immigrants and has continued to do so throughout the postwar period into the new millennium.

The Immigration-Integration Interaction
Canada, France, and Germany have all gone through iterations of aiming to select permanent immigrants considered to be most suitable prior to their arrival. The criteria applied to 'suitability' have been subject to change throughout the last century. While racial, cultural, and religious preferences have largely officially been dropped as criteria, they implicitly still feature on many levels, not least in humanitarian immigration, the recognition of educational achievements, or the facilitation of intra-European Union migration. That being said, Canada has most clearly pre-selected immigrants for their facilitated integration, both socially and economically. Those arriving for permanent settlement hence need less integration support (apart from the obvious settlement services just after arrival). Multiculturalism as a pan-societal project fostering belonging of many cultures in one or rather two societies, further eases the arrival process. In France, subjects of the empire turned into citizens in 1947, facilitating their immigration over a prolonged period of time. Since 2006, France has also allowed a number of economic third country immigrants to settle under the condition that they fill an economic need. The immigration-integration interaction is most evident in the German case after World War II, where only people considered to be part of the German people were allowed to immigrate. This regulation is still in place but has been rolled back significantly since the 1990s. Since 2005, Germany has done the same and broadened opportunities for third-country high-pay and / or skilled immigrants throughout the last 15 years.

The Citizenship-Integration Interaction
The citizenship-integration interaction is the most complicated interaction and one that I tried to understand by asking the expert interviewees of the role of

citizenship and integration in the immigration timeline in the respective country cases. First of all, the French case form the third Republic up to the 1990s represents a situation in which citizenship itself is a method of formal integration. After this step, from the perspective of the French state, no further integration support is needed. In the German case, citizenship was withheld from third country nationals for the longest time. Over time, this has evolved, but citizenship continues to be overwhelmingly seen as the 'prize' that one achieves after one has demonstrated successful integration, by passing a test and demonstrating sufficient income. In Canada, the role of citizenship in integration has oscillated somewhat between the French and the German iterations of it. For a long time, citizenship was seen as an inevitable part of the trajectory of immigrating to Canada, and one with which one is officially part of the community. However, there were periods in which this approach came under scrutiny (i. e. during the Harper years), when tests were introduced, showing a lack of consensus on the role of citizenship in the process. Canada is to this day the country with the highest naturalisation rate amongst the three country cases. By 2007, Canada's naturalisation rate lay at 89 percent, France's at 47 percent and Germany's at 37 percent.

This chapter has summarized the major insights gained through the in-depth comparative-historical analysis of three country cases, Canada, France, and Germany. It has given an overview of the nexus across different periods, of the analyzed critical junctures and those periods that did not qualify as critical junctures. I have summaries the methodical lessons that can be drawn from the critical juncture evaluation and conceptual lessons that can be drawn from the interactions in the nexus. In the final chapter, I conclude this thesi

9. Conclusion – A New Perspective on the Politics of 'Us' and 'Them'

In the autumn of 2019, on a teaching stay in France, I was listening to the popular French news radio channel *France Info*. A local politician from Grenoble was interviewed on his perspective on the ban of the 'burkini', a modest swimming attire for Muslim women from public swimming spaces like pools or beaches. Throughout the past years, French cities had been caught up in the burkini debate, prohibiting, then once again allowing its wear in public swimming pools and on beaches depending on the party in power and the decisions made by the French high court. The politician interviewed on *France Info* was in favour of banning the burkini on secular grounds, invoking the French approach to the division of religion and state, *laïcité*, as a reason for his opposition to the attire. He staunchly defended his view, also referencing the normative foundations of French republicanism, which, to paraphrase, did not allow for communitarian approaches to cultural plurality. Then he said: « *Içi, c'est la France, ce n'est pas le Canada* » (This is France here, not Canada).[118]

His casual reference to Canada as the exact opposite of France in matters of dealing with cultural plurality caught my attention. I had been working on my Ph. D. thesis for about a year and I was still in the process of delineating my research approach. I had started from a place of comparing Germany and Canada, but the opposition of France and Canada seemed completely self-evident to this politician, and it underlined my hunch, which would later become a fully-fledged thesis, that we needed a deeper understanding of the way in which migration politics in all three countries had developed. Adding France to the comparative mix therefore made sense: While I had witnessed a growth in 'Canada-fandom' regarding issues of migration politics on the German side of things in recent years, it was clear for the French politician that being 'like Canada' was something to be avoided at all costs. So, while France (or rather,

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118 The burkini is a swimming attire for women wishing to cover more areas of their body than bikinis or swimsuits cover. It is worn by women all over the world, predominantly those from religious cultures which prefer a more modest clothing style. The design originates in Australia, made by a Lebanese-Australian fashion designer who created it as part of an activewear line for female Muslim sportswomen. Since 2009, the burkini has made headlines in France, with several municipalities prohibiting its wear. In 2016, then Prime Minister Emmanuel Valls was quoted as saying that the burkini was "not compatible with the wardrobe of France and the Republic" (Kroet 2016). Controversy on the burkini erupted once more in Grenoble in 2019, when a group of activists had bathed in the burkini to demonstrate against the ban, prompting all the city's swimming pools to shut down for a week during a heat wave (Le Point 2019).

this French politician) rejected the Canadian approach, Germany had been tak-ing inspiration for public service and academic measures to learn from Canada for years. The core research interest for this dissertation project was confirmed: How had these three countries developed since the Second World War in the area of migration politics and why? Translated into an academic research ques-tion, I set out to study how to conceive of Canada's, France's, and Germany's historical development to understand the differences and commonalities in their immigration, citizenship, and integration politics.

In this final part of the thesis, I conclude my research project and highlight the insights gained. I begin by reiterating the key arguments that guided my work, including the central research question and a summary of *Segment I* of this thesis. Here, I developed my research design and therefore answered the foundational questions that were part of the cluster of research question/s emerging from the central research question. I then give an answer to the cen-tral research question based on the analyses in *Segment II* and the results dis-cerned from the analyses in chapter 9, with a particular focus on the immigra-tion, citizenship, and integration politics nexus. Lastly, I provide a final reflec-tion on the research results and give an outlook on the future/s of each country case's migration politics nexus.

9.1 Looking Back: Central Arguments, Research Design, and Challenges

Since the end of the Second World War, migration politics as the interplay between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics have become a cen-tral component of Canadian, French, and German political histories. In this thesis, I studied the historical trajectories, differences, and commonalities in the political change these three countries underwent regarding their migration politics from 1945 until 2020 with the aim of establishing a fresh, more com-prehensive analytical approach that departs from previous typologies both with regard to the case selection and established models.

To do so, the conceptualization of migration politics as an interactive nexus between different political dimensions and processes which encompass immigration, citizenship, and integration politics in each country was central to this research project. States formed the central unit of analysis, as a collec-tion of political actors, institutions, and policies. The research approach of comparative-historical analysis (CHA) allowed for in-depth analytical narra-tive accounts of the three cases with within- and across-case results. To

facilitate this comparative-historical approach, I employed the analytical framework of critical junctures as periods of fundamental political change to determine the timeframes under study for each case. Rather than offering a chronological account of each country's development, this approach facilitated the identification of meaningful periods to analyse.

As is often the case for small-n comparative research, the case-selection was based on the fact that these three countries have similar political and economic characteristics but different migration politics outcomes. All three countries have been democracies for the past seventy years with comparable socio-economic stability (and simultaneous phases of economic instability). This, in turn, warrants close attention to the differences in migration politics between the three cases, which have widely been considered as paradigmatic. In most research, Canada is portrayed as a progressive immigration country which has long combined the systematic selection of immigrants with swift citizenship acquisition, and multiculturalism as its formula for maintaining its approach to immigration as nation-building. Due to this portrayal, Canada is sometimes depicted as 'exceptional' with regards to its migration politics. The same label has been applied to France, which has a long history of largely uncontrolled immigration and a distinct idea of citizenship and integration based on republican principles going back to the French Revolution. However, the last thirty years have been less straight-forward, as France has seen intensifying pushback on this perspective from a firmly established far right, muddling its hitherto steadfast principles. Germany has been attributed exceptionality due to its history of Nazism. The perspective that Germany refused to acknowledge immigration as part of its politics for a long time, based on an ethnicity-based conception of its demos, prevails in some portrayals of the German case in migration studies to this day. However, this perspective takes away from the significant developments that Germany underwent in the past 30 years.

Building on these tenets of the case selection, the central argument guiding this research project was twofold. Firstly, I argued that due to the portrayed differences between the countries' approaches to migration politics, they are compelling cases for rigorous and meaningful analysis to deepen our understanding the historical trajectories of their migration politics. Secondly, I argued that to provide for such depth, a comprehensive analysis that seeks to understand the interaction between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics would be conducive to a better understanding of the historical trajectories of the three cases.

Research Question/s and Design

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The central research question deduced from these key arguments was:

> How can we conceive of the commonalities and differences in the historical development of Canada, France, and Germany's immigration, citizenship, and integration politics since 1945?

This central question led to a subset of theoretical, methodological, and analytical questions in relation to the research design.

Conceptual questions:
1. What are immigration, citizenship, and integration politics?
2. How do we integrate the study of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics conceptually in one analytical tool that can be used for the development of typologies?

Methodological questions:
3. How can CHA be applied in this context and which methodological tools for a sound CHA can be used to develop this typology?

