Beschreibung

In an era marked by a global retreat from democracy, this book investigates ‘constitutional capture’, defined as the systematic and intentional weakening of constitutional checks and balances, to explain how constitutional change facilitates autocratization. Through innovative comparison of Poland, Hungary, Turkey, and Egypt, it details how incumbents subvert judicial independence to consolidate power. This subjugated judiciary then becomes a key facilitator, dismantling executive constraints and suppressing fundamental rights, from LGBTQ+ rights in Poland to collective ownership of national soil in Egypt, illuminating the mutually reinforcing relationship between constitutional manipulation and autocratization.

The book outlines a process of constitutional capture, whereby incumbents first fill constitutional courts with loyalists, subsequently restricting judicial review and undermining judicial self-governance. The result is a subjugated judiciary that actively facilitates further autocratisation by dismantling executive constraints and obscuring rights infringements, in a process that the author terms “snowballing unconstitutionality”. Drawing on Giovanni Sartori’s conception of constitutionalism as limited government, the analysis incorporates insights from political science, sociology and legal studies. Empirically, it draws on legal monitors, NGO reports and expert interviews from four case studies, offering a comparative framework that can be applied much more widely.

The author:
Dr. Žilvinas Švedkauskas is Assistant Professor at Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, Lithuania.

The subject:
Politics

Zusätzliche Information

Autor*innen

Žilvinas Švedkauskas

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Schlagwörter

Authoritarianism, constitutional change, democratic backsliding, process tracing, regime change