Empirical questions:
4. What are significant periods or moments, or possible 'critical junctures', of change in migration politics in Canada, France, and Germany?
5. How have these 'critical junctures' altered each case's migration politics nexus?
6. What differences and commonalities can be deduced from an analysis of the critical junctures in the cases' migration politics nexus?

To answer these questions, this thesis was divided into three parts: *Segment I 'Foundations'* on the theoretical, methodological, and contextual foundations of the analysis, *Segment II 'Analysis'*, containing three analytical chapters on migration politics in Canada, France, and Germany since 1945, and *Segment III 'Results'*, on the analytical results and conclusions of the analysis. In the following, I present how the first segment served to answer sub-questions one to three of the central research question and thus constituted the core tenets of the overarching research design.

In chapter 2 "Understanding Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration – Theories and Conceptualizations of Core Concepts", I began the thesis with a review of the theoretical literature about im/migration, citizenship, and

integration politics, including a conceptualization of each of the core concepts as well as an elaboration on how to conceive of the nexus between the three for analytical purposes. The chapter therefore spoke to the first two questions on how to conceive of these three concepts in connection to the larger research question posed in this thesis. I was able to show that the politics of systematic immigrant selection or exclusion as they exist today historically emerged in concordance with the emergence of the modern nation-state, and that questions surrounding statehood and immigration are therefore intrinsically connected. For citizenship politics, a similar intrinsic connection to statehood emerged, although paired with the insight that the interconnection between immigration and citizenship is a comparatively recent analytical focus within citizenship research. On integration, I traced the conceptual origins to theories on social cohesion which eventually merged into theories on how states ought to shape or be shaped by immigrant integration. For all three concepts, I chose a pragmatic approach in looking at the totality of political decisions concerning immigration, citizenship, and integration politics during the periods under study. I then conceptualized immigration, citizenship, and integration politics respectively as the emergence of paradigms, significant policy shifts, and political events that have a significant bearing the respective politics in the respective country cases during the periods under study. I then introduced the nexus between the three concepts as an interactive connection that needs to be studied comprehensively.

In chapter 3 "Methodology, Case Selection, and Methods: On Comparison, Comparative-Historical Analysis, and Expert Interviews", I focused on the methodological tenets of the research design. I began by explaining the purpose and value of comparison in the social sciences to position this project's epistemological approach. Distinguishing between the Durkheimian approach of explaining and the Weberian approach of understanding (*Erklären und Verstehen*), the comparativist epistemology of this project aspires to develop a multicausal analysis of the case's trajectories, rather than testing a clear-cut causal inference between dependent and independent variables. Tracing the origins of CHA to the very onset of the social sciences, critical junctures were explained as one useful framework within the CHA approach for the development of an expansive historical analysis that does not warrant a chronological descriptive retelling of events. I concluded with a discussion on why I chose expert interviews as narrative data material and how I operationalized the research question for the interviews and used them for this thesis as sources for both interpretative and contextual knowledge to enrich the analysis. This chapter therefore spoke to the methodological sub-question of the overall research question.

In chapter 4 "State of the Art: Contributions and Gaps in Comparative Migration Research on Canada, France, and Germany", I presented descriptive, statistical, and analytical comparative insights from migration research on the three cases to show on which foundations the project builds, and which gaps it seeks to fill. Chapter 4 therefore fulfilled the contextual part of the research question by bolstering my findings with those of other researchers, highlighting which gaps in knowledge I aimed to address in my thesis. In part one, I described the way in which migration has developed in the past 70 years globally, with a particular focus in Canada, France, and Germany, including quantitative data to illustrate their positioning within the international context. In the second part, I presented insights from migration politics indexes as well as research that uses the same or similar methodology as was used in this thesis. In the ultimate part of the chapter, I elaborated on the shortcomings and gaps in comparative migration politics research on Canada, France, and Germany. Underlining the importance of conceptual breadth and historical scope, this chapter closed with the contention that previous research had not yet managed to study migration politics as a specific nexus in a comparative-historical analysis of three paradigmatic cases, which would yield new insights into our understanding of how immigration countries develop over time.

The rich and variegated histories of each case led to complex comparative analyses of each country's development throughout the past 75 years in chapters 5, 6, and 7. These chapters presented in-depth analyses of nine possible critical junctures to address the empirical sub-questions and the overarching research question. In the in-depth analyses in chapters 5, 6, and 7, I showed how each case underwent intricate processes of change in migration politics, with multi-causal origins that are connected to each case's particularity which I disentangled through analysis. In the next section, I provide answers to the central research question and highlight the main insights based on the in-depth analyses in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

9.2 Central Research Question: Answers and Main Insights

How can we conceive of the commonalities and differences in the historical development of Canada, France, and Germany's immigration, citizenship, and integration politics since 1945?

Differences and Commonalities in the Migration Politics Nexus between the Country Cases

Right after the Second World War, all three countries decided to let people immigrate, with *differences in the selection of desirable immigrants*. Canada continued to select on the basis of ethnic origin and religion, France attempted to do the same (but quickly abandoned this approach due to lack of available and interested immigrants), and Germany allowed immigration solely for co-ethnic immigrants. During this time, *they have in common that they develop a nexus* between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics, where it was previously absent or only partially existent.

Moving on into the middle to late 20th century, the differences became even more pronounced. Again, all three countries continued to have high and sustained levels of immigration. The *difference emerges in their perspective on the permanency of immigrants' residence.* In Canada, race and religion were dropped as the points system ushered in a human capital selection for labour immigrants. Their long-term settlement was provided for in a nexus that emerged in this period that marries selective immigration with swift citizenship acquisition and multiculturalism as a state-doctrine for social cohesion. In France, on the contrary, there was largely uncontrolled immigration from 1950–1973, often from former colonies, changing the immigrant composition. After the immigration stop in 1974, the government reckoned with the fact that many of those immigrants had come to stay, and many were already French citizens. In Germany, the permanent residence of the so-called 'guest workers' was never built into their recruitment, but rather to be explicitly avoided. Nevertheless, after the immigration stop and the implementation of return policies in the 1970s, a sizeable immigrant community remained in Germany, with no path to permanent residence or naturalization built into the German nexus. *There are hardly any commonalities between the three cases at the time*, safe for the immigration stop in France and Germany.

Moving into the 1980s and 1990s, *the difference that emerged can be observed at the extent to which immigration, citizenship, and integration politics have produced a partisan political cleavage.* Canada's nexus was consolidated in a cross-party consensus by 1988. This is in stark contrast to France, where a political cleavage on migration politics emerged in the 1980s. This was fuelled by the rise of the far-right FN. This cleavage would become entrenched and tamper with the long-held status quo on migration which had emerged in the Third Republic, such as French citizenship law. In Germany, the Kohl government, which was in power from 1982 to 1998, was steadfast in its conviction that Germany was not and would not become an immigration country, despite de-facto evidence to the contrary. However, with unification, one of the main reasons to hold on to co-ethnic immigration paradigm disappeared. Throughout the 1990s, the adherence to the no-immigration-country paradigm

became untenable. Once the Kohl government was succeeded by the Red-Green government, a new constellation in migration politics became reality through a citizenship law that allowed for the naturalisation of first- and second-generation immigrants. This sounded the death-knell on the exclusive co-ethnic immigration paradigm and ushered in a new migration politics nexus for Germany.

While Canada never stopped labour immigration, Germany and France both did in the 1970s. However, humanitarian, family, and clandestine immigration continued throughout the 1980s and 90s. In the 2000s, Germany and France rejoined Canada in introducing a framework to select skilled labour immigrants. *Differences emerged on the level of integration and citizenship politics,* where France became stricter, e. g. by making citizenship acquisition harder through integration tests. Throughout the 2000s, Germany consolidated a migration politics nexus that would eventually allow for its ascent to be the second most important immigration country in the world, liberalizing labour immigration requirements and institutionalizing integration politics.

The most important commonality that emerges is sustained immigration through different channels throughout the last 70 years. The difference here lies only in the extent of control and selection of immigrants, as well as their intended permanent residency, as outlined above. Similarly, by virtue of their democratic systems, certain forms of immigration, such that of dependants or humanitarian immigration, were never suspended in any of the three countries throughout the analysed period (but tampered with to different extents). In contrast, fewer similarities can be found in citizenship politics. While Canada and France allowed for the naturalization of immigrants (but only those selected through their programmes for the Canadian case), Germany had little to no regulation that facilitated the naturalization of immigrants until 1990, with a major shift occurring with the citizenship regulations of 2000. *By the end of the analysis, the citizenship politics of all three countries have become more similar than they were at the start. The most important commonality in the three countries' nexus today is that it combines selective immigration for economic expediency with citizenship acquisition that allows for demographic growth*. There are important formal differences between the three, but overall, it is possible for immigrants and their children to become Canadian, French, or German. Today, all three countries provide support for post-immigration settlement, including language courses and labour market immersion support**.** *They all have in common the short-term settlement aspect of immigrant integration.*

The major difference emerges at the discursive level of belonging for immigrants and this interconnection with a historically grown self-conception.

Here, Canada's multicultural approach is long-established and entrenched. France, on the other hand, is grappling with its republican approach, because the last decades have shown that citizenship does not equalize the treatment of all French people. Germany has institutionalized integration politics but also federalized it, which means that we can observe vastly different and at times contradictory messaging towards its immigrant population depending on the federal state. This reflects the on-going ambiguity towards Germany's status as an immigration country. I will elaborate on these findings further below in the section on critical junctures.

In addition to this, the conceptual breadth of the nexus allows for an analysis that goes beyond policy introductions with the term 'immigration' in it. This leads to *the last overarching commonality:* As a political field often charged with controversies, the analysis shows how *state and political actors are wont to avoid terminological transparency to implement changes in migration politics.* In his 2001 book on the "Philosophies of Integration" Adrien Favell points out that countries tend to have a specific "political vocabulary" regarding their integration politics (2001: 161). I believe this can be extended to all migration politics. Germany stands out for this tendency. For instance, while the arrival and settlement of co-ethnic immigrants and so-called 'guest workers' is clearly a form of immigration, the German state attempted to avoid either of these classifications. In France, the late 1950s arrival of people from colonies who (temporarily) held French citizenship was still classed as immigration, even though the people arriving were nominally French. In Canada, the recruitment of TFWs is considered a labour policy completely distinct from immigration policy. However, pathways to permanency are now in place allowing for the transformation of this status. This rhetorical muddling of the migration politics vocabulary may be a helpful guide to migration researchers in their analyses of migration politics in the future. The next section highlights the findings on the migration politics nexus.

The Migration Politics Nexus: Interactions and Findings

The previous section has shown that the migration politics nexus is an insightful conceptual tool for the analysis of the entirety of migration politics of a state, as well as differences and commonalities amongst different states. The interconnection of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics is historically grown and distinct for each country case. The changing constellations and interactions within the nexus are the result of contingent historical processes. However, several interactions between the different components of the

nexus emerged, which can be identified at several historical points across the cases.

I was able to highlight the pronounced *interaction between immigration and citizenship* in the French and Canadian cases, meaning that citizenship is a distinct moment of the immigration process in both countries. In the French case, citizenship acquisition replaced immigrant selection and even immigrant integration for a long time. I was also able to show pronounced *interaction between immigration and integration* in all three countries, meaning that all three countries today try to select those immigrants they deem to be easily integrated, particularly economically. This was always the case for Canada; in France and Germany this clearly articulated interaction only emerged in the 2000s. The precedence given to EU citizens in intra-Union immigration also supports this interaction: It automatically places EU citizens at an advantage regarding labour immigration in both countries. Their easier integration is implied due to their cultural proximity. Lastly, the *citizenship-integration interaction* has played a role in all three cases, when the acquisition of citizenship was made dependent on the demonstrable proof (through tests, language classes, financial capital etc.) that the immigrant applicant had already integrated. On the other side of this interaction was the perspective that citizenship acquisition is the only form of integration needed, originating in Third Republic France. This perspective has now been abandoned in France. All three countries require some proof of integration prior to citizenship acquisition today.

Critical Junctures and the Politics of 'Us' and 'Them'

Critical Junctures were an important analytical tool for the comparative-historical analysis conducted in this thesis. Their framework allowed me to identify periods of analytical interest and understand when and how the migration politics nexus underwent a transformative change as opposed to less significant change that may have led to temporary shifts within the nexus, but no fundamental reconstitution. While the previous chapter has highlighted all the insights gained on the critical junctures and those periods that did not qualify as such, this final reflection draws a comparative conclusion on the critical juncture framework.

It is notable that for all three countries, it is the last period of analysis that does not constitute a critical juncture. How can we understand this finding from a comparative perspective? An argument could be made that not enough time has passed for a critical juncture framework to emerge, because we cannot clearly identify a legacy. I would reject this argument for the Canadian and French cases, since for both periods in the 2000s, there is demonstrably no

critical juncture. There remains a possibility that 2015 may have sparked a critical juncture for the German case, however, eight years later, I hazard the prediction that this is not the case.

Proponents of the convergence hypothesis in migration research, outlined in the theoretical chapter 2.1.1 of this thesis, may argue that this is in line with their central contention that that most Western democratic states have converged in their immigration policies, pairing highly selective labour immigration with family and humanitarian immigration. This is complemented by citizenship politics that allow for the naturalization of immigrants and their children with varying degrees of conditions and strictness. According to their analysis, the reason for this convergence lies in the global economic and demographic demand for more immigrants, as well as, to a lesser extent, human rights norms.

I agree that this is a variation of my findings. However, the results of the presented analysis go beyond their explanation. The roughly concomitant lack of a critical juncture in all three cases points to the durability of their last established nexus, which emerged in the 1970 for Canada and in the 2000s for France and Germany. The analysis of the migration politics nexus, however, is revelatory of the fact that this durability is not only down to economics and democratic systems. Rather, the historical roots of each country's respective nexus, particularly in citizenship and integration politics, continue to influence the migration politics in each country case significantly.

Without a doubt, different iterations of economic expediency feature in the nexus of all three countries, as do different iterations of family and humanitarian immigration schemes. Also, despite continuing variation in the regulations, citizenship acquisition today is accessible for immigrants of the first and second generations in all three countries. Apart from these aspects, the continuing divergence lies at the extent to which immigrants are considered part of the 'Us' in each country. All three countries have distinct perspectives and historically grown internal conflicts over the pertinent question of where permanent immigrants 'fit' in their self-conception.

For Canada, the answer came early and remained constant: Through state-mandated multiculturalism, permanent immigrants are given the chance to integrate into society while maintaining aspects of their cultural diversity. This perspective is not monolithic or undisputed in Canadian society, but it has remained politically dominant throughout the last decades. Immigrants, 'They', are offered a straightforward path to become 'Us', at times even before their actual arrival. But what about the other 'Others'? In recent years, questions have emerged the contradictions between Canada's self-portrayal as a multicultural immigration country and its origins as a settler-colonial country where

Indigenous people continue to be marginalized. While Canada opened up immigration and introduced multiculturalism in the 1970s, assimilatory politics towards its Indigenous population remained the norm until the 1990s. The effects of this history of elimination and structural oppression are felt until today.

In France, the politics of 'Us' and 'Them' are muddled. My analysis adds the aspect of colonial entanglements to account for the on-going tensions and contradictions in its self-conception. France has changed from a country that for a long time, due to its citizenship politics and republican self-conception, officially welcomed anyone becoming French. The picture is different today, due to the deeply entrenched political cleavage on migration politics. There is no cross-partisan or let alone societal agreement on who is part of the 'Us' as opposed to the 'Them'. This discontent leads to a vicious circle for the French migration politics nexus. Citizenship regulations open the door relatively widely to 'Them' becoming 'Us', but the more of 'Them' become 'Us', the higher the disagreement on who constitutes the 'Us'. The case of Algerian immigration is particularly emblematic of the colonial origins of this tension: In the course of 70 years, Algerian immigrants to France and their children went from being colonial subjects, to French citizens, to Algerians, to, in rare cases, French citizens (without their knowledge) by virtue of their parents being born in colonial French Algeria.

Germany's migration politics are marked by a continuing ambivalence towards the politics of 'Us' and 'Them'. The analysis shows how this ambivalence has its roots in the co-ethnic immigration paradigm that dominated German migration politics until the 1990s. Out of the 75 years under study, 40 were coined by the political conviction that no immigrants except co-ethnics should be able to permanently establish themselves in Germany. The political acceptance and openness towards 'Others' settling permanently is a comparatively recent phenomenon. While some parts of the political spectrum are enthusiastic about this development, others have begrudgingly conceded to this new migration politics nexus while on the far right, the myth of reversibility of Germany's immigration country status persists. This ambiguity leads to muddled politics and contradictory messaging towards the immigrant population and helps understand why Germany continues to be a tricky case for migration politics.

COVID-19 as a new critical juncture for migration politics?
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, stopping global mobility in its tracks. Immigration numbers in that year plummeted globally, as borders were closed to limit the spread. As a researcher focusing on critical junctures, I started to think about whether COVID-19 may constitute a shock to spark a

new critical juncture in migration politics for the respective cases. Despite COVID-19 not being part of my formal analysis, I asked the expert interviewees about their tentative assessments. Most agreed with what I conclude: COVID-19, while a temporary crisis for global mobility, has not significantly hampered with the migration politics nexus for each respective country case. The most pronounced impact of COVID-19 (however, still within the established migration nexus paradigm) could be observed in Canada. In the years following 2020, it ramped up its permanent immigration targets to unforeseen amounts to make up for the incoming immigrant loss of 2020. Trudeau also introduced more pathways to permanency for those with temporary residence, to allow for a growth of the permanent immigrant population. For Germany, the pandemic was revelatory of its historical weaknesses which continue to impact integration politics: Immigrants were often neglected in settlement during this time, as language courses and overall support were suspended. As the crisis focus shifted to COVID, immigrants once again experienced benign neglect. In France, apart from the temporary suspension of mobility, the pandemic changed nothing regarding migration politics. Clearly, three years do not allow for a *longue durée* perspective on the pandemic.[119] These insights are therefore instructive, but preliminary.

As the introduction to this thesis stated, it was one implicit aim of this thesis to position migration research firmly within the realm of comparative political science, where it had previously enjoyed a rather marginal status. This marginal status also influenced my research somewhat since this has had a bearing on the constitution of the respective research fields in each country. A brief analysis of this can be found in the appendix (Excursus III). Overall, the results of my analysis show how important comparative political science approaches to migration research are to account for the developments of different countries. I am convinced that further research within this realm also allows for a deeper understanding of the political trajectories of those countries who are in the process of becoming immigration countries. Not only will we be able to structurally analyze and categorize their development, but emerging countries of immigration may also take away insights from the developments in the three countries analyzed here for their decision-making, replicating those policy developments which were helpful or averting mistakes.

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119 I presented an analysis on this interplay in a paper on "COVID as a New Critical Juncture? The Pandemic Impact on Migration Politics" at the APSA yearly meeting in 2022.

9.3 Looking Forward: The Future Politics of 'Us' and 'Them'

When doing a PhD, many people will ask you what your main result is. In the case of this research, I was often asked which country was the 'best' in migration politics according to my analysis. Usually, I used the classic (admittedly boring, but useful) social scientist answer to this question: 'Well, it depends.'. I stand by that reply (which I continued to give throughout the past five years) concluding this analysis. Firstly, I stand by it because my research goal was not to determine which country was 'best' and therefore giving an answer to such an arguably nuanced and subjective question would somewhat undermine my scientific integrity. Being the 'best' implies a universal measure of what it objectively means to be a good immigration country. Since my work did not set out to produce such a universal measure, I would sometimes point to the answers provided in the different indexes that have been produced. Secondly, I stand by 'it depends', because (maybe frustratingly) it truly does depend: 'Best' for the immigrants arriving in the country? There is such stratification among those that a blanket answer is reductive. 'Best' for the country in question? This depends not only on the realm, political, economic, societal, but also on the specific point in time. Again, it would be reductive to give a blanket answer. Overall, the question of which country is the 'best' did not hit the core of my research aim.

I can answer, however, which country's political trajectory shows that it has a historically grown approach to migration politics that supports the arrival, settlement, and admission into society in an encompassing manner. For this, Canada clearly has the most comprehensive historically grown migration politics nexus and continues to be "most comfortable" with its migration politics, as Cornelius et al. already pithily pointed out in 1993 (13). France has the longest history of migration politics, but the past fifty years have been fraught with political controversy and inertia, stunting its historically grown nexus. Germany is the second most important immigration country in the world today, and has a comparatively young, but comprehensive migration politics nexus that supported this development. Nevertheless, Germany's openness to immigration on a societal level is not only recent, but fragmented and volatile.[120]

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120 My assessment does not indicate that immigrants' experiences in Canada will always be 'better' than in France or Germany. An individual immigrant's experience is subjective and depends on so many aspects, including demographic factors like age, gender, and ethnicity, but also the immigrant's socio-cultural, and, not least, financial capital. This question therefore requires a different research design from the one I used.

This reflection contributes to the most important insight I gained from this work as a researcher in comparative politics: The importance of acknowledging the complexity of the historically grown migration politics for each country case. Change in or adherence to a status quo can depend on highly contingent factors, which cannot be quantified but need to be understood within their given historical context. This is the only way to really grasp why these countries are the way they are. This extends to other comparative research within this realm: In-depth comparative-historical work will offer to most valid and reliable results to account for the intricacies of the development of a political field such as migration politics.

In the final weeks of finishing my dissertation, I was asked a different question to the standard 'Who's best?'. Attending a family gathering, a relative asked me: 'Are your conclusions regarding the development migration politics more optimistic or pessimistic?'. This question provides the ground for my personal perspective on the insights provided in this thesis.

I am very pessimistic and deeply concerned regarding the issue of humanitarian immigration. In June 2023, the European Union introduced the Asylum Procedure Regulations, which will fast-track asylum applications at the external EU borders (Council of the European Union 2023). Human Rights organizations have warned that this will lead to the "prison-like" detention of people, including children, at external EU borders and prevent applicants from having a legal counsel (Sunderland 2023). Border externalization has become a major feature of the EU's strategy to deter and reduce humanitarian immigration. This is concerning, because in the last decade alone, over 240 million people were internally displaced for climate change reasons (Tangermann/Kreienbrink 2019). In the next years and decades, the number of vulnerable people seeking shelter in other countries will only grow, as climate migration is set to increase due to the catastrophic climate conditions which will render certain parts of the world uninhabitable. This was already predicted by the late eminent migration researcher Aristide Zolberg, who in 2006 wrote that "environmental degradation would exacerbate conflicts" over resources in already strained regions of the world "contributing to massive uprooting" (Zolberg 2006: 238). The rise of right-wing movements and parties is already affecting humanitarian immigration, and it will also affect those seeking to move to other countries on grounds that might not yet be part of asylum claims.

Canada, France, and Germany must face humanitarian migration openly and realistically to find democratic, sustainable, and humane solutions to these challenges. It is a question of global justice and democratic obligation to contribute to the containment of this looming catastrophe. This may include "adjusting our thinking and at least considering unconventional approaches", as

Steiner (2009: 121) writes regarding migration politics. If they fail and continue down the path most recently proposed by the EU Council, this will impinge on human rights and democracy further than is already the case.

However, I am cautiously optimistic regarding all three countries' migration politics nexus, particularly on the levels of citizenship and integration politics. All three countries have a comprehensive and entrenched migration politics nexus. Undoubtedly, parts of the nexus continue to be scrutinized and rejected by certain parts of the political spectrum or population, depending on the country case. Overall, the nexus has been further consolidated in all three countries in the past twenty years, making a reversal to more exclusionary migration politics less likely. I am also optimistic because all three countries have acknowledged that migration politics are an entrenched part of their political systems. This means that the culturally diverse composition of their respective populations is a given. No one except some extreme right-wing politicians would argue for the systematic exclusion or expulsion of immigrants from the countries or the abolishment of immigration altogether. Immigrant populations are a vibrant part of the cultural and political composition of each country. However, immigrants also have been and continue to be at the receiving end of structural, institutional, or personal discriminations in all three countries, particularly if they are Black or people of colour. The establishment of antidiscrimination structures and the increased solidarity for anti-racist movements in recent years shows that this is no longer accepted as a status quo and is bound to improve.[121] I am hopeful and optimistic that all three countries will be places where people from everywhere will be able to "live without the fear of being different" (Adorno 1953).

As the war in Ukraine broke out in 2022 and many European countries received Ukrainian refugees, we saw the level of flexibility that can be applied in challenging situations. In a recent ARTE documentary on three young Russian men fleeing to Germany from the military draft, one, Andrej, was granted residency almost immediately because he quickly found a job as a graphic designer

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121 Just a few days before handing in this thesis, large-scale riots broke out in France after the Police killing of a teenager, Nahel M., in Nanterre, a *banlieue* of Paris. I have provided a brief reflection on the killing and the riots, which are on-going at the time of writing, in chapter 7.3.4. The events eerily mirror those of 2005. I believe that out of three cases analyzed for this thesis, France is the one that struggles most with issues of institutional and structural discrimination towards its Black and PoC population. While this is implicitly connected to migration politics, it is important to stress that Nahel was French, as were most of the protestors out on the streets in 2005, and I hazard to guess, those who are out on the streets today.

(ARTE 2023). The other two had to leave Germany to wait out their applications for German residency in Armenia. Dennis is a cook and has been waiting for admission for months, despite reassurances that his skill is desperately needed in Germany. The third, Dima, a freelance artist, has almost no chance of immigrating to Germany by virtue of his profession. The documentary shows the German administrative process as slow, costly, and hostile, with little transparency or guarantee for a good outcome. The immigration lawyers consulted in the documentary are all frustrated for their clients and call for more consistency. Dima, Andrej, and Dennis left Russia for the same reason: They did not want to fight and kill in a war they do not support. They perceived the message from Germany to be one of openness towards their plight. Nevertheless, their chances of settling in Germany seem to only depend on their professional skills. This makes me wonder: Will there ever be a new constellation of nexus departing from the ones that have been consolidated in all three countries in the last thirty years? Personally, I hope so. I hope that there will be a nexus dynamic that departs from focusing mainly on economic expediency and the selection of 'desirable' middle-class immigrants and includes more humanistic values and flexibility. With the challenges the world faces today, a purely economic focus in immigrant admission is ethically untenable.

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Appendix

I. Guides to the partially structured Expert Interviews

The following presents the outline of the three partially structured interview guides for each country case. These guides are partial and were often adapted, expanded, or even translated depending on the interviewed expert. For instance, there was a German and French version of the Canadian interview, and an English version of the French interview. For the Canadian case, the interviews with Québécois specialists were adapted with special question items on Quebec. Depending on the expertise of the interviewed person, I would add or eliminate questions to delve deeper into certain subjects. For reasons of brevity, I only included the default interview guides for each country case in the respective languages. The 650-page corpus of the 43 anonymized interviews is available upon request to the author.

Expert Interview Canada

Introductory Question: Since the middle of the century, Canada has become one of the paradigmatic immigration societies in the world. Internationally, it even enjoys a reputation as a "poster boy" of multiculturalism. In academic discourse, immigration is seen as part of the Canadian nation building process. What is your point of view on this development?

Historical Trajectory: Before 1945, Canada was considered as a "white man's country". What were the political motivations for changing this image afterwards? Do you think Canadians were okay with this change at the time?

The 1967 points system appears to be a paradigm shift in the Canadian immigration system and soon after, Canadian multiculturalism was introduced in 1971. What led to these shifts?

In 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms [part of the Canadian Constitution] was incorporated into law, which is considered pivotal in Canadian political history. What has changed in Canada's image of itself when it comes to immigrant diversity?

What do you think were the defining moments in the history of Canadian migration? What recent changes / events would you consider influential for IM, I & C in Canada, also with regard to Canadian refugee policy?

In 2015, Justin Trudeau was elected, which was celebrated around the world. Do you think that thanks to him, the immigration system in Canada will be more liberalized? Do you see a difference between Harper and Trudeau?

Self-Conception: In your opinion, how do new immigrants perceive their status of belonging to Canada? How is this different from the last century? What sense of belonging do immigrant integration measures in Canada give new Canadians? In your opinion, has this objective been achieved?

Interaction between Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics: How would you describe the interweaving of citizenship and immigration in this country? How important is it to you to obtain citizenship in this country?

It is often assumed that citizenship has some sort of pest function in the immigration and integration process. In this context, how would you position the role of citizenship in relation to multiculturalism and immigration?

International Image: How would you describe Canada's international image in terms of IM, II and C?

What image do you think Canadian politicians would like to give of IM, I and C in Canada? What are the differences between the different political parties?

Comparative Dimension: How do you assess the development of Canada compared to other countries? How do you think Canadians see continental Europe in terms of IM, I and C? Are there any differences between countries? How has this changed in recent years and why? How do you think the Canadian political elites perceive the politics of belonging to continental Europe?

Academics: It seems as though the research culture for IM, I and C is very different in different countries. While research on migration has received significant funding and interest in Canada, this is not the case in Germany. What is your experience of this research culture / How would you describe it / Can you confirm it?

Concluding Questions: Who do you think belongs to Canada from a Canadian perspective? How has COVID-19 impacted Canadian migration politics? From your perspective, are there some people I absolutely should talk to?

Expert Interview France

Introductory Question/s : En lisant la littérature académique sur le cas français, il semble clair que de nombreux spécialistes s'accordent à dire que la France a été, pendant très longtemps, le pays d'immigration le plus important d'Europe, avec une longue histoire d'immigration et un pourcentage significatif de la population ayant l'immigration dans son histoire familiale. Un chercheur va jusqu'à qualifier la France de premier pays d'immigration d'avant-garde et "moderne", par opposition au modèle traditionnel de pays d'immigration "archaïque" représenté par les États colonisateurs. En même temps, paradoxalement, la France semble avoir du mal à le reconnaître. Un chercheur appelle la France "un pays d'immigration qui s'ignore". Comment expliquez-vous cette tension de votre point de vue ?

La France, l'un des pays d'immigration les plus anciens et les plus importants d'Europe, a toujours eu son propre système d'immigration et d'intégration fondé sur les idées issues de la Révolution française, sur l'universalisme et le républicanisme. Comment ce "modèle français" a-t-il évolué et s'est-il transformé au cours de la seconde moitié du siècle dernier ?

Historical Trajectory : La fin de la guerre est suivie de l'ordonnance du 2 novembre 1945, de la création quasi immédiate de l'Office national de l'immigration et d'une réforme du droit de la nationalité. Il était clair que la France avait désespérément besoin de travailleurs pour reconstruire la république. Quelle autre raison justifie un effort institutionnel aussi massif pour accroître l'immigration, ce qui prendra encore dix ans dans d'autres pays européens ?

Une chose qui caractérise les années 50 et 60 en France est l'essor de l'immigration algérienne, qui commence relativement tôt, dès la fin des années 40. Grâce à la décolonisation, la République française signe plusieurs accords bilatéraux avec les anciennes colonies françaises pour faciliter la circulation des travailleurs. D'une certaine manière, cette période marque le début d'une diversification régulière de l'origine des immigrés pour la France. Comment cette évolution a-t-elle été reçue par les Français et discutée par les élites ?

La fin des années 60 et le début des années 70 sont caractérisés par une période charnière. La décolonisation a déclenché un nouvel afflux

d'immigration, important et diversifié, et il semble que ce soit le moment où la France accepte le fait qu'elle ne peut plus traiter les politiques d'immigration et d'intégration comme un projet secondaire, mais qu'elle doit définir plus strictement ses objectifs en matière d'immigration.

Pouvez-vous expliquer comment cette période a changé la politique d'immigration et d'appartenance française ?

L'année 1974 marque un tournant en matière d'immigration dans la plupart des États européens. Suite à la crise pétrolière, de nombreux Etats ont stoppé toute immigration en 1973, et dans le cas de la France en 1974. C'est le début de la période d'européanisation de la politique d'immigration. Si cette décision politique a un effet sur l'immigration régulière, elle ne freine pas l'immigration irrégulière, qui atteint des chiffres allant jusqu'à 200 000 par an à la fin des années 70. Quelle est l'importance de cette décennie pour l'histoire de l'immigration française ?

Les années 80 ont été parmi les plus émouvantes pour la politique migratoire en France. C'était la Marche des beures, elle a vu la montée du Front national et son approche exclusiviste de l'appartenance et enfin, le débat sur le foulard. D'une certaine manière, cette décennie a été celle de la politisation de la politique migratoire dans l'arène publique française. Comment décririez-vous les changements et les impacts des années 1980 ?

Les années 80 débouchent sur de grandes discussions autour de la nationalité dans les années 90. Un nouveau Code de Nationalité est introduit en 1993. Cette restriction signifie que les enfants nés en France de parents de nationalité étrangère doivent déclarer leur volonté de devenir français. La manifestation de volonté semble avoir eu un caractère essentiellement symbolique. De quoi était-elle caractéristique à l'époque ?

Des restrictions ont également été introduites au début du nouveau millénaire à la suite des attaques terroristes du 11 septembre. Dans le même temps, une augmentation significative des demandes d'asile a été enregistrée dans les années 2000. Un incident qui marque le début des années 2000 sont les émeutes de 2005. Pourriez-vous expliquer leur signification et leur lien avec la politique migratoire française ?

Juste après son élection, Sarkozy a introduit pour la première fois un nouveau ministère de l'immigration et de l'identité nationale, qui avait déjà été supprimé en 2010. Quelle est l'histoire derrière cette montée et cette chute ?

Comment qualifieriez-vous l'année 2010 en matière de migration ? Y a-t-il eu un changement significatif entre Sarkozy, Hollande et ensuite Macron ?

Le colonialisme français a généralement eu un impact important sur la composition de l'immigration française, mais a-t-il également influencé la manière dont les Français conçoivent la citoyenneté et l'intégration ? Si oui, comment ?

Les relations avec l'Algérie ont une histoire longue et chargée pour la France. Comment l'histoire de la France en Algérie a-t-elle influencé la politique d'immigration ? Je pense notamment aux Harkis et aux Pieds-Noirs.

Self-conception : Selon vous, comment les primo-arrivants perçoivent-ils leur statut d'appartenance en France ? En quoi cela diffère-t-il du siècle dernier ?

Quel sentiment d'appartenance les mesures d'intégration des immigrés en France procurent-elles aux immigrés ? Pensez-vous que cet objectif a été atteint ?

L'universalisme et l'égalité français ont également donné lieu à la loi sur la laicité, dont les origines remontent au début du 20e siècle, mais dont les implications sont aujourd'hui surtout ressenties par la communauté musulmane, l'une des plus importantes d'Europe. Comment caractériseriez-vous cette relation et sa signification pour les débats sur l'immigration et l'appartenance en France ?

Interaction between Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics : Comment décririez-vous l'imbrication de la citoyenneté et de l'immigration dans ce pays ?

Quelle importance accordez-vous à l'obtention de la citoyenneté dans ce pays ?

On considère souvent que la citoyenneté joue une sorte de rôle charnière dans le processus d'immigration et d'intégration. Dans ce contexte, comment positionneriez-vous le rôle de la citoyenneté par rapport à l'intégration et à l'immigration ?

International Image : Comment décririez-vous l'image internationale de la France en termes de IM, II et C ?

Pensez-vous que les immigrés en France seraient en accord avec l'image internationale de la France ?

En quoi leur vision de la France serait-elle différente ? Cela dépend-il du groupe d'immigrés ?

Selon vous, quelle image les hommes politiques allemands souhaitent-ils donner en France en ce qui concerne IM, II et C ? Quelles sont les différences entre les différents partis politiques ?

Comparative Dimension : Comment évaluez-vous le développement de la France par rapport aux autres pays ?

Selon vous, comment les Français* voient-ils les autres pays, comme le Canada ou la France, en matière d'IM, II et C ? Y a-t-il des différences entre les pays ?

Comment cela a-t-il évolué au cours des dernières années et pourquoi ?

Selon vous, quelle est la vision des élites politiques françaises sur la politique d'appartenance à l'Europe continentale ?

Academics : Il s'est avéré que la culture de recherche pour IM, II et C varie considérablement d'un pays à l'autre. Alors qu'au Canada, les financements et l'intérêt pour la recherche sur les migrations ont été abondants, ce n'était pas le cas en France. Quelle est votre expérience de cette culture de recherche / Comment la décririez-vous / Pouvez-vous la confirmer ?

Concluding Questions : A votre avis, qui fait partie de la France du point de vue des gens en France ? Quel a été l'impact du Covid sur la politique migratoire française ? Selon vous, y a-t-il des personnes avec lesquelles je devrais absolument parler ?

Expert Interview Germany

Introductory Question: Auch wenn Deutschland eine lange Geschichte der Einwanderung hat und derzeit zu den Top Five der Einwanderungsländer weltweit gehört, ist die Stellung Deutschlands als ausgewiesenes Einwanderungsland nach wie vor umstritten. Dies gilt möglicherweise nicht mehr in der Forschung, aber sicherlich im politischen Diskurs. Wie stellt sich diese Spannung aus Ihrer Sicht dar?

Historical Trajectory: Vor 1945 war Deutschland eher ein Auswanderungs- als ein Einwanderungsland. Nach dem Krieg, durch die Flüchtlingskrise, die dem Kriegsende folgte, änderte sich das rapide. Welche Haltung denken Sie hatten die Menschen in Deutschland damals zu dieser Entwicklung?

Welche Aspekte denken Sie halten die Menschen in Deutschland für die wichtigsten Aspekte ihres Werdegangs als Einwanderungsland?

Mit den Gastarbeiterabkommen in den 50ern, denen rege Einwanderung aus Südeuropa und später aus der Türkei folgte, änderte sich die westdeutsche

Stellung zu Einwanderung rapide. Wie denken Sie stellte sich dies für die Menschen im Land dar?

1973 wurden die Gastarbeiterprogramme im Zuge der Ölkrise gestoppt. Das änderte aber nichts daran, dass es weiter Einwanderung gab und sich Einwanderung und die mit ihr zusammenhängende Integration vor allem in den 80ern immer weiter zum Politikum entwickelte. Wie stellt sich diese Entwicklung aus Ihrer Sicht dar?

Nach der Wiedervereinigung folgten turbulente Jahre, die auch die deutsche Einwanderungs- und Integrationspolitik betrafen. Mölln, Rostock, Hoyerswerda sind nur einige Ereignisse, die damals auch zu strengeren Regelungen in der deutschen Asylpolitik führten. Wie stellt sich diese Zeit aus Ihrer Sicht dar?

Vor kurzem jährte sich Angela Merkels berühmte Aussage „Wir schaffen das" zum fünften mal. 2015 fand der „lange Sommer der Migration" statt. Welche Auswirkungen hatten diese Entwicklungen auch auf das Selbstbild Deutschlands?

Welche jüngsten Veränderungen/Ereignisse würden Sie als besonders wichtig und einflussreich auf die deutsche Migrationspolitik verstehen?

Self-Conception: Wie sehen Ihrer Meinung nach die Neuzuwanderer ihren Zugehörigkeitsstatus in Deutschland? Wie unterscheidet sich dies vom letzten Jahrhundert?

Welches Zugehörigkeitsgefühl vermitteln die Integrationsmaßnahmen für Einwanderer in Deutschland Einwanderern? Ist dieses Ziel Ihrer Einschätzung nach erfolgreich gewesen?

Interaction between Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration Politics: Wie würden Sie die Verflechtung von Staatsbürgerschaft und Einwanderung in diesem Deutschland beschreiben?

Welche Bedeutung messen Sie der Erlangung der Staatsbürgerschaft in diesem Land bei?
Häufig wird davon ausgegangen, dass der Staatsbürgerschaft eine Art Scharnierfunktion im Prozess der Einwanderung und Integration zukommt.

Wie würden Sie in diesem Zusammenhang die Rolle der Staatsbürgerschaft in Bezug auf Integration und Einwanderung positionieren?

International Image: Wie würden Sie das internationale Bild Deutschlands in Bezug auf IM, II und C beschreiben?

Welches Bild möchten deutsche Politiker Ihrer Meinung nach im Hinblick auf IM, II und C in Deutschland vermitteln? Was sind die Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen politischen Parteien?

Comparative Dimension: Wie schätzen Sie die Entwicklung Deutschlands im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern ein?

Wie sehen Ihrer Meinung nach die Deutschen andere Länder, wie z. B. Kanada oder Frankreich, in Bezug auf IM, II und C? Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern?

Wie hat sich dies in den letzten Jahren verändert und warum?

Academics: Es hat sich gezeigt, dass die Forschungskultur für IM, II und C in den einzelnen Ländern sehr unterschiedlich ist. Während es in Kanada reichlich Finanzmittel und Interesse an der Migrationsforschung gegeben hat, war dies in Deutschland nicht der Fall. Wie sind Ihre Erfahrungen mit dieser Forschungskultur / Wie würden Sie sie beschreiben / Können Sie sie bestätigen?

Concluding Questions: Was meinen Sie, wer gehört aus der Sicht der Menschen in Deutschland zu Deutschland? Inwiefern hat COVID die deutsche Migrationspolitik beeinflusst?

Gibt es aus Ihrer Sicht Personen, mit denen ich unbedingt sprechen sollte?

II.   Tabular Illustration of Critical Junctures

The following presents the tabular summary of the nine periods analyzed as possible critical junctures as explicated in chapter 8.

Identification of Critical Junctures in Canada's Development of the Migration Politics Nexus			
	The 'Canadian Citizenship Juncture'	The 'Points System and Multiculturalism Juncture'	'The Harper Years'

Constitutive elements of Critical Junctures	1945–1952	1967–1983	2006–2015
Antecedent Conditions	Canada only British dominion; no independent status	1950s: less European immigration; Development of international human rights	Economic expediency in immigrant selection processes (since at least 1990s) and PNPs
Shock / Rupture	WWII: no *de jure* recognition of Canadians while fighting alongside the Western Allies; Founding of the CCCC;	1960: Canadian Bill of Rights: end of racists discrimination in immigration politics proclaimed; Quebec/ intra-Canadian tensions → establishment of the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963)	(none)
Critical Juncture	Establishment of formal Canadian citizenship and Institutionalization of Canadian immigration politics	'Colour-blind' immigrant selection, diversification of immigrant population, and establishment of multiculturalism as state approach to immigrant integration	Possible: Harper Premiership, 2005–2015
Productive Mechanisms	*ius soli* regulation (1947); creation of the standing committee for research on migration (1945–53), Creation of the Federal Immigration and Citizenship Department (1950)	Introduction of Canada's points-based system (1967; 1976); Announcement of official policy of multiculturalism (1971); Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982)	accelerated economic expediency trend; bifurcation btw. temporary and permanent immigration schemes; tightened rules of naturalization;

	Immigration Act (1952)		exclusionary discourse on Muslims
Legacy	Legal Canadian citizenship *with ius soli*; migration formally establishes as a foundation of Canadian nation-building	Establishment of enduring Canadian migration-politics-nexus;	None, reversion to previous status quo under PM Trudeau
Identification as Critical Juncture	✓	✓	☒

Source: Own research

Identification of Critical Junctures in France's Development of the Migration Politics Nexus			
	'The Third Republic Return Juncture'	**'The Far-Right Cleavage Juncture'**	**'The Sarkozy Years'**
Constitutive elements of Critical Junctures	1945–1950	1981–1988	2005–2012
Antecedent Conditions	Large-scale immigration from neighbouring countries during the Third Republic 1870–1940 Establishment of *ius soli* and liberal naturalization regime Occupation by France and Nazification/racialisation of migration politics under Vichy regime	1950-1970 Unencumbered and uncontrolled immigration, accepted for labour purposes. Decolonization and facilitation of quick citizenship acquisition of former colonial subjects, particularly Algeria. 1950s and 60s Rising diversification of immigration	Conservative Presidency with socialist cohabitation from 1997–2002, reversal of some of the harsher changes in citizenship law 2002 Sarkozy becomes Interior Minister, re-establishes tough immigration stance in immigration

	Disenfranchisement and denaturalization of French Jews Participation of colonial subjects in the war efforts	from colonies/former colonies, particularly Algeria 1973 Liberalization of naturalization	and citizenship law 2003
Shock / Rupture	Liberation from Nazi occupation in 1944 and end of WWII in 1945 Beginning Establishment of a New World Order	1974 immigration stop due to global oil crisis 1974–1977 general negation of the irreversibility and durability of the immigration of past decades 1977–1980 recognition of the large immigrant presence (from former colonies and Algeria) and (unsuccessful) attempts to force their return 1980 Bonnet law, attempt at forced return of African immigrants (failed)	2005 laws on the positive influence of French colonial immigration Establishment of anti-racist, anti-colonial movements Largest *banlieue* riots in 40 years
Critical Juncture	1945–1950 Establishment and Institutionalization of a Durable Immigration Regime with Colonial Entanglements	1981–1988 Migration politics becomes politicised and a partisan cleavage, with a strong anti-immigrant and anti-immigration far right	*Possible*: 2005–2012 Sarkozy attempts to take immigration issue away from far- right Front National

			Cleavage on immigration gets entrenched and moves from between left and right to between the far right and the rest of French politics
Productive Mechanisms	Ordinance of October 19, 1945 on citizenship Ordinance of Nov. 2, 1945 on immigration Establishment of the ONI, 1945 onwards 1946 Founding of the 4th Republic, colonial subjects get citizenship 1950 Establishment of the Population Ministry	1981 Election of François Mitterrand, brief liberalization of migration politics 1983–1987 The Front National establishes itself in French politics on an anti-immigrant platform 1986–1988 First Cohabitation of Socialist President and Gaullist PM (Chirac), to and fro of restrictions on migration politics	2006 Interior Minister Sarkozy introduces immigration law tightening citizenship acquisition (particularly for immigrants from former colonies) and establishing more extensive integration measures and introducing high-skill immigration (*choisie, pas subie*) 2007 Sarkozy becomes president Establishment of Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity (2007–2010)
Legacy	Laying the foundation for the	Citizenship and immigration emerge	None, maintenance of the

	principles of an im-migration country

Beginning of (post-)colonial immigra-tion movements | as on-going divisive, cleavage-producing issues

The Far right be-comes a guiding force on France's migration politics

Issues of Second and Third Genera-tion Immigrants and questions of their belonging become one of the core ten-ets of migration politics

1988-1993 Second cohabitation with Balladur, introduc-tion of the *Manifes-tation de Volonté* | nexus between immigration, citizenship, and integration since Sarkozy years, entrench-ment of the cleavage on mi-gration politics |
| *Identification as Critical Juncture* | ✓ | ✓ | ☒ |

Source: Own research

Identification of Critical Junctures in Germany's Development of the Migra-tion Politics Nexus			
	'The Co-Ethnic Immigration Junc-ture'	'The Transfor-mation Juncture'	'The Entrenchment Years'
Constitutive el-ements of Criti-cal Junctures	1945–1953	1989–2000	2006–2020
Antecedent conditions	1913 Wilhelmine citizenship law es-tablishing *ius*	1955–1988 Establishment of a large and	Since 2006 formal institutionalization

	sanguinis as a guiding principle for citizenship acquisition Nazi rule, denaturalization and murder of Jews Defeat of Nazi regime in the war	diverse immigrant community in Germany 1980 onwards Denial of Germany's status as an immigration country in policy; "not an immigration country" paradigm instated by conservative Kohl government	of integration politics Support of immigrant groups, funding in conferences National Integration Plan 2006
Shock / Rupture	1945 Nazi Defeat and End of WWII 1945–1948 Occupation of German territory by allied forces Large-scale movement of expellees and DPs into the occupied German territories	1989 Unification of East and West and subsequent arrival of unprecedented numbers of resettlers and asylum seekers 1990 Introduction of liberalised Citizenship law, including the right to claim citizenship after 15 years of residence, eight years for second generation immigrants	2015–2016 Large influx of over one million refugees/asylum seekers from i. a. Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq
Critical Juncture	1949–1953 German Citizenship re-established on *ius*	1989–2000 1991–1994 Increase in violence towards	Possible: 2015–today Progressive Liberalization of

	sanguinis principle and notion of ethnic belonging Institutional Establishment of durable co-ethnic migration and subsequent integration	nominal foreigners, several deadly attacks 1993 Asylum compromise 1993 onwards Resettlers lose their special status, diminishing co-ethnic migration privileges 1999 Citizenship law including ius soli introduced, marking a paradigm shift	Immigration on Labour, Education Structures of Humanitarian Immigrants strengthened
Productive Mechanisms	Reinstating the 1913 RuStAG in the 1949 Basic Law 1953 Establishment of Ministry for Resettlers and Refugees 1953 Citizenship for co-ethnic immigrants further facilitated	End of separation between the two Germany's renders co-ethnic migration privileges unnecessary Change of the conservative Kohl government to red-green coalition in 1998 allows for political shift that had been brewing for years	
Legacy	Any durable immigration limited to co-ethnic immigration until the 1990s	Co-ethnic migration loses its precedence, opening the debate on other forms of migration	None, nexus maintained and normalization of status as an immigration country

		Citizenship acquisition becomes open to immigrants and their children 2000–2001 Independent commission on immigration concedes to Germany's de-facto immigration country status Move away from the "not an immigration country" paradigm, new immigration law introduced in 2005	
Identification as Critical Juncture	✓	✓	☒

Source: Own research

III. Excursus: The Interconnection between Migration Politics and Indigenous Politics in Canada

Canada was founded as a settler-colonial federal dominion of the British empire. Its very foundations as a country rest on the erasure, later oppression, and on-going institutional and structural discrimination of Indigenous people. One expert from public service summarized the early implications of settler colonialism for Indigenous people in the process of Canadian nation-building thusly:

In the early days of Canada's nation-building, late eighteen, hundreds, early 1900, the Canadian government pursued a policy (…) to move Indigenous people off the land and more or *less a policy of neglect to the point to allow them to die. If they died, that would be great because then they'd be out of the way.* And as they were doing that policy on Indigenous people, they were simultaneously pursuing a policy on immigration to bring in white people and not allow Asians or Black people. So, it really was an alignment of policies if you will, where they were clearing the land of Indigenous people, an inferior race that they saw. And

then they were making room for the white people that they wanted to bring in to fill the land. (CPS6: pos. 41)

The increase in political attention paid to Indigenous peoples and their on-going struggle in Canada is a comparatively recent phenomenon of the last ten years. The last century, however, saw little progress in this area. For instance, it is noteworthy that simultaneously to the creation of multicultural integration politics for immigrants by Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1971, the assimilatory integration politics for Indigenous peoples, particularly the separation of Indigenous children from their families in residential schools, was on-going and remained unchallenged. This underlines the Canadian "sidelining" of Indigenous issues, a lack of reckoning with the role of settler-colonialism and the roots of the historical oppression of indigeneity as part of its self-conception (Bauder 2014: 10). As Harald Bauder points out: "While non-Europeans and racialized immigrants may claim a pace in a settler society composed of diverse origin groups, Indigenous identities challenge the cherished image of Canada as a country of immigrants" (ibid.: 16f.). In recent years, a growing number of researchers has started pointing out the interconnection between Canada's migration and indigenous politics to account for their absence in discussion on migration to Canada (Winter 2011: 20; Bauder 2014: 16; Dauvergne 2016: 132; Mayblin/Turner 2021: 107f.).[122]

Due to the settler-colonial origins of Canada's establishment and heightened attention drawn to Indigenous politics, I included a question item on the interconnection between migration and indigeneity in my expert interviews. The answers included insightful perspectives: Several researchers pointed to the inherent tension between Canada's settler-colonial history and oppression of Indigenous people and self-conception as an open and welcoming multicultural immigration country (CAC2: pos. 2; CAC3: pos. 25–26; CAC7: pos. 51; CAC4: pos. 20; CAC5: pos. 34–35; CPS7: pos. 120). CAC4 (pos. 20) mused that there is in fact no dichotomy in Canada being either a settler-colonial and oppressive or a multicultural and welcoming country, but rather that "perhaps Canada is both". CAC5 (pos. 35) noted that "I think there is need to be the recognition that immigration is a continuing form of colonization in that you're bringing in more and you'll continue to bring in settlers and that's really hard to grapple with".[123] A public servant in charge of immigration politics added

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122 As researchers Mayblin and Turner point out: "recognizing states such as Canada as settler colonial rather than immigrant, multiculturalism as a deeply problematic reconciliation of difference in this context of occupation, and the resistance that is occurring to racial sovereignty is a good starting point for migration researchers" (Mayblin/Turner 2021: 97).

123 Some interviewees remarked that it is overall frowned upon to draw a connection between the needs immigrants and indigenous people for fear that Indigenous people are perceived as 'just

that the process of connecting Indigenous politics with immigration politics should happen and take the form of consultative processes:

If we're serious about reconciliation somehow, *we have to engage with Indigenous people about the fact that we're bringing in more people to settle on the land that's supposed to be shared by all of us.* I mean, I think we have some sort of obligation to talk to them about this. Something has to be established in the way we make decisions that we involve Indigenous people. (CPS6: pos. 41)

However, most interviewees also agreed that the increase in political and academic attention has not led to any notable action on this interconnection at the state level (CAC7: pos. 61; CAC9: pos. 24; CAC5: 34–35; CAC6: pos. 6; CP1: pos. 77) beyond some symbolic gestures. As CP1 laconically remarked:

For 50 years, they've [the Canadian government] been claiming they're going to make these communities healthy, sustainable, self-sufficient – they've done nothing. So, I'm sick of listening to people like Trudeau [Justin, F. A.]. It's not just Trudeau, Harper did the same thing. He stood up in Parliament and apologized for what we did to Aboriginal people. Okay great. *What does that do for them? Nothing. Their lives didn't change one little bit. Maybe they felt happy for 20 minutes.* (CP1: pos. 77)

By virtue of their absence in policy making on this interconnection in the migration politics nexus, it follows that Indigenous politics are remarkably absent from my analysis of Canadian migration politics in the last 70 years. Nonetheless, it is an interconnection that may rise in salience in the years to come and it will be important to see how Canada will reconcile its settler-colonial origins with its multicultural present.

IV.   Excursus: Research Cultures on Migration Politics in Canada, France, and Germany

It is one implicit aim of this thesis to position the study of immigration, citizenship, and integration politics firmly within the realm of comparative political science and as a subject of historical analysis. Research on migration

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one of the groups' (CAC4: pos. 24; CAC5: pos. 65; CAC6: pos. 6). Interviewees from Quebec remarked that Quebecois politicians are historically suspicious of more political power for Indigenous people because they feel that there is a competition between their claims and Indigenous claims (CAC9: pos. 24, CAC10: pos 65).

movements and politics has historically been a marginal research topic within political science. What follows is a brief synthesis of the history of the study of migration within the social sciences more broadly and political science specifically. Additionally, I include a small essay on the experts' views on the role of migration research in their respective countries.

The emergence of migration studies: the late 19th century and post-WWII consolidation

The nineteenth century saw the emergence of the systematic, albeit tentative, study of migration movements and their effects, mostly in countries of arrival. The United States was the first to introduce such studies and focused mainly on different immigrant groups and their effects on society, asking questions that aimed at their swift/er assimilation (Mayblin/Turner 2021: 11f.). This is unsurprising considering that the U. S. was dealing with major immigration from many different countries at the time. The origins of this type of migration studies are felt until today, since migration researchers from the United States tend to focus more explicitly on national and/or ethnic origins as explanatory variables in their research (Bloemraad 2013: 32). However, an institutionalization of migration research did not occur until the middle of the 20th century, after the Second World War. The onset of this research can be traced to receiving states' need for tracking global mobility during the process of the resettlement of large groups of refugees and displaced peoples that needed to be accommodated in the war's aftermath (ibid.). This institutionalization evolved further with the onset of decolonization, to track migrations from the Global South to the Global North. Gabaccia (2014) has called the emergence of migration research in this context "a classic example of state science", in the way that this research was funded to respond to governments' needs and their priorities. For political science, the subject migration still held little to no significance in this period.

Disciplinary Entrenchment in Political Science: the 1980s–1990s

Migration studies underwent a significant shift in the 1980 and 1990s, when several academic disciplines 'discovered' the field and went on to make salient contributions to our common knowledge of migration and its implications. However, as several disciplines descended on the topic simultaneously but without much coordination, this period also explains the interdisciplinary dispersion and analytic eclecticism that characterize migration studies until today, with researchers from geography, sociology, law, anthropology, sociology, climate science, history, pedagogy and political science all working on the field

with their respective methodologies and theoretical frameworks (Wihtol de Wenden 2011a: 1567).

It was in this period that migration studies also expanded its scope to include research on citizenship (or citizenship research expanded its scope to include migration dynamics), particularly with regards to immigrant naturalization and provision of citizenship to children of first- and second-generation immigrants. Citizenship had been a long-established research field and a "central notion" of political science, considering its inherent connection to the establishment of states, nation-building efforts, the granting of the franchise, and welfare state provisions (Déloye 2011: 243). Prior research, particularly in the 1950s, focused on this internal dimension of citizenship as a means of rights-provision and instrument of political participation (most prominently Marshall 1950). In the 1990s, by merging into migration studies, citizenship research expanded its scope to the 'inclusion-exclusion dialectic' that characterizes the external dimension of citizenship (groundbreakingly and controversially discussed in Brubaker 1990). To maintain the notion of citizenship, there need to be justifications for granting or withholding it (Brubaker 1990: 2009). As Wihtol de Wenden summarizes aptly: "With migration, citizenship cannot be understood in its traditional context anymore (…). [It has] progressively altered the very content of citizenship, most notably through disassociating citizenship from nationality." (Wihtol de Wenden 2011a: 1570). It may be down to the concept of citizenship's "great elasticity" that its interconnection with migration could be studied in this manner. (Déloye 2011: 237).

A similar merging can be observed in research on integration. The concept of integration has a long history in sociology, going back to Émile Durkheim, Max Weber and Talcott Parson's works on how to achieve societal cohesion in societies with different values. While connected, theories and research on integration initially did not focus on immigrant groups (Favell 2001: 3). It was the Chicago School and their focus on integration of immigrant groups through assimilation that first merged the two fields together. Gradually, throughout the 1980s and 90s, as diverse immigrant populations grew and became a permanent feature of many industrialized democracies, the field was popularized to the point where today, integration studies are almost entirely integrated in migration studies.

The 'Age of Migration Research'?[124] *– 2000 until today*

Today, the field of migration research is well-established, albeit with significant differences depending on the country context, as I elaborate below. Either way, the last 20 years witnessed an "exponential growth" of the field, with "more researchers, university courses, students, research projects, institutes, conferences, journals, and publications than ever before", particularly in the English-speaking world (Castles 2016: 19).

Castles et al. (i. a. 2015) famously called today's age the "Age of Migration", which is simultaneously the title of a multi-edition classic of migration research. However, as Bridget Anderson, referenced in the sub-title, points out, this may not be the case. Migration itself has been an on-going fact of human history. What has changed, however, is our collective perception of its permanence and the intent of states and other major actors to gain a deeper understanding, influence and manage migration movements themselves and their effects. The multidisciplinary character of migration research has been maintained and even intensified, which, despite important insights, has resulted in a lack of unified theoretical framework (ibid.).

Moreover, research has shown that, just like the case of the United States, national frameworks in studying migration, citizenship, and especially integration, carry "implicit normative assumptions about the desirability and undesirability of particular integration measures" (Lavenex 2005: 259). An awareness of the differences that inform migration research is particularly relevant in comparative analysis of migration that draws on research from several different countries and, thusly, differing implicit normative assumptions. Country-specific acknowledgment of the importance of the subject as well as the interconnected issues has a vast bearing on research which, although independent in democracies, largely depends on public discourse's trends with regards to the funding and other support it can garner. Consequently, the research that forms the basis for this thesis did not materialize on equal footing.

Eminent researcher Catherine Wihtol de Wenden has diagnosed migration studies with a lack of legitimacy in political science (Wihtol de Wenden 2011a: 1567). According to her, this may be down to the way that migration processes challenge the very basic presumptions of political science, in the way migration "challenges the state as the main actor that regulates borders, identity and citizenship." (ibid.: 1572). However, rather than ignoring that challenge, recent years have seen more of an acknowledgement of the field for political science, with significant and major new contributions to the field.

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124 Anderson 2019: 2.

Three pertinent points emerge from the discussion of the history of migration research for the further analysis in this thesis: Firstly, Migration research has not featured prominently in political science and even less in the tradition of macro-historical qualitative comparative analysis. With the growing importance of the field and the possibilities offered by political science analysis, this is bound to change. Secondly, while migration presents an optimal research topic for political science, the way it is studied is not only different across disciplines but also across country lines. This is a salient point in a comparative analysis that tries to unite research from free very different, highly specialized national knowledge systems such as Canada, France, and Germany. Those specificities (and how they have changed) are taken into consideration in my research. Lastly, migration is a highly complex research topic with numerous specializations and approaches even within the subfield of political science. To conduct a sound analysis, stringency in case justification, units of analysis and method selection is highly important so as not to diffuse the results.

Conducting a project as large as this, encompassing three countries on two continents over a seventy-year period, I knew that the insights I would be able to gain would therefore also depended on the standing that migration research has in each respective country case. To help me understand the extent of the influence of the different research cultures, I included a question item on it in my expert interviews for academic interviewees. I asked my interview partners about the state and status of migration research in their country, regarding its size, focus, funding, and cross-country cooperation.

The way the research field is constituted, particularly its marginality within political science research, was confirmed throughout my expert interviews. The experts' answers confirmed my underlying hunch that there are profound differences in the fields for each case, but that despite some improvement, migration research has remained relatively marginal in political science no matter the country context. This concerns not only the level of funding and attention paid to migration research, where Canada clearly stood out as the outrider, but also the research disciplines which dominated in each country.

In Canada, I found a mix an even balance of political scientists and sociologists concerned with micro-sociological to macro-level questions regarding migration in Canada. However, there is relatively little across-case comparative work (except for Quebec), and several interviewees stressed that cross-country comparison was not part of their general repertoire in migration research. Cooperation with other countries on projects in migration research was also limited. However, Canada has a firmly established network of migration research that cross-pollinates with public service all the time. This goes back

to the Metropolis project, funded by the Canadian government in the 1990s, lasting for 16 years. This large-scale project connected researchers and public policy makers across Canada on migration research and had an enduring impact on the recognition of the importance of migration politics within Canadian academia (CAC2: pos. 44; CAC3: pos. 62; CAC5: pos 68; CP1: pos. 107). One researcher even stressed that through the Metropolis project, a new generation of researchers across all disciplines was created (CAC3: pos. 62).

In France, the field is more dominated by historians, sociologists, and geographers, with political scientists rather the outliers and relatedly less cross-country comparative work on France (FAC4: pos. 33; FAC2: pos. 99). There is funding and an overall recognition of the importance of the field, but like in other French social sciences, a rather introspective approach with little cross-pollination and a host of normative approaches to delineate the particularity of the French case from the rest of the world.

For Germany, migration research took a back seat until the late 1990s/early 2000s, when a more pronounced research field began to emerge (GAC6: pos. 68). Prior to this, one older political scientist described that migration research in political science was a field "for freaks (…) for those who hadn't learned something proper" like International Relations or domestic politics (GAC1: pos. 2). He noted that this may be because migration as a subject is not firmly rooted in one of the three sub areas of political science, which makes it a natural outlier. Like in France, the field is dominated by sociologists and relatedly micro-sociological questions, with political sociology or comparative politics of migration politics less popular and a tendency to stay firmly within disciplinary realms, which some researchers described as particularly frustrating (GAC6: pos. 86). Funding of migration research in political science is comparatively meagre, also reflected in the lack of political science professorships on comparative migration research (GAC5: pos. 56).

Clearly, as the research in this thesis shows, there was no lack of research sources for my project. Nevertheless, it its helpful to keep in mind that the kind of research and the insights guiding this project stem from fields that are not on a par with one another and are necessarily coined by the respective research cultures and the dominant disciplines therein.

Index

Anna Krämling

Tyranny of the Majority?

Implications of Direct Democracy
for Oppressed Groups in Europe

Does direct democracy result in a tyranny of the majority for oppressed groups?

This first analysis of over 500 referenda shows that on the contrary, oppressed groups were often able to benefit from direct democracy. However, the interests of LGBTQ+ groups, groups of low socioeconomic status, and foreign nationals are under pressure. To protect them, the book develops ways to design direct democratic votes that support oppressed groups.

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Canada, France, and Germany share many similarities, for example, their democratic principles and constitutional commitment to human rights and equal opportunities. However, each country approaches immigration differently. Friederike Alm presents a comparative-historical analysis which sheds light on the historical trajectory of migration politics in the three countries since 1945. The author proposes a new concept for migration research, the migration politics nexus, which highlights the interconnection between immigration, citizenship, and integration politics.

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